Media and Culture: Recent Episodes
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Media and Culture includes works on the arts, literature, and media of communication generally. Also how government often uses the media as a propaganda venue.
Many people believe that the board game Monopoly, developed during the Great Depression, mimics a real-world capitalist economy. Monopoly is a game, not real life.
Original Article: "Is the Monopoly Board Game Like Real Markets?"
Ryan McMaken joins Bob to discuss the surprisingly negative reaction (from a Reason writer and Tyler Cowen) to Oliver Anthony's hit song, "Rich Men North of Richmond." Ryan and Bob defend the lyrics, arguing that Anthony doesn't say anything objectionable from either a libertarian or economic perspective.
Listen to Oliver Anthony's "Rich Men North of Richmond": Mises.org/HAP412a Christian Britschgi's article in Reason on Oliver Anthony: Mises.org/HAP412b Tyler Cowan's Bloomberg Editorial: Mises.org/HAP412c
Join us in Nashville on September 23rd for a no-holds-barred discussion against the regime. Use Code "HA23" for $45 off admission: Mises.org/Nashville23
If Staten Island is allowed to secede, our national technocrats fear that might open up countless similar demands for self-determination across the nation. For the elites, the current status quo works quite well and they want to keep it that way.
Original Article: "Let Staten Island Secede!"
Members of Congress claim to be "concerned" over the proposed merger between LIV Golf and the PGA Tour. They should be supporting it or, even better, backing off completely.
Original Article: "Golf Merger Is Opposed by Congress. This Is Misguided"
Many conservatives, in trying to steer the USA away from "wokeism," fail to understand that their “national greatness” schemes are just as harmful.
Original Article: ""National Greatness" Is Not the Appropriate Response to "Wokeism""
The rioting in France is not due to racism nor is it the logical end of immigration. Instead, it is rooted in France's minimum wage and other labor restrictions that lead to unemployment and resentment.
Original Article: "France's Unrest Has Deep Roots. Proposed Immigration Restrictions Will Make Things Worse"
Modern American media has become so politicized that a once-venerable institution now cannot be trusted.
Original Article: "Politics Has Infected Everything in Our Society, Especially the Media"
Matthew Mohlman joins Good Money with Tho Bishop to discuss his work with Monument Ventures. Matthew and Tho discuss the need to build better alternatives to woke financial institutions, and the limit of political solutions to address the problem.
Join Bob Murphy, Patrick Newman, Jonathan Newman, and Murray Sabrin in November for a Mises Circle in Ft. Meyers, FL on The White House, the Fed, and the Economy. Use promo code Tampa23 for $10 off registration.
Matthew's Article on JPMorgan's Progressive, Anti-Faith Agenda: Mises.org/GM21aOn Politically-Motivated 'De-Banking': Mises.org/GM21bVivek Ramaswamy on ESG: Mises.org/GM21cMonument Ventures: Mises.org/GM21dGood Money listeners can order a special $5 book bundle that includes How To Think About the Economy and What Has Government Done to Our Money? with free shipping using promo code "GoodMoney" at Mises.org/Good
Receive a free subscription to The Austrian magazine at Mises.org/Magazine
Leonard Read's famous "I, Pencil" explained the workings of the market in terms of the creation of a simple pencil. However, we should not forget that the reviled fossil fuels are involved at every turn.
Original Article: "Not Even a Pencil Could Exist without Fossil Fuels"
The Ukraine war brings death and destruction with no end in sight. Instead of encouraging more fighting, Western political leaders need to face reality and find a way to end this conflict.
Original Article: "The Killing and Destruction Must Stop: It Is Time to End the Ukraine War"
Michael Rectenwald talks with Paul Gottfried about Paleoconservatism, the left, Wokism, the identity and ethos of the ruling elite, and decentralization.
Join us in Nashville on September 23rd for a no-holds-barred discussion against the regime. Use code "Rekt23" for $45 off admission: Mises.org/Nashville23
While Americans believe the First Amendment protects their speech, the US government and mainstream media have joined together to suppress speech that does not coincide with government policies.
Original Article: "Censorship through the Centuries: Free Speech Suppression by the Government and the Mainstream Media"
The Christian nationalist state is one in which civil rulers—for a time—regard the Church as a convenient ally. Once this comes to an end, however, the "Christian" state transforms into a state hostile to those it was once designed to protect.
Original Article: "The Dead End of Catholic Nationalism"
The fall of the Pac-12 is an unfortunate end to a proud collegiate institution. But its death isn’t the fault of uncurable greed but of the conference’s own inability to be competitive in the game.
Original Article: ""Greed" Didn't Kill the Pac-12. Entrepreneurial Failure Did"
In order for nations to have capital development and market-based economies, they must have a cultural framework that accepts these developments. Too many nations do not, and they languish in poverty as a result.
Original Article: "Cultural Change Is Necessary for Capital Development"
Some residents of St. Louis, fed up with the nonprotection from the city's police, have hired private security to deal with the problem. The egalitarian Left, of course, doesn't like that.
Original Article: "Egalitarianism as a Revolt against Safety"
Trump is essentially being prosecuted for questioning the outcome of an election, and federal paranoia about protecting its own aura of legitimacy is entering a new highly aggressive phase.
Original Article: "The United States vs. Donald J. Trump"
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop look at the latest indictment of Donald Trump. While many are exhausted with the theater of modern politics, DC's escalating attacks reveal the state's true anatomy. Any challenge to the state's legitimacy — like questioning an election — must be crushed.
Recommended Reading "The United States vs. Donald J. Trump" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_145_A
"If Congress Were Genuinely Interested in Democracy, They Would Welcome an Election Commission" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_145_B
"Trump's Potential Legacy: 50 Million+ Enemies of the State" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_145_C
"America's Elites—Not Trump—Are Responsible for Undermining American Democracy" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_145_D
Download Anatomy of the State for free at Mises.org/Anatomy
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
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To seriously threaten the regime, one must attack it at its roots. This would require rejecting the modern civil rights legal regime, something modern Buckleyite conservatives and James Lindsay-style liberals are not interested in, and unites paleoconservatives and paleolibertarians.
Original Article: "Paleoconservatives Need Better Critics"
In this new age of decentralized and democratized content creation, union members' demands may simply be based on wishful thinking for a bygone era.
Original Article: "Striking Hollywood Actors and Writers Might Have to Get Used to Stagnant Wages"
Michael talks with Gad Saad about evolutionary psychology and the market, the mind parasites, and his new book.
Michael talks with Tom Woods about RFK, Jr., whether the elites are evil or just incompetent, and the secret of Tom's success.
Ryan, Tho, and Kerry Baldwin take a look at why some politicians say they're "nationalists." Is nationalism a good thing or is it just another way to justify more government meddling in our lives?
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
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New York Times columnist David French likes to think of himself as an honest broker. In reality, his "Never Trump" mentality leads him to overlook government lawbreaking.
Original Article: "David French Gets to Sit with the Cool Kids at the NYT Lunch Table"
Crime is increasing in American cities, but don't count on police to protect you. The Defund the Police movement has less to do with that than most people think.
Original Article: "You Can’t Depend on the State to Maintain Public Order"
Einstein might have been one of history's most brilliant men, but even his great mind could not have made socialism work. Unfortunately, he wasn't smart enough to see that.
Original Article: "A Great Man Cannot Salvage a Bad Idea"
Ryan and Tho take a look at the legacy of Daniel Ellsberg's heroic leak of the Pentagon Papers and the evils of government secrecy. Modern leakers like Snowden, Manning, and Assange do important work educating voters and making the state more accountable.
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
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In the pre-industrial world, aggression and physical domination were often labeled as "masculine" virtues because they were useful for survival. The rise of the cooperative market economy changed all that.
Original Article: "How Capitalism Redefined Masculine Virtue"
Political leaders of the so-called liberal Western regimes are engaging in authoritarian tactics to quell legitimate dissent. But leftists who riot and burn get a free pass.
Original Article: "Rise of the Effete Authoritarians"
Much of critical race theory and “antiracism” is aimed at pulling people apart, not bringing them together. To oppose such theories and practices is not racist in itself.
Original Article: "Opposing Critical Race Theory Doesn't Make You a 'White Supremacist'"
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop are joined by Mises Senior Editor Bill Anderson to discuss his recent article, "David French Gets to Sit with the Cool Kids at the NYT Lunch Table." Bill explains the transformation of French from a "cultural conservative" commentator to the preferred "classical liberal" of the elite.
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
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Recommended Reading "David French Gets to Sit with the Cool Kids at the NYT Lunch Table" by William L. Anderson: Mises.org/RR_138_A
"Review: Sohrab Ahmari's New Attack on Laissez-Faire Liberalism" by Zachary Yost: Mises.org/RR_138_B
""Libertarian" Is Just Another Word for (Classical) Liberal" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_138_C
"To Stop the Left, America Needs a Rothbardian Right" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_138_D
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Individualism, while condemned in some cultures, has helped make this country economically successful. Will the influx of immigrants from cultures that devalue individualism reverse that success?
Original Article: "Individualism in the US Has Helped Make It an Economic Success"
The trans rights movement has quickly moved into government coercion and outright violence. There is nothing libertarian about what is happening in this movement today.
Original Article: "“Trans Rights” Means Trans Entitlements and the End of Civil Society"
Modern progressives don't like to refer to their long-held support of eugenics. In fact, American progressives influenced the Nazis, who launched their own murderous eugenics schemes.
Original Article: "The Boston Brahmins, WASPs, and Nazis: The Pursuit of Eugenics"
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop discuss the role statistics play in promoting the regime. Topics include some interesting differences in recently reported unemployment data, changes to inflation reporting over time, government withholding of various reports — including crime and money supply measures — as well as alternative measures Austrians use to better cut through state propaganda.
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
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Recommended Reading "Yet Another Month of Questionable Federal Jobs Data as 310,000 Fewer People Report Having Jobs" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_137_A
"The "True" Money Supply: A Measure of the Supply of the Medium of Exchange in the U.S. Economy" by Joseph Salerno: Mises.org/RR_137_B
"Does GDP Present an Accurate Picture of the Economy? Not Likely" by Frank Shostak: Mises.org/RR_137_C
"World War I as Fulfillment: Power and the Intellectuals" by Murray Rothbard: Mises.org/RR_137_D
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
With the appointment of Linda Yaccarino as Twitter's new CEO, Elon Musk is trying to appease woke advertisers to bring up his company's revenues. This will not end well.
Original Article: "The Woke Cartel and Twitter's New CEO"
Domestic violence is a stain on society, but it is worse if we only care about violence committed against people of one sex.
Original Article: "Committing Domestic Violence against Men . . . Just for a Giggle"
American corporations are lavishing billions of dollars on leftist groups in the name of "equity." But many of them also are donating to even more questionable people and causes.
Original Article: "The Putrid Underbelly of Woke Capitalism"
Modern culture is biased against those that are rich even while depending upon the wealth that successful entrepreneurs have created.
Original Article: "Progressives Want to Eliminate Wealthy Entrepreneurs but Need the Wealth They Create"
People from socially and economically marginized groups in the USA tend to support socialism. Yet socialists have a long and bloody history of suppressing these very groups.
Original Article: "Socialism, Minority Groups, and Personal Liberties"
Every day, more and more Americans are awakening to the reality that the institutions in control of this nation are failing them. From violence in the streets, inflation in our stores, increasing tyranny and censorship, and absolute buffoonery on public display in halls of political power. The ruling class is getting richer while most of us suffer, and new generations are becoming increasingly warped by the dangerous ideologies of the left.
Recorded at The Depot Craft Brewery & Distillery in Reno, Nevada on May 20th, 2023.
Modern Western culture is dominated by demands for "social justice." But how does one even define this term, and does social justice even produce justice in the end?
Original Article: "Is Social Justice Just? A Review"
Taxpayer-funded company Dominion is suing private parties for saying things the company doesn't like. These lawsuits illustrate how defamation laws can be used to destroy free speech.
Original Article: "The Dominion Lawsuit against Fox News Is Part of the War against Free Speech"
We’re supposed to go along with Green Energy schemes—as we did with masks, school lockdowns, and vaccinations to stop covid—because our government, media, and “public interest” groups insist that we “follow the science.”
Original Article: "How Greening the Economy Will Destroy America"
The real issue we face is not whether we should be in the red tribe or the blue tribe, but rather what will be the constituency for freedom.
Original Article: "Neither Red nor Blue, but Free"
We hear ad nauseum from political and media elites that the war in Ukraine is about preserving "our freedoms." Murray Rothbard had something to say about this sophistry.
Original Article: "Rothbard Was Right: Wars Don't Enhance Freedom. They Destroy Liberty."
While politicians, media mavens, and the academic elite spread fear about artificial intelligence, AI is helping make life better for ordinary consumers.
Original Article: "Prices, Food, Employment: AI and Robotics Are for Regular Folks, Not Just the Elite"
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop talk about recent court cases involving defamation claims, justifying libertarian skepticism of the entire concept. As Ryan noted in a recent Wire article, the Dominion lawsuit in particular, is a particularly chilling case for free speech, with a taxpayer-funded company effectively silencing public critics. This, along with the recent Trump verdict, are an illustration of the continuing escalating weaponization of the court system for political ends.
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
PROMO CODE: RothPod for 20% off
Recommended Reading"The Dominion Lawsuit against Fox News is Part of the War against Free Speech" by Ryan McMaken.: Mises.org/RR_133_A
"The Alex Jones Verdict Shows the Danger of Defamation Laws" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_133_B
"Lawsuits Are the Hitman of the State" by Brian Caplan Mises.org/RR_133_C
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
[Originally from Joseph R. Peden and Fred R. Glahe, eds., The American Family and the State (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute, 1986).]
While the "Progressive Era" used to be narrowly designated as the period 1900–1914, historians now realize that the period is really much broader, stretching from the latter decades of the nineteenth century into the early 1920s. The broader period marks an era in which the entire American polity—from economics to urban planning to medicine to social work to the licensing of professions to the ideology of intellectuals—was transformed from a roughly laissez-faire system based on individual rights to one of state planning and control. In the sphere of public policy issues closely related to the life of the family, most of the change took place, or at least began, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. In this paper we shall use the analytic insights of the "new political history" to examine the ways in which the so-called progressives sought to shape and control selected aspects of American family life.
ETHNORELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLSIn the last two decades, the advent of the "new political history" has transformed our understanding of the political party system and the basis of political conflict in nineteenth century America. In contrast to the party systems of the twentieth century (the "fourth" party system, 1896–1932, of Republican supremacy; the "fifth" party system, 1932–? of Democratic supremacy), the nineteenth century political parties were not bland coalitions of interests with virtually the same amorphous ideology, with each party blurring what is left of its image during campaigns to appeal to the large independent center. In the nineteenth century, each party offered a fiercely contrasting ideology, and political parties performed the function of imposing a common ideology on diverse sectional and economic interests. During campaigns, the ideology and the partisanship became fiercer and even more clearly demarcated, since the object was not to appeal to independent moderates—there were virtually none—but to bring out the vote of one's own partisans. Such partisanship and sharp alternatives marked the "second" American party system (Whig versus Democrat, approximately 1830 to the mid-1850s) and the "third" party system (closely fought Republican versus Democrat, mid-1850s to 1896).
Another important insight of the new political history is that the partisan passion devoted by rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans to national economic issues, stemmed from a similar passion devoted at the local and state level to what would now be called "social" issues. Furthermore, that political conflict, from the 1830s on, stemmed from a radical transformation that took place in American Protestantism as a result of the revival movement of the 1830s.
The new revival movement swept the Protestant churches, particularly in the North, like wildfire. In contrast to the old creedal Calvinist churches that stressed the importance of obeying God's law as expressed in the church creed, the new "pietism" was very different. The pietist doctrine was essentially as follows: Specific creeds of various churches or sects do not matter. Neither does obedience to the rituals or liturgies of the particular church. What counts for salvation is only each individual being "born again"—a direct confrontation between the individual and God, a mystical and emotional conversion in which the individual achieves salvation. The rite of baptism, to the pietist, therefore becomes secondary; of primary importance is his or her personal moment of conversion.
But if the specific church or creed becomes submerged in a vague Christian interdenominationalism, then the individual Christian is left on his own to grapple with the problems of salvation. Pietism, as it swept American Protestantism in the 1830s, took two very different forms in North and South, with very different political implications. The Southerners, at least until the 1890s, became "salvationist pietists," that is, they believed that the emotional experience of individual regeneration, of being born again, was enough to ensure salvation. Religion was a separate compartment of life, a vertical individual-God relation carrying no imperative to transform man-made culture and interhuman relations.
In contrast, the Northerners, particularly in the areas inhabited by "Yankees," adopted a far different form of pietism, "evangelical pietism." The evangelical pietists believed that man could achieve salvation by an act of free will. More particularly, they also believed that it was necessary to a person's own salvation—and not just a good idea—to try his best to ensure the salvation of everyone else in society:
"To spread holiness," to create that Christian commonwealth by bringing all men to Christ, was the divinely ordered duty of the "saved." Their mandate was "to transform the world into the image of Christ."The quotations are, respectively, from the Minutes of the Ohio Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1875, p. 228; and the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Maine Baptist Missionary Convention. 1890. p. 13. Both are cited in Paul Kleppner, The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties. Voters. and Political Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 190. Professor Kleppner is the doyen of the "new political," also known as the "ethnocultural," historians See also his The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850–1900 (New York: The Free Press, 1970).
Since each individual is alone to wrestle with problems of sin and salvation, without creed or ritual of the church to sustain him, the evangelical duty must therefore be to use the state, the social arm of the integrated Christian community, to stamp out temptation and occasions for sin. Only in this way could one perform one's divinely mandated duty to maximize the salvation of others.In contrast to previous Christian groups, which were either amillennial (the return of Jesus will bring an end to human history) or premillennial (the return of Jesus will usher in a thousand-year reign of the Kingdom of God on earth), most evangelical pietists were postmillennialists. In short. whereas Catholics, Lutherans, and most Calvinists believed that the return of Jesus is independent of human actions, the postmillennialists held that Christians must establish a thousand-year reign of the Kingdom of God on earth as a necessary precondition of Jesus' return. In short, the evangelicals will have to take over the state and stamp out sin, so that Jesus can then return. And to the evangelical pietist, sin took on an extremely broad definition, placing the requirements for holiness far beyond that of other Christian groups. As one antipietist Christian put it, "They saw sin where God did not." In particular, sin was any and all forms of contact with liquor, and doing anything except praying and going to church on Sunday. Any forms of gambling, dancing, theater, reading of novels—in short, secular enjoyment of any kind—were considered sinful.
The forms of sin that particularly agitated the evangelicals were those they held to interfere with the theological free will of individuals, making them unable to achieve salvation. Liquor was sinful because, they alleged, it crippled the free will of the imbibers. Another particular source of sin was Roman Catholicism, in which priests and bishops, arms of the Pope (whom they identified as the Antichrist), ruled the minds and therefore crippled the theological freedom of will of members of the church.
Evangelical pietism particularly appealed to, and therefore took root among, the "Yankees," i.e., that cultural group that originated in (especially rural) New England and emigrated widely to populate northern and western New York, northern Ohio, northern Indiana, and northern Illinois. The Yankees were natural "cultural imperialists," people who were wont to impose their values and morality on other groups; as such, they took quite naturally to imposing their form of pietism through whatever means were available, including the use of the coercive power of the state.
In contrast to evangelical pietists were, in addition to small groups of old-fashioned Calvinists, two great Christian groups, the Catholics and the Lutherans (or at least, the high-church variety of Lutheran), who were "liturgicals" (or "ritualists") rather than pietists. The liturgicals saw the road to salvation in joining the particular church, obeying its rituals, and making use of its sacraments; the individual was not alone with only his emotions and the state to protect him. There was no particular need, then, for the state to take on the functions of the church. Furthermore, the liturgicals had a much more relaxed and rational view of what sin really was; for instance, excessive drinking might be sinful, but liquor per se surely was not.
The evangelical pietists, from the 1830s on, were the northern Protestants of British descent, as well as the Lutherans from Scandinavia and a minority of pietist German synods; the liturgicals were the Roman Catholics and the high-church Lutherans, largely German.
Very rapidly, the political parties reflected a virtually one-to-one correlation of this ethnoreligious division: the Whig, and later the Republican, party consisting chiefly of the pietists, and the Democratic party encompassing almost all the liturgicals. And for almost a century, on a state and local level, the Whig/Republican pietists tried desperately and determinedly to stamp out liquor and all Sunday activities except church (of course, drinking liquor on Sunday was a heinous double sin). As to the Catholic church, the pietists tried to restrict or abolish immigration, since people coming from Germany and Ireland, liturgicals, were outnumbering people from Britain and Scandinavia. Failing that and despairing of doing anything about adult Catholics poisoned by agents of the Vatican, the evangelical pietists decided to concentrate on saving Catholic and Lutheran youth by trying to eliminate the parochial schools, through which both religious groups transmitted their precious religious and social values to the young. The object, as many pietists put it, was to "Christianize the Catholics," to force Catholic and Lutheran children into public schools, which could then be used as an instrument of pietist Protestantization. Since the Yankees had early taken to the idea of imposing communal civic virtue and obedience through the public schools, they were particularly receptive to this new reason for aggrandizing public education.
To all of these continuing aggressions by what they termed "those fanatics," the liturgicals fought back with equal fervor. Particularly bewildered were the Germans who, Lutheran and Catholic alike, were accustomed to the entire family happily attending beer gardens together on Sundays after church and who now found the "fanatic" pietists trying desperately to outlaw this pleasurable and seemingly innocent activity. The pietist Protestant attacks on private and parochial schools fatally threatened the preservation and maintenance of the liturgicals' cultural and religious values; and since large numbers of the Catholics and Lutherans were immigrants, parochial schools also served to maintain group affinities in a new and often hostile world—especially the world of Anglo-Saxon pietism. In the case of the Germans, it also meant, for several decades, preserving parochial teaching in the beloved German language, as against fierce pressures for Anglicization.
In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, as Catholic immigration grew and the Democratic party moved slowly but surely toward a majority status, the Republican, and—more broadly—pietist pressures became more intense. The purpose of the public school, to the pietists, was "to unify and make homogeneous the society." There was no twentieth century concern for separating religion and the public school system. To the contrary, in most northern jurisdictions only pietist-Protestant church members were allowed to be teachers in the public schools. Daily reading of the Protestant Bible, daily Protestant prayers and Protestant hymns were common in the public schools, and school textbooks were rife with anti-Catholic propaganda. Thus, New York City school textbooks spoke broadly of "the deceitful Catholics," and pounded into their children, Catholic and Protestant alike, the message that "Catholics are necessarily, morally, intellectually, infallibly, a stupid race.”Cited in David B. Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 84–85.
Teachers delivered homilies on the evils of Popery, and also on deeply felt pietist theological values: the wickedness of alcohol (the "demon rum") and the importance of keeping the Sabbath. In the 1880s and 1890s, zealous pietists began working ardently for antialcohol instruction as a required part of the public-school curriculum; by 1901, every state in the Union required instruction in temperance.
Since most Catholic children went to public rather than parochial schools, the Catholic authorities were understandably anxious to purge the schools of Protestant requirements and ceremonies, and of anti-Catholic textbooks. To the pietists, these attempts to de-Protestantize the public schools were intolerable "Romish aggression." The whole point of the public schools was moral and religious homogenization, and here the Catholics were disrupting the attempt to make American society holy—to produce, through the public school and the Protestant gospel, "a morally and politically homogeneous people." As Kleppner writes:
When they [the pietists] spoke of "moral education," they had in mind principles of morality shared in common by the adherents of gospel religion, for in the public school all children, even those whose parents were enslaved by "Lutheran formalism or Romish supersitition," would be exposed to the Bible. That alone was cause for righteous optimism, for they believed the Bible to be "the agent in converting the soul," "the volume that makes human beings men."Kleppner, Third Electoral System, n. 1, p. 222.
In this way, "America [would] be Saved Through the Children.”Our Church Work (Madison, Wis.), July 17, 1890. Cited in ibid., p. 224.
The pietists were therefore incensed that the Catholics were attempting to block the salvation of America's children—and eventually of America itself—all at the orders of a "foreign potentate." Thus, the New Jersey Methodist Conference of 1870 lashed out with their deepest feelings against this Romish obstructionism:
Resolved, That we greatly deprecate the effort which is being made by "Haters of Light," and especially by an arrogant priesthood, to exclude the Bible from the Public Schools of our land; and that we will do all in our power to defeat the well-defined and wicked design of this "Mother of Harlots.”Minutes of the New Jersey Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1870, p. 24. Cited in ibid., p. 230. Similar reactions can be found in the minutes of the Central Pennsylvania Methodists in 1875, the Maine Methodists in 1887, the New York Methodists of 1880, and the Wisconsin Congregationalists of 1890.
Throughout the nineteenth century, "nativist" attacks on "foreigners" and the foreign-born were really attacks on liturgical immigrants. Immigrants from Britain or Scandinavia, pietists all, were "good Americans" as soon as they got off the boat. It was the diverse culture of the other immigrants that had to be homogenized and molded into that of pietist America. Thus, the New England Methodist Conference of 1889 declared:
We are a nation of remnants, ravellings from the Old World. . . . The public school is one of the remedial agencies which work in our society to diminish this . . . and to hasten the compacting of these heterogeneous materials into a solid nature.Minutes of the Session of the New England Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1889, p. 85. Cited in ibid., p. 223.
Or, as a leading citizen of Boston declared, "the only way to elevate the foreign population was to make Protestants of their children.”Tyack, n. 3, p. 84.
Since the cities of the North, in the late nineteenth century, were becoming increasingly filled with Catholic immigrants, pietist attacks on sinful cities and on immigrants both became aspects of the anti-liturgical struggle for a homogeneous Anglo-Saxon pietist culture. The Irish were particular butts of pietist scorn; a New York City textbook bitterly warned that continued immigration could make America "the common sewer of Ireland," filled with drunken and depraved Irishmen.Tyack, n. 3, p. 85.
The growing influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe toward the end of the nineteenth century seemed to pose even greater problems for the pietist progressives, but they did not shrink from the task. As Elwood P. Cubberley of Stanford University, the nation's outstanding progressive historian of education, declared, southern and eastern Europeans have served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our civil life. . . . Everywhere these people tend to settle in groups or settlements, and to set up here their national manners, customs, and observances. Our task is to break up these groups or settlements, to assimilate and amalgamate these people as a part of our American race and to implant in their children. . . the Anglo-Saxon conception of rightousness, law and order, and popular government. . . . Ellwood P. Cubberley. Changing Conceptions of Education in America (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1909), pp. 15–16.
PROGRESSIVES, PUBLIC EDUCATION, AND THE FAMILY: THE CASE OF SAN FRANCISCOThe molding of children was of course the key to homogenization and the key in general to the progressive vision of tight social control over the individual via the instrument of the state. The eminent University of Wisconsin sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross, a favorite of Theodore Roosevelt and the veritable epitome of a progressive social scientist, summed it up thus: The role of the public official, and in particular of the public school teacher, is "to collect little plastic lumps of human dough from private households and shape them on the social kneadingboard."Edward Alsworth Ross, Social Control (New York, 1912). Cited in Paul C Violas, "Progressive Social Philosophy: Charles Horton Cooley and Edward Alsworth Ross," in C.J. Karier, P. C. Violas, and J. Spring. eds., Roots of Crisis: American Education in the 20th Century (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973). Pp. 40–65.
The view of Ross and the other progressives was that the state must take up the task of control and inculcation of moral values once performed by parents and church. The conflict between middle and upper-class urban progressive Anglo-Saxon Protestants and largely working-class Catholics was sharply delineated in the battle over control of the San Francisco public school system during the second decade of the twentieth century. The highly popular Alfred Roncovieri, a French-Italian Catholic, was the elected school superintendent from 1906 on. Roncovieri was a traditionalist who believed that the function of schools was to teach the basics, and that teaching children about sex and morality should be the function of home and church. Hence, when the drive for sex hygiene courses in the public schools got under way, Roncovieri consulted with mothers' clubs and, in consequence, kept the program out of the schools.
By 1908, upper-class progressives launched a decade-long movement to oust Roncovieri and transform the nature of the San Francisco public school system. Instead of an elected superintendent responding to a school board elected by districts, the progressives wanted an all-powerful school superintendent, appointed by a rubber-stamp board that in turn would be appointed by the mayor. In other words, in the name of "taking the schools out of politics," they hoped to aggrandize the educational bureaucracy and maintain its power virtually unchecked by any popular or democratic control. The purpose was threefold: to push through the progressive program of social control, to impose upper-class control over a working-class population, and to impose pietist Protestant control over Catholic ethnics. The cities were already beginning to reach the point where class and ethnic divisions almost coincided, where, in other words, few working-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants resided in the cities.
The ethnoreligious struggle over the public schools in San Francisco was nothing new; it had been going on tumultuously since the middle of the nineteenth century.For an excellent study and analysis of the ethnoreligious struggle over the San Francisco public schools from the mid-nineteenth through the first three decades of the twentieth century, see the neglected work of Victor L. Shradar, "Ethnic Politics, Religion, and the Public Schools of San Francisco, 1849–1933" (Ph.D. dissertation. School of Education. Stanford University, 1974). In the last half of the nineteenth century, San Francisco was split into two parts. Ruling the city was a power elite of native-born old Americans, hailing from New England, including lawyers, businessmen, and pietist Protestant ministers. These comprised successively the Whig, Know-Nothing, Populist, and Republican parties in the city. On the other hand were the foreign-born, largely Catholic immigrants from Europe, Irish, Germans, French, and Italians, who comprised the Democratic party.
The Protestants early tried to use the public schools as a homogenizing and controlling force. The great theoretician and founder of the public school system in San Francisco, John Swett, "the Horace Mann of California," was a lifelong Republican and a Yankee who had taught school in New Hampshire before moving West. Moreover, the Board of Education was originally an all-New England show; consisting of emigrants from Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. The mayor of San Francisco was a former mayor of Salem, Massachusetts, and every administrator and teacher in the public schools was a transplanted New Englander. The first superintendent of schools was not exactly a New Englander, but close: Thomas J. Nevins, a Yankee Whig lawyer from New York and an agent of the American Bible Society. And the first free public school in San Francisco was instituted in the basement of a small Baptist chapel.
Nevins, installed as superintendent of schools in 1851, promptly adopted the rule of the New York City schools: Every teacher was compelled to begin each day by a Protestant Bible reading and to conduct daily Protestant prayer sessions. And John Swett, elected as Republican state superintendent of public instruction during the 1860s, declared that California needed public schools because of its heterogeneous population: "Nothing can Americanize these chaotic elements, and breathe into them the spirit of our institutions," he warned, "except the public schools."Shradar, n. 13. p. 14.
Swett was keen enough to recognize that the pietist educational formula meant that the state takes over jurisdiction of the child from his parents, since "children arrived at the age of maturity belong, not to the parents, but to the State, to society, to the country."Rousas John Rushdoony, "John Swett: The Self-Preservation of the State," in The Messianic Character of American Education: Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Education (Nutley. N.J.: Craig Press, 1963). Pp 79–80.
A seesaw struggle between the Protestant Yankees and Catholic ethnics ensued in San Francisco during the 1850s. The state charter of San Francisco in 1855 made the schools far more responsive to the people, with school boards being elected from each of a dozen wards instead of at large, and the superintendent elected by the people instead of appointed by the board. The Democrats swept the Know-Nothings out of office in the city in 1856 and brought to power David Broderick, an Irish Catholic who controlled the San Francisco as well as the California Democratic party. But this gain was wiped out by the San Francisco Vigilance Movement, a private organization of merchants and New England-born Yankees, who, attacking the "Tammany" tactics of Broderick, installed themselves in power and illegally deported most of the Broderick organization, replacing it with a newly formed People's party.
The People's party ran San Francisco with an iron hand for ten years, from 1857 to 1867, making secret nominations for appointments and driving through huge slates of at-large nominees chosen at a single vote at a public meeting. No open nomination procedures, primaries, or ward divisions were allowed, in order to ensure election victories by "reputable" men. The People's party promptly reinstalled an all-Yankee school board, and the administrators and teachers in schools were again firmly Protestant and militantly anti-Catholic. The People's party itself continually attacked the Irish, denouncing them as "micks" and "rank Pats." George Tait, the People's party-installed superintendent of schools in the 1860s, lamented, however, that some teachers were failing to read the Protestant Bible in the schools, and were thus casting "a slur on the religion and character of the community."
By the 1870s, however, the foreign-born residents outnumbered the native-born, and the Democratic party rose to power in San Francisco, the People's party declining and joining the Republicans. The Board of Education ended the practice of Protestant devotions in the schools, and Irish and Germans began to pour into administrative and teaching posts in the public school system.
Another rollback began, however, in 1874, when the Republican state legislature abolished ward elections for the San Francisco school board, and insisted that all board members be elected at large. This meant that only the wealthy, which usually meant well-to-do Protestants, were likely to be able to run successfully for election. Accordingly, whereas in 1873, 58 percent of the San Francisco school board was foreign-born, the percentage was down to 8 percent in the following year. And while the Irish were approximately 25 percent of the electorate and the Germans about 13 percent, the Irish were not able to fill more than one or two of the twelve at-large seats, and the Germans virtually none.
The seesaw continued, however, as the Democrats came back in 1883, under the aegis of the master politician, the Irish Catholic Christopher "Blind Boss" Buckley. In the Buckley regime, the post-1874 school board dominated totally by wealthy native-born, Yankee businessmen and professionals, was replaced by an ethnically balanced ticket with a high proportion of working-class and foreign-born. Furthermore, a high proportion of Irish Catholic teachers, most of them single women, entered the San Francisco schools during the Buckley era, reaching 50 percent by the turn of the century.
In the late 1880s, however, the stridently anti-Catholic and anti-Irish American party became strong in San Francisco and the rest of the state, and Republican leaders were happy to join them in denouncing the "immigrant peril." The American party managed to oust the Irish Catholic Joseph O'Connor, principal and deputy superintendent, from his high post as "religiously unacceptable.” This victory heralded a progressive Republican "reform” comeback in 1891, when none other than John Swett was installed as superintendent of schools in San Francisco. Swett battled for the full reform program: to make everything, even the mayoralty, an appointive rather than an elective office. Part of the goal was achieved by the state's new San Francisco charter in 1900, which replaced the twelve-man elected Board of Education by a four-member board appointed by the mayor.
The full goal of total appointment was still blocked, however, by the existence of an elective superintendent of schools who, since 1907, was the popular Catholic Alfred Roncovieri. The pietist progressives were also thwarted for two decades by the fact that San Francisco was ruled, for most of the years between 1901 and 1911, by a new Union Labor party, which won on an ethnically and occupationally balanced ticket, and which elected the German-Irish Catholic Eugene Schmitz, a member of the musician's union, as mayor. And for eighteen years after 1911, San Francisco was governed by its most popular mayor before or since, "Sunny Jim" Rolph, an Episcopalian friendly to Catholics and ethnics, who was pro-Roncovieri and who presided over an ethnically pluralistic regime.
It is instructive to examine the makeup of the progressive reform movement that eventually got its way and overthrew Roncovieri. It consisted of the standard progressive coalition of business and professional elites, and nativist and anti-Catholic organizations, who called for the purging of Catholics from the schools. Particular inspiration came from Stanford educationist Elwood P. Cubberley, who energized the California branch of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae (later the American Association of University Women), led by the wealthy Mrs. Jesse H. Steinhart, whose husband was later to be a leader in the Progressive party. Mrs. Steinhart got Mrs. Agnes De Lima, a New York City progressive educator, to make a survey of the San Francisco schools for the association. The report, presented in 1914, made the expected case for an "efficient," business-like, school system run solely by appointed educators. Mrs. Steinhart also organized the Public Education Society of San Francisco to agitate for progressive school reform; in this she was aided by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce.
Also backing progressive reform, and anxious to oust Roncovieri, were other elite groups in the city, including the League of Women Voters, and the prestigious Commonwealth Club of California.
At the behest of Mrs. Steinhart and the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, which contributed the funds, Philander Claxton of the U.S. Office of Education weighed in with his report in December 1917. The report, which endorsed the Association of Collegiate Alumnae study and was extremely critical of the San Francisco school system, called for all power over the system to go to an appointed superintendent of schools. Claxton also attacked the teaching of foreign languages in the schools, which San Francisco had been doing, and insisted on a comprehensive "Americanization" to break down ethnic settlements.
The Claxton Report was the signal for the Chamber of Commerce to swing into action, and it proceeded to draft a comprehensive progressive referendum for the November 1918 ballot, calling for an appointed superintendent and an appointed school board. This initiative, Amendment 37, was backed by most of the prominent business and professional groups in the city. In addition to the ones named above, there were the Real Estate Board, elite women's organizations such as the Federation of Women's Clubs, wealthy neighborhood improvement clubs, and the San Francisco Examiner. Amendment 37 lost, however, by two to one, since it had little support in working-class neighborhoods or among the teachers.
Two years later, however, Amendment 37 passed, aided by a resurgence of pietism and virulent anti-Catholicism in postwar America. Prohibition was now triumphant, and the Ku Klux Klan experienced a nationwide revival as a pietist, anti-Catholic organization. The KKK had as many as 3,500 members in the San Francisco Bay Area in the early 1920s. The anti-Catholic American Protective Association also enjoyed a revival, led in California by a British small businessman, the anti-Irish Grand Master Colonel J. Arthur Petersen.
In opposing Amendment 37 in the 1920 elections, Father Peter C. Yorke, a prominent priest and Irish immigrant, perceptively summed up the fundamental cleavage: "The modern school system," he declared, "is not satisfied with teaching children the 3 Rs . . . it reaches out and takes possession of their whole lives."
Amendment 37 passed in 1920 by the narrow margin of 69,200 to 66,700. It passed in every middle- and upper-class Assembly District, and lost in every working-class district. The higher the concentration of foreign-born voters in any district, the greater the vote against. In the Italian precincts 1 to 17 of the 33rd A.D., the Amendment was beaten by 3 to 1; in the Irish precincts, it was defeated by 3 to 1 as well. The more Protestant a working-class district, the more it supported the Amendment.
The bulk of the lobbying for the Amendment was performed by the ad hoc Educational Conference. After the victory, the conference happily presented a list of nominees to the school board, which now consisted of seven members appointed by the mayor, and which in turn appointed the superintendent. The proposed board consisted entirely of businessmen, of whom only one was a conservative Irish Catholic. The mayor surrendered to the pressure, and hence, after 1921, cultural pluralism in the San Francisco school system gave way to unitary progressive rule. The board began by threatening to dock any teacher who dared to be absent from school on St. Patrick's Day (a San Francisco tradition since the 1870s), and proceeded to override the wishes of particular neighborhoods in the interest of a centralized city.
The superintendent of schools in the new regime, Dr. Joseph Marr Gwinn, fit the new dispensation to a tee. A professional "scientist" of public administration, his avowed aim was unitary control. The entire package of typical progressive educational nostrums was installed, including a department of education and various experimental programs. Traditional basic education was scorned, and the edict came down that children should not be "forced" to learn the 3 Rs if they didn't feel the need. Traditional teachers, who were continually attacked for being old-fashioned and "unprofessional," were not promoted.
Despite continued opposition by teachers, parents, neighborhoods, ethnic groups, and the ousted Roncovieri, all attempts to repeal Amendment 37 were unsuccessful. The modern dispensation of progressivism had conquered San Francisco. The removal of the Board of Education and school superintendent from direct and periodic control by the electorate had effectively deprived parents of any significant control over the educational policies of public schools. At last, as John Swett had asserted nearly sixty years earlier, schoolchildren belonged "not to the parents, but to the State, to society, to the country."
ETHNORELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE RISE OF FEMINISMWomen's Suffrage
By the 1890s, the liturgically oriented Democracy was slowly but surely winning the national battle of the political parties. Culminating the battle was the Democratic congressional victory in 1890 and the Grover Cleveland landslide in the presidential election of 1892, in which Cleveland carried both Houses of Congress along with him (an unusual feat for that era). The Democrats were in way of becoming the majority party of the country, and the root was demographic: the fact that most of the immigrants were Catholic and the Catholic birthrate was higher than that of the pietist Protestants. Even though British and Scandinavian immigration had reached new highs during the 1880s, their numbers were far exceeded by German and Irish immigration, the latter being the highest since the famous post-potato-famine influx that started in the late 1840s. Furthermore, the "new immigration" from southern and eastern Europe, almost all Catholic—and especially Italian—began to make its mark during the same decade.
The pietists became increasingly embittered, stepping up their attacks on foreigners in general and Catholics in particular. Thus, the Reverend T.W. Cuyler, President of the National Temperance Society, intemperately exclaimed in the summer of 1891: "How much longer [will] the Republic . . . consent to have her soil a dumping ground for all Hungarian ruffians, Bohemian bruisers, and Italian cutthroats of every description?"
The first concrete political response by the pietists to the rising Catholic tide was to try to restrict immigration. Republicans successfully managed to pass laws partially cutting immigration, but President Cleveland vetoed a bill to impose a literacy test on all immigrants. The Republicans also managed to curtail voting by immigrants, by getting most states to disallow voting by aliens, thereby reversing the traditional custom of allowing alien voting. They also urged the lengthening of the statutory waiting period for naturalization.
The successful restricting of immigration and of immigrant voting was still not enough to matter, and immigration would not really be foreclosed until the 1920s. But if voting could not be restricted sharply enough, perhaps it could be expanded—in the proper pietist direction.
Specifically, it was clear to the pietists that the role of women in the liturgical "ethnic" family was very different from what it was in the pietist Protestant family. One of the reasons impelling pietists and Republicans toward prohibition was the fact that, culturally, the lives of urban male Catholics—nd the cities of the Northeast were becoming increasingly Catholic—evolved around the neighborhood saloon. The men would repair at night to the saloon for chitchat, discussions, and argument—nd they would generally take their political views from the saloonkeeper, who thus became the political powerhouse in his particular ward. Therefore, prohibition meant breaking the political power of the urban liturgical machines in the Democratic party.
But while the social lives of liturgical males revolved around the saloon, their wives stayed at home. While pietist women were increasingly independent and politically active, the lives of liturgical women revolved solely about home and hearth. Politics was strictly an avocation for husbands and sons. Perceiving this, the pietists began to push for women's suffrage, realizing that far more pietist than liturgical women would take advantage of the power to vote.
As a result, the women's suffrage movement was heavily pietist from the very beginning. Ultrapietist third parties like the Greenback and the Prohibition parties, which scorned the Republicans for being untrustworthy moderates on social issues, supported women's suffrage throughout, and the Populists tended in that direction. The Progressive party of 1912 was strongly in favor of women's suffrage; theirs was the first major national convention to permit women delegates. The first woman elector, Helen J. Scott of Wisconsin, was chosen by the Progressive party.
Perhaps the major single organization in the women's suffrage movement was the Women's Christian Temperance Union, founded in 1874 and reaching an enormous membership of 300,000 by 1900. That the WCTU was also involved in agitating for curfew, antigambling, antismoking, and antisex laws—ll actions lauded by the women's suffrage movement—s clear from the official history of women's suffrage in the nineteenth century:
[The WCTU] has been a chief factor in State campaigns for statutory prohibition, constitutional amendment, reform laws in general and those for the protection of women and children in particular, and in securing anti-gambling and anti-cigarette laws. It has been instrumental in raising the "age of protection" for girls in many States, and in obtaining curfew laws in 400 towns and cities. . . . The association [WCTU] protests against the legalization of all crimes, especially those of prostitution and liquor selling.Susan B. Anthony and Ida H. Harper. The History of Woman Suffrage. Vol. 4 (Rochester: Susan B. Anthony, 1902), pp. 1046–47.
Not only did Susan B. Anthony begin her career as a professional prohibitionist, but her two successors as president of the leading women's suffrage organization, the National American Woman Suffrage Association—Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt and Dr. Anna Howard Shaw—also began their professional careers as prohibitionists. The leading spirit of the WCTU, Frances E. Willard, was prototypically born of New England-stock parents who had moved westward to study at Oberlin College, then the nation's center of aggressive, evangelical pietism, and had later settled in Wisconsin. Guided by Miss Willard, the WCTU began its prosuffrage activities by demanding that women vote in local option referendums on prohibition. As Miss Willard put it, the WCTU wanted women to vote on this issue because "majorities of women are against the liquor traffic. . . .”Cited in Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 183.
Conversely, whenever there was a voters' referendum on women's suffrage, the liturgicals and the foreign-born, responding to immigrant culture and reacting against the pietist-feminist support of prohibition, consistently opposed women's suffrage. In Iowa, the Germans voted against women's suffrage, as did the Chinese in California. The women's suffrage amendment in 1896 in California was heavily supported by the bitterly anti-Catholic American Protective Association. The cities, where Catholics abounded, tended to be opposed to women's suffrage, while pietist rural areas tended to favor it. Thus, the Oregon referendum of 1900 lost largely because of opposition in the Catholic "slums" of Portland and Astoria.
A revealing religious breakdown of votes on an 1877 women's suffrage referendum was presented in a report by a Colorado feminist. She explained that the Methodists (the most strongly pietistic) were "for us," the (less pietistic) Presbyterians and Episcopalians "fairly so," while the Roman Catholics "were not all against us"—clearly they were expected to be.Anthony and Harper, n 15, Vol. 3, p. 724. And, testifying before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of women's suffrage in 1880, Susan B. Anthony presented her own explanation of the Colorado vote:
In Colorado . . . 6,666 men vote "Yes." Now, I am going to describe the men who voted "Yes." They were native-born men, temperance men, cultivated, broad, generous, just men, men who think. On the other hand, 16,007 voted "No." Now, I am going to describe that class of voters. In the southern part of that State are Mexicans, who speak the Spanish language. . . . The vast population of Colorado is made up of that class of people. I was sent out to speak in a voting precinct having 200 voters; 150 of those voters were Mexican greasers, 40 of them foreign-born citizens, and just 10 of them were born in this country; and I was supposed to be competent to convert those men to let me have so much right in this Government as they had. . . Quoted in Alan P. Grimes, The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 87.
A laboratory test of which women would turn out to vote occurred; in Massachusetts, where women were given the power to vote in school board elections from 1879 on. In 1888, large numbers of Protestant women in Boston turned out to drive Catholics off the school board. In contrast, Catholic women scarcely voted, "thereby validating the, nativist tendencies of suffragists who believed that extension of full suffrage to women would provide a barrier against further Catholic influence.”Jane Jerome Camhie "Women Against Women: American Antisuffragism, 1880–1920" (Ph.D. dissertation in history, Tufts University, 1973), p. 198. See also James J, Kenneally, "Catholicism and Woman Suffrage in Massachusetts," Catholic Historical Review 53 (April 1967): 253. Joining in the demand that only Protestants be elected to the Boston school board were, in addition to British-American clubs and numbers of Protestant ministers, the WCTU, the Loyal Women of American Liberty, the National Women's League, and the League of Independent Women Voters. See Kleppner. Third Electoral System. n 1, p. 350. See also Tyack. n. 3, pp 105–6: and Lois Bannister Merk, "Boston's Historic Public School Crisis," New England Quarterly 31 (June 1958): 172–99. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century "the more hierarchical the church organization and the more formal the ritual, the greater was its opposition to women suffrage, while the democratically organized churches with little dogma tended to be more receptive.”Camhi, n. 20, p. 200. Hierarchically organized pietist churches, like the Methodist or the Scandinavian Lutheran, were no less receptive to women's suffrage than the others.
Four mountain states adopted women's suffrage in the early and mid-1890s. Two, Wyoming and Utah, were simply ratifying, as new states, a practice they had long adopted as territories: Wyoming in 1869 and Utah in 1870. Utah had adopted women's suffrage as a conscious policy by the pietistic Mormons to weight political control in favor of their polygamous members, who contrasted to the Gentiles, largely miners and settlers who were either single men or who had left their wives back East. Wyoming had adopted women's suffrage in an effort to increase the political power of its settled householders, in contrast to the transient, mobile, and often lawless single men who peopled that frontier region.
No sooner had Wyoming Territory adopted women's suffrage, than it became evident that the change had benefited the Republicans, particularly since women had mobilized against Democratic attempts to repeal Wyoming's Sunday prohibition law. In 1871, both houses of the Wyoming legislature, led by its Democratic members, voted to repeal women's suffrage, but the bill was vetoed by the Republican territorial governor.
Two additional states adopting women's suffrage in the 1890s were Idaho and Colorado. In Idaho the drive, adopted by referendum in 1896, was led by the ultrapietistic Populists and by the Mormons, who were dominant in the southern part of the state. The Populist counties of Colorado gave a majority of 6,800 for women's suffrage, while the Republican and Democratic counties voted a majority of 500 against.Furthermore, in the Colorado legislature that submitted the women's suffrage amendment to the voters in 1893, the party breakdown of voting was as follows: Republicans, 19 for women's suffrage and 25 against; Democrats, 1 in favor and 8 against; Populists, 34 in favor and 4 against. See Grimes, n. 19, p. 96 and passim.
It may be thought paradoxical that a movement—women's suffrage—born and centered in the East should have had its earliest victories in the remote frontier states of the Mountain West. But the paradox begins to clear when we realize the pietist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant nature of the frontiersmen, many of them Yankees hailing originally from that birthplace of American pietism, New England. As the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, that great celebrant of frontier ideals, lyrically observed:
In the arid West these pioneers [from New England] have halted and have turned to perceive an altered nation and changed social ideals. . . . If we follow back the line of march of the Puritan farmer, we shall see how responsive he has always been to isms. . . . He is the Prohibitionist of Iowa and Wisconsin, crying out against German customs as an invasion of his traditional ideals. He is the Granger of Wisconsin, passing restrictive railroad legislation. He is the Abolitionist, the Anti-mason, the Millerite, the Woman Suffragist, the Spiritualist, the Mormon, of Western New York.Frederick Jackson Turner, "Dominant Forces in Western Life," in The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt. Rinehart & Winston, 1962), pp. 239–40. Quoted in Grimes, n. 19, pp. 97–98.
Eugenics and Birth Control
Thus the women's suffrage movement, dominated by pietist progressives, was not directed solely to achieving some abstract principle of electoral equality between males and females. This was more a means to another end: the creation of electoral majorities for pietist measures of direct social control over the lives of American families. They wished to determine by state intervention what those families drank and when and where they drank, how they spent their Sabbath day, and how their children should be educated.
One way of correcting the increasingly pro-Catholic demographics was to restrict immigration; another to promote women's suffrage. A third way, often promoted in the name of "science," was eugenics, an increasingly popular doctrine of the progressive movement. Broadly, eugenics may be defined as encouraging the breeding of the "fit" and discouraging the breeding of the "unfit," the criteria of "fitness" often coinciding with the cleavage between native, white Protestants and the foreign born or Catholics—or the white-black cleavage. In extreme cases, the unfit were to be coercively sterilized.
To the founder of the American eugenics movement, the distinguished biologist Charles Benedict Davenport, a New Yorker of eminent New England background, the rising feminist movement was beneficent provided that the number of biologically superior persons was sustained and the number of the unfit diminished. The biologist Harry H. Laughlin, aide to Davenport, associate editor of the Eugenical News, and highly influential in the immigration restriction policy of the 1920s as eugenics expert for the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, stressed the great importance of cutting the immigration of the biologically "inferior" southern Europeans. For in that way, the biological superiority of Anglo-Saxon women would be protected.
Harry Laughlin's report to the House Committee, printed in 1923, helped formulate the 1924 immigration law, which, in addition to drastically limiting total immigration to the United States, imposed national origin quotas based on the 1910 census, so as to weight the sources of immigration as much as possible in favor of northern Europeans. Laughlin later emphasized that American women must keep the nation's blood pure by not marrying what he called the "colored races," in which he included southern Europeans as well as blacks: for if "men with a small fraction of colored blood could readily find mates among the white women, the gates would be thrown open to a final radical race mixture of the whole population." To Laughlin the moral was clear: "The perpetuity of the American race and consequently of American institutions depends upon the virtue and fecundity of American women.”Cited in Donald K. Pickens. Eugenics and the Progressives (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), p. 67.
But the problem was that the fecund women were not the pietist progressives but the Catholics. For, in addition to immigration, another source of demographic alarm to the pietists was the far higher birthrate among Catholic women. If only they could be induced to adopt birth control! Hence, the birth control movement became part of the pietist armamentarium in their systemic struggle with the Catholics and other liturgicals.
Thus, the distinguished University of California eugenicist, Samuel J. Holmes, lamented that "the trouble with birth control is that it is practiced least where it should be practiced most." In the Birth Control Review, leading organ of the birth control movement, Annie G. Porritt was more specific, attacking "the folly of closing our gates to aliens from abroad, while having them wide open to the overwhelming progeny of the least desirable elements of our city and slum population.”Annie G. Porritt. "lmmigration and Birth Control, an Editorial," The Birth Control Review 7 (Sept. 1923): 219. Cited in Pickens. n. 24, p. 73. In short, the birth controllers were saying that if one's goal is to restrict sharply the total number of Catholics, "colored" southern European or no, then there is no point in only limiting immigration while the domestic population continues to increase.
The birth control and the eugenics movement therefore went hand in hand, not the least in the views of the well-known leader of the birth control movement in the United States: Mrs. Margaret Higgins Sanger, prolific author, founder and long-time editor of the Birth Control Review. Echoing many of the various strains of progressivism, Mrs. Sanger hailed the emancipation of women through birth control as the latest in applied science and "efficiency." As she put it in her Autobiography:
In an age which has developed science and industry and economic efficiency to their highest points, so little thought has been given to the development of a science of parenthood, a science of maternity which could prevent this appalling and unestimated waste of womankind and maternal effort.Quoted in Pickens. n. 24, p. 80.
To Mrs. Sanger, “science" also meant stopping the breeding of the unfit. A devoted eugenicist and follower of C.B. Davenport, she in fact chided the eugenics movement for not sufficiently emphasizing this crucial point:
The eugenists wanted to shift the birth control emphasis from less children for the poor to more children for the rich. We went back of that and sought first to stop the multiplication of the unfit. This appeared the most important and greatest step toward race betterrnent.Ibid., p. 83.
GATHERED TOGETHER: PROGRESSIVISM AS A POLITICAL PARTYProgressivism was, to a great extent, the culmination of the pietist Protestant political impulse, the urge to regulate every aspect of American life, economic and moral—even the most intimate and crucial aspects of family life. But it was also a curious alliance of a technocratic drive for government regulation, the supposed expression of "value-free science," and the pietist religious impulse to save America—and the world—by state coercion. Often both pietistic and scientific arguments would be used, sometimes by the same people, to achieve the old pietist goals. Thus, prohibition would be argued for on religious as well as on alleged scientific or medicinal grounds. In many cases, leading progressive intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century were former pietists who went to college and then transferred to the political arena, their zeal for making over mankind, as a "salvation by science." And then the Social Gospel movement managed to combine political collectivism and pietist Christianity in the same package. All of these were strongly interwoven elements in the progressive movement.
All these trends reached their apogee in the Progressive party and its national convention of 1912. The assemblage was a gathering of businessmen, intellectuals, academics, technocrats, efficiency experts and social engineers, writers, economists, social scientists, and leading representatives of the new profession of social work. The Progressive leaders were middle and upper class, almost all urban, highly educated, and almost all white Anglo-Saxon Protestants of either past or present pietist concerns.
From the social work leaders came upper-class ladies bringing the blessings of statism to the masses: Lillian D. Wald, Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch, and above all, Jane Addams. Miss Addams, one of the great leaders of progressivism, was born in rural Illinois to a father, John, who was a state legislator and a devout nondenominational evangelical Protestant. Miss Addams was distressed at the southern and eastern European immigration, people who were "primitive" and "credulous," and who posed the danger of unrestrained individualism. Their different ethnic background disrupted the unity of American culture. However, the problem, according to Miss Addams, could be easily remedied. The public school could reshape the immigrant, strip him of his cultural foundations, and transform him into a building block of a new and greater American community.See Paul C Violas. "Jane Addams and the New Liberalism," in Karier et al., eds. Roots of Crisis, n. 11, pp. 66–83.
In addition to writers and professional technocrats at the Progressive party convention, there were professional pietists galore. Social Gospel leaders Lyman Abbott, the Reverend R. Heber Newton, and the Reverend Washington Gladden were Progressive party notables, and the Progressive candidate for governor of Vermont was the Reverend Fraser Metzger, leader of the Inter-Church Federation of Vermont. In fact, the Progressive party proclaimed itself as the "recrudescence of the religious spirit in American political life."
Many observers, indeed, reported in wonder at the strongly religious tone of the Progressive party convention. Theodore Roosevelt's acceptance address was significantly entitled, "A Confession of Faith," and his words were punctuated by "amens" and by a continual singing of Christian hymns by the assembled delegates. They sang "Onward, Christian Soldiers," "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," and finally the revivalist hymn, "Follow, Follow, We Will Follow Jesus," except that "Roosevelt" replaced the word "Jesus" at every turn.
The New York Times of August 6, 1912, summed up the unusual experience by calling the Progressive assemblage "a convention of fanatics." And, "It was not a convention at all. It was an assemblage of religious enthusiasts. It was such a convention as Peter the Hermit held. It was a Methodist camp following done over into political terms.”Cited in John Allen Gable, The Bull Moose Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1978), p. 75.
Thus the foundations of today's massive state intervention in the internal life of the American family were laid in the so-called "progressive era" from the 1870s to the 1920s. Pietists and "progressives" united to control the material and sexual choices of the rest of the American people, their drinking habits, and their recreational preferences. Their values, the very nurture and education of their children, were to be determined by their betters. The spiritual, biological, political, intellectual, and moral elite would govern, through state power, the character and quality of American family life.
SIGNIFICANCEIt has been known for decades that the Progressive Era was marked by a radical growth in the extension and dominance of government in America's economic, social, and cultural life. For decades, this great leap into statism was naively interpreted by historians as a simple response to the greater need for planning and regulation of an increasingly complex economy. In recent years, however, historians have come to see that increasing statism on a federal and state level can be better interpreted as a profitable alliance between certain business and industrial interests, looking for government to cartelize their industry after private efforts for cartels and monopoly had failed, and intellectuals, academics, and technocrats seeking jobs to help regulate and plan the economy as well as restriction of entry into their professions. In short, the Progressive Era re-created the age-old alliance between Big Government, large business firms, and opinion-molding intellectuals—an alliance that had most recently been embodied in the mercantilist system of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries.
Other historians uncovered a similar process at the local level, especially that of urban government beginning with the Progressive Era. Using the influence of media and opinion leaders, upper-income and business groups in the cities systematically took political power away from the masses and centralized this power in the hands of urban government responsive to progressive demands. Elected officials, and decentralized ward representation, were systematically replaced either by appointed bureaucrats and civil servants, or by centralized at-large districts where large-scale funding was needed to finance election races. In this way, power was shifted out of the hands of the masses and into the hands of a minority elite of technocrats and upper-income businessmen. One result was an increase of government contracts to business, a shift from "Tammany" type charity by the political parties to a taxpayer-financed welfare state, and the imposition of higher taxes on suburban residents to finance bond issues and redevelopment schemes accruing to downtown financial interests.
During the last two decades, educational historians have described a similar process at work in public, especially urban, school systems. The scope of the public school was greatly expanded, compulsory attendance spread outside of New England and other "Yankee" areas during the Progressive Era, and a powerful movement developed to try to ban private schools and to force everyone into the public school system.
From the work of educational historians, it was clear that the leap into comprehensive state control over the individual and over social life was not confined, during the Progressive and indeed post-Progressive eras, to government and the economy. A far more comprehensive process was at work. The expansion of compulsory public schooling stemmed from the growth of collectivist and anti-individualist ideology among intellectuals and educationists. The individual, these "progressives" believed, must be molded by the educational process to conform to the group, which in practice meant the dictates of the power elite speaking in the group's name. Historians have long been aware of this process.For further discussion of education, see Robert B. Everhart. ed., The Public School Monopoly: A Critical Analysis of Education and the State in American Society (San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982). But the accruing insight into progressivism as a business cartelizing device led historians who had abandoned the easy equation of "businessmen" with "laissez faire" to see that all the facets of progressivism—the economic and the ideological and educational—were part of an integrated whole. The new ideology among business groups was cartelist and collectivist rather than individualist and laissez faire, and the social control over the individual exerted by progressivism was neatly paralleled in the ideology and practice of progressive education. Another parallel to the economic realm, of course, was the increased power and income accruing to the technocratic intellectuals controlling the school system and the economy.
If the action of business and intellectual elites in turning toward progressivism was now explained, there was still a large gap in the historical explanation and understanding of progressivism and therefore of the leap into statism beginning in the early twentieth century. There was still a need to explain mass voting behavior and the ideology and programs of the political parties in the American electoral system. This chapter applies the illuminating findings of recent "ethnoreligious historians" to significant changes that took place during the Progressive Era in the power of government over the family. In particular, we discuss the movement to expand the power of the public school and the educationist elite over the family, as well as the women's suffrage and eugenics movement, all important features of the Progressive movement. In every case, we see the vital link between these intrusions into the family and the aggressive drive by Anglo-Saxon Protestant "pietists" to use the state to "make America holy," to stamp out sin and thereby assure their own salvation by maximizing the salvation of others. In particular, all of these measures were part and parcel of the long-standing crusade by these pietists to reduce if not eliminate the role of "liturgicals," largely Roman Catholics and high-church Lutherans, from American political life. The drive to stamp out liquor and secular activities on Sundays had long run into successful Catholic and high-church Lutheran resistance. Compulsory public schooling was soon seen as an indispensable weapon in the task of "Christianizing the Catholics," of saving the souls of Catholic children by using the public schools as a Protestantizing weapon. The neglected example of San Francisco politics was urged as a case study of this ethnoreligious political battle over the schools and hence over the right of Catholic parents to transmit their own values to their children without suffering Anglo-Saxon Protestant obstruction. Women's suffrage was seized upon as a means of increasing Anglo-Saxon Protestant voting power, and immigration restriction as well as eugenics was a method of reducing the growing demographic challenge of Catholic voters.
In sum, recent insights into the cartelizing drive of various business interests have provided an important explanation of the rapid growth of statism in the twentieth century. Ethnoreligious history provides an explanation of mass voting behavior and political party programs that neatly complement the cartelizing explanation of the actions of business elites.
In this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop discuss the cancellation of Tucker Carlson's Fox News show and the similar treatment of Murray Rothbard by Bill Buckley. What does Tucker's cancelation mean for the growing anti-regime trends on the right, and why do "conservative" gatekeepers prefer the company of the left more than their audience? We look at this and more on this episode of Radio Rothbard.
New Radio Rothbard mugs are now available at the Mises Store. Get yours at Mises.org/RothMug
For more on the history of the conservative movement, get your copy of Betrayal of the American Right by Murray Rothbard. Receive 20% off with coupon code RothPod at the Mises Store.
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Recommended Reading"Murray Rothbard, RIP" by William F. Buckley Jr.: Mises.org/RR_132_A
"Frank Meyer's Fusionism and the Search for Consensus Among Conservatives" by Paul Gottfried: Mises.org/RR_132_B
"NotCon 3 Video: The Failure of Fusionism" Mises.org/RR_132_C
"Why Fox Fired Tucker: BlackRock, Replacement Theory, and the ADL" by Michael Rectenwald Mises.org/RR_132_D
"Buckley Revealed" by Murray Rothbard Mises.org/RR_132_E
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Washington elites and especially their media have denounced what they once praised: leaking of official documents that show the government has been lying.
Original Article: "Arbitrary Use of Power: Punishing Those Who Expose Not-So-Secret Government Secrets"
Recorded in Birmingham, Alabama on April 22, 2023.
From the Mises Institute's recent event in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to the global threat of "The Great Reset".
Featuring Will Blakely, Bryan Dawson, Allen Mendenhall, and Michael Rectenwald. Recorded in Birmingham, Alabama on April 22, 2023.
From the Mises Institute's recent event in Birmingham, Alabama dedicated to the global threat of "The Great Reset".
The bipartisan RESTRICT Act—marketed as a "Tik Tok ban"—is properly named because it will restrict freedom, empower the state, and expand government surveillance.
Original Article: "The RESTRICT Act Launches a New War on Free Speech"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Like Bentham's panopticon, modern cancel culture is built upon fear and online bullying, making people police their own thoughts.
Original Article: "Cancel Culture: The Digital Panopticon"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Jeff and Bob review the history and impact of The Human Action Podcast—formerly Mises Weekends—and discuss where the podcast is headed.
Get Jeff's new book A Strange Liberty: Politics Drops Its Pretenses: Mises.org/Strange
The Ralph Raico Memorial Commencement Lecture.
Recorded at the 2023 Austrian Economics Research Conference hosted at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, March 16–18, 2023.
The Austrian Economics Research Conference is the international, interdisciplinary meeting of the Austrian School, bringing together leading scholars doing research in this vibrant and influential intellectual tradition. The conference is hosted by the Mises Institute at its campus in Auburn, Alabama, and is directed by Joseph Salerno, professor of economics at Pace University and academic vice president of the Mises Institute.
The Henry Hazlitt Memorial Lecture, sponsored by Harvey and Mei Allison.
Recorded at the 2023 Austrian Economics Research Conference hosted at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, March 16–18, 2023.
The Austrian Economics Research Conference is the international, interdisciplinary meeting of the Austrian School, bringing together leading scholars doing research in this vibrant and influential intellectual tradition. The conference is hosted by the Mises Institute at its campus in Auburn, Alabama, and is directed by Joseph Salerno, professor of economics at Pace University and academic vice president of the Mises Institute.
The latest from the world of social media is the role of "influencers." There is a perfectly good economic explanation for their popularity.
Original Article: "Influencers and Subjective Value: They Have Something to Teach Us"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
The F.A. Hayek Memorial Lecture, sponsored by Greg and Joy Morin.
Recorded at the 2023 Austrian Economics Research Conference hosted at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, March 16–18, 2023.
The Austrian Economics Research Conference is the international, interdisciplinary meeting of the Austrian School, bringing together leading scholars doing research in this vibrant and influential intellectual tradition. The conference is hosted by the Mises Institute at its campus in Auburn, Alabama, and is directed by Joseph Salerno, professor of economics at Pace University and academic vice president of the Mises Institute.
Never before have we seen an entire generation of young Americans being censored—and self-censoring—for making innocuous statements. This does not end well.
Original Article: "The Censored Generation"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Thanks to copyright laws, the estate of Roald Dahl can not only rewrite his books, but can also essentially outlaw the old versions. Only books in the public domain are safe from this.
Original Article: "Roald Dahl and James Bond Books Are Getting Woke Rewrites. Copyright Law Ensures You Can't Stop Them."
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Secularists cheer the decline of religion in Western societies, but that loss comes at a huge cost: the decline of civilization itself.
Original Article: "Loss of Religious Belief Is a Greater Loss for a Civilized Society"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Rest in peace, "technolibertarianism." There was a time when many believed tech entrepreneurs would usher in a new era of freedom. Unfortunately, the new tech elites are technocratic collaborators with the regime.
Original Article: "When the Private Sector Is the Enemy"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Gloria Steinem declared, "The personal is political." Today, politics has reached into family life and even procreation itself, an unhappy trend for unhappy people.
Original Article: "The Politicization of Procreation: The Ultimate in "the Personal Is Political""
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
With Yale economics professor Yusuke Narita suggesting mass suicide—seppuku—as the answer to Japan's rapidly aging demographics, Jeff and Bob take a hard look at the economics and humanity of greying America.
Richard Hanania, "Gerontocracy Versus Western Civilization": Mises.org/HAP383a
Bob on opting out of Social Security: Mises.org/HAP383b
How do societies determine who their heroes are? We know that often those seen as heroes actually made a country worse off.
Original Article: "How Should a Nation Determine Its Heroes?"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Progressives like to claim that "America" has a "gun violence problem." However, the "gun violence problem" happens to exist in places where progressives dominate the government.
Original Article: "Concentrate Where the Murders Are Concentrated"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
All people of goodwill have an obligation to fight the escalation of politics in American life.
Original Article: "The New Rules of Engagement"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
The value of time, i.e., time preference or the higher valuation of want-satisfaction in nearer periods of the future as against that in remoter periods, is an essential element in human action. It determines every choice and every action. There is no man for whom the difference between sooner and later does not count. The time element is instrumental in the formation of all prices of all commodities and services.—Ludwig von Mises, Human Action
Mises’s great quote about time underscores one of the great axioms in economics: all things equal, we prefer present to future consumption.
Time is short, or at least it feels like it. Time is relentless and unyielding, and so we yield to it. We want stuff now, we want happiness now, we want that vacation or car or trinket now. This is simple human nature.
But we also have the capacity to plan and prepare for the future. This innate human desire to improve our material circumstances in the future is the driver of all economic growth, it drives capital accumulation and greater productivity.
Time explains so much. We know, for example, that people prefer buying their dream homes at age forty rather than ninety. We know “natural” interest rates must be positive because nobody would lend money for a period of years—with the attendant forbearance and risk of loss—only to be paid back less nominally.
And yet time is the missing ingredient in what we hesitate to call mainstream economics. Only Austrian economists truly stress the temporal element in human action. Time manifests inexorably: in our personal economic decisions, in interest rates, and in the very structure of production which brings us goods and services unimaginable to our grandparents.
At the heart of the structure of production is interest rates, which can only be understood relative to time. Our cover interview features Edward Chancellor, a writer and journalist who dedicated a long career both to understanding the various economic theories of interest and documenting how interest rates have worked across millennia.
The result is his marvelous new book, The Price of Time, praised by no less than our friend James Grant. I loved every page of it and learned quite a bit.
From the outset, the author frames the phenomenon of interest as rooted in Turgot’s proto-Austrian understanding of time preference. And like with all economic activity, there is always an insatiable political drive to control and shape interest rates.
Thus readers enjoy an opening vignette about an 1849 debate in the French assembly between Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Frédéric Bastiat. Proudhon, echoing Marx, argued that charging interest on borrowed capital was nothing short of usury and theft. Bastiat countered that “time is the stuff of which life is made” and thus interest is “natural, just, and legitimate, but also useful and profitable, even to those who pay it.”
Proudhon’s arguments for a tax on capital (i.e., negative interest rates), a vast expansion of paper money to replace gold, and reduction of rates to near zero—all implemented by a nationalized “people’s bank”— certainly sound like modern central bankers today!
If you want to understand why natural, market-set interest rates are so important to a healthy society, and why manipulating them is so harmful, Mr. Chancellor’s book is indispensable. And as a bonus, you will find favorable treatment of Böhm-Bawerk, Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard!
Our Senior Fellow David Gordon is back with a review of Taxes Have Consequences: An Income Tax History of the United States, by Arthur Laffer. You may remember Laffer from his infamous “Laffer curve,” which demonstrated how tax collections increase when marginal rates are lowered to an optimal level. Laffer (and his two coauthors) is a supply-sider and disagrees with the Austrian monetary interpretation of the Great Depression. He identifies taxes, in particular the Smoot-Hawley Tariff passed by Herbert Hoover in 1930, as the real cause of that terrible economic downturn. Just as tax cuts in the early ’20s created roaring prosperity, Laffer argues, “huge, pangovernmental tax impositions” were the cause of the 1930s crisis. Laffer does not address business cycle theory, but he does correctly debunk the Keynesian claim that radical increases in government spending during World War II ended the Great Depression—when in fact the vast majority of Americans suffered a diminished standard of living during the war. But the book overall is a mixed bag, so David did the work of reading it for you!
As always, we thank you for your commitment to the Mises Institute and its mission. We wish you all the best for a happy and prosperous 2023.
It's only a good time to be a worker in America if one confuses falling real wages and falling full-time employment with robust employment conditions.
Original Article: "Biden Is Lying about the Jobs Data"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Economic factors are only some of the reasons why men are leaving the workforce. The decline of marriage has also lowered the supply of workers by lessening incentives for workers.
Original Article: "Why Are So Many Men Leaving the Workforce?"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
John McWhorter takes on the present infatuation with wokeness and shows the real harm it is doing to our social fabric.
Original Article: "Spelling Out the Problem with W-o-k-e-n-e-s-s"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Woke Racism: How a New Religion Has Betrayed Black America by John McWhorter Portfolio/Penguin, 2021, xv + 201 pp.
John McWhorter is an eminent linguistics professor who teaches at Columbia. He is himself black, and he argues that “woke” racism does not help blacks and other minorities. It has, he says, become a religion, and those who question it are dealt with severely by its acolytes, to the detriment of a free society. He does not confine the book to criticism but also proposes a three-step program aimed to help blacks succeed.
What is “woke” racism? According to McWhorter, it holds that all aspects of American society are racist, having as their function the suppression of nonwhites to the advantage of the dominant white elite. Society consists entirely of a struggle for power.
It is rarely stated explicitly, but decisively steers its adherents’ perspective on existence and morality. Third Wave Antiracism’s homily par excellence would be the following: Battling power relations and their discriminatory effects must be the central focus of all human endeavor, be it intellectual, moral, civic, or artistic. Those who resist this focus, or even evidence insufficient adherence to it, must be deeply condemned, deprived of influence, and ostracized. (pp. 10–11)
A particularly insidious part of the “woke” ideology is an extension of the notion of “white privilege,” under which whites are condemned for virtually anything they do or say, and which often rejects their anxious efforts to show their antiracism as inept or “actually” racist.
To anticipate a question, yes, I do believe that to be white in America is to automatically harbor certain unstated privileges in terms of one’s sense of belonging. Figures of authority are the same color as you. You are thought of as the default category. You are not subject to stereotypes. Although, these days, you actually are subject to one—that of the menacing, anal “whiteness” monster the Elect tar you as—but we shall not quibble. But the issue here is not whether I or anyone else thinks white privilege is real, but what we consider the proper response to it. The Elect are to ritually “acknowledge” that they possess white privilege, with an awareness that they can never be absolved of it. Classes, seminars, and teach-ins are devoted to corralling whites into this approach to the matter. (pp. 30–11)
McWhorter calls our attention to a large number of incidents in which people have lost their jobs because they have said something to which a proponent of the “woke” ideology takes exception. For example, in 2020,
David Shor, a data analyst at a progressive consulting firm, lost his job. He had tweeted a study by a black Ivy League political science professor, Omar Wasow, showing that violent black protests during the long, hot summers of the late 1960s were more likely than nonviolent ones to make local voters vote Republican. Shor’s intent was not to praise this, but to disseminate the facts themselves as a glum announcement—one that had been covered eagerly by liberal media shortly before this. Certain parties on Twitter, though, didn’t like a white man tweeting something that could be taken as criticizing black protest in the wake of George Floyd’s murder. The consulting firm took heed and expelled Shor. (p. 4)
I have so far confined myself to reporting McWhorter’s account of “wokeness,” as it seems to me in large part convincing, but at one point in his analysis, he goes astray, though fortunately this does not weaken the main thrust of his argument. He says that the insistence that absolute credence be given to the “woke” doctrines, without regard to evidence, makes the “woke” movement a religion. He is free to define “religion” in this way, but he intends more than this. He thinks that his characterization applies to Christianity and other theistic religions, and from that he goes on to suggest that the separation of church and state mandated by the First Amendment should apply to the “woke” ideology as well.
He says,
Certain questions are not to be asked, or, if asked, only politely. The answer one gets, despite being somewhat half-cocked, is to be accepted. The Christian is allowed to ask why the Bible is so self-contradictory, or why God allows such terrible things to happen. But no one has had a smackdown answer for two millennia anyway, and what’s key is that you believe. One internalizes an etiquette that it stops there. (p. 25)
One could well ask McWhorter whether his account of the Abrahamic religions rests on evidence. It is my impression, for what it is worth, that some Christians and Jews do have what they take to be satisfactory answers to the problem of evil, and the many who do not usually would not say that they are commanded to believe in God despite the absence of a satisfactory explanation, in defiance of reason, though there are no doubt some who do say this. Rather, I would think the more common view of believers is that the weight of the evidence favors belief, though the existence of evil does indeed count as a problem.
When he turns from theology, McWhorter does much better, and especially so in his suggestions on how to improve the lives of blacks. He argues that the “woke” ideology impedes black progress in that that it encourages blacks to blame all their problems on racism rather than to consider what positive steps they can take their condition.
If it is objected that this is “blaming the victim,” McWhorter responds that he has a positive program that will enable young blacks to succeed, and his program has great merit. First, he calls for an end to the war on drugs because the illegal market in drugs tempts young black men to a life of violent crime. “Its eclipse would create a black American community in which even men dealt a bad hand would likely work legally, spells in prison would be rare, and thus growing up fatherless would be occasional rather than the norm” (p. 141). Second, he favors teaching reading through phonics—i.e., sounding out the letters of a word, with concentration on a word’s spelling rather than the “whole word” method, which is difficult for children who come from homes in which books are not an important part of daily life. Finally, he proposes encouraging vocational training rather than going to college, which is not suitable for everyone. “We must revise the notion that attending a four-year college is the mark of being a legitimate American, and return to truly valuing working class jobs” (p. 143).
McWhorter deserves our thanks for his thoughtful account of “wokeness.”
Remember those dystopian futuristic films in which the evil people try to electronically erase the heroes? Social media companies are trying to recreate that scenario.
Original Article: "Notes from the Digital Gulag"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Bob and Jeff make their provocative 2023 predictions for the economy, the Fed, politics, world events, and cultural issues.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop look back at 2022 and touch on some of the worst and underappreciated trends of the year. For those interested in a more holiday-themed episode, check out last year's debate on the virtues of Ebenezer Scrooge (Mises.org/RR_45).
Looking for Christmas gifts? Use promo code ROTHPOD for a 20% discount on select books featured on Radio Rothbard. Or, use code MURRAYCHRISTMAS for a special 10% discount on select new Mises apparel: Mises.org/RR_113_Store
Recommended Reading"Why Are So Many Men Leaving the Workforce?" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_113_A
"The Jobs "Boom" Isn't So Hot When We Remember Nearly Six Million Men Are Missing from the Workforce" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_113_B
"The Pandemic Is 'Over,' but the Feds Aren't Giving Up Their Emergency Powers" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_113_C
"Ebenezer Scrooge: Hero or Villain?" (Radio Rothbard): Mises.org/RR_113_D
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
For families and friends gathering for Thanksgiving this year, many will assemble in a room called the "dining room." This is a modern luxury made possible by the bourgeois merchants of old.
Original Article: "How the Middle-Class Dining Room Revolutionized Domestic Life"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
As inflation ravages the economy, easy money is disappearing, with political and legal consequences to follow.
Original Article: "As Easy Money Crashes, the Political and Legal Effects Appear"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop look at the topic of nationalism and the role it can play in political decentralization. In his recent book, Breaking Away: The Case for Secession, Radical Decentralization, and Small Polities, Ryan notes how nationalist sentiments have helped ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups resist centralizing political states, such as the Soviet Union. This contrasts the ways nationalism served as a centralizing force in 19th-century Europe. Ryan and Tho look at how recent nationalist sentiments are challenging authoritarian globalist pressures, as well as how strengthening regional and state cultural identities may offer the best chance to roll back the Washington regime in America.
Looking for Christmas gifts? Use promo code ROTHPOD for a 20% discount on select books featured on Radio Rothbard. Or, use code MURRAYCHRISTMAS for a special 10% discount on select new Mises apparel: Mises.org/RR_110_Store
Recommended ReadingBreaking Away: The Case for Secession, Radical Decentralization, and Small Polities by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_110_A
"Is Nationalism a Good Thing? It Depends." by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_110_B
"Mises on Nationalism, the Right of Self-Determination, and the Problem of Immigration" by Joe Salerno: Mises.org/RR_110_C
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
The Conservative AffirmationBy Willmoore KendallRegnery, 2022 (Originally published in 1963)lxix + 362 pp.
Willmoore Kendall was the most important political theorist of the brand of conservatism associated with William F. Buckley Jr.’s National Review during the 1950s and 1960s. To some of us, this will be not altogether a positive recommendation, but as Daniel McCarthy suggests in his excellent foreword to this reissue of Kendall’s book, Kendall had a powerful intellect, and the “populism” that he championed makes it likely that he will become an intellectual voice for the revolt against elite dominance which has characterized the American right wing in recent years. In his criticism of the elites and emphasis on the political wisdom of the American people, Kendall shows interesting parallels and differences with the thought of Murray Rothbard, and that is what I shall concentrate on in this review.
According to Kendall, the elitist intellectuals of the Left favor a revolution in support of a principle that “looks to the overthrow of an established social order. The principle in question is the egalitarian principle—not the equality principle of the Declaration of Independence which ‘holds’ merely that all men are created equal…. The egalitarian principle says that men are not merely created equal, are indeed not created equal at all, but rather ought, that is have a right, to be made equal. That is to say equalized, and equalized precisely by governmental action, so that if they end up other than actually equal—in political power, in wealth, in income, in education, in living conditions—no one shall ever be able to say that government has spared any effort that might conceivably have made them equal” (emphasis in original).
Kendall sees Abraham Lincoln as a source of this destructive egalitarianism. In a review of Harry Jaffa’s Crisis of the House Divided, Kendall says, “As for the status of Abraham Lincoln vis-à-vis the Signers [of the Declaration] and Framers, Jaffa’s Lincoln sees the great task of the nineteenth century as that of affirming the cherished accomplishment of the Fathers by transcending it. Concretely, this means to construe the equality clause as having an allegedly unavoidable meaning with which it was always pregnant but which the Fathers apprehended only dimly” (emphasis in original). Kendall fears that Jaffa’s reading of the equality clause might lead to “a political future the very thought of which is hair-raising: a future made up of an endless series of Abraham Lincolns, each persuaded that he is superior in wisdom and virtue to the Fathers.” Perhaps in reaction to Kendall’s review, Jaffa in his later work changed his interpretation of the equality clause so that Lincoln became the faithful expositor of the Fathers.
It is at this point in Kendall’s argument that populism enters the scene. The American people do not want the radical egalitarianism of the elites, and, Kendall argues, this is shown particularly in congressional resistance to the egalitarian proposals of the executive branch, which is often dominated by leftist elites entrenched in bureaucratic agencies. The conflicts between the branches “all involve matters of policy which … bear very nearly indeed upon the central destiny of the United States—on the kind of society it is going to become (‘open’ or relatively ‘closed,’ egalitarian and redistributive or shot through and through with great differences in reward and privilege, a ‘welfare state’ society or a ‘capitalist’ society); on the form of government the United States is to have (much the same as that intended by the Framers or one tailored to the specifications of egalitarian ideology).”
This is a decisive point of contact with Rothbard, who also takes the side of “populism” against the leftist elites. In an article published in the Rothbard-Rockwell Report in January 1992, he says, “The reality of the current system is that it constitutes an unholy alliance of ‘corporate liberal’ Big Business and media elites, who, through big government, have privileged and caused to rise up a parasitic underclass, who, among them all, are looting and oppressing the bulk of the middle and working classes in America. Therefore, the proper strategy of libertarians and paleos is a strategy of ‘right-wing populism,’ that is: to expose and denounce this unholy alliance, and to call for getting this preppie-underclass- liberal media alliance off the backs of the rest of us: the middle and working classes.”
There is an objection that supporters of populism need to confront, and Rothbard has a better answer to it than Kendall. The objection is that the fact the majority of the population supports a political position does not by itself show that the position is morally justifiable, and this remains so even if the majority reflects what Kendall calls “the deliberate sense of the community.” Kendall’s response would be to deny that he equates political morality with majority support. He supports natural law and regards the American people, historically shaped by the traditions of the Christian West, as in their wisdom the best judges of how to apply the precepts of natural law, which are, after all, not self-executing, to the concrete circumstances of the day.
Unfortunately, Kendall has what from a Rothbardian perspective is a defective understanding of natural law. Following Leo Strauss, whom he calls his greatest teacher, Kendall understands ancient natural right, with its stress on the city-state, as a principal instrument in promoting virtue among citizens, and contrasts it with individualism, conventionalism, and relativism, which deny natural law. He locates John Locke firmly in the latter camp, thus failing to consider the position that Lockean self-ownership and property rights provide an objective basis for natural law as applied to politics. Locke’s individualism, far from being a corruption of classic natural law, is an improvement on it, so far as politics is concerned.
Had Kendall accepted this, he could have avoided what seems to me a serious mistake in his thought. He rightly says that a society need not, and ought not to, regard all questions as unsettled. If, for example, radicals today propose to abolish what they call the “hierarchical” family and to bring into question the distinction between men and women, we are not required to respond to them on their own terms but can ignore them. As Kendall finely says, criticizing the view he opposes, “Whatever the private convictions of the society’s individual members concerning what Plato teaches us to call the important things—that is, the things with which truth is primarily concerned—the society itself is now by definition educated to a national religion of skepticism, to the idea that all questions are open questions, to the suspension of judgment as the exercise of judgment par excellence.… It can, to be sure, tolerate all expression of opinion that is predicated upon its own view of truth; but what is it to do with the man who steps forward to urge an opinion, to conduct an inquiry, not predicated on that view? What is it to do with a man who with every syllable he utters challenges the very foundations of society? What can it say to him except, ‘Sir, you cannot enter into our discussion, because you and we have no common premises from which discussion between us can be initiated’?” Kendall is here describing how the Left viewed Joseph McCarthy, but though Kendall of course rejects their position, he accepts their view of how people should respond to a challenge to society’s public orthodoxy.
Unfortunately, reflecting what I take to be his statist view of natural law, Kendall argues that dissenters may not just be ignored but may be forcibly suppressed. Rothbard’s resolution of free speech issues into questions of property rights avoids the extreme to which Kendall is driven: you are free to say what you want on your own property but not, lacking the permission of the owners, on that of others.
In his relentless campaign against the “open society,” Kendall misunderstands John Stuart Mill, whom he takes to be the foremost proponent of the position he wishes to combat in what I can only call a fantastic way. He says that “Mill’s freedom of speech doctrine has its very roots in dogmatic skepticism—in, that is to say, denial of the existence, at any particular place and at any moment in time, not only of a public truth but of any truth whatever unless it be the truth of denial itself.” If I may be “dogmatic,” Mill definitely did not deny the existence of objective truth, and I suspect that Kendall’s failure to understand this is an example of a besetting sin among political theorists. Kendall was a pupil of the great philosopher R.G. Collingwood at Oxford, and Kendall’s references to F.H. Bradley and José Ortega y Gasset suggest that he was widely read in philosophy, but like many of his fellow political theorists, he appears unaware of most work by analytic philosophers. Had he studied Mill in the context of analytic philosophy, he would have quickly discovered that the position he foists on Mill is a travesty.
It is also necessary to say that as with a number of his colleagues at National Review, Kendall’s apocalyptic calls for a global crusade—involving the use of nuclear weapons if needed—against world communism have not aged well. Though he was right in his uncompromising condemnation of the evils of communist totalitarianism, it does not follow from this condemnation, as Kendall wrongly thought it did, that a noninterventionist foreign policy needed to be abandoned. And though he is again right that there are situations in which one ought to risk death to avert conquest by a tyrannical regime, one gets the impression that this CIA operative relished the prospect of ending his life in such sacrifice a little too much.
Despite his mistakes, Kendall is usually insightful and provocative.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop look at conman Sam Bankman-Fried, the scam of FTX, and how regime legitimacy has fueled several fraudulent companies with unprofitable business practices.
Did post-2008 monetary policy fuel a bubble in "effective altruism?" Do examples like Elon Musk's restructuring of Twitter offer an illustration of what Big Tech firms will have to do to survive in a time of less-than-easy money, or will the regime bailout out the corporate extensions of techno-managerialism? What killed Silicon Valley's once-promising techno-libertarian style? Ryan and Tho look at this and more on this episode of Radio Rothbard.
Looking for Christmas gifts? Use promo code ROTHPOD for a 20% discount on select books featured on Radio Rothbard. Or, use code MURRAYCHRISTMAS for a special 10% discount on select new Mises apparel: Mises.org/RR_109_Store
Recommended Reading "How Easy Money Fueled the FTX Crypto Collapse" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_109_A
"Sound Money Is Our Best Hope Against the Monopolists' Threat" by Brendan Brown: Mises.org/RR_109_B
"How Fiat Money Enriches the Unproductive" by George Ford Smith: Mises.org/RR_109_C
"Without Easy Money, the Tech Sector Faces Layoffs and Losses" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_109_D
"The Housing Boom Is Already Over. The Housing Shortage Will Continue." by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_109_E
"Will the FTX Scandal Bring Down 'Crypto'?" by Jeff Deist and Bob Murphy (video): Mises.org/RR_109_F
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
This year’s midterm disappointment for Americans hoping the lunacy of the left would undermine the Democrat Party highlights that the very real problems we face will not fall under their own weight. Anti-human progressivism continues to rise, no matter how visually absurd it manifests itself.
Original Article: "The Midterm Lesson: Unserious People Can't Stop the Left"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. '
Daniel McCarthy joins Jeff and Bob to consider the deep unseriousness of American politics and electorate.
Willmoore Kendall's The Conservative Affirmation: Mises.org/Kendall
Progressives are quick to blame escalating healthcare costs on free markets, yet it's government rules and policies that are responsible.
Original Article: "In Government-Regulated Healthcare, There Is No Competition Like No Competition"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. '
Jeff joins Chris Casey of WindRock Wealth Management for a deep analysis of next week's punishing midterm elections.
While Elon Musk says he will bring free speech back to Twitter, the forces of statism will not be still. The jury is out on how successful Musk's experiment will be.
Original Article: "Changing of the Guard: Can Musk Deliver on His Promises for Free Speech and Information?"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. '
Criticisms of hapless Senate candidate John Fetterman are labeled "ableist," while Elon Musk's takeover of Twitter is deemed fascist. Jeff and Bob take a hard look at the linguistic battlefield and the corruption of language as an institution.
Jeff's paper on language, "Evolution or Corruption?": Mises.org/HAP367-1 George Orwell's essay "Politics and the English Language": Mises.org/HAP367-2 Ken Smith's Junk English: Mises.org/HAP367-3 Bryan Caplan on "Privilege": Mises.org/HAP367-4
Featuring Tho Bishop, Liam Metzger, Connor Mortell, Mitchell Robson, and Annika Wahlstedt.
Recorded at the Arizona Biltmore Hotel in Phoenix, Arizona on October 7th, 2022.
Free Markets are often criticized for producing ugly, dystopian, consumer-driven landscapes, but is this true? Jeff explains how we need more than intellectual appeal to advance the cause of liberty—we need an appeal to beauty.
Watch other talks from our 40th Anniversary Celebration: Mises.org/SS2022
Even while Americans deal with skyrocketing higher education costs, few would challenge the worth of college and fewer still question the campus culture. Yet, that is precisely where the problems lie, even if people don't recognize it.
Original Article: "College as an Economic and Social Problem: Dealing with the Culture"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. '
The idea of defamation as a punishable legal matter is based on the notion that people do not have free will and are not responsible for their own actions.
Original Article: "The Alex Jones Verdict Shows the Danger of Defamation Laws"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. '
Daniel McCarthy, editor of Modern Age, joins Jeff to consider the state of modern conservatism, modern libertarianism, and whether they can or cannot find common ground.
Watch Daniel's talk at the LSC 2022: Mises.org/LSC22-McCarthy Read The Conservative Affirmation: Mises.org/HAP362-1
Tate Fegley joins Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop to discuss his recent Mises Wire article, "Private Property and Customer Safety: Starbucks Learns a Hard Lesson". As businesses increasingly interject broader "social values" into their business plans, customers are increasingly forced to make difficult decisions about how to navigate their economic behavior with ideological values. What role does the ideology of the state play in the decisions behind how businesses behave? Is a battle for power an inevitable consequence of a civil rights regime? How would these things be handled if we took property rights seriously?
This and more on this episode of Radio Rothbard.
Recommended Reading "Private Property and Customer Safety: Starbucks Learns a Hard Lesson" by Tate Fegley: Mises.org/RR_100_A
"The Equality Act's Attack on Religion Is Really about Private Property Rights" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_100_B
"The Transgender Debate Should Be about Women’s Freedom and Private Property Rights" by Jess Gill: Mises.org/RR_100_C
"To Understand Economics, First Understand Private Property" by Chris Calton: Mises.org/RR_100_D
"Woke Capitalism Is a Monopoly Game" by Michael Rectenwald: Mises.org/RR_100_E
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Who frames the “climate” debate in this country? Or any political debate, for that matter?
We all know the answer. Left progressives have mastered the emotive art of posing supposedly good intentions as actual arguments. They enjoy a childlike state of suspended disbelief that allows them to insist reality can be legislated. Being progressive increasingly means never accepting responsibility for the plainly foreseeable consequences of your proposed policies.
How many times have you found yourself explaining rather than asserting, arguing from your heels rather than requiring your interlocutor to make a positive case for state intervention to fix X, Y, or Z? We see this across a wide range of issues: making the case for government action satisfies the urge to do something (Save the Planet! Flatten the Curve!), while making the opposite case requires refutation and inferential thinking. Sound bites and slogans beat reasoned arguments.
Global warming, climate change, the Green New Deal, and environmentalism in general are pointed examples. The Left successfully frames these phony issues as urgent existential threats to humanity that only immediate government action can eliminate. This puts realists and market economists immediately on a defensive footing. Question begging is the order of the day, as in “Why don’t you care about the earth overheating?”
But we have good news. Our cover story features Alex Epstein, a brilliant young thinker who intends to reframe this debate entirely. Mr. Epstein is the author of Fossil Future, a remarkable new book that ranks among the most important you will ever read. Energy from fossil fuels, he explains, is part and parcel of human civilization and our entire material existence. He shows how the growing movement to restrict or even ban the use of oil, natural gas, and coal is not only delusional in terms of sustaining that existence—at least for the foreseeable future—but also profoundly antihuman.
While he provides mountains of data to advocate continued (and growing) fossil fuel use, the book’s most important contribution may be flipping the script on supposed environmentalists. Under Epstein’s rubric, the question is not “How do we achieve zero human impact on the environment?” but rather “How do we use energy to help create a world of greater human flourishing?”
The first question creates an impossibly loaded goal, literally never achievable but ideal for demonizing human industry and activity. It’s the perfect progressive framing. The second, by contrast, forces antienergy advocates to admit that the well-being of humanity is not their chief concern. It positions humans, energy, and the physical planet as cooperative parts of a whole. And it places the burden of proof squarely on the “catastrophizers” (Epstein’s great term) to justify upending our standard of living to impose their dubious green energy agenda, necessitated by a wholly unproven crisis.
Needless to say, Mr. Epstein has his critics. In a 2016 US Senate hearing, then senator Barbara Boxer from California attempted to dismiss Epstein as a philosopher with no official credentials to testify to matters of “science”—a term she cannot define and undoubtedly misinterprets to mean “the current progressive consensus on issues relating to science.” This exchange is telling:
Senator Barbara Boxer: Mr. Epstein, are you a Scientist?Alex Epstein: No, philosopher.Senator Barbara Boxer: You're a philosopher?Alex Epstein: Yes.Senator Barbara Boxer: Okay. Well, this is the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. I think it's interesting we have a philosopher here talking about an issue...Alex Epstein: It's to teach you to think more clearly.
Bravo! Anyone who corrects a clueless senator this effortlessly deserves our admiration.
We hope you enjoy this interview with Mr. Epstein, a heroic voice fighting the progressive narrative on climate—along with David Gordon’s full review of Fossil Future. Epstein’s rhetorical reframing of the climate debate applies equally to any number of political issues, and we should all follow his lead in our own battles against false narratives, emotional blackmail, and feel-good pandering.
As always, thank you for subscribing to The Austrian and for your support of the Mises Institute.
With Queen Elizabeth II lying in state at Westminster Hall, hereditary monarchies are under attack as archaic & absurd. Has mass democracy in the West done any better? Ryan McMaken joins Jeff and Bob to discuss.
Read Ryan's Article on Monarchs: Mises.org/HAP361-1 Read Hoppe's Democracy: Mises.org/Democracy
Bob and Jeff unravel the corrosive and nonsensical policy of "inflationism," and consider its deep cultural effects.
Read Jeff's talk from the recent Ron Paul Institute conference: Mises.org/HAP360-1
Much of modern history portrays the African slave trade as purely a European venture. But capturing and sending slaves abroad required both approval and aid from African elites.
Original Article: "The African Slave Trade Wouldn't Have Been Possible without African Elites"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Comic Dave Smith joins Jeff and Bob for a compelling look at the poisonous political landscape in post-goodwill America.
If the situation were reversed and protestors had invaded the Capitol to support a left-wing candidate, we can be sure that the vocabulary used to describe the event would be quite different.
Original Article: "'Coup' Means Whatever the Regime Wants It to Mean"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
The IRS plans to hire 87,000 new armed agents, while an FBI raid on Trump–the administration's open political rival–draws allegations of corruption. Economists and political scientists, from Mises to Robert Higgs to James Burnham to public choice scholars, explain why mission creep and abuse by state agencies is the rule rather than the exception.
Jonathan Turley on Trump being disqualified from office: Mises.org/HAP356-1 Mises on the managerial state: Mises.org/Bureaucracy James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution: Mises.org/Burnham Bob Murphy Show Episode on the FBI: Mises.org/BMS92
Has economics fallen to politics? Court economists like Paul Krugman–we might call them "regime economists"–represent a profession in big trouble. Jeff and Bob discuss.
Michael Tanner, "PIketty Gets it Wrong": Mises.org/HAP355-1 Bob Murphy on the economics establishment vs. Judy Shelton: Mises.org/HAP355-2 Jeff Deist on Nancy McLean's unprofessional attacks: Mises.org/HAP355-3 Bob's article with Phillip Magness on Piketty: Mises.org/HAP355-4
"This reform will be resisted at every step; but it must be pressed persistently." —Sam Tilden
Download the slides from this talk at Mises.org/MU22_PPT_44.
Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 30 July 2022.
Download the slides from this talk at Mises.org/MU22_PPT_44.
Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 30 July 2022.
This address was presented at the Mises Institute Graduate School Commencement at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 29 July 2022.
Do these characteristics give rise to monopoly power?
Download the slides from this lecture at Mises.org/MU22_PPT_20.
Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 27 July 2022.
Jeff Deist: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome once again to The Human Action Podcast. We’ve got an excellent guest; he’s a friend of mine and also a friend of the Mises Institute, Stephan Livera. Many of you know him from the bitcoin world, from his eminently successful podcast, The Stephan Livera Podcast, but also, he’s a managing director at Swan Bitcoin International. And our topic this week is political freedom, economic freedom, and personal freedom and how these three things juxtapose. I’m starting to think that economic freedom is the only one we’ve got left, even though we don’t have that necessarily, in a large degree. Stephan, who was living in Australia for most of his life, myself in the United States, we used to think we had a greater degree of political freedom than perhaps we have now after the covid crisis. So Stephan, we can start with the reasons why you personally chose to leave Australia over the last couple of years and why you are currently in Dubai.
Stephan Livera: I was born in Sri Lanka, grew up in Australia. I am an Australian citizen, and essentially, the hysteria over the last two years and the culture in Australia drove me away. I was very, very disappointed with how things went in the country, and I was extremely disappointed at the attitude of what I thought were my fellow Australians. If you are an outsider looking into Australia, you have this perception of Paul Hogan and Steve Irwin and these tough Australian men who don’t take any nonsense from anyone, and they’ll have this sort of rebel outlaw culture. But unfortunately, it seems like that culture is very much gone or deteriorated. I think the culture in Australia is that it went very complacent. They had it too good for too long. They got wealthy. They were the lucky country, as the saying goes. And that essentially drove me away because I was being shut down and stopped from participating in the bitcoin world of attending bitcoin conferences and bitcoin events, obviously representing Swan Bitcoin. I’m being shut out, and I’m paying a very high tax for that privilege of being locked down. It was very, very disappointing to me.
I’ve been a libertarian for most of my life, since I was about fourteen or fifteen years old, and so, if you had asked me before this hysteria, I would have very much said, “Hey, come to Australia, it’s a great country. The taxes aren’t great, but overall, it’s pretty free and the people are nice and it’s good.” But basically, from 2020 onward, that all changed, and I thought, What is the point? Why am I paying this high tax? Obviously as libertarians, we want taxes to be low or zero, but I thought, it’s tolerable. I can tolerate this for the certain freedoms that I’m getting. But in reality, 2020 showed that it was like the tide had gone out and Australia was shown swimming naked. Unfortunately, a lot of Australians do not value freedom. They became complacent, and that drove my search for an alternative.
I’m based in Dubai at the moment for a few reasons. Its low tax, its flight connectivity, its good infrastructure, and it’s ironic, but it ties back to our theme as well, this idea of political freedom and economic freedom, because in Dubai, it’s not like you all vote. The rules are there, and you choose it or you leave. And I saw something appealing about that because at least I can earn and pay very, very low tax or zero income tax. Obviously, there are other little taxes that you pay, things like license fees, sales tax, and so on, but the point is, I viewed it as a much better deal. And yes, obviously, it was a big move in terms of separating from friends and people I knew back in Australia. Obviously, I had my libertarian friends, my bitcoin friends, and obviously some family and friends there, but other than that, I saw myself missing an Australia that does not exist anymore. The Australia of the ’90s and the 2000s is no longer there.
JD: That’s so true. The past is a foreign country, as they say, and the other thing we learned, Stephan, over the past couple of years is that the Anglosphere—Canada and the United States, Australia and New Zealand—didn’t react any better than countries in the East. We think of China as a particularly authoritarian country, and I think that’s true, I think that’s fair. When we think of places like South Korea, when we think of places like Singapore, they were far more rational, in my opinion, in their approach to covid—both on the economic side and the lockdown side, the human side.
There’s so many different ways of looking at this. As you’re in Dubai, there’s actually a small bruhaha over here in the US: like other sports leagues, the National Basketball Association is attempting to increase its footprint around the world and is planning some games coming up in the next season in Dubai, and there’s some pushback on that because apparently Dubai has some pretty draconian antihomosexuality laws. And so, this is where these two things interact. You are able to live fairly freely in a way that you enjoy in Dubai, in terms of your personal work, your personal life, your taxes, but then other people come along and say, “Well, if you happen to be gay and you live in Dubai, you have a tougher time of it.” These things always have to be weighed against one another, but I think this distinction between personal freedom and economic freedom is really quite overblown.
If you look at some of the surveys that different groups have produced—the Fraser Institute and Cato produce what’s called the Human Freedom Index, Heritage produces something called the Index of Economic Freedom, Freedom House produces Freedom in the World—they tend to create an x-y axis with personal freedom as the x and economic freedom as the y. I think that when it really comes down to it, every country has elites. This is just a natural part of life. The question is how can an average person lead their life in that country? That’s really the question, and for you, anyway, the calculus in Australia turned negative.
SL: Absolutely. And I think you’re right to point out that these indexes are interesting. In preparation, I had a look at some of the indexes, the Heritage one, the Cato and Fraser index, and it’s really interesting if you look at who they rate highly. They say, “Ah, these are the free countries.” And guess what? Canada, New Zealand, Australia all rank very highly, and yet they did not look at freedom of movement, which is one of the things these indexes should be looking at. They conflate democracy with freedom. We, as Austrian libertarians, we see it more as private property rights are rights and democracy is cutting against that. Imagine if we just get nine out of ten people to vote to steal the tenth guy’s property, that makes it … well, democratic. Obviously, it’s a little bit of a caricature, of a strawman, but in the Western world, they conflate democracy with freedom as though that’s really the meaning of freedom. You can go and protest for the right to free speech and all of these things when really, I think, the Austrian libertarian aspect or way of thinking is more like “No, whose property is it and who’s the rightful owner of that, and you should be able to decide what happens on that property.”
JD: If you think about your personal body and the property you own, everything flows from that, everything stems from that. If those two things are inviolable, then you are protected. But look, if you held a pure democratic vote in Saudi Arabia on gay marriage, it’d probably lose, right? This idea that democracy and freedom are inextricably linked, is of course, hugely faulty.
I want to tell listeners a little bit about some of the countries that did the best. So here’s the Heritage ranking, which is an economic freedom ranking. To their credit, this is about economics. They have four categories rule of law, government size, the regulatory efficiency, and open markets. And this data’s a little more current from ’21, so this would include the covid years. Singapore comes in number one. Remember Lee Kuan Yew? A lot of folks in the West viewed that guy as an authoritarian, and no one would call Singapore a democratic state today per se. Then Switzerland, Ireland, New Zealand, Luxembourg, Taiwan, Estonia. So I thought that was interesting. But when we go to the Cato- Fraser Human Freedom Index, it checks out a little bit differently. They have Hong Kong in the top position. Now, this data is precovid, so I think that makes a big difference. Then Singapore, then New Zealand, Switzerland, Georgia, United States, Ireland, Lithuania, Australia, and Denmark. So, what good is a freedom index if a virus comes along and all these little protofascists turn into actual fascists and tell you you can’t go to work?
SL: Absolutely. I think it’s very challenging. In some of these indexes, you want to also look at things like the freedom of doing business. Now, of course, in these indexes, they’ll look at things like how quickly can you set up a business if you are starting from scratch, but here’s the problem: If you’re under a lockdown or if there are mask regulations or other restrictions that stop you from actually doing your business, then it’s not really that free to do business, is it? That is a challenging thing to wrestle with because on one hand, we want people to have that freedom to do trade, but then on the other hand, there are these people who—they’re public health technocrats or medicrats of the world—are coming out and making these proclamations. I’m hopeful that this hysteria over the last few years is waning and we can start to see more economic actual freedom.
JD: I think, first and foremost, all these indices have to be updated to have a medical freedom component. Are you subject to so-called public health experts every time there’s a sniffle or a virus or a bird flu or whatever? That’s important. I want to read a bit from the Cato-Fraser Human Freedom Index because they actually break it down into what they’re weighing in far greater detail. They have some categories you would expect, like rule of law, but they have safety and security, things like homicide rates and no gang violence. They have freedom of movement, freedom of religion. Then they have the assembly, association, civil society, the expression of information, so you get into more of what we would consider the political or social rights. They have relationships, like same-sex marriage. So that’s all sort of on one axis. On the economic freedom, there’s size of government, the legal system, the tariffs, the regulations, the taxes. But what’s interesting is they have a sound money category, and this goes to inflation and money growth. I took a quick gander at the top ten countries with the least inflation in 2022 and the only major one there is Japan. The rest are very small, like the Maldives and Vanuatu and Bolivia, Saudi Arabia, but Japan actually has low inflation despite all of their other problems. So, that’s very interesting, to view inflation as injurious to human freedom. I think that’s very important.
SL: Absolutely, but as I’m sure you and listeners are aware, they always play with these metrics. There’s hedonic adaptation, and it’s a subjective thing. As we saw recently, the recent CPI, Consumer Price Index, statistic in the US is 8.3 percent, off the top of my head. Obviously, nobody believes that. It’s obviously much higher than that. And then, it’s not just that. Even in the Japan case, the yen seems to have gone down a fair bit because it seems like a lot of people want the US dollar instead. So, even in the case when there’s supposedly low inflation by the government, that doesn’t necessarily mean the value, the purchasing power, the buying power is staying stable. Of course, in general, I would agree with you that having low inflation is a good thing. It’s a time where people need to be thinking more carefully about where they store their value.
JD: Well, obviously, the US federal government was doing anything and everything it had to do to make sure that that number was not double digits. It wasn’t going to be a ten or an eleven. It’s probably eighteen or something like that in reality, but nonetheless, it’s interesting to think about economic freedom and personal freedom and what you’d be willing to trade individually. For example, when Fraser and Cato talk about religious liberty, a lot of people are atheists or agnostics and would say, “I don’t really care about that. That’s not an important value to me. I’d gladly trade that for maybe some other kind of freedom.” So I guess the question, the rhetorical question for our audience, is would you give up voting, for example, in exchange for paying zero taxes in a jurisdiction. Would you give up any kind of political expression, even mouthing off on Twitter, about politics in your country or any other in exchange for zero taxes? Would you give up other kinds of political freedoms in exchange for zero taxes? I think a lot of people, myself included, would take that.
SL: Right, if we really think about the impact of taxation over the course of your lifetime, especially if you did this when you were young, and you went overseas and you started making money—imagine once you compound it: if anyone just runs a basic compounding calculation on a spreadsheet, you’ll find that the saving for you is massive. By the time you get to the later stage of your life, you have all this additional wealth that you could then put into whatever cause you believe in, whether it’s Austrian economics education or whether it’s bitcoin opensource development. There are all kinds of resources that you could devote and put into causes that you believe in. I think that’s something we all have to really think deeply about, is what do we really see as a life purpose, a life mission. And of course, family is a big part of that too, for many of us, but you have to trade that off because at the end of the day, even if you were in one of the Western supposedly free countries, where you are meant to be able to be more free, well, guess what? In Australia, there was a pregnant woman in Victoria who got arrested on camera because she was organizing an antilockdown protest. What kind of freedom of speech is there, even in the so-called Western free nations, when that is the case?
JD: I think many of the freedoms which are being measured in a lot of the countries which are scoring well are shallow. The important point here is that these freedoms go out the window the minute there’s a crisis, the minute there’s a stock market crash, the minute there’s a terrorist event, the minute there’s a war, the minute there’s a virus. So, freedom really matters when politicians are under the gun and public officials are under the gun, and that’s when they dispense with them. We’ve always had wartime emergency suppression of speech and that sort of thing. This isn’t new.
Let’s talk about voting rights. Fast-forward to 2022. Women have been able to vote for quite a while. Black people have been able to vote in the United States for quite a while. What has that given us? Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton? This is not a great value for most people. If we look at freedom of speech in the United States, which is, to be fair, I’m going to argue, far more robust than in most countries in the world and certainly more robust even than in most Western countries. Judge Andrew Napolitano, a great friend of the Mises Institute, in his talk about the First Amendment in America said, “You know, if you look at the Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding it, it’s been a lot more robust than surrounding the Second Amendment or the Fourth Amendment or some of these other important freedoms we thought we enjoyed.” So, the First Amendment has been pretty good overall in the United States, but again, what has that gotten us? It gets us this political class. Look at Twitter, look at woke, look at clown world. What does speech get us at the end of the day? So, the idea that freedom of speech is more important in a country than, let’s say, the tax rate I think is arguable.
SL: To echo a point I believe you’ve made as well, a lot of people are just overly fixated on the social. They don’t really think about the economic part, so they just get caught up in the issue of the day, whatever that issue is, as long as it’s a social issue. It’s very, very rare that people will really get up in arms about an economic issue, worry about taxation, about currency controls, capital controls, business tax rates. If anything, people are getting riled up about all kinds of things, whether it’s the climate or other issues, but it’s always done in a social context. It could be that there’s some kind of mental aspect to it or a sort of natural biological thing where these issues are more interesting to a lot more people and so that plays more on the news, on the media, and so then people just get riled up about it. Obviously, in our case, we should rightly be getting riled up about economic freedom too. Where’s the outrage? Where’s the outrage over the high-tax nations of the world?
JD: Well, the capital controls issue is very real, and I think covid accelerated it. The idea of unbanking people, whether it’s because they’re gun manufacturers or because they’re Canadian truckers protesting covid— if you look at countries like Turkey, which had a nasty currency crisis over the last few years, they have absolutely imposed capital controls on money headed out of the country and on bank deposit withdrawals. That sort of thing is not unthinkable in the West at all. And if you ever had to become an expatriate and leave your Western country, that might be very, very difficult. You may not be able to move money electronically as easily as you thought. You may not be able to move physical gold as easily as you thought, and I think that’s why a lot of bitcoiners make the argument that in a really ugly situation, bitcoin is able to be transportable in a way that other stores of value are not. I think that’s a valuable consideration. I’ll tell you what, I think Americans care more about social issues until it really hits them. I think Americans are very soft and fat and weak and lazy. This is just a fact. I think the slightest material hardship is going to cause a lot of Americans to have a real meltdown, and we’re seeing that. Gas prices have nearly doubled. Inflation on groceries and other necessities is rising. Now we have a baby formula shortage in this country, so it is going to happen. But somehow, the social issues just engage our brain in a certain way. Nobody’s out there protesting in front of a Supreme Court justice’s house over abuses of the Commerce Clause.
SL: Exactly.
JD: Abortion just triggers that hindbrain. I wonder how much longer that’ll be because whatever divisions or fissures we have in society are going to be far, far worse if we have a really nasty economic meltdown.
SL: I think education is so important here, economic education, and that’s why I am a big fan of the Mises Institute. I owe a great intellectual debt to the Mises Institute and the scholars of the Mises Institute. Things will break down and they will look to blame somebody, and because the populations are not economically educated, they’ll just believe what they are told. For example, the common one: “Oh, the prices are rising. Why is that? Oh, because of the corporate greed.” Wait, corporations have been around for how many hundreds of years? How is it that all of a sudden they just became greedy? When we study Austrian economics, we can understand that no, no, it isn’t like they became greedy all of a sudden, in the last month. It’s that they stopped resolving their own issues. And so, supply chain issues. These and other issues have been caused by other problems, things like lockdowns and stopping business and commerce. I think maybe that’s part of it, that economic issues can manifest, and then the root cause might be economic, but then downstream, the impact is a social one, and that’s what gets people triggered per se. That triggers the hindbrain more than “Oh, I can’t feed my baby because no baby formula.”
JD: Yes, I think that’s what René Gerard describes when he talks about scapegoating. I think it’s easier to scapegoat the other on social issues than it is on pure economic issues. If we have widespread unemployment, rising prices, homelessness, starvation, that sort of thing, certainly people will probably coalesce along nasty groups, whether that’s racial, regional, territorial, ethnic, or religious. We certainly don’t want that in the West, and we’ve been free of that in the West for more than one hundred years and I think we take that for granted. We forget how close most people really are to the bone, in terms of their personal saving or their ability to live without a paycheck or the degree to which they would be dependent on neighbors or charity or government very, very quickly.
Let’s take a quick look at Singapore because I’ve read a few different Lee Kuan Yew biographies, a very fascinating guy, and Singapore has been called fundamentally undemocratic in the Press Freedom Index. It has a Public Order Act, which means you need to have a police permit to have any kind of organized protest or to even hold a conference which has political elements to it. Actually, Singapore ranked 151st out of 180 countries in this Press Freedom Index. And of course, it’s infamous for some of its draconian criminal laws, with respect to littering or just spitting out your gum or vandalism or graffiti, and there have been some Western tourists who have been ensnared and had harsh treatment by caning. A lot of people would look at that and say this is an authoritarian regime. But it’s been called a competitive authoritarian regime. What do we make of Singapore? If you go there, it’s unbelievably modern and apparently prosperous, but not free in a Western conception.
SL: I think you’re right. I recall my visit to Singapore around December 2019. I thought it was really cool. Changi Airport, the Singapore airport, it’s rated as one of the best airports on earth. The infrastructure is excellent. The service is excellent. I had a great time in my short visit there. It’s really interesting to see that parallel. When I’m in other countries, I make sure I respect their culture, their rules, but as long as you do that, you can get by. Setting the covid stuff aside, they’ve been a little more authoritarian, but Singapore has been relatively prosperous. It has been very prosperous for its citizens and people who go there to work, and it’s quite a common expat working destination. I think maybe the last years have kind of shifted that a little bit, but on the whole, it’s still a really great place. I think what happens is there’s a little bit of a cycle, almost like a pendulum swing, to these things, because it might have been much easier to get set up there, say, ten, fifteen, twenty years ago than today because now you need more money to get in or you need a company to sponsor you to get in. Then what happens is that people get richer, and maybe that is what causes the downswing. That said, it’s not that I think Singapore is going to go on a downswing, but you want to find the places that are on the upswing and see if that is where I’m going to place some of my chips.
JD: That is interesting. You want to find places that are on the up, and that’s what Jimmy Rogers said about Asia at the turn of the twenty-first century. You look at a place like Singapore and how things work. Everything works, everything is clean, everything is modern. Subways … It’s safe. If you fly Singapore Airlines internationally, let’s say, and then compare that experience to a domestic flight on a thirty-year-old 757 from Detroit to Seattle, where the tray in front of you is half rattled off … You look at some of these countries in the East and you say, “What is it?” It’s not just explainable by what you and I would consider unfettered or free market capitalism. It doesn’t explain everything about why things just sort of work. And things work in Dubai too. Now there’s an underbelly to that. There are people who suffer to make things work, and we understand that. We don’t want to discount that. But nonetheless, if we’re increasingly becoming authoritarian in the West, it’s like you could have authoritarian and nothing works or authoritarian and things work. I hate to think that that’s the choice in the twenty-first century.
SL: It’s a big world out there. There’s two hundred countries or so. You can choose where you go. And even for me—I’m bullish on Dubai— as you were saying, it’s this idea of what’s on the up. I think Dubai is on the up in terms of people coming here, business going on here, favorable regulatory environment, for the most part. I think ultimately everyone has to choose what jurisdiction that is, and maybe if you’re an American listening, well, that’s which state am I going to be in, as an example. And I’m bullish on that idea because that’s really what rewards the jurisdictions that do well. Take yourself out of the bad jurisdictions and go for the good ones. I think that’s the high-level idea, but perhaps to your point as well, some of it is circumstances, as you were saying. Singapore, it’s not just that they had relatively low taxes and so on. It could also be the proximity to China, because they were able to do a lot of trade there. Some of the Middle Eastern countries, like the UAE, have a lot of their business from oil and gas, so maybe some of that is the luck of the draw. But, at the same time, you look at other countries that were so-called blessed. Venezuela has obviously gone very down. They had a lot of natural resources, and at least in the recent years, it has not been a great place.
I think there are always pros and cons, and you just ultimately have to look at where things are going and look at the culture, look at the overall picture, and decide “Well, look, you know what? Given my choices I could either (and I said this to myself) sit in Sydney, Australia, stay in a high-tax nation where the culture is just going down—all these people, they believe in the state, they believe in lockdown-ism. If you tried to argue these things with them, they would say, “No, no, look how many lives were saved,” despite the analyses that were being done. Maybe we might not fully agree with this, but there were analyses, and actually, there was a recent one put out by Gigi Foster. Now, to be clear, she’s not even a libertarian, but she’s an economist, and she put out an analysis showing that even on a quality-adjusted-life-years basis, the lockdowns cost far more than they saved. And this is obvious, right? To anybody who’s studied economics, it’s obvious, but unfortunately, what the people believe matters because there’s a lot of the people around you—maybe they got invested in the lockdown belief early, and now it’s hard for them to change because they were kind of already committed. It’s like a sunk cost fallacy. So, for me, it was either stay in Australia, pay this really high tax, and amongst people who basically hate your freedom or go to another country where it’s low tax and they don’t really care that much about your freedom. You go and do your thing and they do theirs, and maybe that’s about as much as we can reasonably hope for, given the situation and given the world we’re in.
JD: There’s definitely psychological sunk cost to the covid narrative. It’s going to make it very hard for a lot of people to ever give up the idea that lockdowns and vaccines were good and necessary, and I understand. I admire your choice in saying “I’m not going to sit here and just argue with crazy forever. I’m going to take my life in my own hands and go out into the world and go where I feel like I can find greater freedom.” But here’s the fly in the ointment. When you move to Dubai, you are at least at the outset a guest and you’re not going to throw your gum out your Lambo as you’re rolling down the street, you’re not going to go graffiti some mosque, and you’re probably not going to pen letters to the editor denouncing the local government in the newspaper, right? You would feel as a new person and a guest that’s not your role.
But universalism, I think, is the dominant political ideology of the twentieth century. And it’s not dead, and it manifests as political globalism—not the good kind of globalism, where you can get a Diet Coke everywhere. I’m talking about political globalism, the idea that the whole world sort of needs to have a Western-style social democracy. And this mindset of universalism never sleeps. It is relentless. It’s like rust. And so, when Stephan Livera goes to Dubai, he wants to be a good neighbor and do business and be successful and enjoy the freedoms that Dubai offers, but when some people go to Dubai, they look around and say, “Well, this is a place I have to fix.” This is how all the trouble in the world comes to us, because America especially, but the West more generally, has decided it’s our job to police the world and their political arrangements. I think there will always be arbitrage, there will always be young people like you, who are going to go out and go someplace else in the world, or maybe eventually go to Mars or wherever it might be. I just wonder, whether this arbitrage between jurisdictions is going to be challenged in the twenty-first century, in a digital world.
SL: Well, you’re right in that it is being challenged in certain ways, but here’s the question. Will they be successful? The supernational international organizations, they hate this sort of thing. The OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] and other organizations, they’re trying to do things like “No, you should have minimum tax thresholds.” It’s a similar thing in each. They might be in a situation where they can’t afford that because the way that they are competitive is by having low tax. We see that dynamic as well, that there are challenger nations who want to try something different. El Salvador, trying to go and be the bitcoin country where you can freely go as a tourist and spend your bitcoin or set up a business and such.
I see it like it’s a big world out there, and the Western propagandists don’t want you to understand that. They want you to think that only the US, Australia, UK, Canada, and New Zealand are the only countries that you would ever go to, so just stay put, you little plebs. No, just stay put and just take what you’re given. We’re going to tell you the truth. We’re going to tell you what you’re allowed to say on social media, and yet there’s a pushback. We’re saying, “For all these flaws and for all the subsidies, Elon Musk is at least trying to push back on Twitter,” for what it’s worth, right? We’re seeing people like Jack Dorsey come out and be fully bitcoiner and fully try to promote this alternative money.
So, I think it’s just an ebb and flow. There will, of course, be ways that people are trying to control, but then there’ll also be competition, and there will be other places that you can go and other places where they just don’t get as riled up about politics. There’s not protests on the street here. People just, they assess the country and say, “Look, is it going to be a good fit for me? Work, tax, business, other family, friends, etc.—on those dimensions, is it working for me?” And then, yes or no, am I going there? That’s the high-level way that I’m seeing it.
Of course, that overall battle for heart and mind, it still matters. It still does matter that we try to promote sound ways of economic thinking, sound ways of thinking from a political philosophy point of view. I owe you to not aggress against you, and what you owe me is to not aggress against me—and that we promote that basic ethic. I agree that some of that is going to be a cultural battle, and to the point about what they will get outraged about, socially and culturally, yeah, some of that is just what people get outraged about.
JD: Well, maybe we need an index of the least political countries in the world.
SL: That’s a good idea.
JD: Wherever politics does not dominate, that’s where I want to live. I’ll leave you, Stephan, with this note. Economics is social cooperation. Economics is human beings dealing with each other, hopefully absent force or fraud, and that’s it. And so, the idea that there are personal liberties or social liberties or political liberties, which are somehow different from economic liberties and ought to be tracked differently and plotted on two different axes, I think, is false. I think everything flows from economics, from our desire to improve our material well-being and our desire to interact with other human beings in a win-win manner. I think that’s what it comes down to. Stephan, how can people keep in touch with you and see what you’re doing these days?
SL: People can search me online, Stephan Livera, StephanLivera.com, and if they want to find a place to buy and learn about bitcoin, Swan.com is the place. And Jeff, thanks again for hosting me. It’s always a pleasure to chat with you.
Includes an introduction by Jeff Deist. Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 24 July 2021.
The Right: The Hundred-Year War for American ConservatismBy Matthew ContinettiBasic Books, 2022503 pp.
Why should readers of The Austrian be interested in this book? At first glance, it appears that we shouldn’t be. Though the history of American conservatism is of great importance, and the author has amassed a great deal of information about it, he lacks an illuminating analytic framework; the “history” he recounts is little more than one item after another, and when he touches on intellectual matters, he is often wrong. The answer to our question is this: Continetti has a distinctive vision of what American conservatism should be that is derived, for the most part, from neoconservatives. He views the political and economic ideas of Murray Rothbard and Ron Paul as inimical to the ideas he favors, and correctly so; to him, we are the enemy, albeit not the only one. We ought, then, to have a look at his book, if only to see what he says about us.
Continetti makes crystal clear where he stands. As a young man of twenty-two, he was employed at the Weekly Standard, located in an office building he regards as “an intellectual hub—the frontal cortex of the American Right.” Also to be found at this address was “the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). It was a small think tank cofounded by the magazine’s editor that since its inception in 1997 had advocated for a defense buildup, containment of China, and regime change in Iraq.” The editor mentioned is Continetti’s father-in-law, Bill Kristol, and throughout the book, Continetti proves a faithful follower of that paragon of neoconservatism. In sum, American hegemony, perpetual war, and a modified New Deal that recognizes the free market but calls for the state to promote virtue and welfare: that is the path to be followed.
Continetti does not confine his support for war to the recent past and the present; it is a motif present through the whole course of the book. He sees, and this is a real if hardly original insight, that elitism—the view that an educated and well-off upper class needs to keep the masses firmly in line— and populism—the view that wisdom resides in the American people—have been clashing strains within American conservatism. In Continetti’s opinion, the excesses of populism are particularly to be feared, especially when people have the audacity to oppose war. He says, “Antiwar populists and Progressives joined forces. They assailed the intervention [of Woodrow Wilson in World War I]. They said that shadowy business and political interests were behind it. They lamented the changing demographic makeup of the nation caused by immigration from eastern and southern Europe. Their writings were often anti- Semitic.” Away with those bigots!
Continetti is less than surefooted when he writes about the ideas of the Progressives. He says that Wilson “shared the view of historian Charles Beard, who had written in 1913 in The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution [sic] that the nation’s founding document was the product of a group of selfish men primarily interested in shielding themselves from revolt.” This is not Beard’s thesis: Beard argues, rather, that the framers of the Constitution wished to protect personal property, principally bonds, from devaluation by state governments—not, as Continetti has it, to protect against a revolt. Moreover, Beard does not claim that the framers were selfish.
The author’s accuracy does not improve when he reaches the 1920s. He tells us that “the main figures of the intellectual Right scorned politics. . . . The ‘New Humanists’, for instance, were a group of literary critics who urged their audience to return to the ‘great tradition’ of Western civilization. The leaders of the movement, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More . . . were philosophical rather than political.” Babbitt in fact has a good deal to say about contemporary politics, as Continetti would have discovered had he opened Babbitt’s books.
Continetti is aware of H.L. Mencken and Albert Jay Nock, but he scorns these great figures of the Old Right: “Nock’s and Mencken’s exacting standards were meant to expose the inadequacies of their nation and its citizens. They were snappy and memorable writers, but they were oddballs estranged from the beliefs and behaviors of their countrymen. They pined for a departed age of chivalry and Nietzschean self-assertion that had never existed in the United States.” It is surprising that Continetti attributes to Nock a “snappy” style. By the way, it’s also surprising that he calls Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton “Anglo-Catholic writers.” Apparently, he does not know that “Anglo-Catholic” refers to a movement within the Anglican Church and does not mean “English Roman Catholics.”
In Continetti’s coverage of the Great Depression, the Austrian school of economics attracts his notice, but he much prefers the less principled Chicago school. “Mises’s commitment to liberalism led him to frame the choice between liberalism and socialism as either-or. [How dreadful!] For Mises, any expansion of government’s limited role was a surrender to bureaucracy and statism. He had little use for the empirical methods and real-world nuance of the Chicago scholars.” When Continetti says that Mises’s criticism of socialist central planning was that the planners “could not possibly account for all the variables in an economy,” readers familiar with the calculation argument will find it difficult to suppress a smile.
If Continetti is less than enthusiastic about Mises, this is as nothing compared with his revulsion toward the main group opposing American intervention in World War II, the America First Committee: “Its spokesman, Charles Lindbergh was . . . an icon to noninterventionists in the Midwest but a villain elsewhere. His refusal to denounce the moral depravity of the Nazis polarized audiences. He rubbed shoulders with Fascist sympathizers and anti-Semites . . . America First could not escape the stench of Nazism.”
As you might expect, Continetti is an ardent Cold Warrior as well, and he has this to say about the most extreme of the anti-Soviet crusaders: “The grandeur of [James] Burnham’s vision, the clarity of his expression, the force of his argument, and the iciness of his prose were overpowering. The Managerial Revolution became a best seller . . . Burnham became one of America’s most famous writers on foreign affairs. In 1947, he published The Struggle for the World, in which he declared that America was engaged in World War III whether it liked it or not . . . Burnham worried that America lacked the will to fight.” Continetti does not tell us that Burnham favored a preventive nuclear war against Russia.
In his account of the onset of the Cold War, Continetti has much to say about Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss, and in his account of that famous case, there is a surprising detail. Chambers in 1939 informed Adolf Berle, a famous law professor and advisor to Roosevelt then serving in the State Department, that he had worked with Alger Hiss as a Soviet agent. The surprise is that he calls Berle a Communist fellow traveler and shortly afterward names Berle as one of those New Dealers, along with Harry Dexter White, whom “the Right blamed for Soviet gains.” The accusation is of course false, as anyone with the slightest familiarity with the period would know. Though Berle was a New Dealer, he was a firm anti-Communist, and I’m unaware of anyone who has suggested otherwise.
The author devotes a few pages to an account of several books that influenced the post–World War II Right, and here once more he does something remarkable. In a brief discussion of Richard Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences, Continetti says: “Denying the existence of God, the reality of good and evil, and transcendent, unconditional standards of right and wrong was a one-way ticket to the charnel house of Europe and the ruins of Japan. Ideas Have Consequences was unique in that it did not locate these intellectual errors in the recent past. The mistakes had been committed much earlier . . . Weaver blamed the fourteenth-century philosopher William of Ockham.” The remarkable thing Continetti has done is that he does not mention nominalism, the principal item in Weaver’s criticism of Ockham. It’s of course false that Ockham denied the existence of God and the reality of good and evil; he held a divinecommand theory of ethics.
Given his support for the Cold War, it is to be expected that Continetti would applaud William Buckley’s efforts to expel from the Right those who supported a noninterventionist foreign policy. The noninterventionist views of Franklin Roosevelt’s great critic John T. Flynn were not welcome in Buckley’s National Review; Buckley’s principal guide in foreign policy was James Burnham, who was joined in his advocacy of preventive war against Russia by Frank Meyer and Willi Schlamm. Continetti doesn’t discuss Flynn in this connection, but he describes at some length Buckley’s opposition to the John Birch Society. “After Robert Welch’s American Opinion called for US withdrawal from Vietnam in August 1965, Buckley decided to break with the group unequivocally. Weakness in the face of communism was the final straw.” Continetti cannot see how silly it is to accuse Robert Welch of being soft on communism.
In this book of surprises, it is difficult to pick a winner, but one contender is this: “Reagan . . . went to Eureka College, in Eureka, Illinois. . . . He read Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. By the time he graduated, his individualistic, Christian, democratic world view was fully formed.” One wonders how Reagan managed this. He attended Eureka from 1928 to 1932, and Mises’s major works did not begin to become available in English translation until the mid-1930s. Perhaps Reagan read them in the original German. And if his individualistic world-view was fully formed, why was he a supporter of the New Deal?
Continetti rightly stresses the influence of Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind. He says that “Bloom wrote that the university had abandoned the theory of natural rights that informed the American founding.” This misrepresents Bloom’s view by omission. Bloom thinks that the Lockean concept of rights that influenced the American founding fathers already surrendered to relativism, in that it broke with classical philosophy as interpreted by Leo Strauss; the abandonment of the theory of natural rights in the modern university was a further stage in this break. Continetti again botches things in his remarks about Bloom’s friend Alexandre Kojève, “the French philosopher whose lectures on G.W.F. Hegel had reintroduced the framework of the Hegelian dialectic into European thought. History, in this understanding, was the unfolding story of the state’s recognition of man’s freedom.” But Kojève in his very influential lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit modified the familiar way to read Hegel, taken from the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, that history is the progressive realization of freedom; Kojève’s lectures would hardly have had much impact had he merely restated this conventional interpretation. To the contrary, he argued that for Hegel, history ends in the “universal homogeneous state,” in which mutual recognition is accompanied by the “disappearance of Man.” And though Kojève’s lectures were indeed important, it is silly to say that he reintroduced Hegel’s dialectic into European thought. I shall give just one more example of Continetti’s unusual talent for reversing the theses of books he discusses. He says that “Mancur Olson, in his Logic of Collective Action (1965) stated that the American economy had a free-rider problem: the majority benefited from public goods whose full cost they did not pay.” Olson’s thesis is the opposite: owing to the free-rider problem, large groups cannot produce public goods from which they would benefit.
I noted at the beginning that Continetti has no use for Rothbard and Ron Paul. Their failing was that they “opposed the ‘globalism’ of a ‘neoconservative’ foreign policy that sought to maintain Pax Americana.” Pat Buchanan, Sam Francis, and Joe Sobran are other offenders. Indeed, they opposed neoconservative globalism. And for some of us, that is a badge of honor.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Tho Bishop is joined by Mises Research Fellow Marcel Gautreau for a wide-ranging conversation about challenges to the American-dominated neoliberal order. Marcel is a Ph.D. candidate studying economic and other policy reforms in non-liberal states and offers his perspective on how Rothbardian power-elite analysis is a powerful tool in understanding the world's most pressing issues today. He also shares his favorite Mises U lecture.
Additional Resources "Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature" by Murray Rothbard: Mises.org/RR_91_A
For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto by Murray Rothbard: Mises.org/RR_91_B
Never a Dull Moment: A Libertarian Look at the Sixties by Murray Rothbard: Mises.org/RR_91_C
"A Rothbardian Analysis of the Constitutional Convention" by Patrick Newman: Mises.org/RR_91_Video
Marcel Gautreau on Twitter: @anarchyinblack
Watch Mises University 2022 live: Mises.org/Live
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Even amidst plenty of bad news, quiet revolutions happen all around us.
No American industry is more ripe for disruption than medicine. Americans are addled; sick, overweight, mentally unwell, and dependent on too many prescription drugs. The business of “healthcare” is dominated by government—Medicare—and “private” insurance company middlemen, and it is in big trouble. Premiums and out-of-pocket costs now average $23,000 per year for a family of four. And the most expensive group of insureds, those over age sixty-five, are set to double in number by 2050.
For decades we have been told healthcare is a right, and not subject to the laws of economics. Rising prices, complexity, and insurance capture—caused by state intervention—are claimed to represent market failure. Single payer government schemes are offered as the solution, even as those systems fail disastrously in places like Canada and the UK.
Happily, the market is a powerful force and always finds a way. Heroes like Dr. G. Keith Smith of the Surgery Center of Oklahoma, along with a growing number of direct primary care doctors, are eliminating the middleman and bringing cash prices back to medicine. Where third parties destroyed market discipline and interfered with the doctor-patient relationship, the growing number of cash practices reassert both. My interview with Dr. Smith gives us a look inside this medical revolution and will leave you optimistic for the future.
What does that future look like? We cannot know exactly, but we already have the model from a time when American medicine was the envy of the world:
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Patients pay cash for basic services. This might mean Walmart clinics for some people or exclusive concierge services at home for others, but either way, direct cash prices impose the coherent allocation of resources.
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Insurance covers only insurable events. Serious illnesses or accidents are covered by catastrophic insurance, with high deductibles and priced according to the buyer’s actuarial reality (age, health, and habits).
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Charitable doctors and hospitals care for the truly poor and indigent.
That simple formula is all it takes to align incentives and bring all the price competition and capital needed to revolutionize medicine. Dr. Smith and others are the entrepreneurs leading the way.
Like medicine, conservatism faces its own upheavals. Never-Trump neoconservatives and their fading outlets like National Review—call them Conservatism Inc.—are at war with a “postliberal” populist Right personified by figures like Steve Bannon. This schism has prompted several new books attempting to define conservatism for the twenty-first century, by authors like Yoram Hazony, Patrick Deneen, David French, and Matthew Continetti.
Fortunately, we have David Gordon to review them!
Continetti is the most recent entrant, with his new book The Right: The Hundred-Year War for American Conservatism. Cutting his teeth at the now defunct Weekly Standard before migrating his war cheerleading over to a comfortable sine cure at the American Enterprise (sic) Institute, he is firmly on the establishment neoconservative side of this divide. In fact, Continetti’s book makes more sense if readers consider him a progressive at his core—which is to say grandiose in his worldview and warped in his perception of what the American state can, and should, accomplish. This grandiosity apparently spills over into his perception of his own skills, as very few living writers are equipped to write an overarching history of conservatism in the US. Continetti is not one of them.
If any single issue animates Continetti’s work, it is his unflagging support for war in service of American hegemony. He gets Ludwig von Mises and the socialist calculation problem wrong, which is to say he gets the essential choice between capitalism and socialism wrong. Unsurprisingly, the ardent cold warrior Continetti dislikes Ron Paul and Murray Rothbard, viewing them as enemies whose views were correctly tossed out during the Buckleyite purges. I won’t spoil David’s great review, but in sum, Continetti writes with an authority he does not possess and a certitude he has not earned. Continetti is simply another self-serving neocon who wants to rewrite the history of American conservatism on terms favorable to his camp. As always, thank you for your support for the Mises Institute and its mission.
The New York Times claims that the "administrative state"—that is, governance by unelected bureaucrats—protects our country and enhances democracy.
Original Article: "Turns Out the Elites Like the Administrative State Better than Democracy"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop discuss Jill Biden's "Latinx" outreach and recent polling that illustrates a dramatic shift in political voting patterns. Are we seeing the end of the modern political party system? Do the struggles of American progressives reflect a broader global divide between secular and traditionalist politics?
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Many think cancel culture is an odd particularity of the Anglosphere. Unfortunately, it raised its ugly head at this year's Austrian Economics Meeting Europe held in Lithuania.
Original Article: "The Austrian Economics Meeting Europe Got a Taste of Cancel Culture"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Although social media is blamed for many social ills, the sickness doesn't come from Twitter or Facebook but from how the ruling classes have politicized life itself.
Original Article: "Don't Blame Social Media. Blame the Politicization of Nearly Everything"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop discuss a recent Mises Wire article about how the state uses holidays as a culture war weapon. Independence Day offers the rare opportunity for opponents of the regime to strike back on a holiday that explicitly celebrates secession and self-determination.
Recommended Reading "Juneteenth and Secular Holidays as Tools of the Regime" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_88_A
"3 Things to Remember on Independence Day" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_88_B
"Was the American Revolution Radical?" by Murray N. Rothbard: Mises.org/RR_88_C
"The American Revolution Was a Culture War" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_88_D
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Fiat inflation is a juggernaut of social, economic, cultural, and spiritual destruction. —Guido Hülsmann, The Ethics of Money Production
All of a sudden everyone is an expert on inflation. Your brother-in-law, your local paper, and even dilettantes at dubious outlets like the Washington Post or The Atlantic feel compelled to explain our current predicament. With the admitted rate of consumer price inflation running somewhere around 8 percent, and the real rate much higher, even central bankers can’t hide the reality from us. So the commentariat has to explain to us why this is happening and make sure we blame the mysterious workings of capitalism for our troubles.
In other words, economics is back. Covid was a nice diversion, and Ukraine took up all the media’s oxygen for a few months. But now we must deal with the economic devastation caused both by lockdowns and two years of crazed fiscal and monetary policy. Everyday Americans, stubborn as they are, care more about rising gas and food prices than the political class would like. So they trot out Nancy Pelosi to explain how government spending actually reduces inflation and push pseudoeconomic ideas like modern monetary theory to explain why more federal spending is always the cure.
Thus our cover article features Dr. Robert Murphy performing a very important public service by punching holes in the inflation narrative. By the way, Bob’s series of articles on the Fed, now published as a book called Understanding Money Mechanics, is a must read for anyone interested in inflation and the incendiary schemes proposed to fight it. You can order it from our bookstore or read it free at mises.org!
As Bob explains, Keynesian demand-side true believers—led by Paul Krugman—spent 2021 insisting inflation was not happening, that it was transitory if it was happening, and that even if it’s permanent, nobody could have predicted it.
Monetarists like Scott Sumner, meanwhile, essentially support free markets except when it comes to money. They were busy predicting a “golden age” for Fed policy right up until the covid crisis, praising the Fed for having solved the business cycle (where have we heard that before?). But all of this vaunted central bank “independence” and technical expertise went out the window in March 2020, just as it did in the terrible fall of 2007. And so, when faced with the reality of a political Fed that abandons monetary “rules” at the first sign of trouble, market monetarists retreated to their comfort zone: a big drop in (nominal) GDP is by definition the Fed’s fault, unless it’s the market’s fault!
Speaking of the Fed, our David Gordon is back with a review of a book that is making a big splash in money circles. The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy, by journalist Christopher Leonard, is a thoroughgoing critique of the subversive power of our central bank. And it’s a welcome critique by a writer from the Left who understands the untoward benefits monetary policy creates for politically connected commercial banks. In this sense Leonard inadvertently approaches both the Cantillon effect and Mises’s dictum that money is never neutral. But while his description of the Fed as a huge engine of crony privilege is spot on, his prescriptions are wrong. He argues for strengthening the fiscal institutions of Congress, the White House, and state governments, which he bizarrely imagines are “democratically controlled” unlike central banks. But all considered, Leonard has provided a needed and well- researched gateway argument for those who don’t share our political views.
You’ll also enjoy my quick interview with the great investor and storyteller Jimmy Rogers. Rogers grew up in tiny Demopolis, Alabama, and managed to make his way to Yale, Oxford, and across the world multiple times before landing in Singapore. He’s also a big fan of Austrian economics and a clear-eyed realist regarding the folly of state planning. His advice for young people is particularly apt today.
Finally, our young friend and Mises U alum Peyton Gouzian and I discuss the big questions of liberalism and illiberalism in the twentieth century in a Q&A, with an eye toward the implications for the twenty-first century. Will the West choose the liberalism of Mises—rooted in property and self-determination—or the ersatz version of Hillary Clinton, promising self-actualization and global governance? It’s a question worth asking today more than ever.
The presence of American companies in foreign nations was once seen as a sign of American superiority and an instrument of American cultural power. Not anymore.
Original Article: "McDonald's Closes All Stores in Russia as Woke Russophobes Rage"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Social issues, from abortion to critical race theory to teaching gender identity in elementary schools, dominate our politics and media.
Original Article: "Why Social Issues Dominate"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Would you give up voting in exchange for no more taxes? Stephan Livera joins the show to discuss the curious distinction between economic freedom and personal or political freedoms, and how we weigh those freedoms.
The Fraser/Cato Human Freedom Index: Mises.org/HFI The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom: Mises.org/IEF
It’s well known that Murray Rothbard thinks that intellectuals play a crucial role in getting the public to accept the state. Why are these “court intellectuals” needed? The necessity arises from the nature of the state. Following Franz Oppenheimer and Albert Jay Nock, Rothbard maintains that the state is a predatory organization: it uses coercion to seize property from people. It consists, moreover, of a relatively small minority of people: even in states with large bureaucracies, most people are not state officials. In that circumstance, the continued existence of the state rests on public opinion. If a sufficient number of people refused to obey the state, it would be powerless to continue its coercive activities. As Rothbard says,
If states have everywhere been run by an oligarchic group of predators, how have they been able to maintain their rule over the mass of the population? The answer, as the philosopher David Hume pointed out over two centuries ago, is that in the long run every government, no matter how dictatorial, rests on the support of the majority of its subjects. Now this does not of course render these governments “voluntary,” since the very existence of the tax and other coercive powers shows how much compulsion the State must exercise. Nor does the majority support have to be eager and enthusiastic approval; it could well be mere passive acquiescence and resignation. The conjunction in the famous phrase “death and taxes” implies a passive and resigned acceptance to the assumed inevitability of the State and its taxation.
It’s the role of the intellectuals to convince people to accept what prima facie are undesirable activities that they have reason to reject: Why go along with an organization that seizes your property and can take your life? In this week’s column, I’d like to consider some of the ways intellectuals do this, according to Rothbard’s account.
One of these has to do with an important topic in the philosophy of history. Is history the result of individual, contingent actions, or brought about by impersonal deterministic forces? Let’s look at a couple of examples. If you are studying the origins of World War I, should you mainly be concerned with what particular people—e.g., Wilhelm II, Sir Edward Grey, Raymond Poincaré—did or should your main emphasis be on impersonal forces—e.g., the clash of rival imperialist powers caused by the stage that the economic development of capitalism had reached? Similarly, in studying the origin of the Civil War, should you be looking at Lincoln’s policies or, as Charles and Mary Beard do in The Rise of American Civilization, see the war as an inevitable conflict between the industrial North and the agricultural South? Perry Anderson, the prominent Marxist historian whom I mentioned last week, never tires of demanding a “structural explanation” for events.
Rothbard connects this topic with the question of getting people to accept the state. If history is determined by inevitable forces over which individuals have no control, it is futile to resist the state. As he puts it,
It is also particularly important for the State to make its rule seem inevitable: even if its reign is disliked, as it often is, it will then be met with the passive resignation expressed in the familiar coupling of “death and taxes.” One method is to bring to its side historical determinism: if X-State rules us, then this has been inevitably decreed for us by the Inexorable Laws of History (or the Divine Will, or the Absolute, or the Material Productive Forces), and nothing that any puny individuals may do can change the inevitable. It is also important for the State to inculcate in its subjects an aversion to any outcropping of what is now called “a conspiracy theory of history.” For a search for “conspiracies,” as misguided as the results often are, means a search for motives, and an attribution of individual responsibility for the historical misdeeds of ruling elites. If, however, any tyranny or venality or aggressive war imposed by the State was brought about not by particular State rulers but by mysterious and arcane “social forces,” or by the imperfect state of the world—or if, in some way, everyone was guilty (“We are all murderers,” proclaims a common slogan), then there is no point in anyone’s becoming indignant or rising up against such misdeeds. Furthermore, a discrediting of “conspiracy theories”—or indeed, of anything smacking of “economic determinism”—will make the subjects more likely to believe the “general welfare” reasons that are invariably put forth by the modern State for engaging in any aggressive actions.
The point Rothbard makes here is a key theme in a book that aroused a great deal of discussion when it came out last year, David Graeber and David Wengrow’s The Dawn of Everything. Like Rothbard, but without reference to him, they argue that intellectuals get people to accept the state by advancing the theory that history proceeds through inevitable stages: if you don’t like the prevailing system of “state capitalism, “there’s nothing you can do about it, so the best you can do is learn to live it.” Unfortunately, there are grave problems with their book, as I try to show in a characteristically mean-spirited review.
I’d like to conclude with one more tactic of the court intellectuals, especially relevant to us today. Rothbard points out that “national security managers” claim that some issues, such as war and peace, are too complicated to be left to the masses and must be decided by experts.
In recent years, we have seen the development in the United States of a profession of “national security managers,” of bureaucrats who never face electoral procedures, but who continue, through administration after administration, secretly using their supposed special expertise to plan wars, interventions, and military adventures. Only their egregious blunders in the Vietnam war have called their activities into any sort of public question; before that, they were able to ride high, wide, and handsome over the public they saw mostly as cannon fodder for their own purposes. A public debate between “isolationist” Senator Robert A. Taft and one of the leading national security intellectuals, McGeorge Bundy, was instructive in demarking both the issues at stake and the attitude of the intellectual ruling elite. Bundy attacked Taft in early 1951 for opening a public debate on the waging of the Korean war. Bundy insisted that only the executive policy leaders were equipped to manipulate diplomatic and military force in a lengthy decades-long period of limited war against the communist nations. It was important, Bundy maintained, that public opinion and public debate be excluded from promulgating any policy role in this area. For, he warned, the public was unfortunately not committed to the rigid national purposes discerned by the policy managers; it merely responded to the ad hoc realities of given situations. Bundy also maintained that there should be no recriminations or even examinations of the decisions of the policy managers, because it was important that the public accept their decisions without question…. Similarly, at a time when President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were privately contemplating going to war in Indochina, another prominent national security manager, George F. Kennan, was advising the public that “There are times when, having elected a government, we will be best advised to let it govern and let it speak for us as it will in the councils of the nations.”
The process Rothbard describes here has in our day migrated to “public health” experts, Anthony Fauci foremost among them, who demand that we accede to their totalitarian proposals because “science” so dictates.
Jeff is solo this week and hosts Tom Woods to ask a simple question: Why do social issues dominate our attention, to the detriment of economics and fiscal reality?
Read Jeff's article "Why Social Issues Dominate" Mises.org/Dominate
In this episode of Radio Rothbard, Mises Graduate Program Provost and Constitutional law attorney Joe Becker joins Tho Bishop to break down the leaked opinion on the Dobbs case, potentially overturning Roe v. Wade. Joe provides a thorough breakdown of the logic behind the Alito opinion, and the two look at the impact this could have on American institutions broadly.
Recommended Reading Leaked draft decision, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (PDF): Mises.org/RR_80_A
"End Roe v. Wade: It's Time to Defederalize Abortion Policy" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_80_B
"Why Social Issues Dominate" by Jeff Deist: Mises.org/RR_80_C
"Before Roe v. Wade, Abortion Had Always Been a State and Local Matter" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_80_D
Mises Institute Graduate Program: Mises.org/edu
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Our guest is Dr. Stanley Goldfarb, author of the recently-released Take Two Aspirins and Call Me By My Pronouns, a book that details the intrusion of critical race theory and identity politics into medical education and medical practice. He is a former Associate Dean for Curriculum at the University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine and returns to the show to discuss his book and the new organization that he is leading to push back against the new trend.
SHOW NOTES Stanley Goldfarb: Twitter
Do No Harm
Related Episode: Ep. 102 Curriculum Subverted: An Academic Leader Pushes Back Against Woke Medicine (with Stanley Goldfarb)
Related Episode: Ep. 140 Amy Wax on Wokeness in Medicine
Related Episode: Ep. 149 James Lindsay: Critical Race Theory, Post-Modernism, and Medicine
Watch the episode on the Accad & Koka Report YouTube channel
Johnny Vedmore is an independent journalist from Cardiff, Wales. He discusses his masterful article on Klaus Schwab's mentors, including Henry Kissinger and John Kenneth Galbraith.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interviewJohnny Vedmore’s article on Klaus SchwabPart 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, and Part 5 of the BMS series on Klaus Schwab and the Great ResetAn evaluation of Herman Kahn’s “Year 2000” forecasts. Part 1 of John Kenneth Galbraith’s "The Age of Uncertainty"Trailer for the Kubrick film, “Dr. Strangelove”Bob’s novel, MinervaSchwab’s books The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Covid-19 and the Great Reset For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
On this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop look at the fallout from Elon Musk's purchase of Twitter. While the move reportedly has authoritarian corporate lawyers openly weeping on intra-company calls, what will be the real impact on political discourse? How did a once-favored Obama Administration ally become a supervillain for the progressive elite?
Recommended Reading "Elon Musk Bought Twitter, and the Pundits Sure Are Mad" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_79_A
"Elon Musk's Twitter Gambit and What It Means to the Clique in Power" by Michael Rectenwald: Mises.org/RR_79_B
"Elon Musk, Crony Capitalist" by Lee Enochs: Mises.org/RR_79_C
"A Mixed Hero: A Libertarian Reassessment of Elon Musk" by Konrad Graf: Mises.org/RR_79_D
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Bob critiques the economic views of Yuval Harari, who predicts “useless people” because of technological advances. Bob then showcases similar thinking from right-wingers. He ends by addressing a common critique of the Christian God.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, and Part 5 of the BMS series on Klaus Schwab and the Great ResetBob’s book with Silas Barta on Understanding BitcoinSource for NWO compilationSource for World Government Summit panel on blockchainSource for Harari audioTim Pool episode featuring Michael Malice discussing NPCs (around 1:04:30)Schwab’s books The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Covid-19 and the Great Reset For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
This week Jeff is solo with very special guest Jimmy Rogers, the famed investor, Alabama native, and fan of Austrian economics.
In this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop look at the controversy surrounding recent Florida education reforms. Why does it benefit the state to erode the family structure, and what can be done to combat it?
Recommended Reading "Why Marxist Organizations Like BLM Seek to Dismantle the Western Nuclear Family" by Bradley Thomas: Mises.org/RR_78_A
"Don't Blame Capitalism for the Decline of the Extended Family" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_78_B
"How Wage Work Liberated Women (and Men)" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_78_C
"Why Do Socialists Hate Families?" by Jonathan Newman: Mises.org/RR_78_D
"Can Libertarians Have Communal Property?" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_78_E
Leftism: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Marcuse by Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn: Mises.org/RR_78_F
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Recorded in Birmingham, Alabama, on April 2, 2022.
