Perceiving, then, is like bare announcing and understanding [cf. Charles, saying alone or thinking], but when [the perceived object] is pleasant (ἡδύ) or painful, [the soul/the perceptual soul], as it were affirming or denying, pursues or avoids. In fact, to feel pleasant (τὸ ἥδεσθαι) or pain [cf. Charles, to be pleasurably and painfully affected] is to be active with regard to the perceptual mean in relation to what is good, or bad, as such. Both aversion and desire as active are the same, and the desiring part and the aversive part are not distinct either from one another or from the perceptual one, although the being for them is distinct. To the understanding soul, however, appearances are like perceptions. And when it affirms or denies good or bad, it avoids or pursues. That is why the soul never undersands without appearance. (DA III.7 431a8-17. cf. Met. Θ.10 1051b24-25; NE VI.2 1139a21-22. for the perceptual mean, see DA II.11 424a1-9; 423b27, 424a28)

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή.