Research Saturday: Recent Episodes
CyberWire Inc.
Every Saturday, we sit down with cybersecurity researchers to talk shop about the latest threats, vulnerabilities, and technical discoveries.
Kristopher Russo and Stephanie Regan from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 join Dave to talk about Threat Group Assessment: Muddled Libra. With an intimate knowledge of enterprise information technology, this threat group presents a significant risk even to organizations with well-developed legacy cyber defenses. Posing threats to organizations in the software automation, BPO, telecommunications and technology industries, Muddled Libra is a threat group that favors targeting large outsourcing firms serving high-value cryptocurrency institutions and individuals. The research can be found here: Threat Group Assessment: Muddled Libra
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Tal Skverer from Astrix Security joins to discuss their work on "GhostToken – Exploiting GCP application infrastructure to create invisible, unremovable trojan app on Google accounts." Astrix’s Security Research Group revealed a 0-day flaw in Google’s Cloud Platform (GCP) on June 19, 2022, which was found to affect all Google users. The research states "The vulnerability, dubbed “GhostToken”, could allow threat actors to change a malicious application to be invisible and unremovable, effectively leaving the victim’s Google account infected with a trojan app forever." Google issued a patch to this vulnerability in April of this year, but researchers explain why this can be severe. The research can be found here: GhostToken – Exploiting GCP application infrastructure to create invisible, unremovable trojan app on Google accounts
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Dmitry Bestuzhev from Blackberry joins to discuss their work on "RomCom Resurfaces: Targeting Politicians in Ukraine and U.S.-Based Healthcare Providing Aid to Refugees from Ukraine." Research suggests that the RomCom threat team has been tracked carefully following the geopolitical events surrounding the war in Ukraine, and are now targeting politicians in Ukraine who are working closely with Western countries. This group is different from others in that their focus is more on secrets or information which can be useful in geopolitics and specifically the war in Ukraine, instead of financial gain. The research says "Although it is unclear at this point what initial infection vector was used to kick off the execution chain, previous RomCom attacks used targeted phishing emails to point a victim to a cloned website hosting Trojanized versions of popular software." The research can be found here: RomCom Resurfaces: Targeting Politicians in Ukraine and U.S.-Based Healthcare Providing Aid to Refugees from Ukraine
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Alex Delamotte from SentinelLabs joins Dave to discuss their work on "Cloudy With a Chance of Credentials | AWS-Targeting Cred Stealer Expands to Azure, GCP." As actors find more ways to profit from compromising services, SentinelLabs finds that cloud service credentials are becoming increasingly targeted. The lack of threats explicitly targeting Azure and GCP credentials up to this point means there are likely many fresh targets. The research states "These campaigns share similarity with tools attributed to the notorious TeamTNT cryptojacking crew. However, attribution remains challenging with script-based tools, as anyone can adapt the code for their own use." The research can be found here: Cloudy With a Chance of Credentials | AWS-Targeting Cred Stealer Expands to Azure, GCP
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Aleksandar Milenkoski from SentinelOne joins to discuss their work on "Kimsuky Strikes Again | New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence." Researchers have been tracking the North Korean APT group Kimsuky and their attempt at a social engineering campaign targeting experts in North Korean affairs. The research states "The campaign has the objective of stealing Google and subscription credentials of a reputable news and analysis service focusing on North Korea, as well as delivering reconnaissance malware." Kimsuky has been tracked engaging in extensive email correspondence using spoofed URLs and extensive email correspondence, along with Office documents weaponized with the ReconShark malware. The research can be found here: Kimsuky Strikes Again | New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence
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Ashlee Benge from ReversingLabs discussing their research titled "Operation Brainleeches: Malicious npm packages fuel supply chain and phishing attacks." Researchers recently discovered over a dozen malicious packages published to the npm open source repository. These packages are targeting Microsoft 365 users and appear to target application end users while also supporting email phishing campaigns. Research supports that the malicious campaign encompassed more than a dozen files designed to steal sensitive user credentials. The research states "This most recent campaign caught our attention because of a number of features and characteristics in related npm packages that correlate with malicious intent." The research can be found here: Operation Brainleeches: Malicious npm packages fuel supply chain and phishing attacks
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Joshua Miller from Proofpoint joins Dave to discuss findings on "Welcome to New York: Exploring TA453's Foray into LNKs and Mac Malware." In mid May, TA453, also known as Charming Kitten, APT42, Mint Sandstorm, and Yellow Garuda, was found sending a benign conversation lure masquerading as a senior fellow with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to the public media contact for a nuclear security expert at a US-based think tank focused on foreign affairs. The research states that "the email solicited feedback on a project called “Iran in the Global Security Context” and requested permission to send a draft for review." Proofpoint shares it's findings and what you can expect from the threat group. The research can be found here: Welcome to New York: Exploring TA453's Foray into LNKs and Mac Malware
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Michael Clark from Sysdig joins with Dave to discuss their research on SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. New research from Sysdig threat researchers found that the group continues to thrive with improved tactics. Most recently, they gained access to AWS Fargate, a more sophisticated environment to breach, thanks to their upgraded attack tools. The research states "In their most recent activities, we saw a similar strategy to what was reported in the previous blog: compromise AWS accounts through exploiting vulnerable compute services, gain persistence, and attempt to make money using cryptominers." Had Sysdig not thwarted SCARLETEEL's attack, they estimated that they would have mined $4,000 per day until they were stopped. The research can be found here: SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate,Kubernetes, and Crypto
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Thomas Etheridge from CrowdStrike sits down to discuss their work on "Business as Usual: Falcon Complete MDR Thwarts Novel VANGUARD PANDA (Volt Typhoon) Tradecraft" In May of 2023, industry and government sources detailed China-nexus activity where they found the threat actor dubbed Volt Typhoon targeted U.S. based critical infrastructure entities. CrowdStrike's Intelligence team tracked this actor as VANGUARD PANDA. With CISA’s advisory on VANGUARD PANDA and its link to Chinese adversaries who are increasingly targeting US businesses and critical infrastructure, CrowdStrike’s blog dives deeper into the risks of VANGUARD PANDA. The research says "One specific VANGUARD PANDA incident stands out to review in detail. Falcon Complete responded to a detection that was triggered by suspicious reconnaissance commands executed under an Apache Tomcat web server running ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus." The research can be found here: Business as Usual: Falcon Complete MDR Thwarts Novel VANGUARD PANDA (Volt Typhoon) Tradecraft
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Daniel dos Santos, Forescout's Head of Security Research is sharing insights from a recent exercise his team conducted on AI-assisted attacks for OT and unmanaged devices. Using ChatGPT, Forescout’s research team converted an existing OT exploit developed in Python to run on Windows to demonstrate how easy it is to create an AI-assisted attack that converts the original exploit into alternative programming languages. The research states "our goal was to convert an existing OT exploit developed in Python to run on Windows to the Go language using ChatGPT." This would then allow it to run faster on Windows and run easily on a variety of embedded devices. The research can be found here: AI-Assisted Attacks Are Coming to OT and Unmanaged Devices – the Time to Prepare Is Now
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Ian Ahl from Permiso's PØ Labs joins Dave to discuss their research on "Unmasking GUI-Vil: Financially Motivated Cloud Threat Actor." First observing the group in 2021, they discovered GUI-vil is a financially motivated threat group primarily focused on unauthorized cryptocurrency mining activities. The research states "the group has been observed exploiting Amazon Web Services (AWS) EC2 instances to facilitate their illicit crypto mining operations." This group is dangerous because unlike many groups focused on crypto mining, GUI-Vil apply a personal touch when establishing a foothold in an environment. The research can be found here: Unmasking GUI-Vil: Financially Motivated Cloud Threat Actor
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Our guest, Johannes Ullrich from SANS Institute, joins Dave to discuss their research on "Machine Learning Risks: Attacks Against Apache NiFi." Using their honeypot network, researchers were able to collect some interesting data about a threat actor who is currently going after exposed Apache NiFi servers. Researchers state “On May 19th, our distributed sensor network detected a notable spike in requests for ‘/nifi.’” Investigating further, they instructed a subset of their sensors to forward requests to an actual Apache NiFi instance and within a couple of hours the honeypot was completely compromised. The research can be found here: Machine Learning Risks: Attacks Against Apache NiFi
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Our guest, Allen West from Akamai's SIRT team, joins Dave to discuss their research on "The Dark Frost Enigma: An Unexpectedly Prevalent Botnet Author Profile." Akamai found this new botnet was targeting the gaming industry, modeled after Qbot, Mirai, and other malware strains. The botnet has expanded to encompass hundreds of compromised devices. The research states "through reverse engineering and patching the malware binary, our analysis determined the botnet's attack potential at approximately 629.28 Gbps with its UDP flood attacks." Akamai researchers do a deep dive into the motives behind the attacks, the effectiveness of the attack, and how the law has been handling similar cases. The research can be found here: The Dark Frost Enigma: An Unexpectedly Prevalent Botnet Author Profile
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Jeremy Kennelly and Sulian Lebegue from Mandiant sit down with Dave to discuss their research "From RM3 to LDR4: URSNIF Leaves Banking Fraud Behind? One of the oldest and most successful banking fraud malwares, URSNIF, which caused an estimated “tens of millions of dollars in losses”, has been discovered by researchers to have been re-tooled into a generic backdoor, dubbed “LDR4”.This new variant was first observed in June 2022. Mandiant researchers believe that the same threat actors who operated the RM3 variant of URSNIF are likely behind LDR4. They say "given the success and sophistication RM3 previously had, LDR4 could be a significantly dangerous variant—capable of distributing ransomware—that should be watched closely."The research can be found here:From RM3 to LDR4: URSNIF Leaves Banking Fraud Behind
Alon Zahavi from CyberArk, joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss CyberArk's work in conjunction with Patch Tuesday. CyberArk published about how Docker inadvertently created a new vulnerability and what happens when it's exploited. CyberArk's research concluded that an attacker may execute files with capabilities or setuid files in order to escalate its privileges up to root level. CyberArk found the new vuln in some of Microsoft’s Docker images, caused by misuse of Linux capabilities, a powerful additional layer of security that gives admins the ability to assign capabilities and privileges to processes and files in the Linux system The research can be found here: How Docker Made Me More Capable and the Host Less Secure
Larry Cashdollar, Principal Security Intelligence Response Engineer from Akamai Technologies, joins Dave to talk about their research on "KmsdBot: The Attack and Mine Malware." Akamai's Security Research team has found a new malware that infected their honeypot, which they have dubbed KmsdBot. The research states "The malware attacks using UDP, TCP, HTTP POST, and GET, along with a command and control infrastructure (C2), which communicates over TCP." The botnet targets weak login credentials and then infects systems via an SSH connection. The research can be found here: KmsdBot: The Attack and Mine Malware
Deepen Desai from Zscaler sits down with Dave to talk about the Crytox ransomware family. First observed in 2020, Crytox is a ransomware family consisting of several stages of encrypted code that has fallen under the radar compared to other ransomware families. While other groups normally use double extortion attacks where data is both encrypted and held for ransom, Crytox does not perform this way. The research says "The modus operandi of the group is to encrypt files on connected drives along with network drives, drop the uTox messenger application and then display a ransom note to the victim." It also shares how you may be compromised with this ransomware and goes through each stage in depth. The research can be found here: Technical Analysis of Crytox Ransomware
Roya Gordon from Nozomi Networks sits down with Dave to discuss their work "UWB Real Time Locating Systems: How Secure Radio Communications May Fail in Practice." Ultra-wideband (UWB) is a rapidly-growing radio technology that, according to the UWB Alliance, is forecasted to drive sales volumes exceeding one billion devices annually by 2025. In an effort to strengthen the security of devices utilizing UWB, Nozomi Networks Labs conducted a security assessment of two popular UWB RTLS solutions available on the market. Their research reveals 0-day vulnerabilities and other weaknesses that, if exploited, could allow an attacker to gain full access to all sensitive location data exchanged over-the-air. The research can be found here: UWB Real Time Locating Systems: How Secure Radio Communications May Fail in Practice
Federico Kirschbaum from Faraday Security sits down with Dave to discuss their research on "A vulnerability in Realtek's SDK for eCos OS: pwning thousands of routers." The team at Faraday found a vulnerability that made it to DEFCON 30, labeling it high severity. With more and more people working from home for their companies, the research team went looking for where there may be vulnerabilities as employees are working from home. The research states that the team was "seeking and reporting security vulnerabilities in IoT devices, which led to the finding of an exploitable bug in a consumer-grade router popular in Argentina." They also stated in the research that it was escalating quickly and shares about how protecting home networks is important while working remotely. The research can be found here: A vulnerability in Realtek´s SDK for eCos OS: pwning thousands of routers
Dick O'Brien from Symantec's Threat Hunter team sits down with Dave to discuss their work on "Witchetty - Group Uses Updated Toolset in Attacks on Governments in Middle East." Their research has found that the group known as Witchetty aka LookingFrog, has been progressively updating its toolset, including the new tool, backdoor Trojan (Backdoor.Stegmap) to launch malware attacks on targets in the Middle East and Africa. The research states "The attackers exploited the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities to install web shells on public-facing servers before stealing credentials, moving laterally across networks, and installing malware on other computers. The researchers describe more on the new tool being used and why this new group is a threat. The research can be found here: Witchetty: Group Uses Updated Toolset in Attacks on Governments in Middle East
Brigid O Gorman from Symantec's Threat Hunter team joins Dave to discuss their research on "Noberus Ransomware - Darkside and BlackMatter Successor Continues to Evolve its Tactics." The research states that Noberus ransomware (aka BlackCat, ALPHV) is more dangerous than ever because attackers have been using new tactics, tools, and procedures in recent months. In the research, Symantec says, "Among some of the more notable developments has been the use of a new version of the Exmatter data exfiltration tool, and the use of Eamfo, information-stealing malware that is designed to steal credentials stored by Veeam backup software." They go over an in-depth look at how its affiliate program operates. The research can be found here: Noberus Ransomware: Darkside and BlackMatter Successor Continues to Evolve its Tactics
Jen Miller-Osborn from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 joins Dave to discuss their work on the Cloaked Ursa group, with a recent report released called "Russian APT29 Hackers Use Online Storage Services, DropBox and Google Drive." The research shares insights into an active campaign from Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, that is leveraging the use of trusted, legitimate cloud services including Google Drive as a staging platform to deliver malware. The research states that when these tactics are used, it is extremely difficult for organizations to detect the malicious activity in connection with the campaign. These tactics are used to collect victim information, evade detection, and deliver Cobalt Strike. The research can be found here: Russian APT29 Hackers Use Online Storage Services, DropBox and Google Drive
David Prefer from SANS sits down with Dave to discuss how a new covert channel exfiltrates data via a browser's built-in bookmark sync. David goes on to describe how this research will "describe how the ability to synchronize bookmarks across devices introduces a novel vector for data exfiltration and other misuses." In the research, he shares how he tested his said hypothesis and goes on to describe how the interesting find was tested on multiple browsers including Chrome, Edge, Brave and Opera. In his research, he found that bookmarks are able to keep data and synchronize it, making it easier to infiltrate and extract data from. David shares the rest of his findings, as well as what organizations and browser developers can do to work on this new threat. The research can be found here: Bookmark Bruggling: Novel Data Exfiltration with Brugglemark
Gafnit Amiga, Director of Security Research from Lightspin, joins Dave to discuss her team's research "AWS RDS Vulnerability Leads to AWS Internal Service Credentials." The research describes how the vulnerability was caught and right after it was reported, the AWS Security team applied an initial patch limited only to the recent Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) and Aurora PostgreSQL engines, excluding older versions. They followed by personally reaching out to the customers affected by the vulnerability and helped them through the update process. The research states "Lightspin's Research Team obtained credentials to an internal AWS service by exploiting a local file read vulnerability on the RDS EC2 instance using the log_fdw extension." The research can be found here: AWS RDS Vulnerability Leads to AWS Internal Service Credentials
Sam Crowther, CEO of Kasada join's Dave to discuss their work on "The New Way Fraudsters Bypass Bot Management." Kasada researchers recently discovered a new type of bot called Solver Services, which is used and created by bad actors to bypass the majority of bot management systems. The research states "Now it’s easier than ever for mainstream bot operators to scrape content, take over accounts, hoard inventory, and commit other forms of automated fraud against organizations using legacy bot management solutions." Attackers are able to buy these “Solver” bots, APIs, and services for less than $500 per month to make a profit. The research can be found here: The Emergence of Solver Services: The New Way Fraudsters Bypass Bot Management Vendors
Deepen Desai from Zscaler ThreatLabz joins Dave to discuss their work on "Return of the Evilnum APT with updated TTPs and new targets." Zscaler’s ThreatLabz team recently caught a new Evilnum APT attack campaign that uses the document template on MS Office Word to inject malicious payload to the victim's machine. There are three new instances used of the campaign, including updated tactics, techniques, and procedures. Researchers have been closely monitoring Evilnum APT’s activity. They ssay ThreatLabz identified several domains associated with the Evilnum APT group. Which has led them to discover that the "group has been successful at flying under the radar and has remained undetected for a long time." The research can be found here: Return of the Evilnum APT with updated TTPs and new targets
Ryan Kovar from Splunk sits down with Dave to discuss their findings in "Truth in Malvertising?" that contradict the LockBit group's encryption speed claims. Splunk's SURGe team recently released a whitepaper, blog, and video that outlined the encryption speeds of 10 different ransomware families. During their research they cam across Lockbit doing the same thing. After completing the research, the researchers came back to test the veracity of LockBit’s findings. The research showed three interesting finds. The first find showed that LockBit’s fastest and slowest samples were closely aligned between the tests, but the other results were very different. They also found that LockBit continues to be the fastest ransomware, but LockBit 2.0 was more efficient yet slower than its previous counterpart, LockBit 1.0. Lastly, once ransomware gets to the point of encrypting your systems, it’s too late. The research can be found here: Truth in Malvertising?
Nick Ascoli from ForeTrace in a partnership with PIXM sits down with Dave to provide insight on their team's work on "Phishing tactics: how a threat actor stole 1 million credentials in 4 months." During routine analysis, researchers discovered the connection between the pages using PIXM’s deep html analysis feature, which enabled them to view and analyze the underlying code on the pages after they were flagged as phishing. This led to the ensuing investigation, which was led by PIXM’s threat research team with assistance from Nick Ascoli. The research states "we uncovered a campaign whose scale has potentially impacted hundreds of millions of facebook users, and whose complexity offer insight into the evolving nature of phishing operations, especially from a technical perspective." The research can be found here: Phishing tactics: how a threat actor stole 1M credentials in 4 months
Dick O'Brien from Symantec, a part of Broadcom Software, joins Dave to discuss how the cyber-criminal operation, Clipminer Botnet, makes operators behind it at least $1.7 million. Symantec's research says "The malware being used, tracked as Trojan.Clipminer, has a number of similarities to another crypto-mining Trojan called KryptoCibule, suggesting it may be a copycat or evolution of that threat." Symantec determined that the malware has the ability to mine for cryptocurrency using compromised computers’ resources. They also share a way to protect against the cyber-criminal operation, as well as sharing some indicators you could be compromised. The research can be found here: Clipminer Botnet Makes Operators at Least $1.7 Million
Ashley Taylor from SANS.edu, joins Dave to discuss fake job ads and methods to proactively detect these scams. The research shares how job seekers are under attack, with scammers posing as fake job recruiters to steal information from people who are interested in the job posting. The brands being impersonated as are at risk of losing credibility to their brand identity. The research shares exactly how these doppelgängers are posing a threat to job seekers and the best practices to detect these scams. It also shares how one company that works in medical device manufacturing industry has been a target for these scams. It concludes with sharing some of the ways to proactively spot these scams before they happen. The research can be found here: Doppelgängers: Finding Job Scammers Who Steal Brand Identities
Deepen Desai from Zscaler's ThreatLabz joins Dave to discuss how APTs, like Lyceum Group, create tactics and malware to carry out attacks against their targets. The Lyceum group has been active since 2017 and is a state-sponsored Iranian APT group. This group targets Middle Eastern organizations most notably in the energy and telecommunication sectors, and they rely heavily on .NET based malwares. Zscaler said in their research they "recently observed a new campaign where the Lyceum Group was utilizing a newly developed and customized .NET based malware targeting the Middle East by copying the underlying code from an open source tool." They go on to give an analysis explaining why the .NET based DNS backdoor is causing problems. The research can be found here: Lyceum .NET DNS Backdoor
Israel Barak, CISO from Cybereason, sits down with Dave to discuss their research, "Operation CuckooBees: Cybereason Uncovers Massive Chinese Intellectual Property Theft Operation." Cybereason researchers recently found an attack lurking beneath the surface which was assessed to be the work of Chinese APT Winnti. Cybereason briefed the FBI and the DOJ on the investigation into the malicious campaign. The research states, "For years, the campaign had operated undetected, siphoning intellectual property and sensitive data." The team quickly made two reports on the campaign, one sharing an examination on the tactics and techniques. The second gives a detailed analysis of the malware and exploits used. The research can be found here: Operation CuckooBees: Cybereason Uncovers Massive Chinese Intellectual Property Theft Operation
Rob Pantazopoulos from Secureworks, joins Dave to discuss their work on "REvil Development Adds Confidence About GOLD SOUTHFIELD Reemergence." Secureworks researchers published a new analysis on what can be considered the ‘first’ set of ransomware samples associated with the reemergence. These updated samples indicate that GOLD SOUTHFIELD has resumed operations. The research states "The identification of multiple samples containing different modifications and the lack of an official new version indicate that REvil is under active development." Researchers identified two samples, one in October of 2021, and the other in March of 2022. The March sample has modifications that lead researchers to distinguish the two samples from one another. The research can be found here: REvil Development Adds Confidence About GOLD SOUTHFIELD Reemergence
Chad Seaman, Team Lead at Akamai SIRT joins Dave to discuss their research about a record-breaking DDoS Attack. The research says "A new reflection/amplification distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) vector with a record-breaking potential amplification ratio of 4,294,967,296:1 has been abused by attackers in the wild to launch multiple high-impact DDoS attacks." Starting in mid-February 2022, security researchers, network operators, and security vendors noticed a spike in DDoS attacks. Researchers started to investigate the spike and determined that the devices that were being abused to launch these attacks are MiCollab and MiVoice Business Express collaboration systems. The research goes into how you can help mitigate the attacks and how Mitel has now released patched software. The research can be found here: CVE-2022-26143: TP240PhoneHome Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Vector
Alden Wahlstrom, senior analyst on Mandiant's Information Operations Team, shares a comprehensive overview and analysis of the various information operations activities they’ve seen while responding to the Russian invasion. While the full extent of the Russia-Ukraine war has yet to come to light, more than two months after the start of the invasion, Mandiant has identified activity that they believed to be information operations campaigns conducted by actors possibly in support of the political interests of nation-states such as Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran. The research shares a chart with all of the known information operations events that have taken place so far dating back to January of 2022. It also states that following the beginning of the Russian attack they have seen concerning signs, including "incidents involving the deployment of wiper malware disguised as ransomware." The research can be found here: The IO Offensive: Information Operations Surrounding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Larry Cashdollar from Akamai, joins Dave to discuss their research on a DDoS campaign claiming to be REvil. The research shares that Akamai's team was notified last week of an attack on one of their hospitality customers that they called "Layer 7" by a group claiming to be associated with REvil. In the research, they dive into the attack, as well as comparing it to other similar attacks that have been made by the group. The research states "The attacks so far target a site by sending a wave of HTTP/2 GET requests with some cache-busting techniques to overwhelm the website." It also stated that this is a smaller attack than they have seen by the group before, and notes that there seems to be more of a political agenda behind the attack, whereas in the past, REvil has been less political. The research can be found here: REvil Resurgence? Or a Copycat?
Alan Neville, a Threat Intelligence Analyst from Symantec Broadcom, joins Dave to discuss their research "Lazarus Targets Chemical Sector." Symantec has observed the North Korea-linked threat group known as Lazarus conducting an espionage campaign targeting organizations operating within the chemical sector. The campaign appears to be a continuation of the group's activity called Operation Dream Job, which Symantec first came across in August of 2020. The research states "evidence includes file hashes, file names, and tools that were observed in previous Dream Job campaigns." The research can be found here: Lazarus Targets Chemical Sector
Edward Wu, senior principal data scientist at ExtraHop, joins Dave to discuss the company's research, "A Technical Analysis of How Spring4Shell Works." ExtraHop first noticed chatter from social media in March of 2022 on a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability and immediately started tracking the issue. In the research, it describes how the exploit works and breaks down how the ExtraHop team came to identify the Spring4Shell vulnerability. The research describes the severity of the vulnerability, saying, "The impact of an RCE in this framework could have a serious impact similar to Log4Shell." The research can be found here: How the Spring4Shell Zero-Day Vulnerability Works
Danny Adamitis from Lumen's Black Lotus Labs, joins Dave to discuss new developments in the WSL attack surface. Since September 2021, Black Lotus Labs have been monitoring malware repositories as a part of their proactive threat hunting process. Danny shares how researchers discovered a series of suspicious ELF files compiled for Debian Linux . The research states how the team identified a series of samples that target the WSL environment, they were uploaded every two to three weeks and started as early as May 3, 2021 and go until August 22, 2021. The research can be found here:
Windows Subsystem For Linux (WSL): Threats Still Lurk Below The (Sub)Surface
No Longer Just Theory: Black Lotus Labs Uncovers Linux Executables Deployed As Stealth Windows Loaders
Scott Fanning from CrowdStrike's research team, joins Dave to discuss their work on "LemonDuck Targets Docker for Cryptomining Operations." LemonDuck is a well-known cryptomining botnet, and the research suggests attackers are attracted to the monetary gain from the recent boom in cryptocurrency. LemonDuck was caught trying to disguise its attack against Docker by running an anonymous mining operation by the use of proxy pools. Scott shares how its unknown which organizations have been targeted and just how much cryptocurrency has been stolen. The research can be found here: LemonDuck Targets Docker for Cryptomining Operations
Dick O'Brien from Symantec's threat hunter team, joins Dave to discuss their work on "Stonefly: North Korea-linked spying operation continues to hit high-value targets." Stonefly specializes in mounting highly selective targeted attacks against targets that could yield intelligence to assist strategically important sectors. Symantec found that The attackers breached an engineering firm in February 2022, most likely by exploiting the Log4j vulnerability, Their research describes who these high value targets are and ways to prevent this malware from breaching any more companies as well as indications that you could be compromised. The research can be found here: Stonefly: North Korea-linked Spying Operation Continues to Hit High-value Targets
Yanir Tsarimi from Orca Security, joins Dave to discuss how researchers have discovered a critical Azure Automation service vulnerability called AutoWarp. The security flaw was discovered this past March causing Yanir to leap into action announcing the issue to Microsoft who helped to swiftly resolve the cross-account vulnerability. The research shows how this serious flaw would allow attackers unauthorized access to other customer accounts and potentially full control over resources and data belonging to those accounts, as well as put multiple Fortune 500 companies and billions of dollars at risk. The research shares the crucial time line that the vulnerability was discovered as well as Microsofts response to the vulnerability. The research can be found here: AutoWarp: Critical Cross-Account Vulnerability in Microsoft Azure Automation Service
Dr. May Wang, Chief Technology Officer at Palo Alto Networks, joins Dave Bittner to discuss their findings detailed in Unit 42's "Know Your Infusion Pump Vulnerabilities and Secure Your Healthcare Organization" research. Unit 42 recently set out to better understand how well hospitals and other healthcare providers are doing in securing smart infusion pumps, which are network-connected devices that deliver medications and fluids to patients. This topic is of critical concern because security lapses in these devices have the potential to put lives at risk or expose sensitive patient data. Unit 42's discovery of security gaps in three out of four infusion pumps that they reviewed highlights the need for the healthcare industry to redouble efforts to protect against known vulnerabilities, while diligently following best practices for infusion pumps and hospital networks. May walks us through Unit 42's work. The research can be found here: Know Your Infusion Pump Vulnerabilities and Secure Your Healthcare Organization
Tushar Richabadas from Barracuda joins Dave Bittner to discuss their findings detailed in their "Threat Spotlight: Attacks on Log4Shell vulnerabilities." Their research shows the percentage of attackers targeting the vulnerabilities, and shows where the dips and spikes are over the course of the past couple of months. The research has also gathered where the attackers main IP addresses are located, with 83% of them located in the United States. They breakdown what this malware can do and how to protect yourself against it. They say "Due to the growing number of vulnerabilities found in web applications, it is getting progressively more complex to protect against attacks." The research can be found here: Threat Spotlight: Attacks on Log4Shell vulnerabilities
Vikram Thakur of Symantec Threat Hunter team joins Dave Bittner to discuss their work on Daxin, a new and the most advanced piece of malware researchers have seen from China-linked actors. Symantec said " There is strong evidence to suggest the malware, Backdoor.Daxin, which allows the attacker to perform various communications and data-gathering operations on the infected computer, has been used as recently as November 2021 by attackers linked to China." They go on to explain how Daxin is used to target organizations and governments of strategic interest to China and how those agencies can protect themselves. Symantec also discusses how this is the most advanced piece of malware their researchers have seen. The research can be found here: Daxin: Stealthy Backdoor Designed for Attacks Against Hardened Networks
John Hammond from Huntress joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss malware known as BABYSHARK and how it is swimming out for blood once again. Huntress's research says "This activity aligns with known tradecraft attributed to North Korean threat actors targeting national security think tanks." Huntress also adds that the activity was spotted on February 16th and immediately their ThreatOps team began following the trail of breadcrumbs. They said "This led them to uncover the malware that was set to target specifically this organization–and certain influential individuals within it." The research can be found here: Targeted APT Activity: BABYSHARK Is Out for Blood
Alan Neville from Symantec/Broadcom joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss Antlion, a Chinese state-backed hacker group using custom backdoors to target financial institutions in Taiwan. Symantec's blog shares the research behind the attacks and how the backdoor allowed the attackers to run WMI commands remotely. Symantec's research showed that "The goal of this campaign appears to have been espionage, as we saw the attackers exfiltrating data and staging data for exfiltration from infected networks." They have since found that this attack has been going on over the course of the past 18 months, in which 250 days were spent on the financial organization and around 175 days were spent on the manufacturing organization. The research can be found here: Antlion: Chinese APT Uses Custom Backdoor to Target Financial Institutions in Taiwan
Alon Zahavi from CyberArk, joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss CyberArk's work in conjunction with Patch Tuesday. CyberArk published about how Docker inadvertently created a new vulnerability and what happens when it's exploited. CyberArk's research concluded that an attacker may execute files with capabilities or setuid files in order to escalate its privileges up to root level. CyberArk found the new vuln in some of Microsoft’s Docker images, caused by misuse of Linux capabilities, a powerful additional layer of security that gives admins the ability to assign capabilities and privileges to processes and files in the Linux system The research can be found here: How Docker Made Me More Capable and the Host Less Secure
Guest Michael DeBolt from Intel 471 joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss one of the most popular commodity malware loaders on the underground – PrivateLoader. The blog provides an analysis of campaigns since May 2021, full details on a Pay-per-install (PPI) malware service, the methods operators employ to obtain “installs,” and insights on the malware families the service delivers. On Intel 471's blog, it shows the breakdown of how the PrivateLoader download is delivered and how it works. The blog states "Visitors are lured into clicking a “Download Crack” or “Download Now” button to obtain an allegedly cracked version of the software." Michael explains more about this popular commodity malware loader. The research can be found here: PrivateLoader: The first step in many malware schemes
Guest Dick O'Brien from Symantec joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss how "Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine." The Russia-linked Shuckworm group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) has been active since 2013 and is known to use phishing emails to distribute either freely available remote access tools. In July 2021, Symantec observed Shuckworm activity on an organization in Ukraine and this continued until August 2021. According to a November 2021 report from the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), since 2014 the Shuckworm group has been responsible for over 5,000 attacks against more than 1,500 Ukrainian government systems. Dick walks us through Symantec's investigation. The research can be found here: Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine
Guest Nathan Brubaker from Mandiant joins Dave Bittner on this episode to discuss Mandiant Threat Intelligence's research: "1 in 7 Ransomware Extortion Attacks Leak Critical Operational Technology Information." Data leaks have always been a concern for organizations. The exposure of sensitive information can result in damage to reputation, legal penalties, loss of intellectual property, and even impact the privacy of employees and customers. However, there is little research about the challenges posed to industrial organizations when threat actors disclose sensitive details about their OT security, production, operations, or technology. In 2021, Mandiant Threat Intelligence continued observing ransomware operators attempting to extort thousands of victims by disclosing terabytes of stolen information on shaming sites. This trend, which Mandiant Threat Intelligence refers to as “Multifaceted Extortion,” impacted over 1,300 organizations from critical infrastructure and industrial production sectors in just one year. Nathan walks us through their research and findings. The research can be found here: 1 in 7 Ransomware Extortion Attacks Leak Critical Operational Technology Information
Guest Jon DiMaggio, Chief Security Strategist at Analyst1, joins Dave Bittner to discuss his team's research "A History of REvil" that chronicles the rise and fall of REvil. The REvil gang is an organized criminal enterprise based primarily out of Russia that runs a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) operation. The core members of the gang reside and operate out of Russia. REvil leverages hackers for hire, known as affiliates, to conduct the breach, steal victim data, delete backups, and infect victim systems with ransomware for a share of the profits. Affiliates primarily stem across eastern Europe, though a small percentage operate outside that region. In return, the core gang maintains and provides the ransomware payload, hosts the victim data leak/auction site, facilitates victim communication and payment services, and distributes the decryption key. In simpler terms, the core gang are the service provider and persona behind the operation, while the affiliates are the hired muscle facilitating attacks. Jon walks us through the team's findings and details REvil's story. The research can be found here: A History of REvil
Guest Mike Benjamin, VP of Security Research at Fastly, joins Dave Bittner to talk about the Fastly Security Research Team's work on "Open redirects: real-world abuse and recommendations." Open URL redirection is a class of web application security problems that makes it easier for attackers to direct users to malicious resources. This vulnerability class, also known as “open redirects,” arises when an application allows attackers to pass information to the app that results in users being sent to another location. That location can be an attacker-controlled website or server used to distribute malware, trick a user into trusting a link, execute malicious code in a trusted way, drive ad fraud, or even perform SEO manipulation. Knowing how an open redirect can be abused is helpful — but knowing how to design around it in the first place is even more important. Mike walks us through what his team uncovered, explains how redirects are used, how they can be abused, and how you can prevent that abuse. The research can be found here: Open redirects: real-world abuse and recommendations
Guest Dick O'Brien, Principal Editor at Symantec, joins Dave to discuss their team's research, "Noberus: Technical Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware." Noberus is new ransomware used in mid-November attack, ConnectWise was likely infection vector. Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, tracks this ransomware as Ransom.Noberus and our researchers first spotted it on a victim organization on November 18, 2021, with three variants of Noberus deployed by the attackers over the course of that attack. This would appear to show that this ransomware was active earlier than was previously reported, with MalwareHunterTeam having told BleepingComputer they first saw this ransomware on November 21. Noberus is an interesting ransomware because it is coded in Rust, and this is the first time we have seen a professional ransomware strain that has been used in real-world attacks coded in this programming language. Noberus appears to carry out the now-typical double extortion ransomware attacks where they first steal information from victim networks before encrypting files. Noberus adds the .sykffle extension to encrypted files. The research can be found here: Noberus: Technical Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware
Guest Marcelle Lee, Senior Security Researcher and Emerging Threats Lead, from SecureWorks joins Dave to share her team's work on "Ransoms Demanded for Hijacked Instagram Accounts." An extensive phishing campaign has targeted corporate Instagram accounts since approximately August 2021. The threat actors demand ransoms from the victims to restore access. Organizations typically focus on traditional enterprise cybersecurity threats. However, some threats are more subtle, targeting organizations on unexpected platforms. In October 2021, Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers identified a phishing campaign that hijacks corporate Instagram accounts, as well as accounts of individual influencers who have a large number of followers. The threat actors then extort ransom payments from the victims. The activity continues at the time of the interview. The research can be found here: Ransoms Demanded for Hijacked Instagram Accounts
Guests Avigayil Mechtinger and Ryan Robinson from Intezer discuss SysJoker malware, a backdoor that targets Windows, Linux and MacOS, Malware targeting multiple operating systems has become no exception in the malware threat landscape. Vermilion Strike, which was documented just last September, is among the latest examples until now. In December 2021, the team at Intezer discovered a new multi-platform backdoor that targets Windows, Mac, and Linux. The Linux and Mac versions are fully undetected in VirusTotal. Intezer named this backdoor SysJoker. SysJoker was first discovered during an active attack on a Linux-based web server of a leading educational institution. After further investigation, Intezer found that SysJoker also has Mach-O and Windows PE versions. Based on Command and Control (C2) domain registration and samples found in VirusTotal, Intezer estimates that the SysJoker attack was initiated during the second half of 2021. The research can be found here: New SysJoker Backdoor Targets Windows, Linux, and macOS
Guest Danny Adamitis from Black Lotus Labs joins Dave to discuss their team's new research "New Konni Campaign Kicks the New Year Off by Targeting Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Black Lotus Labs, the threat research team of Lumen Technologies, uncovered a series of targeted actions against the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID). Based upon the totality of information available and the close correlation with prior reporting, we assess with moderate confidence these actions leveraged the Konni malware, which has previously been associated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and were undertaken to establish access to the MID network for the purpose of espionage. This activity cluster demonstrates the patient and persistent nature of advanced actors in waging multi-phased campaigns against perceived high-value networks. After gaining access through stolen credentials, the actor was able to exploit trusted connections to distribute and load the malware, first by impersonating a government software program coinciding with new Covid mandates, and then through sending trojanized files from a compromised account. The research can be found here: New Konni Campaign Kicks Off The New Year By Targeting Russian Ministry Of Foreign Affairs
Guest Sylvester Segura from the Symantec Threat Hunter Team joins Dave to discuss their team's work on "Espionage Campaign Targets Telecoms Organizations across Middle East and Asia." Attackers most likely linked to Iran have attacked a string of telecoms operators in the Middle East and Asia over the past six months, in addition to a number of IT services organizations and a utility company. Organizations in Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Thailand, and Laos were targeted in the campaign, which appears to have made no use of custom malware and instead relied on a mixture of legitimate tools, publicly available malware, and living-off-the-land tactics. While the identity of the attackers remains unconfirmed, there is some evidence to suggest a link to the Iranian Seedworm (aka MuddyWater) group. The targeting and tactics are consistent with Iranian-sponsored actors. The research can be found here: Espionage Campaign Targets Telecoms Organizations across Middle East and Asia
Guest Rob Boyce, Accenture's Global Lead for Cyber Incident Response and Transformation Services, joins Dave to discuss joint research done by Accenture’s Cyber Threat Intelligence (ACTI) group and Prevailion’s Adversarial Counterintelligence Team (PACT). The teams dug into recently publicized campaigns of the cyber espionage threat group Lyceum (aka HEXANE, Spirlin) to further analyze the operational infrastructure and victimology of this actor. The team’s findings corroborate and reinforce previous ClearSky and Kaspersky research indicating a primary focus on computer network intrusion events aimed at telecommunications providers in the Middle East. Additionally, the research expands on this victim set by identifying additional targets within internet service providers (ISPs) and government agencies. Although all victim-identifying information has been redacted, this report seeks to provide these targeted industry and geographic verticals with additional knowledge of the threat and mitigation opportunities. The research can be found here: Who are latest targets of cyber group Lyceum?
This episode features guest Alissa Knight, former hacker and partner at Knight Ink, along with Karl Mattson, CISO from Noname Security, discussing findings on severe API vulnerabilities in U.S. banking applications research that was conducted by Alissa and funded by Noname Security. The research, “Scorched Earth: Hacking Bank APIs,” unveils a number of vulnerabilities in the banking, cryptocurrency exchange, and FinTech industries. In her Money 20/20 keynote presentation entitled “Scorched Earth: Hacking Bank APIs”. In her presentation, Alissa revealed that she was able to gain access to 55 different banks and change PIN codes and move money in and out of accounts. Three lessons learned include: API security vulnerabilities affect all enterprises, API security needs to be operationalized across the enterprise, and API security requires posture management, runtime security, and active testing. Details can be found here:
White paper: Hacking Banks and Cryptocurrency Exchanges Through Their APIs
Blog post: 3 API Security Lessons from “Scorched Earth: Hacking Bank APIs”
Press release: New Research Shows Vulnerabilities in Banking, Cryptocurrency Exchange, and FinTech APIs Allow Unauthorized Transactions and PIN Code Changes of Customers
Alissa's presentation at Money 20/20.
Guest Rob Boyce, Accenture's Global Lead for Cyber Incident Response and Transformation Services, joins Dave to discuss their research "Karakurt rises from its lair." Accenture Security has identified a new threat group, the self-proclaimed Karakurt Hacking Team, that has impacted over 40 victims across multiple geographies. The threat group is financially motivated, opportunistic in nature, and so far, appears to target smaller companies or corporate subsidiaries versus the alternative big game hunting approach. Based on intrusion analysis to date, the threat group focuses solely on data exfiltration and subsequent extortion, rather than the more destructive ransomware deployment. In addition, Accenture Security assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that the threat group’s extortion approach includes steps to avoid, as much as possible, drawing attention to its activities. The research can be found here: Karakurt rises from its lair
Our guest Doel Santos, Threat Research Analyst at Palo Alto Networks, joins Dave Bittner to talk about Unit 42's work on "Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats." As part of Unit 42’s commitment to stop ransomware attacks, they monitor the activity of existing groups, search for dark web leak sites and fresh onion sites, identify up-and-coming players and study tactics, techniques and procedures. During their operations, Unit 42 observed four emerging ransomware groups that are currently affecting organizations and show signs of having the potential to become more prevalent in the future. Doel discusses these (AvosLocker, Hive Ransomware, HelloKitty, and LockBit 2.0) with Dave. The research can be found here: Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats
Enjoy a peek into CyberWire Pro's Research Briefing as the team is off taking our long winter's nap. This is the spoken edition of our weekly Research Briefing, focused on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, as they’re played out in cyberspace. This week's headlines: US Commission on International Religious Freedom reportedly hacked. Sophistication of NSO exploit on par with nation-state tooling. Conti ransomware actors exploit Log4Shell. Like what you hear? Consider subscribing to CyberWire Pro for $99/year. Learn more.
Guests Sagi Tzadik and Nir Ohfeld of cloud security company Wiz join Dave to discuss their research "ChaosDB: How we hacked thousands of Azure customers’ databases." Nearly everything we do online these days runs through applications and databases in the cloud. While leaky storage buckets get a lot of attention, database exposure is the bigger risk for most companies because each one can contain millions or even billions of sensitive records. Every CISO’s nightmare is someone getting their access keys and exfiltrating gigabytes of data in one fell swoop. Database exposures have become alarmingly common in recent years as more companies move to the cloud, and the culprit is usually a misconfiguration in the customer’s environment. In this case, customers were not at fault. The research can be found here:
ChaosDB: How we hacked thousands of Azure customers’ databases
ChaosDB: How to discover your vulnerable Azure Cosmos DBs and protect them
Guest Ilya Volovik, Team Lead of Cyber Intelligence at Gemini Advisory, discusses his team's work on "FIN7 Recruits Talent For Push Into Ransomware." The cybercriminal group FIN7 gained notoriety in the mid-2010s for large-scale malware campaigns targeting the point-of-sale (POS) systems. In 2018, Gemini Advisory reported FIN7’s compromise of Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor stores and the subsequent sale of over 5 million payment cards on the dark web. According to the US Department of Justice, the broader FIN7 carding campaigns have resulted in the theft of over 20 million payment card records and cost victims over $1 billion, making FIN7 one of the most infamous and prolific cybercriminal groups of the last decade. Now with ransomware proving to be cybercriminals’ preferred high-profit, jackpot venture, FIN7 has redeployed their expertise and capacity towards ransomware, with reports indicating that the group was involved in attempted ransomware attacks on US companies as early as 2020. Furthermore, despite focus from law enforcement and the arrest of four FIN7 members from 2018 to 2020, FIN7’s continued activity shows that the group remains a powerful, active threat. The research can be found here: FIN7 Recruits Talent For Push Into Ransomware
Guest Christo Butcher of NCC Group's Research and Intelligence Fusion Team discusses their research into a cybercriminal group they dubbed SnapMC. Forget ransomware, too expensive and too much hassle. Randomly enter through a known vulnerability, take a look around, lock away data and leave again. And all that within half an hour: hit & run. An email is then sent to the affected organization: pay or else the stolen data will be published and/or sold. This is the opportunistic approach of a new group of blackmailers who don't even bother to encrypt data. NCC Group has given them the name SnapMC: a combination of 'snap' (a sudden, sharp cracking sound or movement) and MC, from mc.exe, the primary tool they use to exfiltrate data. They have only seen SnapMC's attacks in the Netherlands for the time being. They do not target specific sectors and we have not (yet) been able to associate them with known attackers. The research can be found here:
SnapMC: extortion without ransomware
SnapMC skips ransomware, steals data
Enjoy a peek into CyberWire Pro's Research Briefing as the team is off recovering from our Thanksgiving feasts. This is the spoken edition of our weekly Research Briefing, focused on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, as they’re played out in cyberspace. This week's headlines: Iranian threat actors target the IT supply chain. North Korean cyberespionage. More information on Emotet's return. Like what you hear? Consider subscribing to CyberWire Pro for $99/year. Learn more.
Guests Nicholas Boucher and Ross Anderson from the University of Cambridge join Dave Bittner to discuss their research, "Trojan Source: Invisible Vulnerabilities." The researchers present a new type of attack in which source code is maliciously encoded so that it appears different to a compiler and to the human eye. This attack exploits subtleties in text-encoding standards such as Unicode to produce source code whose tokens are logically encoded in a different order from the one in which they are displayed, leading to vulnerabilities that cannot be perceived directly by human code reviewers. ‘Trojan Source’ attacks, as they call them, pose an immediate threat both to first-party software and of supply-chain compromise across the industry. They present working examples of Trojan-Source attacks in C, C++, C#, JavaScript, Java, Rust, Go, and Python. They propose definitive compiler-level defenses, and describe other mitigating controls that can be deployed in editors, repositories, and build pipelines while compilers are upgraded to block this attack. The project website and research can be found here:
Trojan Source: Invisible Source Code Vulnerabilities project website
Trojan Source: Invisible Vulnerabilities research paper
Senior Intelligence Researcher at Anomali, Tara Gould, joins Dave to discuss their team's work on "Inside TeamTNT’s Impressive Arsenal: A Look Into A TeamTNT Server." Anomali Threat Research discovered an open server to a directory listing that they attribute with high confidence to the German-speaking threat group, TeamTNT. The server contains source code, scripts, binaries, and cryptominers targeting Cloud environments. Other server contents include Amazon Web Services (AWS) Credentials stolen from TeamTNT stealers are also hosted on the server. This inside view of TeamTNT infrastructure and tools in use can help security operations teams to improve detection capabilities for related attacks, whether coming directly from TeamTNT or other cybercrime groups leveraging their tools. The research can be found here: Inside TeamTNT’s Impressive Arsenal: A Look Into A TeamTNT Server
Guest Mor Levi, Vice President of Cyber Practices from Cybereason, joins Dave Bittner to discuss her team's work on "Operation GhostShell - Novel RAT Targets Global Aerospace and Telecoms Firms." In July 2021, the Cybereason Nocturnus and Incident Response Teams responded to Operation GhostShell, a highly-targeted cyber espionage campaign targeting the Aerospace and Telecommunications industries mainly in the Middle East, with additional victims in the U.S., Russia and Europe. The Operation GhostShell campaign aims to steal sensitive information about critical assets, organizations’ infrastructure and technology. During the investigation, the Nocturnus Team uncovered a previously undocumented and stealthy RAT (Remote Access Trojan) dubbed ShellClient which was employed as the primary espionage tool. To learn more, listen to the episode. The research can be found here: Operation GhostShell - Novel RAT Targets Global Aerospace and Telecoms Firms
Dr. Tudor Dumitras from University of Maryland joins Dave Bittner to share a research study conducted in collaboration with industry partners from Facebook, NortonLifeLock Research Group and EURECOM. The project is called: "When Malware Changed Its Mind: An Empirical Study of Variable Program Behaviors in the Real World." In the study, the team analyzed how malware samples change their behavior when executed on different hosts or at different times. Such “split personalities” may confound the current techniques for malware analysis and detection. Malware execution traces are typically collected by executing the samples in a controlled environment (a “sandbox”), and the techniques created and tested using such traces do not account for the broad range of behaviors observed in the wild. In the paper, the team shows how behavior variability can make those techniques appear more effective than they really are, and they make some recommendations for dealing with the variability. The research and executive summary can be found here:
When Malware Changed Its Mind: An Empirical Study of Variable Program Behaviors in the Real World
Analysing malware variability in the real world
Our guest Doel Santos, Threat Research Analyst at Palo Alto Networks, joins Dave Bittner to talk about Unit 42's work on "Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats." As part of Unit 42’s commitment to stop ransomware attacks, they monitor the activity of existing groups, search for dark web leak sites and fresh onion sites, identify up-and-coming players and study tactics, techniques and procedures. During their operations, Unit 42 observed four emerging ransomware groups that are currently affecting organizations and show signs of having the potential to become more prevalent in the future. Doel discusses these (AvosLocker, Hive Ransomware, HelloKitty, and LockBit 2.0) with Dave. The research can be found here: Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats
Guest Michael DeBolt, Chief Intelligence Officer from Intel471, joins Dave Bittner to discuss their work on "How Groove Gang is shaking up the Ransomware-as-a-Service market to empower affiliates." McAfee Enterprise ATR believes, with high confidence, that the Groove gang is associated with the Babuk gang, either as a former affiliate or subgroup. These cybercriminals are happy to put aside previous Ransomware-as-a-Service hierarchies to focus on the ill-gotten gains to be made from controlling victim’s networks, rather than the previous approach which prioritized control of the ransomware itself. The research can be found here: How Groove Gang is shaking up the Ransomware-as-a-Service market to empower affiliates
Matt Stafford, Senior Threat Intelligence Researcher, from Prevailion joins Dave to talk about their work on "Diving Deep into UNC1151’s Infrastructure: Ghostwriter and beyond." Prevailion’s Adversarial Counterintelligence Team (PACT) used advanced infrastructure hunting techniques and Prevailion’s visibility into threat actor infrastructure creation to uncover previously unknown domains associated with UNC1151 and the “Ghostwriter” influence campaign. UNC1151 is likely a state-backed threat actor waging an ongoing and far-reaching influence campaign that has targeted numerous countries across Europe. Their operations typically display messaging in general alignment with the security interests of the Russian Federation; their hallmarks include anti-NATO messaging, intimate knowledge of regional culture and politics, and strategic influence operations (such as hack-and-leak operations used in conjunction with fabricated messaging and/or forged documents). PACT assesses with varying degrees of confidence that there are 81 additional, unreported domains clustered with the activity that FireEye and ThreatConnect detailed in their respective reports. PACT also assesses with High Confidence that UNC1151 has targeted additional European entities outside of the Baltics, Poland, Ukraine and Germany, for which no previous public reporting exists. The research can be found here: Diving Deep into UNC1151’s Infrastructure: Ghostwriter and beyond
Dan Petro, Lead Researcher, and Allan Cecil, Security Consultant, from Bishop Fox join Dave to share their research "You're Doing IoT RNG," that they presented at DefCon 29. There’s a crack in the foundation of Internet of Things (IoT) security, one that affects 35 billion devices worldwide. Basically, every IoT device with a hardware random number generator (RNG) contains a serious vulnerability whereby it fails to properly generate random numbers, which undermines security for any upstream use. In order to perform most security-relevant operations, computers need to generate secrets via an RNG. These secrets then form the basis of cryptography, access controls, authentication, and more. The details of exactly how and why these secrets are generated varies for each use. The research can be found here: You're Doing IoT RNG
Guest Ariel Zelivansky, Senior Manager of Security Research at Palo Alto Networks, joins Dave to discuss Unit 42's work on the first cross-account container takeover in the public cloud. The Unit 42 Threat Intelligence team has identified the first known vulnerability that could enable one user of a public cloud service to break out of their environment and execute code on environments belonging to other users in the same public cloud service. This unprecedented cross-account takeover affected Microsoft's Azure Container-as-a-Service (CaaS) platform. Researchers named the finding Azurescape because the attack started from a container escape – a technique that enables privilege escalation out of container environments. The research can be found here:
What You Need to Know About Azurescape
Finding Azurescape – Cross-Account Container Takeover in Azure Container Instances
Note: Microsoft is a sponsor of the CyberWire, however, we cover them as we would any other company.
Guest Jake Valletta, Director of Professional Services at Mandiant, joins Dave to talk about the critical vulnerability Mandiant disclosed that affects millions of IoT devices. Mandiant disclosed a critical risk vulnerability in coordination with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) that affects millions of IoT devices that use the ThroughTek “Kalay” network. This vulnerability, discovered by researchers on Mandiant’s Red Team in late 2020, would enable adversaries to remotely compromise victim IoT devices, resulting in the ability to listen to live audio, watch real time video data, and compromise device credentials for further attacks based on exposed device functionality. These further attacks could include actions that would allow an adversary to remotely control affected devices. The research can be found here: Mandiant Discloses Critical Vulnerability Affecting Millions of IoT Devices
Guest Jon Hencinski from Expel joins Dave Bittner to discuss his team's recent work on "Expel SOC Stops Ransomware Attack Aimed at WordPress CMS via Drive-By Download Disguised as Google Chrome Update." In July, 2021, Expel's SOC stopped a ransomware attack at a large software and staffing company. The attackers compromised the company’s WordPress CMS and used the SocGholish framework to trigger a drive-by download of a Remote Access Tool (RAT) disguised as a Google Chrome update. In total, four hosts downloaded a malicious Zipped JScript file that was configured to deploy a RAT, but we were able to stop the attack before ransomware deployment and help the organization remediate its WordPress CMS. Jon will walk us through what happened, how they caught it, and provide recommendations on how to secure your WordPress CMS. The research can be found here: Expel SOC Stops Ransomware Attack Aimed at WordPress CMS via Drive-By Download Disguised as Google Chrome Update
Guest Ben Seri, Armis' VP of Research, joins Dave to talk about a set of remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in the pneumatic tube system of Swisslog. Nine vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure used by 80% of major hospitals in North America. Swisslog’s Translogic Pneumatic Tube System (PTS), a solution that plays a crucial role in patient care, found vulnerable to devastating attack. Dubbed PwnedPiper, the vulnerabilities allow for complete take over of the Translogic Nexus Control Panel, which powers all current models of Translogic PTS stations. Older IP-connected Translogic stations are also impacted, but are no longer supported by Swisslog. The research can be found here: PwnedPiper
Guest Deepen Desai, Zscaler's Chief Information Security Officer and VP Security Research & Operations, joins Dave to discuss their ThreatLabz team's research "Joker Joking in Google Play: Joker malware targets Google Play store with new tactics." Joker is one of the most prominent malware families targeting Android devices. Despite public awareness of this particular malware, it keeps finding its way into Google’s official application market by employing changes in its code, execution methods, or payload-retrieving techniques. This spyware is designed to steal SMS messages, contact lists, and device information, and to sign the victim up for premium wireless application protocol (WAP) services. Zscaler’s ThreatLabz research team has been constantly monitoring the Joker malware. Recently, they observed regular uploads of it onto the Google Play store. ThreatLabz notified the Google Android Security team, who have taken prompt action to remove the suspicious apps from the Google Play store. This prompted them to evaluate how Joker is so successful at getting around the Google Play vetting process. The team saw 11 different samples regularly uploaded to Google Play recently clocking 30k installs. The research can be found here: Joker Joking in Google Play: Joker malware targets Google Play store with new tactics
Guest Tomislav Peričin, Reversing Labs' Chief Software Architect and Co-Founder, joins Dave to discuss his team's research that addresses the importance of validating third-party software components as a way to manage the risks that they can introduce. Developing software solutions is a complex task requiring a lot of time and resources. In order to accelerate time to market and reduce the cost, software developers create smaller pieces of functional code which can be reused across many projects. The concept of code reuse is one of the cornerstones of modern software engineering and it is universally accepted that everybody should strive towards it. However, in addition to the positives, organizations need to be aware of the security risks introduced by such third-party components. The growing number of cyber incidents that target the software supply chain are focused on high-value target compromises. With the latest surge and public uproar, the US President Biden has issued the Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity in order to create an institutional framework addressing these kinds of security risks. The research can be found here: Third-party code comes with some baggage
Guests Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen from SpecterOps join Dave to share the research they recently presented at Black Hat USA on the security of Microsoft's Active Directory Certificate Services. Their abstract: Microsoft’s Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has largely flown under the radar of both the offensive and defensive communities. AD CS is widely deployed, and provides attackers opportunities for credential theft, machine persistence, domain escalation, and subtle domain persistence. We present relevant background on certificates in Active Directory, detail the abuse of AD CS through certificate theft and active malicious enrollments for user and machine persistence, discuss a set of common misconfigurations that can result in domain escalation, and explain a method for stealing a Certificate Authority’s private key in order to forge new user/machine “golden” certificates. By bringing light to the security implications of AD CS, we hope to raise awareness for both attackers and defenders alike of the security issues surrounding this complex, widely deployed, and often misunderstood system. The blog post and white paper can be found here:
Certified Pre-Owned blog post
Certified Pre-Owned white paper
Guest Asheer Malhotra, Threat Researcher of Cisco Talos Intelligence Group, joins Dave to discuss his team's research "InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal." Cisco Talos has observed an expansion in the activity of SideCopy malware campaigns, targeting entities in India. In the past, the attackers have used malicious LNK files and documents to distribute their staple C#-based RAT. We are calling this malware "CetaRAT." SideCopy also relies heavily on the use of Allakore RAT, a publicly available Delphi-based RAT. Recent activity from the group, however, signals a boost in their development operations. Talos has discovered multiple new RAT families and plugins currently used in SideCopy infection chains. Targeting tactics and themes observed in SideCopy campaigns indicate a high degree of similarity to the Transparent Tribe APT (aka APT36) also targeting India. These include using decoys posing as operational documents belonging to the military and think tanks and honeytrap-based infections. The research can be found here:
InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal blog post
InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal report
Guest Charity Wright, Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert in Recorded Future's Insikt Group, joins Dave to discuss her research "China’s Digital Colonialism: Espionage and Repression Along the Digital Silk Road". Through the Digital Silk Road Initiative (DSR), announced in 2015, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is building an expansive global data infrastructure and exporting surveillance technologies to dictators and illiberal regimes throughout the developing world, in some cases trading technology for access to sensitive user data and facial recognition intelligence. Domestically, China uses this type of technology to assert authority over its citizens, censor the media, quell protests, and systematically oppress religious minorities. Now, over 80 countries are enabled to do the same with Chinese surveillance technology. The research can be found here: China’s Digital Colonialism: Espionage and Repression Along the Digital Silk Road
Guest Christopher Budd, Senior Global Threat Communications Manager at Avast, joins Dave to talk about some research his team did when they looked into a Reddit report saying their Avast folder was empty and other reports like it. The team found a new malware they’re calling “Crackonosh” in part because of some possible indications that the malware author may be Czech. Crackonosh is distributed along with illegal, cracked copies of popular software and searches for and disables many popular antivirus programs as part of its anti-detection and anti-forensics tactics. The research can be found here: Crackonosh: A New Malware Distributed in Cracked Software
Guest Nathan Howe, Vice President of Emerging Technology at Zscaler, joins Dave to discuss his team's work, "2021 “Exposed” Report Reveals Corporate and Cloud Infrastructures More at Risk Than Ever From Expanded Attack Surfaces." The modern workforce has resulted in an increase of users, devices, and applications existing outside of controlled networks, including corporate networks, the business emphasis on the “network” has decreased and the reliance on the internet as the connective tissue for businesses has increased. Zscaler analyzes the attack surface of 1,500 organizations and identifies trends affecting businesses of all sizes and industries, across all geographies. Key findings include:
The attack surface impact based on company size
The countries with the greatest attack surface
The industries that are most exposed
The research can be found here: “Exposed”: The world’s first report to reveal how exposed corporate networks really are.
Guest Daniel Kats, Senior Principal Research Engineer at NortonLifeLock, joins Dave to discuss his team's work, "Encrypted Chat Apps Doubling as Illegal Marketplaces." Encrypted chat apps are gaining popularity worldwide due to their central premise of not sending user data to tech giants. Some popular examples include WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal. These apps have also been adopted by businesses to securely communicate directly to their users. Additionally, these apps have been instrumental to subverting authoritarian regimes. However, NortonLifeLock found that encrypted chat apps are also being used by criminals to sell illegal goods. Because content moderation is, by design, nearly impossible on these apps, they allow for an easy vector for dealers of illicit goods to communicate directly to customers without fear of law enforcement involvement. The research can be found here: Encrypted Chat Apps Doubling as Illegal Marketplaces
Guest Tom Roter from Minera Labs joins Dave to discuss his team research: "Rigging a Windows Installation." It is common knowledge that pirated software might contain malware, yet millions still put themselves and their devices at risk and download from dubious sources. It is even more surprising to see the popularity of torrented operating system installations, which are ranked at the top of most torrent tracker ranking lists. Today we will prove conventional wisdom right and show off a devious, yet clever attack chain employed by an infected Windows 10 image, frequently shared and downloaded by tens of thousands of users. Over the last year, numerous malicious PowerShell events popped up in our telemetry. The events caught our attention because a payload was being downloaded into the “C:\Windows” directory, which is usually well guarded under NTFS permissions, this implies that the attacker had very high privilege on the compromised system. The research can be found here: Rigging a Windows installation
Guest Yonatan Striem-Amit joins Dave to talk about Cybereason's research "Prometei Botnet Exploiting Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities." The Cybereason Nocturnus Team responded to several incident response (IR) cases involving infections of the Prometei Botnet against companies in North America, observing that the attackers exploited recently published Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858) in order to penetrate the network and install malware. Yonatan shares his team's findings of the investigation of the attacks, including the initial foothold sequence of the attackers, the functionality of the different components of the malware, the threat actors’ origin and the bot’s infrastructure. The research can be found here: Prometei Botnet Exploiting Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities
Guests Gage Mele and Yury Polozov join Dave to talk about Anomali's research "Primitive Bear (Gamaredon) Targets Ukraine with Timely Themes." Anomali Threat Research identified malicious samples that align with the Russia-sponsored cyberespionage group Primitive Bear’s (Gamaredon, Winterflounder) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Primitive Bear, known primarily to focus on Ukraine, has been very active in 2021. However, the themes of the samples Anomali found, as well as those shared by the security community, could also be used to target multiple former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) countries. Anomali Threat Research found malicious .docx files being distributed by Primitive Bear, likely through spearphishing, that attempted to download remote template .dot files through template injection. The research can be found here: Primitive Bear (Gamaredon) Targets Ukraine with Timely Themes
Guest Adam Tagert is a Science of Security (SoS) Researcher in the National Security Agency Research Directorate. The National Security Agency (NSA) sponsors the Science of Security (SoS) Initiative for the promotion of a foundational cybersecurity science that is needed to mature the cybersecurity discipline and to underpin advances in cyberdefense. Adam works in all aspects of SoS particularly in the promotion of collaboration and use of foundational cybersecurity research. He promotes rigorous research methods by leading the Annual Best Scientific Cybersecurity Paper Competition. Adam joins Dave Bittner to discuss the NSA's SoS Initiative and their Science of Security and Privacy 2021 Annual Report. Information on the SoS Initiative and the report can be found here:
Science of Security
Science of Security and Privacy 2021 Annual Report
Guest Karl Sigler of Trustwave's SpiderLabs joins Dave Bittner to talk about their research: "Hidden Phishing at Free JavaScript Site". The research describes an interesting phishing campaign SpiderLabs encountered recently. In this campaign, the email subject pertains to a price revision, followed by some numbers. There is no email body, but there is an attachment about an ”investment.” The attachment’s convoluted filename contains characters the file-naming convention doesn’t allow, notably the vertical stroke, “|.” Even though "xlsx" is in the filename, double-clicking the attachment will prompt the user to open it with the default web browser. Thus, the file indeed appears to be an HTML document. Of course, it’s malicious. The research can be found here: HTML Lego: Hidden Phishing at Free JavaScript Site
Guest Brandon Hoffman of Intel 471 joins Dave Bittner to share his team's research "EtterSilent: the underground’s new favorite maldoc builder". The cybercrime underground often mimics behaviors that we see in everyday facets of life. Intel 471’s latest discovery is an example of one of these patterns: when a product takes off in the marketplace, users will rush to obtain it and find unique ways to use it in order to fit their needs. The latest “product” is a malicious document builder, known in the underground as “EtterSilent,” that Intel 471 has seen leveraged by various cybercrime groups. As it has grown in popularity, it has constantly been updated in order to avoid detection. Used in conjunction with other forms of malware, it’s a prime example of how ease of use and a concentration of skill sets leads to a commoditization of the cybercrime economy. EtterSilent: the underground’s new favorite maldoc builder
Guest Joe Slowik joins us from DomainTools to discuss his team's research "COVID-19 Phishing With a Side of Cobalt Strike." Multiple adversaries, from criminal groups to state-directed entities, engaged in malicious cyber activity using COVID-19 pandemic themes since March 2020. Adversaries continue to leverage the pandemic, arguably the most significant issue globally as of this writing, in various ways. Yet the most persistent avenue remains using COVID-19 themes for building malicious document files. Examples include lures associated with Cloud Atlas-linked activity and broader targeting of health authorities. Given the continued significance of the pandemic and persistent use of pandemic themes by adversaries, DomainTools researchers continuously monitor for items leveraging COVID-19 content for malicious purposes. While conducting this research, DomainTools analysts identified an interesting malicious document with what appeared to be unique staging and execution mechanisms. Research can be found here: COVID-19 Phishing With a Side of Cobalt Strike
Guest LTC Erica Mitchell from Army Cyber Institute joins us to talk about their infrastructure resiliency research project called Jack Voltaic. The Army Cyber Institute’s (ACI’s) Jack Voltaic (JV) project enables the institute to study incident response gaps alongside assembled partners to identify interdependencies among critical infrastructure and provide recommendations. JV provides an innovative, bottom‐up approach to critical infrastructure resilience in two unique ways. Whereas most federal efforts to improve resiliency focus on regional or multistate emergency response, JV focuses on cities and municipalities where critical infrastructure and populations are most heavily populated. Furthermore, JV deviates from other cybersecurity and national preparedness exercises in that it builds around areas of interest nominated by the participants. Although JV events include national-level capabilities and resources, they are conceptually driven by the concerns of the cities and their infrastructure partners. Through this approach, the ACI, the Army, and the Department of Defense (DoD) are able to harvest insights about potential roles, dependencies, partners, and support requests, while cities are able to discover potential capability gaps and expand their critical infrastructure information-sharing networks before a potential disaster strikes. Research links:
Jack Voltaic Cyber Research Project
Jack Voltaic 3.0 Cyber Research Report Executive Summary
Guest Mike McLellan from Secureworks joins us to share his team's insights about SUPERNOVA and threat group attribution. Similarities between the SUPERNOVA activity and a previous compromise of the network suggest that SPIRAL was responsible for both intrusions and reveal information about the threat group. In late 2020, Secureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers observed a threat actor exploiting an internet-facing SolarWinds server to deploy the SUPERNOVA web shell. Additional analysis revealed similarities to intrusion activity identified on the same network earlier in 2020, suggesting the two intrusions are linked. CTU™ researchers attribute the intrusions to the SPIRAL threat group. Characteristics of the activity suggest the group is based in China. The research can be found here: SUPERNOVA Web Shell Deployment Linked to SPIRAL Threat Group
Guest Jen Miller-Osborn from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 joins Dave to discuss their 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, which highlights a surge in ransomware demands based on a global analysis of the threat landscape in 2020. To evaluate the current state of the ransomware threat landscape, the Unit 42 threat intelligence team and the Crypsis incident response team collaborated to analyze the ransomware threat landscape in 2020, with global data from Unit 42 as well as US, Canada, and Europe data from Crypsis. The report details the top ransomware variants, average ransomware payments, ransomware predictions, and actionable next steps to immediately reduce ransomware risk. The report can be found here: 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report
Guest Jason Passwaters of Intel 471 joins us to discuss his team's research into bulletproof hosting (BPH). The research team at Intel 471 defined what a typical BPH service offers and how these services can be stopped in order to limit the damage they have on enterprises, businesses and digital society itself. They examined some popular malware families that actors host or leverage via BPH services. While much more goes into a cybercriminal’s full operation, it would be vastly more difficult to pull off without the ability to host malware and be free from impunity. Finally, they listed of some of the BPH providers that are firmly entrenched in the cybercrime underground and how they give support to other cybercriminal enterprises. By recognizing their behaviors, security teams can begin to take measures to figure out who the actors are, how they operate and what their infrastructure looks like. By doing so, organizations can begin to uncover ways to proactively counter maliciously-used infrastructure before criminals have a chance to launch their attacks. The blog posts can be found here:
Hiding in plain sight: Bulletproof Hosting’s dueling forms
Bulletproof hosting: How cybercrime stays resilient
Here’s who is powering the bulletproof hosting market
Guest Deepen Desai joins Dave to talk about Zsaler's research "Return of the MINEBRIDGE RAT With New TTPs and Social Engineering Lures." In Jan 2021, Zscaler ThreatLabZ discovered new instances of the MINEBRIDGE remote-access Trojan (RAT) embedded in macro-based Word document files crafted to look like valid job resumes (CVs). Such lures are often used as social engineering schemes by threat actors. MINEBRIDGE buries itself into the vulnerable remote desktop software TeamViewer, enabling the threat actor to take a wide array of remote follow-on actions such as spying on users or deploying additional malware.The use of social engineering tactics targeting security teams appears to be on an upward trend. The research can be found here: Return of the MINEBRIDGE RAT With New TTPs and Social Engineering Lures
Guests Gage Mele, Winston Marydasan, and Yury Polozov from Anomali join Dave to discuss their research into Static Kitten targeting government agencies in the UAE and Kuwait. Anomali Threat Research uncovered malicious activity very likely attributed to the Iran-nexus cyberespionage group, Static Kitten (Seedworm, MERCURY, Temp.Zagros, POWERSTATS, NTSTATS, MuddyWater), which is known to target numerous sectors primarily located in the Middle East This new campaign, which uses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consistent with previous Static Kitten activity, uses ScreenConnect launch parameters designed to target any MOFA with mfa[.]gov as part of the custom field. Anomali's team found samples specifically masquerading as the Kuwaiti government and the UAE National Council respectively, based on references in the malicious samples. The research can be found here: Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies
Guests Fernando Martinez and Tom Hegel from AT&T Alien Labs join Dave to discuss their team's research "Malware using new Ezuri memory loader." Multiple threat actors have recently started using a Go language (Golang) tool to act as a packer and avoid Antivirus detection. Additionally, the Ezuri memory loader tool acts as a malware loader and executes its payload in memory, without writing the file to disk. While this technique is known and commonly used by Windows malware, it is less popular in Linux environments. The research can be found here: Malware using new Ezuri memory loader
Guest Sergio Caltagirone from Dragos joins us to take us through their 2020 ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review report. Dragos's annual ICS Year in Review provides an overview and analysis of ICS vulnerabilities, global threat activity targeting industrial environments, and industry trends and observations gathered from customer engagements worldwide. The goal of the report is to give asset owners and operators proactive, actionable information and defensive recommendations in order to prepare for and combat the world’s most significant industrial cybersecurity adversaries. The report can be found here: 2020 ICS CYBERSECURITY YEAR IN REVIEW
Guest Jen Miller-Osborn from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 joins us to discuss their research into BendyBear. Highly malleable, highly sophisticated and over 10,000 bytes of machine code. The code behavior and features strongly correlate with that of the WaterBear malware family, which has been active since as early as 2009. The malware is associated with the cyber espionage group BlackTech, which many in the broader threat research community have assessed to have ties to the Chinese government, and is believed to be responsible for recent attacks against several East Asian government organizations. Due to the similarities with WaterBear, and the polymorphic nature of the code, Unit 42 named this novel Chinese shellcode “BendyBear.” It stands in a class of its own in terms of being one of the most sophisticated, well-engineered and difficult-to-detect samples of shellcode employed by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). The research can be found here: BendyBear: Novel Chinese Shellcode Linked With Cyber Espionage Group BlackTech