Special thanks to Mark Walker for sponsoring this event.
Russian oligarchs, American pols, and state-connected billionaires are all cut from the same cloth: they didn't earn, or fully earn, their wealth and position in society. We must withdraw our sanction of these people.
Original Article: "The Wrong Elites"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon.
Recorded in Birmingham, Alabama, on April 2, 2022.
Slides used during this talk are available here.
Special thanks to Mark Walker for sponsoring this event.
Bob and Jeff get into the weeds of Disney's shareholders, revenues, and holdings in light of the company's recent spat with Florida Governor Ron DeSantis.
Recorded at the 2022 Austrian Economics Research Conference hosted at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, March 18–19, 2022.
The Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, sponsored by Dr. Don Printz. Includes audience question and answer period.
The Austrian Economics Research Conference is the international, interdisciplinary meeting of the Austrian School, bringing together leading scholars doing research in this vibrant and influential intellectual tradition. The conference is hosted by the Mises Institute at its campus in Auburn, Alabama, and is directed by Joseph Salerno, professor of economics at Pace University and academic vice president of the Mises Institute.
Recorded at the 2022 Austrian Economics Research Conference hosted at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, March 18–19, 2022.
The Murray N. Rothbard Memorial Lecture, sponsored by Steven and Cassandra Torello. Includes audience question and answer period.
The Austrian Economics Research Conference is the international, interdisciplinary meeting of the Austrian School, bringing together leading scholars doing research in this vibrant and influential intellectual tradition. The conference is hosted by the Mises Institute at its campus in Auburn, Alabama, and is directed by Joseph Salerno, professor of economics at Pace University and academic vice president of the Mises Institute.
A recent New York Times article featuring economist Stephanie Kelton and her (disastrously misguided) book on Modern Monetary Theory garnered criticisms, but not from the usual sources. No less than economist Larry Summers, former Treasury secretary and Harvard president, weighed in to criticize the Times for giving credence to MMT (he likened it to "quack cancer cures"). Reliably leftwing economics writer Noah Smith chimed in on substack to call MMT a "fringe ideology" and lambaste its lack of macroeconomic foundations. But a backlash ensued: several female economists claimed the criticisms of Kelton (and MMT) were rooted in sexism, bemoaning the male-dominated nature of the economics profession. And as with all academic or professional disciplines, "diversity" is now not only a buzzword but an open requirement in hiring. I asked Baylor professor and Mises Institute senior fellow Dr. Peter Klein to join the show and give us his behind-the-scenes view of the increasingly politicized economics profession.
Read the Times article: Mises.org/KeltonNY Bob Murphy's review of Kelton's book: Mises.org/KeltonBook Noah Smith's review of Kelton's Times article: Mises.org/KeltonNoah
In this episode of Radio Rothbard, Ryan and Tho trade predictions for the year ahead. Topics include the importance of internal primaries ahead of next year's mid-terms, predictions on what the Fed will do with rising inflationary pressure, and what comes next from the covid regime.
Additional Reading "Americans May Finally Be Losing Confidence in the Woke Military" by Jose Nino: Mises.org/RR_64_A
"Could 2022 Bring the Collapse of the Euro?" by Alasdair Macleod: Mises.org/RR_64_B
"Will Senate Republicans Endorse Biden-Powell Inflation?" by Tho Bishop: Mises.org/RR_64_C
"The Fed Is Hawkish Now? I’ll Believe It When I See It." by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_64_D
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
In the first Radio Rothbard of 2022, Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop discuss the regime's portrayal of the one-year anniversary of January 6.
While most Americans may care more about kitchen table issues than Washington's hysterics, already we have seen the state use last year's riot as an excuse to expand the prosecution of political minorities.
Is this a moment the American right will learn from, or will history once again be written by progressives?
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Includes an introduction by Tom Woods. Recorded in Lake Jackson, Texas, on December 4, 2021.
Ron Paul's two campaigns for president (2008 and 2012) were watershed moments for liberty-minded people around the world. The "Ron Paul Revolution"—centered around his undiluted message of peace, property, and markets—changed the way millions thought about the American empire and the American financial system. Dr. Paul's focus on central banking and foreign policy caught politicians and pundits off guard, forcing them to scramble for explanations of our Middle East policy and Soviet-style central planning at the Fed. Politics in America has not been the same since the "Giuliani moment" and "End the Fed." The Ron Paul Revolution was both a political and cultural phenomenon.
Recorded in Lake Jackson, Texas, on December 4, 2021.
Ron Paul's two campaigns for president (2008 and 2012) were watershed moments for liberty-minded people around the world. The "Ron Paul Revolution"—centered around his undiluted message of peace, property, and markets—changed the way millions thought about the American empire and the American financial system. Dr. Paul's focus on central banking and foreign policy caught politicians and pundits off guard, forcing them to scramble for explanations of our Middle East policy and Soviet-style central planning at the Fed. Politics in America has not been the same since the "Giuliani moment" and "End the Fed." The Ron Paul Revolution was both a political and cultural phenomenon.
Abstract: The rise of socialism has been one of the more dramatic movements in US politics in the modern era, with recent Gallup polling indicating that 39 percent of Americans (and 65 percent of Democrats) hold a favorable view of the political economic ideology. Upward trends in the popularity of political economic ideologies such as socialism are observed when much of what is known by the public about them is gleaned through heuristic approaches rather than through scientific investigation. However, an increase in the persistence and severity of problems resulting from the practice of a political economic ideology such as socialism will likely lead to more science-based introspection, a turn in approach that will almost certainly be a boon to political and economic theories/models offering refutations of the ideology. This study explores such a demand-side argument with regard to the recent rise of socialism in US politics by asserting, and testing, the notion that the Austrian school of economics, which is most closely identified with the claim that socialism is unworkable, has been a beneficiary of recent political trends. Statistical evidence from various trends in informetrics is consistent with our assertion, as Google News hits and Twitter hashtag counts have ascended over the recent period (i.e., 2016 to 2019).
JEL Classification: A11, B51, B53, P21, P22, P27
G. P. Manish (gmanish@troy.edu) is BB&T Professor of Economic Freedom at the Manuel H. Johnson Center of Political Economy at Troy University in Troy, Alabama. Franklin G. Mixon Jr. (mixon_franklin@columbusstate.edu) is Thomas Buck Jr. Professor of Economics at the Center for Economic Education at Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia and a corresponding author. Mark Thornton (mthornton@mises.org) is Peterson-Luddy Chair in Austrian Economics at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama. The authors thank three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on a prior version. Any remaining errors are our own.
INTRODUCTION The increase in support for socialism in US politics has been one of the more dramatic movements in the modern political era. Gallup polling near the end of 2019 indicated, for example, that 47 percent of Americans believe that government should do more to solve problems, up from 36 percent in similar polling from 2010 (Jones and Saad 2019). Similarly, a “preference” for “active government” and a “positive view” of “socialism” rose by eight and three percentage points, respectively, over this same time, climbing from 34 percent to 42 percent in the former case and from 36 percent to 39 percent in the latter case (Jones and Saad 2019). Increases in the favorability of socialism among Democrats have been even more pointed, reaching a new high of 60 percent in 2016, which Jones and Saad (2019) suggest “may have reflected the influence of avowed Democratic socialist Bernie Sanders’ 2016 presidential campaign.” The trend continued in 2019, when 65 percent of Democrats polled reflected favorability toward socialism.
Upward trends in the popularity of political economic ideologies such as socialism are more likely to be observed when much of what is known by the public about them is gleaned through heuristic approaches rather than through scientific investigation. For many in the US, the recent experiences of Venezuela serve as the heuristic lens through which the pitfalls of socialism are understood. Since 2013, economic output has fallen dramatically, and hyperinflation has paralyzed the country’s economy, with the typical Venezuelan adult losing as much as twenty-four pounds of body weight in 2017 alone (Sequera 2018).Economic output in Venezuela fell by 16 percent in 2016, and by 14 percent in 2017, while inflation, which stood at 112 percent in 2015, rose to 2,400 percent in 2016 (Flannery, 2018). By August of 2019, Venezuelan inflation stood at 10 million percent, while the cumulative decline in its economy since 2013 reached 65 percent (Sanchez, 2019). At the same time, 4 million Venezuelans, or about 10 percent of the country’s population had fled the country, decimating the country’s professional class (Sanchez, 2019). Lastly, the Venezuelan practice of eating two or fewer meals each day is often referred to as “the socialist diet.” To outside observers, however, Venezuela’s economic problems may be rationalized as simply the result of the malpractice of socialism by the country’s ruling elites (e.g., President Nicolás Maduro), and not the result of inherent problems with socialism as a political economic ideology. To insiders, the opposite conclusion is likely to be drawn.
To either group, any increase in the persistence and severity of the economic problems resulting from the practice of a political economic ideology such as socialism will likely lead to more science-based introspection about that ideology. Such a turn in approach will almost certainly be a boon to political and economic theories and models offering thorough refutations of the ideology. This study explores such a demand-side argument with regard to the recent rise of socialism in US politics. More specifically, it asserts, and tests, the notion that the Austrian school of economics has been a beneficiary of the recent growth in the favorability of socialism in US politics. This assertion is based on the premise that the scholarship of economists belonging to this school, particularly Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) and Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992), represents what is arguably the most renowned rebuke of claims of socialism’s superiority as a method of political and economic organization.
Statistical evidence from various trends in informetrics supports our assertion, as Google News hits and Twitter hashtag counts involving the views of prominent Austrian economists have ascended over the recent period from 2016 to 2019. The more recent era corresponds to the period of increased support for socialism in US politics as expressed through the increasing political fortunes of Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other prominent US legislators. Before turning to the statistical evidence, however, this study first provides a primer on the recent increase in support for socialism in US politics since 2016 and a brief examination of the views of two prominent Austrian economists—Mises and Hayek—on the shortcomings of socialism as a political economic ideology.
INCREASING SUPPORT FOR SOCIALISM IN US POLITICS, 2016–PRESENT: A PRIMER The recent increase in support for socialism in modern US politics has been embodied by the political ascendancy of Bernie Sanders, an independent US senator from Vermont. Sanders, who refers to himself as a “democratic socialist,” announced his first presidential run on April 30, 2015.Born in Brooklyn, New York, Sanders moved to Vermont after graduating from the University of Chicago. His first successful run for office came in 1981, when he was elected Burlington’s mayor by only ten votes (Merica 2015). Later, in 1990, he was elected Vermont’s at-large member of Congress, and almost twenty years later, in 2007, he was elected to the US Senate (Merica 2015). During interviews just before his public campaign announcement, Sanders indicated that trade, income inequality and healthcare would be key issues in his campaign (Merica 2015). Sanders’s 2016 presidential run most prominently included plans to (1) fund a single payer healthcare system by raising income tax rates, referred to as “Medicare for All,” (2) increase the tax rate on capital gains and dividends, (3) raise taxes on corporations, and (4) combat climate change by imposing a tax on carbon emissions.See Ballotpedia s.v. “Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016,” accessed Aug. 9, 2021, https://ballotpedia.org/Bernie_Sanders_presidential_campaign,_2016. According to some analyses, Sanders’s policy proposals would have added $18 trillion to the federal budget deficit over ten years, even after the collection of $15.3 trillion in new tax revenues (Mermin, Burman, and Sammartino 2015).
The 2016 Democratic Presidential Primary
The 2016 Democratic Party presidential primary season began in February of 2016, with Sanders’s opponent, former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, winning in Iowa, Nevada, and South Carolina. Still, Sanders won the New Hampshire primary, and on “Super Tuesday” (March 1, 2016), Sanders added victories in Colorado, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Vermont. Later, on March 4, 2016, Sanders won the primaries in Kansas and Nebraska, and on the following day he won in Maine. March 2016 would also see Sanders claim primary victories in Alaska, Hawai’i, Idaho, Michigan, Utah, and Washington, while in April he would win in Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Sanders continued winning state primaries into May 2016, taking victories in Indiana, Oregon, and West Virginia, while in June he added wins in Montana and North Dakota. Even with these individual successes, Clinton would ultimately claim a majority of the pledged delegates (2,205–1,846) in victory over Sanders.Delegate totals collected from cnn.com.
Despite his defeat in 2016, Sanders’s performance against Clinton made it clear that his socialist platform was a force for prospective political foes to reckon with. This realization was only buttressed by the sense among many voters that Clinton’s 2016 Democratic presidential primary victory was tainted by the participation of 712 so-called superdelegates in the Democratic National Convention vote. Clinton garnered 602 superdelegates, four hundred of whom had committed to her campaign before the first caucus or primary.See cnn.com and pbs.org. This sense was later supported by revelations in Brazile (2017) that the 2016 Democratic caucuses and primaries were engineered in various ways to produce a Clinton victory.
The Justice Democrats and the 2018 Midterm Elections Cycle
One backlash against these 2016 events occurred one year later, in 2017, when the progressive political action committee known as Justice Democrats was formed by Kyle Kulinski of Secular Talk, Cenk Uygur of The Young Turks, and former Sanders presidential campaign executives Saikat Chakrabarti and Zack Exley (Grigoryan and Suetzl 2019).Secular Talk is a progressive political podcast. The Young Turks is an alternative media (online) political news and entertainment company that supports progressivism. According to Grigoryan and Suetzl (2019), Justice Democrats supports and endorses working-class progressive candidates who seek political office, and its platform includes, but is not limited to, a reorganization of the entire US economy with a focus on preventing climate change (i.e., the “Green New Deal”), a federal jobs guarantee, free universal education (through college) and healthcare (both as human rights), paid maternity and vacation leave, free childcare, and raising the minimum wage.See also https://www.justicedemocrats.com/home.
The Justice Democrats political platform’s first foray into federal elections occurred during the 2018 midterm elections cycle, when the organization endorsed seventy-three congressional candidates, twenty-four of whom won party primaries. Seven of these twenty-four ultimately won seats in the US Congress (Grigoryan and Suetzl 2019). That group included Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), and since taking office in January 2019, these three representatives have become some of the most prominent federal legislators of the current era. Key among them is Ocasio-Cortez, whose political fame rose after a thirteen-point victory over an incumbent representative in the 2018 Democratic primary.Chakrabarti became Ocasio-Cortez’s first chief-of-staff. Ocasio-Cortez, who won the 2018 general election by about sixty-five points, ran on a socialist political platform supporting Medicare for All, a federal jobs guarantee, housing as a human right, immigration justice, and higher education for all.See Ballotpedia s.v. “Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez,” accessed Aug. 9, 2021, https://ballotpedia.org/Alexandria_Ocasio-Cortez. Since taking office in January 2019, Ocasio-Cortez’s political influence has risen to the point of rivalling that of Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), the speaker of the US House of Representatives (Caygle, Ferris, and Bresnahan 2019; and Lovelace 2019).
The Run-Up to the 2020 Presidential Election
Following his meteoric rise during the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, in February 2019 Sanders announced his candidacy in the 2020 US presidential election. In announcing his bid on Vermont Public Radio, Sanders pointed to the Democratic Party’s leftward shift since 2016 as a reason for a second run (Detrow and Taylor 2019). As Sanders explained (Detrow and Taylor 2019),
It turns out that many of the ideas that I talked about [in 2016]—that health care is a right, not a privilege, and that we’ve got to move toward a Medicare-for-all, single-payer system … [and] raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour…. [Then, w]hen I talked about making public colleges and universities tuition-free and lowering student debt, that was another issue that people said was too radical. Well, that’s also happening around the country.
Sanders’s renewed push for the White House got a boost when incumbent representative Ocasio-Cortez offered her endorsement for Sanders’s campaign at a rally in Queens, New York, just days after another incumbent, Omar, offered her public support for Sanders’s socialist agenda (Gathright and Martin 2019). A few days later Tlaib, another incumbent representative, joined Omar and Ocasio-Cortez in stumping for Sanders’s 2020 election bid (Krieg and Grayer 2019). These endorsements helped to propel Sanders’s candidacy, built upon a socialist platform, into the lead among a relatively large field of Democrats vying to become the forty-sixth president of the United States.
AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS ON SOCIALISM As Holcombe (2014, 46) points out, many economists during the twentieth century considered the Austrian school of economics (hereafter Austrian school) the most closely identified with the claim that central planning is unworkable. Central to that claim is the idea that prices are necessary for rational economic calculation (Holcombe 2014, 46). This idea originated in a presentation by Ludwig von Mises, a titan of the Austrian school, during a 1919 meeting of the Vienna Economic Society. That presentation, which evolved into an academic paper the following year (Mises 1990), launched what became known as the socialist calculation debate.See Holcombe (2014, 46). Two years later Mises’s paper was expanded into a book (Mises 1960), and in the decades that followed, another giant of the Austrian school joined in his efforts to explain the pitfalls of socialism, namely Friedrich Hayek.See Holcombe (2014, 46). For his part, Hayek (1948) concentrated on the entrepreneurial and innovative functions that lead to economic progress in a market economy, which is well suited to coordinate the decentralized knowledge that is held by market participants (Holcombe 2014, 51).Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974 for his work on the theory of money and economic fluctuations, and for his analysis of the interdependence of economic, social, and institutional phenomena.
Together, these two economists led the Austrian school’s critique of socialism as an economic and political ideology. In fact, Holcombe (2014, 51) argues that it was the ideas about rational calculation developed by the Austrian school in the socialist calculation debate that helped develop the unique identity of the school. Many of the more recent contributions from Austrian school economists, such as George Reisman of Pepperdine University and Sanford Ikeda of the State University of New York (Purchase College), have extended the understanding of the implications of the information problems involved in attempting to plan out the economic order (Holcombe 2014, 51).See Ikeda (1997); and Reisman (1998). This research, in turn, has been supplemented by the work of Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne, both of George Mason University.See Boettke (1990, 1994, and 2000); and Boettke and Coyne (2004). In the section that follows, a more detailed review of Mises’s and Hayek’s contributions vis-à-vis the pitfalls of socialism is presented.
MISES AND HAYEK ON SOCIALISM Mises is the foremost opponent of socialism in history. He was an economist from Austria who dealt with the practical affairs of the time using the deductive theory approach of the Austrian school of economics based in Vienna. In the economic chaos following World War I, European governments began implementing socialism, with Austria’s leadership seeking to adopt Russian-style bolshevism. Mises convinced the Austrian political leader, Otto Bauer, to eschew socialism altogether, saving the country from its deleterious effects (Hülsmann 2007, 331–35).
Mises then set out to prove that socialism was untenable, indeed impossible. In doing so he wanted to go beyond the standard criticisms of socialism, such as the past failures of applied socialism and the problem of incentives under socialism. In developing his argument Mises made two important assumptions. First, he assumed that a socialist economy is a closed economy where the ownership of the available means of production is centralized: the state decides what to produce, how to produce it, and how it will be distributed. Second, he assumed that the planner(s) would be altruistic, brilliant, and have access to all available technical knowledge.
His calculation argument focused on capital goods, their production and allocation (Mises 1990). Capital goods (e.g., tools and machines) must be replaced as they wear out. In a static economy (i.e., one that is in a state of long-run equilibrium) this could be achieved simply by replacing worn parts or the capital goods themselves. In such a scenario all the means of production, including the available capital goods, have already been allocated to satisfy their most highly valued uses. Thus, there is no possibility of reallocating the available resources and improving the well-being of consumers. The same goods will be produced in the same quantities period after period, and there will be no need to alter the existing bundle of capital goods.
However, in a real economy most things are subject to change, and simple replacement of existing capital goods is not feasible. The real world is characterized by constant changes in technology, population, migration patterns, demographics, and the weather, and some resources will inevitably become more valuable, and others less, while some resources will inevitably become more abundant and others scarcer. This incessant change means that the available producer goods, at any given moment, are not allocated to satisfy their highest-valued uses; there is room to reshuffle and change the allocation of resources and improve overall well-being. Making these changes requires economic calculation: it requires a comparison of the marginal benefit and the opportunity costs involved in any production decision.
In the simple world of a Crusoe economy, producer goods can be allocated without reducing costs and benefits to a common denominator. If the structure of capital is relatively sparse and production processes are not very complex or lengthy, an actor can easily isolate the amount of consumer goods that are dependent on the use of a producer good in different production processes. As a result, the costs and benefits involved can be reduced to satisfaction obtained versus satisfaction foregone, and a decision can be made by weighing the two satisfactions, one against the other.
In a well-developed economy, however, the problem of resource allocation is far more complex. Producing consumer goods now involves several steps or stages, with all but the final step resulting in the production of capital goods to assist in further production. Many of these capital goods are highly nonspecific, creating an immense number of relationships of substitutability and complementarity throughout the production structure. In such a scenario, the allocation of producer goods requires the costs and benefits of a decision to be reduced to a common denominator: it requires the use of cardinal numbers in the mental process that precedes the decision to allocate a certain resource toward one particular end and not the other.
Given the inherently ordinal nature of economic value and utility, this will be impossible for the socialist planner to accomplish. In socialist societies there is one entity that owns the means of production (i.e., the state or central planner), and no exchange of producer goods takes place, which, therefore, means that no prices for these goods exist. Shorn of such prices, the planner finds it impossible to compare the anticipated marginal benefit and opportunity cost of any production decision. As a result, socialism is inherently irrational.In order to gain a proper understanding of Mises’s argument, it is worth noting that Rothbard, Mises’s foremost American student, extended Mises’s calculation argument by showing that the same problems associated with the socialist state would also exist in a world where one corporation owned all the means of production (Rothbard [1962, 1970] 2009, 609–16). That is, a rational economy requires multiple property owners.
In a market society, entrepreneurs calculate how to proceed with production based on the money prices of the factors of production and their estimate of the future prices of their products. These prices are established in the process of exchange, which presupposes two or more trader-owners. Markets and money are therefore the essential prerequisites for solving the problem of economic calculation and for making meaningful decisions regarding the allocation of the available factors of production.
When market prices serve as a common denominator for comparing the costs and benefits associated with a particular production project, production decisions can be made without a survey of all the steps that lie between the given decision and the ultimate production of consumer goods. A market economy is characterized by an “intellectual division of labor,” where no entrepreneur is forced to isolate the potential satisfaction gained and lost as a result of his (or her) decisions (Mises 1990, 15). Instead, he can focus solely on estimating the prices that he expects to receive for the particular products that he is engaged in producing, while the connection between entrepreneurial decisions and consumer preferences results from the numerous decentralized decisions made by entrepreneurs in the various stages of production.
Mises would go on to write a six hundred–page treatise on socialism in 1922, titled Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, in which he delves into greater detail about the socialist calculation problem and other negative effects of socialism, as well as the superiority of capitalism (Mises 1962). This book and his earlier article ignited the socialist calculation debate between pro- and antisocialist economists, as well as among pro-socialism economists such as Henry Douglas Dickinson (1899–1969), Maurice Dobb (1900–76), Oskar R. Lange (1904–65), Abba P. Lerner (1903–92), and Fred M. Taylor (1855–1932) in terms of how to best solve the problem.See Hayek (1935); Hoff (1949); Lavoie ([1985] 2015); Ekelund and Hébert (2014); and Holcombe (2014) for an overview of the socialist calculation debate. For work by the prosocialist economists, see Lange and Taylor (1938); Dobb (1937); Dickinson (1939); and Lerner (1946).
Another prominent participant in the socialist calculation debate was Hayek, a Viennese student of Mises’s. Over the course of this debate Hayek defended and elaborated on Mises’s argument regarding the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism (Hayek 1948, 57–91). Hayek focused on the difference between scientific or technical knowledge, which is objective, and the subjective knowledge that guides resource allocation in a dynamic world. The planners, he argued, could easily collect the former type of knowledge. But such knowledge will not help them make meaningful production decisions. What the planners will lack is the subjective knowledge of the “man on the spot,” who is the driving force of the market economy (Hayek 1948, 83). This knowledge, which is necessarily time and place specific, is impossible for the planners to obtain, given that much of it is tacit and only revealed as the process of pricing and exchange unfolds in a market economy.The following passage from Hayek (1948, 80) illustrates the kind of time- and place-specific knowledge that is crucial for resource allocation: “To know of and put to use a machine not fully employed, or somebody’s skill which could be better utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which can be drawn upon during an interruption of supplies, is socially quite as useful as the knowledge of better alternative techniques. The shipper who earns his living from using otherwise empty or half filled journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the arbitrageur who gains from local differences of commodity prices are all performing eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others.”
There have since been a number of criticisms and suggested remedies for the calculation problem by socialist economists. There have even been a number of reinterpretations of the problem offered by Austrian economists. However, Mises’s argument remains valid, as Salerno (1990, 66) concludes:
Thus Mises’s original thesis stands on its own against all counterarguments and without any need for qualification or emendation: without private ownership of the means of production, and catallactic competition for them, there cannot exist economic calculation and rational allocation of resources under conditions of the social division of labor. In short, socialist economy and society are impossible.
Some people felt that Mises’s argument was correct when Russia quickly collapsed after adopting socialism and was forced to readopt money, prices, wages, and other features of capitalism with the New Economic Policy. Others accepted that Mises was correct when his theory remained unblemished by his critics during the socialist calculation debate. Finally, when the propped-up pseudo-communist economies in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China collapsed, most observers concurred with Mises.There is now an extensive literature that focuses on the economic failure of central planning from an Austrian perspective, especially in the cases of the Soviet Union and India. For the Soviet Union, see Boettke (1990 and 2000) and Boettke and Coyne (2004). For India, see Shenoy (1958, 1963, and 1966; Shenoy (1971); and Manish (2011, 2013, and 2014). Also see the essays in Boettke (1994). A very successful pro-socialism economist, Robert Heilbroner (1989), confessed that “[i]t turns out, of course, that Mises was right.” Heilbroner (1992) later wrote,
Capitalism has been as unmistakable a success as socialism has been a failure. Here is the part that’s hard to swallow. It has been the Friedmans, Hayeks, and von Miseses who have maintained that capitalism would flourish and that socialism would develop incurable ailments. All three have regarded capitalism as the “natural” system of free men; all have maintained that left to its own devices capitalism would achieve material growth more successfully than any other system.
Others had heard of Mises and his theory of socialism too. When the Nazis (i.e., national socialists) invaded Austria in 1938 they sent a special unit to Mises’s apartment. Mises had already moved to Switzerland for his safety. However, the Germans took all of Mises’s papers and even his furniture. Modern American Austrian economists believed that the papers had been destroyed in the war, but after the collapse of communism beginning in 1989 the papers were found in a Committee for State Security (KGB) warehouse near Moscow. Apparently, both types of socialists—fascists and communists—felt that Mises was right about socialism but that he was withholding the solution to the problem of socialist calculation for ideological reasons.
New interest in socialist ideas is disturbing because of the potential severe damage they could inflict on the economy. The only good thing that can be said about the renewed interest in socialism is that it has spurred new interest in Mises and the Austrian school of economics.
GROWING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOCIALISM IN US POLITICS AS A BOON TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS This section examines various informetrics trends, such as Google News hits and Twitter hashtags usage, that relate to prominent Austrian school economists, namely Mises and Hayek, who opposed socialism as a political and economic ideology. In each case, the ten-year trends are separated into two periods, the period during which the public’s favorability toward socialism in US politics increased (2016–19) and the period preceding the rise in socialism’s popularity (2010–15). Our statistical analyses of these trends span the two subsections below.
Google News
Google News is a computer-generated news site that aggregates headlines from news sources worldwide and groups similar stories together. Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of the number of Google News hits found in a search process using derivations of the phrase “Austrian school of economics” in combination with the term “socialism.”These hits or counts were collected manually. The dates of each hit determined in which year the hit was credited. Included among the news and politics sources associated with the Google News hits discovered through our search are The Atlantic, Barron’s, Bloomberg, The Economist, Financial Times, Forbes, Los Angeles Times, National Public Radio, the New York Times, New York Post, Politico, the Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, and Yahoo! News, among many others. The hollow plots (i.e., ◦) apply to the number of Google News hits found for the 2010–15 portion of the time period under study, all years prior to 2016, when the Democratic Party primaries and caucuses were held. The solid plots (i.e., ●) apply to the number of Google News hits found for the 2016–19 period, which includes the 2016 Democratic Party primaries/caucuses and presidential election, the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections; the 2018 midterm elections; the run-up to the 2020 Democratic Party primaries, caucuses, and presidential election; and the 2020 Democratic Party primaries, caucuses, and presidential election. This period, and the events that occurred during it, are associated with the increase in support for socialism in US politics.
Figure 1. Google News hits, 2010–19: Austrian economics
As evident in figure 1, the number of annual Google News hits for the recent period (2016–19) increased over time and the figures generally exceeded those for the earlier period (2010–15).A pre-2016 linear trend line indicates that Google News hits increased by only one hit each year for that period. This is compared to a post-2015 linear trend line, which indicates that Google News hits increased by twenty-one hits each year for this more recent period. In fact, as indicated in table 1, the mean number of annual Google News hits for the more recent period is equal to 31, compared to a mean of only 2.7 for the earlier period. These figures produce a difference of 28.3, which is consistent with the notion that the recent increase in public support for socialism in US politics has generated greater news (media) interest in the arguments against socialism made by economists in the Austrian school. When subjected to a difference-in-means test, this difference (28.3) is greater than zero at the 0.019 level of significance.The null hypothesis for this test is H0: (m1 − m2) ≤ 0, where m1 is the mean number of Google News hits over the 2016–19 period and m2 is the mean number of Google News hits over the 2010–15 period. The alternative hypothesis for this test is, H1: (m1 − m2) > 0.
Table 1 also presents information on effect size (Ellis 2010), which indicates how much one group mean differs from another. One particular measure of effect size, Hedges’s g, is required in cases where the groups are represented by different sample sizes, as it relies on pooled weighted standard deviations (Hedges 1981; and Hedges and Holkin 1985).In our case, Hedges’s g is equal to , where (i.e., the pooled weighted standard deviation) is equal to ; n1 and s1 represent the sample size and standard deviation for Google News hits during the 2016–19 period; and n2 and s2 represent sample size and standard deviation for Google News hits during the 2016–19 period (Hedges 1981; and Hedges and Holkin 1985). Interpretation of Hedges’s g is straightforward. For example, a Hedges’s g of 0.75 indicates that the group means differ by three-fourths of one standard deviation. Cohen (1977) suggests a rule of thumb for interpreting effect size wherein a Hedges’s g of 0.2 represents a small effect (i.e., not discernable to the naked eye), one of 0.5 represents a medium effect, and one of 0.8 represents a large effect (i.e., discernable to the naked eye). Lastly, given that Hedges’s g has been shown to be biased upward in the case of smaller samples, a bias correction is typically recommended. This study employs two bias corrections—the bias correction recommended by Durlak (2009) and another recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).Both bias corrections involve multiplication of Hedges’s g by a bias correction term. That suggested by Durlak (2009) is equal to , where N is equal to n1 + n2. That recommended by NIST is equal to . Simulations indicate that the latter of these is more accurate.
Table 1. Difference-in-means tests and effect size: Google News hits
Note: The smaller bias-corrected Hedges’s g above employs the bias correction term recommended by Durlak (2009), while the larger one employs the bias correction term recommended by NIST. As indicated in table 1, the bias-corrected Hedges’s g, referred to as Hedges’s gbc, for Google News hits referencing both “socialism” and some iteration of the phrase “Austrian school of economics” lies along a range from 1.29 to 1.44, depending upon which bias correction technique is employed. This result indicates that the mean value of Google News hits during the more recent period (2016–19) is 1.29 to 1.44 standard deviations larger than that of the earlier period (2010–15). This effect size, which is clearly visible in figure 1, is considered large (Cohen 1977).
Figure 2. Google News hits: Ludwig von Mises
Next, figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the number of Google News hits found from a search process using the name “Ludwig von Mises” in combination with the term socialism. As evident there, the number of annual Google News hits using these terms for the recent period (2016–19) increased over time and are generally larger than those found for the prior period (2010–15).A linear trend line the for pre-2016 period indicates that Google News hits increased by only 1.8 hits each year for that period. This is compared to a post-2015 linear trend line, which indicates that Google News hits increased by 5.4 hits each year for this more recent period. Table 1 provides a more formal comparison of these two series. As indicated in the table, the mean number of Google News hits for the more recent period is equal to 15, compared to a mean of 8 for the earlier period. These figures produce a difference of 7, which is consistent with the idea that the recent elevation in public support for socialism in US politics has generated greater news (media) interest in the arguments against socialism made by Ludwig von Mises. According to a difference-in-means test, this difference is greater than zero at the 0.041 level of significance. In this second experiment involving Google News, the appropriate effect measure (Hedges’s gbc) ranges from 1.04 to 1.16 (see table 1), indicating that the mean value of Google News hits during the more recent period (2016–19) is 1.04 to 1.16 standard deviations larger than that of the earlier period (2010–15). Following Cohen’s (1977) rule of thumb, points along this range qualify as a large effect.
Lastly, figure 3 presents a scatterplot of the number of Google News hits found through a search process using the name “Friedrich Hayek” in combination with the term socialism. As it shows, the number of annual Google News hits for the recent period (2016–19) trended upward over time and generally exceeded those for the earlier period (2010–15).A linear trend line for the pre-2016 period indicates that Google News hits increased by 0.8 each year for that period. This is compared to a linear trend line for the post-2015 period showing that Google News hits increased by 1.8 hits each year for this more recent period. The more formal analysis of these two series presented in Table 1 indicates that the mean number of Google News hits for the more recent period is equal to nine, compared to a mean of only three for the earlier period. These figures produce a difference of six, which is consistent with the notion that the recent increase in support for socialism in US politics has led to much greater news (media) interest in the arguments against socialism made by Friedrich Hayek. According to a difference-in-means test, this difference is also greater than zero at the 0.005 level of significance.
Figure 3. Google News hits: Friedrich Hayek
In this final experiment involving Google News, the appropriate effect size measure (Hedges’s gbc) ranges from 1.79 to 2.00 (see table 1), indicating that the mean value of Google News hits during the more recent period (2016–19) is a remarkable 1.79 to 2.00 standard deviations larger than that of the earlier period (2010–15). This effect size, which is clearly visible upon visual inspection of the plots in figure 3, qualifies as a large effect according to the rule of thumb discussed in Cohen (1977).
Twitter is a social media platform that operates for its users as a microblogging website. Individual posts made by users are referred to as “tweets,” each of which is limited to either 140 or 280 characters, depending on the language used by the Twitter user. An individual Twitter user may insert a hashtag symbol (#) before a relevant keyword or phrase in his or her tweet in order to categorize that tweet and help it show up more easily in a Twitter search.See Twitter.com. Twitter hashtags can be included anywhere in a tweet. Clicking or tapping on a hash-tagged word or phrase in any post shows other tweets that include that particular hashtag.
Figure 4. Twitter hashtag frequency: Austrian economics
Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of annual Twitter hashtag counts found through a search process using iterations of the Twitter hashtag phrase “Austrian school of economics.” As evident in figure 4, the annual Twitter hashtag counts for the recent period (2016–19) trended upward over time and generally exceeded those for the prior period (2010–15).The pre-2016 linear trend line indicates that Twitter hashtag use increased by only 2.4 hashtags each year for that period. This is compared to the post-2015 linear trend line, which indicates that Twitter hashtag use increased by 7.4 hashtags each year for this more recent period. In fact, as indicated in table 2, the mean number of Twitter hashtag counts for the more recent period is equal to 33.5, compared to a mean of only 15.5 for the earlier period. These figures produce a difference of 18, which is consistent with the proposition that the recent increase in support for socialism in US politics has generated a much greater presence on social media of the arguments against socialism made by Austrian economists. This difference is, according to a difference-in-means test, greater than zero at the 0.007 level of significance.
Table 2. Difference-in-means tests and effect size: Twitter hashtag frequency
Note: The smaller bias-corrected Hedges’s g above employs the bias correction term recommended by Durlak (2009), while the larger one employs the bias correction term recommended by NIST. As also indicated in table 2, the Hedges’s gbc for counts of Twitter hashtags referencing some iteration of the term “Austrian school of economics” lies along a range from 1.63 to 1.82, indicating that the mean value of Twitter hashtag counts during the more recent period (2016–19) is 1.63 to 1.82 standard deviations larger than that of the earlier period (2010–15). This compelling effect size can be characterized as large (Cohen 1977).
Next, figure 5 presents a scatterplot of annual Twitter hashtag counts found in a search process using some iteration of the name “Ludwig von Mises.” As indicated there, the annual counts of Twitter hashtags using this name for the recent period (2016–19) are increasing over time and generally exceed those for the prior period (2010–15).The pre-2016 linear trend line indicates that Twitter hashtag use fell by 0.5 hashtags each year for that period. This is compared to the post-2015 linear trend line, which indicates that Twitter hashtag use increased by 30.1 hashtags each year for this more recent period. As before, a more formal comparison of these two series is found in table 2. As indicated in the table, the mean of the Twitter hashtag counts for the more recent period is equal to 46.3, compared to a mean of only 15.5 for the earlier period. These means produce a difference of 30.8, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the recent increase in support for socialism in US politics has generated a larger presence on social media of the arguments against socialism made by Ludwig von Mises. Moreover, at the 0.059 level of significance, this difference is, according to a difference-in-means test, greater than zero.
Figure 5. Twitter hashtag frequency: Ludwig von Mises
Turning again to table 2, the Hedges’s gbc for counts of Twitter hashtags referencing some iteration of the name “Ludwig von Mises” lies along a range from 0.91 to 1.02, indicating that the mean value of Twitter hashtag counts during the more recent period (2016–19) is about one standard deviation larger than that of the earlier period (2010–15). Thus, Hedges’s gbc points toward a large effect in this case (Cohen 1977).
Figure 6. Twitter hashtag frequency: Friedrich Hayek
Lastly, figure 6 presents a scatterplot of annual Twitter hashtag counts found using a search process employing iterations of the name “Friedrich Hayek.” In this case, although the series trended upward during each separate period, there is no visible difference between annual Twitter hashtag counts for 2016–19 and those for 2010–15.The pre-2016 linear trend line indicates that Twitter hashtag use increased by 5.9 hashtags each year for that period. This is compared to the post-2015 linear trend line, which indicates that Twitter hashtag use increased by only 0.2 hashtags each year for this more recent period. However, the more formal analysis of these two series found in table 2 indicates that the mean Twitter hashtag count for the more recent period is equal to 26, compared to a mean of 23 for the earlier period. These means produce a difference of 3, which is consistent with the notion that that the recent rise of socialism in US politics has generated a larger presence on social media of the arguments against socialism made by Friedrich Hayek. However, according to a difference-in-means test this difference is not greater than zero at the usual levels of significance. In this final experiment involving Twitter hashtag counts, Hedges’s gbc ranges from 0.19 to 0.22 (see table 2), indicating that the mean value of Twitter hashtag counts during the more recent period is about one-fifth of one standard deviation larger than that of the earlier period. Thus, the effect size in this case is small according to Cohen’s (1977) rule of thumb.
IS THERE A SUPPLY-SIDE EXPLANATION? A potential shortcoming of the analyses above is that they focus solely on the demand-side argument—that the recent increase in the demand for Austrian economics is the result of the rise of socialism in US politics. There is, however, a possible supply-side explanation, with scholars simply producing more academic research in the post-2015 era focusing upon Austrian economics that subsequently attracts the attention of the general public, concerning the observed use of social media in this case. This possibility can to some extent be parsed by examination of Google Scholar trends of citations to Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. Google Scholar is useful for tracking citations of individual scholars (e.g., Mises, Hayek) in academic journals and books. Any structural break between 2015 and 2016, with generally larger and increasing values reported in the post-2015 era, in the two data series provided by Google Scholar for von Mises and Hayek would support a supply-side argument for the social media trends generally observed in the previous section of this study. On the other hand, the absence of a structural break would tend to support our demand-side hypothesis.
Google Scholar
Google Scholar provides a simple way to find relevant work across the world of scholarly research.Google.com. It allows one to explore citations of scholarly work by author and by year, two numerical measures that provide information on the impact of a researcher’s scholarship.Google.com. Figure 7 presents a scatterplot of Google Scholar citation counts found for Ludwig von Mises.The Google Profile function of Harzing (2016) was used for the Google Scholar searches discussed in this study. In this case, although the mean of citations for the post-2015 period is slightly larger than for pre-2016, the series lacks an upward trend during the more recent period. In fact, the latter portion of the series trends downward.A linear trend line for the post-2015 period indicates that Google Scholar citations fell by 24.4 citations per year over this period. Hence, there is no clear evidence in figure 7 to support a supply-side argument for what is generally occurring in the figures presented in the previous section.
Figure 7. Google Scholar citations: Ludwig von Mises
Next, figure 8 presents a scatterplot of the Google Scholar citation counts found for Friedrich Hayek. As with Mises’s scholarship, although the mean of citations for the post-2015 period is slightly larger than for pre-2016, the series lacks an upward trend during the more recent period. More specifically, the latter portion of the series is quite clearly trending downward.A linear trend line for the post-2015 period indicates that Google Scholar citations fell by 205.3 citations per year over this period. As such, the series shown in figure 8 does not support a supply-side hypothesis.
Figure 8. Google Scholar citations: Friedrich Hayek
Additional Discussion
To summarize, the trend comparisons in the previous section of this study are generally consistent with the idea that the recent increase in support for socialism in US politics has been a boon to the Austrian school, and to Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek in particular. The argument supported by the empirical analysis above—that the rise of socialism in US politics has led to an increase in the demand for Austrian economics—has intuitive appeal. The Austrians, by virtue of constituting less than 5 percent of all academic economists (Vedder and Gallaway 2000), tend to rely more heavily on nontechnical expositions aimed at the wider public in order to garner greater interest. Additionally, many Austrians have involved themselves in politics directly (e.g., former US representative Ron Paul) or indirectly (such as through the Mises Institute).
The type of analysis presented above regarding the rise in interest in the ideas of the Austrian school that is owed to recent increases in support for socialism in US politics has wider application. For example, the 2019 impeachment of US president Donald Trump prompted renewed interest by Americans in the writings of America’s founding fathers—contained in The Federalist Papers—on subjects such as the limits of the executive branch’s power and the downside of hyperpartisan political processes.Interestingly, during the Senate impeachment trial in early 2020, the president’s defense counsel cited historical evidence of US president Abraham Lincoln’s use of his authority as commander in chief to support his reelection efforts in the 1864 presidential election. Lincoln’s activities in this regard are the subject of public choice studies by Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Crisp and Mixon (2011). Similarly, recent growth in the economic power of US tech giants (e.g., Facebook, Amazon) combined with increasing income inequality has renewed Americans’ interest in the Gilded Age (1870–early 1900s) and President Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to address these issues (Bruno 2019).Roosevelt’s response ushered in the Progressive Era in the US (Bruno 2019). Thus, that episode is related to the subject of this study. There are certainly many other examples.
LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS As with most examples of informetrics research, this study is not without its limitations. First, the use of data provided by large technology companies such as Google is subject to the many product (algorithm) changes that they make over time. For example, Lioudus (2019) reports on a significant change by Google in 2018 that “leveled the playing field for smaller publishers” by directing searches to small and medium-sized news publishers. The company again revised its algorithm in 2019 to favor original reporting over follow-up stories (Nieto and Arroyo 2019). To the extent that small and medium-sized news outlets have a proclivity for addressing stories related to Austrian economics and/or economists, the findings in this study are affected by algorithm changes to Google News such as those discussed in Lioudus (2019) and Nieto and Arroyo (2019). In addition to these concerns, there is also the overarching issue of the Google algorithm’s use of a set of ranking factors to deliver relevant content, where relevance is determined in part by how well publishers optimize their content and by a particular user’s preferences.Google News personalizes results on the basis of location, language, interests, and past activity, among others. All of these issues potentially impact the results of academic inquiry, including those presented in this study.
The use of data from another large technology company, Twitter, also presents some issues that may relate to the study’s findings. Twitter currently boasts 353 million users, up from only 54 million in 2010. This span approximates the time frame covered in this study. It is plausible that as Twitter became a social phenomenon over the 2010 to 2019 time period, independent-minded individuals holding favorable views of Austrian economics and/or economists adopted the channel in order to share their voices. It could also be the case that the activities of the Mises Institute, the Federal Reserve, and/or Gary Johnson’s campaign for the US presidency generated substantial Twitter attention around Austrian economics and economists. Again, these issues potentially impacted the results presented above in this study. To work around some of the issues above, researchers commonly use Google Trends indices on search queries to gauge demand (e.g., see Silverstovs and Wochner 2018). A check of our results using a variety of Google Trends filters yielded less support for our hypothesis than reported in our analyses above. However, Google Trends too is subject to spurious patterns and other issues discussed above with regard to Google News (Bokelmann and Lessmann, 2019).
Future research might address some of the issues discussed above by applying “science mapping,” or citation context analysis, described by Anderson and Lemkin (2020). As Gupta and Chaudhary (2021) explain, this approach assists researchers in describing how important ideas spread from source literature to subsequent research citing it.See also Golden-Biddle, Locke, and Reay (2006). Gupta and Chaudhary (2021) apply the approach to the influence of Jacobson’s (1992) seminal work on the field of organizational research.As Gupta and Chaudhary (2021) explain, Jacobson (1992) asserts that a firm’s competitive advantage emanates from its ability to discover entrepreneurial opportunities, mobilize dispersed information, and innovate. Science mapping may prove useful in quantifiably addressing the quality of both the Google News results and Google Scholar citation counts that are analyzed in this and other similar informetric studies. Alternatives to the approach used by Gupta and Chaudhary (2021) for future research include use of the Bokelmann and Lessmann (2019) method for sanitizing Google Trends data to reduce the adverse impact of spurious patterns. Finally, perhaps a modified version of the hierarchical cluster analysis used in a recent study by Hwang et al. (2019) to classify productive management education scholars would prove helpful in further parsing the type of information provided by Google Scholar.
CONCLUSION This study explored the possibility that the recent ascendance in the favorability of socialism in US politics has been a boon to the Austrian school of economics due to its thorough refutations of this ideology during the first half of the twentieth century. More specifically, two economists belonging to this school, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, devoted much of their professional careers to the study of socialism as a political economic ideology, and their scholarship on socialism represents what is arguably the most renowned rebuke of claims of socialism’s superiority as a method of political and economic organization. As such, this study asserted that the Austrian school in general, and Mises and Hayek in particular, have been beneficiaries of the recent growth in the favorability of socialism in US politics. Put differently, the rise of socialism in US politics has led to an increase in the demand for Austrian economics.
Statistical tests of various informetrics trends support our assertion, as Google News hits and Twitter hashtag usage involving the views of prominent Austrian economists have generally ascended over the recent period (2016–19). The more recent era corresponds to the period of increased support for socialism in US politics as expressed through the increasing political fortunes of Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other prominent US legislators whose political platforms extol the virtues of socialist approaches to public policy. Lastly, the type of analysis presented in this study shows promise for wider application. For example, recent events surrounding the impeachment of the US president has renewed Americans’ interest in the founders’ views, as laid out in The Federalist Papers, on executive branch authority in the federal government, a subject of interest in both constitutional law and political science. Perhaps the events surrounding the impeachment has sparked increased interest in the constitutional philosophies of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison that might be evident across social media.
Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha: Religion, Feminism, Slavery, Politics, and Economics in the First Modern Novelby Eric Clifford GrafLanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2021, 290 pp.
Abstract: Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha: Religion, Feminism, Slavery, Politics, and Economics in the First Modern Novel is Eric Clifford Graf’s argument that Don Quijote falls within the liberal tradition, advancing a distinctly humanist vision of liberty and, at times, a sardonic critique of undue coercion. Graf’s effort is one small deposit in a slowly growing stock of research that reconsiders literary texts with an eye towards liberty as a guiding good.
Allen Mendenhall (AllenMendenhall.com) is Associate Dean and Grady Rosier Professor in the Sorrell College of Business at Troy University.
“A major thesis of this book,” Eric Clifford Graf says of Anatomy of Liberty in Don Quijote de la Mancha, “is that [Miguel de] Cervantes’s great novel offers a realist bourgeois solution to the confusing labyrinth of tyranny, bondage, and corruption” that characterize early modern Europe (p. 3). Widely recognized as the first early modern novel, Don Quijote advances “positive themes like freedom, harmony, and progress” that commerce and exchange make possible (p. 3).Following Graf, this review uses the spelling Quijote rather than Quixote. It falls, arguably, within the liberal tradition, advancing a distinctly humanist vision of liberty and, at times, a sardonic critique of undue coercion, containing “a significant set of sophisticated casuistic lessons about liberty as an economic science of unusual complexity” (p. 180).
Don Quijote is a picaresque“A picaresque,” Graf avers, “is an episodic and satirical type of narrative fiction” (p. 13). featuring the ridiculous nobleman Alonso Quixano, or Don Quijote, and his simple sidekick Sancho Panza. Their carnivalesque, absurd adventures—comical spoofs on medieval, romantic, knight-errand legends of gallantry and chivalry—result in irony, hilarity, and, alas, tragedy. Criticism in the manner of wit rather than militant provocation or brute force is less likely to invite violent reaction, and Cervantes deftly and prudently employed the satirical mode to popular effect.
That Don Quijote is the first modern novel is no trivial fact. Compared to the high ecclesiastic treatises of the Roman Catholic Church or the urgent tracts and polemics of the Protestant Reformers, the novel itself was, in the seventeenth century, a proto-liberal medium of expression that represented bourgeois values: commerce, commercialism, trade, exchange, interaction, entertainment, and work. The internal form of novels, in fact, resembled (and resembles) the everyday hustle-bustle of their presumed audience. “The wide-ranging and all[-]embracing character of the novel at its best may be purchased at the prices of a certain disunity and inconsistency by the standards of strict poetic form,” Paul Cantor (2009, 49) alleges, “but this is a price we are prepared to pay in return for the novel’s greater ability to capture the texture of lived experience.” Graf points out, as well, that “respect for women on a cosmic scale” was integral to “the novel form” (p. 55).
The point of a review such as this is to summarize and assess the subject author’s leading, seminal arguments. Elements of Cervantes’s plot, which Graf analyzes with depth and breadth, will not appear here. Graf, not Cervantes, is my focus. He sets out to clarify Cervantes’s probable intents and decisions for Don Quijote by providing historical context to interpret details from the text, compare scenes in which Cervantes renders economics broadly conceived, and link Don Quijote to other works and thinkers who influenced, or may have influenced, Cervantes. To accomplish this objective, Graf arranges his case topically by themes that define the liberal tradition, namely “religious tolerance,” “respect for women,” “abolition of slavery,” “resistance to tyranny,” and “economic freedom” (p. 5). Each chapter of this book tracks one of these themes.
It is probably too much to call Cervantes a classical liberal, so Graf, at the outset, cautiously posits that Cervantes anticipated and influenced classical liberals such as Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Mill, and certain American Founders—to say nothing of the numerous Hispanic liberals who valued economic freedom and individual rights to varying degrees. By the end of his book, however, Graf changes his tune. His conclusion is surprising in its boldness: “So, am I saying Cervantes was a capitalist? An Austrian? A free-market Randian? A libertarian? An English classical liberal? In a general sense, yes, and probably to a greater degree than most readers recognize” (p. 189). Strong words, even if they are qualified by the adjective “general.”
Graf dubs his book an “anatomy,” the term Murray Rothbard employed for his Anatomy of the State. Both texts “dissect” their subjects, so to speak, as the scientist might probe the human body in all its intricate particulars. Graf joins Darío Fernández-Morera (2009, 101) in treating Cervantes “as a writer whose works present situations, statements, and ideas that illuminate sympathetically important aspects of the market economy, while providing material for a critique of collectivism, statism, and redistributionism.”
The School of Salamanca is among the influences that Graf identifies as central to Cervantes’s humanist style of religious tolerance. That is also the school, of course, from which Rothbard traced the origins of Austrian Economics. Graf sees in Cervantes Erasmus-like and quasi-Protestant sympathies, which, in his telling, seem more political (i.e., anti-monarchical) than theological or doctrinal. Protestantism thus understood placed a primacy on the individual, resisted state surveillance and persecution, advocated mass literacy and learning, and rejected ecclesiastic power and orthodoxy. “Cervantes was himself excommunicated,” Graf adduces in support of his view (p. 32). Cervantes’s “Protestantism,” if that is the correct label, was historically and geographically contextual and in contradistinction to the systematic coercion institutionalized by the Spanish Inquisition.“Cervantes criticizes the Inquisition as an immortal, brutal, random, superstitious, and hypocritical institution that suffers from considerable ideological inconsistency.” Graf, p. 29.
Graf connects religious freedom with freedom of thought because they both concern “the limits of the state’s ability to control the inner lives of its citizens” (p. 17). A negative example of religious coercion against which Cervantes wrote was the Expulsion of the Moriscos under Phillip III. Here, a monarch exercised state compulsion to enforce religious conformity and oppress heretical individuals or groups. Graf notes that this religious and ethnic conflict occurred between the publication of the first and second parts of Don Quijote. The fact that state-religious censors cut irreverent passages from Don Quijote before its second edition appeared suggests the extent to which freedom of thought and religion are bound together. Cervantes’s strategic irreverence was “part of a dramatically down-to-earth discourse aimed at subverting orthodoxy” (p. 23). One explanation for why Don Quijote continues to appeal is that light humor is more enjoyable than violent sanctimony. Comedy, done well, has staying power.
Don Quijote “should be of great interest to feminists” (p. 55), according to Graf, for several reasons: (1) Because it “defends women characters against the kinds of brutality often practiced and permitted by the Islamic, Protestant, and Catholic men of his day” (p. 55); it “mocks the extremes of male sexuality” (p. 56); it depicts “comical, prosaic, and pathetic renditions of male fantasy” (p. 58); it portrays women “as no different from men when it comes to their moral status” (p. 59); and it “recognizes that since women get pregnant, their experience of sex is more consequential, both in terms of social stigma and material cost” (p. 59). Only a lengthy exposition beyond the scope of this review could adequately address Graf’s account of the multifaceted “feminism” (an anachronistic designation for Cervantes) communicated by Don Quijote.
The same might be said of Graf’s account of slavery, which, he says, is “essential to any serious understanding of Don Quijote” (p. 85) in light of Cervantes’s treble objections to human bondage: that “slavery itself is wrong, the new racial justification of it is absurd, and any material advantage it offers over a free labor market is likely an allusion” (p. 85). Equating slavery and skin color grew increasingly common during the seventeenth century, when Spanish investment in the slave trade increased and Cervantes himself encountered human bondage in Algiers. That experience, combined with his imprisonment for embezzlement, among other things, turned him against slavery. Graf credits the School of Salamanca and principles of natural law for Cervantes’s gradual opposition to slavery and claims that Don Quijote was part of a larger “Spanish innovation in early modern fiction” (e.g., Lazarillo de Tormes and El coloquio de los perros) that folded “the themes of race and slavery into a picaresque satire against slavery” (p. 87).
Of the five chapters of Graf’s book, the fifth, regarding economics, is the most exciting, going great lengths to demonstrate the relevance and usefulness of Austrian economics to literary theory and criticism. Those familiar with the Austrian School, however, may flip past sections of this chapter that are addressed to an audience lacking economics training. For instance, Graf spends six pages describing subjective theory of value as articulated from Carl Menger to Rothbard. The wide range of economic concepts that Graf finds in Don Quijote—price theory, money, markets, usury, interest, debt, credit, inflation, counterfeiting, and more—testifies to Cervantes’s sustained interest in that subject, which appealed to future classical liberals. “[T]he essential attraction of Cervantes’s great novel for the likes of Locke, Hume, Jefferson, and Bastiat, all of whom emphasized individualism, private property, stable money, and free markets in lieu of market intervention and control,” was, Graf submits, Cervantes’s apparent proto-liberalism (p. 227).
Globalization, the “influx of gold and silver from the New World” (p. 175), economic treatises that Christianized business and trade, fresh financial practices and active commerce in and around Spain—these and other factors explain the economics that figures in Don Quijote. “Over the course of his life,” Graf asserts, Cervantes “acquired tangible micro- and macro-economic knowledge about things like tax laws, the quality of different coins, and the gain, loss, and risk of a range of debt and credit arrangements” (p. 179). Graf maintains that Cervantes was economically sophisticated, comprehending “abstract concepts like Gresham’s Law and the subjective theory of value, and that he grasped the folly and immorality of authoritarian decrees like price controls, penalties for usury, and compulsory exchange rates” (p. 180).
Because of the time and place in which Cervantes wrote, Graf’s presentation of liberalism, which centers on Cervantes, seems to imply an incompatibility with, or opposition to, religious establishments and institutions. Yet there is an appreciable difference between religious establishments and institutions—especially those endowed with government or state power—and the movements and teachings of historical Christianity and those religious texts around which it developed. Larry Seidentop’s Inventing the Individual supplies a cogent case for Christianity as an impetus for individualism and liberalism in the West. Graf’s treatment of Christianity may have looked different had his subject matter been different.
Graf is a self-proclaimed independent scholar; he maintains no formal affiliation with a university, research institute, think tank, or other scholarly organization. That Lexington Books would publish an author without such establishment ties suggests that it is committed, chiefly, to intellectual merit and not, say, credentialism. Too many university presses would pass on this book because its author does not grace the Ivory Tower. That is a mistake because the quality and rigor of Graf’s arguments far exceed that of many tenured professors in the hallowed halls of higher education.
Readers already familiar with Cervantes and Don Quijote are the target audience for this book, which might come in handy as a curricular supplement in a course on Cervantes or Don Quijote, the emergence of the novel as a literary form, Spanish literature, and so forth. The benefit of teaching Graf’s perspective in a college classroom involves his counteraction of Marxist or quasi-Marxist—or at least anti-capitalist—exegeses and discourses that abound in humanities disciplines.“The vast majority of authors, critics, and professors of literature attend an anti-capitalist perspective regarding economic literary criticism.” (Spivey 2020, 4). It has been over a decade since Cantor and Stephen Cox’s Literature and the Economics of Liberty reached print, and optimism regarding a sudden flowering of libertarian literary criticism has, no doubt, diminished. But Graf’s effort is one small deposit in a slowly growing stock of research that reconsiders literary texts with an eye towards liberty as a guiding good. There is, indeed, hope and promise for a more humane economics in literary theory and criticism. If we are patient, it will come.
Recorded in St. Petersburg, Florida on October 22, 2021.
The weekend revolves around a discussion of strategy. Nearly 25 years ago, Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe delivered his famous "What Must Be Done" speech on the pressing topic of how—and whether—to engage the state. Today his prescription for a bottom-up ideological revolution beginning at the local level rings more true than ever. With Hoppe's admonitions in mind, all of our speakers and panels will consider three vital questions: Where are we? How Bad is it? And what should we do now?
Having branched to our first novel with All Quiet on the Western Front, the Human Action Podcast begs your indulgence for one of the works of 20th century British satire. Lucky Jim is the late Kingsley Amis's seminal send-up of campus life, and it's among your host's favorite books. The book takes place in 1951, and England is trying but failing to lose its class distinctions. The protagonist Jim Dixon is singularly unfit for the academic life he's chosen, and the opportunities for Amis to skewer both the academy and English society are manifest.
Allen Mendenhall of Troy University joins the show to discuss the academic pretenses and foibles punctured by Amis, along with great insights about Amis's background and political views. If you like satire, don't miss this show or this book!
Creating a functioning and sustainable local economy is much more time consuming and complicated than sprucing up a few buildings to look good on a TV show.
Original Article: "Revitalizing a Town Takes a Lot More Than Fixing Up a Few Buildings for a TV Show"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Jeff Deist hosts a solo show to discuss one of his favorite novels from childhood, All Quiet on the Western Front. Its young protagonist Paul Bäumer, barely out of adolescence, narrates the horrors of trench warfare from the perspective only a grunt soldier can provide. Bäumer and his mates lose their innocence, along with various limbs and often their lives. But what makes the book so compelling is not simply the description of wartime savagery, but the dialogue between the men: stripped of any illusions, they see the futility of killing and maiming simply to capture a few more feet of no-man's land. The dialogue in Chapter 9 between the men, arguing about whether states or "people" go to war, is masterful. This is a book every passionate antiwar advocate needs to read time and again.
All Quiet on the Western Front on Amazon: Mises.org/AllQuiet Jeff Deist's review of They Shall not Grow Old: Mises.org/ShallNot
Bob reviews the "Unbreakable" movie trilogy, arguing that M. Night Shyamalan knows we need to awaken the superheroes among us. They might not even know who they are—yet.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube trailer for “Unbreakable,” the first movie in the trilogy under discussion For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Media Wars: The Battle to Shape Our MindsWalter Donway and Vinay KolhatkarIndependently Published, 2020, 330 pp.
William L. Anderson (banderson@frostburg.edu) is professor of economics at Frostburg State University.
Even the sunniest optimist would admit that the year 2020 was extremely challenging with the COVID-19 pandemic that hit our shores in January, anti-police riots in the spring and summer, and an extremely contentious presidential election in the fall. For people holding to libertarian and Austrian Economic viewpoints, 2020 was an unmitigated disaster, and almost all the trauma was the result of human action.
While the events of 2020 seemed to come upon us all of a sudden, in truth, they were the result of the political and cultural left marching through our social, media, governmental, religious, and educational institutions for many years, and especially in the past decade. In their book, Media Wars: The Battle to Shape Our Minds, journalists Walter Donway and Vinay Kolhatkar set out to document the rise of cultural Marxism and its accompanying Critical Theory and how they have gained control of the commanding heights of so many of our institutions.
Although the title of the book might lead one to believe it is about the news media, it really covers more ground, looking at a number of aspects of our society from higher education to economics, science, the arts and beyond. And, of course, it does deal with the media or, more specifically, with the various narratives that seem to drive current media coverage of events.
There are some important points I need to make at the beginning of this review, and the first is that this is a collection of essays, some written several years ago and others more recent. Second, it is not a scholarly volume of essays, but rather journalistic commentary with a conservative/libertarian bent. (They are worth reading but are not researched in the way that we would see a book of academic essays.) Third, this is not a book that is likely to convince someone on “the other side” to re-evaluate their own ideological positions, as it tends to affirm what many readers already might believe.
Despite its popular appeal, is Media Wars a good resource for academic researchers? Furthermore, how seriously should we take its commentary? The answer to both questions is yes.
Donway and Kolhatkar begin with an overall analysis of what they call “the establishment’s cultural narratives” that represent the Culture War, Black Lives Matter, racism, animus toward historic Western Culture, college campus issues, and what they call the “fountainhead of irrationality in the West.” Interestingly, they begin with the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist governments of that country and its Eastern European satellites. For those of us old enough to have lived through most of the Cold War, including participating in the “duck-and-cover” nuclear bomb drills held in the schools and experiencing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was a heady and happy time. Even a socialist like Robert Heilbroner would write in the New Yorker (1990) that socialism had failed and that Ludwig von Mises (1951) had been correct when he claimed in Socialism that socialist economies would break down because of the problem with economic calculation. Capitalism seemed to have been vindicated and socialism was openly declared a failure.
Three decades after Heilbroner’s article, the pendulum has swung mightily. All of the political media darlings today, such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, are outspoken socialists, and the New York Times has launched two major broadsides against capitalism. The first was its November 2017 series on the 100-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution when the NYT portrayed the former European communist world as a paradise lost where women had great sex and the welfare state covered everyone’s needs from housing to medical care.
The second NYT attack on capitalism came with its controversial 1619 Project in which the paper claimed that American capitalism was deeply and irredeemably rooted in slavery and that every business tool from double-entry bookkeeping to personnel management had been developed to keep slaves in check, modern-day slaves being employees of private firms. Not only was modern business the direct descendant of American chattel slavery, but that even the American Revolution itself was fought because the colonists feared Great Britain would abolish slavery. America’s founding, the NYT declared, was in 1619, when the first slaves arrived on American shores, not 1776 when colonists declared their independence from Great Britain.
When numerous historians and economists thoroughly debunked much of the 1619 Project, the Times responded not in good faith but rather accused its critics of racism and worse, ensuring that there could be no debate over the veracity of the series, at least according to what supposedly is the standard of American journalism, the vaunted “Newspaper of Record.” Instead, the NYT has turned into a vehicle that not only disseminated historical disinformation, but also has become a major foe of the very capitalist system that make a newspaper like the New York Times even possible.
Capitalism in America today is not fighting rear-guard action but rather a full-frontal assault from nearly every institution from politics to higher education. While some critics, such as economist Paul Krugman, claim that capitalism has the self-tendency to implode, since markets are imperfect and will fall into the Keynesian “liquidity trap” unless rescued by government policies, others condemn capitalism for promoting what they allege to be inequality. The authors, not surprisingly, present a different view on capitalism, applying the Austrian paradigm.
In a section in Chapter 12 entitled “Rational Economic Science,” Kolhatkar writes that free markets permit “price discovery” in which prices allow market participants to bring supply and demand into balance. He goes on to note that interest rates permit a term structure that is best “discovered by a free market.” Economic growth, he writes, “is primarily driven by accumulation of capital to invest in applying scientific progress and innovation to production,” and in a free market, the process builds upon itself. Over time, this capital investment builds upon itself to bring about increases in living standards.
In contrast to Austrian economics, Kolhatkar attacks Keynesianism as being “quackery,” laying out some fundamental precepts that John Maynard Keynes and his followers have created in the years since Keynes published The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936. Some of these principles include what Austrians have been saying about Keynesian economic thinking for years, including the beliefs that:
interest rates always are “too high” and must be manipulated by monetary authorities;the stock market really is like a gambling casino;gold as money is (to quote Keynes) a “barbarous relic”;the price system does not help markets “self-correct.” Kolhatkar writes:
Eventually, euphemisms like fiscal policy, monetary policy, and quantitative easing became folklore in peer-reviewed journals, then part of an everyday lexicon of generations of bureaucrats, economists, journalists, and finance professionals. As the lie morphed into “mainstream economics,” it became the Big Lie. What does the Big Lie euphemize?
Money supply manipulation, interest rate bastardization, crony project funding, incessant stealing from savers to let borrowers borrow cheaply, an absurd reverence for inflation as though it is needed for economic growth, setting up false convictions (the Fall Guys), extolling the issuance of paper money unlinked to value, subsidizing and interfering with banking—these are only some of the absurdities that hide behind the euphemisms. (p. 101, emphasis theirs)
This is not something one can write in an academic journal and it certainly is not something one would see in a textbook, yet for many of us, it is something we wish we could see in such publication, or something close to it. Those of us tied to the Austrian School believe that Keynesian “economics” and the related schools of thought (i.e., Modern Monetary Theory) are fraudulent even though they have been blessed with academic and political credentials.
But while Media Wars examines subjects like economics and sciences, its actual focus is our current culture war and how modern progressivism really is based upon cultural worldviews. We are not dealing with an intellectual arena in which people of goodwill dispassionately examine various ideas to see what is best; if that really were the case, Modern Monetary Theory would already have been dismissed as nothing more than an attempt to academically sanitize massive money printing. Instead, we are dealing with what only can be called a rigged system in which a progressive pipeline from academe moves to the academic journals and publishers and ultimately to the mainstream news media, led by the New York Times and Washington Post, along with the broadcast networks like NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS, and CNN.
The authors briefly examine social media at the end of the book, but do not deal with the current controversies surrounding the hard-left censorship that the social media firms like Facebook and Twitter have imposed upon their platforms. Given the major role that social media and tech firms like Google played in the U.S. presidential election, one would have liked to have read the opinions and insights the authors might have had—although it probably is not hard to predict what they would have written.
Media Wars is worth reading but, as I noted earlier, it isn’t a book that will have academic standing and it isn’t a volume one gives to a progressive friend to present a convincing viewpoint from the other side. That doesn’t mean the authors have failed to make their points, but in this partisan age, even well-researched and well-reasoned conclusions are dismissed as hackery and shilling for that “failed” system known as capitalism.
Bob unveils a new recurring series, in which he gives the context of infamous quotations. In this episode, he covers two allegedly shocking quotes from John Lennon, John Maynard Keynes' "in the long run we're all dead," Trump on Nazis being very fine people, Dan Quayle misspelling potato, Obama's "you didn't build that," and Bohm-Bawerk on Karl Marx.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Wikipedia entry on John Lennon’s “more popular than Jesus” comment. Lyrics to “Revolution.”Bob and the Music City Friends of Liberty cover “Come Together.”Video for Trump’s “very fine people” remark. Video of Obama’s “you didn’t build that.”Nancy Pelosi on “We have to pass the bill to find out what’s in it.”Bohm-Bawerk’s Karl Marx and the Close of His System. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
The recent sale of an invisible statue for £13,000 is symptomatic of the thoroughgoing financialization of our economy. Investors have become ever more obsessed with the symbols of economic reality and less concerned with underlying economic facts.
Original Article: "Much Ado about Nothing in the Art Market"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Government schools have always been tools of the regime for teaching state-approved ideology and culture. The rise of critical race theory is just the latest phase for America's public schools system.
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Curiosity and Its Twelve Rules for Lifeby F. H. BuckleyEncounter Books, 2021xx + 228 pages
Frank Buckley, a Canadian-born lawyer who teaches at the Scalia School of Law at George Mason University, has given us in this remarkable book a philosophy of life, based on unusually wide knowledge and penetrating reflection. In what follows, I shall discuss only a few of the topics he covers, concentrating on his observations about politics and economics. In doing so, I risk conveying a wrong impression of the book, as these topics by no means exhaust it; but Buckley himself emphasizes the value of taking risks.
Buckley says, “Survival is not enough. We also need to create, to struggle and not to yield, to be curious about the world and what we owe other people. Every leap of knowledge and every entrepreneurial firm was created by a person who was curious.” His twelve rules of curiosity are these: don’t make rules; take risks; court uncertainties; be original; show grit; be interested in other people; be entertaining; be creative; be open to the world; don’t be smug; don’t overreach; and realize you’re knocking on heaven’s door.
He tells us that “uncertainty isn’t the same as risk. With risks, you know the probabilities for different outcomes…. Uncertainty is different. There are different possible outcomes, but you won’t know the probabilities for each. Instead, you’re in Donald Rumsfeld’s world of unknown unknowns.”
In our uncertain world, entrepreneurs who are willing to take chances when they cannot calculate the odds are crucially important for economic progress. “The anti-fragile entrepreneur [Nicolas Taleb’s term for those who thrive on uncertainty] must be willing to gamble on business opportunities. He’s looking for a payoff, and he’ll not put his time and money in government savings bonds or blue chip firms but on the uncertainty whose value can’t be measured before the wheel is spun. He’s the producer who creates something that beforehand, consumers never knew that they wanted. And that’s the story of the new, high-tech economy that gave us things we didn’t know we couldn’t do without.”
He cites in support a comment by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “If people did not sometimes do silly things … nothing intelligent would ever get done.” Buckley is fascinated by Wittgenstein and gives an excellent account of his life and personality.
Many economists fail to recognize the importance of uncertainty, but the “Austrian school of economics is built around uncertain outcomes and the need for creative entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs who take a gamble. They may not know how to market their product, how to advertise or ship it; they don’t know who the customers are or where they live; and they don’t know if anyone wants it. But they bring a sense of ‘alertness’ to a business, one that recognizes an unfulfilled and even unrecognized consumer demand. What’s missing from Austrian economics, however is a way to recognize alertness before the fact.” But isn’t the whole Austrian point that this cannot be done?
Bold entrepreneurs resemble original thinkers, who dare to challenge views that the mass media impose on us. “Writers crave attention and get it by attaching themselves to what George Orwell called the smelly little orthodoxies of the day…. And the nonconformists? In America, the great newspapers, the prime networks, apply a filter that excludes their voices, and they’re also silenced by the social media giants. The price of admission is conformity.”
One such nonconformist was Henry Manne, one of the founders of the law and economics movement. This “perspective favored free market rules, and that’s what attracted Manne. He … thought that government planning would lead to economic waste and tyranny. With that in mind and brimming with self-confidence that he was first off the mark with a new discipline, he ventured into corporate law scholarship looking for people to shock. It didn’t take long. Even he was bowled over by the reaction to his Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966) … academics took it for granted that it was shameful and should be illegal. And here was this professor telling us it was a good thing?… A less courageous man might have backed off, but that wasn’t in Manne’s nature.”
Buckley has many illuminating things to say about creativity in the visual arts and literature, and readers will find learned discussions of, among other matters, Gothic architecture, the art criticism of John Ruskin, the works of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, and the style of Walter Pater. (The painter Ford Madox Brown is wrongly called “Ford Maddox Brown.” Brown, by the way, was the grandfather of the writer Ford Madox Ford.)
The author’s philosophical knowledge and acumen are evident in his discussion of weakness of will. “What Socrates was denying was the possibility that we might know what’s good for us but fail to act on it because we’re weak willed.” On the view that Socrates opposed, “We might be problem drinkers, binge eaters, or drug users…. We know we’re choosing badly but lack the strength of will to stop ourselves…. Socrates didn’t agree. People who are weak willed are simply ignorant about their own good, he thought.” (See also the citations of contemporary philosophical literature on the subject, chapter ten, note 8.)
He concludes the discussion by saying: “We don’t have to decide whether Socrates was right. But if he was, and if ignorance about the good is the root of all evil, the remedy is more curiosity. And even if he were wrong, we’d be morally improved with a greater curiosity about where we go wrong.”
Buckley is well aware of the dangers of the wrong sort of curiosity. “Sometimes it’s rational to avert your gaze. There are things we’re not meant to see, such as public executions that are degrading to watch…. There are also the Holy of Holies that are veiled from our eyes and the forbidden games we are not meant to play. Curiosity killed the cat and turned Lot’s wife into a pillar of salt.” It’s surprising that he does not mention St. Augustine’s condemnation of curiosity in the Confessions, though the work is listed in the bibliography. Interested readers should consult the learned discussion of St. Augustine’s views by Hans Blumenberg, in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age.
Buckley has a fine sense of what Unamuno calls the “tragic sense of life,” and he speaks about our need to confront death and the possibility of an afterlife. He also has much to say of great value about Pascal and the Jansenist movement. It is clear that he has sought for what the book of Job calls “the inner deeps.”
Matt Asher is an investor, writer, and host of The Filter podcast. He has a background in journalism and statistics.
Matt Asher: My guest today on The Filter is Jeff Deist. Jeff is president of the Mises Institute, where he serves as a writer, public speaker, and advocate for property, markets, and civil society. He previously worked as a longtime advisor and chief of staff to legendary congressman Ron Paul, for whom he wrote hundreds of articles and speeches. In his years with Dr. Paul, he worked with countless grassroots advocates and organizations dedicated to reducing the size and scope of government. Maybe you could start by telling us a little bit about your work at Mises, in particular what you’re focused on right now.
JEFF DEIST: Like most people we’ve been focused on covid, which came out of left field. From my perspective, on the governmental side, it represents a huge overreaction in terms of tradeoffs and also a huge failure on the part of social scientists, in which I certainly include economists, to show us the unseen behind covid. The tradeoffs are enormous that we’re going to suffer from in terms of economic damage, in terms of psychological damage, mental health, obesity, untreated cancer, all kinds of doctor’s visits, people gaining weight, people becoming despondent, people losing social connections and social ties. That’s the job of a social scientist, to help us see and understand the unseen that’s not necessarily right in front of our eyes, in terms of data. Covid has been a bit of a wake-up call and an indictment of economics somewhat as a profession, because economists have not been on the fore of saying, Hey, hold on a minute, the government policies we’re enacting here, maybe we ought to be thinking about this. Maybe we ought to be looking at history. Maybe we ought to be saying epidemiology and virology are not everything; we also need to understand the social science element of what we’re doing with these lockdowns.
For the last year or so at Mises, we have been very focused on trying to promote the idea of freedom over lockdowns. That is, that the marketplace, that doctors, that individual physicians, that families, that individual and local communities can deal with covid in ways that make sense for them. We don’t need a one-size-fits-all policy for a really crowded urban environment versus a very sparsely populated state, like Wyoming.
As with so many things in our society we seem hell bent on having a really centralized top-down, one-size-fits all policy coming out of Washington, DC. That’s a huge mistake. Ludwig von Mises, our namesake at the Mises Institute, wrote extensively about sovereignty. He wrote about self-determination. He wrote about nation versus state and what liberalism would look like. One of the big elements for him of a truly liberal society—in the Misesian sense, a liberal society is one where people have some sort of say over the rules under which they’re supposed to live, when it comes to the state—is secession and decentralization.
