Dualism Central Claim: The mind is own separate kind of substance/property. * Ex: Pain is an experience and experiences are not physical things. * Central Problems*: Can you give a good account of what this mind stuff is supposed to be? And how does this mind stuff causally interact with physical stuff?

Logical Behaviorism Central claim: Mental states are behavioral dispositions. All ‘mental talk’ can be translated into ‘behavior talk’. * Ex: ‘Pain’ is a word we use to pick out certain behavioral dispositions. * Central Problem:* Can you be in a mental state without displaying characteristic behavior? (Super-Super Spartans)

Identity Theory Central Claim: Mental states are identical with brain states. * Ex: Pain is the firing of C-fibers in the brain. * Central Problem:* Too Strong. (Multiple Realizability.)

Functionalism Central Claim: Mental states are functional states. Mental states are token-identical with whatever state plays a particular causal role. * Ex: Pain is whatever internal state that is caused by harmful stimuli and (normally) produces shouting, grimacing, etc. * Central Problem:* Too liberal. Under functionalism, certain ‘mindless’ systems might have to count as minds. (Searle’s Chinese Room and Block’s Chinese Nation)

Eliminitivism Central Claim: The "mind", like other imaginary things that science has disproven, doesn’t actually exist. * Ex: While you may think* you are experiencing pain when the car door slams down on your hand, that's really just an illusion. * Central Problems: It has potentially radical consequences. For instance, it becomes difficult to say why "pain" is bad...