Guest Dr. Rosario Cammarota from Intel Labs joins us to discuss confidential computing. Confidential computing provides a secure platform for multiple parties to combine, analyze and learn from sensitive data without exposing their data or machine learning algorithms to the other party. This technique goes by several names — multiparty computing, federated learning and privacy-preserving analytics, among them. Confidential computing can enable this type of collaboration while preserving privacy and regulatory compliance. The research and supporting documents can be found here:
Intel Labs Day 2020: Confidential Computing
Confidential Computing Presentation Slides
Demo video
Guest Hossein Jazi of Malwarebytes joins us to take a deep dive into North Korea's APT37 (aka ScarCruft, Reaper and Group123) toolkit. On December 7 2020 the Malwarebytes Labs threat team identified a malicious document uploaded to Virus Total which was purporting to be a meeting request likely used to target the government of South Korea. The meeting date mentioned in the document was 23 Jan 2020, which aligns with the document compilation time of 27 Jan 2020, indicating that this attack took place almost a year ago. The file contains an embedded macro that uses a VBA self decoding technique to decode itself within the memory spaces of Microsoft Office without writing to the disk. It then embeds a variant of the RokRat into Notepad. Based on the injected payload, the Malwarebytes team believes that this sample is associated with APT37. This North Korean group is also known as ScarCruft, Reaper and Group123 and has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting victims in South Korea. The research can be found here: Retrohunting APT37: North Korean APT used VBA self decode technique to inject RokRat
Guest Maurits Lucas from Intel471 joins us to discuss his team's research into cybercrime in China. Data from Intel 471 show that the Chinese cybercrime underground proliferates through use of common methods or platforms, but behaves differently in large part due to the caution that actors take with regard to their identity. While the average citizen must follow the heavy handed nature of the government’s surveillance of cyberspace, Chinese threat actors take special precautions to protect their forums, TTPs and themselves. This leads to the Chinese cybercrime underground being disorderly when compared to others, particularly Russia, which tend to be much more organized. The research can be found here: No pandas, just people: The current state of China’s cybercrime underground
Guest Bojan Zdrnja of Infigo IS and a certified instructor at SANS Institute shares an incident he discovered where attackers were using a pretty novel way of exfiltrating data and using that channel for C&C communication. The code that was acquired was only partially recovered, but enough to indicate powerful features that the attackers were (ab)using in Google Chrome. The basis for this attack were malicious extensions that the attacker dropped on the compromised system. The research can be found here: Abusing Google Chrome extension syncing for data exfiltration and CC
Guest Dr. Shreyas Sen, a Perdue University associate professor of electrical and computer engineering, joins us to discuss the following scenario:. Instead of inserting a card or scanning a smartphone to make a payment, what if you could simply touch the machine with your finger? A prototype developed by Purdue University engineers would essentially let your body act as the link between your card or smartphone and the reader or scanner, making it possible for you to transmit information just by touching a surface. The research can be found here:
Tech makes it possible to digitally communicate through human touch (press release)
BodyWire-HCI: Enabling New Interaction Modalities by Communicating Strictly During Touch Using Electro-Quasistatic Human Body Communication (research paper)
Guest Joe Slowik joins us from Domain Tools to share their research "Current Events to Widespread Campaigns: Pivoting from Samples to Identify Activity" where they examined technical artifacts emerging around the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus region. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) practitioners can gain insight into adversary operations by tracking conflicts or geopolitical tensions. Similar to a “follow the money” approach in criminal investigations, looking at conflict zones can reveal cyber capabilities deployed as part of events —either by the parties to the conflict itself, or third parties interested in monitoring events for their own purposes. Based on precedent, analysts can identify developments in adversary operations and technical capabilities by tracking identifiers related to major events and conflict zones. Identifying capabilities deployed to take advantage of such items can yield insights into fundamental attacker tradecraft and behaviors, and enable defense and response for incidents which may strike far closer to home at a later date. The research can be found here: Current Events to Widespread Campaigns: Pivoting from Samples to Identify Activity
Guest Yonatan Striem-Amit joins us from Cybereason to share their Nocturnus Team research into Kimsuky. The Cybereason Nocturnus Team has been tracking various North Korean threat actors, among them the cyber espionage group known as Kimsuky, (aka: Velvet Chollima, Black Banshee and Thallium), which has been active since at least 2012 and is believed to be operating on behalf of the North Korean regime. The group has a rich and notorious history of offensive cyber operations around the world, including operations targeting South Korean think tanks, but over the past few years they have expanded their targeting to countries including the United States, Russia and various nations in Europe. The research can be found here: Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite
Guest Mark Arena from Intel471 joins us to discuss his team's research into Trickbot and its evolution from a banking trojan to a long-standing, most likely well-resourced operation that was taken down last year. Mark shares some insight into Trickbot's order of operations and what went on behind the scenes that his team working with Brian Krebs were able to discover. Since the separate and independent actions taken against Trickbot, Intel471 has observed successful disruption of its command and control infrastructure. However, the actors linked to Trickbot have not ceased their criminal activities. These actors have continued engaging in ransomware activity, using BazarLoader instead of Trickbot. Intel471 is unable to assess the long-term impact of the Trickbot disruption activity or whether Trickbot will continue to be used by cybercrime groups. This analysis covers the period from Sept. 22, 2020 until Nov. 6, 2020. The research can be found here: Trickbot down, but is it out?
Guest Selena Larson, senior cyber threat analyst at Dragos, Inc., joins us to discuss their research into recent observations of ICS-targeting threats to manufacturing organizations. Cyber risk to the manufacturing sector is increasing, led by disruptive cyberattacks impacting industrial processes, intrusions enabling information gathering and process information theft, and new activity from Industrial Control Systems (ICS)-targeting adversaries. Dragos currently publicly tracks five ICS-focused activity groups targeting manufacturing: CHRYSENE, PARISITE, MAGNALLIUM, WASSONITE, and XENOTIME in addition to various ransomware activities capable of disrupting operations. Manufacturing relies on ICS to scale, function, and ensure consistent quality control and product safety. It provides crucial materials, products, and medicine and is classified as critical infrastructure. Due to the interconnected nature of facilities and operations, an attack on a manufacturing entity can have ripple effects across the supply chain that relies on timely and precise production to support product fulfillment, health and safety, and national security objectives. Ransomware adversaries are adopting ICS-aware functionality with the ability to stop industrial related processes and cause disruptive – and potentially destructive – impacts. Dragos has not observed ICS-specific malware targeting manufacturing operations on the same scale or sophistication as that used in the disruptive TRISIS and CRASHOVERRIDE malware attacks that targeted energy operations in Saudi Arabia and Ukraine, respectively. However, known and ongoing threats to manufacturing can have direct and indirect impact to operations. This report provides a snapshot of the threat landscape as of October 2020 and is expected to change in the future as adversaries and their behaviors evolve. The research can be found here: ICS Threat Activity on the Rise in Manufacturing Sector
Deep Instinct's Shimon Oren joins us to talk about his team's research on "Why Emotet's latest wave is harder to catch than ever before - Part 2." Emotet appears to have reemerged more evasive than before, this time with a payload delivered from a loader that security tools aren’t equipped to handle. Emotet, the largest malware botnet today, started in 2014 and continues to be one of the most challenging threats in today’s landscape. This botnet causes huge damage by spreading ransomware and info stealers to its infected systems. Recently, a rise in the number of Emotet infections was observed in France, Japan, and New Zealand. The high number of infections shows the effectiveness of the Emotet malware at staying undetected. Shimon joins us to discuss how Deep Instinct investigated the payload that was encrypted inside the loader, analyzes the next steps in the infection process, and discovers the techniques used to make this malware difficult to analyze. The original blog post and updated post on the research can be found here:
Emotet Analysis: Why Emotet’s Latest Wave is Harder to Catch than Ever Before
Why Emotet's latest wave is harder to catch than ever before - Part 2
Researchers at Cisco's Talos Unit recently published research exploring the tactics, technics and procedures of the global malvertising ecosystem. Craig Williams is head of Talos Outreach at Cisco, and he guides us through the life cycle of malicious online ads, along with tips for protecting yourself and your organization. The research can be found here: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/07/malvertising-deepdive.html
Researchers at Symantec have been tracking Seedworm, a cyber espionage group targeting the Middle East as well as Europe and North America. The threat group targets government agencies, oil & gas facilities, NGOs, telecoms and IT firms. Al Cooley is director of product management at Symantec, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group
On August 24, 2020, Snyk announced the discovery of suspicious behaviors in the iOS version of a popular advertising SDK known as Mintegral. At that time, they had confirmed with partners in the advertising attribution space that at minimum, Mintegral appeared to be using this functionality to gather large amounts of data and commit ad attribution fraud. Their research showed that Mintegral was using code obfuscation and method swizzling to modify the functionality of base iOS SDK methods without the application owner’s knowledge. Further, their research proved that Mintegral was logging all HTTP requests including its headers which could even contain authorization tokens or other sensitive data. Since that time Mintegral announced that they were opening the source of their SDK to the market. While the SDK can only be downloaded by registered partners, a major game publisher shared the source code with Snyk for further analysis. They also continued their research by digging deeper into the Android versions of the SDK in which they hadn’t found similar behaviors at the time of the initial disclosure. This has resulted in some significant discoveries that necessitate an update to the previous disclosure. Additionally, Mintegral and the community at large have responded to the situation, and Snyk felt a summary of the events was a good way to finalize their research into this SDK. Joining us on Research Saturday to discuss their research is Snyk's Alyssa Miller. The original blog and Snyk's update can be found here:
SourMint: malicious code, ad fraud, and data leak in iOS
SourMint: iOS remote code execution, Android findings, and community response
From US Department of Justice: "On Oct. 15, 2020, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh returned an indictment charging six computer hackers, all of whom were residents and nationals of the Russian Federation (Russia) and officers in Unit 74455 of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), a military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. These GRU hackers and their co-conspirators engaged in computer intrusions and attacks intended to support Russian government efforts to undermine, retaliate against, or otherwise destabilize: (1) Ukraine; (2) Georgia; (3) elections in France; (4) efforts to hold Russia accountable for its use of a weapons-grade nerve agent, Novichok, on foreign soil; and (5) the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games after Russian athletes were banned from participating under their nation’s flag, as a consequence of Russian government-sponsored doping effort. Their computer attacks used some of the world’s most destructive malware to date, including: KillDisk and Industroyer, which each caused blackouts in Ukraine; NotPetya, which caused nearly $1 billion in losses to the three victims identified in the indictment alone; and Olympic Destroyer, which disrupted thousands of computers used to support the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. The indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy, computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and false registration of a domain name." Returning to Research Saturday this week to discuss their research of NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer are Cisco Talos' Craig Williams and Matt Olney. The indictment and Cisco's research can be found here:
Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace
New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide
The MeDoc Connection
Who Wasn’t Responsible for Olympic Destroyer?
Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics
While SSL/TLS encryption is the industry standard for protecting data in transit from prying eyes, encryption has, itself, become a threat. It is often leveraged by attackers to sneak malware past security tools that do not fully inspect encrypted traffic. As the percentage of traffic that is encrypted continues to grow, so do the opportunities for attackers to deliver threats through encrypted channels. To better understand the use of encryption and the volume of encrypted traffic that is inspected, Zscaler's research team, ThreatLabZ, analyzed encrypted traffic across the Zscaler cloud for the first nine months of 2020, assessing its use within specific industries. The study also set out to analyze the types of attacks that use encryption and the extent of the current risk. Returning to Research Saturday this week to discuss the report is Zscaler's CISO and VP of Security Research, Deepen Desai. The research can be found here:
2020: The State of Encrypted Attacks Blog
2020: The State of Encrypted Attacks Report
The goal of malicious activity is to compromise the system to install some unauthorized software. Increasingly that goal is tied to one thing: the user. Over the past several years, we as an industry improved exploit mitigation and the value of working exploits has increased accordingly. Together, these changes have had an impact on the threat landscape. We still see large amounts of active exploitation, but enterprises are getting better at defending against them. This has left adversaries with a couple of options, develop or buy a working exploit that will defeat today's protections, which can be costly, or pivot to enticing a user to help you. In today's threat landscape, adversaries are always trying to develop and implement the most effective lures to try and draw users into their infection path. They've tried a multitude of different tactics in this space, but one always stands out — current events. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday from Craig Williams from Cisco's Talos Outreach team to walk us through how current events are used as lures. The research and blog post can be found here: Adversarial use of current events as lures
Identity and access are intrinsically connected when providing security to cloud platforms. But security is only effective when environments are properly configured and maintained. In the 2H 2020 edition of the biannual Unit 42 Cloud Threat Report, researchers conducted Red Team exercises, scanned public cloud data and pulled proprietary Palo Alto Networks data to explore the threat landscape of identity and access management (IAM) and identify where organizations can improve their IAM configurations. During a Red Team exercise, Unit 42 researchers were able to discover and leverage IAM misconfigurations to obtain admin access to a customer’s entire Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud environment – a potentially multi-million dollar data breach in the real-world. These examples highlight just how serious the failure to secure IAM can be for an organization. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the report for Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 is CSO of Public Cloud, Matt Chiodi. The research can be found here: Highlights from the Unit 42 Cloud Threat Report, 2H 2020
In the late 90s, hackers who discovered vulnerabilities would sometimes send an email to Bugtraq with details. Bugtraq was a notification system used by people with an interest in network security. It was also a place that might have been monitored by employees of software companies looking for reports of vulnerabilities pertaining to their software. The problem was - there wasn't an easy way to track specific vulnerabilities in specific products. It was May 1999. Larry Cashdollar was working as a system administrator for Bath Iron Works under contract by Computer Sciences Corporation. Specifically, he was a UNIX Systems Administrator, level one. His team managed over 3,000 UNIX systems across BIW's campuses. Most of these were CAD systems used for designing AEGIS class destroyers. This position gave me access to over 3,000 various flavors of UNIX ranging from Sun Solaris to IBM AIX. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss his journey from finding that first CVE through the next 20 years and hundreds of CVEs is Akamai Senior Response Engineer Larry Cashdollar. The research can be found here: MUSIC TO HACK TO: MY FIRST CVE AND 20 YEARS OF VULNERABILITY RESEARCH
Cisco Talos discovered PoetRAT earlier this year. Since then, they observed multiple new campaigns indicating a change in the actor's capabilities and showing their maturity toward better operational security. They assess with medium confidence this actor continues to use spear-phishing attacks to lure a user to download a malicious document from temporary hosting providers. They currently believe the malware comes from malicious URLs included in the email, resulting in the user clicking and downloading a malicious document. These Word documents continue to contain malicious macros, which in turn download additional payloads once the attacker sets their sites on a particular victim. As the geopolitical tensions grow in Azerbaijan with neighboring countries, this is no doubt a stage of espionage with national security implications being deployed by a malicious actor with a specific interest in various Azerbajiani government departments. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research from Cisco's Talos Outreach is Craig Williams. The research can be found here: PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves
The U.S. government has charged seven men in relation to hundreds of cyber attacks against organizations in the U.S. and multiple other countries in Asia and Europe. Two of the men, who were based in Malaysia, were arrested and their extradition to the U.S. has been requested. The other five are based in China and remain at large. The attacks were attributed to a China-linked organization dubbed APT41 and involved a combination of intellectual property theft and financially motivated cyber crime. While some of our peers monitor APT41 as a single operation, Symantec regards it as two distinct actors: Grayfly and Blackfly. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research from Symantec's Threat Hunter Team is Jon DiMaggio. The research can be found here: APT41: Indictments Put Chinese Espionage Group in the Spotlight
Ben-Gurion University researchers have developed a new artificial intelligence technique that will protect medical devices from malicious operating instructions in a cyberattack as well as other human and system errors. Complex medical devices such as CT (computed tomography), MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) and ultrasound machines are controlled by instructions sent from a host PC. Abnormal or anomalous instructions introduce many potentially harmful threats to patients, such as radiation overexposure, manipulation of device components or functional manipulation of medical images. Threats can occur due to cyberattacks, human errors such as a technician's configuration mistake or host PC software bugs. As part of his Ph.D. research, Tom Mahler has developed a technique using artificial intelligence that analyzes the instructions sent from the PC to the physical components using a new architecture for the detection of anomalous instructions. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss his research is CBG - Cyber@Ben Gurion University's Tom Mahler. The research can be found here: A Dual-Layer Architecture for the Protection of Medical Devices from Anomalous Instructions
Bitdefender researchers recently uncovered a sophisticated APT-style attack targeting an international architectural and video production company. The attack shows signs of industrial espionage, similar to another of Bitdefender’s recent investigations of the StrongPity APT group. The real-estate industry is highly competitive, and information exfiltrated by APT mercenary group can give negotiation advantages to other players in high-profile real-estate contracts. While APT groups traditionally could only be afforded by governments or were financially motivated purely out of self-interest, they recently appear to have become a commodity. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research is Global Cybersecurity Researcher Liviu Arsene from Bitdefender. The research can be found here: APT Hackers for Hire Used for Industrial Espionage
Containers offer speed, performance, and portability, but do they actually contain? While they try their best, the shared kernel is a disturbing attack surface: a mere kernel vulnerability may allow containerized processes to escape and compromise the host. This issue prompted a new wave of sandboxing tools that use either unikernels, lightweight VMs or userspace-kernels to separate the host OS from the container's OS. One of these solutions is Kata Containers, a container runtime that spawns each container inside a lightweight VM, and can function as the underlying runtime in Docker and Kubernetes. Kata's virtualized containers provide two layers of isolation: even if an attacker breaks out of the container, he is still confined to the microVM. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research is Yuval Avrahami from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. The research presented at Black Hat USA 2020 can be found here: Escaping Virtualized Containers
Threat actors and cybercriminals that don’t have the ability to develop their own ransomware for malicious campaigns can turn to the Smaug Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) offering, which is available via a Dark Web Onion site. At least two threat actors are operating the site, providing ransomware that can be used to target Windows, macOS, and Linux machines. The site is built with ease of use in mind. To launch an attack, threat actors simply need to sign up, create a campaign, and then start distributing the malware. The site also handles decryption key purchasing and tracking for victims. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research is Anomali's Joakim Kennedy and Rory Gould. The research can be found here: Anomali Threat Research Releases First Public Analysis of Smaug Ransomware as a Service
Throughout March and April, QuoIntelligence (QuoINT) observed four attacks (i.e. sightings) utilizing various tools from the Golden Chickens (GC) Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) portfolio – they recently declassified their findings, after first notifying their clients. Further, during their analysis of the sightings, QuoIntelligence confirmed the GC MaaS Operator, Badbullzvenom, released improved variants with code updates to three tools in the service portfolio. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research is QuoIntelligence's Vice President of Threat Intelligence, Chaz Hobson. The research can be found here: Latest Golden Chickens MaaS Tools Updates and Observed Attacks
After the 2016 General Election, the talk was all around foreign meddling. Rumors swirled that some votes may have been changed or influenced by state-sponsored actors. Sanctions and accusations followed. Four years later, is the U.S. any more prepared to protect the results of its largest elections? More than you may realize. Talos researchers take a deep dive into election security after spending the past four years talking to local, state and national officials, performing their own independent research and even watching one state plan an election in real-time. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the report on this timely topic is Cisco Talos' Matt Olney. The research can be found here:
What to expect when you’re electing: Talos’ 2020 election security primer.