We have this situation in the United States where we’re politically at odds over Trump, over red states versus blue states, over the culture wars, and add a new element to this, covid, which brings up lockdowns versus open. It brings up masks versus no masks, it brings up vaccine versus no vaccine, passports versus no passports. It’s almost uncanny the way our government—I would include our state and media complex—manages to take everything that happens in society and turn it into a divisive wedge issue when, in fact, economics is all about social cooperation and people dealing with one another peacefully. It’s been an instructive year. I think a lot of people saw a side of US society and Canadian society and European society and of places all around the world that they’re not so happy with.
MA: I want to go back to the idea of the focus and the idea that at the beginning of this it was almost as if the only thing one could focus on was covid. That was the most striking thing to me about the early days of the pandemic and of the media about the pandemic, was that there was no other topic, there was no other thing one could think about. It was an astounding narrowing. It was almost as if all of society had been put into a fight-or-flight mode, some kind of really heavily cortisol-injected, adrenalized moment where it was hard to think past days or weeks. Everybody seemed to be intently focused on that one thing. I’d never lived through anything like that, as far as just the intensity and the narrowing of the focus.
JD: Yes, and to say that everything was about life and death, first and foremost, was a wild exaggeration. Now— of course, we do have some benefit of hindsight today, to be fair—we know that maybe 80 percent of people were already immune, had natural immunity from previous cold viruses in their bodies. Among that 20 percent, the people who were greatly at risk were overwhelmingly people over sixty, over seventy, over eighty, and also people with obesity problems. Given that, the idea that this was a life-or-death moment for the United States and we had to shut everything down, that we had to focus solely on supposedly humanitarian or health concerns and forget the rest because of the gravity of the situation, I think was untrue then. It’s certainly untrue now.
But you could understand what’s happening here, which is that we have fallen into the trap of “well, that’s mere economics.” Forget the economy, the economy doesn’t matter if we’re all dead or if we’re all sick. We have to be worried about people’s health first and foremost. What this implies is that you can somehow separate the two. There’s no universe where a poorer society is a healthier society. We know this beyond any shadow of a doubt, that more prosperous societies have better health outcomes in terms of longevity, in terms of disease, in terms of deaths at birth, in terms of quality of life. There’s no question about this. As societies get poorer, their healthcare generally deteriorates as well.
First and foremost, if you want to create a healthier society, locking down the economy strikes me as a bad idea and an exaggeration, to put it mildly. But I think this is really part of the overall project, which is to treat economics as a phony or made-up science, to dismiss economics and to say, Well, you know, there aren’t any real laws of economics. Economies can basically be commanded by legislative fiat. We can just create the outcomes we want. We can do it through monetary policy, through fiscal policy, through regulatory policy. I think this is a gigantic error. I think this is a form of hubris, free lunch-ism, which really defies belief.
And the idea that there’s not economic laws, that we can, for example, raise wages forever, that we can give people a UBI (universal basic income) to sit at home and that incentives won’t matter, they’ll still want to come back to work just as strongly—all these things which we might consider economic theorems or economic laws a lot of people on the left, they just don’t buy it. Now, there’s certainly some bad economics on the right. There’s some terrible economics on the right, but this idea that economics isn’t real, that it’s just this made-up profession that’s mostly designed to provide intellectual cover, a sort of pseudo discipline to excuse property and rich fat cats, like the guy in the Monopoly game. That’s not true. But that perception represents a huge advancement of left ideology.
We’re now in the twenty-first century and unless you’re maybe Bernie or AOC—or even Bono from U2—and say, Well, markets work and we ought to have markets in Africa, because that’ll actually do better in terms of helping African people come up out of poverty and increase their standard of living than charity. So, even a Bono will say that and maybe a Hillary Clinton would say that, maybe a John Podesta would say that, so we think neoliberalism has now triumphed. And that represents some kind of social democracy with a strong social safety net and a lot of antiracism focus, a lot of LGBT focus, a lot of feminism focus, but at least a grudging acceptance of markets and their ability to create prosperity. Maybe their accesses need to be regulated, but for the most part capitalism has won the day and now the Soviet Union is gone, and look at Singapore and Dubai and these kinds of places. Well, fast forward and we find that that’s very much in question. Socialism is a mainstream economic form of thinking on the left today. Socialism has not gone away, and I think the Great Reset talk that has surrounded covid has given the Left an opportunity to really push that narrative.
MA: I think certainly what hasn’t gone away is big government. Conservatives threw in the towel on that maybe twenty to thirty years ago. I remember there was a George Will column during the second Bush era where he tried to reframe big government as strong government, and that was essentially throwing in the towel. I see a thread running through both the Left and the Right, though maybe more so on the left economically, that is, a feeling that tradeoffs don’t exist or don’t matter. That goes for covid especially. The idea of this extraordinary state of an emergency was an exceptional cover to be in a place where you didn’t have to consider tradeoffs. If everything is an emergency, if there’s a speeding car coming at you, then you do anything whatsoever to get out of the way and you don’t worry if it costs you everything you have to get out of the way. There is no tradeoff because, as Cuomo famously said, “The virus is death.” It’s death, right? If that’s what you’re facing, then there are no tradeoffs.
And that kind of thinking was certainly at a high point throughout the covid hysteria, but it’s also somewhat endemic of our time that there is no sense that, say, spending limits matter. There’s no tradeoff in the amount of money we spend. There’s no tradeoff in the number of rules or complexity of government or whatnot. Maybe it’s pushed back, maybe it’s pushed forward a little bit, but when those things are implemented, there is very rarely a discussion of what the downsides are.
You mentioned the minimum wage. I think raise it as high as you want, it does not matter: there’s no tradeoff there, and there’s no need for discussion of it. We have a lot of people who are basically living in a reality in which whatever their goal is, there’s no reason to consider the downsides of trying to obtain that. Partly that may be kind of a rationalization, and partly I don’t think that we’ve been conditioned to think that there are those tradeoffs. In part, the universe hadn’t handed them to us that harshly until covid, in which case the lockdowns had huge, clear tradeoffs, but those were somewhat buried in stimulus and in shock. Do you see that kind of general feeling that we no longer live in a world where people have to worry about tradeoffs?
JD: I think the rise of MMT, modern monetary theory, as a phenomenon, which is gaining traction in left progressive circles is really a symptom of that, this idea that deficits don’t matter, at least they don’t matter much unless and until we’re running huge hyperinflation. The idea that the United States is sovereign, so we can simply print currency and we can finance deficits as far as the eye can see, this is not a crackpot theory in the sense that even people like Paul Krugman will give it grudging respect in the New York Times. Things that seemed crazy maybe five or ten years ago have been brought to the fore.
The idea of tradeoffs, that you could have everyone sit at home, that you could create money either on the fiscal side or on the monetary side, that you could reward people for not working, well that comes with a price, and increasingly a lot of Americans just don’t believe there’s a price. They think economics is something that can be commanded.
And so, we bring up minimum wage, but you could also bring up the capital gains tax hike. Joe Biden is proposing to take long-term capital gains from about 20 percent now to, for people with enough money, up over 40 percent. When you double that, there are tradeoffs, but I think a lot of folks on the left would say, Well what’s the tradeoff? Yeah, the rich guy has to pay more, so he’s unhappy, he has a tradeoff, but the rest of us don’t have any tradeoff whatsoever. We just benefit because government gets more money in its coffers and then they spend that on us, so there’s no tradeoff for me. The only way you could think this is if you have simply given up on the idea that a prosperous society results from production, not consumption, and production is the result of profit, capital savings, and capital accumulation poured into more productive mechanisms within the economy. Everyone used to understand this simple fact, but if you don’t believe that, if you don’t believe that capital accumulation is required and capital investment is required to drive a healthy economy, if you simply reject that (almost as a political matter, but also I would say as a matter of faith. That’s a faith-based belief), then you don’t see a tradeoff in doubling the capital gains tax rate.
At some point you have to say, What’s the answer to dealing with people who believe this sort of thing? Is it to give them another economics treatise? Is it to hand them a nine hundred–page copy of Human Action? Well, certainly some of them, but not very many. We’re in a situation now where the education system and the political system and what I would consider a very complicit media have made people believe things which are crazy and untrue, and that’s where we are. We ought to be honest with ourselves.
MA: We’re ruled by a combination of magical thinking and mob rule at the moment, whether that is literally mobs in the streets or a kind of woke mob online, keyboard warriors. And that kind of mob action is very rarely influenced by logic or reason.
I kept waiting for someone to come along, some charismatic preacher, and see covid as the end of times and drive forward a religious group of separatists who saw this as a signal, one of the horsemen of the apocalypse. And then it very slowly dawned on me over time that what had happened was not a single or multiple little split-off cult or sect, but that mainstream society had turned into covidians, a large number of people in society had created a new religion out of this that was an orthodoxy of medical doctor saints and a clergy. A clerisy and a set of new rules for living—that your face was impure and had to be covered at all times because you were spewing vile, infectious evil spirits out into the world.
The doomsday cult was what happened to mainstream regular society. Everybody was coopted into that and had their brains washed. It was startling to me and it took a long time to realize that, because you always think of extremist movements as being a small fringe that goes off and comes together as a small community and lives elsewhere. But in this case, it was all of us.
JD: By definition, a cult is a movement which cannot be challenged or questioned and so that certainly represents the prolockdown, promask covid side of things and the antilockdown, antimask side of things. That’s true, but when you say that what we might need to right the ship here is some sort of magic, maybe we could rephrase saying it’s going to take rhetoric as opposed to dialectic. I can hear Mises rolling over in his grave because he was somebody who really lamented the end of enlightenment rationalism in the conflagrations of the twentieth century, some of which he lived through.
A lot of people who like to read economics, a lot of people who like to read libertarian theory, a lot of people who like to think about the state and the economy like to think that we can reason our way through things and that there are enough people of goodwill to run things, but boy, this covid year really put the test to that. There’s a lot going on here in terms of herd psychology, in terms of propaganda and influence. Edward Bernays comes to mind. There’s a lot going on which is beyond just economics and which is beyond just public policy. There’s a cultishness to it, there’s a magic, and how you overcome that increasingly is some sort of separation rather than some sort of persuasion, by creating our own clergy and our own cult leaders.
MA: I think that’s right, and that’s one of the things that this magic moment opens up. At a moment when people are starting to think that nothing matters, nothing has consequences, at least in terms of spending money or these other things, you also have the reality that things do matter, that jobs were lost, that people are moving from places that are more locked down to less locked down. I am witness to that. I voted with my feet to get out of Ontario a few months ago and I’m here in Key West right now, in very large part because of the local political situation here, versus up north where I lived very happily for thirteen years and spent money and paid taxes.
The magical thinking that lockdowns don’t matter ends up spilling off some real-world consequences, and one of those is that people are self-segregating. They’re doing it both culturally and ideologically and physically. One of the interesting things you reported on, maybe it was in October, was all of the ways in which there are essentially two Americas. That if you filter election results from 2016 based on particular beliefs, you see that the United States swings all one way or swings all the other, depending upon which fault line of a particular belief people fall on, and sometimes there’s magical thinking on both sides of that.
JD: It’s terrible because the politicization of everything that yields these consistent voting patterns, not just urban versus rural, is really deadly and damaging for our country. It’s predictable, but if you talk to people and they’re honest with you, you’ll find out that their politics really is tribal. In other words, it’s not so much about policy and it’s not even so much about my guy or gal. It’s more that I’m not the other guy.
People don’t vote for people who hate their guts as a general rule, and a lot of people rightfully thought Hillary Clinton held them in contempt. And there was a progressive, a deterministic arc to history. Hillary Clinton was destined to be president, she was going to be the first female president of the United States, and all of this was almost set in stone. And it turns out there were more deplorables than they thought, and they voted in greater numbers than they imagined in 2016 and shocked the progressive world, which had been ready to anoint and coronate Hillary Clinton. There’s a lot of resentment and anger and hostility over that still, which takes the form of vengeance, which takes the form of retribution, which are both related to this idea of magic. They don’t operate purely in the rational realm. These are emotional constructs, emotional impulses that people have and there was the desire to hurt people.
That’s really what politics is at the end of the day, it’s a lesser form of warfare. It’s a lesser form of violence in the sense that you want to vanquish people. It’s a zero-sum game. You get Hillary Clinton or you get Donald Trump, and either way, there’s an enormous percentage of the population, maybe 40 percent, who feels they’re living in occupied territory, as silly as that might be. Presidents don’t really matter that much and they don’t have that much influence over our daily life (they have some, certainly). So, this division and the idea of magical thinking, I think are heavily related.
But rather than trying to conquer the political world, we have to look at the cracks, where entrepreneurship and economics flourish, and say what can we do personally, individually, to make a world that is more rational, a world that is more based on voluntary choice and that’s not the political world? It just isn’t. Should I spend all of my time trying to get a certain person elected president in 2024? That seems like a mugs game, because this magical thinking, this inability to conceptualize tradeoffs, this inability to apply reason to the political process, is not something you can just overcome. This takes decades and maybe centuries, and I’m not sure we have decades or centuries in terms of our entitlement problems, our dollar problems.
Like a lot of people, we have to pivot and say given the circumstances, what’s the job of the Mises Institute? What are we trying to do? What are we trying to do everyday when we wake up and what are we trying to do also as individuals in our own lives? You took affirmative steps to change your own personal situation when covid hit, and I think that’s really the kernel. That’s where everything starts.
MA: I think that forces have been set in motion which are going to make some things inevitable. Magical thinking or no, there are realities. There are realities to what happens if you print endless amounts of money. There are realities when the response to the pandemic is essentially to consolidate wealth and power in the hands of the professional managerial class that probably, if you were doing one of those fault-line divides, would have voted for Hillary Clinton at a 90 percent rate.
Those particular journalists, government workers, higher-echelon businesspeople, Amazon-style, Silicon Valley folks, and academia certainly—the people who didn’t lose their jobs with the imposition of lockdown policies—they won, they vanquished, they consolidated power, they got much more wealthy. The covid was magical for them, as a group. Now, this is not to say that individual people in that group would have wanted a pandemic. This is not the allegation here, but the measures that were taken, the consequences of those, and this is certainly not an accident, were highly favorable toward the professional managerial class and very unfavorable toward pretty much everybody else. And those consequences are being felt now. They’re being felt with me moving. They’re being felt with also a sense that if a nation is a shared destiny, we’re not a nation anymore, are we?
JD: No. We certainly aren’t. I hadn’t thought of it the way you just crystalized it, that the managerial class was the big winner here. And when we’re talking about this class, this could just mean somebody who makes $40,000 a year but they work at Fox. It doesn’t necessarily mean you’re Jeff Bezos when we talk about elites in society. But, when you say with this magical thinking that we can get by without any particular harm or pain economically—especially for managerial people that’s been somewhat true. Even schoolteachers basically have gotten a paycheck, and all the way up.
You said lockdowns have been a big “screw you” to working-class and less affluent folks, and that’s so true because they’re the ones home without a paycheck, maybe hourly workers, maybe Hispanic immigrants who build houses and do things where they can’t work from home. Not everybody’s a digerati looking at a screen all day and doing Zoom calls. A lot of people work with their hands, a lot of people work in hotels and restaurants and tourism down here in Florida and a lot of people pull fish out of the water so that you can have what you want at Publix.
There’s a huge class of society that has suffered and what we’re starting to see now are the unbelievable supply chain disruptions. You have lumber trickling, which is going to hugely add to the cost of new housing, which is going to artificially increase the cost of existing housing, which we’ve seen all over the country. There’s an absolute housing mania, which is starting to rival anything we saw in the ’05 to ’07 timeframe when things got really crazy and cab drivers and strippers in Las Vegas were flipping condos. It feels like we’re entering into something like that again with ultralow interest rates. And so, covid hasn’t been bad for everyone. It hasn’t been bad for Walmart or Target or Amazon or the Washington Post.
As you said, I don’t think that the technocratic people in the society wish harm on people in the form of a virus. I don’t think this is some sort of bioweapon that anybody really foresaw. This is just a very manageable virus with a really relatively small infection death rate and a really pretty small vulnerable population, which we could have dealt with by simply managing the risk among that vulnerable population. The rest of us could have pretty much gone on with life unabated, maybe wash your hands a little more, maybe wear a mask if you’re going in to visit grandma at the nursing home. You know, really simple stuff, would have sufficed.
The idea that we shut down the world—we’ve never had this before. We’ve had shutdowns over pandemics in localized or regionalized times, but people went to work in London during the Blitz. People went to work during every plague, during the Spanish flu, during world wars. I have to think that this was fueled at least in part, by an underlying desire to create the Great Reset, which we’ve now heard, I’ll be snarky, the Davos crowd speaking about it pretty openly.
Not only the Great Reset, which obviously frightens me and concerns me, but I think a part of this was just, We’ll shut down the world to get Trump. And it worked, in part. They got Trump. I don’t think that was the only reason. Covid is real. Covid has lethal effects for some people, but the reaction to it would not have been the same were Hillary Clinton president when it came along. There’s no question that this would have been treated very differently as a media story if she had taken the exact same steps as Donald Trump did, to shut off international flights, vaccines, whatever he did. She would have been praised to the highest halls, as a competent leader who is soberly looking at covid. Let’s not forget that “get Trump” was part of the impetus behind all of this.
MA: It certainly played a role, and maybe a significant role, though a lot of other countries found their own reasons to partake, excitedly, in the lockdown measures. Governments like power. They like having more power and that might have been driven in the US by the “get Trump” kind of affiliation in the sense that it was helpful, but then in other parts of the world there’s just perhaps a useful reason for people in power to have more of it, which they generally always tend to like. One of the things that you mentioned about the strippers flipping houses has me thinking that one of the marks of a magical era is that it’s co-optive and that even people who wouldn’t necessarily be prone to magical thinking are drawn into it because at an individual level it’s in your own best interest to be irrational along with the crowd. You might as well, right? What is the old saying—“markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent,” right?
In situations like that, where everybody is thinking magically, your best rational choice may be to go along with that. Your best choice may be to quit that stripping job and go flip houses. That’s what society is saying with economic incentives. You’ve done some work on the ways in which economic structures and the economic incentives that we’ve created have broken the link between underlying value and useful work.
JD: Yes, it’s an incredible story and an untold story, in terms of journalism or social science, of what monetary policy has done to shift the sands underneath our feet so we don’t really know what we’re standing on. We don’t really know what the foundation consists of. We don’t really know the actual proper price or value of anything in society. In my opinion, it’s the result of what the Fed has done.
That’s a little bit complicated, there’s some layers to that. It’s not necessarily the easiest thing to explain in sound bites. It’s certainly not something I understand fully, and I would argue that actual PhD monetary economists don’t understand it fully. What really helped me was reading The Great Deformation by David Stockman, which is a brilliant book. One of the things he points out is that the federal funds rate that used to be—before they were flush with reserves from quantitative easing after the crash of ’07— the overnight rate at which banks lent money to each other to cover their capital requirements and their reserve requirements. Now they don’t really have to do that, and the federal funds rate kept going down and down and down and, effectively, at some point the Fed started paying them interest on those excess reserves they held. It was a quarter point, and at some point, banks said well, it’s just better to keep our reserves parked, because we’re actually getting paid interest. And so, this idea of banks lending and borrowing from each other became less important.
But Stockman’s point is that there’s a price, a cost of money, which is certainly linked to the federal funds rate in the United States, which is not set by the Fed, but it’s targeted. (They use the term “targeted,” because they can’t control it one to one.) Basically, you take that number (which is now effectively negative, when you think of real terms in inflation) and you, say, add a couple points to that and that’s the prime rate at which borrowers borrow from each other. Add a couple more points and that’s where subprime borrowers would be. This signal of a really low interest rate just cascades throughout society in so many ways.
We don’t know how much value this stripper created by flipping those houses, because the numbers are funny. And in a way—let’s just say the stripper’s a she, I guess there’s male strippers—she was acting rationally, given the signals, the magical signals that the Fed was sending out. At some point that filtered down to her local bank, let’s say, in Las Vegas, and in many ways, she was acting perfectly rational, given the signals and the ability to borrow without a lot of documentation, without a lot of income verification.
While the system underneath might be irrational, she was acting rationally and we see this throughout society now. We have, especially since ’07–’08, but with covid in 2020, we have so much new money and credit creation, both on the fiscal side, directly giving people money and giving industries money. Most of the money went to industries, you know, the CARES Act and all those trillions of dollars. Let’s not forget that most of that went to private industry, not to individuals getting their $1,200 bucks or whatever they got. When you create a lot of new money and credit, both on the monetary and fiscal side, it’s like squeezing a balloon, where does it all go? Well, after ’07 and ’08, a lot of it just sort of stayed parked in bank reserves and we didn’t see a lot of consumer inflation. And looking back, that makes more sense that it didn’t all pour into the general economy, but at the time, it wasn’t so clear what was going to happen with that.
Austrians have been criticized a lot for saying that that would create hyperinflation and it didn’t, but it did create a drastic form of inflation in certain asset classes, in equities, in housing, in places like Key West, Florida, and in Manhattan and in San Francisco and in Toronto and in Vancouver. A lot of money flowed into things other than just consumer goods. And there’s a supply and demand element to that, of course, but this idea that inflation didn’t happen isn’t true. When we have funny money at the bottom of it, in other words, money that’s not provided by the market, as Hayek called for, and an interest rate, the cost of money, which is not provided by the market, it becomes very hard for us to understand what things cost, what is its value or what is it worth.
For example, so much money went into stocks. So, stock prices went up and up and up and up, but does that mean that the underlying company, let’s say it’s Amazon, or look at the FAANG stocks, were they really getting that much better? They weren’t necessarily getting more profitable. They weren’t necessarily paying dividends. They weren’t necessarily entering new markets. They weren’t necessarily radically increasing their top-line growth. In other words, what was it that caused their stocks to go up? Well, to an extent, it was funny money at the bottom. And so, when that funny money flows throughout the culture, when it goes into venture capital, when it goes into private equity, when it goes into hedge funds, a lot of stuff begins to look good on paper. We call this malinvestment in the economics world.
Maybe some brilliant young kid in Silicon Valley comes up with a widget or an app and he builds a company; it’s just seven or eight guys, it’s kind of like a Minecraft story, and five years later, they sell that app to some big company or some big private equity firm for $50 million. You look at this young guy and you say wow, the company you started is worth $50 million, so you’ve created $50 million worth of value for society, at least as judged by the buyer of your company. Well, maybe, but in a world of rational money and rational interest rates, which I would define as market driven, maybe he would have only sold it for $20 million. It’s very hard to understand what anything costs and what anything’s worth when we have the basis of money itself being commanded and controlled by what we might call a politburo of monetary central planners.
Half of every transaction is in no way, shape, or form free market. You go buy a Honda Accord. Yes, that car has been through a lot of regulatory and safety stuff, Honda’s paid taxes, Honda’s had to pay a certain minimum wage and had to have certain workplace safety. There’s a government overlay to what Honda does to produce a Honda Accord. But we can view that as a market good, in large part. But what’s a Honda Accord, $38,000, something like that? The money you’re giving the good folks at Honda in exchange for that is in no way, shape, or form a market phenomenon. So, what’s Honda getting? Well, in my opinion, at least in 2021, they’re getting a rapidly depreciating $38,000 and they better do something with it quick. And let’s imagine that Honda’s smart enough to bake in a little bit of a premium for that risk and uncertainty on the currency they’re getting. Can’t know that, but I assume that.
It’s a really screwy situation when you think of it in those terms, that half of every transaction, the money that you, or at least an American, are giving for the good or service on the other side, you can examine the quality of that good or service, but where is the examination of the quality of the money being exchanged? Pretty amazing to think about.
MA: It’s really interesting how much we’re playing around with money as if it’s a toy or a fake now. I see that a lot. There is the story that you told about the effects of low interest rates and the Fed’s manipulations on the market in the way that people react and the diminution of the dollar as a reliable signal, of cost as a reliable signal. There’s also a story that has to do with technology, in that technology allows things to scale very quickly, very rapidly to go global. It makes a lot of marketplaces global that were not previously global, which creates more winner-take-all dynamics, which creates a much more skewed distribution.
We’ve gone from a world where a local musician, they’re there, they may not be getting a lot of money, but they’re getting some money, to a world where I can pull up on my computer right now any song by anybody that’s ever been digitally encoded, which is to say, just about anything of the last fifty years of note. And in that kind of a world, you get a handful of players who are going to do exceptionally well, that’s true in the area of music and then that’s true in the area of any kind of a tech company. Software scales exceptionally well.
You get a situation where all of the factors that you described are in play and then you also have in play a kind of easy money, fast money, an era in which some people are accumulating large sums of money extremely quickly and everybody sees that. Everybody sees a small group of folks who are able to roll the dice, win, and walk away with an extraordinary amount of money. You throw that all together and you get a culture where people start to not treat money as a serious thing. You get phenomena like the GameStop gambling, which was essentially an attempt by a group of people to collude and drive up the price of a stock in order to stick it to a particular hedge fund, I think, and also make money for themselves. But they were doing it very much in a spirit that “we’re gambling with our money,” but that’s just what’s happening right now. Everybody is gambling with their money.
I have a little bit of money in the bank. I feel like having that in the bank is gambling right now. You know, I’ve always known that inflation is kind of a slow, creeping thing, or understood that, but now, having money in the bank feels like gambling. I feel like maybe I should take my $2K out and go spend it on something tangible, maybe I should be gambling on GameStop, that’s where people are getting rich, or starting a start-up—do something that has some lottery ticket–like aspect to it because that’s where the excitement is, that’s where the fun is, that’s where the incentives are pushing people. It’s very easy to get caught up in that kind of magical thinking about what one should do with one’s money or, conversely, to start to feel like if you don’t do something extreme with it that you’re just going to lose it—you’re going to lose ground very quickly just by standing in place or being conservative with it.
JD: We’ve seen huge price increases in just the last months, at the grocery store, at the gas pump. These things are going to be visible, and they may affect Joe Biden, because those are the two things, gas and groceries, that most people see in their day-to-day life, and there’s a million other things. And I agree, money has gotten to be something that we don’t really understand. It’s almost like a form of power or electricity, you get so much of it.
I don’t know that I have a good answer to this concept of tech scaling, because in many ways, we benefit from tech scaling. It makes things, like you mentioned digital music, available. You can go listen to just about any song ever, whereas when I was a kid, you had to go to the record store and find the vinyl, so it was more difficult. But for Honda to get yet another Honda Accord in physical form to your local dealer might require many thousands of people, many tens of thousands of materials, and a lot of logistics, whereas seven or eight guys could necessarily build Minecraft and then each additional unit of Minecraft sold is just a tiny bit of data somewhere and there’s huge scale. And so, young people growing up today say, Well, gee, I should be doing this for work, not this old fuddy-duddy tangible world.
I guess maybe I’m showing my stripes. I’m not a techie libertarian in the sense that I just absolutely cheer this stuff unequivocally. I think that there’s a social and a moral component to it. I don’t think wealth inequality is quite the problem the Left makes it out to be. When you mention how rich people can get rich so fast, what does that really mean? There’s sort of a diminishing marginal utility to those extra billions or hundreds of millions or whatever it might be.
I do think it’s true that today your day-to-day life is far more like Bill Gates’s than unlike, and two to three hundred years ago, your day-to-day life would be very, very, very unlike one of the richest people on earth in terms of just a physical and material reality surrounding you. You’d probably be working outside with your hands, a rough life, a short lifespan, that sort of thing, whereas Bill Gates gets up in the morning in a house. OK, maybe it’s bigger and nicer than yours. Maybe he gets in a car, maybe he’s got a fancy car. He drives somewhere, maybe he stays at home. Maybe he looks at a computer screen all day, a lot of us look at a computer screen all day. He’s got some food in the fridge, maybe it’s a fancier fridge with fancier food, but calories, really, historically, are pretty cheap. They’re going up lately, but up until a year or two or so ago, calories have never been cheaper relative to wages, I think, in human history.
And so, it’s not a robber baron situation. It’s just a situation where the scaling you mentioned has dovetailed with what I consider just absolutely crazy monetary policy, which is an enormous driver of wealth and income inequality, which the Left never talks about, by the way. And it all comes together in ways that can be unpredictable. It’s hard to say the way that this filters throughout society, including culturally. Guido Hülsmann, the German economist, has written about the cultural consequences of fiat money. They make us have higher time preference. We want stuff now.
You say everybody feels like they have to chase something. Well, that includes little old ladies, who used to just say, Well, I have enough money I think to last me the rest of my life. I’m in my 80s, maybe I’ll live another five or ten years, and I don’t want to risk it in the stock market. I want to just have a really safe account and maybe get 5, 6, or 7 percent interest. Well, not only can you not do that today in simple investments, you’re probably losing 2, 3, 4 percent in real terms to inflation. So, that means little old ladies go out and get investment advisors and they go buy Tesla, go buy bitcoin, whatever it might be. And that, to me, is a real tragedy. It’s a tragedy for savers, it’s a tragedy for blue-collar, working-class people who are maybe less sophisticated in the investment world. That’s no knock on them. When someone works hard physically, cleaning hotel rooms or something, fourteen hours a day, they may not just want to come home and spend their evening in their E*TRADE account reading company prospectives.
This idea that we all have to be financially savvy and keep up or we’re going to lose money, that we can’t have a simple safe savings vehicle, is really harmful for society. And how can we ever measure or quantify it? How many people bought a BMW instead of a Taurus, just little things like that, because of interest rates, because credit was so widely available? How many people went on European vacations instead of just driving to Disney? It’s hard to say all the different ways in which fiat money affects us culturally.
MA: That’s the key word. Culture is the key to all this. Culture is the big thing that people are not appreciating. I haven’t spent as much time thinking about culture as I should have until the covid era, really. And it has me now very much rethinking the importance I put on economics versus culture as we’re splitting up and voting with our feet and becoming two different or multiple different nations. The most important question may not be even policy per se, although those are still important at the local level, but maybe they come from culture more than they are driven by it and that is the important thing.
In fact, as I think about the forces that we talked about, the government forces in terms of money, but even more so just the natural force of technology in terms of driving extremism (and by that, I don’t mean ideological extremism, I mean extremism of outcomes and extremism of ways of life and concentrations of wealth in the context of a government that’s willing to be bribed, which is to say every government in history, concentrations of power that necessarily follow from those concentrations of wealth). Maybe what we need to be talking more about is the particular local cultures that we want to live in as we self-segregate. And also whether we might want to look at the value in systems like the Amish have, where your culture has built-in self-limitations to your aspirations, which is in some ways kind of a hard thing for me to say and would have been stunning words to my ears years ago. Our way forward collectively may be in cultures that decide that we don’t want every technology all the time, that maybe we want to be more deliberate about that. Maybe we want cultures in which we decide we should think about this whole Facebook thing and what it’s doing to us.
I, like probably almost every American, feel addicted, to some extent, to my phone and I’m trying to cull that. It’s hard, as an individual person, to do that. If I could choose to live in a culture that had decided that we’re not doing Facebook, we’re not doing Twitter, we’re not doing any of those things, that’d be an okay tradeoff. I can deal with getting my news once a day on paper. I can live in that kind of a world, but it’s very hard for me to live in that kind of world alone. It has to be part of a culture around me and there has to be consensus about that. There has to be a community around that. I think that that’s true about technology and being more deliberate about how we choose it. It’s true about other things.
I see a movement among people who have been part of the tech industry, which includes myself, to be very careful about what we let into our own lives in terms of technology and also in terms of how we see our own kids using technology. I imagine, as a father, you have your own thoughts about whether it’s great that your child has a cell phone. You see that and as someone who’s familiar with that world, maybe even more so someone who’s familiar with the world of tech, you think maybe this isn’t a good idea, maybe we should be striving for cultures that aren’t endlessly embracing of this.
JD: It’s a tough question, because culture’s far broader than economics. Earlier we mentioned mere economics. I think economics is very important. Economics influences culture and it has an important role to play in culture, but culture’s broader and wider, when you think about it. Hoppe has spoken a lot about the way government has degraded culture in many ways. So, when we say that we’re so addicted to Twitter and Facebook and to our smartphones and that we sometimes wish maybe it weren’t this way, well, we’re not just swimming in a pond of free market ingenuity.
There’s a government overlay to the media around us and what we consume. These companies just didn’t arise from the ether. We have to understand that first and foremost, but it certainly caused me to have to challenge some of my own anarchist orthodoxies. The idea that private corporations can do whatever they want. My view today versus, let’s say, ten years ago, has changed. I increasingly view those corporations as part of a government-technology nexus, a complex.
And I do worry about my kids. I think social media for the most part’s a disaster, because it trains us to think in these quick, flickering sound bites, to let our hindbrain pull up our emotive response to that. And in many ways, rather than giving us lots of new information to consider and to become more thoughtful people, it’s probably making us just dig in more to our existing worldview, because now we can curate exactly what we see and don’t see. We can live in an echo chamber and hear things all day long that comport with our particular perspective, and then we can sit there and attack or lament or laugh at the other perspectives.
Far from creating understanding among people, social media is serving to divide us further. A lot of people would agree with that. Then, the follow up question would be, Come on, Jeff, you’re this free market fundamentalist and that’s what these companies have done, there’s profit in that, there’s money to be made in that, so where’s your free market critique of what they’re doing? The answer to that is that we have to understand value more broadly. I mean there’s culture, there’s our kids’ well-being, there’s all kinds of things we value or at least ought to value more than just pecuniary or economic benefits to things.
If you said to one of us here, that rather than do what you do currently for a living, you could go to Miami and sell crack cocaine and quadruple your income, I wouldn’t do that, you wouldn’t do that. I don’t want to have people ruin their lives using drugs, and a lot of people are going to do that, but they don’t need me to help them with it. We all understand implicitly that money isn’t everything, that there are tradeoffs but those tradeoffs are not just in the purely economic realm. They’re in the ethical and moral and even spiritual realm for a lot of people. This has been an awakening. Seeing the tech world become what it’s become, that’s been a real eye-opener. I think it forces us to go back to fundamentals, to go back to Menger, for example, Carl Menger, the progenitor of the Austrian school in the late 1800s and say what’s value and how do we define it? And it’s not always just dollars and cents.
MA: For sure, it isn’t, and economics has recognized this for a long time. The concept of utility is not necessarily the same as money. It allows for us to put our value in a wide range of things, whether those particular models that are used are valuable or not. There has mostly been the recognition that it isn’t all about money, or money is not as simple as ten is half as much as twenty and twice as much as half, from the perspective of value to an individual person—and the same with any object—that it’s more complicated than that, certainly. And culturally we get to decide where we place those values and what we want to do about that; what do we want to value?
Certainly, in terms of what you’re saying about the tech companies and “oh, it’s a private company,” I think it should be clear at this stage we’re well beyond that. We’re in waters that are so sufficiently muddied and companies that are so sufficiently bullied or captured by governments, or vice versa, governments that are bullied or captured by private corporations, that we’re at a place where a certain number of free market arguments break down, not because they were unsound in theory or would be unsound in a particular kind of world, but because they just make no sense in a world in which private enterprise is the right arm of the government and vice versa.
In that kind of a world, talking about how you’re doing value creation, or it’s not censorship because it’s a private company, none of those things make sense. Or economic theories of this being value creation because it’s driven forward by the demand of consumers in a free market, that has something to do with it, but increasingly the dominant factor there is the strong arm of either a corporation working with the government or vice versa. When those models have broken down because we’re in that kind of a world, then what’s your next move?
My opinion is then you have to go back to culture. Well, for one thing, maybe you have to disentangle forcefully … I don’t have any faith in the government’s actions breaking up. I don’t think that that’s necessarily viable, but then, it does get you to the question of: Okay, you’re now in this place where you have these two things tied at the hip. It’s causing a lot of problems. You have cultures that are destructive that probably would have arisen even without the two hand in hand, like the increasing arms race or the addictiveness of our technology and phones. What’s the next move? Is it purely cultural? Do you demand that you’re going to try to get back to more of a free marketplace? Through what? It’s not clear to me. Maybe you have some thoughts.
JD: I guess the overriding question is, Is there some sort of new technology, is there some new driver in society, which forces us to change economic principles? That’s a harsh question and a hard question. But I think the answer to that is no. The principles we apply to subjective value, and to value more generally, still apply.
But we have to look at these tech companies as sort of a new animal, something we haven’t dealt with before, and as a result, we have to rethink how we approach them from a market perspective. I’m not sure that I’ve figured out the answer to that, but I think that the Rothbardian conception of harm in society, whether that’s trespass or aggression against a person’s physical person or a theft of their physical property—in other words, this entire conception of harm, which Rothbard wrote about in his book The Ethics of Liberty—is completely based in a physical world, not in a digital space.
In other words, what kind of harm ought to give rise to legal liability, a way to rein in some of these tech companies for what I consider actual real harms that they’re creating in society, and how might we go about rectifying that within some sort of libertarian worldview? I think it starts with defining Rothbardian aggression a little more broadly and taking it into the digital world.
When we read Rothbard’s Ethics of Liberty on the concept of defamation, for example—which Walter Block, professor at Loyola in New Orleans, has expanded upon— the idea is that you don’t own other people’s thoughts and opinions and feelings about you, so if somebody utters a defamatory statement about you, you ought not to have any legal recourse to sue them civilly. In a libertarian legal code, you can only sue people for injuries, actual physical injuries, for the most part, against your own property, and what we’re talking about in a defamation suit is not your own property. That’s been sort of the plumb line, hardcore libertarian view for a long time.
Now, when you introduce defamation into the digital sphere of Twitter, let’s say somebody on Twitter says a famous author is a pedophile and can prove it, and has evidence of this. Well, let’s just say that that’s completely outrageous and completely untrue, as a purely factual matter. And let’s just say hypothetically that as a result of this defamation, this person was to lose his job, his position, lose his book publishing, lose his reputation, his family disowns him, he can’t make any more money. There is a real harm there, and both in the Rothbardian and even in today’s Walter Block conception of that, well, too bad for the guy. He just has to live with it because even if this statement is false, he didn’t own, he didn’t have a right in any libertarian sense of the word, from homesteading or contractual right, to the future goodwill of all those people who bought his books and employed him and maybe even his own wife and kids.
It strikes me that, at some point, we need to rethink that from a common law perspective. In other words, I think common law ought to be very localized and it ought to be very temporally applicable. I’ve mentioned this in an article recently, stealing a man’s horse a couple hundred years ago is different than stealing a man’s horse today, because a couple hundred years ago he may have been in the desert, that may be his only transportation, and stealing his horse may have consigned him to a death by dehydration in the Old West desert. Whereas today, if you steal a guy’s horse, you’re probably not consigning him to death, right? So, local custom, local rule of law, local common law can evolve, local juries can evolve and find a remedy for that, which would be different in Tombstone, Arizona, a couple hundred years ago than Key West today.
I think we have to allow some degree of common law to operate in the realm of reigning in tech companies, because what I don’t want to see is a heavy-handed, top-down federal bureaucracy, which we know is, first of all, going to be captured by the very interest it attempts to regulate and, second of all, is going to have a million unforeseen consequences for good and bad. And I would argue that the famous section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has had consequences both good and bad. I don’t want to see things done in a centralized or bureaucratic manner. I want to see them in a dispersed, localized manner. So, in an imperfect world, that’s my imperfect answer to how you begin to approach this tech issue.
MA: It occurs to me that maybe the solution is there, or if not directly in the local, at least in terms of in the alternative. So, the solution isn’t to break up Facebook or heavily regulate Facebook or Twitter. I think those are doomed to fail as measures anyway for the reasons that you provided. Maybe it’s alternative structures, alternative platforms. Maybe it’s voting with your feet and getting out of those platforms and into others. Now that’s a very hard thing to do because Google is omnipresent.
One of the ideas I’ve floated is that it actually should be illegal for the government to be using social media platforms that censor because they’re putting out information and they’re not putting it out in a medium where everybody can access it. They’re putting it out in a medium that discriminates, ideologically or on other things. Certainly, getting government out of the business of supporting, in any way, shape, or form, these platforms would be great.
JD: I really like your idea of a law prohibiting the federal government from using platforms which discriminate, and I think that’s fantastic. If you’re going to put out a federal government press release about covid, for example, and you’re going to do so via Twitter, well, some people are kicked off Twitter, and so that seems like an excellent idea.
But more importantly, the thing to remember about companies like Twitter and Facebook, for example, is that as dominant as they seem today … you can go back and look at the Fortune 500 list of biggest companies in America, you can go back five years, go back ten years, go back thirty years. You had IBM and companies like that, so it really does change. The market deals with this in large part.
MA: I see what you’re saying. At the same time, I no longer see them as market. Their dynamics are well beyond the market, they’re quasi-governmental. And so, changing out of Facebook is almost like a regime change. Those things happen, but they’re a lot harder than dethroning IBM.
You saw what happened to Parler, right? Parler was a kind of alternative to Twitter. They gained a lot of traction among Trump supporters who were being kicked off Twitter, and then that platform was promptly kicked off Amazon, which hosted it, and also kicked out of the Apple Store. I think it’s coming back, but in probably a captured way where it’s denatured, spayed. So, that idea that an upstart can come about, in the context we have now of these companies being quasi-governmental and controlling the platform and the infrastructure, it’s trickier.
JD: And it can go a lot farther than social media being able to spout your opinions on Twitter. It can go to banking or having companies like gun manufacturers being kicked out of using Visa or Mastercard. We have certain big banks refusing to hold cash; and people who do a lot of bitcoin transactions, people who are maybe in certain industries, getting a letter saying, we’re going to give you a check for all of your funds; you’re no longer allowed to bank with us; APIs and payment gateways like PayPal being denied to some people. We’re starting to hear ideas of no-fly lists, ostensibly by private airlines. Now, if you want to talk about a govermentality, airlines are so heavily regulated they might as well be divisions of the Department of Transportation or the FAA. It’s not just the ability to talk about vaccines on Facebook. You’re getting into an area where people are really going to be constrained in their personal lives and how they can operate and make a living, and this is something where we need to be rethinking our approach, because it’s scary times.
MA: This brings us back to the idea that if we’re going to find an out from that sort of a system, it’s going to have to begin at the local and the cultural level, where we’re opting out, we’re voting with our feet. We are finding alternative structures, alternative platforms, alternative places to be and rebuilding, perhaps, from the ground up all of these pieces in our own, perhaps individual city-states.
JD: Amen to that.
In response to a listener request, Bob continues a 3-part series explaining areas where his views have changed. In this episode, he covers government debt and future generations, accuracy in polemical writing, the Fed being a private corporation, whether nice guys finish last, and mainstream utility theory.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Bob’s “The Economist Zone” article with links to the original contributions to the Great Debt Debate. Bob’s Mises University lecture on the topicBob’s link for Tom Woods’ Liberty Classroom (which features a lecture on government debt burdens)Bob’s FEE article on the origin of public schoolsBob’s essay on advice for single Christian menBryan Caplan’s “Why I Am Not an Austrian Economist For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Perhaps reporter Michelle Kosinski is unaware that the Trump-era secrecy she denounced flourished mightily thanks to the beloved Obama administration. Kosinski’s mindset also helps explain why Americans' trust in the media has collapsed.
Original Article: "The Media Wants You to Trust Washington Again Now That Trump Is Gone"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Senator Hawley wants government regulation of social media, and he insists that social media companies are somehow controlling and manipulating people. But Hawley is mistaken. You have free will even when using Facebook.
Original Article: "Social Media's Algorithms Aren't Really Controlling You"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
The ideas of critical race theory and critical white studies shield a ruling elite from vengeance by attempting to make the mass of white people the scapegoat for their own crimes.
Original Article: "Vengeance and Sacrifice: Whiteness as Scapegoat in Critical Race Theory and Critical Whiteness Studies"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Listen to the Audio Mises Wire version of this article.
Senator Josh Hawley’s just-published The Tyranny of Big Tech (Regnery, 2021) raises important issues. Hawley asks, for example, Do Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube censor views that that their managers do not like? It seems clear that the answer is yes. Many people who have tried to post Facebook comments that criticize the “official” line on covid-19 have had their posts removed and have been sentenced to “Facebook Jail.” YouTube removed a popular video by Tom Woods that argues lockdowns and masks are ineffective. What, if anything, should be done about this? Hawley notes also that these media giants often rely on government aid to enhance their power. Hawley embeds his discussion in a larger argument about independence and self-government in the American tradition, which I think is mistaken but nevertheless of considerable interest. I hope to address some of the book’s good points elsewhere. What I’d like to talk about in this week’s article is a common fallacy that Hawley falls into.
He starts from an indisputable fact. People spend a great deal of time on Facebook and YouTube. He adds to this a premise that is more disputable, but one I’m not going to question, namely that people are spending “too much” time on these media. Other uses of their time are “better.” He goes on to suggest that people are addicted to using these media, and this what I’d like to challenge.
“Addiction” suggests that people find it difficult to stop a particular sort of behavior. In some cases, there may be pains from withdrawal, as, for example, habitual smokers who attempt to “kick the habit” report. The addict, it is claimed, doesn’t really have free choice over whether to continue. Maybe in some sense he could quit (and in fact many people do give up smoking), but it takes extraordinary “willpower” to do this.
Hawley applies the addiction model to the media giants in this way. He says that their “algorithms”—a key word in the book—can use the vast amounts of information collected by tracking consumers’ use of the internet to predict what people are likely to purchase. On Facebook, these items will appear on the consumers’ pages, and—sure enough—people buy them. On Google, you will see advertisements based on these algorithms when you type in a search. What better proof of addiction do we need?
Hawley says this:
Google developed a formula, a series of mathematical algorithms, for predicting which consumers would click on which ads, which consumers would make purchases, and what they would buy…. With its massive and ever-growing store of user information, the company could direct tailored ads to individuals that its data machine suggested would have a high probability of leading to a purchase. Which in turn led to a profit.” (p. 65)
This isn’t a case of “addicting America.” Contrary to cases of addiction, there has been no evidence showing that if you don’t buy the products that the algorithms indicate you would, you will experience any untoward effects. You won’t have “withdrawal” symptoms; all that would happen is that the algorithm predicted incorrectly.
But maybe this objection demands too much of Hawley. Even if there is nothing akin to withdrawal symptoms if you don’t buy the products, isn’t it enough for Hawley’s case that something bad is happening that the algorithm has a high rate of predictive success?
No, it isn’t. This response wrongly assumes that a successful prediction about what you will do takes the matter out of your control. If I predicted with very high probability that you would do something and you did it, then how can it be up to you whether you will do it?
We can see that something is wrong with this argument by looking at an example. I predict that when you read this article, you won’t respond by smashing your computer screen, even if you don’t like the article. Does it follow that you had no choice about the matter? If you had intended to smash the screen, would you have found your hand blocked? No—obviously, you didn’t smash the screen, because you didn’t want to. This conjunction can’t be true: I correctly predict that you will smash the screen and you don’t smash the screen. If you smash the screen, then the prediction was true, and if you don’t, then the prediction was false. But it doesn’t follow that if you smashed the screen, you had to smash it, i.e., that the prediction had to turn out true. It’s just that it did turn out true. Hawley is making a big deal about the tautology that a successful prediction isn’t false.
If Hawley has correctly described the algorithms, they enable advertisers to provide you with products that you want. Why is this a problem? Here it is important not to be sidetracked by another issue raised by Hawley, one that has more substance. Do social media have the right to subject users to surveillance, in order to gather the data on which the algorithms are based? Have the consumers consented to this? There is a reasonable case that they haven’t, but this is a different question that leaves untouched the claim that successful predictions about what you will buy take away your freedom.
There is another problem in what Hawley says. He says that “Big Tech’s business model is based principally on data collection and advertising, which means devising ways to manipulate individuals to change their behavior” (p. 5). What actually happens, according to Hawley’s own account, is that the advertisers offer consumers products they have good reason to think they want. This is not “manipulating” people, which suggests that the advertisements induce desires in people that they didn’t already have. To the contrary, the algorithms are based on data about already existing consumer preferences. The algorithms don’t create the data on which they are based. “Change their behavior” is also misleading. If you buy a product, your behavior has changed: you weren’t buying it before you bought it. But just as he did in the prediction case, Hawley has turned a tautology—buying something is a change—into something that sounds sinister. I hope his readers aren’t fooled by his attempt to manipulate them.
Justice is specific, not general. It is individual, not cosmic.
Original Article: "George Floyd and Generalized Justice"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Unfortunately, the corporate press and public health officials have determined that unilateral rule by executive decree, unimpeded by any conception of individual freedom, is necessary to respond to the coronavirus.
Original Article: "Who's to Blame for Normalizing One-Man Rule?"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Politics degrades our lives in innumerable ways, from personal relationships to work to places of worship. Even sports and movies now seem to have become deeply politicized. The political class and political system in America appear intent on creating division and hatred rather than cooperation. The two political tribes in America—red and blue—are divided on everything: abortion, guns, immigration, Trump, and now Covid. Is there any way to reclaim some semblance of a truce between these warring nations?
Our guest Ross Benes has written an engrossing memoir of his experiences in both worlds, from small town life in his ultra-red Nebraska hometown to his writing career in ultra-blue Brooklyn. It's a fascinating look at how and why we have allowed politicians to alienate us, and a hopeful call for a less political America.
Find Rural Rebellion: How Nebraska Became a Republican Stronghold at Mises.org/RuralBook
"Private companies" that openly deplatform, impoverish, and unperson dissident voices are waging a war of attrition
Original Article: "What Clarence Thomas Gets Wrong about Big Tech"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Using a recent Dave Smith interview of Michael Malice as a springboard, Bob elaborates his understanding of anarcho-capitalist principles to the thorny issues of vaccine passports, court rulings, and desegregation of the Old South.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Part of the Problem episode from February 20, 2021, “They Don’t Care About You” featuring Michael MaliceBob’s book The Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism (featuring his analysis of racism in business)Bob Murphy Show ep. 176, “A Framework for Analyzing Big Tech Censorship.”Bob’s essay against mandatory vaccinationsBob’s Mises U talk, “The Market for Security” (explaining private law enforcement)Khan Academy page on the Rosa Parks bus boycottBob’s critique of an AIER article on private mask mandates
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Allen Mendenhall joins the show to expand last week's discussion on the intellectual state of America. Are we living in a decidedly anti-intellectual age, or has America always been predisposed toward doers over thinkers? Have Americans simply stopped reading books? Have we lost our ability to think deeply, due to the constant distractions of the digital age? And what does the shift away from any shared baseline cultural knowledge mean for our future? Don't miss this fascinating but sobering discussion.
Listen to HAPod episode with Dan McCarthy at Mises.org/HAP63
Benjamin Boyce is a writer, interviewer, and filmmaker who rose to fame by relaying his experiences as a student during the infamous Evergreen State protests in 2017. He talks with Bob about the lessons we can learn as the rest of the country follows the same trajectory of identity politics.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interviewBenjamin Boyce’s YouTube channelBenjamin Boyce’s Complete Evergreen Story (chaps. 10 and 15 were specifically mentioned in the interview)Stephen King’s On Writing For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
We're now living in Biden's America. But what does that mean? It means a continuation of trends already in place: the long slow decline of America's institutions, and the public's faith in them.
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop discuss five reasons why Rothbard's work is so memorable. From his fearlessness in the face of opposition, to his commitment to peace and decency, Rothbard provides us with a model of principled scholarship.
Additional Resources "Nations by Consent": Mises.org/RR_54_02
Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, and Other Essays: Mises.org/RR_54_03
"A Strategy for the Right": Mises.org/RR_54_04
A History of Money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II: Mises.org/RR_54_05
An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, Volume 1: Economic Thought Before Adam Smith: Mises.org/RR_54_06
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Tho Bishop and Zachary Yost join Ryan McMaken to discuss covid politics in three states, and whether anyone is paying any attention to social distancing rules anymore.
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Rather than representing “white supremacy,” the evolution of mathematics has been a globe-, race-, and culture-spanning collaboration of advancements, an ongoing development of more effective tools for anyone to use.
Original Article: "Is Math Racist? That Does Not Compute"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
The controversy over Mark Cuban and the national anthem reminds us the NBA and the NFL have spent the last few decades relying on the national anthem as a cynical ploy. Employing "antiracism" and BLM politics was just the natural next step.
Original Article: "The NBA's National Anthem Mandate: Another Political Ploy from Pro Sports"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Jeff Deist and David Gornoski comment on the latest news such as the fiasco that is Trump’s impeachment, the effort to turn Trump voters into deplorable second-class citizens, the establishment’s history of pushing conspiracy theories, DC’s scapegoating of Florida as punishment for making the regime look bad, the future of fiscal conservatism in Florida, soldiers patrolling Washington DC, the normalization of totalitarianism, and more.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
Jeff Deist joins David Gornoski to talk about the GameStop Wall Street Saga. He highlights how the media narrative seeks to manipulate the masses to view Reddit traders as fascistic and Hedge Funds as the victims. Is there really any difference between what the Wall Street elites are doing and what the Reddit traders did? What exactly is Robin Hood? What is Stake Holder theory? Listen to the entire segment to find out and more.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
In a free society, peaceful citizens deserve the legal benefit of the doubt. In an age where government agents have endlessly intruded onto people’s land and into their emails, citizens should not be scourged for transgressing unknown or unmarked federal boundaries.
Original Article: "In a Paranoid Nation, "Treason" Is Everywhere"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
So, you've heard that big tech companies have transcended the niggling free market and reached the lofty heights of partisan politics—and act accordingly. Unlike prominent political figures, you might not make the top of the purge list, but it's no secret that censorship is surging. Both to protect your freedom and to stop providing resources to those who would undermine it, it makes sense to jump ship. Now, when everybody else is also doing it. But how?
Original Article: "How to Join the Alt-Tech Exodus"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Almost immediately after his inauguration, President Joe Biden began creating new government dictates via executive orders. Many of these executive orders concern coronavirus, fulfilling Biden’s promise to make ramping up a coronavirus-inspired attack on liberty a focus of his first one hundred days.
Original Article: "When Fascism Comes, It Will Be Wearing a Mask"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
David Gornoski is joined by Jeff Deist who talks about Biden's slandering of half of America's population and the calls to "deprogram" Trump voters. Are the talking heads on TV demanding a monoculture? What exactly is meant by the terms "Big Lie," "Build Back Better," and "Great Reset?" Is there a coordinated push of these terms? Is there ever a possibility of a principle-driven media in our country? Listen to the show to find out and more.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
To offer a semblance of solidarity with the working class, wealthy leftists have substituted identity politics for class conflict, and attempted to recast economic problems as problems of racism or bigotry.
Original Article: "Understanding Inequality Requires Much More Than Calling Everything Racist"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Democrats and anti-Trump GOP leaders are calling the Capitol riot a "coup" and "treason." This is in part because if Washington politicians can portray the riot as a grave threat, they can use the riot as an excuse to greatly expand federal power.
Additional Reading "There Is No Such Thing as Treason" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_49_01
"The Capitol Riot Wasn’t a Coup. It Wasn't Even Close." by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_49_02
"The Truth about January 6, and Where We Should Go from Here" by Lew Rockwell: Mises.org/RR_49_03
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
The United States has gone through at least six "party systems." Populism, war, or economic crises usually trigger a change from one system to another. Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop host Patrick Newman.
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Jeff Deist, Ryan McMaken, and Tho Bishop discuss Wednesday's takeover of the US capitol building. What are the potential long term effects, and just how much of a double standard does the American media have?
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Mobilization and separation, not persuasion, is the way forward.
Original Article: "2021: Welcome to Post-persuasion America"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
There's no reason to assume 2021 will bring a reversal of 2020's trends. Many of the fights that began in 2020 are likely to intensify in the new year.
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Ideally, political elites would like nothing more than state-sponsored ethnic conflict. Having multiple groups pitted against each other in petty political squabbles makes effective opposition against the managerial class virtually impossible.
Original Article: "California Voters Defeated Affirmative Action and the Left Was Very Surprised"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
The attorneys for Betsy Fresse have filed a lawsuit claiming that Starbucks fired her for not wearing a “Pride” shirt while working at her New Jersey store.
Original Article: "Employment Discrimination at Starbucks Is a Matter for Private Contracts".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
The Boston Tea Party was an opening act in what came to be a violent culture war and war of national liberation. And it helps us understand how America in 2020 could become as bitterly divided as America during the revolution.
Original Article: "The American Revolution Was a Culture War".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Millennial Sam Jacobs went off to college a wealthy but normal young man and came back a socialist. Suddenly his family’s “extreme, plutocratic wealth” became too much of a burden for him.
Original Article: "Rich Millennials Plot the End of Civilization".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Market progress through entrepreneurship and innovation means increased production. In a world of scarcity, that benefits all of us in society. That makes it a positive-sum game.
Original Article: "Why the Marketplace Is Not a Zero-Sum Game".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop debate whether Ebenezer Scrooge's words and actions teach us important economic truths, or if he's just an ignorant crank.
Radio Rothbard is available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, Soundcloud, Stitcher, and via RSS.
Additional Reading "The Case for Ebenezer" by Butler Shaffer: Mises.org/RR_45_01
"Scrooge Defended" by Michael Levin: Mises.org/RR_45_02
"Defending the Miser" by Walter Block: Mises.org/RR_45_03
"Was Scrooge the Victim in A Christmas Carol?" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_45_04
"Correcting Scrooge's Economics" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_45_05
"Ebenezer Scrooge's Tiresome Crusade Against 'Consumerism'" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_45_06
"This Christmas, Let's Celebrate a Different Scrooge: Scrooge McDuck" by Kristoffer Mousten Hansen: Mises.org/RR_45_07
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
The Puzzle of Prison Order: Why Life Behind Bars Varies Around the Worldby David SkarbekNew York: Oxford University Press, 2020240 pp.
Christopher Calton (caltonc@ufl.edu) is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Florida.
In The Puzzle of Prison Order, David Skarbek builds upon his governance theory of prison social order, which posits that in cases in which the official governance institutions are inadequate, prisoners will form their own institutions to secure property rights, facilitate market exchange, adjudicate disputes, and mitigate violence. Skarbek’s work rests at the intersection two interesting subjects of inquiry. Most obviously, he is contributing to the rapidly growing body of literature on carceral systems.“Carceral systems” refers broadly to penitentiaries, asylums, schools for juvenile delinquents, and similar institutions designed for involuntary surveillance and containment. Although The Puzzle of Prison Order is not a work of history, Skarbek answers historian Mary Gibson’s (2011) call for a more global approach to prison studies, which remains predominantly centered on the United States and the West. Skarbek also builds on a less prevalent body of work carried largely by George Mason-trained economists such as Edward Stringham and Peter Leeson: studies of private governance. Like Leeson’s The Invisible Hook (2009), which looks at the social order of pirates, Skarbek studies the people who seem least likely to establish functional systems of governance—criminals—to show how informal governance institutions form and operate.
Although Skarbek leans heavily on his previous work, there is a great deal of new insight even for those who are already familiar with his research. The focus of Skarbek’s analysis centers on the relationship between official and informal institutions—the foundation of his governance theory of prison social order—but the book is organized into two parts that respectively illustrate two newly developed features of his theory. By comparing prison governance across various systems, Skarbek categorizes the governance regimes in his study into four ideal types: official governance, co-governance, self-governance, and minimal governance regimes. These ideal types structure Part I of The Puzzle of Prison Order (chapters 2–4). In Part II (chapters 5–7), he considers the conditions that lead prisoners to develop either centralized or decentralized mechanisms of governance. Skarbek’s previous work on the San Quentin and San Pedro prisons (Skarbek 2010, 2014) involves only regimes that qualify as centralized systems of self-governance, according to his new taxonomy. His new book, therefore, offers a far more dynamic analysis than anything he has previously produced.
Each chapter is designed to highlight a specific element of his classificatory scheme by focusing on a representative example, but the strengths and weaknesses of the book are most embodied in the chapters on Nordic prisons and Civil War prisons, respectively. The Nordic system highlights the importance of comparative analysis by providing a de facto control group—a prison system that is largely successful in providing a high-quality system of official governance. Skarbek’s governance theory posits that prisoners will form their own institutions on the condition of failure from the official system of governance. The Nordic example provides some empirical substantiation of this claim that Skarbek’s previous studies have largely accepted as merely abstractly intuitive. The Nordic prison also challenges Skarbek to explain the lack of an informal market economy—he describes a system of sharing—which leads to new considerations about the conditions upon which market prices develop in a limited underground economy. While the Nordic system provides the most valuable contrast to the other systems Skarbek describes, it underscores the value that the comparative analysis offers across all chapters, in contrast to in-depth but isolated studies.
The chapter on the Confederacy’s Andersonville prison camp during the Civil War highlights the weakest points of The Puzzle of Prison Order. Andersonville is Skarbek’s example of a prison that lacks both official and informal governance institutions, presenting the greatest challenge to the governance theory of prison order. Skarbek acknowledges that “it is actually somewhat surprising that so little governance emerges” in Andersonville, since “the prison camp is full of soldiers, not criminal offenders,” who faced an “utter failure of official governance” (p. 63). He explains away this challenge to his theory by suggesting that “extreme restrictions on their freedom...smother[ed] collective action” (p. 64). Skarbek’s analysis of Andersonville demonstrates a focus on the operative variables of his governance theory to the neglect of other potentially relevant determinants of whether and how prisoners form institutions. These omissions stem largely from the problem of Andersonville being both Skarbek’s only historical and only wartime case. In one odd claim, Skarbek states that the prisoners “made choices—often shortsighted because of the mistaken belief that prisoner exchanges would soon free them” (p. 73), but this “mistaken belief” only relates to what the prisoners viewed as a lengthy incarceration at the time—when penitentiaries were still virtually non-existent and prisoners of war had traditionally, even early in the Civil War, been allowed probationary freedom. Relative to the other prisons in the book, their belief in a short term in prison was not mistaken—Andersonville was only constructed a year before the war’s end. The question Skarbek neglects, in using Andersonville as a comparative example, is how quickly governance institutions developed elsewhere? If the answer is anything longer than one year, Andersonville becomes a moot example for Skarbek’s theory. Additionally, when describing the failures of official governance, Skarbek describes a contaminated creek that flowed through the camp, which “was so filthy... that prisoners would later throw thieves into it as a punishment” (p. 67). Is this not an informal governance mechanism? Skarbek does not appear to recognize it as such, only citing this practice to illustrate the extent of filth the prisoners suffered without (apparently) establishing governance institutions.
The Andersonville chapter also illustrates both the broadest problem and greatest opportunity for his research: the contrast of prisoner governance institutions with those of society outside the prison. Andersonville highlights this oversight because of how many of the problems Skarbek describes in the prison were not unique to prison life, as his exposition implies. By not considering the state of the Confederacy in 1864, Skarbek makes it seem as if the lack of market exchange and the prevalence of raiders, for example, related uniquely to prison camps. In fact, the conditions at Andersonville are arguably more reflective of the broader society at the time than any other prison Skarbek studies. Wartime destruction and Confederate state socialism had destroyed market exchange in the Confederacy well before Andersonville was built, and raiders harassed civilians in much the same way Skarbek describes in the prison. By neglecting to consider the society in which the prison exists, he ignores significant external variables that relate to his analysis.
This neglect of comparison to the wider society immediately outside the prison overhangs all of Skarbek’s research, not merely his analysis of Andersonville. While he rightly highlights the importance of comparative institutional analysis when stating the contributions of The Puzzle of Prison Order, he fails to account for the variety of comparisons relevant to his inquiry. In his first book, The Social Order of the Underworld, Skarbek implicitly compares the institutions of prison governance within a single prison, San Quentin, over time. In his most recent book, he explicitly compares governance institutions across various prisons. What all of his studies lack is any analysis of how the governance institutions that develop within a prison compare in their operations and effect to the governance institutions within the society that contains the prison. With regards to the efficacy of prisoner institutions, this comparison may be the most important. When he qualifies his description of San Pedro’s extensive system of self-governance to acknowledge that extreme cases of violence do occur, the point seems empty without any contrast to the degree of violent crime in Bolivian cities more generally; we cannot judge the efficacy of prisoner self-governance in mitigating violence by comparing it to the violence in other prisons that house prisoners from different cultures. As Skarbek continues his research, this is a consideration he would do well to address.
These critiques notwithstanding, Skarbek continues to produce important and original work that raises questions no other scholar is asking, even as carceral studies receive unprecedented levels of interest across disciplines. Although The Puzzle of Prison Order does not match the quality and depth of analysis of The Social Order of the Underworld (which remains one of the best prison studies I have yet read), Skarbek offers useful insights and expands on his theories. While many scholars have the unfortunate tendency to rehash their early scholarship and offer stagnant contributions to their fields, readers can rest easy that The Puzzle of Prison Order raises new questions, offers novel ideas, and moves Skarbek’s governance theory of prison social order forward in important and innovative ways.
Unless the Left's opponents focus on changing voters' ideological drift to the left, candidates who want to actually win elections will have to keep moving left also.
Original Article: "Why GOP Loyalists and Candidates Keep Moving Left".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
In 1923 Lenin released a propaganda pamphlet titled Down with the Private Kitchen. It explained how private dinners with one's family are reactionary, bourgeois, and generally something requiring total destruction.
Original Article: "Why Commies Hate Your Thanksgiving Dinner".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
The trouble with China’s new five-year plan is that it attempts to solve problems while leaving their underlying structural causes unaddressed. In this it is not unlike the final Soviet five-year plans of the 1980s.
Original Article: "China's New Five-Year Plan Exposes the Wishful Thinking behind Socialist Regimes".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Government planners have embraced a materialistic view of human beings which cheapens the importance of family and social events. These "experts" fail to understand what being human really means.
Original Article: "Lockdowns Destroy What Makes Us Human".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
This victory is not of one candidate or party over another in this race or that, but rather a resounding ideological defeat of one of the most illiberal and menacing forces we face at the moment: technocracy.
Original Article: "Election 2020: Rout of the Technocracy".
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Murray Rothbard was enthusiastic about fighting for laissez-faire and freedom through both scholarship and political activism. He wasn't afraid to push freedom and free markets with everyone he could, including academics, politicians, the media, and the public.
Additional Resources "3 Reasons the Left Keeps Winning" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_41_1
"Why GOP Loyalists and Candidates Keep Moving Left" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_41_2
"Both Theory and Praxis: Rothbard's Plan for Laissez-Faire Activism" by Ryan McMaken: Mises.org/RR_41_3
Be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at Mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Pollsters, many of whom predicted an overwhelming "blue wave," obviously failed miserably as reliable gauges of political sentiment. But prediction markets may offer an alternative.
Original Article: "Down with Political Polling. Up with Prediction Markets."
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
A panel featuring Jeff Deist, Daniel McAdams, and Tom Woods.
Presented at the Symposium with Ron Paul on Saturday, 7 November 2020, in Angleton, Texas.
Whether Trump or not-Trump is finally declared the winner of the 2020 US presidential election, we're in for the battle of our lives. A constellation of state and state-extended apparatuses has openly declared war on liberty—on us. We're all thought criminals now.
Presented at the Symposium with Ron Paul on Saturday, 7 November 2020, in Angleton, Texas.
Silicon Valley and the media are moving even further left. This is what is to be expected when a single ideological group controls educational institutions and major media outlets over a period of several decades.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "How Decades of Media and Faculty Bias Have Pushed America to the Left".
Social media has lied about user privacy and has misled the public about the platforms' status as open forums. But none of this makes these companies monopolies.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "Social Media Companies Aren't the Good Guys. They're Also Not Monopolists.".
In 2020, privilege manifests as political extortion. Push back against these bullies.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The Privilege of Politics".
Jeff Deist joins David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice for a preview of the Trump, Biden debate. On the aborted 60 Minutes Trump interview, Deist says: “Talk to us directly….We don’t need the sham intermediary of CNN or any of these people. That, for me, is what the digital age is all about.” Is Trump the “lesser of two evils”? Deist makes the case that, in terms of centralization, there is almost no difference between Trump and Biden. Join David and Jeff as they reflect on all of this, plus the online mob attack on Chris Pratt, and more.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
The film Black Panther offered an attractive view of an African nation untouched by slavery or colonialism. Unfortunately, the film offers a rather dubious counterfactual.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "The Myth of Wakanda: How Hollywood Distorts the Legacy of Colonialism".
The Stakes: America at the Point of No Returnby Michael AntonRegnery Publishing, 2020441 pages
Michael Anton is best known to the public through his essay “The Flight 93 Election,” published in 2016 under a pseudonym in the Claremont Review of Books. It warned of the dire consequences if Hillary Clinton were elected. Anton, an authority on Machiavelli, was long associated with the so-called West Coast Straussians of the Claremont Institute, and he was personally close to Harry Jaffa. But although Jaffa is not absent from The Stakes, the book’s presiding genius is my old friend Sam Francis. The book is excellent. It is well written, thoughtful, and imaginative. It has much to teach us, and, although I disagree with a number of points in it, I’ll stress the insights.
Before proceeding, I need to allay, at least in part, one source of misgiving. Anton disparages “market fundamentalists,” and some of my readers may for this reason cast the book aside. It would be a mistake to do so. Anton writes, “Even more decisive, though, in turning finance to the left has been the adoption of government-backed central banking and fiat currency, which make private banks effectively appendages of the state. If anyone had any doubt about the truth of that observation before 2008, the TARP bailouts should have put the matter to rest for all time.” Later in the book, he wonders “whether it’s possible to maintain a fiat currency indefinitely with endless money printing and whether said currency can long maintain its global reserve status.” Dr. Ron Paul could not have said it better.
In one of the best sections of the book, Anton sets forward his understanding of the Constitution. He says, “Our founders sought to establish the weakest possible federal government capable of performing its essential functions, for three fundamental and intertwined reasons. First, government is inherently dangerous, so the less power it has, the better. Second, the states—being closer to the people and more responsive to regional differences and needs—are better equipped to handle most matters than a far-off centralized administration. Third, the states were prior to the federal government; the people, through their states, created the latter to serve them, not the other way around.”
Anton continues: “According to the parchment [the Constitution], the federal government is supposed to field and fund an army and navy, protect the borders, make treaties, regulate foreign trade and interstate commerce, maintain a sound common currency…and that’s about it. But if you haven’t noticed, there is almost nothing today that the federal government doesn’t do—or try to. The fact that it fails embarrassingly at most of the tasks it sets itself never circumscribes its ambitions, which seem to multiply by the year.”
Again sounding like a supporter of the free market, Anton says about the federal budget: “That leaves about a trillion for means-tested welfare—which, like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, are not constitutionally authorized; they are also of dubious and uneven effectiveness at best.”
Anton notes that the founders believed that the American Revolution was grounded in universal truths, “but they did not expect their declaration to revolutionize the world—nor were they under any illusion that it, or they, had the power to do so….America is—in the words of John Quincy Adams—‘the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all’ but also ‘the champion and vindicator only of her own.’”
Those who wish to restore these principles face a challenge of unprecedented severity. Anton argues that an elite based in certain blue states disdains ordinary Americans. “The core message of the meta-Narrative is that America is fundamentally and inherently racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, transphobic, and so on. The flaws and sins of America derive directly from those of its founding stock, who are natural predators, inherently racist, and malevolent.”
Elite policy is at its worst in California, now under the near-total domination of the left wing of the Democratic Party. “In modern California, hypocrisy and double-standardism aren’t merely part of the business climate; they’re endemic to the whole society….Sam Francis dubbed this system ‘anarcho-tyranny’: complete freedom—even exemption from the gravest laws—for the favored, maximum vindictive enforcement against the pettiest infractions on the disfavored.” Anton fears that if President Trump isn’t reelected, the Democrats will seek actively to suppress whomever in the red states challenges them, and they will prove very difficult to dislodge from power.
Who are the ordinary Americans the elite disdains, and who are the elite? The ordinary Americans are those whom Hillary Clinton called “deplorables,” i.e., white males who value their family, their religion, and their property, including their guns. “Funny thing, too: a core tenet of modern liberalism is supposed to be the sanctity of ‘one man, one vote.’ Except, you know, not really. The barely concealed presupposition of denouncing Republicans as ‘racists’ simply because whites vote for them is that all votes are not created equal. Votes of color are morally superior to white votes, which are inherently tainted. Which is why the left holds any election won by a Republican to be morally if not (yet) politically illegitimate.”
The elite consists at its core of wealthy financiers and business interests allied with government. It is buttressed by professionals who have attended top universities, especially those of the Ivy League. In a way that readers of Hunter Lewis on “crony capitalism” will recognize, Anton writes: “So-called ‘public-private cooperation’ will increase. This benign-sounding phrase—who could object to ‘cooperation,’ to government and business ‘solving problems together’? —masks a darker reality. What it really describes is the use of state power to serve private ends, at private direction. Hence foreign policy…will be further reoriented around securing trade, tax, and labor ‘migration’ patterns and paradigms that benefit finance and big business.”
If elite dominance continues, Anton predicts that those of us who dissent will be rigidly restricted. “Free speech as we have known it—as our founders insisted was the bedrock of political rights, without which self-government is impossible—will not survive coming leftist rule. The playbook is already being expanded to include banking and credit. Getting on the wrong side of elite-woke opinion is increasingly to find oneself locked out of the financial system: no bank account, no credit card, no ability to get a loan or pay a mortgage. Pay cash? The move to a ‘cashless society’…will obviate that option right quick.”
Anton cites an especially chilling instance of the policy of suppression. “A new regulation in the United Kingdom—which we must assume will be proposed here sooner or later—would allow Britain’s National Health Service to deny non-emergency care to those deemed ‘racist, sexist, or homophobic.’ Government bureaucrats, naturally, will be the ones doing the deeming.” Small wonder that Anton has had enough.
The author seems to me misguided in what he says about “industrial policy,” but I’ll pass over that in silence. He criticizes Murray Rothbard who suggested that the principle of secession has no logical stopping point, down to the level of each person. Anton says, “Every-man-a-government-unto himself is literally Hobbes’s ‘state of nature,’ yet Rothbard appears to approve.” This rests on a misunderstanding: it hardly follows that if you have a right to secede that you will in fact do so, and Rothbard did not favor a world of one-person “nations.” Also, Anton doesn’t understand John Rawls very well.
But enough of criticism. Anton’s rhetorical talents are remarkable, and I urge everyone to read his book.
Dave Smith is a New York–based stand-up comedian, radio personality, and political commentator. Dave can be seen regularly on The Greg Gutfeld Show and Red Eye on Fox News, as well as Kennedy on Fox Business Network. In 2013 Dave was featured as one of the “New Faces” at the prestigious Just for Laughs Comedy Festival in Montreal. He was also a featured performer on the New York Comedy Festival’s “New York’s Funniest” showcase in 2014 and 2015. Dave’s outlet for his social commentary is his podcast, Part of the Problem, which is available on iTunes. His one-hour special Libertas is available online at gasdigitalnetwork.com.
JEFF DEIST: Dave, for starters you share a pedigree with Walter Block and Bernie Sanders. All three of you were born in Brooklyn, New York.
DAVE SMITH: Yes, that’s right. I’m happy to share a pedigree with one of those two people.
JD: Tell us a bit about your childhood. Did you attend public schools?
DS: I went to both public and private school in Brooklyn. I went to PS107 and then to the Berkeley Carroll School for middle school and high school. I remember reading Rothbard, about his experiences going first to public school and then private school. I didn’t like my private school much either, but it was much, much better than the public school. The public school was just a disaster. I still have a vivid memory of my third grade teacher giving the entire class all of the answers for standardized tests, citywide tests at the time. There were abusive teachers. It was really a horrible environment. I learned nothing while I was there. For all of the problems that my private school had, it was not nearly as bad. I feel about private school teachers the way Donald Trump feels about Mexicans coming into our country. Some I’m sure are good people, but they’re not sending their best.
JD: Tell us more about your home environment. Do you have siblings?
DS: I have a brother and a sister, but my brother is much younger. He’s thirteen years younger, from my mother’s second marriage. I grew up with a single mother and my older sister. We were lower middle class, and then moved into middle class. We moved a lot. I lived in probably nine or ten different apartments throughout my life. I was born in 1983 and grew up in what is now old Brooklyn and what I guess is now old America. I feel like I was the last generation where you would go outside unattended and that was just what children did. If someone threatened to beat you up and you told an adult, they would probably tell you to punch him in his nose. It was a different world with no internet and no wokeism, the pre-9/11 America.
JD: Was your mother political?
DS: My mother was a liberal. She was a left liberal, but in the true sense of liberal. None of the woke stuff, but she was a Democrat and pretty much bought the Democratic party line. She’s changed a bit in the last few years, or perhaps she’s stayed the same and the Democrats have changed. But she was interested in politics. My mother and my stepfather would watch Crossfire back with Pat Buchanan and the guy on the left. That was on in the background.
JD: Michael Kinsley. And they were on five nights a week!
DS: Yes, Kinsley. She always read the New York Times. A pretty standard run-of-the-mill liberal Democrat.
JD: I’ve heard you allude to going away for college in a much smaller town. I suspect that was a culture shock for you.
DS: Oh, yeah. I went to Hartwick College in Oneonta, New York. A tiny little town, brutal winters. Winter starts in October and goes until April, and I just did not like it at all. It was boring and I missed the city. That college experience was not for me.
JD: Unlike Brooklyn, the only food you could find late at night was maybe Domino’s pizza.
DS: Yes! I remember Domino’s closed at midnight and if you didn’t catch them before they closed, that was it. There was nothing to eat—my New York City brain could not understand. I remember when I first went up there I thought: Okay, well what else is there? And no, there’s nothing else. And it was actually the first time, at college, I confronted wokeism—what’s now taken over the entire national discourse. It was very left-wing. I had a history professor who said, and this had nothing to do with history, but he insisted there were basically no differences between men and women. We’ve been socialized to believe this. I remember arguing with him. I argued, are you suggesting if women were raised differently they could compete in the NFL with men? And he said yes, very seriously. Yes, if we just raised little girls differently, they could be middle linebackers in the National Football League. And I remember thinking the whole thing was just really stupid. None of it was interesting to me, and I didn’t like living in the small town. I just wanted to get out of there.
JD: At this point, it looked like you were not destined to be a grad school academic type.
DS: No, I hated school. I was a very poor student throughout. Teachers always thought of me as that kid who wasted potential because I was bright but just didn’t care about schoolwork. I always did the bare minimum to pass. My big concern was not getting kicked off the basketball team, and I think you had to have a C average to play. I always managed to just get by, but I didn’t care about school, it didn’t interest me. I also didn’t like the whole system. When I went to Berkeley Carroll it was this wannabe elitist Park Slope private school, and I hated the whole culture. I had a few teachers I liked very much, but for the most part they were fake. It was probably a 90 percent white school at the time if I had to guess. But when you’d come in the entrance, there were pictures of the few black students so they could brag about their diversity. I immediately saw right through it.
JD: As an aside, though, I bet your old-school liberal mom really cared about you going to a decent school.
DS: Yes. She did. She very much did. My mother was the daughter of a Holocaust survivor and this had a big, big impact on her. She always identified with the downtrodden or whatever group she thought was oppressed. But she also had normal cultural values and thought things like families were very good.
JD: You began your career in New York City, which is the epicenter of comedy clubs. You’ve lived in Manhattan a long time, after Brooklyn. But with all the craziness of 2020, you’ve considered leaving. Isn’t that awfully tough for someone who is both culturally and professionally a longtime New Yorker?
DS: Yes, it’s very tough for me. I’m truly heartbroken over what’s happened to New York City. To me, it’s nothing short of a tragedy. I think New York City is an amazing city. I know a lot of libertarians and small government types think of it as this hellhole, but I love the people and I love the culture. I love the museums and the restaurants and the theater and everything. I think it’s a great place. But I have a two-year-old daughter and I don’t want to raise her around heroin addicts. For her I need a nice house with a nice backyard in a good neighborhood. So I’m fond of a lot of aspects of New York City, but it’s time for me to get out.
JD: You describe your younger self as having standard boilerplate left-wing perspectives. Like all good Brooklynites, you disliked George W. Bush, who was president when you became politically aware in the 2000s. Maybe you disliked him for the wrong reasons, I don’t know.
DS: No, actually I disliked George W. Bush for the right reasons! I was a standard left-leaning guy. I didn’t know much about politics, but obviously we should tax rich people and give the money to not-so-rich people. Who wouldn’t want to do that? We should have a higher minimum wage—don’t you care about poor people? I wasn’t really thinking these things through, and coming to what seemed obvious left-liberal perspectives. But George W. Bush was a different story. I was eighteen on 9/11, and it had a big effect on me. I stood on Flatbush Avenue and watched people covered in debris who had walked over the Brooklyn Bridge because the subways were shut down. And I thought, oh man, maybe they’re going to bring back the draft! Maybe we’re going to be in crazy wars. Bush came to New York City a week later and said his famous line: “I hear you, Washington hears you, and soon enough the people who knocked down this tower are going to hear from you.” I was all in. I didn’t know anything about the history of US conflicts in the Middle East, but I thought, These bastards picked on the wrong enemy and they’re going to pay for this. But as the years went on I saw George W. Bush really didn’t care about who had attacked us on 9/11. He was using it as his excuse to invade Iraq and shred the Bill of Rights. When he finally said that he really didn’t care about getting Osama bin Laden—a few years later some reporter asked him about it, and he said, “I don’t really think about it that much”—I was furious. I was furious about that. He came to us in our moment of panic and lied to us. I could see through Dick Cheney and Bush. Being a left liberal it was easy to see through them, but I hated the Patriot Act; I hated the war in Iraq; I hated everything about those guys. I thought George W. Bush was unimpressive, kind of dumb, this elitist child who was gifted a silver spoon and handed the White House. I hated everything about him. In this sense my opinions haven’t changed. I was right about all of that.
JD: I like your natural reflexive inclination to care about your city on 9/11, to have a sense of home. You were angry when it was attacked.
DS: Yes.
JD: Libertarians are really shortsighted about this.
DS: Yeah, I completely agree. It’s been infuriating to me over the last few months. So many libertarians are dug into their preconceived biases. The cops are the bad guys, and the state is the bad guy, so they blindly support any group upset with the state. How could any normal person see mobs destroying cities and not think this is horrible? And for all the same reasons we hate the state? You know, the lack of respect for private property or civilization or basic human decency. For all of the same reasons you hate the state, you should hate these mobs every bit as much.
JD: In your twenties you were influenced by the 2008 Ron Paul presidential campaign. Talk us through that. What was your first moment when you felt your worldview changing?
DS: It was so random. I happened to be at my mother’s house and we were watching the Republican debate, in late 2007. This happened to be the famous Ron Paul–Rudy Giuliani exchange. I already was strongly antiwar, and I thought Iraq was the biggest issue of that election. That’s what I cared about. I assumed, well, George W. Bush is leaving and obviously we need to get a Democrat in there. If you don’t know anything about politics or history, it was easy to think Democrats were the antiwar party, even though most of them in Congress voted to invade Iraq. But they were positioning themselves as the anti-Bush, antiwar party, so I wanted to see one of them win.
And then I saw this exchange with a Congressman I had never heard of named Ron Paul—and he made the antiwar case better than any Democrat I had ever heard! You could tell, there was something real…Ron Paul’s authentic beliefs just pierced through the screen. You knew this guy really believed what he was saying. And I watched him mop the floor with Rudy Giuliani, and there was something about him. I know a lot of people were influenced by this moment,and I just really responded to his courage. People almost forget how the crowd was with Giuliani. Ron Paul had no support in that crowd and he didn’t care, it meant nothing to him. Ron Paul was going to tell the truth, and if you want to boo him out of the arena, that’s fine. And I immediately thought, Who the hell is that guy? How have I never heard of him? I started googling Ron Paul to read more about him, and then I watched every single Republican debate after that because I wanted to see what else this guy said. It was a really interesting dynamic, those debates in 2007 and 2008. It was a bunch of boring shills and Ron Paul on stage. The lineup was boring guy, boring guy, boring guy, really interesting guy. He started talking about free market economics and I thought it sounded kind of crazy, but he was so good on the war question I thought, Okay, let me at least look into this. Let’s see why he’s wrong. And as I got deeper, I was converted.
JD: Are there any particular books or articles you remember from that period?
DS: Well, I read Dr. Paul’s book The Revolution, but that might have been several months later. Through Google and YouTube I listened to Ron Paul’s speeches, and then I found Peter Schiff and Tom Woods. I started reading their articles, and then the economy crashed. These guys had been talking about it. Tom Woods kept talking about Murray Rothbard and the Mises Institute, and so I read Anatomy of the State and “War, Peace, and the State”—those two Rothbard pieces. And it was off to the races from there. I almost never looked back. I had to consume everything Murray Rothbard wrote. I was on mises.org every single day, reading tons of stuff. It really spoke to me.
JD: Rothbard’s work tends to punch you in the face.
DS: Yes. Maybe it’s my personality type, but that’s what I responded to. I loved being challenged. I remember reading Rothbard and sometimes I put the book down in front of me to look around for a moment and say “wow.” That’s what I liked to read, stuff that really slams you. Rothbard makes this unbelievably compelling case, and I spent so much time reading him and stuff from the Mises Institute in general. I started reading Lew Rockwell. It was life changing.
JD: Maybe it’s a Brooklyn thing, you seem to share Rothbard’s intransigence when it comes to moderation or compromise.
DS: I’m sure there’s something about my personality that makes me respond to that type of thing. But also when it comes to the subject matter Rothbard was dealing with, it’s the appropriate attitude to have. If we’re talking about a mass murder campaign in Iraq, why would we approach it with anything less than that energy?
JD: How do you describe yourself to someone who asks about your politics?
DS: I pretty much agree with Rothbard on everything. I don’t know if it really makes sense to call yourself a Rothbardian or a Keynesian or whatever. But if I was going to be associated with any one thinker, I’m quite comfortable with it being Murray Rothbard.
JD: Recently you did a show about so-called 90s Rothbard, which always makes me laugh. Some people claim he deviated rather than evolved in his principles. You defend his more polemical and populist work, like the articles in the Rothbard-Rockwell Report.
DS: I think his most controversial articles, at least among left libertarians, propose right-wing populism or “paleolibertarian” strategy. I’ve probably read “Right-Wing Populism” a dozen times, and I think at first I was like, This could be a problem, maybe he shouldn’t have written this. And then every time I read it, I’m a little bit more sympathetic to it. Most recently I read it and thought he’s just completely right. The guy is a prophet, I mean he’s right about everything. And of course a lot of people who criticize the article really misrepresent it or give it the least charitable reading. If you read the article with an open mind, you’ll realize that he’s not straying from Rothbardian principles at all. He’s analyzing the political moment, that moment being 1991 or ’92, and making some very good points. Much of it proved to be absolutely correct. You can disagree, but thinking the country was ripe for right-wing populism, thinking libertarians’ best bet was populism—how can you argue with that in hindsight?
You have the [Charles] Koch and [Ed] Crane types, who have been trying to get into corridors of power and influence the government for decades. There’s been zero success from that. You have the Hayekian model of trying to influence the influencers, win the intellectuals over. There’s been zero success in that. Libertarian philosophy is more toxic in a university than critical race theory! Far more toxic. So, there’s been zero success in any of those efforts. The only success libertarians really have is the Ron Paul movement. It was a populist movement that got people up out of their seats and convinced them this whole system was screwing them over. If you’re being honest, admit Rothbard was really onto something.
JD: I’ve heard you mention in particular The Ethics of Liberty to listeners. That’s really the quintessential normative Rothbard.
DS: If I’m recommending Rothbard to people, I usually start with Anatomy of the State and “War, Peace, and the State,” like I mentioned earlier. Maybe that’s because I read them first and project my own sensibilities onto others. But The Ethics of Liberty gives you the most compelling argument. And to me, it also speaks to my role in this whole movement. I knew we had all of these really brilliant academic types, but I felt I could speak to regular people. I don’t think libertarianism should exclusively be for academics. I really think of us as abolitionists, essentially. We want to abolish slavery and we believe people should be free. We want to abolish slavery to the state rather than traditional chattel slavery. There might be some brilliant economists in 1845 who could explain why slavery is actually not as efficient of an economic system as free men voluntarily interacting with each other, but any normal person could just be an abolitionist. You don’t have to be an intellectual to understand this is wrong and should be abolished. I feel the same way about libertarianism today. And so I like books that can just speak to regular people where they are.
JD: Talk about Hans-Hermann Hoppe. He still draws a lot of ire, but in many ways he continued where Rothbard left off. What is Hoppe’s influence on you?
DS: Hoppe had a tremendous influence on me. I mean, I think that Hoppe is brilliant. He does draw a lot of criticism, although it’s almost never actually based in any of his work or anything he’s said. There are a lot of provocative memes on the internet with Hoppe and people are outraged about those, but I think his work has been enormously valuable. He explains the true implications of a private society, and has the best, most useful thought experiments about different cultural issues. Things like immigration, covenant societies, time preference. With any interesting or controversial thinker, you can always find things they’ve said throughout their career which are not supposed to be said. But if you look at the body of Hoppe’s work, I think his contributions to libertarianism are, with the exceptions of maybe Mises and Rothbard, almost unrivaled.
JD: How much Mises have you read? Do you feel like you have a respectable grounding in economics?
DS: For the people you hang out with, Jeff, probably not so much, but for normal people, yes, I’m doing very good! I’ve read Human Action and I’ve read Socialism and I’ve read plenty of articles on mises.org. I’ve read a lot more Rothbard than I have Mises, probably a lot more Hoppe than I have Mises also. I’ve also read Bob Murphy’s Choice, so I’ve absorbed a lot of Mises through other people too. Let’s say for a comedian I’m very sound on economics.
JD: Talk about your career. To an outsider, comedy seems like a brutal business. Has it taught you to be entrepreneurial, to control your own content, to have multiple income streams? Twenty or thirty years ago you simply would have a manager or an agent, but now, not so simple.
DS: That really changed just in the time since I started in 2003. Older, more established guys explained how you need to get into all of the clubs, then you need to get a manager or an agent, and then you can get on television. That was the system and there was no way around it. But right around that time, social media started happening. There were a few comedians on MySpace who started building up big followings. Little by little, it all changed and became a completely different world. Now you can put out your own content, directly to your fans. You don’t have to rely on gatekeepers. It’s a challenging business, but you’re trying to tell jokes for a living—so why should it be given to you easily? I came around at the perfect time in many ways. I feel very lucky. I got into comedy before wokeism overtook everything, so I was already a little bit established. Somebody like me is never going to get a network TV deal today, but who cares? Who cares about that? I can build up my own audience and do what I want to do. I literally get to do stand-up comedy, tell jokes, rant about libertarianism, talk to the people I admire, the most interesting thinkers of our time. I get to do all of this and make a really good living and support my family. This is everything I want to do. I don’t really want to be on Saturday Night Live. I’m very fortunate to work in a time when all of this is viable.
JD: I read a quote from you saying the Left has waged a full-scale war on comedy. If there’s any line of work that ought to be spared from cancel culture, surely it’s stand-up comedy.
DS: You would think so. That certainly was true when I first started stand-up comedy. Wokeism has been creeping into different parts of society for a while now, but it was not a factor in stand-up comedy. No one cared if a joke was offensive. If you could write an offensive joke and still made the crowd laugh, everybody respected that. That’s the hardest thing to do—to say something that would normally turn people off but it’s still really funny. In the last five years or so things really changed. There’s a huge push in the corporate comedy world, Comedy Central, Netflix, all of these different companies, to push diversity for the sake of diversity. But only left-wing perspectives. And wokeism does not lead to funny. It never does. If you look around the broader world of comedy, not just stand-up comedy, but watch an episode of The Office—you could never put this on television anymore. This is only from seven to eight years ago. You could never put something like that on television anymore. The left woke types have set up parameters that all of the greatest comedians could not work within. George Carlin, Richard Pryor, Chris Rock, Dave Chappelle, any of these guys would have to be canceled. And in fact, Dave Chappelle draws heat like he hasn’t kept up with the times. But really he’s still just funny and they have a problem with that. There’s also this counterculture, which I guess I’m a part of now, where people just want funny comedians. A lot of people just want comedians to make them laugh, and are very ripe for antiwoke comedy.
JD: We tell most celebrities or athletes to shut up and sing or shut up and dribble the ball. But we want comedians to get political, it’s funny. Look at Lenny Bruce.
DS: Absolutely. A comedian is a different thing, but it’s not even about shut up and dribble. It’s not that we don’t want a great basketball player to say anything. What we hate is when they repeat the same basic and boring approved opinions. I thought it was really interesting when Dennis Rodman talked about North Korea. I thought it was really interesting when Kanye West talked to Trump about criminal justice reform. People get sick of people in Hollywood or the NBA or NFL saying the same predictable things. That’s what turns people off. But to your point, comedians’ whole job is to give you their point of view. Obviously with the goal of being funny, but comedians can’t shut up and do comedy. They have to talk in order to do comedy. So, it’s particularly absurd to expect comedians to keep quiet about politics.
JD: You’ve always been un-PC in your approach and you haven’t been afraid to combine politics with your act or your podcast. Your comedy special Libertas has plenty of expressly political material. Does that come naturally to you or is it a conscious choice?
DS: In terms of stand-up, it really wasn’t a conscious choice. It just started happening. I started comedy before I was a libertarian and so I had a whole act which had nothing to do with politics, but I became obsessed with libertarianism. All I wanted to do was read more and more about free markets and the history of the liberty movement and politics in general. So it just crept into my act, little by little. It’s what I was thinking about all the time, so I’d end up writing jokes about it. Weirdly, in the last five years or so, almost every comedian became political—but they all had the most boring superficial takes…not all of them, but the majority. It got to a point when I put out Libertas, well I have this whole hour of the jokes I’ve been making about the state of America and the 2016 presidential race. It just made sense to put that out as a show.
JD: You’ve also done a lot of cable news. You’ve appeared on Fox and CNN, which no doubt increases your visibility. Are you ever struck by how basic and superficial those shows really are?
DS: I’ve gotten used to it at this point, but I sure was at first. I think it’s something about Pareto distribution, but the truth is most people are unimpressive. This is true in stand-up comedy, most comedians are unimpressive. It’s true in academia. Cable news and journalism in general are no exception. A very small percentage of people are actually impressive. Cable hosts can do the job, they’re essentially literate in their job. They can read the teleprompter, they can host a show, they can graduate college. But in terms of being an impressive thinker, there are very, very few.
It feels weird, and still does, to be the most interesting person on a panel. It’s easy. Just have something interesting to say—for God’s sake, they’re only giving you a minute or thirty seconds to talk, so whittle it down to the most interesting thing you have to say! It amazes me. I’ll be on one of these panels and you’re maybe going to get three questions. Someone will get a question and just waste the time saying nothing, just filler words and basic nonsense with no real point! Why do you even want to do this? It’s shocking how many people that describes in the cable news world. Both hosts and guests. Cable news is dominated by mediocre thinkers.
JD: As you put it, they all sound like a Bank of America ad.
DS: Yes.
JD: You describe how your industry has changed, it’s not about clubs or getting on Johnny Carson anymore. You’re trying to make a living as a comedian, but you also are a podcaster, you also go on cable news shows. You also do other people’s podcasts, you do live streaming specials. You engage heavily with fans and critics on social media. You have all these different ways of getting your content out there. This sounds like a very entrepreneurial venture, a one man band.
DS: Exactly. Getting on Carson was the big thing for stand-up comedians back in the day. If you got on Carson and he liked you, you could make it as a successful stand-up comedian. After Carson retired you had to get on Leno or Letterman, maybe Conan O’Brien. Then Leno retired and there’s Fallon and these other guys. It reached a point where if you get on Conan, you get to go do seven minutes of stand-up comedy and a few hundred thousand people will see you. And that’s nice, but the years go on and on and every week Conan’s got three or four comedians on his show. Appearing on his show doesn’t really separate you from the pack, even with the three hundred thousand people who saw you for seven minutes. Even if they liked you, they probably forgot about who you were. By the next month, they had seen seven more stand-up comedians and it didn’t move the needle at all.
Suddenly you could get on Joe Rogan’s podcast where 8 million people see you. They’re not seeing you for seven minutes telling some jokes, they’re seeing you for three hours. You go in-depth on everything about you as a person and your beliefs. If you gain a fan from that, it’s a whole different type of fan. That fan is invested in you now. So appearing on a big podcast is better for your career than going on one of these late night shows. Little by little that became true for having a Comedy Central special or an HBO special. They don’t matter as much anymore. What matters is having a relationship with your fan base. Lucky for me, I was able to get on Rogan and the shows that matter.
JD: Rogan, for example, reaches a huge pop audience—but a reasonably cerebral and thoughtful pop audience. I interviewed Professor Paul Cantor, who loves South Park like you. He laments the complete takeover of pop culture by the Left. There is an opportunity for people like you to engage the broader public and make them think a little bit.
DS: Absolutely. Rogan’s audience is more thoughtful and more interesting than your average television viewer, for sure. Something happened to the Left. If you go back to the 1960s, they were at least the fun ones. They really were. They made funny comedy and funny movies. Even conservatives would have to admit the left-wingers are probably more fun at parties. But something changed, and the Left embraced woke scolds and gave up fun. They’ve ceded the ground of fun, and not just in some degenerate sense. Now it’s the woke scolds who are uptight. It’s an interesting dynamic where the roles have been reversed.
JD: The other day I saw where Johnny Rotten, Johnny Lydon of the Sex Pistols, wore a red MAGA T-shirt. This was purely performance art, but the Left couldn’t help pouncing. They don’t like him because a few years back he committed the sin of supporting Brexit. So a MAGA shirt is the new punk rock.
DS: Pat Buchanan said conservatives won the Cold War and lost the culture war. And there’s no question about either of those things. The United States of America outlasted the Soviet Union and that’s a pretty wonderful thing, but the counterculture has taken over the country. It is now counterculture to be a Christian who wants to have a family and live by traditional values. That is the most counterculture thing you could do at this point. Not having a tattoo is more of a statement than having a sleeve of tattoos on your arm. It’s strange because it just doesn’t feel right. It doesn’t feel right for either side. It’s very different from most times in human history. But if you were to walk down the streets of New York City with a T-shirt that said “kill cops” that would not be provocative at all—not nearly on the level that wearing a MAGA hat would be.
JD: Let’s wrap up with two slightly personal questions. First, you have always led with your antiwar position. You’ve always made it a hallmark of your public persona. For your generation, US wars in the Middle East seem like part of the permanent landscape. So, how did war become such a motivating issue for you?
DS: It all goes back to 9/11 and the response. There’s my family history. My grandfather was a refugee from Germany, a Jew who was basically born in the worst place at the wrong time. He enlisted in the US Army and fought in World War II. My stepfather fought in Vietnam. So I have some veterans in my family who know about the evils of war, but to me it’s the worst thing in the world, the worst thing anyone could possibly do. And yet somehow it’s completely accepted by the Democrats and Republicans who are doing it. It drives me crazy. You hear about what’s happened to the people of Iraq, the people of Afghanistan and Yemen and Syria and Libya. It’s a huge tragedy, a biblical level of evil. It is accepted and it drives me crazy. Most people in this country don’t want these wars anymore and yet they persist because really evil interests make money off killing children. Even with all the crazy stuff going on in America, there’s nothing more important than ending this.
JD: That dovetails with my final question about fatherhood. You haven’t shied away from discussing the impact of having a little girl. You haven’t shied away from the question of abortion. You haven’t shied away from talking about why families matter and why we shouldn’t view political liberty as atomized individualism. This probably does you no favors in comedy circles. Have you always had this perspective?
DS: I certainly haven’t always had this perspective. It’s something that grew. I really changed when I met my wife, I changed when we got married, and I really changed when she got pregnant and had our daughter. My heroes were guys like Murray Rothbard and Ron Paul who would always tell the truth, even when it was not going to do them any favors. Rothbard was connected to powerful people like the Koch brothers. He could have compromised a little bit and had a much cushier life than he had, but he chose not to because he wanted to tell the truth.
Ron Paul was friendly with Reagan and a lot of powerful people. He easily could have been a star in the Republican Party. If Ron Paul just toned down the antiwar stuff, he could have been a made guy in that world, but he refused to because he wanted to tell the truth.
Those are the guys I really admire. I was somebody who lived a very degenerate lifestyle for a long time. I was a comedian on the road, a single guy. I did that for a while. Then I met a really great woman and settled down and got married and had a kid. And I realized life is so much better. Who would I be if I didn’t share that with my audience, particularly the younger men who listen to me who are a large part of my audience? How could I not tell them about these traditional institutions like marriage and family which can be really wonderful?
Young men are really disparaged in our culture today and I don’t think that’s good. I don’t think that’s helpful. I don’t think it’s helpful to have a huge percentage of children raised in single parent households, and it certainly won’t create a culture that supports liberty. Little by little I came to all of these conclusions.
I’m going to say it, whether it’s about family or God or being pro-life. I have a family, this is how my thinking evolved and changed. I’d always rather be the person who tells the truth, and let the controversy come, that’s fine with me. Now I have a daughter, and I’d like to be a role model for her. What type of role model would I be if I avoided controversial issues because I was afraid of being called a mean name?
We think of people as being courageous, but historically speaking there’s not much courage involved. What’s going to happen? Someone on Twitter will call you a mean name? I get my YouTube channel banned? I’m not worried about being shot in the public square. If other people could speak up when they faced real dangers, I should have enough courage to tell the truth.
JD: Very well said, Dave.
Bob offers his commentary on the movies “The Hunt” and “The Purge”—both produced by Blumhouse Productions—and focuses on whether The Purge storyline offers a challenge to Rothbard’s depiction of anarcho-capitalism.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
With an ugly presidential election just three weeks away, we dive into Hans Hoppe's classic Democracy: The God That Failed to puncture some of the myths surrounding democracy and voting. Jayant Bhandari joins the show to discuss Hoppe's controversial thesis concerning monarchy and democracy, time preference and its manifestation in the two systems, the forces constraining monarchs, and the terrible incentives created for democratic rulers. This is a must-listen show for anyone interested in Hoppe's most famous work and its application to the problems western states face today.
Find more from Jayant Bhandari on his website (JayantGhandari.com) and his Twitter account (@JayantBhandari5).
Use the code HAPOD for a discount on Democracy: The God That Failed from our bookstore: Mises.org/BuyHoppe
Covid has exposed how easy it is for government to weaponize healthcare. How long will the doctor-patient relationship remain sacred?
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "Covid and the Escalation of Medical Tyranny".
We have had nearly eight months of life and liberty stolen from us by politicians and their hysteria-promoting accomplices in media. How much more will we accept?This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "The Absurdity of Covid 'Cases'".
Given the overt hostility that progressives have toward private enterprise in the first place, politicians will take shutdown-caused shortages and empty shelves as “proof” that private enterprise has failed.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "The Second Act Will Be Worse Than the First: Lockdowns Are Not the Answer".
[From the 2020 Supporters Summit, presented at the historic Jekyll Island Club Resort on Jekyll Island, Georgia, on October 9, 2020.]
Today I’m going to talk to you about what’s been going on in our country for over half a year now, not just in the United States, but around the world. Some of this we all know, but we’ve been getting, let’s say, not the entire story for much of the time and we’ve had to wait to hear additional experts chime in to say, Wait a minute, maybe the first experts were all wrong. It’s been hard to know exactly what to think and what numbers we ought to be looking at when it comes to this covid-19. Should we be looking at cases, should we be looking at percent positive rates, hospitalizations, deaths? All kinds of numbers have been thrown at us, some with context, some without. So, I’m going to spend a little time reviewing this and making a bit of a clarion call to enjoy human life the way it’s meant to be enjoyed. Now since March, we’ve experienced lockdowns and restrictions of various kinds, supposedly all in the name of science, you understand. If you don’t support these things, you must hate science. That’s the intellectual level of the conversation. We were told, We need fifteen days to flatten the curve—fifteen days. I believe we’re on day number 209 of fifteen days to flatten the curve. Remember the old days when the concern was, We don’t want to overwhelm the hospitals? We can’t cure this thing, but at least we could get the hospitals in the condition they need to be in and allow them to be able to cope with reasonable numbers of people, and we would flatten out the number of hospitalizations and deaths over time, so as to allow the hospitals to be able to cope with them rather than have everybody arriving at the hospital all at once.
OK. Then, you start to see on social media all your friends saying the hospitals are overwhelmed. It was like a memo had gone out that the word we were all going to use was “overwhelmed.” Like your friends couldn’t even be creative enough to come up with a different word; they all had the same word: the hospitals are overwhelmed. Because their other friend said the hospitals are overwhelmed, because the other friend said that. What actually happened was that in April alone, 1.4 million jobs in healthcare were lost, because far from being overwhelmed, the hospitals were mostly empty. As a matter of fact, in May, NPR ran a story with this headline about all those field hospitals that they built because of all the overflow that was supposedly going to happen. Headline: “US Field Hospitals Stand Down, Most without Treating Any COVID-19 Patients.”
Hmm, what was going on here? The hospitals were never overwhelmed at any time, with the possible brief exception of New York City. In California, we began to see how the goalposts began to be changed. What they were worried about at the time they were telling us about flattening the curve was thirty thousand hospitalizations. We really have to be careful about hitting that number. The current hospitalization number in California as of this time—we’re in October 2020—is just over three thousand and they’re still so panicked that they won’t open anything. They’ll open a little tiny thing and you have to put your mask on in between bites while you’re eating at a restaurant. So, it’s one-tenth what they feared. There’s state after state after state. Washington, DC, not a state, but nevertheless, Washington, DC, that’s an example of one of many places in the US where the numbers all indicate, have indicated for months, that the state is clearly at the phase justifying reopening. The numbers clearly indicate, from what they said at the beginning—we need to reach such and such—well, they’ve reached it, and now they keep changing it.
Now it’s not hospitalizations anymore, now it’s “cases” and as we’ll talk about, the way that testing is being done even the New York Times had to say Maybe your coronavirus test shouldn’t have been positive. Even the New York Times was reduced to admitting this—that as many as 90 percent of the tests, because the testing is so sensitive, are yielding just viral debris that isn’t infectious at all. But you’ve got to go and isolate yourself for X number of days for no reason. And we’re going to use this number, and we’re going to wait till this number hits zero, which even just given the problem of false positives is impossible. So, you can’t have your life back in some states unless you more or less take it back. That’s what they’ve done to us. Also, in Washington, DC, the public schools have been closed, but they put a cap of eleven students per room on private schools, no matter how big the room is. That basically cripples the private schools, for no reason. There’s no scientific basis for that.
Then it became You can have your life back once there’s a vaccine. What? There might never be a vaccine. As Martin Kulldorff of Harvard Medical School puts it, “The timeline for a vaccine is anywhere between 6 months from now and never.” So, at some point, we have to figure out how to live with this kind of situation. Well then, when it started to look like maybe we might get a vaccine, then the story became Even with a vaccine, you can’t have your life back. And if you object to that, you’re the problem. You’re not listening to the science. Everything that brought people joy was abruptly taken away and every time it looked like it might creep back in, you get another headline about how you can’t have this back, you can’t have that back, this’ll never be the same, maybe we’ll never have sports again, maybe we’ll never do…And it’s almost like they take a perverse delight in this. Well, if ever there were a use of the expression “get bent,” I would say it’s right about now.
Now, of course people will say, Wait a minute, what, do you just want people to die? Again, this is the intellectual level of the conversation. You just want people do die. How do you talk to somebody like that? So, in order to do that, I’m going to appeal to the above midwit-level population and I’m going to remind people of the important lesson in Henry Hazlitt’s great book Economics in One Lesson. This is a book that’s sold millions of copies and Hazlitt’s one lesson, as we all know in this room, is that if you’re going to evaluate an economic policy, it’s not enough to evaluate the short-term consequences for one earmarked group. Any blockhead can do that. If you want to know the long-term consequences or the real consequence of it, you look at the long-term effects on everybody, not the short-term effects on an earmarked group.
For example, suppose the government taxes the public to build a stadium. Well, the midwit will simply point to the stadium and say, “Hey, look at this wonderful thing that the government did. It’s a stadium.” And yes, we can all see with our physical eyes that there’s a stadium there, but they think that’s the entirety of the analysis: a stadium has somehow appeared. There’s no thought of costs, opportunity costs, where the money came from, where it would have gone otherwise—none of that is even considered, because those things can’t be seen with your physical eyes. To understand the fullness of the policy, you have to be able to think and see with your mind’s eye.
Likewise, with rent control people think, You impose rent control and people get lower rents, and that’s the entirety of the analysis as far as they’re concerned. There’s nothing further we need to consider. We just take these fat cats and just force them to lower rents, and then everybody gets lower rent and that’s, as far as the midwit is concerned, that’s the end of the discussion, because that’s what he sees with his physical eyes. But, for people capable of seeing with their mind’s eye, they ask other questions like, How many people are going to start building low-cost rental housing if they know that this ceiling has been imposed? There will obviously be far less housing built, which will make the problem of housing people worse. We also know that at these particular rates, you have a million people and surfeit of demand, so if you’re a landlord, you can be a jerk, you don’t have to fix that leaky pipe, you don’t have to do any maintenance, because if somebody’s upset about it, you got 8 million other people who would be very happy to take that person’s place.
So, in other words, if you see with your mind’s eye, you understand that rent control is a lot more complicated than just Duh, we forced them to lower the rent and it’s low for everybody. And in fact, if, for some reason, you wanted to lower rents through the means of government impositions, you would actually want to do the exact opposite of rent control. You would want to control every single price in the entire economy except rents, because that would make entrepreneurs not want to go into the production of anything other than rental property because everything else would be unprofitable. The one thing they could produce would be rental property, which would lead to a collapse in rental prices, which would be great for everybody. So, literally the opposite of what these people recommend would be the best thing. But the point is, we have to think about all the consequences for everybody.
Well, the same thing goes for public health, because my talk could be called “Public Health in One Lesson.” Because yes, if you simply focus monomaniacally on one virus, you might be able to say, Look at what we did for this one virus. You might be able to say that. I’m not even sure they can say that, but they might be able to say, Look what we’ve done for people with this one virus, and then, being midwits, they leave the discussion right there. They don’t bother to investigate the seventeen other aspects of health that have catastrophically collapsed because of that one thing they did. All they say is, look at what they did in the short run for this targeted group instead of saying, Look at the long-run consequences for everybody. And because they don’t look at that, it’s not even mentioned.
When was the last time Dr. Fauci, who is viewed superstitiously by everybody, even acknowledged that there are collateral damages from lockdowns, even mentioned them? Nothing. And so they’re, therefore, able to turn around and say, You just want people to die. Okay, well, let’s play that game. They want to play it, let’s play it. How about this? We know, for example, coming out of the UK, that there will be more likely to be at least as many, if not more, preventable cancer deaths than covid deaths because of the diversion of resources into covid and the panicking of everybody about it. And so we read Richard Sullivan, professor of cancer and global health at King’s College London, director of its Institute for Cancer Policy, saying “The number of deaths due to the disruption of cancer services is likely to outweigh the number of deaths from the coronavirus itself. The cessation and delay of cancer care will cause considerable avoidable suffering. Cancer screening services have stopped, which means we will miss our chance to catch many cancers when they are treatable and curable, such as cervical, bowel and breast. When we do restart normal service delivery after the lockdown is lifted, the backlog of cases will be a huge challenge to the healthcare system.”
We read on October 6 in the Daily Mail coming out of the UK, that health secretary Matt Hancock says, “Cancer patients may only be guaranteed treatment if COVID-19 stays under control.” How about that? This is the Daily Mail, which is much more honest than the American press. “Almost two and a half million people missed out on cancer screening, referrals or treatment at the height of lockdown—even though the NHS was never overwhelmed.” They had the honesty in the UK to say that. “Experts now fear the number of people dying as a result of delays triggered by the treatment of coronavirus patients could even end up being responsible for as many deaths as the pandemic itself.” Now, we won’t see that kind of effect right away. It’s not like a huge number of cancer patients are going to die immediately in 2020, but it does mean that people who might have lived an extra fifteen to twenty years, may live just another three or four, and we’ll see those numbers in the coming years.
Then we heard a United Nations report in April saying that “economic hardship generated by the radical interruptions of commerce could result in hundreds of thousands of additional child deaths in 2020.” UNICEF later increased that number to 1.2 million child deaths, and at Oxford University Professor Sunetra Gupta has reminded us several times, in recent weeks and months, of the UN’s prediction that as many as 130 million people could be at risk of starvation because of the lockdown, because of the possibility of famine in several dozen places around the world. Now who are the ones who don’t care about human life?
But, that’s not all, because in the United States in Oakland, California, we have Benjamin Miller of the Well Being Trust who tells us, as coauthor of a study on deaths of despair—so that’s drug or alcohol abuse or suicide—that an excess—that is to say, above what would normally occur—of 75,000 deaths will occur as a result of all this. Not to mention the CDC itself estimates that in the United States alone, there will be more than 93,000 excess noncovid deaths this year because of what’s been going on, including over 42,000 from cardiovascular conditions, over 10,000 from diabetes, and 3,600 from cancer. A recent UK study just out found that the risk of death was increased because of lockdowns by 53 percent among seniors with dementia and another 123 percent among seniors with severe mental illness. For four decades, India Nobel Peace laureate Kailash Stayarthi rescued thousands of children from slavery and human trafficking and he fears that that’s going to be reversed. He says the biggest threat is that millions of children may fall back into slavery, trafficking, child labor, child marriage. Well, with millions of families being pushed into poverty, they’re being pressured to do something, to put their children to work to make ends meet. So this is being done.
They’re trying these lockdowns even in the developing world, where people live hand to mouth. When you live hand to mouth, it means that every day you earn enough money to feed yourself for that day, and they’re being told to stay home for weeks and months. I think we see where this is going. Now, the people of Malawi, one of the poorest countries in the world, when they got wind of their government’s lockdown plans, they rose up and said, We’re not abiding by this. There will be no lockdown. And so there wasn’t. We could learn from them.
Even The Atlantic had to admit, “When you ask them to stay home, in many cases, you’re asking them to starve.” In the UK, The Telegraph says, “The absurd demand that developing countries adopt economically disastrous lockdowns is driving untold misery.” How often is that mentioned in the US? Ever? Any of our people ever mention that? No, it’s You want to kill people, because you want to live your life. Or because you don’t want two years of your kids’ lives taken away from them. Because now we’re being told, Maybe you can have your life back in the spring of 2022. Not fifteen days to flatten the curve, probably spring of 2022 you can start getting back all these pleasurable things that make life worth living. Okay. So, it seems to me that the crazies who think that public health should mean a monomaniacal fixation on one virus and then pretending that none of the other stuff is happening should have to answer for this a little bit more.
Now, some of this stuff that I’m talking about now appears in—wait for it—the free e-book I wrote on this subject: Your Facebook Friends Are Wrong about the Lockdown. They’re even wronger than you thought—wrong as wrong can be if you value human life and flourishing. So, in the United States, you can get this free book by just texting the word lockdown to the number 33444, and you’ll like it because it smashes these SOBs completely. Or you can get it at wrongaboutlockdown.com. Yes, I bought that domain, I was so happy to nab that one.
Not to mention that of course over the course of this people’s life savings have been depleted, their livelihoods have been destroyed and things that give their lives meaning and fulfillment abruptly removed. So, we’re supposed to believe that all that matters is just biological existence. And this prompts some interesting philosophical questions. If I could live to be 120 and enjoy robust health for all those years, but the price was we would destroy all the architectural treasures of Europe, we would abolish music altogether, and we would restrict social life to 5 percent of its formal level, would I choose that? Who would? Human happiness is not some optional extra. These things, like close, intimate relationships or so-called large gatherings, like concerts, theater, lectures, church, sporting events, the arts in general—if you think these are merely dispensable adjuncts to human life and flourishing, you have no business being in charge of anything. These are life itself, and as I’ve said in a previous talk, for anybody who performs in front of an audience—and particularly think about your children, dancers, musicians, athletes, magicians, comedians, singers, actors, whatever—they’re basically being told, Maybe you can never have this. Maybe you can never ever do what brings your soul happiness. And yeah, maybe we can’t have these until we have a vaccine, said Dr. Zeke Emanuel. “We may have to give up cherished things for a long time,” he says—things like schooling and income and contact with our friends and extended family for at least eighteen months. Maybe this talk could also be called “Get Bent.”
Well, another terrifying statistic came out recently, showing the grim if entirely predictable effects all this inhuman regimentation has been having on the young, particularly those between 18 and 24. Now, the federal government has a Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. And they, among other things, look at percentages of people who have considered suicide within the previous twelve months. Now typically, before all these lockdowns occurred, in the 18–25 group, it fluctuates between just under 7 percent and 11 percent of those people have contemplated suicide in the previous 12 months. What we now know is that just in June—not twelve months, just one month—it’s now over 25 percent of them have contemplated suicide in just one month. Now why is that? We’ve taken away everything they love, deprived them of the opportunity to socialize and to experience those irreplaceable moments of youth and demanded they accept this dystopia as the new normal and tell them there’s something wrong with them if they long for normal human life, the kind that is lived by humans. Yeah, that’s selfish, that right there. That’s selfish.
One of my friends has a friend in Melbourne, Australia, which is under a severe lockdown. Here’s what this friend wrote:
It’s been three months since I saw another human face besides [my partner’s].
Seven months since [my partner] and I had a little break together in the form of going and having a coffee down the street.
Over a year since I last sat out in nature. Sitting staring at the wall for two hours, again, unable to move.
Despair
Horrible negative emotions virtually all day.
Awake and tired nights, distress.
I can’t think of anything to look forward to because I don’t know when we will be allowed to do anything.
Just go for a drive, go to the forest.
Just go somewhere together, far from all this.
We are not allowed.
The police could enter our homes at any point and arrest us if we say the “wrong” thing online. That has happened.
This doesn’t feel human.
I don’t smile.
I don’t laugh.
I worked out the other day and I felt nothing, no pain.
Nothing would register as pain.
I couldn’t feel anything.
I feel far away from myself.
Sometimes I forget how long the day has been going for.
Does it matter?
You’re not allowed to leave, even if family members are terminally ill. They could die before we are let out of Melbourne. We got told it isn’t a good enough reason to be let out.
You aren’t allowed more than five kilometers from your house.
You aren’t allowed to buy a takeaway coffee and sit under a tree or on the ground anywhere that isn’t your house.
This isn’t human.
This isn’t human.
This isn’t human.
This isn’t human.
There is no empathy here.
No price is too high.
Suicide is not too great a price to pay.
Self-harm is not too great a price to pay.
Structural brain changes in large portions of the population is not too high a price to pay.
Do you know what prolonged social isolation does to the brain?
We are made to feel it does not matter because all we are, are numbers.
We are not people; we are the masses without a say
Without a time period to look forward to when we can hug again
I am sharing my experience because you should know the truth.
Sincerely,
A faceless number in Melbourne.
And we’re the ones who don’t care about human lives. Screw these bastards.
Over at Stanford, Dr. Jay Bhattacharya put it this way. “To get zero COVID, I don’t know if it’s even technically feasible.” We know that we’re going to have to destroy our society in order to get it. Essentially, it’s so high a cost that it’s not worth it. Oh, we’re just doing it until there’s a vaccine. But, in just half a year of doing it, the consequences have been, to quote Dr. Bhattacharya again, “catastrophic.” Sunetra Gupta, of Oxford, whom I mentioned before, who has been called the world’s preeminent infectious disease epidemiologist, says, “It’s a good thing for young and healthy people to be exposed.” She says, “This is how we have always managed viruses. Why is this so different? If we keep introducing restrictions and lockdowns while we wait for a vaccine, it will be the young that suffer the most, particularly those from more deprived backgrounds. We can’t keep doing this. It would be an injustice.” One Yale professor came back with, “Well, no serious scientist is calling for lockdowns everywhere all the time.” Some of them are, so that’s not even true. Some of them are. But all these other scientists want are just sudden lockdowns here, there, and everywhere, then partial resumptions, then lockdowns, all the while with the arts completely shut down. Oh yeah, that’s a whole lot different. We cannot run a society like this. And without the arts, as Professor Gupta put it, “What are we alive for in the first place?” What kind of a life does this portend? Everything that makes life worth living.
Now, we hear this a lot. If you knew someone who died of it, maybe you’d take this virus seriously. Well, how about this? I’ll take the virus seriously, whatever that means, if you take seriously or even mention even once, the seventeen areas of noncovid life, where your supposedly anticovid strategy has left wreckage everywhere. How about that? Is that a deal? Or how about this one? All the people who have died from covid, all those people had families and we should honor them, respect it. Of course no one’s denying that. But, how about the 1.4 million people who according to the New York Times will die of tuberculosis because of the lockdown, over and above the number of tuberculosis deaths we would have had otherwise? Do those people have families? We don’t have to think about that because they don’t exist, because don’t forget, public health just means the monomaniacal fixation on one virus. Tuberculosis, sorry. Didn’t make the cut. Those people’s families don’t matter; they’re not even going to be mentioned. How about the extra 385,000 malaria deaths, the extra half a million HIV deaths? Do those people have families? Can we not be narcissists for five seconds and consider that maybe other people matter too, not just your friends, but other people and their friends? How about that for a change? A hundred and thirty million people at risk of starvation from the lockdowns and we’re even having this debate anymore?
But Woods, you’ll say, you’ve got to listen to the science. “Listen to the science” has become the rallying cry of the most irrational, anecdote-driven, fact-free believers in voodoo I have encountered in my lifetime.
I had Martin Kulldorff on my podcast, the Tom Woods Show. I actually bought the domain Tomspodcast.com, get there very easily. He is an infectious disease epidemiologist at Harvard Medical School and he told me that it may be that a lot of scientists think lockdowns are the way to go. He said, But I basically talk to infectious disease epidemiologists and among that group, from what I would see, a majority of us are against the lockdowns, have been from the beginning, and we favor a totally different strategy of what we call focused protection of vulnerable groups. But yeah, the infectious disease epidemiologists, he said, we’re not calling for lockdowns.
Huh, isn’t that funny. We don’t really hear from these people very much, do we? By some odd coincidence, we don’t hear from them.
Can you believe the people who shout at you for jogging without a mask or who hurriedly cross the street when they see you so that they can maintain social distance? You don’t get covid by a chance passing on the street. Those people don’t get to lecture you about science. If they themselves were less ignorant of the science, they’d be embarrassed by their irrational behavior.
The “listen to the science” people warned us about opening schools. The results have been fine. Even The Atlantic just ran an article, like within the past twenty-four hours, saying, Hmm, the crazy warnings over the summer seem to have been overblown. Well, there’s an understatement. At the universities, we’ve had so far seventy thousand so-called cases, three hospitalizations and zero deaths.
Then there’s the general craziness. In the county where the city of Gainesville, Florida, is, they established a one-person-per-one-thousand-square-feet rule for private businesses. And at a meeting the county commission chair was asked to justify this. Now, did he justify this on the basis of Well, science tells us that…You already know the answer. This is all voodoo. None of it has to do with science. His answer was, Well we put that in there “because it’s easy math for everybody to do.”
If I were one of these “listen to the science” people, I would be mortified right now. I mean, I feel like I am listening to the actual science—not the voodoo practitioners, but the actual science. Lockdowns aren’t science, by the way. There’s no book that they’re following that tells them lockdowns are the way to go. So, when we get told, Well the reason that lockdowns didn’t work is that you didn’t do it right—this is based on literally nothing.
And I asked, again, Professor Kulldorff about this. He said, there’s essentially no chance of eradicating a virus in this way. What you can do is cause a huge number of ancillary problems that will be worse, but you won’t eradicate it. Now they can get away with that because we just don’t mention those ancillary problems. We shouldn’t even call them ancillary. If I show you charts of different American states or different countries, and we look at cases or deaths or whatever, you will not be able to tell me which ones locked down, when they locked down, how hard they locked down, when they lifted the lockdown, whether they had a mask mandate, when they imposed the mask mandate, and when and if they lifted the mask mandate. You have absolutely no way of knowing that. Now, if these things were as powerful as we’re told, there darn well better be some clear and obvious way of distinguishing one jurisdiction from another, and there is not. Therefore, it is voodoo. And I think the more we use the word “voodoo,” the better.
I have an article linked on a special page I put together that goes through and justifies this and looks and says, Look, obviously the lockdowns do not solve the problem. So, you can find that on my website, TomWoods.com/covid and you’ll find some other very interesting things there as well, but in the interest of time, I’ll refer you to that there. Same with mask mandates. Is it possible that certain types of masks in certain types of situations when worn correctly could have some minor effect? Sure it is. But the religious fervor behind masks, which clearly cannot be justified, because we’re being told if we had worn masks sooner or if we just wear masks for six weeks this will all stop or whatever. Again, go to TomWoods.com/covid, I’ve got the charts up there, for place after place after place after place and on. In each chart, it’s indicated exactly when the mask mandate went into effect, and you ask yourself: If I hadn’t told you where on that chart the mask mandate had gone into effect, would you have been able to tell? Would you have had any idea? So, if they’re that effective, they’re so effective that the director of the CDC says they’re better than a vaccine, you would think we’d be able to see it on the charts. Can’t see it at all, nothing. Oh, it would be worse if we didn’t…Come on. We should see something. Nothing.
There’s a guy on Twitter, Eric Topol, who is one of the big the-world-is-ending apocalyptic people on the virus, and he told us the reason Japan did well is their government shipped masks to the people. Okay. If you needed any more evidence this guy’s a BS artist, there you go. Because number one, yeah, they sent enough masks to last people one day. Secondly, the masks were all the wrong size. It’s the government, after all. They’re all child sized; nobody can fit them. So, everybody in Japan laughed and joked about these masks and nobody wore them, but this know-nothing idiot is on Twitter lecturing us about this. He doesn’t know a thing. Again, look at the charts for the Philippines, the most mask compliant country in the world. Hawaii doesn’t have a neighbor for two thousand miles and they wore masks religiously. Didn’t do a thing, in terms of cases.
What exactly would the graphs have to look like in order for the lockdowners to say, Maybe none of this does any good. What would they have to look like? I think they’d have to look exactly the way they look now. Meanwhile, in the Sunbelt (I live in Florida), the spike there fizzled out on its own, everywhere, despite different policies. We were told, I saw on Twitter, we were going to have half a million deaths, we’re going to have dozens of New Yorks if they don’t lock down. We didn’t lock down; we didn’t come anywhere near that. In Florida, the only thing that happened in some places was that some bars closed, but what really happened was the bars pretended to be restaurants and they kept going and that was it. And I guess the virus was tricked by the bars pretending to be restaurants. What kind of BS is this? California, where they had this massive lockdown, their curve looks exactly like Florida’s.
And a friend told me [that] at his work they’re scared of an applicant from Florida and they said, We got to be careful, they do things differently there. Their curves are the same. Paul Krugman, when Governor DeSantis said he was opening up Florida, Paul Krugman said, “Oh, that’s very unwise. They’re sill having over 100 deaths per day in Florida.” No, they’re not, you ignorant moron. We’re not having a hundred deaths per day. They’re reporting a hundred deaths per day. Now, reporting date is very different from actual date of death. So, for example, I just looked at October 1. October 1, there were I guess 130 deaths reported. Sixty-five of them were in September, fifty-four were in August, another eleven were in July. There are no hundred deaths occurring per day, and with hospitalizations plunging, it’s not like three months from now when we recount today it will turn out to be a hundred. No. So, he doesn’t even know that or maybe he does and he’s just being…I don’t know.
And now we’ve learned from the New York Times, as I mentioned before, that up to 90 percent of these tests that are coming back positive could be in people who are not contagious and therefore are being ordered to isolate for no reason. Because the PCR tests that they’re using are being calibrated in a way that they’re super sensitive in the United States. So, in Europe they’re using about let’s say thirty cycles. In the US, it’s thirty-seven to forty. In Arizona, it’s forty, at forty they’re detecting nothing. That is completely pointless and most of what’s going on in Arizona is at forty. So, in Washington, DC, a fellow named Phil Kerpen from American Commitment asked them, What’s the cycle threshold that you’re using for these tests? And DC Health got back to him. DC Health “does not have information about cycle thresholds.” What kind of a joke is that? So, the tests could be completely meaningless and we haven’t even looked into it.
Now finally (I am going a little bit over and I hope the Mises people will let me do it, but I’ll make it up to you somehow, I promise), an immunologist, like somebody who is an expert on immunology like Dr. Fauci, is not taught how to balance public health concerns. People say, Oh, just listen to the experts, and, You won’t listen to the experts. Well, I feel like I am listening to the experts, but there are some questions that no expert can answer or that some experts aren’t trained to answer. There’s no class that an immunologist takes that teaches, well, if you lock everybody in their houses, there could be other effects of this that…He doesn’t learn anything like that. And here’s how you balance it: well, if you do this, there’ll be this many of that. He doesn’t learn anything like that. So, it’s just, again, it’s rank superstition, like this is some kind of priesthood. It’s rank superstition to think that Dr. Fauci could view this so holistically as to have the overall answer.
We have the answer. What is worth doing and what isn’t? We could all drive our cars at five miles an hour and save a lot of lives. We don’t think that’s worth doing. We don’t wait for Dr. Fauci to tell us what the speed limit should be. We understand the absurdity of that. And here’s what Dr. Bhattacharya said. I love this guy. He’s from Stanford. He is the consummate professional. He’s not like me, gets really worked up, and that makes him all the more effective, because he’s slicing and dicing with his calmly delivered sentences. So, here’s what he said about Dr. Fauci, and it’s about time this crazy priesthood was taken down a peg: “Dr. Fauci’s been involved in infectious disease control for a very long time. He’s a preeminent scientist for a good reason; he’s an expert. But, in early February, March, we sort of put him on a pedestal, to essentially give his knowledge about a whole range of things, some of which were in his control and knowledge set, some of which were not. And I saw him a few months ago where he very humbly said, ‘Look, I’m giving you my expertise as an infectious disease expert on how to manage this disease. I’m not looking at the broader policy context.’”
Exactly my point. Dr. Bhattacharya again: “We think about science as giving us all the answers, but that’s a mistake. What science does is tell us if we do A, we might get B. It’s up to nonscientists to make a decision. Do we want to get B if we know the costs of getting B are C, D and E? Do we really want zero COVID?” Well again, only a blockhead would think that’s a scientific question. That’s a philosophical question. And again, this is where he says, “If you get zero COVID, we know that we’re going to have to destroy our society in order to get it. We’ll have to get rid of all our freedoms, we’ll have to make sure that very few people interact with each other. It’s so high in cost that it’s not worth it. Science can tell us, here’s how you can minimize the probability of getting COVID, but it’s up to nonscientists to decide whether it’s worth it. You can’t put one person on a pedestal and ask him to make that decision for society. I love that I live in a democratic society where those kinds of decisions aren’t up to experts. It’s up to people deciding together through electoral processes what we value.” That’s Bhattacharya.
So, of course, no expert can tell you if the costs are worth the benefits because no expert can know your value scale. So, when people say we need to listen to the experts as they urge us to dismantle everything that makes a society function and brings people joy, they have no idea what they’re talking about. This is a philosophical question, not one that a scientific source would have the standing to answer. Unfortunately, for some people, science is not an ongoing search for the truth and whose findings can help us make good decisions. It’s a kind of priesthood, and whatever scientists tell us about anything, no matter how far removed from their areas of expertise, these people will obey, and the dangers of that should be obvious. Not only do we have a priesthood that isn’t even thinking about tradeoffs or collateral damage from their covid monomania, but we also have tens of millions of devoted followers who will help enforce whatever lunacy the priesthood proposes. And your hopes, dreams, and livelihood will be placed on that alter, of that you can be sure.
Now, what should have been done instead? Well, here I refer you to Drs. Bhattacharya and Kulldorff and Gupta, who have a recent statement explaining that so-called focused protection makes much more sense and is certainly feasible. That is to say, you give young people their lives back. Have the arts be resumed immediately. And again, Dr. Gupta said, why are we even living? What is the point of living? If living is simply having a pulse, I could do that in a windowless room eating cans of navy beans for seventy-five years. Is that a human life? These are the kinds of questions we need to ask ourselves.
Finally, how about Sweden? You’re not supposed to mention Sweden. Now, I could mention Japan; they had one of the highest covid infection rates in the world, the world’s oldest population, yet one of the lowest death rates and they did that with very halfhearted measures and no mass testing. So, there are a million explanations. They had to explain this away. But the key example was Sweden. Now what they used to say to us was, You can’t use the example of Sweden because Sweden has a high death rate. Sweden had five thousand deaths out of a country of 10 million. About two-thirds to three-quarters of those were in long-term care facilities, and they did a horrendous job there and they admit that. But, look at the rest of them. So, that means that they actually have a very small number in the general society. The question of how did people do in nursing homes when they’re completely isolated from society, is now in a way a commentary on how the strategy works for society at large. And now that Sweden’s example is looking really good because their curve looks like this. I mean they basically have no…They’ve resumed normal life. Just look at pictures from Stockholm. It lives right down here. Whereas if you look at Spain, it’s like this and France it’s like this. Sweden is just like that.
So now we don’t mention Sweden and what we say is, Oh, well, the reason Sweden did so well…so now notice it switched. First it was, Sweden, they’re dying everywhere. Now it’s, The reason Sweden did so well…They can’t just stop and say, Maybe I don’t have all the answers. The reason they did so well is people voluntarily complied with these measures and they wouldn’t do that in the US because you’re all a bunch of stupid hicks and whatever. Okay. All you have to do is look at pictures from Stockholm over the summer and you decide if that’s true or not, but the key thing is, they never closed schools for ages 1 to 15; they never closed down businesses and they had no mask mandate. How do you account for this? And you don’t get an answer. You do not get an answer.
It seems to me the only answer, at this point, is the one that was obvious from the beginning. Let people decide how they want to live, what risks they’re willing to take and what life means to them. Governor DeSantis, when he had his press conference, reopening Florida, said, You know, we shouldn’t assume we know what everybody wants, because I know a lot of older folks who when they get visited by their relatives wearing masks, they say, please take off your mask, I want to see your smile. And who are we to say no? Or, You should see your grandchildren only over Zoom forever? Or, You should be isolated in a nursing home forever with no human contact? Or, You can see people through a window if you like. We’re really not going to ultimately say. You decide what’s best for you, because we all take different risks that we’re willing to tolerate.
Martin Kulldorff at Harvard Medical School says, “The experts are afraid to speak out.” You have a lot of blah-blah-blah people who are not entitled to an opinion. He says the experts, the infectious disease epidemiologists, are afraid to speak out. Nice society you’ve given us, hysterics, where the actual experts qualified in this field are afraid to speak out, a society of fear. Nice going. Now, incidentally, my view is there are people who have lost their livelihoods, their lives, things that give them meeting, and all you have to do is speak out. Speak out. Enough is enough. By now, we’ve all gotten the message that you’re selfish if you want to do the kinds of things that once gave your life meaning. For these people, life is about nothing but the avoidance of death and you can’t have anything back until they say so. How did we let this happen? They wouldn’t dare have told us this back when it was fifteen days to flatten the curve. No way. Nope, it’s, You’ve got to have virtual events over Zoom, and no hugs and no weddings and ten people at your father’s funeral, and all these other grotesque demands that we’ve gone along with.
What metrics are they using to tell us when we can have things back? Not the ones they told us at the beginning. We’ve met all those and we still can’t have any back. Well, maybe you can have it in 2021. Fauci says spring of 2022, if everybody gets vaccinated. Okay. So, part of the natural order is that parents make sacrifices for their children, not the other way around. If vulnerable people want to isolate themselves, and I can understand why they would, then they should do that. But, as I am going through middle age it would never occur to me to make those demands of young people, never. Because I would think that was selfish, selfish of me that when I was young I got to experience all these things, all these irreplaceably beautiful moments of youth, but you can’t have them, to keep me safe. No, I’ll stay safe by following precautions and limiting my contacts, but you go out and enjoy the one life you get. That’s what a good and decent human being says. That’s what an unselfish person says.
The CDC is now saying we should go have a virtual Thanksgiving. Nope, not doing that. Not doing that. I’m going to go see people and hug them on Thanksgiving like a human and that is what we should do.
A lot of older people I talk to say, We don’t want out children’s lives ruined. We don’t want our grandchildren’s lives ruined. We don’t want you to do this for us. Enough is enough at this point. The doomers keep having this crazy comic book view of the virus. When Wisconsin’s bars were allowed to open, that was supposed to lead to a million deaths. It didn’t. The Sunbelt spike was supposed to kill everybody. It didn’t. Those spikes were long over; they were brought up and down without lockdowns. South Dakota never closed at all. They’re doing fine. But then they had that Sturgis motorcycle rally and we got told, The Sturgis Motorcycle Rally led to 260,000 cases. It was a superspreader event. Well then Slate, you know Slate, the enemy of mankind, Slate, the website? They ran an article saying, Look, let’s be honest. The Sturgis Motorcycle Rally did not lead to 260,000 cases. You’re only saying that because you want it to have led to 260,000 cases, but this is BS. Now, Slate is not known for standing up for Trump-loving biker dudes. So, the only reason they would run an article like that is that it’s true. The virus does what it will do, regardless of what our priesthood with their white coats and clipboards tries to do.
There’s a sickness out there, all right, but I’m not talking about covid-19. I’m talking about the irrational fact-free response. We should demand our lives back, take our lives back. This is not selfish. It is selfish to be ignoring all the collateral damage that’s being done by this policy. You get one life, you want to live it, that’s normal. What’s selfish and abnormal is the presumption that other people are entitled to your life or to take an arbitrary number of years away from your life. If they want to live as prisoners in their own homes and experience life over Zoom, they can be our guests. The rest of us—I think I can speak for all of us in this room—intend to live. Thank you.
[From the 2020 Supporters Summit, presented at the historic Jekyll Island Club Resort on Jekyll Island, Georgia, on October 9, 2020.]
There are two distinct classes in America, and we have to break up. And we have to break up sooner rather than later. If we are to avoid a disastrous conflict, each side has to let the other go.
From the 2020 Supporters Summit, presented at the historic Jekyll Island Club Resort on Jekyll Island, Georgia, on October 9, 2020.
Vague and generalizing theories about culture and race don't tell us much about the wealth gap between blacks and whites. The answer is more complex.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Problems with Theories on the Black-White Wealth Gap".
Libertarian writer David Ramsay Steele joins Bob for a fun tour of some essays from his collection, "The Mystery of Fascism".
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this episode.David Ramsay Steele’s books The Mystery of Fascism and From Marx to Mises.Bryan Caplan’s article endorsing the Thomas Szasz approach to mental illness.Comedian Bill Hicks on the JFK assassination. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Jeff Deist joins David Gornoski to discuss some important upcoming events. Deist addresses the absence of the trillion-dollar deficit and other topics not addressed in the debate. Is there a mass clamoring for the COVID economic shutdowns? What does Dick Costolo’s tweet on executing business leaders reveal about the mindset of Big Tech barons? Who are the Spanish scholastics and how have they influenced the Austrian school of economics? Listen to the full episode to find out.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
Our guest is physician and author Sally Satel, MD. Dr. Satel is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and staff psychiatrist at a local methadone clinic in the Washington DC area. She earned a bachelor’s degree from Cornell University, a master’s degree from the University of Chicago, and an MD degree from Brown University.
She has written widely in academic journals on topics in psychiatry and medicine, and has published articles on cultural aspects of medicine and science in numerous magazines and journals. She has testified before Congress on veterans’ issues, mental health policy, drug courts, and health disparities. She is the author of numerous books including The Health Disparities Myth: Diagnosing the Treatment Gap with co-author Jonathan Klick and, most recently, Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience co-authored with Scott Lilienfeld.
SHOW NOTES Sally Satel, MD: Twitter and Website
“The Hypocritical Oath” (in Persuasion online community)
The Health Disparities Myth: Diagnosing the Treatment Gap (with co-author Jonathan Klick)
Watch the episode on YouTube
Ryan McMaken and Tho Bishop talk about Tuesday's debate, why "the issues" don't matter, and why the debate probably won't change the minds of many voters.
And be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at mises.org/RadioRothbard.
It seems that the rest of us will be forced to suffer as egalitarian rich kids work out their psychological problems through some window-smashing therapy.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Michael Stack.
Original Article: "What's with the Rich Kid Revolutionaries?".
Jeff Deist joins David to discuss the latest news of Nashville officials withholding covid numbers from bars and restaurants. What lessons can future generations learn from the stupidity of governments shutting down economies on bogus information? Are mainstream journalists sacrosanct in our culture?
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
Dr. Michael Rectenwald was a professor of liberal studies at NYU from 2008 to 2019. Although at one point he was a committed Marxist, he gradually lost faith, and is now an outspoken critic of campus activists. Bob asks Rectenwald about apparent contradictions in the current cultural Marxist / postmodern movement, and they discuss several themes from his new book, Beyond Woke.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this episode.Michael Rectenwald’s website.Michael Rectenwald’s books Beyond Woke and Springtime for Snowflakes. #CommissionsEarned (As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)Michael’s lecture on postmodernism at the Mises Institute. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Jeff Deist returns to the show. Are there any differences between North Korea and Antifa? David asks. Deist says that, for the left, democracy is a means to an end. Listen to the full episode for all this and more.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
This show features a personal and revealing interview of Comic Dave Smith by Jeff Deist. It shows a side of Dave you haven't seen before—so don't miss it.
And be sure to follow Radio Rothbard at mises.org/RadioRothbard.
Eric July is the front man for the street-hop/metalcore group Backwordz. He discusses his personal odyssey in navigating the leftist metal scene. Bob then asks Eric about another of his major interests, comic books.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Eric July’s homepage.The website for Backwordz.Eric’s YouTube review of Captain Marvel. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Our first show was recorded with a raucous live audience at our recent event in Orlando, with Jeff Deist hosting and Lena Wang, Tho Bishop, and Patrick Newman joining. They handicap Trump's reelection chances, consider whether Biden makes it to election day, and defend the young shooter Kyle Rittenhouse caught up in the Kenosha riots. Don't miss this hardboiled hour of pro-liberty populism, with a strong dose of anti-politics every Rothbardian will love!
In the Ron Howard movie "A Beautiful Mind," Russell Crowe plays John Nash, a major figure in game theory. Although it was a good movie, it totally misconstrues Nash's doctoral dissertation and how it fit into the pre-existing literature. In this episode, Bob sets the record straight.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: John Nash’s doctoral dissertation.Bob’s link for Liberty Classroom. (If you click this link and then register, the site will know you came from me.)Sylvia Nasar’s book that inspired the Ron Howard movie about Nash. #CommissionsEarned (As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)A good explanation of the Allais Paradox (which shows limits of expected utility theory).Bob Murphy Show ep. 96, which starts with critique of use of game theory. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Last time we met in Orlando, Bob Murphy mentioned how much worse our political and social divide would be if the economy crashed like 2008. Now we face this very problem—with COVID-19 lockdowns and George Floyd protests decimating the economy and social media exposing raw animosity along racial and "woke" lines. Congress and the Fed have gone into overdrive creating new stimulus and "liquidity," but 40 million Americans are unemployed and major cities are still recovering from turmoil. The national debt tops $26 trillion while tax receipts at all levels of government plummet.
So what does it all mean for you, for freedom, and for the future of America—economic and otherwise?
Recorded in Orlando, Florida, on August 29, 2020. Special thanks to Mr. and Mrs. Greg Roe for making this event possible.
DC execs think Superman is "too perfect" to resonate with modern audiences, but Dan Sanchez profoundly disagrees. He and Bob discuss this issue and other topics in the intersection of politics & superhero movies.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Dan Sanchez’s FEE articleBob’s previous interview with Dan on the JokerThe Captain America clipBob’s article Superman Needs an AgentJordan Peterson on Cain and AbelSome Supes clips mentioned: one, two, three, and four For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Our guest is Amy Wax, Robert Mundheim Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Before attending law school she obtained her undergraduate degree from Yale University in biophysics and biochemistry, graduating summa cum laude. She then attended Harvard Medical School and trained as a neurologist at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center before completing her law degree at Columbia University. She is the author of Race, Wrongs, and Remedies: Group Justice in the 21st Century. In 2017, she was the target of academic backlash after co-authoring an opinion piece in the Philadelphia Inquirer on the societal benefits of “bourgeois values.”
SHOW NOTES Amy Wax: Faculty page and Wikipedia entry
Watch the episode on YouTube
One of the standard criticisms of the free market point of view is that it treats individuals as isolated atoms who view other people only as means to the pursuit of their selfish ends.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Jefferson on the Family and Liberty".
[This article is excerpted from chapter 3 of Classical Liberalism and the Austrian School. Footnote numbering differs from the original.]
Hayek on the Intellectuals and Socialism F.A. Hayek was acutely concerned with our problem, since he, too, was wholly convinced of the importance of the intellectuals: “They are the organs which modern society has developed for spreading knowledge and ideas,” he declares in his essay “The Intellectuals and Socialism” (Hayek 1967). The intellectuals—whom Hayek characterizes as “the professional secondhand dealers in ideas”This definition by Hayek is somewhat idiosyncratic, in that it excludes the originators of ideas, e.g., among socialists, Saint-Simon and Marx.—exercise their power through their domination of public opinion: “There is little that the ordinary man of today learns about events or ideas except through the medium of this class.” Among other things, they often virtually manufacture professional reputations in the minds of the general population; and through their domination of the news media, they color and shape the information that people in each country have of events and trends in foreign nations. Once an idea is adopted by the intellectuals, its acceptance by the masses is “almost automatic and irresistible.” Ultimately, the intellectuals are the legislators of mankind (178–80, 182).
With all this, Hayek’s view of the intellectuals is flatteringly benign: their ideas are determined by and large by “honest convictions and good intentions” (184).At one point (182) Hayek does suggest that selfish personal interests might play a part in the intellectuals’ attitude; he refers, without naming him, to Karl Mannheim and “the curious claim…that [the intellectual class] was the only one whose views were not decidedly influenced by its own economic interests.” But he does not indicate why he considers this claim “curious.” In “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” Hayek does mention in passing the intellectuals’ egalitarian bias; the analysis, however, is basically in terms of their “scientism.” With his characteristic emphasis on epistemology, Hayek sees the revolt against the market economy as stemming from the methodological errors he identified and investigated at length in his brilliant study of the rise of French positivism, The Counter-Revolution of Science (1955).
Thus, in Hayek’s view, the chief influence on the intellectuals has been the example of the natural sciences and their applications. As man has come to understand and then control the forces of nature, intellectuals have grown infatuated with the idea that an analogous mastery of social forces could produce similar benefits for mankind. They are under the sway of “such beliefs as that deliberate control or conscious organization is also in social affairs always superior to the results of spontaneous processes which are not directed by a human mind, or that any order based on a plan beforehand must be better than one formed by the balancing of opposing forces” (186–87). Hayek even makes the following astonishing statement (187):
That, with the application of engineering techniques, the direction of all forms of human activity according to a single coherent plan should prove to be as successful in society as it has been in innumerable engineering tasks is too plausible a conclusion not to seduce most of those who are elated by the achievements of the natural sciences. It must indeed be admitted both that it would require powerful arguments to counter the strong presumption in favor of such a conclusion and that these arguments have not yet been adequately stated….The argument will not lose its force until it has been conclusively shown why what has proved so eminently successful in producing advances in so many fields should have limits to its usefulness and become positively harmful if extended beyond those limits.
It is exceedingly difficult to follow Hayek’s reasoning here. He appears to be saying that because the natural sciences have made great advances and because innumerable particular engineering projects have succeeded, it is quite understandable that many intellectuals should conclude that “the direction of all forms of human activity according to a single coherent plan” will be similarly successful.
But, in the first place, the advances of the natural sciences were not brought about in accordance with any overall central plan; rather, they were the product of many separate decentralized but coordinated researchers (produced analogously in some respects to the market process; see Baker 1945 and Polanyi 1951These are both works with which Hayek was quite familiar, which makes his argument at this point more perplexing.). Second, from the fact that many particular engineering projects have succeeded it does not follow that a single vast engineering project, one subsuming all particular projects, is likely to succeed; nor does it seem likely that most people will find such a claim plausible.
Why, then, is it natural, or logical, or easily comprehensible that intellectuals should reason from the triumphs of decentralized scientific research and of individual engineering projects to the success of a plan undertaking to direct “all forms of human activity”?In another essay, on “Socialism and Science,” 1978: 295, Hayek refers to “the undeniable propensity of minds trained in the physical sciences, as well as of engineers, to prefer a deliberately created orderly arrangement to the results of spontaneous growth—an influential and common attitude, which frequently attracts intellectuals to socialist schemes. This is a widespread and important phenomenon which has had a profound effect on the development of political thought.” It seems highly doubtful that surveys of political opinion among university professors in the United States, western Europe, or elsewhere, would find socialist opinions more common among physical scientists and engineers than in the humanities and social science faculties.
In his review of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, Joseph Schumpeter (1946: 269) remarks that Hayek was “polite to a fault” towards his opponents, in that he hardly ever attributed to them “anything beyond intellectual error.” But not all the points that must be made can be made without more “plain speaking,” Schumpeter declares.Hayek 1973: 161n. 18, 70, rebutted Schumpeter’s criticism, asserting that it was not “‘politeness to a fault’ but profound conviction about what are the decisive factors” for his having attributed merely intellectual error to his opponents in The Road to Serfdom. Hayek reaffirmed that: “It is necessary to realize that the sources of many of the most harmful agents in this world are often not evil men but highminded idealists, and that in particular the foundations of totalitarian barbarism have been laid by honorable and well-meaning scholars who never recognized the offspring they produced.” One wonders how Hayek could know this about the character of those who “laid the foundations of totalitarian barbarism.”
Schumpeter here implies an important distinction. Civility in debate, including the formal presumption of good faith on the part of one’s adversaries, is always in order. But there is also a place for the attempt to explain the attitudes, for instance, of anti-market intellectuals (a form of the sociology of knowledge). In this endeavor, “politeness” is not precisely what is most called for. As regards the positivist intellectuals who argued from the successes of natural science to the need for central planning: it may well be that this false inference was no simple intellectual error, but was facilitated by their prejudices and resentments, or perhaps their own will to power.Cf. the comment by George Stigler 1989: 6: “a central reason for the dissatisfaction of the intellectuals with the enterprise system” is that “it does not give them a mechanism to coerce changes in the behavior of individuals.” Cf. also Robert Skidelsky 1978: 83, who mentions, as one factor in the conversion of the younger American economists to Keynesianism, that, in the version propagated by Alvin Hansen, it provided a “rationale for the permanent direction of economic life by an élite of economists….In the Keynesian political economy, public policy would be handed over to the professional economists, who alone would understand what needed to be done.” Robert Higgs 1987a: 116 observes that American Progressives around 1900 found state intervention appealing because it implied a social organization supervised and directed by engineers, planners, technicians, and trained bureaucrats, and thus put “a wise minority in the saddle.”
In any case, Hayek’s gentlemanly deference to anti-market intellectuals can sometimes be downright misleading. Consider his statement (1967: 193):
Orthodoxy of any kind, any pretense that a system of ideas is final and must be unquestioningly accepted as a whole, is the one view which of necessity antagonizes all intellectuals, whatever their views on particular issues.
This, of a category of persons that in the twentieth century has notoriously included thousands of prominent apologists for Soviet Communism in all western countries, is indeed politeness “to a fault.”There is by now a substantial literature on the subject; see, for instance, Caute 1973. Richard Pipes 1993: 202 makes the interesting comment that: “The Bolshevik regime, for all its objectionable features, attracted them [intellectuals] because it was the first government since the French Revolution to vest power in people of their own kind. In Soviet Russia, intellectuals could expropriate capitalists, execute political opponents, and muzzle reactionary ideas.” See also the challenge issued by Eugene D. Genovese (1994) to his fellow intellectuals to testify publicly on what they knew of the crimes of Soviet Communism and when they knew it. There was, after all, good reason, as late as the 1950s, for Raymond Aron (1957) to have written on The Opium of the Intellectuals and for H.B. Acton (1955) to have entitled what is probably the best philosophical critique of Marxism-Leninism The Illusion of the Epoch.Cf. O’Brien 1994: 344, who notes that “the overwhelming majority of [his] academic colleagues adopted an attitude of judicious agnosticism and relativism towards the horrors of the Stalinist and other Marxist regimes.”