Researchers at Symantec spotted a Sodinokibi targeted ransomware campaign in which the attackers are also scanning the networks of some victims for credit card or point of sale (PoS) software. It is not clear if the attackers are targeting this software for encryption or because they want to scrape this information as a way to make even more money from this attack. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the report is Jon DiMaggio of Symantec. The research can be found here: Sodinokibi: Ransomware Attackers also Scanning for PoS Software, Leveraging Cobalt Strike
A look at the realities of ransomware from Sophos, including an industry-first detailed look at new detection evasion techniques in WastedLocker ransomware attacks that leverage the Windows Cache Manager and memory-mapped I/O to encrypt files. A complementary article examines the evasion-centric arms race of ransomware, providing a months-long review of how cybercriminals have been escalating and markedly changing evasion techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) since Snatch ransomware in December 2019. The research also breaks down the five early warning signs organizations are about to be attacked by ransomware and why ransomware attacks continue to occur. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday to walk us through the research and share their findings is Sophos' Principal Research Scientist Chet Wisniewski and EVP & Chief Product Officer Dan Schiappa. The media alert and research articles can be found here:
Media Alert: Sophos Reports on the Realities of Ransomware
WastedLocker’s techniques point to a familiar heritage
Ransomware’s evasion-centric arms race
5 signs you’re about to be hit by ransomware
The realities of ransomware: extortion goes social
Ransomware: why it’s not just a passing fad
Docker containers have been gaining popularity over the past few years as an effective way of packaging software applications. Docker Hub provides a strong community-based model for users and companies to share their software applications. This is also attracting the attention of malicious actors intending to make money by cryptojacking within Docker containers and using Docker Hub to distribute these images. Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 researchers identified a malicious Docker Hub account, azurenql, active since October 2019 that was hosting six malicious images intended to mine the cryptocurrency, Monero. The images hosted on this account have been collectively pulled more than two million times. Additionally, when last checked minexmr.com for this wallet ID, Palo Alto's team saw recent activity indicating that it’s still being used. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday is Jen Miller-Osborn from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 group to share the research and findings. The research and blog post can be found here: Attackers Cryptojacking Docker Images to Mine for Monero
The goal of malicious activity is to compromise the system to install some unauthorized software. Increasingly that goal is tied to one thing: the user. Over the past several years, we as an industry improved exploit mitigation and the value of working exploits has increased accordingly. Together, these changes have had an impact on the threat landscape. We still see large amounts of active exploitation, but enterprises are getting better at defending against them. This has left adversaries with a couple of options, develop or buy a working exploit that will defeat today's protections, which can be costly, or pivot to enticing a user to help you. In today's threat landscape, adversaries are always trying to develop and implement the most effective lures to try and draw users into their infection path. They've tried a multitude of different tactics in this space, but one always stands out — current events. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday from Craig Williams from Cisco's Talos Outreach team to walk us through how current events are used as lures. The research and blog post can be found here: Adversarial use of current events as lures
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Bitdefender researchers have recently found the APT group StrongPity has been targeting victims in Turkey and Syria. Using watering hole tactics to selectively infect victims and deploying a three-tier C&C infrastructure to thwart forensic investigations, the APT group leveraged Trojanized popular tools, such as archivers, file recovery applications, remote connections applications, utilities, and even security software, to cover a wide range of options that targeted victims might be seeking. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday to discuss the research is Bitdefender's Liviu Arsene. You can find the research here: StrongPity APT – Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure
“Cyberbunker” refers to a criminal group that operated a “bulletproof” hosting facility out of an actual military bunker. “Bullet Proof” hosting usually refers to hosting locations in countries with little or corrupt law enforcement, making shutting down criminal activity difficult. Cyberbunker, which is also known as “ZYZtm” and “Calibour”, was a bit different in that it actually operated out of a bulletproof bunker. In September of last year, German police raided this actual Cyberbunker and arrested several suspects. While most of the group's assets were seized during the initial raid, the IP address space remained and was later sold to Legaco Networks. Before being shut down, Legaco Networks temporarily redirected the traffic to the SANS Internet Storm Center honeypots for examination. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday from SANS Technology Institute is graduate student Karim Lalji and Dean of Research Johannes Ullrich to discuss their experiences. The research and blog post can be found here: Real-Time Honeypot Forensic Investigation on a German Organized Crime Network Cyberbunker 2.0: Analysis of the Remnants of a Bullet Proof Hosting Provider
NortonLifeLock Research Group (NRG) released a prototype browser extension called BotSight that leverages machine learning to detect Twitter bots in real-time. The tool is intended to help users understand the prevalence of bots and disinformation campaigns within their Twitter feeds, particularly with the increase in disinformation of COVID-19. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday to discuss this tool is Daniel Kats from NortonLifeLock Research Group. You can find the research here: Introducing BotSight
On April 29, 2020, the Salt management framework, authored by the IT automation company SaltStack, received a patch concerning two CVEs; CVE-2020-11651, an authentication bypass vulnerability, and CVE-2020-11652, a directory-traversal vulnerability. On April 30, 2020, researchers at F-Secure disclosed their vulnerability findings to the public, with an urgent warning for Salt users - patch now. Before the weekend was out, criminals were deploying malware and targeting vulnerable Salt installations, successfully affecting operations at Ghost, DigiCert, and LineageOS. The malware is a cryptominer, but there is an additional component, a Remote Access Tool written in Go called nspps. Researchers at Akamai have also observed in-the-wild attacks on Salt vulnerabilities. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday is Larry Cashdollar, Senior Security Response Engineer at Akamai, to discuss this issue. The research can be found here: SaltStack Vulnerabilities Actively Exploited in the Wild
Researchers at Symantec identified and alerted customers to a string of attacks against U.S. companies by attackers attempting to deploy the WastedLocker ransomware (Ransom.WastedLocker) on their networks. The end goal of these attacks is to cripple the victim’s IT infrastructure by encrypting most of their computers and servers in order to demand a multimillion dollar ransom. At least 31 Symantec customer organizations have been attacked, meaning the total number of attacks may be much higher. The attackers had breached the networks of targeted organizations and were in the process of laying the groundwork for staging ransomware attacks. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the report is Jon DiMaggio of Symantec. The research can be found here: WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations
Built into virtually every hardware device, firmware is lower-level software that is programmed to ensure that hardware functions properly. As software security has been significantly hardened over the past two decades, hackers have responded by moving down the stack to focus on firmware entry points. Firmware offers a target that basic security controls can’t access or scan as easily as software, while allowing them to persist and continue leveraging many of their tried and true attack techniques. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday is Maggie Jauregui, security researcher at Dell, to discuss this issue. The research can be found here: Three firmware blind spots impacting security
A new report examines how five related APT groups operating in the interest of the Chinese government have systematically targeted Linux servers, Windows systems and Android mobile devices while remaining undetected for nearly a decade. The report comes on the heels of the U.S. Department of Justice announcing several high-profile indictments from over 1,000 open FBI investigations into economic espionage as part of the DOJ’s China Initiative. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to discuss the report is Eric Cornelius of Blackberry. The research can be found here: Decade of the RATs: Novel APT Attacks Targeting Linux, Windows and Android
Slack is a cloud-based messaging platform that is commonly used in workplace communications. Slack Incoming Webhooks allow you to post messages from your applications to Slack. Generally, Slack webhooks are considered a low risk integration. A deeper dive into webhooks shows that this is not entirely accurate. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday is Ashley Graves from AT&T Cybersecurity's Alien Labs to discuss her research. The research can be found here: Slack phishing attacks using webhooks
Proactive, efficient threat mitigation and risk management require understanding adversaries’ fundamental thought processes, not just their tools and methods. Cyber threat intelligence analysts combed through 15 years (2004 to 2019) of public sources that have documented the activities of one prolific threat actor, Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. Analysis shows that the timing, targets, and impacts of this activity mirrored Russian strategic concerns about specific events and developments. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday are Brad Stone & Nate Beach-Westmoreland from Booz Allen Hamilton to discuss their report and some of the 33 case studies presented in it. The research can be found here: Bearing Witness: Uncovering the Logic Behind Russian Military Cyber Operations
Earlier this year, a Virgin Media database containing the personal details of 900,000 people was discovered to be unsecured and accessible online for 10 months. The breach was discovered by researchers at the security firm TurgenSec. This breach had major implications under GDPR. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday are George Punter and Peter Hansen from TurgenSec to talk about the discovery of the breach. The research can be found here: Virgin Media Disclosure Statement & Resources
Working with many different honeypot implementations, a security researcher did an experiment expanding on that setting up a simple docker image with SSH, running a guessable root password. The catch? What happened in the next 24 hours was unexpected. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday to talk about his experiment is Larry Cashdollar of Akamai. The research can be found here: A Brief History of a Rootable Docker Image
In December 2019, the GOLD VILLAGE threat group that operates the Maze ransomware created a public website to name and shame victims. The threat actors used the website to dump data they exfiltrated from victims' networks before they deployed the ransomware. Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers have observed several ransomware operators following suit. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday is Alex Tilley of SecureWorks' Counter Threat Unit.
Section 52, CyberX’s threat intelligence team, has uncovered an ongoing industrial cyberespionage campaign targeting hundreds of manufacturing and other industrial firms primarily located in South Korea. CyberX has identified more than 200 compromised systems from this campaign, including one belonging to a multi-billion dollar Korean conglomerate that manufactures critical infrastructure equipment such as heavy equipment for power transmission and distribution facilities, renewable energy, chemical plants, welding, and construction. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday is Phil Neray, one of the authors of this report. The research can be found here: Gangnam Industrial Style: APT Campaign Targets Korean Industrial Companies
Multiple media reports have indicated that the United States’ (U.S.) 2020 general election could be targeted by foreign and domestic actors after the successful cyber and misinformation attacks during the 2016 general election. The responsibility of secure and ethical online campaigning has become a central issue in the 2020 election. In some cases, it has become part of candidate platforms. Joining us in this week's Research Saturday is Paul Gagliardi from Security Scorecard, discussing their recent report detailing the cybersecurity of the 2020 Presidential race. The research can be found here: 2020 Democratic Presidential Candidates Get Smart to Cybersecurity Report
Passwords are the traditional authentication methods for computers and networks. But passwords can be stolen. Biometric authentication seems the perfect solution for that problem. Our guest today is Craig Williams, director of Talos outreach at Cisco. He'll be discussing and providing insights into their report which shows that fingerprints are good enough to protect the average person's privacy if they lose their phone. However, a person that is likely to be targeted by a well-funded and motivated actor should not use fingerprint authentication. The research can be found here: Fingerprint cloning: Myth or reality?
Successful containment of the Coronavirus pandemic rests on the ability to quickly and reliably identify those who have been in close proximity to a contagious individual. Mayank Varia from Boston University describes how his team suggests an approach based on using short-range communication mechanisms, like Bluetooth, that are available in all modern cell phones. The research can be found here: Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus
As much of the world grapples with the new coronavirus, COVID-19, and how to handle it, attackers are taking advantage of the widespread discussion of COVID-19 in emails and across the web. Joining us today is Fleming Shi, CTO of Barracuda discussing their report on these types of attacks, which are up 667-percent since the end of February. The research can be found here: Threat Spotlight: Coronavirus-Related Phishing To learn more about our Academic and Military discounts, visit The CyberWire and click on the Contact Us button in the Academic or Government & Military box.
By day, he is Dton, an upstanding Nigerian citizen. He believes in professionalism, hard work and excellence. He’s a leader, a content creator, an entrepreneur and an innovator; an accomplished business administrator; a renaissance man who is adored by his colleagues. But by night, he is Bill Henry, Cybercriminal Entrepreneur. We sat down with a researcher at CheckPoint for the inside scoop into this fascinating, brazen individual. The research can be found here: The Inside Scoop on a Six-Figure Nigerian Fraud Campaign
2020 is shaping up to be a rough year. Ransomware attacks will continue to grow as cybercriminals get more sophisticated in their methods and expand their reach. Allan Liska, Senior Analyst at Recorded Future, shares their findings and predictions in a new report. The research can be found here: 5 Ransomware Trends to Watch in 2020
Eclypsium has issued a study that suggests the prevalence of “unsigned firmware in WiFi adapters, USB hubs, trackpads, and cameras used in computers from Lenovo, Dell, HP and other major manufacturers.” Here to discuss their findings is Rick Altherr, a Principle Engineer at Eclypsium. The research can be found here: Perilous Peripherals: The Hidden Dangers Inside Windows and LINUX Computers.
Cloud computing is now at the center of nearly every business strategy. But, as with the rapid adoption of any new technology, growing pains persist. The key findings in these reports shed light on security missteps that are actually in practice by organizations across the globe. Joining us in this special Research Saturday are Palo Alto Network's Matthew Chiodi and Ryan Olson. They discuss their findings in two different threat reports. The research can be found here: Cloud Threat Report IoT Threat Report
As websites and apps more widely adopt TLS (Transport Layer Security) and communicate over HTTPS connections, unencrypted traffic may draw even more attention, since it’s easier for analysts and security tools to identify malicious communication patterns in those plain HTTP sessions. Malware authors know this, and they’ve made it a priority to adopt TLS and thereby obfuscate the contents of malicious communication. Joining us on this week's Research Saturday is Chester Wisniewski from SophosLabs discussing their research on the subject. The research can be found here: Nearly a quarter of malware now communicates using TLS
Why do some developers and development teams write more secure code than others? Software is written by people, either alone or in teams. Ultimately secure code development depends on the actions and decisions taken by the people who develop the code. Understanding the human factors that influence the introduction of software vulnerabilities, and acting on that knowledge, is a definitive way to shift security to the left. On this Research Saturday, our conversation with Anita D’Amico from CodeDX on which developers and teams are more likely to write vulnerable software. The research can be found here: Which Developers and Teams Are More Likely to Write Vulnerable Software?
Today's Research Saturday features our conversation with Robert Heaton, a software engineer with Stripe who penned a blog post about his disappointing discovery involving his Wacom tablet tracking his applications. The post struck a nerve and has since been widely distributed. The research can be found here: Wacom drawing tablets track the name of every application that you open
SafeBreach Labs discovered a new vulnerability in the Realtek HD Audio Driver Package, which is deployed on PCs containing Realtek sound cards. On this week's Research Saturday, our conversation with Itzik Kotler, who is Co-Founder and CTO at SafeBreach. The research can be found here: Realtek HD Audio Driver Package - DLL Preloading and Potential Abuses
BGN Technologies, the technology transfer company of Ben-Gurion University (BGU) of the Negev, Israel, is introducing the first all-optical “stealth” encryption technology that will be significantly more secure and private for highly-sensitive cloud computing and data center network transmission. Joining us in this special Research Saturday is BGN's Dan Sadot who helped pioneer this technology. The Research can be found here: Ben-Gurion University Researchers Introduce the FirstAll-Optical, Stealth Data Encryption Technology
The Chameleon attack technique is a new type of OSN-based trickery where malicious posts and profiles change the way they are displayed to OSN users to conceal themselves before the attack or avoid detection. Joining us to discuss their findings in a new report entitled "The Chameleon Attack: Manipulating Content Display in Online Social Media" is Ben-Gurion University's Rami Puzis. The research can be found here: The Chameleon Attack: Manipulating Content Display in Online Social Media Demonstration video of a Chameleon Attack
Operation Wocao (我操, “Wǒ cāo”, is a Chinese curse word) is the name that Fox-IT uses to describe the hacking activities of a Chinese based hacking group. We are joined by Fox-IT's Maarten van Dantzig who shares his insights into their new report entitled "Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups". The Research can be found here:
Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups
The electric utility industry is a valuable target for adversaries seeking to exploit industrial control systems (ICS) and operations technology (OT) for a variety of purposes. As adversaries and their sponsors invest more effort and money into obtaining effects-focused capabilities, the risk of a disruptive or destructive attack on the electric sector significantly increases. Selena Larson from Dragos joins us to discuss their new report North American Electric Cyber Threat Perspective. The report can be found here: North American Electric Cyber Threat Perspective
Some of our favorite and most trusted IoT devices help make us feel secure in our homes. From garage door openers to the locks on our front doors, we trust these devices to recognize and alert us when people are entering our home. It should come as no surprise that these too are subject to attack. Steve Povolny is head of advanced research at McAfee; we discuss a pair of research projects they recently published involving popular IoT devices. The research can be found here: McAfee Advanced Threat Research demo McLear NFC Ring McAfee Advanced Threat Research Demo Chamberlain MyQ
Multiple e-commerce and financial organizations around the world are targeted by cybercriminals attempting to bypass or disable their security mechanisms, in some cases by using tools that imitate the activities of legitimate users. Linken Sphere, an anti-detection browser, is one of the most popular tools of this kind at the moment. Staffan Truvé is the CTO and Co-Founder of Recorded Future, he joins us to discuss their new report on the browser. The research can be found here: Profiling the Linken Sphere Anti-Detection Browser
Unit 42 (the Palo Alto Networks threat intelligence team) released new research on a Jira vulnerability that’s leaking data of technology, industrial and media organizations in the public cloud. The vulnerability (a Server Side Request Forgery -- SSRF) is the same type that led to the Capital One data breach in July 2019. Jen Miller-Osborn is the Deputy Director of Threat Intelligence for Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks, and she joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/server-side-request-forgery-exposes-data-of-technology-industrial-and-media-organizations/
Dan Woods is VP of the intelligence center and Shape Security. He shares insights on two noteworthy attacks tools, Genesis and Magecart. Before joining Shape Security Dan served as assistant chief agent of special investigations at the Arizona attorney general's office, where he investigated complex fraud. Prior to that, he spent 20 years with federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations, including the CIA and FBI, where he specialized in information operations and cybercrime.