Nor was Communism the only nefarious orthodoxy to claim the loyalty of numerous intellectuals, as is shown by the cases of Martin Heidegger, Robert Brasillach, Giovanni Gentile, Ezra Pound, and many others. For a less complimentary but more realistic view of the integrity of modern intellectuals we may turn to the memoirs of the German historian Golo Mann (1991: 534), who quotes from his diary of 1933: “18 May. [Josef] Goebbels in front of a writers’ meeting in the Hotel Kaiserhof: ‘We [Nazis] have been reproached with not being concerned with the intellectuals. That was not necessary for us. We knew quite well: if we first have power, then the intellectuals will come on their own.’ Thunderous applause—from the intellectuals.”Benjamin Constant 1988: 137–38, in criticizing the French writers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, described the intellectuals’ penchant to identify with arbitrary power: “all the great developments of extrajudicial force, all the examples of recourse to illegal measures in dangerous circumstances have from century to century been recounted with respect and described with complacency. The author, sitting comfortably at his desk, hurls arbitrary measures in every direction….For a moment, he believes himself invested with power just because he is preaching its abuse…in this way he gives himself something of the pleasure of authority; he repeats as loud as he can the great words of public safety, supreme law, public interest….Poor imbecile! He talks to those who are only too glad to listen to him and who, at the first opportunity, will test out his own theories upon him.” Constant’s words may be viewed as a prescient gloss on Stalin’s treatment of many of the Bolshevik intellectuals who had lent their aid to the creation of the Soviet terror state.
Schumpeter on the Intellectual Proletariat In chiding Hayek, Schumpeter suggested (1946: 269) that he might have learned a useful lesson from Karl Marx. Schumpeter’s own interpretation reflects his lifelong engagement with Marxism. Like Marx, he offered a highly pessimistic prognosis for the capitalist system, though for mainly different reasons (1950: 131–45). But while Schumpeter holds that intellectuals will play a key role in capitalism’s demise, he in no way relies on the scenario set forth in the Communist Manifesto.
There, Marx and Engels (1976: 494) announced that as the final revolution approaches, a section of the “bourgeois ideologists” will go over to the side of the proletariat. These will be the ideologists “who have worked their way up to a theoretical understanding of the historical movement as a whole.”The critique of Marxism as the camouflaged ideology of an intellectual would-be “new class” is part of the communist anarchist tradition, begun by Bakunin and continued by Machajski and others; see Dolgoff 1971 and Szelenyi and Martin 1991. Such a laughably self-serving description could hardly appeal to an inveterate skeptic like Schumpeter. Instead, his “Marxism” consisted in examining capitalism as a system with certain attendant sociological traits, and exposing the class interests of the intellectuals within that system.This approach, however, like the Marxist analysis of historical change in terms of class conflict, had numerous precursors among classical liberal thinkers; see the essay on “The Conflict of Classes: Liberal vs. Marxist Theories,” in the present work.
Compared to previous social orders, capitalism is especially vulnerable to attack:
unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates, and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest. (1950: 146)
In particular, it brings forth and nurtures a class of secular intellectuals who wield the power of words over the general mind. The capitalist wealth machine makes possible cheap books, pamphlets, newspapers, and the ever-widening public that reads them. Freedom of speech and of the press enshrined in liberal constitutions entails also “freedom to nibble at the foundations of capitalist society”—a constant gnawing away that is promoted by the critical rationalism inherent in that form of society. Moreover, in contrast to earlier regimes, a capitalist state finds it difficult, except under exceptional circumstances, to suppress dissident intellectuals: such a procedure would conflict with the general principles of the rule of law and the limits to the police power dear to the bourgeoisie itself (1950: 148–51).
The key to the hostility of intellectuals to capitalism is the expansion of education, particularly higher education.Cf. Raymond Ruyer 1969: 155–56, who indicates the social and psychological problems resulting from prolonged state instruction (including “adult education”) and the diffusion of “culture” under the aegis of the state. He concludes: “It is typical that the greatest progress that has come about in ‘the democratic extension of culture’ has been produced by private enterprise in the form of paperback books, in which the state did not involve itself, except to impose its usual taxes.” A third of a century later, the same could be said of compact discs and computers. Ruyer’s work, quite unduly neglected, is a profound and elegant dissection of the intellectual’s persistent resentment of the free market economy and capitalist society. In this respect, it stands in contrast to the recent book of Raymond Boudon (2004). Despite its promising title (Why the Intellectuals Do Not Like Liberalism) and occasional insights, Boudon’s book proves to be superficial, e.g., in dating the intellectuals’ turn against a liberal order from around 1950. This creates unemployment, or underemployment, of the university-schooled classes; many become “psychically unemployable in manual occupations without necessarily acquiring employability in, say, professional work.” The tenuous social position of these intellectuals breeds discontent and resentment, which are often rationalized as objective social criticism. This emotional malaise, Schumpeter asserts,
will much more realistically account for hostility to the capitalist order than could the theory—itself a rationalization in the psychological sense—according to which the intellectual’s righteous indignation about the wrongs of capitalism simply represents the logical inference from outrageous facts… (1950: 152–53)Schumpeter 1950: 155 highlights an important channel of the intellectuals’ influence, by means of the state bureaucracies, which are “open to conversion by the modern intellectual with whom, through a similar education, they have much in common.”
A major merit of Schumpeter’s argument is that it elucidates an abiding feature of the sociology of radicalism and revolution: the hunt for government jobs. The interconnection between over-education, an expanding reservoir of unemployable intellectuals, the pressure for more bureaucratic positions, and political turmoil was a commonplace among European observers in the nineteenth century.See O’Boyle 1970; also Levy 1987: 160, who writes of “the state-created intelligentsias of post-Restoration Europe [i.e., after 1815] which, outpacing economic growth, faced serious underemployment and played important roles in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.” In the Reichstag, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (Raico 1999: 100) claimed that social revolutionaries in Russia consisted of the “diploma-proletariat,” an excess produced by higher education which society could not absorb. The leaders were not workers, but consisted “in part of people of genteel education, many half-educated people…dissipated students and unsullied dreamers…” In 1850, the conservative author Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1976: 227–38) offered a remarkable analysis, in many ways anticipating Schumpeter, of the “intellectual proletariat” (Geistesproletariat). Even then Germany was producing each year much more “intellectual product” than it could use or pay for, testifying to an “unnatural” division of national labor. This was a general phenomenon in advanced countries, Riehl maintains, resulting from the enormous industrial growth that was taking place. But the impoverished intellectual workers experience a contradiction between their income and their perceived needs, between their own haughty conception of their rightful social position and the true one, a contradiction which is far more irreconcilable than in the case of the manual laborers. Because they cannot “reform” their own meager salaries, they try to reform society. It is these intellectual proletarians who have taken the lead in social revolutionary movements in Germany. “These literati see the world’s salvation in the gospel of socialism and communism, because it contains their own salvation,” through domination of the masses.Schumpeter does not mention Riehl in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy and refers to him once in his History of Economic Analysis (1954: 427 and 427 n. 20), but only in connection with Riehl’s work in Kulturgeschichte (cultural history). Later revolutionary movements, whether of the left or the right, can be understood to a large extent as the ideologically camouflaged raid on the great state employment office. Carl Levy (1987: 180) has linked the expansion of the state from the later nineteenth century on to the growth in the numbers of the university-educated, who sought government jobs and utilized positivism as a facilitating ideology. Positivism
stressed the need for expertise, special training, and trained intelligence…[fortified by] a desacralizing of tradition and the rapid expansion of the public sphere…[there proliferated] schemes for the organization of society which substituted for traditional elites and capitalist entrepreneurs a stratum of experts and/or the lay clerisy. Examples can be found among the Fabians and the ILP [Independent Labor Party], [Edward] Bellamy and other American authoritarian utopia builders, the Italian socialist professors, and the French socialist elites.
From this perspective, we obtain a deeper understanding of the claim that the welfare state “saved capitalism.” What the welfare state has actually accomplished is to furnish a never-ending source of state jobs for the (mainly middle-class) products of what is still referred to as university education, without, as in the nineteenth century, requiring a revolutionary assault.Cf. Mises (1974: 47–48): “In dealing with the ascent of modern statism, socialism, and interventionism, one must not neglect the preponderant role played by pressure groups and lobbies of civil servants and those university graduates who longed for government jobs.” In this connection, Mises mentions the Fabian Society in Britain and the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) in Imperial Germany.
While there is doubtless a great deal of truth in Schumpeter’s identification of the systemic surplus of intellectuals as a source of anti-capitalism, it also presents certain difficulties.
Such an overproduction—and consequent un- or under-employment—is a feature of non-capitalist societies, as well. Its effect is the general destabilization of regimes, as occurs from time to time in underdeveloped countries. A more detailed knowledge of the situation in former Communist societies might show that it was also implicated in their subversion and final overthrow.
More to the point: it is not so much the unemployed intellectuals who are the problem but the ones who are employed. Intellectuals unable to find suitable jobs may well provide a receptive subculture as well as occasional cannon fodder for revolutionary movements: among communist anarchists in the late nineteenth century, or in some third world countries more recently. In Germany after the First World War, artists and writers frozen out of the avant-garde culture of Weimar were prominent among the early National Socialists.
But Schumpeter’s thesis does not hold for many other cases, probably the historically most significant ones. Émile Zola and Anatole France, Gerhart Hauptmann and Bertold Brecht, H.G. Wells and Bernard Shaw, John Dewey and Upton Sinclair were scarcely “unemployables” in the intellectual world. Today the “stars” of the mass news media of all the advanced countries—you would know their names in your own country; one could mention American “newspersons” who earn a million dollars a year or more, such being the savage inequalities of capitalism—are typically constant “nibblers” at the system of private enterprise. The question is rather why so many successful and highly influential intellectuals become carping critics of the free economy.Doubt is cast on Schumpeter’s fundamental analysis by Paul A. Samuelson 1981: 10, who points out that in Japan for decades “the continued omnipresence of Marxist terminology among journalists and teachers” has had no discernible effect on Japanese politics.
A recent article authored by Dr. Norman Wang on the history and current state of affirmative action programs in medical schools and cardiology departments has led to a storm of controversy and to Dr. Wang’s demotion as fellowship program director. To discuss that article and the controversies we are joined by Dr. Martha Gulati, division Chief of Cardiology at the University of Arizona. She is also the best-selling author of Saving Women’s Hearts and editor-in-chief of ACC’s CardioSmart.
SHOW NOTES Martha Gulati: Twitter and Website
The now retracted Wang paper
Journal of the AHA comment on retraction
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, SCOTUS decision
Watch the episode on YouTube
Anish Koka and Michel Accad discuss lockdowns in light of the experience of the last few months.
SHOW NOTES Michel Accad: It’s Not About Trade-OffsWatch the episode on YouTube
Bob first observes that the Left (institutionally) hates Christianity, and that standard explanations, such as its alleged bigotry, don't explain why the Left gives Islam a pass. Christianity stands in the way of the Leftist agenda. Moreover, if the Devil exists, he would favor not just the "false religion" of environmentalism and Marxism, but also postmodernism, for Jesus is the Logos. Ultimately, the gospel reconciles God and man, which is not what the Devil wants.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: An example of James Lindsay arguing about 2+2=5 on Twitter.A Mises University presentation on Antonio Gramsci.The Snopes article “debunking” claim that Saul Alinsky dedicated his book to Lucifer.Wikipedia entry on “Logos” in Christology context.John Piper on the opening of the gospel of John.Bob’s debate (ep. 133) with Thaddeus Russell on postmodernism as a foundation for liberty. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
What’s going on in the gold market? Is cryptocurrency the way forward? How can we map out our economic future in light of the GDP drop and unemployment? Jeff Deist calls in to A Neighbor's Choice and discusses Biden’s call for mask mandates, moving on from the lockdowns, and how to realistically deal with the virus.
Find more from David Gornoski on A Neighbor's Choice.
Adrian Lee Oliver wrote a Twitter thread on the BLM protests and how they are contributing to racial polarization. The thread took off, leading to Adrian's appearance on Benjamin Boyce's podcast. Bob wanted his own listeners to hear Adrian's personal story of police brutality along with his critique of today's "anti-racism" campaign.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interview.Adrian Lee Oliver’s original Twitter thread that brought him attention.Adrian’s appearance on Benjamin Boyce’s podcast.Bob’s debate on postmodernism with Thaddeus Russell.Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay on Thaddeus’ podcast.Academic literature on “implicit bias.” An article showing the concept in today’s usage. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
David Friedman is one of the pioneering theorists of anarcho-capitalism, as laid out in his book The Machinery of Freedom. In this free-wheeling discussion, he discusses physics versus economics, the work of Ronald Coase, his dad’s view of anarchism, and what happened to the SlateStarCodex site.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interview.David Friedman’s homepage.David’s book The Machinery of Freedom. Heinlein’s classic The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress. #CommissionsEarned (As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)David debates Bob at Porcfest on Austrian vs. Chicago School methodology in economics.One of Walter Block’s essays on hanging from an apartment flagpole.The website SlateStarCodex and the post Bob mentioned, “You Are Still Crying Wolf,” which defended Trump from accusations of racism. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Thaddeus Russell, creator of Renegade University, has been arguing that libertarians should embrace postmodernism as their philosophical foundation, rather than blame it for today’s “social justice warriors” as Jordan Peterson has done. Bob profoundly disagrees, arguing that the Judeo-Christian notions of truth and morality are a much better foundation.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interview.The homepage for Thaddeus Russell and YouTube account of his Unregistered podcast.Thaddeus’ book A Renegade History of the United States. #CommissionsEarned (As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)Thaddeus’ SoHo Forum debate against Stephen Hicks.The full clip on college students and identity, and Thad arguing gender identity with Joe Rogan. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
The Black Lives Matter organization explicitly states it seeks to "disrupt" the "nuclear family structure." In this, BLM is no different from countless other Marx-inspired organizations which seek to destroy the family as part of the "patriarchy."
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Why Marxist Organizations Like BLM Seek to Dismantle the 'Western Nuclear Family'".
Americans have been buying lots of guns out of fear of crime and unrest this year. This suggests that the crime-guns causality is the opposite of what gun controllers say. Rather than saying "guns cause crime," we should be saying "crime causes guns."
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Americans Are Buying Guns in Record Numbers. The Washington Post Isn't Pleased."
Murray Rothbard explains that anarcho-communists' longing for a preindustrial primitivism would mean starvation and death for nearly all of mankind and a grinding subsistence for the ones remaining.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The Death Wish of the Anarcho-Communists".
Every major scientific advance challenged the “settled science” of its day and was often denounced as pernicious and false, even dangerous.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The COVID-19 Panic Shows Us Why Science Needs Skeptics".
"Public health crisis" is essentially a left-wing stock phrase at this point, as is reflected by the fact that the solutions proffered to the social ills in question are virtually always some sort of government regulation or income redistribution scheme.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "How the Left Uses "Public Health Crises" to Get What It Wants".
Download the slides from this lecture at Mises.org/MU20_PPT_33.
Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 17 July 2020.
The forces of anticapitalism have long latched on to whatever best suits them for pushing their agenda. Whatever the latest injustice may be—from a polluted environment to poverty to racism—the solution is always the end of capitalism.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "How the Left Exploits Antiracism to Attack Capitalism".
As Japan has shown, ultralow interest rates can greatly affect a society that was once impressively focused on innovation and investment.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The Social Consequences of Zero Interest Rates".
Our guest is Rohin Francis, MD. Dr. Francis is a Cardiologist in London, who also hosts a popular YouTube channel. He recently discussed what COVID may tell us about racism in science and medicine, and comes on the show for a wide ranging discussion on racism in medicine, COVID in Britain, and how minority groups have fared in Britain.
SHOW NOTES Watch Rohin’s video on Racism in Science and MedicineWatch the episode on YouTube
Pointing to a recent Twitter thread from a progressive detailing his white male cisness, Bob shows how narrow the focus is on only particular "privileges" and not others. More generally, the effort to demonize white men is causing young people great harm, whether white or otherwise. The movement is based on power politics and relies on economic ignorance.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: Nathan Tankus’ twitter thread on his privileges.News story on US national women’s soccer team losing to U15 boys.Bob Murphy Show episodes covering the economics of slavery: 71 with Mark Thornton and 81 with Jeffrey Rogers Hummel.Walter Block’s paper on reparations for slavery.Help support the Bob Murphy Show. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Woodrow Wilson was an especially devoted white supremacist, even by the standard of his day. The Left is finally targeting Wilson for this, but Wilson's legacy is far worse than even the Left will admit.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The Disastrous Legacy of Woodrow Wilson".
Michael Hardin is a theologian with a radical message of Jesus’s forgiveness and peace. He and Bob have a lively and deep discussion on the true meaning of the gospel and how today’s Christians often misunderstand it.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interview.Michael Hardin’s website Preaching Peace.Michael Hardin’s book Knowing God?: Consumer Christianity and the Gospel of Jesus.Help support the Bob Murphy Show. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Austrian economist and Mises Institute Fellow Mateusz Machaj discusses two of his books. The first is a technical work explaining how the Austrian structure of production concept can help resolve puzzles in economics. Machaj’s second book analyzes the political philosophy behind the Star Wars prequels. This episode contains deep insights that will inform even advanced students of both economic theory and the Star Wars universe.
Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The YouTube version of this interview: Part 1 on structure of production and Part 2 on Star Wars.Matt’s book on capital theory and his book on Star Wars. #CommissionsEarned (As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.)Bob’s referee reports from Paul Samuelson.Bob’s article explaining “reswitching.”Krugman on potential GDP flip-flop.Mace Windu, vigilante. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Marilyn Singleton, MD, JD joins the Accad and Koka Report.
Dr. Singleton comes from a long line of American physicians. She shares with us her fascinating family history and her insights into the rich history of Black physicians in America. We also discuss the deleterious effects of race victimization manifest today.
The Left believes that we need the state to force people to act in line with "social justice." This means that somebody must force compliance with state edicts, even if those people aren't called "police."
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Abolishing the Police Won't Mean Abolishing State Violence".
Bob first discusses the theory of transferring police services away from the government and to the private community. Then he interviews Whitney Davis, a Rothbardian with a history of libertarian activism, who is a Seattle resident and happens to live down the street from the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ).
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob explains some of the basic–but crucial–errors in the cost/benefit analyses that have been offered by economists to justify the political lockdowns issued in light of the coronavirus. Specifically, economists have conflated voluntary physical distancing with coerced lockdowns, and they are also misusing the concept of a Value of a Statistical Life (VSL).
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Until interracial marriage restrictions were abolished in the 1950s, Colorado had two sets of marriage laws: one for the northern Anglo-dominated part of the state, and a second rule for the southern state, formerly part of Mexico.
Narrated by Daniella Bassi.
Original Article: "A Study in Decentralization: Colorado's Two Sets of Marriage Laws".
The political machines that run America's cities are likely to keep running them when these protests and riots end. Taxpayers will be worse off, but politicians will be even more powerful.
Narrated by Daniella Bassi.
Original Article: "These Protests Don't Threaten the Ruling Party in America's Big Cities".
George W. Bush has resurfaced to pander to the Left and the media in hopes of getting some attention. Apparently, Bush's brutal history of lies, wars, and torture is all fine now since he said some nice things condemning racism.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The Media Has Conveniently Forgotten George W. Bush's Many Atrocities".
The next time lockdown fetishists demand more coerced social distancing, many will say: "Social distancing didn't matter to these experts very much back during the protests in June. Why should we believe them now?"
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "The Moral Authority of the Lockdown Fetishists Is Gone. Thank the Protestors and Rioters."
Our guest is Neurosurgeon Chengyuan Wu. Dr. Wu specializes in functional neurosurgery, a field that focuses on using brain surgery to restore function to patients. He discusses Elon Musk’s initiative to create a new brain-human interface using implants in the brain that communicate with the environment.
Just as America begins to reopen from the Coronavirus lockdowns, protests break out across the country over the killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis. Governors deploy riot police into the streets to deal with looting, Trump threatens to invoke the Insurrection Act of 1807, and millions of Americans wonder if they still have a job. Racial tensions grow, while groups like Antifa violently agitate for the abolition of property and capitalism. With curfews and business closures in effect, what does the rule of law even mean? How does government at any level maintain legitimacy when it cannot provide basic order?
Judge Andrew P. Napolitano, the Senior Legal Analyst for Fox News and a board member of the Mises Institute, joins Jeff Deist for an in-depth look at the legal crisis facing America in the wake of COVID-19 and ongoing civil unrest. Among the topics:
What powers do Trump and governors have to quell protests or prevent the spread of disease? Are orders not authorized by legislatures flatly illegal? Do they carry the force of law?Can Trump call out National Guard or federal military forces without congressional approval or consent of governors?What does due process mean during a crisis? Do constitutional protections disappear when public health is at stake or mass protests overtake the streets?What level of constitutional scrutiny should apply to measures taken by governors and mayors—quarantines, business closures, curfews, police mobilizations?Are qualified immunity protections keeping dangerous cops and politicians from accountability? Will business owners be able to sue state or local governments for violating their rights?Is "property vs. lives" a false choice from a legal perspective? Do police have any affirmative duty to safeguard either?What roles do the Ninth and Tenth Amendments play—or should they play—in how various states deal with these crises? Is federalism poised for a resurgence? This online seminar is a hard-hitting and uncompromising discussion of government malfeasance and lawlessness.
It’s important to call the government and media on this unholy alliance, whether you view their targets as sympathetic or not. If we stay silent when they come for our enemies, they will ultimately come for us.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Michael Flynn, Lori Loughlin, and the Permanent Culture of Prosecutorial Abuse"
Executive orders are inherently suspect and generally bad, not simply because of (at this point laughable) constitutional concerns, but because they establish another layer of de facto "laws" for which you and I have little legal recourse.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Notes on Trump's Executive Order for Tech Companies"
Ultimately, we need not rely on the government (i.e., the “king’s men” putting Humpty-Dumpty back together again). People acting freely in a marketplace could do it all by themselves. If only the government would let them.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Two Analogies for the Economy That the Media Keeps Getting Wrong"
Propaganda kills, but it also works. Many of the same tactics employed to destroy opposition to the Iraq War are being used today against opponents of lockdowns.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Coronavirus Propaganda Mimics War Propaganda"
Neither voters nor politicians watch the bureaucracy very carefully, so they respond as one might expect—advancing their own and their favorites' interests, at the expense of the public they are supposedly working for.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Why Congressional "Oversight" of the Bureaucracy Is No Such Thing"
Americans were once harangued by government "experts" about the need to slow down on highways in order to save lives. Few listened. Today, laws demanding everyone "stay at home" may suffer a similar fate.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "What the Failed 55-MPH Speed Limit Law Tells Us about COVID Lockdowns"
James Bovard reports form Maryland, where the COVID-19 lockdowns have decimated employment and the rules only apply to powerless ordinary people. Cops and politicians can do as they like.
Narrated by Daniella Bassi.
Original Article: "Politicians' COVID Mania Ravages Maryland"
Libertarians know Michael Boldin as the founder of the Tenth Amendment Center, but he started out as a leftist promoting clubs in LA and other major cities. In this fun conversation, Michael explains his origins and how he ended up advising state governments on how to kick the NSA out of their backyard.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
The editors of The Babylon Bee have a podcast, and they invited Bob on to discuss the economic situation. Then, they asked a series of fun questions, against the backdrop of their shared Christianity.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Some claim "the rich" will be fine—or even better off—after the COVID panic destroys the economy for most of us. But there's a problem: the wealthy depend heavily on an economy fueled by the production and consumption of all workers and entrepreneurs.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "We’re All in This Together. But Not in the Way You Think."
Media outlets, both left and right, are mostly narrative driven. Also, journalists have a tendency to lazily reprint whatever "experts" say. This makes media reporting thoroughly unreliable.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Why Media Coverage of COVID-19 Has Been So Bad"
We've reached the end of Human Action! Tom Woods joins the podcast to discuss Part Seven, "The Place of Economics in Society," and it's a show you don't want to miss.
Woods and host Jeff Deist enjoy an engaging and far-ranging discussion of the book's place in history, Mises's frustration with economics co-opting the methods of physical sciences, and the public's seeming inability to overcome anticapitalist propaganda. Mises concludes his great treatise with unmatched clarity and wisdom, reminding us why economics belongs at the forefront of society—and why we all should retain our unwavering sense of élan vital.
Use the code HAPOD for a discount on Human Action from our bookstore: Mises.org/BuyHA.
Additional Resources The Sociology of the Development of Austrian Economics by Joe Salerno: Mises.org/SalernoHAP
Mises's Élan Vital by Jeff Deist: Mises.org/Elan
Human Action: Mises.org/HumanAction
Bob Murphy's Study Guide to Human Action: Mises.org/Study
Experts such as Anthony Fauci are experts only in the narrow field of their expertise. They have almost no knowledge or expertise in other fields, including—apparently—the basics of how human societies function.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Anthony Fauci, the "Learned Ignoramus"
Imagine if we had used even a fraction of the resources spent to lock down the entire population and focused on providing assistance and protection to the most vulnerable—the elderly and those with serious medical conditions. We could have protected these people and still had an economy to go back to when the virus had run its course. And it wouldn’t have cost us $6 trillion dollars either. This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "What If the Lockdown Was All a Big Mistake?"
What is the number of deaths due to disease which justifies the total abandonment of the rule of law and basic human freedoms? Sixty thousand? One hundred thousand? Three hundred thousand? Supporters of the current police state ought to pin down a number for us at which all rights are forfeit.
This Audio Mises Wire is generously sponsored by Christopher Condon. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.
Original Article: "Exactly How Many Deaths Are Needed to Justify Giving Governments Control of Everything?"
Larry Reed has been an organizational leader for liberty for decades, first at the Mackinac Center and then at FEE. He talks with Bob Murphy about Solzhenitsyn’s ability to withstand the Soviet gulag, and more generally makes the case for optimism in the face of oppression. For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy first gives some thoughts on the stock market crash and coronavirus, then discusses the jaw-dropping discussion between Brian Williams and a member of the New York Times editorial board regarding Mike Bloomberg’s claimed ability to give every American $1 million.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Our friend and economist Dr. Robert Murphy joins the show for a discussion of Part Two in Human Action, "Action Within the Framework of Society."
This is a great discussion of Mises's view of society and cooperation; Mises on Darwin; the Ricardian Law of Association; the case for treating ideological differences as purely ideological; Mises's utilitarianism as it relates to democracy and anarchism, and the critical importance of exchange and monetary calculation in developing society.
Use the code HAPOD for a discount on Human Action from our bookstore: Mises.org/BuyHA.
Additional Resources Human Action: Mises.org/HumanAction
Bob Murphy's Study Guide to Human Action: Mises.org/Study
Following up on his two previous episodes firing off provocative questions for both progressives and conservatives, Bob Murphy now looks inside his own camp and raises issues for self-reflection. The tough questions for libertarians cover topics ranging from God to abortion to drag queens to tax incidence.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
In the fall of 2018 three people went public with a long-running hoax in which they’d published fake papers to various feminist, critical studies, etc. journals. Perhaps the most memorable example was an article purporting to catalogue the number of “rapes” that occurred at a dog park. Bob explores the precise reasons for why (or why not) this hoax reflects poorly on the targeted fields.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Economist Tim Terrell explains why the common rankings of "health outcomes" are so often biased against the United States, and why big businesses often support certain environmental regulations. Hint: it's not for reasons progressives will like.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy first explains a standard progressive viewpoint when it comes to dealing with issues like virus outbreaks, underage drinking, and prostitution. Yet, when it comes to dealing with people whose views they abhor, the progressives suddenly are “zero tolerance” and ignore the mechanisms they point to for the other issues.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Lyn Ulbricht is the mother of Ross Ulbricht, the founder of the Silk Road website. Contrary to the government’s assertions, Lyn argues that her son was hardly a criminal kingpin menacing society. Even taking the laws on the book at face value, Ross’ trial was a sham, and the government’s behavior was shocking.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Tareq Haddad was a (recently hired) reporter for Newsweek who was repeatedly rebuffed when trying to cover the emerging story of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report on Syria. He eventually resigned. Tareq discusses how US authorities pressured the OPCW to change the report to fit their desired narrative, and how powerful groups control the corporate media.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy interviews Lindsay Goldwert on her years performing at and organizing stand-up comedy shows in NYC, the interaction between comedy and finance, and her new book, BOW DOWN.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy uses the media coverage of the December Inspector General (IG) report on the FBI to illustrate how the establishment is gaslighting America. Specifically, some of the FBI’s tactics when applying for permission to spy on the Trump campaign are jaw-dropping, and yet the corporate media have used the report to refute Trump’s “conspiracy theories” about an FBI plot against him.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Dr. Sabine Hossenfelder is a Research Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, where she heads the “Analog Systems for Gravity Duals” group. Bob first asks her to explain why physicists began using the concepts of “dark matter” and “dark energy” to explain their observations of galaxies. Then they discuss her June New York Times column in which she explained that existing computer models can’t tell us if climate change poses an existential threat or is merely an inconvenience.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Central bankers dismiss gold as a relic, even as they buy up more of it. Politicians dismiss gold as money they don't control and can't expand. Holders dismiss gold as outdated tech. And investors dismiss gold as a static metal paying no yields.
So why does gold still matter? Why does it hold value over millennia? Why does it threaten inflationist governments? Why does it seem to be flowing West to East? Why does an ounce of it still trade for more than $1,000, if the critics are right? This is the comprehensive show on gold and its enduring role in today's economy, with Keith Weiner of Monetary Metals.
Negative interest rates are now entrenched reality in Europe, and not just for buyers of sovereign or corporate debt – even retail savings accounts are affected. What does this mean for real people trying to save for retirement? And more broadly, what does it mean for Europe culturally? Not to mention America, since Alan Greenspan tells us negative rates are coming here soon?
Our guest Rahim Taghizadegan from the independent Viennese Scholarium joins the show to discuss the anti-economics of negative rates. He is co-author of a new book titled The Zero Interest Trap. He is also a co-author of Austrian School for Investors.
Recorded on November 9, 2019, in Lake Jackson, Texas. From the 2019 Ron Paul Symposium, "State Propaganda and the 2020 Election." See all lectures from this event.
Recorded on November 9, 2019, in Lake Jackson, Texas. From the 2019 Ron Paul Symposium, "State Propaganda and the 2020 Election." See all lectures from this event.
Includes an introduction by Jeff Deist. Recorded on November 9, 2019, in Lake Jackson, Texas. From the 2019 Ron Paul Symposium, "State Propaganda and the 2020 Election." See all lectures from this event.
Includes an introduction by Jeff Deist.
Ludwig von Mises and his work remain incredibly prescient and relevant today. The world needs his voice more than ever, and our speakers celebrate Mises as a supremely vital thinker well-suited for today's challenges. Recorded in Los Angeles, California, on October 26, 2019.
[All lectures from the Supporters Summit 2019 are available here.]
Online rock artist and music blogger Matthew Bankert walks Bob Murphy through his picks for the Top Ten Libertarian Rock Bands.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 22, no. 2 (Summer 2019) full issue. ABSTRACT: Inflation not only debases the value of currency by lowering purchasing power. It also serves to erode the quantity and quality of marriages while creating distortions in the decision-making processes of those hoping to form marriages and to have children. Furthermore, a loss of purchasing power helps to create relational tension for married couples, contributing to increasing divorce rates throughout the globe. As for the formation of families via marriage, the literature surrounding inflation and the family shows that price increases in higher education and housing both limit the number of first marriages as well raising the average age at which they occur. These phenomena are present in Western democracies, Islamic theocratic regimes, and highly-developed East Asian economies. Rising prices impact already married couples who would pro-create, but decide to accelerate or nearly eliminate child-bearing based on the inflationary environment in which they live. Finally, the literature shows that a loss of purchasing power leads to marital tension and higher rates of divorce. This trend is exhibited all over the world. This relationship occurs across cultural and religious systems as well as differing levels of economic development. While the problem of rising prices is economic in nature, it is shown to have deleterious effects upon the family institution.
inflation family JEL Classification: D10, E34 INTRODUCTION At the centennial gathering of the American Economic Association, Dr. Gary Becker addressed those assembled and described a growing awareness of how macroeconomic forces affect the family institution. In his concluding remarks, he noted that the, “evolution of the economy greatly changes the structure and decisions of families.” (Becker 1988) The aim of this review is to summarize the literature that describes how a variety of rising prices impact family formation, fertility, and failure. Since family institutions exist throughout the varied cultures of the world, the review will observe the heterogeneity of inflation’s impact on the family across cultures and national borders.
There are two key distinctions that this writer wishes to articulate. The first is in regards to the philosophical framework and definition of the family institution. In my understanding of the role of family in society, I borrow from the Dutch Calvinist philosopher Abraham Kuyper (while rejecting his views on state intervention into various markets among other views). He describes the family as a divine creation. As such, this ‘sovereign sphere’ is an institution designed with its own rights, responsibilities, norms, roles, and limits. In addition, the family institution is not subject to the control of other institutions such as ruling authorities, religious institutions, or markets. While at the same time, the family social unit will freely interact with all of the other institutions without being absorbed by or otherwise diminished in its role as the primary way in which children are raised, educated, and socialized. In Kuyper’s view, the other divinely inspired institutions such as markets (for goods, services, money creation, and financial assets) and governing authorities also have their own divinely constructed purposes, jurisdiction, and limits.
Our world now represents what happens when mankind rejects the divine order and decides to merge the distinct spheres, regardless of the rationale for doing so. The most important example of such an ‘unholy marriage’ in our time occurs when the market for money creation is combined with the governing institution. In such instances both of these institutions have already stepped outside of their divinely-ordained spheres of operation. Furthermore, this new, man-made organization necessarily sets itself up against the other institutions that choose to retain their intended form and function. As such, this man-made entity will inevitably infringe on the proper operations of the other sovereign spheres. This viewpoint provides a narrative for the corrosive effects of modern central banking cartels upon the family institution. In Kuyper’s view, “surely, to centralize all power in the one central government is to violate the ordinances that God has given for nations and families. It destroys the natural divisions that give a nation vitality, and thus destroys the energy of the individual life-spheres and of the individual persons.” (Van Dyke 2015)
This observation is quite meaningful in our time as we observe both Central Bank inflation and the ‘deinstitutionalization’ (Cherlin 2004) of the family and of marriage throughout the world. Altered family structures and decisions are seen in the delay of family formation and by increasing divorce rates across the globe. Perhaps unwittingly, Cherlin affirmed that a growing disregard for Kuyper’s definition of the family institution has emerged in 20th century America for the very reasons that Kuyper describes. In light of this deinstitutionalization, this literature review seeks to describe how researchers have linked declining purchasing power to the crumbling institution of marriage.
The second point of clarification is that the writer of this review defines inflation as any increase in the supply of money and credit. I reject the notion of ‘inflation’ as an increase in government-measured price levels. In most cases, the literature does not adopt this writer’s definition. Therefore, when some writers refer to “inflation”, I will refer to “price increases”. The first reason for this clarification is based on Richard Cantillon’s observation that price increases are not simultaneous, universal, nor do they occur by the same degree in all places after monetary injections have occurred. (Murphy 1989) In addition, the writer discards the mainstream use of the term ‘inflation’ on the grounds that it is considered to be synonymous to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index. I reject the CPI and commonly used term ‘inflation’ precisely because it does not reflect the experience of rising prices within households, across income levels, races, or even genders. (Michael 1975, Hobijn and Lagakos 2003, Armantier et al. 2012, Sequino and Heintz 2012, Bryan and Venkatu 2002)
To provide an overview of the literature on family formation, I first begin with the economic theory of family formation articulated by Gary Becker. In 1974, he described marriage as a process of “Positive Assortive Mating” where potential spouses seek to improve their overall utility as compared to the utility held by remaining single. The existence of mate selection processes by no means requires one to dismiss marriage as a divinely created institution. The fact that men and women select partners to improve overall utility does not require that the institution is therefore simply a man-made institution. Just as a person may select a seat on a airplane based on their subjective values that account for prices, comfort and other factors does not mean that they are responsible for the construction of the plane or for the physical laws that govern its operation. Likewise, in mate-seeking, the desire to gain additional marginal utility in a state of marriage, potential partners consider factors such as IQ, education level, height, ethnicity and more, while not altering the fundamental design of marriage itself.
Recent scholarship has revealed that in the US, price increases and the ensuing distress borrowing by young people is positively correlated to the average age of first marriage. (Bosick and Estacion 2014, Gicheva 2016) To be more precise, education-based debt levels of the potential spouse have been shown to have a negative impact on the positive assortive mating that Becker describes. These high debt levels are associated with inflation in higher education tuition. However, these high debt levels are more consistent with the educational attainment of middle and upper middle-class American youths who can afford to delay the necessity of work.
Among these more affluent young people, it is obvious that not every couple wishes to live together or to have children. The literature shows that among those with higher incomes and higher levels of educational attainment, many couples avoid traditional marriage and choose to cohabitate simply because they have different costs in view than their poor counterparts. The literature affirms that these couples are waiting to reach financial milestones, not in terms of nominal cash holdings or income, but in terms of real asset and property accumulation. The achievement of such goals is made more difficult with a lack of purchasing power. (Smock et al. 2005) All told, the literature paints a picture wherein inflationary pressure across geographic, racial, and educational descriptors is linked to delayed marriage formation and non-formation in the case of cohabitating couples.
In the case of the poor in the US, rising prices for the goods that they consume have been shown to increase criminality among single males. Males who have resorted to more lucrative criminal activity and the incarceration that often ensues has, resulted in low marriageability status across cohorts in the United States. Another consequence of male criminality is that there are increasing levels of fatherless children throughout racial groups, as these men are viewed as reproductive partners, but not as traditional husbands or fathers. (Rosenfeld et al. 2018) This situation further erodes the family institution when coupled with the wage inflation that has been more prominent for females in the US, which leads many women (even those with low labor productivity) to eschew husbands as providers in exchange for provision from the state, their own wages, or older family members. (Schneider et al. 2018)
The presence of increasing prices has also been shown to impact the fertility rates of married couples over time and in different cultural and economic settings. Robert T. Michael observed that wealthy and poor households experience price increases differently in the modern US economy. Since this is the case, it follows that the poor and the wealthy would approach fertility decisions differently as well. (Michael 1979) This observation foreshadowed Caldwell’s work in international family economics, which asserted that families in low-income countries respond to price increases by growing the number of children they bring into the world. They decide to do so because their offspring represent net positive income flows and because the children can contribute to overall family wealth with their low-skilled labor. Conversely, in developed nations, the increasingly high price of educating children for modern economic life leads families to have fewer children, as each child produces negative income flows during their years under their parents’ roofs. (Caldwell 1983)
In more recent research, Kaplan suggested an update to Caldwell’s view by introducing different measures for ascertaining intergenerational wealth flows. Specifically, there is a call to recognize the fact that underdeveloped economies often measure wealth in terms of commodity acquisition rather than nominal monetary amounts. (Kaplan 1994) When considering the body of literature on how higher prices effects fertility, it is shown that a lack of wealth across time, culture, and economic standing all produce fertility rates that are distortions from a natural state of reproductive supply and demand within households. Ultimately, developed nations tend to have lower fertility rates, leading some to fall short of zero population growth, while developing nations still struggle with the challenges of young, booming populations. When families in these poor nations also experience price increases, fertility rates are also shown to increase. The literature also demonstrates that there is a negative relationship between price increases and fertility in developed nations.
Across the world, families also dissolve under the pressure of escalating prices. The literature examining US divorce rates since 1929 has shown that during periods of large price increases that there is a robustly positive relationship to marriage dissolution. (Nunley and Zietz 2012) This relationship was most powerfully illustrated throughout the 1960s and all the way through the Vietnam Era. The escalating prices caused by ‘Great Society’ legislation such as Medicare and Medicaid, coupled with the massive expenditures on the war in Vietnam both occurred during this period and represented a shift of real resources from American households to the welfare state and to war-making. These macroeconomic realities left the already married with a loss of purchasing power and all of the relational strains that come along with it. Some literature has asserted that this ongoing increase in the divorce rates in the US, and particularly the high divorce rates of the 1970s, were caused by the adoption of no-fault divorce law. (Peters 1993, Friedberg 1998, Rogers et al. 1999) However, Wolfers finds that while these changes in the legal environment did have an initially positive but weak correlation to divorce rates, these effects did not persist over time. (Wolfers 2006)
Meanwhile, in the UK, a similar conclusion was reached by research which showed that the liberalization of divorce law simply lowered the cost of the divorce transaction, ensuring the end of marriages that were already “on the rocks”, while having no impact in the long-run trend. (Smith 1997) Throughout the European continent, divorce rates have also climbed substantially in the post-WWII era. Some have indicated that the rise of the welfare state (itself a part of the inflationary regime) has encouraged both lower rates of family formation and more frequent divorce. (Balestrino et al. 2013)
In southwestern Asia, price increases in the Iranian housing sector and for dowry payments have been shown to drive increased divorce rates from 1982 through 2010. (Farzanegan and Gholipour 2015) The authors note that this is a particularly troubling social trend in such a conservative Islamic state. Also, in Pakistan, connections have been drawn between price increases for the goods that households typically consume to increases in domestic violence and female spousal abuse, clinical depression among both men and women, and understandably, an increasing divorce rate. (Khanam et al. 2015)
Across the planet, central bank inflation has led to price increases in the markets for goods that are important to families everywhere. There is little doubt that local customs surrounding family formation and expectations for familial behavior can produce a wide variety of responses to the loss of purchasing power. In order to capture more of those specific examples, this review will now turn to a more precise look at the realities of family life under the pressure of elevated prices.
PRICE INCREASES AND FAMILY FORMATION In 1960, the average age for first family formation for US females was 20.1 years and 22.2 for males. Forty years later, the first marriage for US women had jumped to 24.4 and to 26.1 for men. (Schoen and Canudas-Romo 2005) Even greater change has been afoot in England and Wales during the same time period. There, the average age of first marriage for women went from 21.0 to 26.3 and from 23.4 to 28.3 for men. At the same time these researchers note the increase in co-habitation as an alternative arrangement for adults living together, leading to a decline in the real prevalence of marriage over time.
Recent research in the US regarding the later age of first marriage has yielded findings stating that the rising cost of higher education and the accompanying debt load held by both men and women is positively correlated to the average age of first marriage. (Addo et al. 2018) More specifically, Addo’s research shows that the greater the student loan debt, the more likely young men and women are to cohabitate and for longer as opposed to entering a marriage relationship. Furthermore, with more education, the expectations of young people are that they would marry one with similar educational status. (Becker 1974) In addition, it has been shown that MBA students not only raise their age of first marriage, but that they decrease the likelihood of ever being married at all. (Gicheva 2016) This relationship is stronger among female MBAs than for their male counterparts. Research has found that for every $1,000 in student loan debt that women carry, they reduce their odds of first marriage by 2 percent per month after undergraduate graduation. (Bozick and Estacion 2014) Although massive higher education debt loads are peculiar to the US it is plausible that if significantly negative net worth is carried into the housing market, that a person carrying the debt will seem less marriageable. (Bleemer et al. 2014) Alongside such credit-based challenges is the lack of affordable housing, a phenomenon that is hardly unique to the US. In Great Britain price increases in the housing market have also kept young people at home (and single) longer than in past decades, thus delaying the age of first marriage there as well. (Ermisch and Francesconi 2003)
The marked increases in East Asian first marriage age have also been driven by housing prices. In Singapore, qualitative studies on the attitudes of young singles make it clear that the male is under considerable social pressure from family and their potential spouse to acquire a flat. (Jones et al. 2012, Quah 2008) Delays in first marriage in Eastern Asia demonstrate similar trends as those in the US but to an even higher degree. In Japan the average age of first marriage for men has risen from 26.9 in 1970 to 30.5 in 2010. Their female counterparts have seen a change in this statistic go from 24.2 to 28.8. (Raymo et al. 2015) The pattern is similar in South Korea and Taiwan. The question addressed here is whether price increases have anything to do with this phenomenon. The literature does indicate that the later age for family formation in East Asia is largely driven by rising prices. These prices include the housing, education, food, and energy sectors. It is apparent to researchers that these increasing costs of living do have a positive relationship to age at first marriage. (Park and Sandefur 2005) These rising prices are coupled with cultural expectations of aspirational consumption which also contribute to first marriage delays. (Mu and Xie 2014) Other features that delay first marriages in East Asia include extended family expectations of co-residence, educational mismatches in the marriage market, and extended family expectations regarding fertility. Despite these nuances, the common theme of price increases and their positive correlation to age at first marriage is present both in the East and the West.
PRICE INCREASES AND FAMILY FERTILITY When Robert T. Michael observed that poor families within the US experienced price increases differently than the wealthy, and that their experiences were worse than the reported CPI measurements, it became clear that the poor would behave differently than the wealthy in the face of rising prices than those of higher income levels. (Michael 1979) This reality inside the US makes Caldwell’s views on family behavior in underdeveloped economies versus industrialized nations all the more understandable. In his theory of wealth flows, it was explained that parents in underdeveloped parts of the world would respond to their lack of labor productivity and purchasing power with a set of choices that was distinct from their counterparts in the industrialized nations of the world. He observed that because low-skilled labor and wages were attainable by young children, their parents would seek their income generating efforts to combat the family’s lack of wealth. With this reasoning, parents would not only expect their children to work at an early age, but they themselves would respond to these conditions by having even more children, thus increasing the fertility per female in the underdeveloped world. In addition, the US welfare system creates incentives for unwed mothers to have more children and not to educate them beyond their years of free public education. By funding higher education, children would begin represent a negative net income flow. Thus, unwed and poor mothers are presented with an incentive structure that encourages non-education and the immediate (though short-term) benefits of children working in low-skilled labor markets in order to contribute to increased family income. (Caldwell 1983)
When it comes to the middle-class and wealthy in the United States, declining fertility rates have not only been linked to the reasoning provided by family economists like Caldwell, but healthcare economists have weighed in as well. The Journal of Medical Economics contends that the delay in first marriage and family formation contributes to overall lifetime fertility decline. With the increase in age of first marriage, and subsequent first conception within marriage, fertility rates are lower among women who have their first child later in life. This observation may seem as obvious as it is trivial. However, if it is clear that economic realities impact physiological outcomes, it is easy to see why some would describe increasing prices and the subsequent loss of fertility as a public health concern. (Tannus and Dahan 2018, Sunderam et al. 2015)
Simply put, the literature demonstrates a chain of events where the increases in education costs and housing prices delay first marriage, first childbirth, and ultimately lead to diminished fertility. To quantify the decline in fertility in the US, the average number of children per woman has plummeted from 3.65 in 1960 to 1.84 in 2015. (FRED 2019) Further study on the connection between rising prices and falling fertility suggests that parents sense a moral obligation to refrain from having children during periods of money and credit expansion via central bank policy (Abo-Zaid 2013) In this line of reasoning, parents observe climbing prices and recognize that providing education, nutrition, and general care will be more difficult as they lose purchasing power. Furthermore, this loss of purchasing power leads many married couples to seek more than one income, making child-rearing more difficult as the couple demonstrates a subjective preference for time working over time spent raising children. Earlier literature defends a model where this outcome means that the children of these parents will decrease the next generation’s labor supply, driving output per capita higher for women who will then substitute child-bearing for income earning. (Galor and Weil 1996) This theoretical connection, however, has not been found robust by some (Jones et al. 2012) who assert that the same would be true for males whose greater earning power would enable women to resume more traditional child-rearing roles.
Innovative research from England and Wales has emerged as researchers have sought to distinguish between the fertility response to home price increases between renters and existing home owners. The findings are complementary to those in the US for renters as higher home prices deter would-be owners from having more children. This negative relationship between housing prices and fertility does not hold for British homeowners from 1995 to 2008. (Washbrook 2018) Although there is a positive relationship between home prices and fertility for homeowners, this effect was found to be temporary. This finding is not necessarily contrary to economic theory because homeowners believe they will acquire more wealth in the future through the sale of that home. It is plausible that this anticipated increase in wealth makes them feel as though they are able to support more children. This explanation of homeowner behavior is consistent with earlier studies in the US where renters have a 2.4 percent decline in fertility for every $10,000 in average home prices, while the homeowners respond with a 1 percent increase in fertility. (Dettling and Kearney 2011) If we use Becker’s reasoning to shed some light on this outcome, it is reasonable to posit that for renters, the cost a future home will be too great to afford the cost of the delivery and care of an additional child. However, the reasoning could be reversed for families who currently own a home. They may look at the potential proceeds of the sale of their home as being a greater financial benefit allowing them to have another child and perhaps the purchase of a new home with more space to accommodate those additional children.
It has been found that for East Asian families, the negative relationship between price increases and fertility are not only present but have even stronger effects than they do in the West. Japan has been at or below replacement rates since 1957. South Korea has experienced a rapid decline in fertility since the 1970s, and Taiwan’s fertility has reached an extremely low 0.9 children per mother in 2010. (Raymo et al. 2015) Once again, these lower lifetime fertility rates are associated with higher age for a mother’s first marriage and first birth, spurred by the high costs of education and housing. In fact, the average age of first delivery in Japan reached 29.3 years of age in 2010. In the same year, the mean age at first birth reached 30.1 in South Korea and 29.6 in Taiwan. Other literature on East Asia explicitly refers to Becker’s model of fertility behavior when studying the impact of housing prices in Hong Kong upon fertility rates from 1971 until 2005. (Yi and Zhang 2009) Using a cointegration analysis, researchers found that for every 1 percent increase in housing prices there was a statistically significant negative relationship in fertility rates of 0.45 percent. Further testing revealed that housing price inflation can account for about 65 percent of the fertility decrease in Hong Kong since the 1970s.
The general pattern of the literature paints a picture of middle-class and wealthy families in developed nations who reduce their fertility in response to rising costs of housing and education. In pre-modern economies as well as among the poor in developed nations with sizeable welfare states, the literature points to a pattern where parents increase their fertility rates in order to benefit from the net positive income that children can produce. This is especially the case in low-skilled labor markets within those nations. Parents in those situations will often remove their children from schooling as the opportunity costs to the family’s standard of living is too great. (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977)
PRICE INCREASES AND FAMILY FAILURE When substantial price increases occur in the markets for goods and services demanded by married couples, the returns on staying married are diminished. This finding by Nunley and Zietz is clarified by observing the dramatic rise in the US new divorce rate through the 1960s and 1970s. When the stagflation era ended in the early 1980s, they find that a slowing of price level increases also contributed to a decline in the rate of new divorces which continued through 2005. (Nunley and Zeist 2012) The literature also shows that when unexpected macroeconomic shocks occur, changes such as increasing prices or increasing unemployment also produce higher rates of divorce. (Becker et al. 1977) The causal link between the rising price of consumption goods and divorce begins when spouses have to increase the quantity of labor supplied to maintain the same levels of spending and leisure as they had previously enjoyed. This then leads to a decrease in the time spent on leisure and household production, leading to relational tension and conflict. Since potential wage increases do not keep pace with price increases, there are worsening financial and relational returns on the marriage relationship. (Christiano et al. 2001)
Some literature has emphasized the increases in women’s educational attainment and their higher labor force participation rate as leading causes of increased US divorce rates in the 1960s and 70s, but these findings are not without controversy. (Lombardo 1999) This dispute arises because others have found that it is the higher divorce rate which drives an increase in the labor force participation rate among women who have already received higher amounts of education in the preceding decades. (Bremmer and Kesselring 2004, Spitze and South 1986, Mincer 1984) This approach suggests a feedback loop where more divorce leads to more female labor force participation, which leads to greater earning power, and eventually more divorce. Yet another explanation for the higher divorce rates in the 60s and 70s is that rising prices required both spouses to work outside the home. This macroeconomic shock required women to begin accelerating their entry into the workforce, which created the relational tensions already described. The resulting large-scale female entry into the workforce disrupted familial harmony, child-rearing patterns, and the domestic division of labor. This narrative is substantiated by Nunley and Zietz’s empirical methodology which produced results showing a positive relationship between inflation rates, nominal GDP growth rates, increasing amounts of women’s educational attainment, and divorce rates. (Nunley and Zietz 2012) However, this study does not establish links between those 3 determinants which leads to opportunities for further study. One important caveat to this explanation is that it does not include the liberalization of divorce laws. While some have suggested that this is a driving force in the high divorce rates, (Friedberg 1988) Nunley and Zietz exclude this variable due to the literature that shows that the advent of no-fault divorce law in the US has a small and short-lived positive impact on increasing divorce rates, but no impact on long-term frequency of divorce. (Wolfers 2006)
In the British context, the literature also seeks to establish the multivariate causes of divorce including the legal framework within the UK as well as macroeconomic triggers. The literature notes that when reforms in divorce law were introduced in the European context, divorce rates were already climbing and the supply of these reforms merely met the demands for innovation and lower costs for divorce. In other words, the reforms were a response to rather than a cause of rising divorce rates. (Becker 1993, Michael 1988) Over the course of the post WWII period, the UK has experienced similar trends in the divorce rates as those in the US. The British had rapid increases in rates of divorce in the 1960s and 70s and found that rates were lower from the rise of Thatcher onwards. (Smith 1997) In Britain, Smith reaches similar conclusions as Wolfers did in the US. While there is a positive correlation between divorce liberalization and the divorce rate, the correlation is weak and temporary. However, a lack of literature is clear in the case of identifying the impact of price increases on divorce rates in Great Britain. This lack of research may be the result of a lack of concern over the issue in general as societal values regarding divorce have moved from viewing divorce as a taboo to viewing it with indifference.
In the Middle East, the issue of divorce is hardly viewed lightly and is even considered a public health risk due to its negative impact on children and women. (Barikani et al. 2012) A significant body of research has come from Iran in recent years. When examining the causes for a rising divorce rate in the Islamic Republic, both women and men cite economic dependence upon other family members for maintaining an acceptable standard of living as a leading cause of divorce. Fifty eight percent of men seeking divorce in this literature cite economic dependency upon extended family members as a driving force in the dissolution of their marriages while 49 percent of women say the same. Furthermore, 53 percent of divorced females specifically cited their former husband’s inability to pay for the rising cost of living as a prominent factor in their divorces. Additional research from Iran indicates that from 2002 through 2010, Iran had reached the highest divorce rate in the Islamic world. Furthermore, the price of housing both for renters and owners was directly linked to marital tension and divorce. (Farzanegan and Gholipour 2015) In addition, rising unemployment rates and increases in both public and private spending on education were positively correlated to this change in divorce rates. In a unique urban setting, Tehran was found to have thousands of vacant investment residences thus reducing the supply and driving rental prices to very high levels. Farzanegan and Gholipour are careful to point out that when there are sudden and unexpected surges in housing prices, there are even stronger positive effects on the divorce rate. In an interesting note on education spending in Iran, these researchers explain (like Caldwell) that increasing prices for education also suggest lower fertility rates among married couples. The lower number of children in turn diminishes the social pressure for families to remain together. In other words, families with fewer children have a higher likelihood of divorce than those who have offspring.
A compelling cultural idiosyncrasy in Iran that has been shown to drive increasing divorce rates is the practice of ‘Mehrieh’ or a dowry. This payment is traditionally required to be delivered in gold coins. (Farzanegan and Gholipour 2018) The price of a gold as a reliable measure of a loss of overall purchasing power is one of the most commonly accepted premises in monetary economic theory. The Mehrieh asserts the legal right of the wife to request payment in gold jewelry or coin at the time of marriage or after the marriage has already begun. The ever-increasing nominal price of gold places great financial strain on the male partner, thus producing further marital tension. The existence of this arrangement has also been found to cause an increasing age of marriage formation by an average of 3 additional years from 1986–2011. The cultural purpose of the Mehrieh is to act as a form of self-insurance for the wife and her family. It us used to cushion the financial blow of a divorce in order to protect women from economic ruin after a divorce. The Mehrieh this lowers the cost of divorce for women, making it less likely that women will remain in tense marriages. In addition, young brides who are aware of the diminishing purchasing power of currency versus gold actually plan for an early divorce in order to collect the Mehrieh as an appreciating asset in order to facilitate their own independent living arrangement. Although this narrative may present a system of perverse incentives to the western mind, it does illustrate the similarity of effects on families due to falling purchasing power against real assets like gold or housing and the increasing divorce rates to match. (Conger et al. 1990, Jensen and Smith 1990, Amato and Beattie 2011, Harknett and Schneider 2012, Dehghanpisheh 2014)
Eastern Asia, like the Near East and West, has also experienced rising divorce rates and the literature points to similar causes as those in other parts of the world. The general literature surrounding East Asian marriage points out that marriage as an institution has become increasingly less attractive for both those who would be married and for those who are already in marriages and that macroeconomic factors play a significant in the decaying esteem of marriage. (Bumpass et al. 2009, Rindfuss et al. 2004) While many values of East Asian marriage remain intact, some researchers show that it has adopted western values as well. (Cai 2010, Thornton et al. 2012) In light of these changes, projections show that 20 percent of South Korean marriages are expected to fail by 2023. (Park and Raymo 2013) Nearly 1/3 of Japanese marriages are expected to end in divorce. (Raymo et al. 2004) One important contrast between those who divorce in East Asia is that divorce is clearly more prevalent among lower income couples than for higher income families. This narrative is similar to the one in Iran where young and relatively low-income families have difficulty affording suitable housing and the relational strain placed on marriages has a corrosive effect on their longevity. These lower income families are also less educated and as such researchers have shown that there is a strong negative relationship between education level (and thus earning and purchasing power) and divorce rates. (Chen 2012)
CONCLUSION Across the globe, family formation, fertility, and failure are all impacted by rising prices. In the US, the age of first marriage is higher than ever due to high education costs that are manifest in increasing debt loads for young adults. This reality means that their incomes are redirected to debt repayment, making already increasing housing prices even harder to afford. Throughout Europe and East Asia housing affordability is also leading young people to delay their first marriage as well. Across the globe, these increasing prices are making cohabitation more financially sensible than marriage.
The literature shows that fertility decisions are distorted in the developing world and for the poor in developed countries. A pattern emerges that when prices rise, parents have more children as they are viewed as adding to family assets. Families make these reproductive decisions and at later ages may pull children out of school due to their ability to earn incomes through their low-skilled labor in order to combat price increases. This keeps families from making investments towards their children’s education and eventually, a higher standard of living. Meantime, in the developed world, wealthier parents choose to have fewer children in response to increasing costs for housing and for educating their offspring. The body of literature concurs with much of Caldwell’s theory on intergenerational wealth flows.
Research from across the globe shows that when married couples are met with falling purchasing power, marital tensions rise. In the developed world these couples who face rising prices have less motivation to stay married as the average number of children is already relatively low. In the underdeveloped world, the literature shows that the relational tension brought on by rising prices is exacerbated by cultural expectations of male provision and extended family pressures. This is a recipe for higher divorce rates even among some of the most traditional societies.
All of these realities show a body of literature that affirm Kuyper’s vision of the family institution being under stress from man-made institutions such as central banks who produce debased currency and easy credit. This state of affairs leads to the detriment of families as they see the value of their savings and purchasing power evaporate for the things that are most important to maintaining a suitable standard of living. The literature described in this review paints a picture of the ‘deinstitutionalization’ of marriage and family that Cherlin described. In seeking a common thread among the erosion in the quantity and quality of marriages throughout the world, it is the loss of purchasing power brought on by central bank money supply inflation which drives people to avoid marriage across the world through delay, cohabitation and divorce. Children in poor nations suffer under inflation as well because their parents require them to work so that the family might survive. Meanwhile, in the developed world, children see less of their parents as two incomes are often necessary to make ends meet, while their parents’ marriages are under threat of divorce due to the relational and financial difficulties brought on by rising prices.
There is room in the body of literature for a stronger statement on the strength of the correlation between rising prices in the categories that are important to family formation. More work remains to establish how tuition rate increases in the US lead to higher ages of first marriage. There is also an opportunity to describe the distinctions between fertility decisions in the developed and developing economies of the world. Research could focus on price increases for childcare, education, food, energy, and housing for their impact on fertility rates in both types of economies. The literature on housing and gold prices increases and divorce has received a very promising set of studies from Iran and researchers could attempt the same type of examination in other nations as well. While several attempts have been made to describe liberal divorce laws and changing norms regarding sexuality and views on cohabitation there is also room for more specific links to discover which prices in the economy have the most powerful effect on marriages that end in divorce.
In the end, we observe that a divinely-created institution can have its definition and even its existence malformed and eventually crushed under the weight of man-made institutions like central banking cartels. This description of the deinstitutionalization of the family and marriage should warrant serious attention from Austro-libertarian thinkers. The simple reason for this is that marriage and family are distinctly non-state institutions that have always been capable of providing wealth, order, and continuity, within a framework of peaceful and voluntary cooperation. Therefore, family holds a unique place among institutions as a bulwark against the deleterious effects of the welfare state. As such, it is an institution worth defending and strengthening as the Austro-libertarian school aims to abolish man-made central banks and replace them with free-market money production and consumption.
Bob analyses the 2014 film Transcendence, starring Johnny Depp and Morgan Freeman. Besides making his case that Depp’s character was in the right, Bob explores some of the economic and even religious elements of the film.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 22, no. 2 (Summer 2019) full issue.
ABSTRACT: This Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, sponsored by Yousif Almoayyed, was given at the Austrian Economics Research Conference at the Mises Institute on March 22, 2019.
Coined by Ross Douthat of the New York Times, woke capitalism refers to a burgeoning wave of companies that apparently have become advocates of social justice. The newly "woke" corporations now support activist groups and social movements, while adding their voices to political debates. How can we understand woke capitalism, is it effective, and if so, why? Analyzing woke capitalism tells us a great deal about contemporary corporate capitalism, the contemporary political left, and the relationship between the two. It also recalls an earlier corporate leftism. It does not consist merely of rhetorical placebos, symbolic over economic concessions, or even the mere placating of liberal political elites. Woke capitalism or corporate leftism actually represents the corporate interests of the would-be monopolist, the corporate socialist, and the corporate leftist in general.
leftism social justice capitalism
A peculiar phrase recently introduced into the political lexicon by media cognoscenti describes a new corporate philosophy: “woke capitalism.” Coined by Ross Douthat of the New York Times (2018), woke capitalism refers to a burgeoning wave of companies that apparently have become advocates of social justice. Some major corporations now intervene in social and political issues and controversies, partaking in a new corporate activism. The newly “woke” corporations support activist groups and social movements, while adding their voices to political debates. Woke capitalism has endorsed Black Lives Matter, the #MeToo Movement, contemporary feminism, LGBTQ rights, and immigration activism, among other leftist causes.
How can we understand woke capitalism, is it effective, and if so, why? Meanwhile, what is now meant by “social justice” and is it a good thing? As it turns out, analyzing woke capitalism tells us a great deal about contemporary corporate capitalism, the contemporary political left, and the relationship between the two. It also recalls an earlier corporate leftism, as I’ll discuss later.
As for social justice, some will recall twentieth-century social justice movements. The Civil Rights movement comes to mind. But due to the influence of postmodern theoretical ideas and Soviet and Sino-communist disciplinary techniques, social justice has taken on new, distinct features. Whereas the campus free speech movement was a hallmark of social justice in the 1960s, violent skirmishes waged against free speech and academic freedom are now associated with the term. Events that have unfolded on college campuses, including at Yale, New York University, UC Berkeley, Middlebury College, Evergreen State College, and many others, bear the social justice insignia.
Among other postmodern theoretical notions, the contemporary social justice creed draws on “social and linguistic constructivism,” an epistemological premise derived from postmodern theory holding that language constitutes social (and often all) reality, rather than merely attempting to represent it. Under social and linguistic constructivism, language is considered a material agent—its uses, as tantamount to physical acts. This belief explains the term “discursive violence.” For the social justice believer, language can enact violence by itself, without any attendant actions.
Today’s social justice creed is marked by preoccupations with new identities and their politics. It entails a broad palette of beliefs and practices, represented by new concerns and shibboleths, including “privilege,” “white privilege,” “privilege-checking,” “self-criticism” or “autocritique,” “cultural appropriation,” “intersectionality,” “discursive violence,” “rape culture,” “microaggressions,” “mansplaining,” “manspreading,” and many others. The terms proliferate almost as rapidly as the gender identities.
Self-criticism and privilege-checking are the vestiges of “autocritique” and “struggle sessions,” purification methods of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–76). In the late 1960s, as word from the communist revival spread to the West through the student and feminist movements of Europe, especially France, the birthplace of postmodern theory, they became part of the Western left’s vocabulary and toolkit. In struggle sessions, the guilty party—accused of selfishness, ignorance, and the embrace of bourgeois ideology—was pilloried with verbal and often physical assaults by her comrades, until she broke down and confessed her characterological and ideological flaws. Today, the confessions involve privilege, or the unearned advantage enjoyed by members of a dominant group based on appearance. Usually on demand, checking one’s privilege means to acknowledge unearned advantage and to atone for it publicly. Meanwhile, in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, autocritique began with the guilty party, who subjected herself to brutal verbal self-inspection and denigration before the jury of her comrades. Autocritique and struggle sessions could lead to imprisonment or death as the comrade was often found to be insufficiently pure. In self-criticism (self-crit) and “callout” routines, soft forms of autocritique and struggle sessions became prevalent on the Internet sometime after 2009. They then infiltrated universities and other social spaces.
“Intersectionality” is the axiomatic oppression-ranking framework that establishes a new social justice hierarchy based on the multiplicities of oppression as they may intersect and affect subjects in multiple, supposedly subordinated social categories. It is no less than a scale for weighing oppression. It then inverts the supposedly existing hierarchy on the basis of this intersectional oppression ranking, moving those on the bottom to the top, and vice versa. This is not a temporary feature of social justice but represents a hierarchical inversion that must be maintained to engender the animus and ressentiment necessary to continue fueling the movement.
This ranking system began with the work of the Hungarian and Soviet literary critic and Marxist philosopher György Lukács. In his book, History and Class Consciousness ([1923] 1971), Lukács introduced a form of epistemology that has had an outsized impact ever since, serving as a source for postmodern theory and social justice. The social justice notion that each person has their own truth based on their particular type of subordination can be traced to Lukács. He argued that the unique position of the working class within the social order and the relations of production provide the proletariat with a privileged vantage-point for discerning objective truth and called the theory “proletarian standpoint epistemology.” Lukács argued that reality under capitalism is a single objective reality. But the proletarian has a peculiar relationship to objective reality. The objective world strikes the proletarian differently than it does the capitalist. Like the capitalist, the proletarian is a self-conscious subject. However, unlike the capitalist, the proletarian is also a commodity, an object for sale on the market. The proletarian’s consciousness of the commodification of his selfhood contradicts his experience as living subject, a person with a subjective existence. The proletariat’s “self-consciousness of the commodity” (that is himself) explains the working class’s antagonism toward capitalism as Lukács saw it. While the proletariat fully grasps the contradiction of its self-conscious commodification, the class can only come to terms with the contradiction by upending and abolishing existing conditions.
Feminists and postmodern theorists later appropriated standpoint epistemology and siphoned it through various identity filters. It is the root of the contemporary social justice belief in the connection between identity and knowledge. Social justice holds that membership in a subordinated identity group grants members exclusive access to particular knowledge, their own knowledge. Members of dominant identity groups cannot access or understand the knowledge of subordinated others. For example, a white “cishetero” male (a white straight man who accepts the gender that he was “assigned at birth”) cannot have a black lesbian’s experience and therefore can’t access or understand her knowledge. Individuals within subordinated identity groups also have their own individual knowledge. For social justice believers, knowledge is personal, individual, and impenetrable to others. It is “muh knowledge.” I call this notion of knowledge “epistemological solipsism.” Under the social justice worldview, everyone is locked in an impenetrable identity chrysalis with access to a personal knowledge that no one else can reach.
Therefore, social justice ideology does not foster egalitarianism. Rank is maintained, only the bottom becomes the top when the totem pole of identity is inevitably flipped upside-down and stood on its head. Is it any wonder then that social justice warriors compete valiantly for the status of “most subordinated” in the games derogatorily referred to as “the Oppression Olympics?” The race to the bottom is really a race to the top—although the race runs downhill.
Both its epistemology and ontology—its assumptions about how one acquires knowledge, who can know, and the nature of the objects of knowledge—are enforced with authoritarianism. Claims made on behalf of correct beliefs, correct wording, and proper naming—that is, language itself—trump empirical evidence and nullify scientific findings and methods in advance. Thus, social justice represents an entirely new understanding, quite distinct from previous versions. It also involves entirely different practices and methods for implementing it. The social and linguistic constructivist claims of social justice ideologues amount to a form of philosophical and social idealism that is enforced with a moral absolutism. Once beliefs are unconstrained by the object world and people can believe anything they like with impunity, the possibility for assuming a pretense of infallibility becomes almost irresistible, especially when the requisite power is available to support such a pretense. In fact, given its willy-nilly determination of truth and reality on the basis of beliefs alone, philosophical and social idealism necessarily becomes dogmatic, authoritarian, anti-rational, and effectively religious. Since it sanctions no push-back from the object world and regards it with indifference or disdain, it necessarily encounters push-back from the object world and must double-down. Because it usually contains so much nonsense, the social and philosophical idealism of the social justice creed must be established by force, or the threat of force.
Today, I will discuss some contemporary manifestations of “social justice,” but not as it plays out in the academy, a topic I have treated in my most recent book, Springtime for Snowflakes: ‘Social Justice’ and Its Postmodern Parentage (2018). Instead, my topic today is the “social justice” of U.S. for-profit corporations. Although regarded as new, I will show that “woke capitalism” is but a subset and recent type of a broader and longer-standing corporate ethos that I call “corporate leftism.” Woke capitalism also helps to make sense of the topic of my next book, Google Archipelago, a study of Big Digital—the mega-data services; media, cable, and Internet services; social media platforms; Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents; apps; and the developing Internet of Things. The Google Archipelago is not merely an amalgam of digital business interests. It operates and will increasingly operate as what the only redeemable postmodern theorist, Michel Foucault, called a “governmentality,” a means of governing the conduct of populations but also the technologies of governance and the rationality that underpins the technologies.Michel Foucault introduced the term “governmentality” in a series of lectures from 1977 to 1979. By the rationality underpinning technologies of governance, Foucault meant the way that power rationalizes the relations of power to itself and to the governed.
Despite the initial backlash, Nike’s “Believe in Something” ad campaign featuring Colin Kaepernick—whose national anthem kneel-downs brought #BlackLivesMatter protest to the NFL—dramatically boosted Nike’s sales. The ad’s success supported Business Insider columnist Josh Barro’s (2018) theory that woke capitalism provides a form of parapolitical representation for corporate consumers. Given their perceived political disenfranchisement in the political sphere, woke capitalism offers representation in the public sphere.See Martinez (2018).
With wokeness, Ross Douthat (2018) of the New York Times argues, corporations offer workers and customers rhetorical placebos in lieu of costlier economic concessions, such as higher wages and better benefits, or lower prices. Short of a socialist revolution, New York Congressional Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Green New Deal seems unlikely to materialize.See Levitz (2018). Douthat suggests that woke capitalism works by substituting symbolic for economic value. The same gestures of wokeness may also appease the liberal political elite, promoting their agendas of identity politics, gender pluralism, transgenderism, lax immigration standards, sanctuary cities, and so on. In return, the woke corporations hope to be spared higher taxes, increased regulations, and antitrust legislation aimed at monopolies.See Douthat (2018).
Meanwhile, at least one woke corporation appears intent on scolding its customers. I refer to Gillette (2019) and its “We Believe” ad. Like Nike, Gillette is a subsidiary of Proctor & Gamble. First posted to its social media accounts in mid-January 2019, the ad condescendingly lectures men, presumably “cishetero” men, about “toxic masculinity.” In the provocative ad, three men look into separate mirrors—not to shave but to examine themselves for traces of the dreaded condition. Voice-overs admonish men “to say the right thing, to act the right way.” Dramatizations of bullying, mansplaining, misogyny, and sexual predation shame bad men and enjoin a woke minority of men to “hold other men accountable,” or else face shame as well.
For Gillette, “shaving” now apparently means shearing away the characteristics associated with manhood now deemed pathological by the American Psychological Association.See Pappas (2019). These damaging traits include “stoicism, competitiveness, dominance and aggression.” To prevent the sudden onset or relapse of man-disease, self-groomers must exercise vigilance, scathing self-scrutiny, and unwavering determination. Even though their gender malignance has been “socially constructed,” men are responsible for immediately discerning and excising its outgrowths. The Gillette ad thus prescribes a new gender hygienics by which such brutes can “move upward, working out the beast,”Tennyson (1850, 183). By “working out the beast,” Alfred Lord Tennyson meant to eradicate the moral baseness of animal nature, rather than to establish an earthly utopia, as his predecessor William Godwin had suggested, or to remove the traits associated mostly with men due to evolutionary selection. becoming “The Best a Man Can Get,” a newly-shorn animal, or rather a new kind of man shorn of animality.
Like the Nike Kaepernick ad, the Gillette “We Believe” ad provoked significant backlash. But parent company Proctor & Gamble’s executive response to the ensuing furor suggested that the corporation was willing to forgo profits for virtue points, at least for now. Jon Moeller, Proctor & Gamble’s CFO, told reporters that post-ad sales were “in-line with pre-campaign levels.” In advertising terms, in other words, the ad was a failure. Yet, Moeller viewed the expenditure as an investment in the future. “It’s a part of our effort to connect more meaningfully with younger consumer groups,”Meyersohn (2019). he explained, perhaps referring to those too young to sport the toxic stubble.
Unsatisfied with the above explanations, I still wondered how and why corporations assumed the role of social justice arbiters and how and why social justice came to be the ideology of major U.S. corporations.For a summary of the relationship between corporate social activism and political activists, see Lin (2018). But before venturing my own theory, however, I’d like to retrace a history of corporate leftism, which will shed light on the relationship between leftism and corporatism.
Corporate leftism has a long history, dating at least to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I first recognized corporate leftism through the histories that documented the funding of the Russian and other socialist revolutions by leading U.S. capitalists and bankers. As Richard B. Spence (2017) boldly declares in Wall Street and the Russian Revolution 1905–1925, the term see, “socialist-capitalist” is not an oxymoron.
Spence was not referring to so-called “mixed economies” but rather to a false dichotomy, a mating of two supposed economic antinomies, socialism and capitalism. Understanding why the term is not an oxymoron does not necessarily depend upon the historical knowledge uncovered by Spence, and before him, by Antony C. Sutton (2016)—although, given that I am a historian, I found this material revealing. But the apparent contradiction in terms is based on a mischaracterization of economic opposites and a failure to detect in the original name for the field of economics, namely “political economy,” the inherent possibility of such a conjunction. The real opposites are not capitalism and socialism but rather individual freedom versus centralized political control, whether statist or corporate.
According to Sutton’s Wall Street and FDR (1975), “corporate socialism is a system where those few who hold the legal monopolies of financial and industrial control profit at the expense of all others in society.” For Sutton, “The most lucid and frank description of corporate socialism and its mores and objectives is to be found in a 1906 booklet by Frederick Clemson Howe, Confessions of a Monopolist.” In attempting to validate Sutton’s reference to Howe as the prototypical monopolist or even corporate socialist, I was disappointed, but ultimately found the excursion rewarding.
Beginning with Spence’s Wall Street and the Russian Revolution 1905–1925, which had the same title as one of Sutton’s major books except for an added date range, I searched feverishly for “Howe” and “Confessions of a Monopolist.” (Actually, as is my wont, I searched electronic texts and the Kindle version of Spence, so my search produced nothing like a fever. But I am nostalgic for a past that I never knew, when in nineteenth century novels, the researches of fictional characters like Victor Frankenstein resulted in life-threatening frenzies.)
My problem was that I wanted to introduce corporate leftism and corporate socialism by referring to a television sitcom of the 1970s, namely, Gilligan’s Island. Some of you will be old enough and will have hailed from backgrounds as plebeian as my own to recall this program. The situation for this “dumb TV show,” as Mises scholar B.K Marcus aptly put it, is a small community of seven American castaways on a deserted island. Because it aired in the ‘60s, Gilligan’s Island is a collectivist Robinson Crusoe tale with a socialist pretext. Each character represents a different life station in an otherwise lost world of individualism, cast from a division of labor that is rendered absurd let alone inapplicable by the social and economic life of desertion. Since the show’s creator and producer Sherwood Schwartz was at least an unconscious Marxist, the sitcom demonstrated episode after episode that “in communist society … nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity.” Actress, professor, millionaire’s wife, and “all the rest” must “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner” (Marx [1845] 1968). They must outgrow the limited specializations imposed on them by the capitalist order. This goes for everyone on the island, except, it seems, for the monopolist, Thurston B. Howell III.
Although their names were not identical, they were near homonyms and I’d hoped to connect Frederic Howe and Thurston B. Howell. I hadn’t been so sanguine as to expect that Thurston Howell had been named directly after Frederic Howe. After all their names were spelled differently. Yet, I still hoped for some reference. And they were both monopolists, or so I thought.
Uh oh. Spence did not mention Howe as the model monopolist or corporate socialist. In fact, he curiously omitted any reference to Howe’s name and his “rule book.” Coming up empty in such a cognate publication, I began to feel flush and somewhat panicky. (As you know, we humanities scholars are susceptible to hyper-emotionality.) Nor could I find any mention of Frederic Howe in connection with Thurston B. Howell at all. And, while a few early reviews of Confessions took the book at face value and came to the same conclusion as Sutton, that it represented the autobiography of a real monopolist giving away his secrets, even the most cursory assessment of Doctor Frederic Howe’s life and other works would have quickly disabused anyone but the most tendentious polemicist of the idea that Howe’s Confessions was a rule book or how-to manual for monopolists. Howe was nothing like the corporate magnate or mega-banker that Sutton suggested he was, and so he could not possibly have helped bankroll the creation of “a captive market and a technical colony to be exploited by a few high-powered American financiers and the corporations under their control,” that is, the Soviet Union. First of all, Howe had earned a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. A real monopolist would wait for an honorary degree. Furthermore, Confessions of a Monopolist was not even an autobiography; it was a biting satire, a criticism of monopolies and monopolists, written by a progressive reformer and later FDR statesman. As it turned out, both Howe and Howell had been fictional monopolists.
Yet the Thurston Howell on Gilligan’s island was certainly something like the stereotypical monopolist described in Frederic Howe’s book. Like the character in Confessions, Howell’s number one rule was to “make Society work for you.” Thurston Howell certainly managed to command the labor and deference of his fellow islanders. As Marcus (2004) notes in “The Monetary Economics of Thurston Howell III,” Howell was able to commandeer labor and goods by virtue of his off-island status, to procure goods and services by writing checks drawn on U.S. banks. The fact that this fiat currency functioned in the absence of the government that backed it suggests that money operates according to a cultural, Lamarckian evolutionary process. Money’s governmentally-enforced fiat characteristic is an acquired characteristic that is passed along through future generational transactions and retains these characteristics even after its basis in force disappears—at least until it is replaced, and sometimes even after that. As Mises showed, the value of a currency is historical and the study of currencies must be historicist.
Howell’s expression of monopolistic desiderata, however, is best expressed in episode 9, “The Big Gold Strike,” (Warner Bros. Entertainment [1964] 2013) when Gilligan, acting as Howell’s golf caddie, falls into a giant hole where he notices something golden embedded in the walls of the cave. Naturally Howell recognizes gold and assumes that it is his property. After all, Gilligan was in his employ, albeit fooled by a faux fiat currency. Howell swears Gilligan to secrecy to secure his ownership against the islanders’ agreement that all property on the island would be communal. But soon the mine is discovered by the rest of the community. The unreliability of the state appears to account for Howell’s problem in securing exclusive gold mining rights. Gilligan is the nominal and ineffectual President of the island and a buffoon who has no power. But Howell’s failure as a monopolist is more fundamental. While he is perfectly capable to “let others work for you,” he does not know the language or ways of corporate socialism, and does not understand how to establish monopoly within such a state. Rather than continually yielding expressions of blatant self-interest, a corporate socialist would couch his monopolistic ambitions in the language of equality.
Rather than Frederic Howe, King Camp Gillette would have provided a much better model for Thurston Howell. The founder of the American Safety Razor Company in 1901, who changed its name to the Gillette Safety Razor Company in 1902, Gillette published The Human Drift in 1894. While acknowledging that “[n]o reform movement can meet with success unless that movement takes into consideration the power of capital, and is based on present business methods, and conforms to the same laws” (4), Gillette’s Human Drift railed against competition, which he believed was “the prolific source of ignorance and every form of crime, and that [which] increases the wealth of the few at the expense of the many…the present system of competition between individuals results in fraud, deception, and adulteration of almost every article we eat, drink, or wear.” Competition resulted in “a waste of material and labor beyond calculation.” Competition was the source of “selfishness, war between nations and individuals, murder, robbery, lying, prostitution, forgery, divorce, deception, brutality, ignorance, injustice, drunkenness, insanity, suicide, and every other crime, [which] have their base in competition and ignorance. This explains the recent Gillette ad; the company has finally discovered that the root of competition, and thus, of all evil, is toxic masculinity.
But the corporate socialist King Camp Gillette may as well have patented the disposable safety razor to prevent so many desperate people from cutting their throats—at least until they realized the answer to all of their problems, which he had introduced in Human Drift: a singular monopoly, which would “naturally” control all production and distribution, specializing in everything, such that “every article sold to consumer, from the package to its contents, will be the product of the United Company.” Under the United Company, the production of necessary goods, and eventually of everything, would be consolidated and centralized, eliminating the waste and hazards of the many and widely dispersed manufacturing plants and buildings of the current haphazard and chaotic system. Most cities and towns would “destroyed,” as would all competitors, as the vast majority of the population would relocate to “The Metropolis,” where, powered by Niagara Falls, all production would take place and everyone’s lives would center around the corporation, whose commercial and governmental power would be total.
Lest one think that The Human Drift represented the lark of a young idealist before he came to his senses and founded a company with almost unparalleled name recognition, Gillette went on to publish the World Corporation in 1910, a prospectus for developing a world-wide singular monopoly. But, founding his company and patenting his razor between writing these two treatises, Gillette’s biographer Russel Adams quipped, “[i]t was almost as if Karl Marx had paused between The Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital to develop a dissolving toothbrush or collapsible comb.” (Adams, 1978)
A few passages from World Corporation should be sufficient to establish Gillette as the prototypical corporate socialist:
CORPORATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO FORM, ABSORB, EXPAND, AND GROW, AND NO POWER OF MAN CAN PREVENT IT. Promoters [of World Corporation] are the true socialists of this generation, the actual builders of a co-operative system which is eliminating competition, and in a practical business way reaching results which socialists have vainly tried to attain through legislation and agitation for centuries (Gillette 1910, 9).
Opposition to “WORLD CORPORATION” by individuals, by states, or by governments will be of no avail. Opposition in any case can only be of temporary effect, barriers will only centralize power and cause increased momentum when they give way (Gillette 1910, 62).
The corporation will dominate material but also mental production, as Gillette praises the hive mind:
“WORLD CORPORATION” represents individual intelligence and force combined, centralized and intelligently directed. Individuals are OF the corporate mind, but are not THE corporate mind (Gillette 1910, 45).
And, as if anticipating Google’s secret mission statement, Gillette wrote:
“WORLD CORPORATION” will possess all knowledge of all men, and each individual mind will find complete expression through the great Corporate Mind.
Finally, waxing poetic in Ray Kurzweil mode, Gillette wrote:
“WORLD CORPORATION” will have life everlasting. Individual man will live his life and pass into the great beyond; but this great Corporate Mind will live on through the ages, always absorbing and perfecting, for the utilization and benefit of all the inhabitants of the earth.
It is worth noting that Gillette’s business practices were not wholly at odds with the ideas in his books. True to his monopolistic impulses, he regularly filed patents, and in 1917 with the outbreak of World War I, the company provided every soldier with a shaving kit, paid for by the U.S. government. But did Gillette’s expressions of corporate socialism actually help his business efforts, or merely ease his guilty conscience? We can’t be sure, but speculating about the objectives of today’s corporate leftists may help make sense of the rhetoric of such corporate leftists of the past.
Today’s corporate social justice rebranding represents at least a rhetorical overthrow of Milton Friedman’s extremely narrow view of corporate responsibility. In Capitalism and Freedom ([1962] 2002), Friedman declared that the “one and only one ‘social responsibility’ of business” is to “increase profits.”In 1962, Friedman argued against the value of “corporate responsibility” that is expressed by woke capitalism. In a section entitled, “Social Responsibility of Business and Labor,” Friedman wrote: “The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate officials and labor leaders have a ‘social responsibility’ that goes beyond serving the interest of their stockholders or their members. This view shows a fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. In such an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.” Friedman ([1962] 2002). Friedman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976 and by the mid-1980s Friedman’s notion of limited corporate “social responsibility” had become widely accepted.
Yet woke capitalism may still satisfy Friedman’s profit-only maxim. If all the world’s a stage, then the corporate mouthing of social justice bromides may be play-acting and therefore mawkish parody. To be truly woke, then, might mean that one is awake to the woke-acting corporations, the woke-believing consumers, and maybe even the demands of wokeness altogether. This explanation is consistent with the profit requirement and allows one to make short-shrift of newly found corporate virtue. It is a cynical sham and proves more than ever that the chicanery of corporations and their billionaire owners knows no bounds. This view is similar to that held by Anand Giridharadas (2019), critic of woke billionaires and author of Winners Take All.See Feloni (2019).
Now, as tempting as such “post-truth” cynicism may be, it doesn’t explain the promotion of woke or leftist views by corporations and the effects that such promotions may have in making their consumer bases more leftist, a circumstance they will have to deal with at some point. Arguably, corporations would not espouse and thereby potentially spread political views merely to assuage a consumer contingent, unless said views ultimately aligned with their own interests. One is led to wonder what politics would best serve the interests of corporate leftists, especially aspiring corporate socialists.
To benefit corporate leftists, corporate socialists, or any monolithic singular producer and governmentality, a political creed would likely place a heavy emphasis on equality. Such an emphasis would likely be accompanied by shaming of the privileged along with demands that they surrender their advantages. To emphasize equality, the creed benefitting the corporate leftist would recognize refugees, the disenfranchised, and at least in theory would be internationalist rather than nationalist or nativist. While declaring equality, the political creed of the corporate leftist might nevertheless stress difference—between identity groups and even within them—and might benefit from the creation of utterly new identity types. Such a creed would consistently keep the identity groups concerned with whether or not they were losing ground to other identity groups rather than worrying about the corporate socialist. Watch words might include “equity, inclusion, and diversity.” Always on the cutting edge, the corporate leftist would welcome the promotion of the new and the disruption of the old, but always with improvement in mind. A political creed that aimed at dismantling traditional gender, the family, local customs, tradition, and even historical memory would remove the last bastions against state or major corporate power. Ultimately, the corporate leftist or corporate socialist would benefit from a singular governmental monopoly, with one set of rules. As Gillette noted, ideally this global government would be the corporation itself.
Thus, woke capitalism or corporate leftism does not consist merely of rhetorical placebos, symbolic over economic concessions, or even the mere placating of liberal political elites. Woke capitalism or corporate leftism actually represents the corporate interests of the would-be monopolist, the corporate socialist, and the corporate leftist in general.
Rectenwald argues that, just as the Gulag was the means to physically disappear dissidents and other thought criminals from normal life in the Soviet Union, powerful corporations currently preside over big data and serve as the chief arbiters of expression with power to delete "dangerous" persons from its various platforms.
Presented at the Libertarian Scholars Conference on 28 September 2019, at The King's College in New York City.
Julie Borowski (LibertyJunkies.com) has a very popular YouTube channel producing funny videos that teach free market economics and libertarian principles. She joins Bob Murphy to discuss her new children’s book, Nobody Knows How to Make a Pizza.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy asks a series of tough (but fair, he hopes) questions for progressives, ranging from abortion to the minimum wage to climate change.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy analyzes Dave Chappelle’s Netflix special, “Sticks & Stones.” Bob applauds one bit and criticizes another, but overall thinks Chappelle has done his duty as the court jester.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Robert Anthony Peters is a professional actor as well as a promoter of liberty. His most recognizable film roles were appearances in The Pursuit of Happyness (with Will Smith) and Steve Jobs. His latest creation is the short film Tank Man.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
[Excerpt from "The Fall and Rise of Puritanical Policy in America," Journal of Libertarian Studies 12, no. 1 (1996): 143–60]
America was colonized by Europeans seeking economic and religious liberty, with many of the colonies founded explicitly along theocratic lines. The most notorious of these groups, the Puritans, founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony. They adopted wide-ranging sumptuary legislation including restrictions on alcohol and tobacco. Despite the natural advantages of a small homogeneous group based on voluntary association, many of the measures proved to be unworkable and ineffective and had to be modified or replaced by decrees to maintain moderation.Gary North, Puritan Economic Experiments (Fort Worth, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1988). It is the Puritan impulse for social reform that drives the cycle of reform, prohibition, and repeal. Over time this cycle has produced Puritanical social control that has been secularized, centralized, and has achieved a kind of permanence within government bureaucracy.
The American Revolution was an expression of political and economic independence, primarily precipitated by the British domination over trade and taxes. Americans did not want to pay British excises on the products they consumed. But equally important was the desire to eliminate British control over international trade that enriched the English at American expense. “Sinful” goods like alcohol, tea, and tobacco were targets of British colonial policy. Tobacco farmers, for example, were forced to export their tobacco to England at extremely unfavorable terms.John S. Bassett, A Short History of the United States: 1492-1929 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 143.
The success of the radical American Revolution ushered in a multitude of reforms honoring individualism at the expense of traditional hegemony. Slavery was abolished in several Northern states and freedom to manumit slaves was established in several Southern states. After writing the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson set about abolishing entail, eliminating primogeniture, and establishing religious freedom in Virginia, the first time this had ever been done in so complete a form. Freedom of religion was established in several other states and many established churches lost their state monopoly.
The late eighteenth century produced not only the American Revolution but also the Industrial Revolution. The new republic grew in size and population and prospered economically. Manufacturing, agriculture, and trade thrived in the northeast. The plantation economy of the South prospered and expanded, while the Northwest Territory was explored and settled.
The freedom from British dominion and the economic growth that followed the war resulted in fundamental changes in the production and consumption of alcohol. New England lost its advantage in the production of rum while western grain farmers developed an advantage in the production of whiskey. With the rise of whiskey, the long term trend of lower prices for spirits continued. Lower prices combined with the new prosperity and freedom to generate increased consumption of alcohol.
Consumption of spirits continued to increase after the Revolution, peaking during the 1820s. Despite the fact that consumption was greater than ever before or since, America was not a nation of drunkards, and public drunkenness was not common. Alcohol consumption in America was comparable to European patterns.W.J. Rorabaugh suggests that problem drinking was rare. The two types of drinking most prominent were dietary drinking, which involved numerous small servings throughout the day as a substitute for food and water, and communal binge drinking in which the entire town might get intoxicated in celebrations, such as Independence Day, harvest, weddings, and public events such as elections, generally less than once per month. See W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 521.
Not all Americans felt the same way about the progress and freedom generated by these revolutionary spirits. Many of these grumblers had benefited from English colonial rule as administrators, tax collectors, and bureaucrats. Others benefitted from playing key roles in the system of triangular trade which saw New Englanders sell their rum and other products, while African slaves were transported on the “middle passage” to the West Indian sugar islands where the slaves were sold in order to purchase molasses, the necessary ingredient for the burgeoning New England rum industry.Many of the smaller towns of New England, especially Boston and the Rhode Island ports benefitted materially from the production of rum and the slave trade, see Bassett, A Short History, pp. 140-145.
The Revolution thus posed a threat to some members of the ruling upper classes who controlled colonial society. A primary symbol of this threat to their hegemony was alcohol consumption. In colonial America, politicians controlled the issuance of licenses to sell spirits, the wealthy owned the taverns, and the clergy monitored consumption in the taverns. Spirits were expensive enough that only the wealthy could regularly afford these goods in large quantities. Public intoxication was viewed as a kind of status symbol.
The elite’s first line of defense against alcohol consumption by the lower classes had been the licensing of taverns. However, this measure had already lost much of its clout by 1764 when Benjamin Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette labeled the tavern a “Pest to Society.” John Adams had led a crusade in 1760 to restrict or reduce the number of licenses in Massachusetts but was ridiculed by the public and defeated in his effort. As the “seedbed of the Revolution,” the tavern was greatly strengthened (by victory over England) against the elites who sought to control alcohol consumption with policies of regulation and taxation.
The first anti-alcohol movement in the Republic turned to the British example of imposing excise taxes on spirits. After various anti-spirit measures failed at the state level, temperance advocates began calling for federal action, but no action was forthcoming until the overthrow of the Articles of Confederation. Alexander Hamilton had advocated the use of high excise taxes on spirits in the Federalist Papers and lobbied hard for such a tax as the Secretary of the Treasury.
The excise tax was eventually passed by Congress under the pressure of a budgetary shortfall, but was angrily opposed by citizens of the west and south. By 1794 hostilities erupted into open warfare known as the Whiskey Rebellion. This widespread revolt was concentrated in western Pennsylvania, but also effected parts of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, South Carolina and had support in parts of New York, the Northwest Territory, and in the Southwest.See Mary K. Tachau, “The Whiskey Rebellion in Kentucky: A Forgotten Episode of Civil Disobedience,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 239-259. The rebels called for secession, sacked the federal tax commissioners, made advances on Fort Pitt, and threatened the federal arsenals at Pittsburgh and Frederick Maryland.
To surpress the revolt and collect the tax, George Washington and Alexander Hamilton nationalized the militia and sent a massive army into western Pennsylvania to crush the nucleus of the rebellion. Larger than most armies of the Revolutionary war, the “Watermelon Army” had more soldiers than western Pennsylvania had men of military age and was probably more than ten times the number needed to suppress the revolt. Despite this massive demonstration of federal commitment to tyranny and union, the suppression of open revolt was anything but a decisive triumph for the “friends of order” over the “friends of liberty.”
The excise tax remained difficult to collect, as western farmers continued to oppose the excise tax resulting in the costs of collection exceeding the revenue collected in the West. The Rebellion also solidified Jeffersonian opposition to the Hamiltonian nationalists. The majority of Americans now recognized that the Hamiltonians held a Tory ideology and were using the same methods and tactics as the British had used earlier. The friends of order had more in common with the enemies of the Revolution than with most Americans. Jefferson’s Republican government abolished the whiskey excise and all other internal taxes, establishing libertarianism as the dominant ideology in national government for the period 1800–1860.On this see Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). It has been shown that the western farmers’ economic rationale for fighting was more as consumers of whiskey than as producers. See David O. Whitten, “An Economic Inquiry into the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794,” Agricultural History 49, No. 3 (July 1975), pp. 491-504.
The war was not, however, a total loss to George Washington and his supporters. The cost of the army was very large and much of the money was spent in the west. The visiting soldiers and newly cash-rich residents began a buying spree in western land. George Washington personally owned large holdings in the western lands, and decided to start selling his lands just prior to the Rebellion. Of course, the buying spree meant that Washington’s own holdings dramatically increased in price. As Thomas Slaughter observed, “the coincidence was certainly a propitious one for his finances.” Even Washington, who had gobbled up the largest and choicest parcels of land while in public service, noted that “this event having happened at the time it did was fortunate.”Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, p. 224.
The puritanical counterrevolution that would eventually undermine the libertarian structure of the Early Republica had its beginnings in the early temperance movement. One of the great contributors to the early temperance movement was Benjamin Rush, physician and signer of the Declaration of Independence. Rush published pamphlets that condemned the use of alcohol as both unhealthy for the individual and destructive to society. His views, while of questionable scientific validity, were used by temperance leaders to confirm their faith that both science and God were on their side. Rush’s position as doctor and patriot rendered his message highly effective among the intellectual classes, culminating in the conversion of Jeremy Belknap, a minister from Boston who later became President of Harvard College. Rush also promoted the anti-alcohol crusade by requiring his doctrines be taught at his medical school.
Churches, however, were the principle players in the puritanical counterrevolution.This religious ideology is not necessarily inconsistent with the economic self-interest of the churches. Traditional Christian churches held that sin was a voluntary act even when temptation was involved. In early 19th century America, reformed or “heretical” Christians began a mass movement to make a preemptive strike at sin. These Christians believed that sinful objects were the source of temptation and consequently the cause of sin and thus had to be removed from society.This perspective on sin is analogous to an objective theory of value in economics. From the “objective” viewpoint, value and sin are innate aspects of the good, while from the subjectivist point of view, economic value and sin are matters of individual choice. They felt that alcohol hindered their ability to reorganize and purify society in their image. Quakers and Methodists were the first churches to declare their anti-alcohol beliefs and form the early temperance movement.
This new religious perspective can be characterized as post-millennial evangelical pietistic protestantism. They were militantly zealous and emphasized preaching from the Bible. They were also pietistic in stressing Bible study, devotion, personal religious experience, and like the 17th century German religious movement, pietism, they opposed formalism and intellectualism. Most important to this counterrevolution was the doctrine of millennialism, a prophecy or belief in an ideal society that would be created by revolutionary action. Post-millennialists hold the “reformed” or “heretical” view that man himself must purge the world of sin and imperfection and establish the Kingdom of God on Earth as a prerequisite of Jesus’s second coming.Orthodox Christians, such as Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, and mainstream Protestants, are typically a-millennialist in that they do not believe in a literal 1000-year Kingdom of God on Earth. Pre-millenialists hold that Jesus will come again, defeat the forces of evil, and establish a Kingdom of God on Earth. Pre-millennialists are notorious for their incorrect predictions about the end of the world. Obviously, post-millennialist belief provides a wide latitude in terms of policy prescriptions. Rothbard considered the spread of post-millennialism to be a crucial factor in ideological change in America because it was post-millenialism ideology that would become the driving force behind the drive for prohibition and other efforts to drive out sin and imperfection using the coercive arm of the state.Rothbard writes about the earlier post-millennialist, Joachim of Fiore, a twelfth-century Calabrian monk who attempted to establish a heretical communist society and almost converted three popes to his beliefs. Post-millennialism continued to spring up in medieval Europe, especially in Germany and among the Anabaptists. This history is described in Norman R.C. Cohn, The Pursuit of Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements (London: Harper & Row, 1961). According to Rothbard post-millennialism is also an important component of secular movements such as Karl Marx’s communism. Adolph Hitler's Nazism and Third (1000 year) Reich could also be interpreted as a secular derivation of Joachim’s millennialism and original thesis that history would be divided into three, rather than the traditional two periods of christian doctrine. See Murray N. Rothabrd, “Karl Marx: Communist as Religious Eschatologist,” Review of Austrian Economics 4 (1990), pp. 123-79.
Geographically, post-millennialist evangelical pietism emanated from New England where the Puritans first settled. The Puritans (who had already experimented with theocracy, witch hunts, and prohibitionism) and the Separatists evolved into the Congregational and Unitarian churches which were the state-established churches of New England. This Yankee influence spread into western New York, the Midwest, and Great Lakes region and eventually south and west as New Englanders, their clergy, and educators migrated with the nation’s expansion.Much of this migration was concentrated in areas claimed by Massachusetts and Connecticut in the Treaty of 1783. On the dispersion of the prohibitionists, see Whitney R. Cross, The Burned-over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950); Peter H. Odegard, [1928] Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York: Octagon Books, 1966).
The first anti-alcohol organization was the Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance, which was formed in response to the intemperance associated with the War of 1812. The American Temperance Society was organized in 1826. By 1833, the temperance movement had over one million members, largely comprised of New England evangelicals from the Baptist, Congregationalist, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches.Ironically, both the anti-alcohol movement and anti-slavery movement were centered in Boston which dominated the early colonial triangular trade in rum and slaves. This surge in prohibitionist sentiment is related to religious revivalism of the Second Great Awakening. Religious revivalism was very strong in the 1820s and 1830s throughout New England. Revivalism had always meant reform of the individual and society, but Americans saw themselves as a special case. Americans had defeated the savage Indian, nature, and the British. America was the proverbial city on the hill, an example to the world, and the most likely place for God to establish His Kingdom on Earth.
Increased alcohol consumption may have also stimulated the temperance movement. Rorabaugh estimated that the consumption of alcohol increased from 3.5 pure gallons per capita in 1770 to almost 4 gallons in 1830. This increased consumption was the result of lower production costs, lower taxes, and higher incomes. Drinking was part of virtually every aspect of life for many in the early Republic and was a symbol of the American spirit.Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic, p. 9. While it is dubious that alcohol causes sin, “sinful” behavior is clearly associated with alcohol use. Given their superstitions, heretical religious views, and limited knowledge, it is not surprising that reformers would base their efforts on this association. Early success with private prohibitionism, such as the signing of pledges of moderation and abstinence also provided reinforcement for this association.
An added push for religious revivalism was provided by church privatization in New England. The Congregationalist Church was disestablished in 1818 in Connecticut and in 1824-1833 in Massachusetts. This period of church privatization and religious revivalism is described as follows:
During the first half of the nineteenth century, religion in New England was changing in dramatic fashion. On the one hand, the number of preachers demanded in Connecticut and Massachusetts with respect to the population increased by more than half even as real preaching salaries almost tripled. The increase in total pastors reflected a fivefold increase in dissenting preachers. From 1800 to 1840, the proportion of dissenting preachers in these two states increased from under 20 percent to over 50 percent.Kelly Olds, “Privatizing the Church: Disestablishment in Connecticut and Massachusetts,” Journal of Political Economy 102, No. 2 (April 1994) p. 291.
Despite the timing of privatization and religious revivalism, it is not possible to say definitively that privatization caused revivalism.In fact, many social and economic factors contributed to revivalism and the Second Great Awakening. For example, natural factors and natural disasters also contributed to revivalism. See Michael Barkun, Crucible of the Millennium: The Burned-Over District of New York in the 1840s (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), esp. chapters 6 and 7.
However, this separation of church and state involved not only the disestablishment of churches but also a movement from tax-funded churches to the voluntary funding of churches. In 1800, 90 percent of churches in Massachusetts and Connecticut used taxation but only 30 percent did so by 1840 in Connecticut and by 1850 in Massachusetts.Olds, “Privatizing the Church,” p. 291. Economic theory can therefore provide some support for a causal connection between privatization and religious revivalism. A monopoly church with taxing power would be expected to reduce output below competitive levels and charge monopoly prices for its “services.” We would therefore expect an increase in output after the privatization-demonopolization. Theory also predicts that new firms would enter the industry and supply competing products.Again see Olds, “Privatizing the Church,” for his evidence that the established churches did have state authority, practice price discrimination, and increase output after disestablishment (privatization), and that alternative churches expanded faster than the established churches after privatization.
As temperance groups formed and grew, several important changes took place. Initially temperance efforts were voluntary efforts to promote moderation in alcohol consumption. Members of the temperance groups were expected to lead by example and provide education and assistance to others. Over time, however, alternative groups were established that advocated abstinence from spirits and moderation in beer, wine, and cider. Eventually, even these groups were replaced with total abstinence societies in which members were required to sign an abstinence pledge. As the work of reform became more difficult over time, reform leaders became frustrated and dissatisfied with voluntary efforts and began to advocate the use of government to enforce temperance throughout society.Thornton, The Economics of Prohibition, pp. 43-45.
Temperance forces began to organize coalitions to pass restrictive legislation. Their first reform measure was typically to replace the license system with the more restrictive local option laws which gave communities the right to prohibit local liquor sales. Other restrictive policies included minimum-quantity purchase laws (which require the individual to buy at least 15 or 28 gallons of spirits at a time) and local prohibitions. These policies were difficult to enforce and had few if any beneficial effects. The failure of these policies to satisfy prohibitionists ultimately led to the call for state-wide prohibition.
State prohibitions were adopted in many northern states and territories between 1851 and 1855. These prohibitions were based on Maine’s law which was authored by the zealous prohibitionist, Neal Dow. The “Maine Laws” allowed for search and seizure, reduced the requirements for conviction, increased fines, created mandatory prison sentences, and called for the destruction of captured liquor.
The rapid success of the Maine Laws was shortlived as the rapidly growing immigrant populations opposed such laws. The Maine Laws also suffered several important setbacks in court. Enforcement was difficult because professional police forces existed in only a few large cities where the law was least popular. In the emerging Republican party, prohibition was considered a divisive issue and was not enthusiastically embraced at the national level.Interestingly, the decrease in alcohol consumption that resulted from temperance and prohibitionist efforts created a 500+ calorie deficit in the adult diet leading to declines in demographic-health measures during a period of high economic growth. See Mark Thornton, “Alcohol Consumption and the Standard of Living in Antebellum America,” Atlantic Economic Journal 23, No. 2 (June 1995).
One event seemed to have sealed the fate of the Maine Laws. Neal Dow, who was mayor of Portland, Maine in 1855, was accused of personally profiting from the government-controlled sale of alcohol.
An angry mob assembled at the liquor agency on the night of June 2, 1855, after the existence of the liquor had become common knowledge. The mob demanded destruction of the liquor and threatened to break into the agency if the demands were not met and Neal Dow arrested for violation of his own law. Dow, who was always quick to look to force in defense of morality, assembled the local Rifle Guards. In the confrontation which followed with the stone-throwing mob, Dow ordered his troops to fire when several rioters broke into the liquor agency.Ian R. Tyrrell, Sobering Up: From Temperance to Prohibition in Antebellum America, 1800-1860 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 295-299
Dow was labeled a murderer and a fanatic, and the prohibition movement which he was instrumental in crafting quickly diminished in political significance.Frank L. Byrne, Prophet of Prohibition: Neal Dow and His Crusade (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1969), pp. 60-69.
The rise of the Republican party was the result of a long series of attempts to form a coalition strong enough to challenge the dominance of the Democratic party. Forged from the Whig and No-Nothing Parties, the Republicans naturally captured the prohibitionist-abolitionist radicals and thereby dominated “Yankeedom.” This coalition of mercantilist parties did not directly satisfy the prohibitionist faction, but they were able to institute taxes on alcohol and tobacco that appeased the reformers and helped the Republican party to dominate American politics for decades. After the Civil War, prohibitionists became increasingly political and better organized at the national level. Their progress included the formation of the Prohibition Party, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and the Anti-Saloon League.
During the period between the Civil War and the Progressive Era the post-millennial crusade became increasingly secular. According to Barkun, the “slow nineteenth-century separation of a secular from a religious vision of the perfect society” accelerated after (and possibly because of) the Civil War and that by “the end of the nineteenth century, millennialism was dominated by secularizing tendencies” so that “by the very time that it succumbed in religious circles its secular version triumphed in the society at large.”Barkum, Crucible of the Millenium, pp. 2, 151, 29.
With respect to prohibitionism, this period is best classified as one of “modified” prohibition. State prohibition waned to such an extent that by 1875 only three states remained “dry.” Although there was a brief resurgence in state prohibitions in the 1880s, only three states remained dry by 1904. Modified prohibition consisted of local option, high license fees and restrictive regulations. These coalition-building and seemingly pragmatic policies ironically helped establish the conditions under which national prohibition would be promoted and enacted.
The scientific veneer of modified prohibition was provided, in part, by political economist Richard T. Ely.See Murray N. Rothbard, “World War I as Fulfillment: Power and the Intellectuals,” Journal of Libertarian Studies (Winter 1989), pp. 81-125, for more on Ely and other progressives academics. In a report to the Maryland legislature, Ely argued for a modified prohibition that consisted of local option and an annual auction of licenses for large exclusive territories (retail monopolies) for the sale of alcoholic beverages. He argued this would greatly reduce the number of establishments selling alcohol and maximize public revenue. He argued that such businesses would be easier to tax and regulate because of the greatly reduced number of establishments and the fear of losing expensive liquor licenses for violating regulations. He further argued that concentrating the liquor business via modified prohibition “drags it before the public where all its evils must be conspicuous.”Richard T. Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1888),pp. 280-288.
Modified prohibition was promoted as the pragmatic alternative to prohibition because it resulted in fewer saloons, higher government revenues, and reduced public drunkenness. According to The Nation, “the same story that has been told of every State in which high-license or tax laws have gone into effect. That is, they provide ‘corroborative evidence of the practical wisdom of this method of fighting the liquor evil.’” The Nation also opposed the policy of prohibition because it was not “a proper or practical method of liquor regulation,” and that “no amount of amendment or addition can make the Prohibitory Law a success.” They concluded that when in the majority use local option, but when in the minority use high taxation to control drinking and make drinkers pay for their sins. “The lesson which has been taught over and over again (is) that prohibition laws cannot be enforced except where public sentiment in their favor predominates.”The Nation, January 12, 1888, Vol. XLVI No. 1176, pp. 24-26; February 16, 1888, No. 1181, p.127; January 31, 1889, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1231, p. 83; March 14, 1889, No. 1237, pp. 214-5; April 25, 1889, No. 1243, p. 336; June 27, 1889, No. 1252, p. 515.
Despite testimonials of its success, modified prohibition caused a plethora of problems such as black market production, smuggling, monopoly pricing, reduced quality, corrupt retail practices, graft, and political corruption. While not as evident as the problems caused by prohibition, modified prohibition did indeed drag the evils before the public. Indeed, the problems of modified prohibition were already obvious when Pennsylvania enacted its modified prohibition. The law attempted to limit corrupt practices stemming from modified prohibition by including a restriction on brewers that prevented them from financing the high license fees charged to saloon operators.The Nation, February 16, 1888, Vol. XLVI, No. 1181, p. 127. Also with respect to high taxes the National Municipal Review (January, 1935, p. 63) noted that “High taxation thus becomes the chief foundation of the illegitimate trade.” Tun Yuan Hu found this illegitimate trade to be “deeply disturbing” but he believed it could be “driven out” by reducing taxes. See The Liquor Tax in the United States, 1791-1947: A History of the Internal Revenue Taxes Imposed on Distilled Spirits by the Federal Government (New York: Columbia University Graduate School of Business, 1950), p. 86.
The political success of modified prohibition would suggest that true prohibitionist sentiment had all but died out in the late nineteenth century. The federal excise tax on distilled spirits had been increased by 120 percent between 1868 and 1894, most non-prohibition states had enacted local option laws by 1900, and most states and local jurisdictions had enacted high license fees.Hu, The Liquor Tax, Appendix II, p. 3, shows that the federal excise tax on distilled spirits was fifty cents per tax gallon in 1868 and one dollar and ten cents in 1894. Elsewhere, Hu notes that 37 states had local option laws by 1900 (p. 49). The Nation (January 12, 1888, Vol. 46, No. 1176, p. 25) describes the high license fees in several states. Ely, Taxation, notes that in Savannah, Georgia a liquor dealer would pay a Federal license of $25, a State license of $50, a County license of $100 dollars, and a City license of $200. The bar-keepers license in Charlotte, North Carolina was $1000 (pp. 203-205). However, instead of dying out, the prohibition movement was preparing to achieve the ultimate goal of national prohibition by organizing against the saloon, developing institutions and coalitions, and experimenting with new political techniques.
Women were an important source of support for prohibition. The leaders of the women’s suffrage movement were prohibitionists and encouraged their members to swell the ranks of prohibition organizations. The alliance was clear; women would support prohibition (and vote for it when and where they could) while prohibitionists would in turn support the women’s suffrage movement. Women would get the vote and sober husbands, while prohibitionists would reestablish social control and dry up society. In 1873, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union was formed to institutionalize this alliance.
In 1869, the Prohibition Party was formed. Often characterized as ineffective, it played a key although often neglected role in the ultimate success of national prohibition. Its electorial success was indeed limited, but the Prohibition party provided a valuable training ground for prohibitionists in politics. The Party also introduced ideas, such as child-labor laws, direct election of senators, the income tax, woman suffrage, and national alcohol prohibition, that were absorbed into major party platforms and enacted into law. The Prohibition Party also was a major factor in the major party realignment that occurred during the 1890s in which the Democratic party embraced prohibition.
The Anti-Saloon League was formed in 1895 as a political arm of the post-millennial evangelical protestant churches. By 1904, the League had organizations in forty-two states or territories. When Prohibition was enacted, the Anti-Saloon League could claim affiliation with over 30,000 churches and 60,000 agencies. It is important to note that the League, which was the prime mover toward national prohibition, explicitly emblemized the most prominent institution of “sin,” the government-licensed and heavily taxed saloon.Cf. Jack S. Blocker, Retreat from Reform: The Prohibition Movement in the United States, 1890-1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 157; Odegard, Pressure Politics, pp. 20-21. The central forces of prohibitionism were the Congregationalist, Quaker, Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian churches. These churches, their ministers and their flocks had radiated out from New England into western New York, the mid-west, and by the turn of the century eventually throughout most of the western and southern states. It is this geographic and demographic dissemination that enhanced the potential for national alcohol prohibition.
The League completely split with the voluntary and educational efforts of past temperance movements. Coercion, propaganda, and intimidation of political candidates were the new tools. Professional reformers were paid to propagandize (often from the pulpit), in many instances making outrageous claims against blacks and Catholics. At its height, the League published over forty tons of propaganda literature each month. The League was able to shield its big contributors from public exposure by refusing to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Corrupt Practices Act.As a result, Warburton found little evidence for determining the extent of commercial rentseeking against alcohol. Clark Warburton, The Economics of Prohibition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 263. See also Odegard, Pressure Politics, pp. 74, 181, 210; This absence of data should not be taken to infer a lack of commercial interest in promoting prohibition.
The League was able to refine, strengthen, and spread the prohibitionist ideology. The ideology that emerged during the Progressive Era was forged from the experience of “modified prohibition” and symbolized in the very name of its most powerful and effective political institution, the Anti-Saloon League. As Timberlake described, the saloon became the object of national opprobrium under modified prohibition:
The liquor industry became thoroughly involved in political corruption through its connection with the saloon. The root of the trouble here was that the ordinary saloonkeeper, confronted by overcompetition, was practically forced to disobey the liquor laws and to ally himself with vice and crime in order to survive. Unable to make a living honestly, he did so dishonestly.James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement: 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 110.
Modified prohibition forced many saloons to offer breweries exclusive selling rights in exchange for payment of their annual license fees. Saloons would also disobey blue laws, serve poor quality and watered-down liquor, and employ prostitutes, professional gamblers, and pickpockets in order to generate sufficient revenues under modified prohibition. Of course all of these practices often necessitated the bribery of police and public officials.
The success of Prohibition depended vitally on defining its goal as ridding America of the crime and vice-ridden saloon that was corrupting both the political leadership and the poor immigrants who relied on the saloon as a center of entertainment, politics, and much more. Indeed, destroying the saloon would achieve an underlying goal of prohibitionists — providing the old-stock protestants with a method of social control over the “drinking class” who were largely recent Catholic immigrants from countries such as Ireland, Italy, and Germany.
The only major remaining hurdle in the establishment of national alcohol prohibition was government revenue. The tax on alcohol products was the second largest source of revenue for the federal government prior to Prohibition. However, as Boudreaux and Pritchard have demonstrated:
The income tax proved a viable alternative to liquor taxation for raising revenue, thus making prohibition possible. To be sure, the ideology of voters and politicians mattered, but Congress could not afford the cost in foregone tax revenue (hence, foregone wealth redistribution) that an ideological vote for prohibition entailed until the income tax demonstrated its revenue-raising potential.Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard, “The Price of Prohibition,” Arizona Law Review 36 No. 1 (Spring 1994), p 2.
They also argue that the shortfall of income tax revenue during the early years of the Great Depression led to the repeal of Prohibition and restoration of alcohol tax revenues.
In support of this tax substitution thesis, it should be recalled that it was the Prohibition party that first called for an income tax and that prohibitionists widely supported the income tax. It is also noteworthy that a tax revolt was gathering momentum in the early years of the Great Depression. The revolts began as a movement against property taxes in cities such as Chicago. Prior to Prohibition, local governments raised a great deal of revenue from high license fees, revenue which was lost with Prohibition. The repeal of Prohibition would not only lower alcohol prices, but would also reestablish revenue from license fees, thus relieving cities’ overreliance on property taxes. As Beito notes, “by the end of 1933, the effectiveness of the tax-resistance movement had started to wane.”Beito provides an excellent history of tax revolts during the Great Depression. He finds that the tax revolts ultimately failed because of a failure to develop a coherent anti-tax ideology and an overreliance on a strategy that stressed “good government.” David T. Beito, Taxpayers in Revolt: Tax Resistance During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 140.
The Progressive era also saw the prohibitionists launch their “war” against narcotics, tobacco, marijuana, gambling, prostitution and other “imperfections” in society. In each of these wars, prohibitionists and progressives sought to stamp out “vice,” establish means of social control (particularly over immigrants and inferior races), and to provide a path toward order and perfection of society.
During the Progressive Era the prohibitionist movement had become secularized, achieved the precedent of nationalized prohibition, and expanded its scope to cover marijuana and narcotics. The elitist, twentieth century Hamiltonians had established their control over American society.
Bob Murphy explains a common rhetorical dodge that he’s encountered from both the progressive Left and the conservative Right. On the issue of slavery and reparations, the Left will argue that modern whites benefited from the institution. When someone like Murphy points out that slavery actually made the average white person poorer, the leftist may object that this isn’t about economics, but about privilege and social hierarchy. Likewise, when Bob pointed out that Tucker Carlson’s “economic nationalism” would hurt the national economy, right-wingers responded that they cared about culture, not just prices at Walmart.
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Robby Soave, a writer at Reason, was the first journalist to shatter the original narrative about the Covington Catholic students caught in the infamous face-off with Native American Nathan Phillips. But Soave has also tried to correct the unfair coverage of Ilhan Omar.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob Murphy analyzes John Carpenter’s 1988 cult classic They Live, starring Roddy Piper. After making some general observations about the major thematic elements, Bob critiques the main character’s strategy for dealing with an alien takeover of the media and government.
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JEFF DEIST: The last time the Mises Institute interviewed you was way back in 2001, for what was then called the Austrian Economics Newsletter. That interview discusses how you met Ludwig von Mises and read Human Action at a very young age.
PAUL CANTOR: Yes. My brother was studying with Sylvester Petro at NYU Law School and Petro was a friend of Mises, and a kind of disciple, and the only labor law professor who didn’t like unions. Anyway, he had his students read Mises and that way it filtered down to me. My brother’s eight years older than I am and so I started reading Mises. I definitely read Human Action. I know I read Socialism. I think I read The Theory of Money and Credit.
I had a friend in high school who was interested in it and we both got interested in reading Mises. At one point, he said, “let’s call him up,” as kind of a dare. “If he’s in the Manhattan phone book, we’ll call him up.” I can’t believe we did this, but Mises was very gracious about it, had us come to his office and talk to us, and then invited us to join the seminar. So, this would be fall of ’61, my senior year in high school. I actually would have been 15 at the time. I didn’t turn 16 until the end of October. I attended, I think, every meeting of the seminar for the fall and the spring semester and it was a wonderful experience.
I have vivid memories of Mises to this day. He was always impeccably dressed. He had manners which I would now describe in retrospect as Viennese courtliness. I didn’t know what a Viennese gentleman looked like, at the time, but having since been to Vienna, I can recognize the way he carried himself. He was always elegant, and I remember his sparkling eyes, which struck me very much at the time. He was 80 when I met him, but he had the eyes of a young man. They still sparkled and he was obviously the most intelligent person I’d met in my life to that point. And to this day, he remains certainly one of them, one of the best teachers I’ve ever seen. He was utterly lucid. What I admired most about him was his steel trap logical mind.
I was kind of peculiar at the time, my favorite reading was Euclid’s Elements. So, I absolutely loved logical arguments and axiomatic ones. That’s one reason I think I was attracted to Mises’s praxeology and his axiomatic approach to things. I think that comes across as very foreign to a lot of people, but to me, it seemed natural and the right way to approach things. He would, quite honestly, talk most of the time in the seminar. He would take questions, but he was so fluid in his presentation that I think people hesitated to interrupt them. Murray Rothbard, who was one of the students, he certainly did interrupt, and he and Mises had a good teacher-student relation. I think Mises enjoyed being challenged by Rothbard. I once had occasion to sit next to Mises, right next to him. I came in late. I normally, as a little kid, wouldn’t have dared to do that, but it was the only remaining seat. I was quite struck. He had one 5 x 7 index card and he had just a series of little notes and clearly he had outlined what he wanted to cover, but he basically just could speak essentially off the cuff or present his ideas in a way that was very comprehensible to everybody in the room, including a little kid from high school.
JD: And this clarity of thought impressed you, even though he wasn’t speaking in his native language?
PC: Yes, and I’m sure by then — this is 1962 — that he was utterly comfortable in English. He did have a distinct and somewhat heavy Viennese accent, but fortunately, here is where my brother came to my aid again. He had a friend whose parents immigrated from Vienna and so I’d heard that Viennese accent a long time before I met Mises. So, I was tuned into it.
JD: You read Human Action at 14 or 15?
PC: Yes, I would think so. I was kind of a child tragedy. … I guess I should say prodigy, but I just read too much as a kid. My parents had to throw me out of the house: “Go out and play.” I just loved books. I was the same in literature. I was reading things like Dante’s Divine Comedy at that time. I just loved books.
JD: Did Mises intimidate you, or did he take account of your tender age?
PC: Well, you know, he was inevitably intimidating by the mere fact that he was Ludwig von Mises and I recognized his stature and his genius. He was in no way intimidating personally. He was very genial and in retrospect, I’m struck by the fact that at age 80, he was still interested in young people and being able to teach them. I realized that was an incredible privilege I got there, to be able to sit in on this seminar. He was not an argumentative person in the sense that he liked to get into arguments. He just would present his views logically and he basically relied on the logic of the arguments to carry the day. So, he never tried to intimidate anybody. There was no way, I would say, that he tried to exert his authority. His authority rested solely on the power of his arguments. So, again, I wasn’t taking this as a course; I didn’t interact with him in that sense, as a student, and I don’t think I ever spoke up once in the seminar, but occasionally, I’d talk to him after class and I remember that with some fondness and he had a good sense of humor. He was a relatively small man, so he wasn’t physically intimidating. He had a quiet voice, but again, he did carry himself with great dignity and in that sense, he didn’t want to mess around.
JD: In this same period you met Henry Hazlitt and Friedrich von Hayek at Mises’s seminar. Give us your impressions.
PC: Again, I hesitate to use the word, “meet.” I mean, Hazlitt was at virtually every meeting in the seminar. He usually sat next to Mises. Again, I’m not sure I ever spoke to him. I’m sorry to present myself as such a wilting violet. Again, he was exceedingly well dressed. These things make an impression on a 15 year-old from Brooklyn. And he did speak up and I knew very much who he was, reading his Newsweek columns in those days and I had read his famous books, at that point, including, for example, his book on Keynesian economics.
Hayek showed up only once and I, in some ways hesitate to get into this, but I will. I do remember vividly that he got into an argument with Murray Rothbard and it’s a kind of funny story. People who have heard me tell this story have said that what I didn’t know was that Hayek was hard of hearing at this point and that probably provoked this confrontation. But basically the seminar was on international economics and the issue of foreign exchange came up and the gold standard. Murray made a hypothetical argument, in which he said, “if I could convert these dollars to gold.” Somehow Hayek thought that Murray thought that you could convert dollars to gold in 1962. We were meeting down right off Wall Street in Lower Manhattan and I do remember this, that Hayek pulled a $50 bill out of his pocket, and he said, “take this, the Federal Reserve Bank is two blocks away, go get me gold for this.” Nothing really came of this and in retrospect, I think it was just Hayek mishearing a hypothetical as a statement of fact.
But it made a big impression on me, just to see. I didn’t know how important Murray was going to grow up to be, but he definitely was the most vocal of all the people in that room and again, the one who would actually directly challenge Mises on some points. But, in any case, that’s my encounter with Friedrich Hayek. The one other thing I told people is that, I may have been reading something into this or projecting, but it did strike me that Mises and Hayek were still in a teacher-pupil relationship, even though one was in his 80s and one was in his 70s. Hayek was the more famous of the two, at that point, but I sensed the dynamic between them was that Hayek would defer to Mises. So, that’s my one comment.
JD: They were born about 18 years apart, almost a generation then. So you were a young, precocious kid who happens to rub elbows with these great economists. But you decide to go off to Harvard and study English literature.
PC: It’s actually not as simple as that, but precocity was my problem, and I was precocious in a lot of different fields. Honestly, I went to Harvard because of astronomy. That’s what I dreamed of. I wanted to be an astronomer originally and I read Harlow Shapley’s Of Stars and Men and he was at Harvard and I had to go to Harvard. But meanwhile, I discovered Shakespeare, actually, when I was about 9 years old when my mother took me to some Shakespeare plays. But by high school, I was taking Shakespeare very seriously. I wrote my high school senior paper on King Lear, studied the plays, reading A.C. Bradley and I’d fallen in love with Shakespeare. And I do remember this at the time, and this is going to sound a bit strange, but I looked at Human Action and said, okay, here’s economics. This guy, Ludwig von Mises has done it. And like I said, I don’t want to seem to denigrate every Austrian economist since Mises, but my reaction was, I don’t see where I could contribute in this field and I’ll invoke the law of comparative advantage here and say, I thought I was doing some interesting stuff on Shakespeare.
But I must say, I always regretted that I had this great training from Mises and had not put it to use, so I am very happy, in retrospect, to realize I was able to find a way to apply Austrian economics to literature. It all began with the Mises Institute’s tenth anniversary essay contest, I wrote and submitted an essay on Thomas Mann, his story, “Disorder and Early Sorrow and the German Inflation,” and won the contest. And from then on, I’ve done a lot to show how Austrian economics can be applied to culture. So, I feel now that I did not put to waste this privilege I had to study with Mises. And in a curious way, I like to say, I have opened up a new front on the war against socialism and left-wing economics and it’s appropriate in the sense that the battleground has increasingly turned to culture. Socialism lost the economic argument against capitalism, although there are an awful lot of people running for office these days who don’t seem to be aware of that fact. But really, culture became the last refuge, not just of scoundrels in general, but scoundrels on the Left. So, I feel I’ve been able to make a distinct contribution putting together what I’ve learned of Austrian economics with what I’ve learned about literature and more generally, about culture.
JD: I think you absolutely have. In the old interview I mentioned you have a great quote: “People come to literature because they’re trying to learn something about the world.” So literature and economics have that in common.
PC: Well, it’s true, although there’s not been much good economic criticism on literature going way back. I mean, most of the criticism that takes into account economics, is Marxist. So many of the literary critics in the twentieth century, especially the ones known as the New Critics, grew out of Southern agrarianism and so, they thought that the whole world of the market is debased, and we shouldn’t even talk about such things. So, it’s an interesting case where I think the hard Left and I’ll call it the hard Right, I mean, basically don’t understand the role of commerce in culture.
JD: But as you say, it’s a mistake to cede literary criticism to the Left.
PC: Oh, absolutely. And even more so in a way, pop culture criticism. I mean, that’s another thing that I began to realize in the 1990s, that the Left had a monopoly, not just on the criticism of literature, but now film and television and all the popular arts. That also came from a tendency on the Right, to have a disdain for commercial culture and especially this whole sort of T.S. Eliot-style critic, who just looked down upon movies — certainly on television — and I realized that was a huge mistake because the future was in movies. Well, the past was already in movies at that point, but I began to realize in the 1990s that the future of art was in television and I’ve been vindicated in that judgment, even though colleagues would tell me, “oh television, I don’t watch television,” or “I don’t own a television.” At this point, I would feel like saying, “well you don’t own a pair of glasses, so you don’t read?” But in any case, I sensed they were missing out on what the future would be and especially the future for young people. And again, there was this deep irony that people who were speaking out in favor of capitalism, when it came to culture, thought that commerce could only debase culture. Quite frankly, the most viable argument with capitalism, by the 80s and 90s was a cultural one. The claim has been “okay, so capitalism does better for your bodies, but it corrupts your soul.” And that’s what I wish to argue against. I don’t take single-handed credit for this, but I think I’ve had some important role to play, in the fact that libertarians and conservatives have turned their attention to popular culture and realized it’s an important battleground for ideas.
JD: There is an aesthetic critique of capitalism on the Left. Markets produce lowbrow art, crass consumerism, and so forth. Capitalism cares nothing for beauty. Aren’t these progressive articles of faith, coming mostly from the Left?
PC: Oh, no, no. I mean, it is, but it’s not the only way. Again, you just have to look at a whole tradition of conservative thinking largely associated with T.S. Eliot, and New Critics like Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren. They were called Southern agrarians and they looked with contempt on the North and its industrialization. The reason they were called agrarians, they wanted to go back — perhaps they’d never left — to a nineteenth-century way of life, based on the farm. They were very anti-urban and these people are thought of as conservatives, but they have great contempt for modern popular culture.
Now, there’s a lot that’s contemptible in popular culture, but my point is always that there’s a lot contemptible in any culture you’ll ever find. In retrospect, we single out the great achievements of any given culture and forget that every culture has had its trash. I mean, we now look back at the nineteenth-century novel and we see Dickens and Jane Austen and George Eliot and the Brontë sisters. But it was estimated there were 40,000 Victorian novels and 39,800 of them are terrible. We don’t read them anymore, we know nothing about them and they’re the equivalent of the worst television show you could ever find. It’s the same for Shakespeare’s theater. We go back and look at Shakespeare’s plays and it’s an unrivaled achievement in cultural history and we can add in the best plays of Ben Jonson and the best plays of Christopher Marlowe and a few more. But the bad stuff is unspeakably bad. The worst play I’ve ever read from the period is Robert Daborne’s A Christian Turned Turk and if you want to see something as bad as the worst TV show you’ve ever seen, read it. Its highlight is a live circumcision scene on the stage and it’s as gross as anything you see in television today and it’s presented comically, by the way. So, we have an illusion of time that we look back at the past and we only remember and sometimes only have the highlights of the period. At any point in culture, there’s a vast spectrum from the lowest to the highest. When we look at the world today, we shouldn’t be looking at these dumb reality shows we have on television or the dumb sitcoms. You look at Deadwood and you look at Breaking Bad and these are masterpieces and they will be viewed as such hundreds of years from now. And again, most people who used to condemn popular culture, did it with no knowledge of what it was. “I’ve never watched television, but I know it’s bad.” You know, it’s a strange notion, as if this is a matter of media. There are just as many bad books as there are bad television shows. You just have to walk into Barnes and Noble and see that. And people act as if the book is this high medium and television is this low medium. I will take the best show on television against the worst book in Barnes and Noble any day of the week. It’s not as if books are inherently superior to television shows. It’s just that again, we have this illusion that a lot of great books have been written, but they’re completely outnumbered by the bad books written.
We kind of forget how low the medium of a book can go and people were warning against books. It was one of my most amazing discoveries that around 1830, there were all these things being written. “Books are harmful for you. Children shouldn’t be allowed to read books.” Part of it was, they’re not doing their chores because they’re reading a book and of course, a lot of it was the standard thing, there’s too much sex and violence in books. People always say that about any medium. But then, there’s actually a sermon by Matthew Arnold’s father, Thomas Arnold, the head of Rugby School, who gave a sermon saying, oh, these books, they’re brought out in installments and our students, they just can’t wait for the next installment and it’s ruining their week. They’re not doing their schoolwork because they wanted to find out what happens next in The Pickwick Papers. That’s just the argument made about television serials and I was quite surprised. I always assumed that books were attacked on their content, but the book was actually attacked as a medium in the early 1800s.
JD: Books were going to ruin the youth.
PC: And that was not by Marxists. That was by conservative moralists.
JD: You mentioned Dickens, who wrote popular serialized novels and wasn’t afraid to make a buck off it.
PC: Yes, he was quite proud to make a buck off it. And in my book, Literature and the Economics of Liberty — which I co-edited with Stephen Cox — I have a long essay on the serialized novel as an example of how commerce improves culture. The very fact that the novels were serialized meant Dickens was continually getting feedback and he would change the plot. If the number of installments sold jumped up, he would look and see, oh, this character is the reason, the people really liked Little Nell, I have to write Little Nell more into the story. That’s supposed to be the horror of professors of aesthetics. This is supposedly a corrupt procedure — an author giving in to his audience. But my point is, that the audience often has the wisdom of crowds and can send an author in a good direction and Dickens’s career is a good example of that and we see that in modern television series. In fact, many producers of shows pay attention to what the audience is saying. I’ve seen this most recently in this disastrous last season of Game of Thrones, where the audience was clamoring for a redo. They want the last season done over because it was so bad, and I think the audience is right. So, again, there’s a kind of aristocratic pretension to a lot of aesthetic criticism that takes the point of view that only an elite can determine what culture should be like and there’s something that could be said for that. I’m not going to attack the elites in the Renaissance who helped produce the paintings of Leonardo and Raphael and Michelangelo, but on the other hand, the record of commercial cultures is quite impressive and defensible as we’ve seen in fields such as Italian opera, Victorian novels, now in television, certainly in the movies, that artists who’ve appealed to a general public have not always done lousy works of art. I’m one of the few people to argue that in fact, in many cases, their art has been improved by paying attention to the audience. I would say, for example, with contemporary music, one of the reasons it’s so bad and unlistenable is that composers end up in universities where they’re cushioned from the marketplace. They’re paid a salary and therefore, the more harsh and dissonant and incomprehensible their music sounds, the better they are judged to be and that’s how they get their grants and draw in their salaries. They have no concern whether anyone will want to listen to their music, especially now that they can’t even think that a consideration is that people should enjoy the music, that they should come out whistling a nice tune, for example, or enjoying pleasant harmonies. And so, as a result, we’ve got music that’s unlistenable and we’re forced to hear that this is the great music of the day. In my view, anyone who’s a serious composer has to go into writing movie music now, where they can get away with writing something that people would actually want to listen to.
JD: Mises makes this point in The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality. Who’s to say art should never mix with commerce? What government bureaucrat is in a position to judge what people consume as entertainment? Mises believed in consumer sovereignty.
PC: Yes. I will say, Mises seemed to have had very elite cultural taste and I don’t think he was making the argument that this popular art would actually be great.
JD: Right.
PC: I think he was just saying that we have no right to tamper with it. Maybe I’m wrong, but I think I’ve taken the argument a step further by saying that in fact, what’s dismissed as lowbrow art, is not uniformly so. You will find diamonds in the rough and indeed, that’s the nature of all culture.
JD: You’ve never been afraid to consider the merits of pop culture. Your seminal book in libertarian circles is The Invisible Hand in Popular Culture. You have a new book as well. Talk about both.
PC: OK. Let me start with the new book. It’s called Pop Culture and the Dark Side of the American Dream: Con Men, Gangsters, Drug Lords and Zombies. And it’s got a picture of Walter White from Breaking Bad in his underwear carrying a gun, on the cover. In fact, there are two Walter Whites in an effort to emulate Andy Warhol’s Elvis double portrait. This book actually is an attempt to carry on what I was doing in The Invisible Hand in Popular Culture and I must say, I start from the premise that the American Dream is a reality. The book is about the dark side of the American Dream, which implies that there is a bright side. This isn’t one of those books that just tries to trash the American Dream. I think it is real and that America has lifted more people out of poverty and to success than any other country in history and if other countries now are doing bigger numbers, the reason is they’re imitating the United States in its best respects. But I was interested in the fact that the public is interested in the dark side of the American Dream. And again, we have a long tradition in popular culture in what are called Horatio Alger stories, which is a very popular genre in the nineteenth and twentieth-century success stories. America loves the success story; America loves happy endings. We speak about Hollywood endings, how the story’s supposed to come out right and for a long time, Americans were fascinated with books, and then movies, and even TV shows that show people, as we say, achieving the American Dream. That’s having your own business, often a family business, securing the economic future of your family, getting the children a good education and again, that’s a very archetypal American story.
At the same time, though, Americans have been fascinated with what happens when that story goes wrong and some of the most famous books and movies in American culture have shown the dark side of the American Dream. The Great Gatsby is a wonderful example of this. Citizen Kane would be another, and I have in effect, five case studies in my book. I begin with Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, then do the films of W.C. Fields, then I do The Godfather, parts one and two. And then Breaking Bad, and I end largely with the Walking Dead. But in general, with apocalyptic narratives in modern television. I begin with Huck Finn because this is an American classic, everyone thinks of it as this rosy story. We picture Mickey Rooney or Elijah Wood playing Huck Finn. But Huck Finn is a very, very dark book. Murders occur in it; lynchings occur in it and a great number of con men are in it, especially this “duke” and this “king” who go around bilking people along the Mississippi. And what I realized in studying and trying to account for the dark side in what ought to be a very bright book, is that America professes to be the fresh start nation, the nation that gives people a fresh start, a new beginning in life. Just forget about anything that happened in the Old World, you’re in America now. The slate is blank; you can become whatever you want to become. But, if America’s the fresh-start nation, it’s also going to be the false-start nation, that you can’t expect everybody to make it. In fact, what Twain examines is how much the good side of America blends over into the bad side. For example, identity is very fluid in America. It’s one of the great things about America. We don’t have a rigid class system. Anyone can become whoever he wants, but that means America is also the land of con men. It’s where people can masquerade. Huck Finn as a novel is just filled with people masquerading, including Huck Finn himself, who masquerades as Tom Sawyer for much of the book and the reason he can is he’s with Tom Sawyer’s relatives who live several states away and they’ve never seen Tom Sawyer. And America is this incredibly mobile nation with a fresh start around every corner and that’s great and in a way, that’s the heart of American entrepreneurship. You can build yourself up from nothing. But the flip side of that is the con man and a lot of this book turns on the easy movement from the con man to the entrepreneur and perhaps back. And what’s interesting there, from where I begin in the book is that although I’ve turned to the dark side, in some ways, you still see the bright side there.
For example, in The Godfather, it’s the nightmare tale of American immigration. American immigration is at the heart of the American Dream; it’s one of the greatest things that America offers, that you can come to this new land and prosper. And what that means, though, is that sometimes immigrants have a hard time, they encounter prejudice, they’re not given a chance and so, they swerve off into crime and that’s certainly the story of Italian-Americans, also Irish-Americans, and Jews in terms of Prohibition and other areas of crime. They were denied legitimate outlets and access to legitimate business, and so they sought out some shady outlet in business. But that can be flipped to understand that these people actually were enterprising. Norman Podhoretz wrote a very interesting essay about The Godfather novel, I think it was specifically on crime and the American Dream. I don’t know if I buy this argument entirely, but he said that by this point, the 1970s, capitalism was so despised in intellectual circles and in the media circles, that the only way you could get away with celebrating an entrepreneur in a book was by taking a gangster, and showing this criminal as a successful businessman. He saw The Godfather as the descendant of the old Horatio Alger stories. He thought people are actually fascinated by the virtues of Vito Corleone and in many ways, his virtues are the traditional American virtues. He’s a family man, he’s a hard worker, he’s trying to improve his family, he takes chances.
In that sense, these criminals are entrepreneurs, and this is an issue that comes up with the Drug War in Breaking Bad as well. In fact, there is a sequence in Breaking Bad where Walter White, the hero, as I call him, is talking with his brother-in-law, Hank, the DEA agent. Hank is brewing his own beer and Walter says to him, “you know, in 1930, you would have been doing something illegal.” And they get into a long discussion about the morals of whether something’s legal or illegal and whether it’s just something that the government is determining. I like the fact, especially since the book focuses on The Godfather movies and Breaking Bad, that I’m able to focus on those issues. The Godfather chapter has an epigraph from Frank Sinatra and I can tell you that when I was in English graduate school, I never dreamed I’d write a book where a chapter would have an epigraph from Frank Sinatra and it’s a wonderful indictment of Prohibition and everything that was wrong with it. So, again, these stories allow me to take up some very serious issues — libertarian issues — and I try to show how many of the problems that these works deal with are actually created by the federal government in the first place.
JD: You choose to write books for popular consumption, instead of writing academic journal articles like many professors.
It’s much easier to publish on popular culture, as I found out after I was approached to do my first popular-culture book, Gilligan Unbound. Steve Wrinn, who was then with Rowman and Littlefield, approached me with the idea. I basically never intended to get into the pop culture criticism business. I kind of did it first as a joke. I wrote a piece on Gilligan’s Island and wrote something on The Simpsons. I’ll never forget, the BBC was interviewing me for the 400th episode of The Simpsons and somehow, my background came up and this BBC interviewer says, “You’ve written a book on Hamlet. Why are you writing about The Simpsons?” And I said, “because when I wrote my book on Hamlet, you didn’t even dream of interviewing me on the BBC, but the minute I write on The Simpsons, you interview me.” He didn’t like that answer, actually.
JD: Great answer.
PC: By the way, I have never taught pop culture. I have never taught a course on pop culture in my life. I lecture on it at colleges and universities, but sort of outside the normal academic framework. I don’t believe in carrying coals to Newcastle — that phrase will mean nothing to the current generation — but I don’t believe in teaching a course on popular culture, to students who are thoroughly immersed in pop culture. I found when I wrote on it and lectured on it outside of regular classes, that students really could respond to it and I’d be struggling to find if they’d read even one Shakespeare play, but they could quote every episode of The Simpsons back at me. So, I found I was having productive discussions and they were about serious issues. You can talk about the decline of the family in American life from watching The Simpsons. You can talk about the role of the federal government when you look at the FBI or the IRS episodes of The Simpsons. So, I felt I actually had a kind of leverage that I could speak to students about interesting subjects and they would respond, and I thought that was good. So, I pursued it more than I would have otherwise.
JD: Give us your thoughts on the state of the humanities in higher education. We read about university administrations cutting humanities budgets, that nobody wants to major in English or history or philosophy anymore.
PC: Well, it’s certainly true. I will not attempt to cite numbers because I don’t have them accurately, but the enrollment in English departments is falling everywhere to the point where I am told that some major English departments now have majors in double digits.
JD: Wow.
PC: Yes. And triple digits were typical in my department — the UVA English major is still in triple digits — but the number is significantly lower than it was 10 years ago. And whole departments are disappearing around the country. Some of the languages, German departments, for example, are under pressure. Comparative literature departments are under pressure, and there’s no question that it’s happening. There are many reasons for it and people in the humanities will complain that it’s a result of the increasingly mercenary nature of students, that they want to study in undergraduate business schools or study economically useful subjects like economics or political science. But my answer to that is the problem is internal, that humanities departments wouldn’t be losing as many students if they still had something high minded to offer students. There’s a reason why students might gravitate toward practical subjects. After all, most colleges and universities are now advertising themselves on the idea that you will boost your income by going to college and the more they choose to raise their tuition, the more it seems imperative to students to get some payback for their money. But what the liberal arts — especially the humanities — used to have to offer is great books, great paintings, great music and you could make a deal with students. Yeah, this stuff ’s tough. It’s not easy to understand a J.S. Bach fugue, and it’s not easy to read Joyce’s Ulysses and it’s not easy to comprehend Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel. But at the end of the effort, you will be a better human being and you will feel it; you will feel uplifted from having encountered this and you will see your life change. I mean, as recently as last week, I got an email from somebody who had been listening to my Shakespeare lectures online and said, “The lectures have changed my life.” And that’s what you want to hear as a teacher. But, it’s very difficult now that the humanities have become a species of what is known as grievance studies in the world. Now, you turn to literature, not because it’s uplifting, not because it’s in any meaningful sense “great,” but you regard literature as the expression of identity. Most of the time, it’s the expression of a bad identity. Most courses will concern themselves with whether a given author is sexist or racist or classist. The idea is to treat the artist negatively, as politically incorrect, and that gets old very quickly.
Part of the benefit of reading these works is that they take us to a very different time and place. I remember from the start, reading books because they were about a different world. I wanted to learn about Aeschylus, and I wanted to learn about Homer. I did not want to read books about a middle-class Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn. And people were writing that.
People would say to me, “you’ve never read a novel by Philip Roth?” And I’d say “no, I lived that, I don’t need to read a novel about it.” And it’s kind of shocking that I’ve never read a book by Philip Roth. But you know, I’ve read novels by Franz Kafka and by Dickens and by Dostoyevsky, and it’s a whole different world and I find that more interesting. And that’s what we’ve lost the sense of. I noticed the favorite and most complimentary adjective my students have of a book is, “it’s relatable.” And that’s what they’ve been taught, to relate the book to — quite frankly — the little circumscribed narrow world that they grew up in. By contrast, I’ve always looked to literature to be eye opening, to take you some place you’ve never been before.
So, it’s one thing to complain that money making is exerting its magical charm on students. That’s a natural impulse, so you need something to counteract it. But now, if you really are running down most of the literature of the past and showing its limitations, well why bother to read it? And in fact, with many of my colleagues and throughout my profession, literature is seen now as a means to social justice. That’s how we have to use literature. We have to read literature to know how prejudiced and outmoded the world is and how we have to move beyond it. But if social justice is the goal of reading literature, why not just take courses in social justice? Why not take courses in the social sciences, if the goal of literature is the economic improvement of the masses. Go take a couple of economics courses and I think that’s what’s happening. In effect, literature departments have lost their comparative advantage. What they did best and what they could offer to people is to show these masterpieces in the history of human culture. These are the peaks of human achievement; these are what we look up to. And again, this is Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, this is Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel. These are jaw-dropping things in the world, and it used to be that college would introduce people to that. Now, it doesn’t anymore and that’s why I think the students are voting with their feet. I think the mistake my colleagues have made is, they thought they had a captive audience, that we’ve been given the Western heritage and people want access to it and students will always come to our courses because we’re English professors or we teach German literature, or whatever.
But if you don’t teach that heritage, you lose the one thing that was getting students in the seats. I don’t think that’s actually sunk in to my colleagues and we seem to have fallen off a cliff in the past two years. I asked two classes this year if they’d heard of T.S. Eliot. These are English majors and not a single person in the class had heard of T.S. Eliot. Now, I’ve always thought T.S. Eliot was a tad overrated, but I won’t get into that. Still, he’s certainly one of the most important poets of the twentieth century, and to think of an English major who’s never even heard the name T.S. Eliot! You know, about three years ago, they had never heard of Matthew Arnold. Again, I can kind of understand that. He’s from the 1800s, but it’s really amazing, I had a class where no one had heard of Beethoven and it was so funny because I was teaching a play by Friedrich von Schiller and I understood none of them were going to have heard of Friedrich von Schiller. I said, you know, you’ve never heard of him, but of course, you know his poetry. And they stared at me and I say, “Freude, schöner Götterfunken, Tochter aus Elysium,” quoting the “Ode to Joy” at the end of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and I knew they weren’t going to understand the German, but my joke was going to be, you know: “That’s Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.” And they stared at me. They’d never heard of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and I said, you have heard of Beethoven, haven’t you? And they said “No, who’s Beethoven?” And if it weren’t for Chuck Berry’s, Roll Over Beethoven, they probably wouldn’t have a prayer of figuring it out. I mean, I was stunned and in fact, I’m really annoying my students now because whenever I bring up a new subject, I feel I have to ask them, “Have you heard of X?” and they are thinking, “we have good educations, we’re college students.” But if you haven’t heard of Beethoven and you haven’t heard of T.S. Eliot it’s really amazing. You can’t teach if you don’t have reference points. I used to build my whole introductory course on comparative literature around T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land. I assumed they all know this poem and they love it, and it’s this great poem. I basically said, “take this course and you can understand this poem.” It quotes from Shakespeare’s The Tempest and it quotes from Dante, it quotes from Richard Wagner. To understand this poem, you’ve got to go back to the past and understand all the things Eliot understood. Well, now they don’t even know who Eliot is. I’ve lost my little trick to get them interested in the course. So, I am really seeing even greater decline in what my colleague E.D. Hirsch calls cultural literacy in students and it looks to be getting only worse. Because that’s the other thing, that we’re now in a kind of cycle of forgetting. For a while, I could get great discussions going on Breaking Bad. As recently as three years ago, my class on tragedy was faltering and I said, well, if you don’t understand what a tragic hero is, let’s talk about Walter White and we had the best class all semester, but now they don’t catch Breaking Bad references.
JD: It’s been a few years since that show ended.
PC: Yes, it’s ancient history, but they live so much in the present and I don’t want to sound like an old fogey. Let me try to sound a bit like a young fogey. In many ways, the students are impressive. They are computer literate in a way I am not and that is impressive. That’s a talent, it’s a skill, it gives them a lot of access to information and even at times knowledge and I don’t want to underestimate that. I often look at a website and I don’t know which button to click and the student says, “Well of course, you click the one on the lower left hand in the corner that’s blinking” or something and I don’t want to be like some ancient medieval colleague who said to students, “I know they’ve got this thing called print now, but you learn to copy that manuscript by hand, it’s the only way to preserve a text. This print thing, it’s just a passing fad” and I’m sure if I’d lived in Gutenberg’s time, I would have said something like that to my students, so I try to be careful to avoid that. But still, you can’t help but notice these blank spaces in their minds and they are kind of unpredictable. You know, you can still refer to Stalin and Hitler, for example. For some reason, they still know who they were, and that they were not nice people, but other moments in history have really blurred for them. It’s funny, they get things out of order in history. Here’s an example: there is a recording of Alfred Lord Tennyson reading The Charge of the Light Brigade. It was one of the first recordings ever made of a poet reading and I was talking to a student about this and he said, “When did Tennyson live, around 1950?” And I kind of looked at him and I realized, he thought sound recording dates from 1950, not from Edison’s phonograph of the 1870s. So, the fact we have his recorded voice meant, to this student, that Tennyson must havebeen born after 1950. And again, they know at some point there was a poet named Tennyson (although some of them don’t even know that). They know at some point, sound recording was invented, but which century these two things happened in, and in what order, escapes them. And this was one of my best students! And again, it’s not their fault, they’re getting badly educated, so I try to be gentle with them and conceal my shock. The students are good-hearted — they really want to learn, but they’re just not being taught properly.
JD: Well that’s why the Mises Institute exists. Thank you, professor.
Does Carlson honestly think Republican members of Congress are overly theoretical and ideological? And here we thought they were a bunch of unprincipled and poorly-read hacks!Original Article: "Tucker Carlson's Broadside Against Austrian Economics"
The welfare state is a key ingredient in sowing social mistrust and discord among diverse groups in Sweden. Original Article: "The Welfare State is Tearing Sweden Apart"
The Bill of Rights doesn't mention that freedom of speech is restricted to a special class of establishment journalists. Freedom of speech is a universal property right, regardless of what the establishment-media gatekeepers say.
Original Article: "Yes, Julian Assange Is a Journalist — But That Shouldn't Matter".
The Human Action Podcast reviews another overlooked classic by Mises: The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality. This book takes no prisoners, showing how envy motivates progressive and conservative intellectuals who fear dynamic capitalism. The real reactionaries, according to Mises? Socialists who want to keep everyone stuck at one station in life.
Our friend Andy Duncan from Mises UK, who recently reviewed the book, joins the show to discuss.
Read the book free here, or enter code "HAPOD" in our bookstore to buy a softcover for only $5!
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Bob brings on Mises Institute founder Lew Rockwell to primarily discuss Lew’s article in defense of Lori Loughlin (“Free Lori Loughlin and All Political Prisoners”). Why is the FBI involved in a college admission scandal in the first place? And why is Lori Loughlin’s behavior so much worse than all the other cheating that happens systematically? Bob and Lew then discuss the chilling role of the FBI in American life, as well as various methods by which the CIA takes care of business. Bob also asks Lew questions submitted in the Bob Murphy Show Facebook group.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Bob brings on Robbie “The Fire” Bernstein, host of Run Your Mouth and junior host to Dave Smith on the popular libertarian podcast Part of the Problem. Bob and Robbie discuss the NYC stand-up comedy scene, and give a tutorial on jokes using some examples. Bob asks Robbie whether the mocking campaign against AOC might backfire, and then Robbie turns the tables by asking Bob about the coming economic crash.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Jeff Deist joins David Gornoski to discuss the impending train-wreck of runaway government spending, and why the average person doesn't feel the effects of huge foreign-policy expenditures by government. They also talk about the influence of media outlets during catastrophic events such as the recent terrorist attack in Sri Lanka.