Researchers at BlackBerry Cylance have been tracking ordinary WAV audio files being used to carry hidden malicious data used by threat actors. Eric Milam is VP of threat research and intelligence at BlackBerry Cylance, and he joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/malicious-payloads-hiding-beneath-the-wav.html
Researchers at Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 recently published research outlining attacks on home and small-business routers, taking advantage of known vulnerabilities to make the routers parts of botnets, ultimately used to attack gaming servers. Jen Miller-Osborn is the Deputy Director of Threat Intelligence for Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks. She joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/home-small-office-wireless-routers-exploited-to-attack-gaming-servers/
Researchers at Anomali have been tracking China-based threat group, Mustang Panda, believing them to be responsible for attacks making clever use of Windows shortcut files. Parthiban is a researcher at Anomali, and he joins us to share their findings. The research is here: https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations
Researchers at McAfee's Advanced Threat Research Team have been analyzing Sodinokibi ransomware as a service, also known as REvil. John Fokker is head of cyber investigations for McAfee Advanced Threat Research, and he joins us to share their findings. The research is here: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/
Researchers from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 have been tracking a Chinese cyber espionage group they've named PKPLUG. The group mainly targets victims in the Southeast Asia region. Ryan Olson is VP of threat intelligence at Palo Alto Networks, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research is here: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/pkplug_chinese_cyber_espionage_group_attacking_asia/
Until recently, usability was often an afterthought when developing security tools. These days there's growing realization that usability is a fundamental part of security. Lorrie Cranor is director of the CyLab Usable Privacy and Security lab (CUPS) at Carnegie Mellon University. She shares the work she's been doing with her colleagues and students to improve security through usability. The research can be found here: https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/news/2019/07/29-usability-history.html
Researchers at Juniper Networks have been tracking a trojan they call Masad Stealer, which uses the Telegram instant messaging platform for part it its command and control infrastructure. (Telegram wasn't hacked; it's the innocent conduit.) Mounir Hahad is head of Juniper Threat Labs at Juniper Networks and he joins us to share their findings The original research is here: https://forums.juniper.net/t5/Threat-Research/Masad-Stealer-Exfiltrating-using-Telegram/ba-p/468559
Researchers at Independent Security Evaluators (ISE) recently published a report titled SOHOpelessly Broken 2.0, Security Vulnerabilities in Network Accessible Services. This publication continues and expands previous work they did examining small office/home office (SOHO) routers, network-attached storage devices (NAS), and IP cameras. Shaun Mirani is a security analyst at ISE, and he joins us to share their findings.
The original research is here: https://www.ise.io/whitepaper/sohopelessly-broken-2/
Michael Gillespie is a programmer at Emsisoft, as well as a host of the popular ID Ransomware web site that helps victims identify what strain of ransomware they may have been infected with, and what decryptors may be available. He's written many decryptors himself, most recently for the Syrk strain of ransomware. Links to the research and Michael's work: https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/33885/emsisoft-releases-a-free-decryptor-for-the-syrk-ransomware/ https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com/ https://www.youtube.com/user/Demonslay335
Researchers at FireEye recently released a report detailing the activities of APT41, a Chinese cyber threat group notable for the range of tools they use, their origins in the world of video gaming, and their willingness to shift from seemingly state-sponsored activity to hacking for personal gain. Nalani Fraser and Fred Plan contributed to the report, and they join us to share their findings. The original research is here: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/apt41-dual-espionage-and-cyber-crime-operation.html
Researchers at Prevalion have been tracking a malware campaign making use of antiquated file formats and social engineering to target specific groups.
Danny Adamitis and Elizabeth Wharton are coauthors of the report, and they join us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://blog.prevailion.com/2019/09/autumn-aperture-report.html
Many users of inexpensive internet routers use guest network functionality to help secure their home networks. Researchers at Ben Gurion University have discovered methods for defeating these security measures. Dr. Yossi Oren joins us to share their findings. The original research is here: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/woot19-paper_ovadia.pdf
A team of researchers have published a report titled, "KNOB Attack. Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack: Breaking Bluetooth Security." The report outlines vulnerabilities in the Bluetooth standard, along with mitigations to prevent them. Daniele Antonioli is from Singapore University of Technology and Design, and is one of the researchers studying KNOB. He joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://knobattack.com
Researchers at McAfee's Advanced Threat Research Team recently published the results of their investigation into a popular VOIP system, where they discovered a well-know, decade-old vulnerability in open source software used on the platform. Steve Povolny serves as the Head of Advanced Threat Research at McAfee, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/avaya-deskphone-decade-old-vulnerability-found-in-phones-firmware/
The Emotet malware came on the scene in 2014 as a banking trojan and has since evolved in sophistication and shifted its business model. Researchers at Bromium have taken a detailed look at Emotet, and malware analyst Alex Holland joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bromium.com/resource/emotet-a-technical-analysis-of-the-destructive-polymorphic-malware
Researchers at Distil Networks have been tracking online bots targeting ecommerce gift card systems of major online retailers. The threat actors show remarkable resourcefulness and adaptability. Jonathan Butler is technical account team manager at Distil Networks, part of Imperva, and he joins to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://resources.distilnetworks.com/all-blog-posts/giftghostbot-attacks-ecommerce-gift-card-systems
Researchers from King’s College London, University of Bristol, Boston University, and University of Melbourne recently collaborated to publish a report titled, "Automatically Dismantling Online Dating Fraud." The research outlines techniques to analyze and identify fraudulent online dating profiles with a high degree of accuracy.
Professor Awais Rashid is one of the report's authors, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.12593.pdf
Researchers at Cisco's Talos Unit recently published research exploring the tactics, technics and procedures of the global malvertising ecosystem. Craig Williams is head of Talos Outreach at Cisco, and he guides us through the life cycle of malicious online ads, along with tips for protecting yourself and your organization. The research can be found here: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/07/malvertising-deepdive.html
Researchers at Reversing Labs have been tracking malware hidden in software package manager repositories, and it's use as a supply chain attack vector. Robert Perica is a principal engineer at Reversing Labs, and he joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/suppy-chain-malware-detecting-malware-in-package-manager-repositories
Researchers at bot mitigation firm White Ops have been tracking fraudulent apps in the Google Play store. These apps often imitate legitimate apps, even going so far as to lift code directly from them, but instead of providing true functionality they harvest user data and send it back to command and control servers. Marcelle Lee is a principal threat intel researcher at White Ops, and she shares their findings. The original research can be found here — https://www.whiteops.com/blog/another-day-another-fraudulent-app
Researchers at Guardicore Labs have been tracking an unusual cryptominer that seems to be based in China and is targeting Windows MS-SQL and phpMyAdmin servers. Some elements of the exploit make use of sophisticated components previously associated with nation-state actors. Ophir Harpaz and Daniel Goldberg are members of the Guardicore Labs team, and they join us to explain their findings. The research can be found here - https://www.guardicore.com/2019/05/nansh0u-campaign-hackers-arsenal-grows-stronger/
Researchers at Netscout's ASERT Team have been tracking the growth of botnets originating in Egypt and targeting routers in South Africa. The payload is a variant of the Hakai DDoS bot. Richard Hummel is threat intelligence manager at Netscout, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research is here: https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/realtek-sdk-exploits-rise-egypt
Synopsys recently published the 2019 edition of their Open Source Security and Risk Analysis (OSSRA) Report, providing an in-depth look at the state of open source security, compliance, and code quality risk in commercial software.
Tim Mackey is principal security strategist within the Synopsys Cyber Research Center, and he joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/resources/analyst-reports/2019-open-source-security-risk-analysis.html
Researchers at Cloudflare have been examining HTTPS interception, a technique that weakens security, and have developed tools to help detect it. Nick Sullivan is head of cryptography at Cloudflare, and he joins to us share their findings. The research can be found here: https://blog.cloudflare.com/monsters-in-the-middleboxes/
Researchers at Zscaler have been tracking look-alike apps in third-party Android app stores that carry malicious code. Deepen Desai is VP of security research and operations and Zscaler, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/third-party-android-store-sms-trojan
Researchers at AT&T Alien Labs have been tracking a new malware family they've named "Xwo" that's scanning systems for default credentials and vulnerable web services. Tom Hegel is security researcher with AT&T Alien Labs, and he share their findings. The original research is here: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/xwo-a-python-based-bot-scanner
Adrian Bednarek is a senior research analyst at Independent Security Evaluators. He and his colleagues looked at weak private cryptocurrency keys on the Ethereum blockchain in an attempt to discover how and why they are being generated as well as how bad actors are taking advantage of them. The original research is here: https://www.securityevaluators.com/casestudies/ethercombing/
Chronicle researchers Juan Andres Guerrero Saade and Silas Cutler recently published research tracking the development of the Stuxnet family of malware, which ultimately led them to the GOSSIPGIRL Supra Group of threat actors. Juan Andres Guerrero Saade joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/who-is-gossipgirl-3b4170f846c0
Researchers at Symantec have been tracking an espionage group known as Elfin (aka APT 33) that has targeted dozens of organizations over the past three years, primarily focusing on Saudi Arabia and the United States. Alan Neville is a principal threat intelligence analyst at Symantec, and he joins us to share their findings. The research can be found here: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage
Researchers at Blackberry Cylance have been tracking payload obfuscation techniques employed by OceanLotus (APT32), specifically steganography used to hide code within seemingly benign image files.
Tom Bonner is director of threat research at Blackberry Cylance, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://www.cylance.com/en-us/lp/threat-research-and-intelligence/oceanlotus-steganography-malware-analysis-white-paper-2019.html
Researchers at Cisco Talos have been tracking what they believe is a state-sponsored attack on DNS systems, targeting the Middle East and North Africa. This attack has the potential to erode trust and stability of the DNS system, so critical to the global economy. Craig Williams is director of Talos Outreach at Cisco, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/seaturtle.html
Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel have developed techniques to infiltrate medical imaging system networks and alter 3D medical scans within, fooling both human and automated examiners with a high rate of success. Yisroel Mirsky is a cybersecurity researcher and project manager at Ben Gurion University, and he joins us to share what his team discovered. The original research can be found here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.03597.pdf A video demonstrating the exploit is here: https://youtu.be/_mkRAArj-x0
Researchers have discovered a number of vulnerabilities in the SwissPost e-vote system which could allow undetectable manipulation of votes. Dr Vanessa Teague is Associate Professor and Chair, Cybersecurity and Democracy Network at the Melbourne School of Engineering, University of Melbourne, Australia. She joins us to explain her team's findings. The original research is here: https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/SwissVote
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University's CyLab Security and Privacy Institute claim to have made an important breakthrough in establishing root of trust (RoT) to detect malware in computing devices. Virgil Gligor is one of the authors of the research, and he joins us to share their findings. Link to original research - https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/establishing-software-root-of-trust-unconditionally/
Joep Gommers from EclecticIQ joins us to share their research tracking the information operations and and security methods they've been tracking that Russians have been using in advance of the recently held elections in Ukraine. The research can be found here: https://www.eclecticiq.com/resources/fusion-center-report-situational-awareness-ukraine-elections
Researchers at Pen Test Partners recently examined a variety of third-party automotive security systems and found serious security issues, potentially giving bad actors the ability to locate, disable or meddle with multiple vehicle systems. Ken Munro is a security researcher with Pen Test Partners, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/gone-in-six-seconds-exploiting-car-alarms/
Investigators from McAfee's advanced threat research unit, working with partners at Coveware, have reevaluated hasty attributions of Ryuk ransomware to North Korea and have explored the inner workings of the threat. John Fokker is head of cyber investigations in McAfee's Advanced Threat research unit. He join us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/ryuk-exploring-the-human-connection/
Akamai's Larry Cashdollar joins us to describe an exploit he recently came across while researching MageCart incidents. It's a remote command execution vulnerability affecting ThinkPHP, a popular web framework. The original research can be found here: https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2019/01/thinkphp-exploit-actively-exploited-in-the-wild.html
Vitali Kremez is a Director of Research at Flashpoint. His team discovered that the recently disclosed intrusion suffered in December 2018 by Chilean interbank network Redbanc involved PowerRatankba, a malware toolkit with ties to North Korea-linked group Lazarus. The intrusion represents the latest known example of Lazarus-affiliated tools being deployed within financially motivated activity targeted toward financial institutions in Latin America. The original research can be found here: https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/disclosure-chilean-redbanc-intrusion-lazarus-ties/
Researchers at Zscaler have been tracking a variety fake versions of the popular Fortnite game on the Google Play store, along with associated scams. Deepen Desai is head of security research at Zscaler, and he joins us to share their findings.
The original research can be found here:
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/fake-fortnite-apps-scamming-and-spying-android-gamers
Researchers at security firm Cylance have been tracking a threat group targeting the Rosneft Russian oil company. As Cylance uncovered details, suspicions shifted from state-sponsored espionage to business email compromise.
Kevin Livelli is director of threat intelligence at Cylance, and he joins us to share what they found. The original research can be found here: https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/poking-the-bear-three-year-campaign-targets-russian-critical-infrastructure.html
Researchers at Symantec have been tracking Seedworm, a cyber espionage group targeting the Middle East as well as Europe and North America. The threat group targets government agencies, oil & gas facilities, NGOs, telecoms and IT firms. Al Cooley is director of product management at Symantec, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group
The team at Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 recently published research tracking trends in how organizations are addressing cloud security, along with tips for improvement. Ryan Olson is VP of threat intelligence at Palo Alto Networks, and he joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-cloud-security-trends-tips/
Researchers at Trend Micro recently published their look inside online underground marketplaces in the Middle East and North Africa, where criminals are buying and selling malware, laundering money and event booking their next discount vacation. Jon Clay is director of global threat communications at Trend Micro, and he joins us with their findings.
The original research can be found here: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/cash-and-communication-new-trends-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-underground
Researchers from Duo Security have been analyzing the behavior of Twitter bots in a series of posts on their web site. Their most recent dive into the subject explores amplification bots, which boost the impact of tweets through likes and retweets.
Jordan Wright is a principal R&D engineer at Duo Security, and he joins us to share their findings. Link to the original research - https://duo.com/labs/research/anatomy-of-twitter-bots-amplification-bots
Researchers from Netscout's ASERT team have been making use of honeypots to gather information on rapidly evolving IoT botnets that take advantage of default usernames and passwords to gain access and take control of unprotected devices. Matt Bing is a security research analyst with Netscout, and he guides us through their findings. The original research can be found here: https://asert.arbornetworks.com/dipping-into-the-honeypot/
Researchers at RiskIQ have been tracking a series of web-based credit card skimmers known as Magecart. We take a closer look at attacks on Ticketmaster, British Airways, NewEgg and Shopper Approved payment card pages. Yonathan Klijnsma is lead of threat research at RiskIQ, and he guides us through what they've learned. Links to RiskIQ research: https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-ticketmaster-breach/ https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-british-airways-breach/ https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-newegg/ https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-shopper-approved/
Researchers from Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks have discovered an interesting relationship between the NOKKI and DOGCALL malware families, as well as a new RAT being used to deploy the malware. Jen Miller-Osborn is Deputy Director of Threat Intelligence with Unit 42, and she joins us to share their findings. The original research can be found here: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/
Researchers at Duo Security have been looking into Apple's Device Enrollment Program (DEM) and have discovered vulnerabilities that could expose users of the service to potential issues from social engineering and rogue devices. James Barclay is Senior R&D Engineer at Duo Security, and he joins us to share what they've found. The original research can be found here: https://duo.com/blog/weak-apple-dep-authentication-leaves-enterprises-vulnerable-to-social-engineering-attacks-and-rogue-devices
Researchers at Risk Based Security took a detailed look back at the 2014 Sony hack, comparing analysis that occurred while the facts were still unfolding with what we know, today. There are interesting lessons to be learned, especially when it comes to attribution. Brian Martin is V.P. of vulnerability intelligence at Risk Based Security, and he shares their findings. The research can be found here: https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2018/09/you-didnt-think-the-sony-saga-was-over-did-you/
Researchers at Trend Micro uncovered a supply chain attack targeting organizations in South Korea. With the goal of information theft, attackers compromised the update server of a third party support provider, resulting in the installation of a RAT, or remote access trojan.
Rik Ferguson is Vice President of Security Research at Trend Micro, and he guides us through their discoveries.
The research can be found here: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/supply-chain-attack-operation-red-signature-targets-south-korean-organizations/
Researchers from Secureworks' Counter Threat Unit have been tracking a threat group spoofing login pages for universities. Evidence suggests the Iranian group Cobalt Dickens is likely responsible. Allison Wikoff is a senior researcher at Secureworks, and she joins us to share what they've found.
The original research is here: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/back-to-school-cobalt-dickens-targets-universities
The NETSCOUT Arbor ASERT team has been tracking Cobalt Group campaigns targeting financial institutions. Richard Hummel is manager of threat intelligence with ASERT, and he joins us to share his team's findings. The research can be found here: https://asert.arbornetworks.com/double-the-infection-double-the-fun/
Joseph Nye is former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He served as Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under President Clinton. He serves as a Commissioner for the Global Commission on Internet Governance, and is the author of over a dozen books, including, “Soft Power: The means to success in work politics,” and “The future of power.”
Symantec technical director Vikram Thakur returns to share his team's look at threat groups APT 28 and APT 29, the influence they had on the 2016 election, and how the cyber security industry has responded in preparation for the 2018 midterms.
The original research can be found here: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/election-hacking-faq
Researchers at security firm Check Point Software Technologies explored the possibility of exploiting old, complex fax protocols to gain access to modern multifunction office printers, and then pivot to connected networks. Yaniv Balmas is head of security research at Check Point, and he joins us to share what he and his colleague Eyal Itkin discovered. The research can be found here: https://research.checkpoint.com/sending-fax-back-to-the-dark-ages/
Security firm Lastline recently took a close look at threats to the Office 365 cloud environment, taking advantage of the insights they gain protecting their clients. Andy Norton is director of threat intelligence at Lastline, and he joins us to describe their findings. The research can be found here: https://www.lastline.com/blog/malspam-malscape-snapshot-malicious-activity-in-the-office-365-cloud/
Researchers at Virginia Tech investigate possible ways to manipulate GPS signals and send drivers to specific locations without their knowledge.
Gang Wang is Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Virginia Tech, and he joins us to share his team's findings.
The original research can be found here: https://people.cs.vt.edu/gangwang/sec18-gps.pdf
Researchers at Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 have been tracking the rise of cryptocurrency mining operations run by criminal groups around the world. Ryan Olson is V.P. of threat intelligence at Palo Alto Networks, and he joins us to share what they've learned. The original research can be found here: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rise-cryptocurrency-miners/
Researchers at security firm FireEye have been tracking malicious actors they call FIN7, a group which targets payment card data in the hospitality industry and elsewhere. They make use of targeted phishing campaigns, telephone vishing and even a convincing front company to do their deeds. Nick Carr and Barry Vengerick are coauthors of the research, along with their colleagues Kimberly Goody and Steve Miller. The research is titled On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. It can be found here: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html
Researchers at security firm Cybereason recently set up online honeypots to attract adversaries interested in industrial control system environments. It didn't take long for sophisticated attackers to sniff out the virtual honey and start snuffling around. Ross Rustici is senior director of intelligence services at Cybereason, and he joins us to share what they learned. The research is titled ICS Threat Broadens: Nation-state Hackers are no Longer the Only Game in Town. It can be found here: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/industrial-control-system-specialized-hackers
A team of researchers from Northeastern University and UC Santa Barbara examined over 17,000 Android apps, and revealed a number of alarming privacy risks. Elleen Pan and Christo Wilson were members of the research team, and they join us to share what they found. The research is titled Panoptispy: Characterizing Audio and Video Exfiltration from Android Applications. It can be found here: https://recon.meddle.mobi/papers/panoptispy18pets.pdf
Researchers at Symantec recently published their findings on an active attack group named Leafminer that's targeting government organizations and businesses in the Middle East region. Vikram Thakur is a technical director at Symantec, and he joins us to share what they've found. The research can be found here: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/leafminer-espionage-middle-east
Threat researcher Marcelle Lee from LookingGlass Cyber Solutions joins us to share her research on the growing threat of ATM hacks in the U.S. The research can be found here: https://www.lookingglasscyber.com/blog/atm-hacking-you-dont-have-to-pay-to-play/
Threat intelligence firm Recorded Future recently published research describing espionage activities originating from servers at a major Chinese university, coinciding with international economic development efforts. Winnona DeSombre and Sanil Chohan are authors of the report, Chinese Cyberespionage Originating from Tsinghua University Infrastructure, along with their colleague Justin Grosfelt. The research can be found here: https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-cyberespionage-operations/
Researchers at Bitdefender have been tracking a bit of complex rootkit malware called Zacinlo that they suspect has been operating virtually undetected for over six years. Bogdan Botezatu is a senior cyber security analyst with Bitdefender, and he describes what they've found. Research link: https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/06/six-years-and-counting-inside-the-complex-zacinlo-ad-fraud-operation/
Researchers at Symantec have been tracking a wide-ranging espionage operation that's targeting satellite, telecom and defense companies. Jon DiMaggio is a senior cyber intelligence analyst at Symantec, and he takes us through what they've discovered. The research can be found here: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets
Researchers at McAfee recently discovered code execution vulnerabilities in the default settings of the Cortana voice-activated digital assistant in Windows 10 systems. Steve Povolny is head of advanced threat research at McAfee and he shares their findings. The research can be found here: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/want-to-break-into-a-locked-windows-10-device-ask-cortana-cve-2018-8140
Researchers at Defiant recently analyzed a malware family they named "BabaYaga," which has the curious behavior of clearing out other malware and keeping infected sites up to date. Brad Hass is a senior security analyst at Defiant, and he guides us through their findings. The research can be found here: https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2018/06/babayaga-wordpress-malware/
Researchers Gang Wang and Hang Hu from Virginia Tech recently conducted an end-to-end measurement on 35 popular email providers and examining user reactions to spoofing through a real-world spoofing/phishing test. Gang Wang joins us to share the sobering results. End-to-End Measurements of Email Spoofing Attacks https://people.cs.vt.edu/gangwang/usenix-draft.pdf
Andy Bochman is senior grid strategist for Idaho National Lab’s National and Homeland Security directorate. Today we’re discussing the research the INL has been doing, developing new approaches to protecting mission critical systems.
Sellers of malware on Dark Web forums often use No Distribute malware scanning tools to help verify the effectiveness of their wares, while preventing legitimate virus scanning tools from adding the malware to their database. Daniel Hatheway is a Senior Security Analyst at Recorded Future, and he takes us through their recently published research, Uncover Unseen Malware Samples with No Distribute Scanners.
Researchers from Cisco Talos continue to track malware they've named VPNFilter, a multi-stage infection with multiple capabilities, targeting consumer-grade routers. Craig Williams is head of Cisco Talos Outreach, and he joins us with the details.
Researchers at Check Point Research recently discovered vulnerabilities in some LG smartphone keyboards, vulnerabilities that could have been used to remotely execute code with elevated privileges, act as a keylogger and thereby compromise the users’ privacy and authentication details.
Carbon Black's Chief Cybersecurity Officer Tom Kellerman shares the results of their recent report, Modern Bank Heists: Cyberattacks & Lateral Movement in the Financial Sector. For the report, they interviewed CISOs at 40 major financial institutions, revealing attack and mitigation trends.
Researchers from ProtectWise's 401TRG team recently published research linking a variety of new and previously reported Chinese cyber threat groups. Tom Hegel is a Senior Threat Researcher with the 401TRG, and he joins us to share their findings.
Researchers from Flashpoint recently explored ISIS' ability to distribute propaganda across the internet, and their use of major internet service providers to help them achieve persistence.
Ken Wolf is a Senior Analyst at Flashpoint, and he describes what they learned.
Researchers at Akamai recently published a white paper titled UPnProxy: Blackhat proxies via NAT Injections. In it, they describe vulnerabilities with Universal Plug and Play capabilities in home routers, and how malicious actors could take advantage of them. Chad Seaman is a senior CERT engineer at Akamai, and he's our guide.
Researchers from Arbor Networks' ASERT Threat Intelligence Team recently published a report titled, "Lojack Becomes a Double Agent." It outlines how threat actors are altering legitimate recovery utility software and simulating its command and control servers to gain access to target machines. Richard Hummel is manager of the ASERT Threat Research Team, and he joins us to describe their work.
Bobby Filar is a Principal Data Scientist at Endgame, and coauthor of the research paper, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation. The report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of AI, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. Bobby Filar joins us to discuss the paper, and his views on the evolving role of AI in cybersecurity. The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation
Kevin Epstein is Vice President of Proofpoint's Threat Operations Center. We’re discussing two bits of research with him today. The first is about BlackTDS, a traffic distribution tool for sale in dark web markets. A little later in the show, he’ll tell us about ThreadKit, a document exploit builder.
Researchers at Trend Micro recently discovered a backdoor targeting MacOS users that they believe is the work of the OceanLotus threat group, an organization previously thought to have launched targeted attacks against human rights organizations, media organizations, research institutes, and maritime construction firms. Mark Nunnikhoven is VP of Cloud Research at Trend Micro, and he explains what they've learned. https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found/
Researchers with Arbor Networks ASERT team have been tracking a malware campaign targeting commercial manufacturing, and have uncovered various samples dating back to at least 2016.
Richard Hummel is Threat Intelligence Manager for Arbor Networks' ASERT Team, and he takes us through what they've discovered. https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/innaput-actors-utilize-remote-access-trojan-since-2016-presumably-targeting-victim-files/
Researchers at Cylance recently uncovered the malicious use of a core router in a campaign aimed at critical infrastructure around the world.
Kevin Levelli is Director of Threat Intelligence at Cylance, and he takes us through what they've discovered.
In their recently published paper, "Crypto Crumple Zones: Enabling Limited Access Without Mass Surveillance," coauthors Charles Wright and Mayank Varia make their case for an alternative approach to the encryption debate, one based on economics as a limiting factor on government overreach and surveillance.
Crypto Crumple Zones: Enabling Limited Access Without Mass Surveillance
FlawedAMMYY is a newly discovered remote access trojan (RAT) that’s been used in malicious email campaigns, as far back as 2016. Ryan Kalember is Senior Vice President of Cyber Security Strategy at Proofpoint, and he takes us through their research.
Researchers at Duo Security recently unearthed a new vulnerability class that affects SAML-based single sign-on (SSO) systems. This vulnerability can allow an attacker with authenticated access to trick SAML systems into authenticating as a different user without knowledge of the victim user’s password. Kelby Ludwig is a Senior Application Security Engineer at Duo security, and he takes us through his discoveries.
There's been an epidemic of cryptojacking code injections recently, as bad actors attempt to cash in on the cryptocurrency craze through unauthorized cryptomining operations on unsuspecting users. Marcelle Lee is a threat researcher at LookingGlass, and she takes us through her recently published research, Cryptojacking — Coming to a Server Near You.
Researcher from Lookout and the EFF have discovered an APT group operating out of Lebanon they've named Dark Caracal. The group is running a global espionage campaign, targeting journalists, military personnel, activists, lawyers, medical professionals and educational institutions. Mike Murray is VP of Security Intelligence at Lookout, and he's our guide through their research.
Researchers at Comodo Security Solutions have been tracking a recently discovered strain of malware named Lebal. The malware uses several clever techniques to attempt to hide itself, and once installed targets credentials and cryptocurrency wallets. Fatih Orhan is VP of Threat Labs at Comodo, and he takes us through their research.
Or Katz is principal lead security researcher for Akamai's Enterprise Security Business Unit, and the research he’s sharing today is a widespread phishing campaign targeting users using an advertising tactic. The research is titled, “Gone Phishing for the Holidays."
The research we’re discussing today is called, “Beware the Hex Men”, and it tracks multiple attack campaigns conducted by a Chinese threat actor. The GuardiCore Labs team identified three attack variants that they named Hex, Hanako and Taylor, targeting SQL servers.
IcedID is a banking trojan recently discovered and tracked by IBM's X-Force research team, targeting banks, payment card providers, mobile services providers, payroll, webmail and e-commerce sites in the U.S. Limor Kessem is an executive security advisor with IBM Security. She returns to Research Saturday to describe what she and her team found.
Adware is generally considered unsophisticated, and because of its low perceived threat level it's often ignored. Researchers at the Booz Allen Dark Labs' Advanced Threat Hunt Team have recently published research describing a more advanced type of adware, using infection techniques usually attributed to nation-state actors.
Jay Novak is a threat hunter and tech lead at Booz Allen, and he takes us through their research.
This week we’re discussing the a campaign the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team recently discovered, one that’s targeting organizations involved with the upcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Raj Samani is chief scientist at McAfee, and he shares the campaign's clever details.
Researchers at ThreatConnect have discovered evidence that Fancy Bear, a cyber espionage group generally associated with Russia's military agency GRU, may be spoofing domains belonging to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), and the Olympic Council of Asia.
Kyle Ehmke is a threat intelligence researcher with ThreatConnect, and he takes us through their work.
A group of Russian-speaking hackers have stolen nearly $10 million from banks around the world. Group-IB, a company with expertise in computer forensics, information security and, specifically, Russian‑speaking criminal groups, have named these thieves MoneyTaker. Nicholas Palmer is the director of international business development at Group-IB, and he's joined by their head of threat intelligence, Dmitry Volkob to explain the MoneyTaker group's schemes.
Robert M. Lee. is CEO of Dragos Security, a company that specializes in the protection of industrial control systems. He’s describing his team's research on TRISIS, tailored ICS malware infecting safety instrumented systems (SIS), so far found only in the middle east. It's only the fifth known incident of malware targeting ICS systems.
Alan Neville is a senior threat intelligence analyst at Symantec located in Dublin. He is responsible for leading and documenting investigations into high priority attacks.
He recently published research on the Sowbug cyber espionage group targeting South American and Southeast Asian governments.
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments
In this edition of the CyberWire Research Saturday, we'll take a look at a more recent intrusion PwC has uncovered, named KeyBoy and highly likely a China-based threat actor. It uses compromised Word documents to gain access.
Bart Parys is a lead researcher in PwC's cyber threat intelligence team, responsible for tracking cyber threat actors, their latest toolsets and methodologies.
https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-data-privacy/research/the-keyboys-are-back-in-town.html
Online underground markets thrive across the globe, with the Middle East and North Africa being no exception. Researchers at Trend Micro recently too a look inside these digital souks, and while much of what they discovered matches similar online marketplaces, there are unique cultural elements that set these regional trading posts apart. Jon Clay is a cyber security expert from Trend Micro, and he takes us through their research paper, "Digital Souks: A Glimpse into the Middle East and North African Underground."
Zberp is a stealthy banking trojan with an unconventional process injection technique. A hybrid of the ZeusVM and Carberp malware, Zberp uses a variety of techniques to prevent detection while it gathers information from infected systems. Limor Kessem is an executive security advisor for IBM, and she's our guide.
Bad actors are using Fast Flux Networks with quickly-changing IP addresses and domain names to help hide their activities. Or Katz, Principal Lead Security Researcher at Akamai, takes us through their recently-published white paper, "Digging Deeper — An In-Depth Analysis of a Fast Flux Network."
The Terdot Banker Trojan is a descendant of the Zeus family of malware, and has evolved to feature serious espionage capabilities. It can compromise transactions, steal accounts and credit card information, and can eavesdrop on and modify traffic on social media and email platforms. While not yet widely spread, it's a threat to consumers and businesses alike. Bogdan Botezatu is a senior e-threat analyst at Bitdefender, and he takes us through their recently published whitepaper.
Cybercriminals offer all sorts of illicit goods for sale on Deep and Dark Web markets. In this episode, Liv Rowley, cybercrime intelligence analyst at Flashpoint, takes us through her team's research into the pricing of certain illegal goods online, including "Fullz", exploit kits, DDoS for hire, RDP servers, card data, bank logs and passports. Supply meets demand in this shady underground ecosystem.
Dr. Adrian Nish is head of cyber threat intelligence at BAE Systems. His team has been tracking a new cyber-enabled bank heist in Asia. Some of the tools used are reminiscent of the Bangladesh Bank attack from February 2016. The full report can be found here.
In this episode of the CyberWire’s Research Saturday we are joined by Jordan Wright, Senior Research and Development Engineer at Duo Security. He’s the author of the research report, “Phish in a Barrel,” which describes his work gathering and examining thousands of phishing kits from around the web.
The moniker KHRAT came about because of the identification of a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with command and control infrastructure found in Cambodia (KH). In the most recent episode of the CyberWire's Research Saturday, Ryan Olson, Director of Threat Intelligence at Palo Alto Networks, talks with us about the capabilities of KHRAT and shares details the feature set it provides to threat actors that use it. https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/08/unit42-updated-khrat-malware-used-in-cambodia-attacks/
In August 2017, multiple Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and content providers were subject to significant attacks from a botnet dubbed WireX. (The botnet is named for an anagram for one of the delimiter strings in its command and control protocol.) The WireX botnet is primarily made up of Android devices running malicious applications and is designed to create DDoS traffic. The botnet is sometimes associated with ransom notes to targets. Justin Paine is Head of Trust and Safety at Cloudflare, and he joins us to share the WireX story. https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-wirex-botnet/
Peter Ney is a PhD candidate in the Allen School of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Washington where he is advised by Professor Tadayoshi Kohno. His current research is focused on understanding computer security risks in emerging technologies like DNA synthesis and sequencing and the new threats posed by maliciously crafted, synthetic DNA. He and his team found that security of DNA processing programs is poor and show with a proof-of-concept that it is possible to attack computer systems with adversarial synthetic DNA.
Android Toast Overlay enables attackers to trick Android users into enabling permissions on infected devices by making them think they are clicking on benign buttons superimposed over the user interface.
Ryan Olson is Director of Threat Intelligence at Palo Alto Networks' Unity 42, and he joins us to share their research.
APT 33 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that targets aerospace and energy sectors and has ties to destructive malware. John Hultquist is Director of Intelligence Analysis at FireEye, and he takes us through their research.
In 2016 Bitdefender uncovered a new advanced persistent threat dubbed Pacifier, targeting government institutions starting in 2014. Using malicious .doc documents and .zip files distributed via spear phishing e-mails, attackers would lure victims with invitations to social functions or conferences into executing the attachments. It’s capable of dropping multi-stage backdoors. Liviu Arsene is a senior e-threat analyst at BitDefender, and he's our guide to the complex components of Pacifier APT.
Deepen Desai, senior director of security research and operations at Zscaler, describes research he and his team have been doing since discovered a clever bit of malware they’ve named Cobian RAT. (RAT stands for Remote Access Trojan.) It’s available for free, but contains a back door that allows the original author to access and control the RAT remotely.