David Gornoski's A Neighbor's Choice Radio airs live Monday 7–9pm and Tuesday–Thursday 8–9pm ET on NewsRadio WFLA in Orlando, 93.1 FM and 540 AM
The Green New Deal contains a wish list of progressive social and economic goals that come with a staggering price tag.
Original Article: "Study Estimates the Green New Deal to Cost $93 Trillion — That's a Conservative Estimate".
The radical nature of anti-climate-change measures require promises of a near-total apocalypse in the near future. But the date for the promised disaster keeps getting pushed back.
Original Article: "The Apocalypse Has Been Postponed".
The real problem was the money supply inflation that happened during the boom phase. Combating deflation in the bust phase only superficially treats a symptom of the boom-bust cycle.
Original Article: "Central Banks Shouldn't Fight Deflation".
Equalization of incomes can be accomplished only by moving down the road toward serfdom.
Original Article: "This Way Toward Equality".
The Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, sponsored by Yousif Almoayyed. Includes an introduction by Joseph T. Salerno.
The Austrian Economics Research Conference is the international, interdisciplinary meeting of the Austrian School, bringing together leading scholars doing research in this vibrant and influential intellectual tradition. The conference is hosted by the Mises Institute at its campus in Auburn, Alabama, and is directed by Joseph Salerno, professor of economics at Pace University and academic vice president of the Mises Institute.
It's been almost 100 years since Mises literally wrote the book on socialism. His arguments against central economic planning, still acutely relevant today, have never been refuted—in theory or dismal practice. Joining the Human Action Podcast to discuss this monumental book is Dr. Shawn Ritenour, professor of economics at Grove City College and editor of the Mises Reader.
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Bob goes solo to discuss a particular aspect of outrage mobs on social media, in which people intentionally spread misleading or outright false smears against their opponents. He covers the fate of Scott Alexander (who had to shut down a subreddit thread because of online harassment accusing him of supporting Nazis), Nick Sarwark’s latest (feigned) ignorance of Tom Woods’ views on prostitution, the hatchet job on Bob’s Wikipedia entry, the smears of Jordan Peterson, and—in the interest of fairness—some examples of overreach by “his side” too. Bob wraps up by explaining the harm of this behavior, and how comedians are the only ones left who can speak the truth.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
What is the real state of life in America? Why are we so divided, politically and otherwise? How fragile is the economy, and how much longer can debt and deficits go unaddressed? Will culture wars destroy any remaining sense of a shared American vision? Is a cold civil war—or worse—inevitable? Recorded at "The Mises Institute in Orlando: The Real State of the Union" on February 16, 2018.
David Gornoski is the creator of ANeighborsChoice.com, a media platform that tells the stories of victims of State violence and which provides healthy alternatives to a violence-based society. David hosts the Orlando-based “A Neighbor’s Choice” radio program on WFLA 93.1 FM and 540 AM. Much of his work is an application of René Girard’s mimetic theory.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Standup comic and host of Part of the Problem Dave Smith joins Bob to talk about the theory and practice of comedy. They also discuss Dave’s discovery of Austrian economics, hypocritical leftists, the exasperating Tucker Carlson, and how the birth of his daughter led Dave to God.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
This is the last Mises Weekends episode!
But don't despair, Jeff will soon be back with a brand new format: The Human Action Podcast. The new show is not radically different, but focuses more exclusively on Austrian economics, its great books, and its great thinkers — with longer, more in-depth interviews. But don't take our word for it, tune in next week to the first show with David Gordon!
Your RSS-fed platforms like Stitcher and SoundCloud will continue to support the new show, while Mises.org will still host both streaming and downloadable audio files. And your iTunes subscription will redirect you from Mises Weekends to The Human Action Podcast.
This week Jeff takes a hard look at socialism and why it seems to gain greater support in the US and across the West. Do people really understand socialism as Mises did, and do they really want collective ownership of industry? Or do they just want what he termed "pseudo-socialist" economic systems that redistribute wealth? What motivates socialists? And how do they reconcile their moralizing self-regard with the doctrine that socialism is inevitable and inexorable?
Mises's Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis.
Jeff Deist on why support for socialism persists.
[Chapter 3 of Classical Liberalism and the Austrian School. This chapter is adapted from a paper delivered at the general meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society, in Cannes, September, 1994.]
Bankrolling Adam Smith? Ronald Coase, Nobel Laureate in economics, relates an interesting incident highly revelatory of the state of mind of opinion moulders in the United States.
It concerns the natural gas shortage of the 1960s. Edmund Kitch, of the University of Chicago, had written a study demonstrating the part that short-sighted federal regulation played in the shortage, and presented his findings in a public lecture in Washington, D.C., in 1971. In Coase’s words (1994: 49–50):
Much of the audience consisted of Washington journalists, members of the staff of congressional committees concerned with energy problems, and others with similar jobs. They displayed little interest in the findings of the study but a great deal in discovering who had financed the study. Many seem to have been convinced that the law and economics program at the University of Chicago had been “bought” by the gas industry ... a large part of the audience seemed to live in a simple world in which anyone who thought prices should rise was pro-industry and anyone who wanted prices to be reduced was pro-consumer. I could have explained that the essentials of Kitch’s argument had been put forward earlier by Adam Smith — but most of the audience would have assumed that he was someone else in the pay of the American Gas Association.
In this episode we see a microcosm of the world habitually inhabited by anti-market intellectuals and those who have absorbed their teachings. The continued flourishing of this class of intellectuals remains an enduring puzzle and problem for classical liberals. The purpose of this essay is not to propose a definitive solution to the problem, but mainly to assemble and contrast some of the more salient positions advanced (mostly) by liberal scholars, as a step towards solving the puzzle. Finally, I will suggest which position appears to me to be the most plausible.
The Perennial Question Forty-three years ago, at the 1951 meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society at Beauvallon, a distinguished panel of scholars discussed the treatment of capitalism by the intellectuals.T.S. Ashton, “The Treatment of Capitalism by Historians,” L.M. Hacker, “The Anticapitalist Bias of American Historians,” and Bertrand de Jouvenel, “The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental Intellectuals.” These were later supplemented by an additional essay by Ashton, a contribution by W.H. Hutt on the early nineteenth century factory system, and an introduction by F.A. Hayek on “History and Politics,” and published by the University of Chicago Press, 1954. The talks were assembled and published in a volume edited by F.A. Hayek, Capitalism and the Historians.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., (1954: 178) composed an entertaining screed on the work,A later, and less biased, judgment on the importance of the work is provided by Taylor 1997: 163: “During the following decade modern economic history took a dramatic swing away from the liberal-left consensus established by the Hammonds, Tawney, and the Webbs. The seminal text for this change of direction was the 1954 collection of essays compiled by F.A. Hayek, Capitalism and the Historians ...” in the form of a review for, of all things, the prestigious Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. “All the contributors to this queer volume seem to be driven by some curious sense of persecution,” Schlesinger declared. Capitalism and the Historians is simply “a summons to a witch-hunt. Americans, one would think, have enough trouble with home-grown McCarthys without importing Viennese professors to add academic luster to the process.” Harvard professor Schlesinger ended by denouncing the University of Chicago Press for publishing the book in the first place: “What conceivably could have persuaded a university press to publish this book is hard to imagine. This volume is one more example of what Senator Fulbright recently called ‘that swinish blight so common in our time ... anti-intellectualism.’”
Yes, of course: Hayek, Ashton, de Jouvenel, and the others, all swinish anti-intellectuals and witch-hunters, possibly afflicted with a touch of mental illness (a “sense of persecution”). The review is, in fact, a good example of how New Deal hacks like Schlesinger treated classical liberal thinkers when they were able to get away with it, even, inanely, trying to whip the University of Chicago Press into line.
Capitalism and the Historians In his paper, Bertrand de Jouvenel described intellectuals as those who deal in the “mental images, representations of the universe ... of the things and agents therein, of [man] himself and his relation to them.” Since every society requires such representations, the importance of this group is very great (91).
It happens that a striking characteristic of modern intellectuals is their animosity towards the marketplace:
An enormous majority of Western intellectuals display and affirm hostility to the economic and social institutions of their society, institutions to which they give the blanket name of capitalism. (103)
Why should this be? The reason cannot lie, de Jouvenel argues, in a puritanical disdain for social arrangements that satisfy the hedonistic demands of selfish individuals. Modern welfare democracy is also such an arrangement (although not as efficient in accomplishing its end), yet it is not subject to the same antagonism (95–96).
De Jouvenel claims, surprisingly, that “the intellectual’s hostility to the businessman presents no mystery, as the two have, by function, wholly different standards.” While the businessman’s motto is the customer is always right, the intellectual’s task is to preserve the highest standards of his field even against the weight of popular opinion (hence, the tendency to favor the painters, novelists, poets, film-makers, etc., “who are for intellectuals only”). (116–21).
There is no doubt that de Jouvenel has identified what is felt to be one of capitalism’s major irritants. Many intellectuals find it impossible to resign themselves to the fact that, as Ludwig von Mises pointed out (1956: 9): “What counts in the frame of the market economy is not academic judgments of value, but the valuations actually manifested by people in buying or not buying.”
But the attitude of the intellectuals can hardly be wholly accounted for by the mere fact that entrepreneurs serve the wishes of the public, rather than any loftier end — and for the same reason de Jouvenel himself gave earlier. In democratic welfare states, politicians and bureaucrats are also supposed to serve the public, rather than to struggle to preserve standards of excellence per se. Yet the intellectuals’ enmity is rarely if ever directed against democracy, the welfare state, or its leaders and functionaries.
Thus, the problem remains. In a significant respect, the situation has deteriorated since the 1951 Mont Pèlerin meeting. Then, de Jouvenel could take for granted that even the modern leftist intellectual “takes pride in the achievement of technique [i.e., technology] and rejoices that men get more of the things which they want” (113). The same can hardly be said today, with the rise of a fanatical environmentalism and incessant attack on industrialism and the consumer society.
In 1972, twenty-one years after that panel at Beauvallon, R.M. Hartwell delivered a talk at the Mont Pèlerin meeting at Montreux, on “History and Ideology” (Hartwell 1974).I am grateful to Professor Leonard P. Liggio for bringing this essay to my attention. Hartwell, too, had occasion to remark on the “widely held aversion to the economic and political system which provided the institutional framework for modern economic growth.” As a historian, he naturally stressed the crucial role of historical myths, concocted and circulated by academic intellectuals, in nourishing this aversion.
Hartwell’s lecture is especially noteworthy for drawing attention to the systematic character of the anti-capitalist onslaught, as experienced by the typical educated citizen of a western democracy, including those journalists cited above. History, he notes, “is only one element in a battery of self-reinforcing prejudice” against private property and the market economy. In literature, economics, philosophy, sociology, and other subjects, the student is continually subjected to data and interpretations that converge on a single point: the viciousness of private enterprise and the virtuousness of state intervention and state-supported labor unionism. “And what schools and universities propagate in formal education,” Hartwell observes, “many other institutions reinforce” — particularly the churches, the creative arts, and the mass media (Hartwell 1974: 11–12).On the leftist leanings of American academics, see Lee 1994 and the surveys cited therein.
The Ever Changing Indictment Now, twenty-two years later, we address, once again, the question of the intellectual and the marketplace.
This does not argue the futility of the question, however, but rather its central importance. In a sense, the Mont Pèlerin Society was founded to deal with the problem of the modern intellectual’s antipathy to capitalism and the harmful consequences of that antipathy. Most of us here have now lived long enough to understand the truth of Schumpeter’s assertion that “capitalism stands its trial before judges who have the sentence of death in their pockets.” The only thing that changes, Schumpeter wrote, are the particulars (1950: 144). That ever-changing indictment is presented, over and over again, by the intellectuals.
In earlier times, they indicted capitalism for the immiseration of the proletariat, inevitable depressions, and the disappearance of the middle classes. Then, a little later, it was for imperialism and inevitable wars among the imperialist (capitalist) powers.
In more recent decades, the indictment again changed, as earlier accusations became too obviously untenable.
Capitalism was charged with being unable to compete with socialist societies in technological progress (Sputnik); with promoting automation, leading to catastrophic permanent unemployment; both with creating the consumer society and its piggish affluence and with proving incapable of extending such piggishness to the underclass; with “neo-colonialism”; with oppressing women and racial minorities; with spawning a meretricious popular culture; and with destroying the earth itself.Cf. Bronfenbrenner 1981: 104: “Both the rise of environmental legislation and the postthalidomide burgeoning of ostensible consumer protection have come since Schumpeter’s death; both would have been grist for Schumpeter’s mill.” Philosopher Robert Nozick 1984: 134 wrote of an experience he often had in replying to criticisms that laissez-faire capitalism causes various evils, from monopoly and pollution to systematic overproduction or underproduction. After Nozick painstakingly refuted the stated charge, his interlocutor “drops the point and quickly leaps to another,” child labor, racism, advertising, etc., etc. “Point after point is given up. ... What is not given up, though, is the opposition to capitalism.” Nozick concluded that the particular arguments are not important, since “there is an underlying animus against capitalism” (emphasis in original). This is an experience that many another advocate of the free market could also attest to. As George Stigler remarked: “A constant stream of new criticism — such as the problem of homeless families — is being invented, discovered, or heavily advertised.”Stigler 1989: 1. I am grateful to Dr. Claire Friedland, manager of the George J. Stigler archives, for her kindness in making this and other unpublished papers of Professor Stigler available to me. The question remains: what is at the root of this ever-changing, never-ending indictment? What accounts for the intellectuals’ unremitting hostility to the market economy?
To throw light on these questions, we must go beyond the specific accusations themselves. Israel Kirzner writes (1992: 96):
Whatever the stated specific denunciations of capitalism, whatever the errors in economic analysis which are implicit in these denunciations, a thorough understanding of the anti-capitalist mentality cannot avoid ultimately coming to grips with the deep-seated prejudices and ingrained habits of thought which are, both consciously and unconsciously, responsible for the antipathy shown to the market system.
Hayek on the Intellectuals and Socialism F.A. Hayek was acutely concerned with our problem, since he, too, was wholly convinced of the importance of the intellectuals: “They are the organs which modern society has developed for spreading knowledge and ideas,” he declares in his essay, “The Intellectuals and Socialism” (Hayek 1967). The intellectuals — whom Hayek characterizes as “the professional second-hand dealers in ideas”This definition by Hayek is somewhat idiosyncratic, in that it excludes the originators of ideas, e.g., among socialists, Saint-Simon and Marx. — exercise their power through their domination of public opinion: “There is little that the ordinary man of today learns about events or ideas except through the medium of this class.” Among other things, they often virtually manufacture professional reputations in the minds of the general population; and through their domination of the news media, they color and shape the information that people in each country have of events and trends in foreign nations. Once an idea is adopted by the intellectuals, its acceptance by the masses is “almost automatic and irresistible.” Ultimately, the intellectuals are the legislators of mankind (178–80, 182).
With all this, Hayek’s view of the intellectuals is flatteringly benign: their ideas are determined by and large by “honest convictions and good intentions” (184).At one point (182) Hayek does suggest that selfish personal interests might play a part in the intellectuals’ attitude; he refers, without naming him, to Karl Mannheim and “the curious claim ... that [the intellectual class] was the only one whose views were not decidedly influenced by its own economic interests.” But he does not indicate why he considers this claim “curious.” In “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” Hayek does mention in passing the intellectuals’ egalitarian bias; the analysis, however, is basically in terms of their “scientism.” With his characteristic emphasis on epistemology, Hayek sees the revolt against the market economy as stemming from the methodological errors he identified and investigated at length in his brilliant study of the rise of French positivism, The Counter-Revolution of Science (1955).
Thus, in Hayek’s view, the chief influence on the intellectuals has been the example of the natural sciences and their applications. As man has come to understand and then control the forces of nature, intellectuals have grown infatuated with the idea that an analogous mastery of social forces could produce similar benefits for mankind. They are under the sway of “such beliefs as that deliberate control or conscious organization is also in social affairs always superior to the results of spontaneous processes which are not directed by a human mind, or that any order based on a plan beforehand must be better than one formed by the balancing of opposing forces” (186–87). Hayek even makes the following astonishing statement (187):
That, with the application of engineering techniques, the direction of all forms of human activity according to a single coherent plan should prove to be as successful in society as it has been in innumerable engineering tasks is too plausible a conclusion not to seduce most of those who are elated by the achievements of the natural sciences. It must indeed be admitted both that it would require powerful arguments to counter the strong presumption in favor of such a conclusion and that these arguments have not yet been adequately stated. ... The argument will not lose its force until it has been conclusively shown why what has proved so eminently successful in producing advances in so many fields should have limits to its usefulness and become positively harmful if extended beyond those limits.
It is exceedingly difficult to follow Hayek’s reasoning here. He appears to be saying that because the natural sciences have made great advances and because innumerable particular engineering projects have succeeded, it is quite understandable that many intellectuals should conclude that “the direction of all forms of human activity according to a single coherent plan” will be similarly successful.
But, in the first place, the advances of the natural sciences were not brought about in accordance with any overall central plan; rather, they were the product of many separate decentralized but coordinated researchers (produced analogously in some respects to the market process; see Baker 1945 and Polanyi 1951These are both works with which Hayek was quite familiar, which makes his argument at this point more perplexing.). Second, from the fact that many particular engineering projects have succeeded it does not follow that a single vast engineering project, one subsuming all particular projects, is likely to succeed; nor does it seem likely that most people will find such a claim plausible.
Why, then, is it natural, or logical, or easily comprehensible that intellectuals should reason from the triumphs of decentralized scientific research and of individual engineering projects to the success of a plan undertaking to direct “all forms of human activity”?In another essay, on “Socialism and Science,” 1978: 295, Hayek refers to “the undeniable propensity of minds trained in the physical sciences, as well as of engineers, to prefer a deliberately created orderly arrangement to the results of spontaneous growth — an influential and common attitude, which frequently attracts intellectuals to socialist schemes. This is a widespread and important phenomenon which has had a profound effect on the development of political thought.” It seems highly doubtful that surveys of political opinion among university professors in the United States, western Europe, or elsewhere, would find socialist opinions more common among physical scientists and engineers than in the humanities and social science faculties.
In his review of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, Joseph Schumpeter (1946: 269) remarks that Hayek was “polite to a fault” towards his opponents, in that he hardly ever attributed to them “anything beyond intellectual error.” But not all the points that must be made can be made without more “plain speaking,” Schumpeter declares.Hayek 1973: 161n. 18, 70, rebutted Schumpeter’s criticism, asserting that it was not “‘politeness to a fault’ but profound conviction about what are the decisive factors” for his having attributed merely intellectual error to his opponents in The Road to Serfdom. Hayek reaffirmed that: “It is necessary to realize that the sources of many of the most harmful agents in this world are often not evil men but highminded idealists, and that in particular the foundations of totalitarian barbarism have been laid by honorable and well-meaning scholars who never recognized the offspring they produced.” One wonders how Hayek could know this about the character of those who “laid the foundations of totalitarian barbarism.”
Schumpeter here implies an important distinction. Civility in debate, including the formal presumption of good faith on the part of one’s adversaries, is always in order. But there is also a place for the attempt to explain the attitudes, for instance, of anti-market intellectuals (a form of the sociology of knowledge). In this endeavor, “politeness” is not precisely what is most called for. As regards the positivist intellectuals who argued from the successes of natural science to the need for central planning: it may well be that this false inference was no simple intellectual error, but was facilitated by their prejudices and resentments, or perhaps their own will to power.Cf. the comment by George Stigler 1989: 6: “a central reason for the dissatisfaction of the intellectuals with the enterprise system” is that “it does not give them a mechanism to coerce changes in the behavior of individuals.” Cf. also Robert Skidelsky 1978: 83, who mentions, as one factor in the conversion of the younger American economists to Keynesianism, that, in the version propagated by Alvin Hansen, it provided a “rationale for the permanent direction of economic life by an élite of economists. ... In the Keynesian political economy, public policy would be handed over to the professional economists, who alone would understand what needed to be done.” Robert Higgs 1987a: 116 observes that American Progressives around 1900 found state intervention appealing because it implied a social organization supervised and directed by engineers, planners, technicians, and trained bureaucrats, and thus put “a wise minority in the saddle.”
In any case, Hayek’s gentlemanly deference to anti-market intellectuals can sometimes be downright misleading. Consider his statement (1967: 193):
Orthodoxy of any kind, any pretense that a system of ideas is final and must be unquestioningly accepted as a whole, is the one view which of necessity antagonizes all intellectuals, whatever their views on particular issues.
This, of a category of persons that in the twentieth century has notoriously included thousands of prominent apologists for Soviet Communism in all western countries, is indeed politeness “to a fault.”There is by now a substantial literature on the subject; see, for instance, Caute 1973. Richard Pipes 1993: 202 makes the interesting comment that: “The Bolshevik regime, for all its objectionable features, attracted them [intellectuals] because it was the first government since the French Revolution to vest power in people of their own kind. In Soviet Russia, intellectuals could expropriate capitalists, execute political opponents, and muzzle reactionary ideas.” See also the challenge issued by Eugene D. Genovese (1994) to his fellow intellectuals to testify publicly on what they knew of the crimes of Soviet Communism and when they knew it. There was, after all, good reason, as late as the 1950s, for Raymond Aron (1957) to have written on The Opium of the Intellectuals and for H.B. Acton (1955) to have entitled what is probably the best philosophical critique of Marxism-Leninism, The Illusion of the Epoch.Cf. O’Brien 1994: 344, who notes that “the overwhelming majority of [his] academic colleagues adopted an attitude of judicious agnosticism and relativism towards the horrors of the Stalinist and other Marxist regimes.”
Nor was Communism the only nefarious orthodoxy to claim the loyalty of numerous intellectuals, as is shown by the cases of Martin Heidegger, Robert Brasillach, Giovanni Gentile, Ezra Pound, and many others. For a less complimentary but more realistic view of the integrity of modern intellectuals we may turn to the memoirs of the German historian, Golo Mann (1991: 534), who quotes from his diary of 1933: “18 May. [Josef] Goebbels in front of a writers’ meeting in the Hotel Kaiserhof: ‘We [Nazis] have been reproached with not being concerned with the intellectuals. That was not necessary for us. We knew quite well: if we first have power, then the intellectuals will come on their own.’ Thunderous applause — from the intellectuals.”Benjamin Constant 1988: 137–38, in criticizing the French writers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, described the intellectuals’ penchant to identify with arbitrary power: “all the great developments of extrajudicial force, all the examples of recourse to illegal measures in dangerous circumstances have from century to century been recounted with respect and described with complacency. The author, sitting comfortably at his desk, hurls arbitrary measures in every direction. ... For a moment, he believes himself invested with power just because he is preaching its abuse ... in this way he gives himself something of the pleasure of authority; he repeats as loud as he can the great words of public safety, supreme law, public interest. ... Poor imbecile! He talks to those who are only too glad to listen to him and who, at the first opportunity, will test out his own theories upon him.” Constant’s words may be viewed as a prescient gloss on Stalin’s treatment of many of the Bolshevik intellectuals who had lent their aid to the creation of the Soviet terror state.
Schumpeter on the Intellectual Proletariat In chiding Hayek, Schumpeter suggested (1946: 269) that he might have learned a useful lesson from Karl Marx. Schumpeter’s own interpretation reflects his lifelong engagement with Marxism. Like Marx, he offered a highly pessimistic prognosis for the capitalist system, though for mainly different reasons (1950: 131–45). But while Schumpeter holds that intellectuals will play a key role in capitalism’s demise, he in no way relies on the scenario set forth in the Communist Manifesto.
There, Marx and Engels (1976: 494) announced that as the final revolution approaches, a section of the “bourgeois ideologists” will go over to the side of the proletariat. These will be the ideologists “who have worked their way up to a theoretical understanding of the historical movement as a whole.”The critique of Marxism as the camouflaged ideology of an intellectual would-be “new class” is part of the communist anarchist tradition, begun by Bakunin and continued by Machajski and others; see Dolgoff 1971 and Szelenyi and Martin 1991. Such a laughably self-serving description could hardly appeal to an inveterate skeptic like Schumpeter. Instead, his “Marxism” consisted in examining capitalism as a system with certain attendant sociological traits, and exposing the class interests of the intellectuals within that system.This approach, however, like the Marxist analysis of historical change in terms of class conflict, had numerous precursors among classical liberal thinkers; see the essay on “The Conflict of Classes: Liberal vs. Marxist Theories,” in the present work.
Compared to previous social orders, capitalism is especially vulnerable to attack:
unlike any other type of society, capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates, and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest. (1950: 146)
In particular, it brings forth and nurtures a class of secular intellectuals who wield the power of words over the general mind. The capitalist wealth machine makes possible cheap books, pamphlets, newspapers, and the ever-widening public that reads them. Freedom of speech and of the press enshrined in liberal constitutions entails also “freedom to nibble at the foundations of capitalist society” — a constant gnawing away that is promoted by the critical rationalism inherent in that form of society. Moreover, in contrast to earlier regimes, a capitalist state finds it difficult, except under exceptional circumstances, to suppress dissident intellectuals: such a procedure would conflict with the general principles of the rule of law and the limits to the police power dear to the bourgeoisie itself (1950: 148–51).
The key to the hostility of intellectuals to capitalism is the expansion of education, particularly higher education.Cf. Raymond Ruyer 1969: 155–56, who indicates the social and psychological problems resulting from prolonged state instruction (including “adult education”) and the diffusion of “culture” under the aegis of the state. He concludes: “It is typical that the greatest progress that has come about in ‘the democratic extension of culture’ has been produced by private enterprise in the form of paperback books, in which the state did not involve itself, except to impose its usual taxes.” A third of a century later, the same could be said of compact discs and computers. Ruyer’s work, quite unduly neglected, is a profound and elegant dissection of the intellectual’s persistent resentment of the free market economy and capitalist society. In this respect, it stands in contrast to the recent book of Raymond Boudon (2004). Despite its promising title (Why the Intellectuals do not Like Liberalism) and occasional insights, Boudon’s book proves to be superficial, e.g., in dating the intellectuals’ turn against a liberal order from around 1950. This creates unemployment, or underemployment, of the university-schooled classes; many become “psychically unemployable in manual occupations without necessarily acquiring employability in, say, professional work.” The tenuous social position of these intellectuals breeds discontent and resentment, which are often rationalized as objective social criticism. This emotional malaise, Schumpeter asserts,
will much more realistically account for hostility to the capitalist order than could the theory — itself a rationalization in the psychological sense — according to which the intellectual’s righteous indignation about the wrongs of capitalism simply represents the logical inference from outrageous facts ... (1950: 152–53)Schumpeter 1950: 155 highlights an important channel of the intellectuals’ influence, by means of the state bureaucracies, which are “open to conversion by the modern intellectual with whom, through a similar education, they have much in common.”
A major merit of Schumpeter’s argument is that it elucidates an abiding feature of the sociology of radicalism and revolution: the hunt for government jobs. The interconnection between over-education, an expanding reservoir of unemployable intellectuals, the pressure for more bureaucratic positions, and political turmoil was a commonplace among European observers in the nineteenth century.See O’Boyle 1970; also Levy 1987: 160, who writes of “the state-created intelligentsias of post-Restoration Europe [i.e., after 1815] which, outpacing economic growth, faced serious underemployment and played important roles in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.” In the Reichstag, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (Raico 1999: 100) claimed that social revolutionaries in Russia consisted of the “diploma-proletariat,” an excess produced by higher education which society could not absorb. The leaders were not workers, but consisted “in part of people of genteel education, many half-educated people ... dissipated students and unsullied dreamers ...” In 1850, the conservative author Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1976: 227–38) offered a remarkable analysis, in many ways anticipating Schumpeter, of the “intellectual proletariat” (Geistesproletariat). Even then Germany was producing each year much more “intellectual product” than it could use or pay for, testifying to an “unnatural” division of national labor. This was a general phenomenon in advanced countries, Riehl maintains, resulting from the enormous industrial growth that was taking place. But the impoverished intellectual workers experience a contradiction between their income and their perceived needs, between their own haughty conception of their rightful social position and the true one, a contradiction which is far more irreconcilable than in the case of the manual laborers. Because they cannot “reform” their own meager salaries, they try to reform society. It is these intellectual proletarians who have taken the lead in social revolutionary movements in Germany. “These literati see the world’s salvation in the gospel of socialism and communism, because it contains their own salvation,” through domination of the masses.Schumpeter does not mention Riehl in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy and refers to him once in his History of Economic Analysis (1954: 427 and 427 n. 20), but only in connection with Riehl’s work in Kulturgeschichte (cultural history). Later revolutionary movements, whether of the left or the right, can be understood to a large extent as the ideologically camouflaged raid on the great state employment office. Carl Levy (1987: 180) has linked the expansion of the state from the later nineteenth century on to the growth in the numbers of the university-educated, who sought government jobs and utilized positivism as a facilitating ideology. Positivism
stressed the need for expertise, special training, and trained intelligence ... [fortified by] a desacralizing of tradition and the rapid expansion of the public sphere ... [there proliferated] schemes for the organization of society which substituted for traditional elites and capitalist entrepreneurs a stratum of experts and/or the lay clerisy. Examples can be found among the Fabians and the ILP [Independent Labor Party], [Edward] Bellamy and other American authoritarian utopia builders, the Italian socialist professors, and the French socialist elites.
From this perspective, we obtain a deeper understanding of the claim that the welfare state “saved capitalism.” What the welfare state has actually accomplished is to furnish a never-ending source of state jobs for the (mainly middle class) products of what is still referred to as university education, without, as in the nineteenth century, requiring a revolutionary assault.Cf. Mises (1974: 47–48): “In dealing with the ascent of modern statism, socialism, and interventionism, one must not neglect the preponderant role played by pressure groups and lobbies of civil servants and those university graduates who longed for government jobs.” In this connection, Mises mentions the Fabian Society in Britain and the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) in Imperial Germany.
While there is doubtless a great deal of truth in Schumpeter’s identification of the systemic surplus of intellectuals as a source of anti-capitalism, it also presents certain difficulties.
Such an overproduction — and consequent un- or under-employment — is a feature of non-capitalist societies, as well. Its effect is the general destabilization of regimes, as occurs from time to time in underdeveloped countries. A more detailed knowledge of the situation in former Communist societies might show that it was also implicated in their subversion and final overthrow.
More to the point: it is not so much the unemployed intellectuals who are the problem but the ones who are employed. Intellectuals unable to find suitable jobs may well provide a receptive subculture as well as occasional cannon fodder for revolutionary movements: among communist anarchists in the late nineteenth century, or in some third world countries more recently. In Germany after the First World War, artists and writers frozen out of the avant-garde culture of Weimar were prominent among the early National Socialists.
But Schumpeter’s thesis does not hold for many other cases, probably the historically most significant ones. Émile Zola and Anatole France, Gerhart Hauptmann and Bertold Brecht, H.G. Wells and Bernard Shaw, John Dewey and Upton Sinclair were scarcely “unemployables” in the intellectual world. Today the “stars” of the mass news media of all the advanced countries — you would know their names in your own country; one could mention American “newspersons” who earn a million dollars a year or more, such being the savage inequalities of capitalism — are typically constant “nibblers” at the system of private enterprise. The question is rather why so many successful and highly influential intellectuals become carping critics of the free economy.Doubt is cast on Schumpeter’s fundamental analysis by Paul A. Samuelson 1981: 10, who points out that in Japan for decades “the continued omnipresence of Marxist terminology among journalists and teachers” has had no discernible effect on Japanese politics.
The Two Approaches of Ludwig von Mises If Schumpeter declined to be “polite to a fault” when it came to anti-market intellectuals, what is one to say of Hayek’s own mentor, Ludwig von Mises?
No one surpassed Mises in the importance he attached to the power of ideas.For instance, in 1932, Mises 1990: 96 stated: “All the misfortunes from which Europe has suffered in the last two decades have been the inevitable result of the application of the theories which have dominated the social and economic philosophy of the last fifty years.” Thus, it was crucial to his social philosophy and historical interpretations to determine the basis of “the anti-capitalistic mentality,” especially as represented among the intellectuals (Mises 1956).
Often Mises emphasizes invidious personal motivation — resentment and bitter envy — as the source of this attitude. Replacement of the society of status by the society of contract aggravated feelings of failure and inferiority. With equality of opportunity and all careers open to talent, lack of financial success becomes a judgment upon the individual. This is a burden he attempts to shift by scapegoating the social system (1956: 5–11). Intellectuals share this weakness, perhaps in an accentuated form. On occasion, Mises goes so far as to trace the “psychological roots of anti-liberalism” to mental pathology. The scapegoating of the social system by those unable to cope with the reality of their relative failure in life is, Mises claims, a mental disorder which psychiatry has so far neglected to classify. Engaging in a bit of volunteer psychiatric nosology, he ventures to label this condition “the Fourier complex” (1985: 13–17), after the early French socialist, Charles Fourier.
Although Mises’s focus on envy and resentment is the best known of his attempts to explain the anti-capitalist mentality,On one of the very few occasions that he has taken notice of Mises’s writings, Paul Samuelson 1981: 10, n. 3 writes of his “notion that those who can’t hack it in the competitive commercial struggle for existence become the whiners and complainers who seek to subvert the capitalistic order.” This is also the only Misesian explanation mentioned by Nozick 1984: 138. a second and different approach of his seems more fruitful. In an early essay titled “The Psychological Roots of the Resistance to Economics” (1933: 170–88), Mises launches a radical attack on the strand of traditional western morality that has stigmatized moneymaking. Citing Cicero’s De officiis as an exemplary text, he identifies the contempt for moneymaking deeply ingrained in western culture as the source of the hostility towards capitalists, trade, and speculation “which today dominates our whole public life, politics, and the written word.” This contempt, nurtured and sustained through the centuries under changing regimes, is the natural outgrowth of a class morality — specifically, the morality of the classes that are sheltered from the market by the circumstance that they live from taxes.Friedrich Naumann, today a liberal icon in Germany, founded his National Social Association in 1896 to promote social welfare measures and an imperialist agenda. Eugen Richter, the chief authentic liberal political figure of the time, mocked Naumann’s little group as a “pastor and school teacher party.” Richter explained the deficient understanding of the market on the part of its members from the fact that they obtained their living from taxes. Raico 1999: 227. See also the essay on Richter in the present volume. In our own day, it is a morality generated by “priests, bureaucrats, professors, and army officers,” who look with “loathing and scorn” on entrepreneurs, capitalists, and speculators (1933: 181–82).It should be pointed out that Mises had in mind Continental regimes, in which the clergy was customarily supported by state subsidies. De Jouvenel, in Hayek (ed.), 1954: 104, points out that modern intellectuals have taken over the task of the medieval clergy: they are “forever thrusting the condition of the poor before the eyes of the rich,” and forever scolding the rich for being rich.
Insight into the prevalence of this anti-market ethic helps explain (as Mises’s other, envy-based approach does not) the anti-market attitudes often found even among the economically successful in the private sector, since “no one can escape the power of a dominant ideology.” Thus, “entrepreneurs and capitalists themselves are swayed by the moral outlook that damns their activity.” They suffer from a bad conscience and feelings of inferiority. This shows itself in, among other things, the support given to socialist movements by millionaires and their sons and daughters (1933: 184).Drawing on Schumpeter, Robert Higgs 1987: 239 comments on one of the results of the cultural hegemony of the anti-capitalist intellectuals: “the bourgeoisie loses faith in its traditional values and ideals; its defense of the free-market system grows steadily weaker as it accommodates itself to a political environment that gives ever greater priority to social security, equality, and governmental regulation and planning.” George Stigler 1984: 152–53 also held that, because of the influence of the intellectuals, capitalists have themselves become apologetic for their pursuit of profit. “To boast that large profits demonstrate great efficiency in producing existing products and introducing new ones is considered even by them [the capitalists] to be too archaic a form of thought for public consumption.” Mises 1933: 183 suggests another reason for the intellectuals’ rejection of economic theory, and, by implication, liberalism: they identify with “the demigods who make history,” while economics demonstrates the strict limits to the power of these masters of mankind.
Envy and Envy-Avoidance A different slant on the anti-market attitudes of the economically successful is offered by another liberal scholar, Helmut Schoeck. In his Envy (1987), Schoeck presents an empirical examination of this pervasive yet elusive — and strangely under-investigated — phenomenon, in the light of evidence from anthropology, ethnology, social psychology, and history.Choi 1993 equates envy with the demand for social justice, and sees it as stemming from an inability to understand the sources and functions of entrepreneurial profits. While suggestive and useful as far as it goes, this would seem to take too narrow a view of envy.
Human beings are by nature prone to envy, springing from a primitive conception of causality that interprets the good fortune of others as having been achieved at a cost to oneself. People are equally subject, however, to a “universal fear of one’s neighbor’s envy and of the envy of the gods and spirits” (363, 308). Fear of the envy of others — of the “evil eye,” for example — gives rise to “a primitive, pre-religious, irrational sense of guilt,” and with it behavior patterns that aim at envy-avoidance.
In various societies varying means have evolved to cope with this sense of guilt and to ward off the retribution of the envious. With intellectuals in capitalist society, envy-avoidance often manifests itself in support for egalitarian causes. The diffuse dread of the envy of others, Schoeck finds, is “the root of that general, aimless sense of guilt which, during the past hundred years, has exercised so disrupting and disorienting an influence. The pangs of guilt (social conscience), and the naive assumption that there could ever be a form of society that was either classless or otherwise non-provocative of envy, have been responsible for the adherence to leftist movements of large numbers of middle- and upper-class people ...” (324). In adhering to movements that preach social and economic equality, they assuage their guilt and anxiety, for now they can feel they are helping to set up “a society in which no one is envious” (325).Regarding the leftist orientation of the economically successful, Schoeck remarks (327) that: “a man will opt for a philosophically decked-out, long-term communist programme ... all the more readily, the more unequal, distinguished, and exceptional is the position he already holds in society, in so far as he combines his privileged position with a sense of guilt.”
Schoeck’s theory has the advantage of accounting also for the peculiar self-righteous “idealism” often displayed by leftist intellectuals, especially among the young:
sensitivity to the envy of others is so deep-rooted in the human psyche that most people erroneously interpret the sense of redemption and peace, which they feel when they have made concessions to envy, as confirmation, not only of their moral superiority, but also of the expediency of their action in the reality of the here and now. (362)
We may add that the blessed release experienced by those who have, they feel, placed themselves safely beyond the envy of the resentfully dispossessed often turns to fury when they are faced with their class brethren who have casually spurned such psychological capitulation.
But How Relevant are the Intellectuals? The authors considered so far have been agreed at least in assigning a great deal of weight in the ultimate determination of political events to intellectuals and the ideologies they generate. This was also the standpoint of Murray Rothbard, which he set forth theoretically (e.g., in Rothbard 1974: 72–76) and frequently explicated historically (e.g., Rothbard 1989 and 1996). Virtually uniquely among free-market thinkers, Murray Rothbard was equally adept, where appropriate, at analyzing political change as the result of interest-group machinations — for example, in the case of the Federal Reserve (Rothbard 1994). But the political relevance of the intellectuals has been challenged by another group of liberal scholars, most notably by George J. Stigler.Norman Barry 1989: 55 (see also idem 1984) somewhat overstates the case when he refers to an “intellectual schizophrenia” in classical liberal thinking, which undertakes to explain the expansion of the public sector by the actions of “sinister interests,” while crediting the triumph of the liberal cause to the advance of liberal “ideas.” Actually, the position of most liberals who have addressed the problem may be best summed up by the statement of R.M. Hartwell 1989: 122: “Ideas count, and always have, for good or for ill.” Barry’s own suggestion 1989: 54, that “there is an interplay between ideas and interests and that the relative strengths of the two forces will depend upon the prevailing institutional arrangements in the society in question,” is a fair summary of the customary liberal view.
Professor Stigler’s justly famed wit was on target when he defined intellectuals (1975: 314) as “people who strongly prefer talking and writing to physical exertion.” In this way, Stigler spurned the common but faulty inference that intellectuals are particularly intelligent. There is no necessary connection between the two categories: for the most part, what distinguishes an intellectual is his command of a particular discourse.Cf. the typically adroit aperçu of Raymond Ruyer 1969: 158: “One is an intellectual today . . . without any special aptitude for intellectuality, with an intelligence often inferior to that of a worker, an artisan, or a middling tradesman, and sometimes with an IQ manifestly close to the level of mental deficiency. In order to ‘pass,’ it is enough to have acquired the vocabulary of intellectuality.”
Stigler was quite aware that, despite the many benefits they reap from the capitalist system, intellectuals have by and large been its implacable critics in all the sectors they dominate (Stigler 1984a: 143–58)Cf., ibid., 161: “The intellectual wishes to choose his way of life and also to choose his standard of living. He chooses freedom, outside of the economic circuit, but he does not renounce the benefits of this circuit. The men who work within the economy displease him, as the yokels displeased the aristocrats, who nonetheless lived on the labor of the yokels, or as the clothiers and shopkeepers of the seventeenth century were the butt of the sarcasms of high society and the ‘persons of quality,’ who in the end might refuse to settle their bills.” It is a great pity that Ruyer’s insightful and beautifully written book has not been translated into English, nor gained the appreciation it deserves.. Yet, while “there is a natural temptation to credit to them ... the decline that has occurred in the public esteem for private enterprise and the large expansion of state control over economic life” (1982: 28–29), this temptation should be resisted. In his view, claims regarding the decisive influence of intellectuals and ideologies are unscientific, since such claims have never been quantified and subjected to empirical testing. In fact, there is a total lack of any theory of how ideologies originate and change (Stigler 1982: 35; 1984b: 3).
In contrast, Stigler proposes to attack the problem with the conventional analytical methods of (neoclassical) economics: hypotheses are to be formulated in quantifiable terms and tested against the data.
A central implication of economic theory is that “man is eternally a utility maximizer, in his home, in his office, — be it public or private — in the church, in his scientific work, in short, everywhere” (1982: 35). Just as they act on the market to maximize their personal utility, so “individuals consistently behave in a utility-increasing manner with respect to the use of the state” (1984b: 3), that is, in supporting measures that, in the aggregate, constitute the historical expansion of state power.
Very sensibly, Stigler warns against defining utility in such a way as to make the hypothesis tautological (1982: 26). Conceding that there is “no accepted content to the utility function,” he proposes one, viz., that a person’s utility “depend[s] upon the welfare of the actor, his family, plus a narrow circle of associates” (1982: 36).
How far this advances the argument is unclear, however. After all, a person’s adherence to a given ideology is usually conditioned by his belief that it will, in some sense, promote his “welfare” and that of his family and close associates, so that reliance on utility functions does not automatically obviate the need to reckon with the impact of ideology.
In Stigler’s view, the simplest way to test the role of ideology as a non-utility-maximizing goal is to ascertain whether the champions of a given ideology incur costs in supporting it:
If on average and over substantial periods of time we find (say) that the proponents of “small is beautiful” earn less than comparable talents devoted to urging the National Association of Manufacturers to new glories, I will accept the evidence. But first let us see it. (1982: 35)
“Utility,” then, appears, for all practical purposes, to mean maximization of income. This is reasonable from Stigler’s viewpoint, since employing another value, for instance, maximization of power, would create insuperable difficulties for formalization and empirical testing in Stiglerian terms.
Stigler further holds that the desire of intellectuals to maximize their incomes (now including prestige and “apparent influence”) explains their distribution along the political spectrum (1982: 34). He refers to Joseph Schumpeter as having partially accepted this position. But Schumpeter’s (and Riehl’s and others’) ascription of economic motives to the intellectuals is of a very different order from Stigler’s. As we have noted, Schumpeter held that economic factors (underemployment, etc.) tend to create a mind-set among intellectuals which is apt to generate anti-capitalistic ideologies that, in turn, spread throughout society. Stigler seems to maintain that economic factors operate upon individual intellectuals directly and immediately.
Stigler applies his notion of the relative unimportance of ideology in a general way to the repeal of the Corn Laws in England in 1846 usually considered a landmark victory of liberalism in its heroic phase. In this instance, it was not intellectuals like the classical economists, from Adam Smith on, nor even leaders like Richard Cobden and Robert Peel, who were responsible, but rather “a shift in political and economic power” (1975: 318–20).
Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison (1985) purport to provide a somewhat detailed study of the Anti-Corn League in the fashion of Stigler (as well as Gary Becker and others), which appears to avoid the ambiguities of Stigler’s position.Stigler at one point writes 1975: 315 that the intellectual’s role is not that of “simply meeting a well-defined demand for ideology by some important groups in the society. Groups and desired ideologies are neither clearly defined nor immutable through time, so the effective intellectual performs useful functions in detecting shifts of view, in filling in the details of the views, and in gradually adapting them to new circumstances.” His tasks are “giving coherence to a set of positions or interests, of developing them into principles sufficiently broad to allow ready application to new issues and facts, of finding the natural allies and uncovering the submerged conflicts between groups”; these are “not routine or unimportant tasks.” But Stigler’s qualifications undermine his position to a substantial degree. If the intellectuals have the job, among other things, of even defining interest groups, then their independent effect would seem to be considerable. While the authors do not deny that “ideology played a role” in repeal, they declare that any basically ideological explanation should be avoided because of its untestability. Instead, they apply the framework of public choice analysis, focusing on the part played by the direct financial self-interest of some of the League’s contributors and supporters. Yet it is far from clear how their own narrative, which piles up generally well-known facts with no attempt at quantification and formalization, is supposed to be “testable” in the rigorous sense they require. Droll is the authors’ earnest presentation of the public subscription for Cobden and the awarding of a seat for Manchester in the House of Commons to John Bright as “the Payoff” of the two great liberal leaders.
George Stigler sometimes combined his deprecatory estimation of the influence of intellectuals with a similarly low evaluation of the influence of individuals altogether, including political leaders. As a general explanation of political change, Stigler’s own hypothesis is that
we live in a world of reasonably well-informed people acting intelligently in pursuit of their self-interests. In this world, leaders play only a modest role, acting much more as agents than as instructors or guides of the classes they appear to lead. (1982: 37)
As a rule, the effect of prominent leaders on history is “almost infinitesimal” (1975: 319). It is safe to say that this assessment would find little agreement from students of the careers of Mohammed, Napoleon, Bismarck, or Hitler — or of Lenin and Stalin.In a work tracing the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary vision that came to be shared by intellectual and military cadres in poor countries across the world, Forrest D. Colburn wisely observes 1994: 104, “for a satisfactory understanding of revolution, the revolutionary impulse itself has to be explained, and only the most reductionist theorist would argue that the radical urge to remake state and society is either completely ‘rational’ or ‘self-interested’ ... this approach can perhaps explain the behavior of a Cuban bureaucrat or peasant, but it is a loss to explain Fidel Castro. His leadership of the Cuban Revolution cannot be explained solely as result of changes in objective conditions or material interests. His ideas — and he is full of them — are consequential because they surely shape his decisions. Explaining revolutionary elites’ ideas is crucial, because in a revolution ideas are more than a kind of intervening variable that mediates interests and outcomes. Ideas transform perceptions of interests, sometimes wildly so. They shape actors’ perceptions of possibilities, as well as their understanding of their interests.”
The Rise and Fall of Soviet Communism Authors who minimize the impact of ideology in politics would have a hard time accounting for the rise, duration, and final demise of Communism in Russia. It is difficult to imagine what could explain crucial episodes in the history of Soviet Communism if ideology is relegated to a subordinate position. Such episodes include Lenin’s own revolutionary career, the formation of the Bolshevik party, the coup d’état of October, 1917, the institution of “War Communism,” victory in the civil war, and the fanatical dedication of the cadres who carried out the collectivization of agriculture and the terror famine.
In a major study, Martin Malia asserts (1994: 16) that “the key to understanding the Soviet phenomenon is ideology,” specifically, Marxism-Leninism.
Malia traces the story back to the mid-nineteenth century. Russia, where civil society was weak and the state strong, provided fertile ground for the spread of socialist ideas. Liberal social theory the ideas of Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Turgot, Jefferson, and others had never struck root. By the time an intelligentsia sprang up in Russia, European intellectuals, from whom the Russians derived most of their political views, had made capitalism into an object of horror. The chaos following the fall of the Tsar and the demoralization caused by the First World War permitted Lenin and his highly disciplined Bolsheviks to effect their coup d’état.
The Bolsheviks at once set about to realize the Marxist dream: to construct a free and prosperous society by abolishing private property and the market. But that task, Malia maintains, citing the Austrian School, in particular Mises and Hayek, was and is inherently impossible, an assault on reality (185, 515). From the start the Soviet Union was a “world-historical fraud” (15). The land that was supposedly in the vanguard of progressive humanity was, in truth, an arena of endless oppression, mass poverty, and boundless despair. Suppressing this reality, generating and propping up a surreality, became the job of the legions of state-intellectuals at home, and, abroad, of the fellow-traveling intellectuals in every western country.In contrast to Malia and others, Richard Pipes 1993: 502 holds that ideology was a “subsidiary factor ... not a set of principles that either determined [the Communist ruling class’s] actions or explains them to posterity.” Pipes’s reasoning, however, is seriously flawed: he claims, for instance, that Marxism could not have been complicit in Soviet crimes, because “nowhere in the West has Marxism led to the totalitarian excesses of Leninism-Stalinism.” Here he ignores the fact that, in the West, socialist parties abandoned orthodox Marxism, opting instead for a “mixed economy” and the welfare state. In any case, his argument concerns ideology only as a determinant of the actions of the Communist rulers, not as a means of animating and controlling the people. Pipes further maintains that ideology played only a minor role in National Socialism. In this case he relies on the writings of Hermann Rauschning, who held, allegedly on the basis of his personal experiences, including intimate conversations with Hitler, that Nazism represented mere “nihilism.” Rauschning’s reports, however, are a highly questionable source and possibly fraudulent; see Tobias 1990. Moreover, it would be impossible today to find any knowledgeable person prepared to argue that theideology of anti-Semitism played no role, or a minor one, in the Nazi massacre of the European Jews.
The indoctrination first began on a vast scale with the civil war, and its target were the millions of recruits of the Red Army. Every known means of propaganda, from the printed word, lectures, and discussion groups to cabaret, plays, and movies, was used by the thousands of Bolshevik cadres who toured the fronts, with the explicit aim of turning the Russian peasant-soldier into “a conscious revolutionary fighter.” The half-million Red Army soldiers who joined the Party in the course of the civil war became “the missionaries of the revolution,” who “carried Bolshevism, its ideas and its methods, back to their towns and villages, where they flooded into Soviet institutions during the early 1920s” (Figes 1997: 602). The pervasive propaganda barrage continued for seven decades, testifying to the awareness of the Communist authorities that repression alone could never ensure their continued rule.The use of the public school system for the mass indoctrination of the populace by all modern governments, but especially by totalitarian ones, is dealt with in Lott 1999.
Similarly, the collapse the Soviet regime can only be understood as a case study in the operation of ideology, in this case, of the end of an ideology’s sway.
The subversion of the Leninist faith began after Stalin’s death, with the “Thaw” introduced by Khrushchev. In the 1960s a few dissident intellectuals, often samizdat [independent, usually underground] publishers, sowed the seeds of doubt in small urban and university circles. Still, the great mass of Soviet citizens remained indoctrinated, until the declaration of perestroika and glasnost under Gorbachev.
Then the truth — of the crimes of Lenin as well as Stalin, the poverty prevailing in the socialist homeland, the true nature of the fantasy world woven by Soviet ideologists for decades — came to light. It was propagated by what Hayek called the “second-hand dealers in ideas,” in the press, television, and radio (Shane 1994: 212–44). “By 1991 polls showed the majority of Soviet citizens and a substantial majority of urbanites had lost that basic faith in the system ... the Soviet world-picture had been wrecked not by tanks and bombs but by facts and opinions, by the release of information bottled up for decades. ... What changed minds was the cumulative, synergistic effect of a great deal of new information on a variety of subjects at once” (Shane 1994: 214–15, 221). The same swelling cascade of information shattered the faith of the Soviet ruling class itself, dissolving its sense of its own legitimacy and, finally, its will to coerce (Hollander 1999).
Importance of the Intellectuals Theoretically Reaffirmed The position represented by Stigler has, in turn, been criticized by other liberal scholars, among them Douglass C. North. North freely concedes that public choice theory is invaluable in explaining much of political behavior: interest group pressures do account for a good deal of political decision-making (1981: 56). But to regard this as the whole story is to fall victim, in his view, to the “myopic vision” of neoclassical economics:
Casual observation provides evidence that an enormous amount of change occurs because of large group action which should not occur in the face of the logic of the free rider problem. ... Large groups do act when no evident benefits counter the substantial costs to individual participation; people do vote, and they do donate blood anonymously. ... Individual utility functions are simply more complicated than the simple assumptions so far incorporated in neoclassical theory. (1981: 46–47)
Ideology, which, according to North, is ubiquitous, is “an economizing device by which individuals come to terms with their environment and are provided with a ‘world view’ so that the decision-making process is simplified.” The fundamental aim of ideology “is to energize groups to behave contrary to a simple, hedonistic, individual calculus of costs and benefits.”Cf. Sartori 1969: 410: “in the ideological actor the ‘logic of interest’ combines with the ‘logic of principles.’ In fact, ideological politics represents a situation in which the utility scale of each actor is altered by an ideological scale. Hence, and much to the bewilderment of the pragmatist, in this case the logic of interest no longer suffices to explain, and even less to predict, political behavior.” And, aside from rare exceptions, ideologies develop under the guidance of intellectuals (North 1981: 49–53)
A crucial part of ideologies, ignored by scholars who minimize their significance, are judgments of right and wrong, just and unjust. In this connection, North presents an argument that might well give such scholars pause:
If the concept [of just and unjust] is not crucial to the way in which choices are made, then we are left with the puzzle of accounting for the immense amount of resources invested throughout history in attempting to convince individuals about the justice or injustice of their position. (51)
In other words, if, as Stigler believed, people are reasonably well informed and act intelligently in pursuit of their self-interest, how are we to account for this massive and continual “misuse” of resources in contending over questions of right and wrong?
Robert Higgs is another knowledgeable critic of the Stiglerian position. In Crisis and Leviathan (1987a), he presents a detailed examination of the growth of the U.S. federal government in the twentieth century, highlighting the importance of intellectuals, “the specialists in the production and distribution of ideologies.” “An understanding of ideology,” he asserts, “is essential to an understanding of the growth of government” (1987a: 192, 36).Higgs (37) usefully defines ideology as “a somewhat coherent, rather comprehensive belief system about social relations,” with four distinct aspects: cognitive, affective, programmatic, and solidary.
Higgs, too, believes that the conventional neoclassical approach is incapable of explaining a wide range of political behavior (1987a: 39–41). Drawing on widely accepted conclusions of social psychology, including those of Amartya Sen, he notes that individuals often act to confirm, enhance, and validate their “identity” or “self-image.” For instance, “the kind of groups to which a person chooses to belong is closely connected with the kind of person he takes himself to be — a matter of prime concern to the typical person.” This holds also for the political dimension of their self-image. Again, like North, Higgs stresses that in acting politically people are often truly concerned with what is right and wrong, just and unjust, issues that cannot be reduced to a narrow hedonistic calculus. Citing Schumpeter on the purely formal nature of the utility theory of value, which implies nothing regarding the content of people’s wants, Higgs concludes that “one cannot demolish an ideological fortress with the weapons of neoclassical economics” (1987a: 42, 44; 1987b: 141–42).
Higgs’s own methodology is strictly empirical, though not in any unrealistically quantitative sense. Since rhetoric is crucial to ideology, ideological changes can often be tracked by a careful examination of the rhetoric of opinion leaders. However, as everywhere in science, the method applied must be suited to the area of reality under study: “Although we cannot measure [ideology and ideological changes] as we would height or weight, we can learn a good deal about them qualitatively, and for certain purposes such knowledge may be adequate” (1987a: 48–51).
Higgs’s insight that much political behavior involves the affirmation of one’s self-image prompts the question: How do people acquire political identities which they then act to instantiate and confirm? A fountainhead of such identities is clearly the system of formal education.Cf. North 1981: 54: “The educational system in a society is simply not explicable in narrow neoclassical terms, since much of it is obviously directed at inculcating a set of values, rather than investing in human capital.” From this point of view, it would prove highly instructive to examine how the educational establishments of western countries — especially higher education — function not only to convey the panoply of anti-capitalist ideas, but also to impart a particular self-image to a significant proportion of the students it processes, a self-image which they will then live out — roughly, their identities as members of the adversary culture, the bearers of a lifelong animus against private enterprise.
The Role of Historical Myths Hayek believed that historical writings have in all likelihood been the major medium for the spread of anti-market ideas among intellectuals. In his essay, “History and Politics,” he notes the great impact of historical interpretations on political opinion, and speaks of “a socialist interpretation of history which has governed political thinking for the last two or three generations and which consists mainly of a particular view of economic history” — especially, of the industrial revolution. It is an interpretation most of whose tenets have long been shown to be mythical (Hayek [ed.] 1954: 3, 7). Hayek observes that the continued domination of this view, long discarded by scholars, presents a problem. In fact, today, forty years after Hayek wrote these lines, the obsolete “catastrophic” version of the industrial revolution continues to be cherished by the great majority.
It may be useful to focus on an example of another legend that has been a part of socialist pseudo-history, and that has now likewise been exploded.
For decades the prevailing view was that German big business played a central and essential role in the Nazi rise to power. Coincidentally, this interpretation echoed the official position of the Comintern (Communist International), set forth in the 1920s and 30s, according to which a generic “fascism,” including its German variant, represented the naked fist of a bourgeoisie confronting the final proletarian assault.
For years socialists continued to tout the line that the financial and political support of German big business was to a great degree responsible for Hitler’s coming to power — and, consequently, for World War II and all the atrocities it entailed. In the Federal Republic of Germany, intellectuals never tired of repeating Max Horkheimer’s aphorism, couched in the patented portentousness of the Frankfurt School: “He who does not want to speak of capitalism should also be silent about fascism” (cited in Nolte 1982: 76). The view was shared and propagated, however, by many prominent non-socialist writers as well, Alan Bullock, Norman Stone, and H. Stuart Hughes, among them.
In 1985, in a work of superb scholarship, Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., of Yale, demonstrated that this interpretation was, simply, a myth. He relied on a multitude of primary sources ignored by other writers. Turner’s own analysis is now accepted by practically all experts in the field. Whether he will have any more success in seeing his version passed on to the educated public than the economic historians of the industrial revolution have had remains to be seen.
Years ago, R.M. Hartwell had posed the question, why do we observe the persistence of historical accounts that are demonstrably false (Hartwell 1974: 2)?Another question of Hartwell’s, why are most historians “softer on the ‘left’ than on the ‘right’?’” is also worth serious consideration. Towards the end of his work, Turner reflects on why so many professional historians should have accepted the old fable of Hitler and the German industrialists so uncritically. His reply is: bias. “Bias, in short, appears over and over again in treatments of the political role of big business even by otherwise scrupulous historians” (Turner 1985: 350). He attempts to explain this dangerous prejudice (350–51):
Professional historians generally have little or no personal contact with the world of business. Like so many intellectuals, they tend to view big business with a combination of condescension and mistrust.Cf. Pollard 2000: 1: “Making money is a dirty game. That sentence might almost sum up the attitude of English literature towards British business. Few writers have had first-hand experience of the world of commerce and industry. Their world is governed by the imaginative and the spiritual. It is no wonder therefore that they so often despise the other world that they see as materialistic ...” ... Since almost all of those who have concerned themselves with the relationship between the business community and Nazism have, to one degree or another, stood left or at least left of center in their political sympathies, a great many have found it difficult to resist the temptation to implicate big business ... in the rise of Nazism. Although deliberate distortion figures in some publications on the subject, the susceptibility of most historians to the myths dealt with in this volume is attributable not to intellectual dishonesty but rather to the sort of preconceptions that hobble attempts to come to grips with the past.
Another way of putting Turner’s explanation is in terms of one of the several components of the Marxist concept of ideology, as refined by Jon Elster (1985: 476, 487–90). The individual’s comprehension of social relations is inevitably skewed by the particular position he himself occupies in the network of these relations, because he necessarily comes to understand “the whole from the point of view of the part.”
Seen in this light, the root of the problem lies in the social position — the way of life — of the academic intellectual, whose views in turn profoundly shape and condition those of virtually all other intellectuals. Essentially, he is a mandarin, accustomed, to reiterate Mises’s point, to living from an assured source of income — usually taxes, but the case is similar with guaranteed endowments. As such, he will rarely find it possible to appreciate or even begin to understand the way of life of capitalists, entrepreneurs, traders, and speculators, men and women who live and die by the vicissitudes of the market. Thus, the problem turns out to be one not so much of invidious personal motivation as of a socially determined distorted cognition.
In reply, one might object that it is academic intellectuals who, of all people, are morally and professionally obliged to free themselves from socially imposed blinders and to strive to see the free market order as it really is. That they have manifestly not lived up to this obligation is, however, merely another way of stating the problem we have been considering.
My own inclination is towards the “second” approach of Ludwig von Mises, focusing on the ingrained hostility to business and profit-making in our culture. This millenia-old antipathy continues to be spread by the highly influential classes sheltered from the market’s threatening rigors, classes that will be with us for as far as we can see.
The great comic Dave Smith is the proud dad of a newborn baby girl. Will she witness fewer American wars in her lifetime than a girl born in 1918?
Dave and Jeff Deist discuss the astounding news from Trump about reducing troops in Syria and Afghanistan, the growing push-back against neoconservative foreign policy from ordinary Americans of all stripes, the impassible rift in Conservatism Inc. caused by Trump, and how Rand Paul may lead a new noninterventionist resurgence.
Norman Horn is the founder and president of the Libertarian Christian Institute. He and Bob have a provocative conversation that will enlighten both believers and skeptics alike. They critically analyze the tendency of American Christians to support war, in its domestic and foreign applications. Norman gives Bob the best, succinct analysis of Romans 13 he has ever encountered. Bob ends (playing devil's advocate) by challenging Norman to explain why the Church isn't just as exploitative as the State.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
Connor Boyack is back with another book in the Tuttle Twins series called The Fate of the Future. It's based on Murray Rothbard's famous Anatomy of the State, and like Rothbard it pulls no punches when describing government as predatory, violent, and coercive. Connor and Jeff Deist discuss why it's so important to offer an early alternative to the fantasyland view of the state that kids get in schools, and how the revolutionary act of home schooling may prove more powerful than any other libertarian activism.
In this episode, Bob tackles Tucker Carlson's intuitive—yet wrong—claim that Jeff Bezos is unloading his labor costs onto the taxpayer. If anything, food stamps and other government assistance programs cause Amazon to pay its workers higher wages.
For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.
The legacy media doesn't report news, it produces a show. "The Show" lies to us, divides us, inflames the culture wars, and creates political division. The old broadcast networks, cable channels, newspapers, and magazines all actively work against liberty and correct economics—so the importance of alternative sources for news, economics, history, and politics has never been greater.
Jeff Deist spoke on the topic of new and old media at our recent event in Texas.
This week, we feature a recent episode of Ryan McMaken's Radio Rothbard podcast.
We continue to hear about how capitalism and industrialization distract us from the important things in life. In reality, the historical record shows that it was industrialization and capitalism that propagated the conditions under which we can afford to treat each other more humanely.
Radio Rothbard is a series of short podcasts based on columns and research from the Mises Institute's Mises Wire. Topics include economics, comparative politics, and history. Subscribe to Radio Rothbard today on iTunes, Google Play, Stitcher, Soundcloud, or via RSS.
JEFF DEIST: Tom, you grew up in Boston. Your dad was a blue collar guy and also a Teamster. So, tell us a little bit about him and your childhood.
TOM WOODS: He was a Teamster for 18 years, and worked as a forklift operator in a food warehouse for a grocery chain that no longer exists. I wouldn’t say he was a Reagan Democrat because he was never a Democrat. He was a blue-collar Reagan Republican. That was the kind of household I grew up in. My father had very strong political opinions.
At that time he had not finished high school. He was very self-conscious about not having a high school diploma, so he spent a lot of time reading about a wide variety of topics. You could talk to him about a great many things and he would have something intelligent to say. He wound up going back to get his GED when he was in his 40s.
On politics, he was the one who introduced me to the evils of communism and the merits of low taxes and things like that. It was fairly conventional Republican stuff, but for all that, if it hadn’t been for him telling me those things, I could easily see myself having fallen into conventional leftism. And why not? If you have poor people, why not give them money, and if you have some problem, why not appoint regulators to solve it? It all seems so simple. He challenged that narrative in ways that were very productive for me.
JD: Isn’t that interesting how America used to have blue-collar-working-class guys who were well read in poetry or history or philosophy? Now, even people with advanced degrees don’t know as much.
TW: It is kind of funny. I took a bit of that from him in that when I went off to school I was planning to be a math major, but I wanted to know many other things, so I took a wide variety of courses. That was actually what ended up getting me out of studying math. I noticed that all the other math students did nothing but math — even in their spare time they read books on number theory. I didn’t think I could compete with people like that. So I decided maybe history, which is what I was doing in my spare time anyway, perhaps ought to be my main concentration.
My favorite example of my father’s desire to learn everything he could is: one day I found him reading Candide by Voltaire. I said, Dad, enough’s enough here. You don’t have anything more to prove. Nobody wants to read Candide. You can stop now.
JD: I know you’ve mentioned that you’re of Armenian ancestry. Was he an Armenian immigrant?
TW: No, it’s my mother who is Armenian (though not an immigrant), which is why our last name is just plain-vanilla Woods.
JD: Now, do you think that they were pleased with your studies? It sounds like they were pleased that you went to Ivy League schools and became a traditional PhD.
TW: I think so. By the time I got out of Columbia, it might have seemed a bit quixotic that I was going to try to break into academia, given the strikes I had against me, but certainly the way it’s all worked out, it’s hard to second guess it. You know, Jeff, I have somewhat unconventional views on a number of topics, so it would have been a little bit more difficult to get a hearing without those kinds of credentials. I know in our movement it’s become fashionable to say you don’t need to go off to college or grad school. In some cases you don’t, but for me, I just don’t know that I would have been able to crack into what I was trying to crack into if I hadn’t had that kind of a pedigree.
JD: Tell us a little bit about your neocon stage, at least as an undergraduate or a young man.
TW: Well, I guess under the influence of my father, I definitely considered myself a member of the Republican Party. I watched the entire Democrat and Republican conventions, at least the portions that were televised, when I was 12. Twelve years old, and I watched the whole thing. I remember vividly Jeane Kirkpatrick delivering her Blame America First speech and I thought, boy, isn’t she right? They’re always trying to blame America first! So, the very kind of juvenile thinking that makes me crazy today, well, now you see why it makes me crazy: because I’ve been there. I was that guy. I hate to see a mind go to waste like that and I want to bring people back from the brink.
By the time I went off to school, I was kind of a middle-of-the-road Republican. I thought we did need some social spending and I definitely had all the hawkishness. The year I got to college was when the Persian Gulf War of Operation Desert Shield and Storm took place. I was so on board for that. And I accepted every neoconservative excuse and explanation. I likewise favored all the neoconservative domestic policy proposals, the school vouchers, and heaven knows what else. So I guess I was in that camp.
Yet early on I felt uncomfortable with that war. I was in a left-wing environment. Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a left, left, left-wing environment. And there were protests against American imperialism everywhere. Part of me thought: these stupid lefties, they just don’t understand anything. But another part of me thought: I just can’t cheer the way my fellow Americans are cheering over our victory against Iraq.
I thought probably a lot of the people in the Iraqi military were just, you know, half of them had no option and there they are. I had no grievance with these people. And although you are allowed to feel sorry sometimes for women and children who die, you are forbidden by the logic of war to feel sorry for the soldiers on the other side. They’re the enemy and they’re dehumanized. But they were human beings and they were fathers and husbands, and now these people’s lives, people who lost these folks, they’re now widows and orphans. I just didn’t think I could listen to Bob Hope’s jokes and watch the little American flags being waved and cheer for that. Something just didn’t sit right with me.
I’ve told this story before. I went in to see my European history professor. I knew he was a left-liberal and I thought, maybe he’ll give me some insight into this (I had heard he supported the war). I thought, well, if even a left-liberal supports the war, I must just be missing something. It was Charles Maier (his wife was the late Pauline Maier of MIT; she wrote some great books in American history). He told me to go read the cover story in the New Republic magazine in favor of the war and that that should satisfy me. So I did. But something still just wasn’t right about it. And so I didn’t stay a neocon all that long, I’d say by ’92 to ’93, I wasn’t sure I could keep doing this.
JD: And then at some point, presumably in your conservative reading, you came across an ad or somehow found out about the Mises Institute and Mises U.
TW: That’s right. It was some libertarian magazine. Maybe it was Reason magazine. Honestly, I don’t know. I saw an ad for Mises Institute’s Mises University program and I thought that sounded great: a week where I could really learn hardcore free-market economics. I didn’t really know much about the Austrian school at that point and, after the experience of being in Cambridge and on the Harvard campus for those years, I was becoming radicalized in a good way. I was thinking: I don’t want to be a middle-of-the-road anything. I want to either be one thing or its opposite. And I know the thing that I want to be the opposite of: the craziness I see here on this campus. I want to be the opposite of that. So, it made me hone and sharpen my positions and really think clearly.
JD: But, what’s interesting is, if we look at someone like you or Anthony Gregory or Brian McClanahan, most historians ... you guys are the exceptions. Most historians almost willfully take no interest in economics.
TW: I don’t know why. I found economics to be such an exciting field. It really does teach you how the world works and what’s going on beneath the surface of the headlines. It teaches you the forces at work beneath those headlines. And it makes clear thinking possible.
And of course, if you’re looking at history and you don’t understand economics, then what are you going to do? Are you just going to repeat what the textbook says about the Great Depression? Well, how do you know if the textbook is right? Just because it’s the textbook? What kind of thinking is that? It’s deeply irresponsible not to know economics, especially if you’re going to be in history.
JD: What happened when you met Murray Rothbard?
TW: I had introduced myself to him to discuss my senior thesis. Murray was very interested in the Old Right. It wasn’t really a movement, but it was a group of individuals in the ’40s and ’50s who were anti-New Deal and anti-intervention. And I did my senior thesis on that. He had written about it; he had been part of it. He lived it. Our shared interest in it made it a good entry point for a conversation.
I remember asking for reading suggestions and he’s giving me all these obscure sources and I’m jotting them down. It was amazing the time that he was willing to spend with some shmuck like me. Maybe because I was at an Ivy League school, he thought that there was a decent chance I’d wind up in academia, and that this topic, far from a mere curiosity for me, was something I might run with later.
Although Rothbard taught in Las Vegas, he always kept his apartment in New York and went back there whenever he could. And so, over the Christmas break in 1994 to 1995, Lew Rockwell told me Murray would like to see me. I was in New York, too, getting my PhD at Columbia. I was living on 113th Street at that time and Rothbard lived on 88th Street. I could have walked to his apartment.
So Lew gave me his number. He said I should call Murray and arrange something. And the way I’ve often put this, Jeff, is that it was like when you’re calling that girl to ask her out and you’re afraid that once you get her on the phone, you’re going to go tongue tied or your mind’s going to go blank and you’re going to forget what to say. I got a sheet of paper and wrote out everything I was going to say to Rothbard so I wouldn’t look like an idiot. But of course, he puts you immediately at ease — before I could say anything on my sheet, he’s talking about current events and the like.
So we arranged to meet. I told him I’d be going to Massachusetts for the Christmas break, but that when I got back I’d be delighted to get together. So, we arranged for me to see him in maybe the first week or two of January, which meant he had already died by the time we would have been getting together.
JD: Now, at some point along your academic path, you’re getting your PhD. Surely you considered becoming a traditional tenured professor somewhere.
TW: Yes, I did. I was going to be awarded the PhD one-third of the way into an academic year, though. So, I’d have two-thirds of an academic year with no job. I decided I had to go on the market without a PhD, because the alternative was to sit around for two-thirds of a year with no income.
The problem was, going on the job market without a PhD in 1999, I might as well have been trying to jump to Mars. That wasn’t happening. The market was absurdly competitive: I applied for a position at Syracuse, and they had 350 applicants. Now, what are they going to say to some kid who doesn’t have his PhD yet, but assures them he’s about to get it, like they haven’t heard that a million times? So it was brutal. I was on the job market against people who had had two books published. At that point I was just about to turn 27 years old. I mean, come on, this is ridiculous.
I wound up getting a job at a two-year school thinking: all right, well, this is at least a job where they’ll take me. I could get a salary there, and then once I get the PhD, I’ll go back on the job market and I’ll go somewhere else. But for now I need the income.
I did get a job at a community college and I did get the PhD, but then inertia set in, and I liked the fact that I could teach survey courses there. I am so not interested in teaching the social history of the 1920s. That would just bore me to death. Whereas here I could teach big survey courses in US History and Western Civilization. I got a nice travel allowance. I had a better salary than almost any professor I knew of. I had so many good things going for me that I kept putting off when I was going to move to another institution. I just kept putting it off. I didn’t need to move. I liked the opportunities that I had. And because the college where I taught was a two-year school, there weren’t a lot of other faculty members who were publishing. And so, there wasn’t as much politics and there wasn’t, well, I’ve written this left-wing book you all have to like. They all liked me because I was friendly and because I published anything at all. I mean I published more than the rest of my department put together. And so, they just liked the fact that I was doing anything, so I thought, this is a lot better than probably what I would have to deal with in a lot of other places.
But eventually I wound up going down to the Mises Institute and then at that point I realized, I don’t think I want to go back. I like this situation where I just decide what I’m going to do every day and I do it. Now, you have to be productive to make that work, but when I was at the Mises Institute, I was basically putting out a book a year. I had 33 Questions About American History, I had Who Killed the Constitution?, I had We Who Dared to Say No to War. I had Meltdown, I had Nullification. Well, that’s actually more books than years I was there. I was just producing like crazy and I liked that. I preferred that to academia, even though I enjoy being in front of an audience; I enjoy teaching things. But I really like waking up in the morning and choosing what I do and knowing it’s always going to be something I love doing.
JD: But have you had enough time in your career to look back and think about how if you had gone the traditional route and been a tenured PhD somewhere just teaching, just like Murray Rothbard and Mises, far fewer people would know your name? Far fewer people would have read you or been influenced by you because you would be writing for academic journals nobody reads.
TW: Yes. I just don’t want to do that. I don’t see what the attraction to that is. I understand the value of it, because there are some academic articles and books that have really advanced our knowledge. Rothbard wrote a lot of popular articles, but his scholarly piece on air pollution, for example, I wouldn’t want to live in a world where that hadn’t been written. I’m just saying that for me, I got to a point where I felt like I had written all the academic books and articles I felt like writing, and now I actually wanted to convey the ideas to the public. Especially because I felt like one of my talents is explaining complicated things. I’ve been able to do that since high school, in fact, even earlier than that.
When I was in second grade I met a kindergartner in my school. I myself had attended kindergarten in a different town. I was appalled to learn that students were not being taught simple arithmetic in kindergarten where I now lived. This was an outrage to me. And so I sat her down and I taught it to her myself.
By high school I reached a point where I would be the guy the coach would come to who had three athletes who were about to flunk out of the team. And I would teach them math successfully because I could explain complicated things.
That’s what I like about what I’m doing here in reaching a popular audience. The academic audience already gets the complicated things, but I want the average Joe, too, to understand where the business cycle comes from. And that, more than anything else, is the feedback I’ve received over the years. Listeners and readers say, “I didn’t understand this stuff (or find it exciting) until you explained it to me.”
Sometimes I’ll bring a guest on my show and say, “All right, I’ve invited you on so we can explain” some complicated thing. But in the comments, everybody is saying, “You know, next time you want to explain some complicated thing, just do it yourself. People in academia are so lost in their own jargon and lexicon, they have no idea how difficult they’re making things on the ordinary Joe.”
JD: Let’s talk about your books. It’s interesting because in your books we see your metamorphosis from a historian. I think today you’re better known as a libertarian scholar and a scholar of economics. How did that happen?
TW: The first couple of books I wrote were a little bit more on the obscure side. In 2004, I had a book called The Church Confronts Modernity. That was a big feather in my cap because Columbia University Press published it and it got extremely favorable reviews in the most important academic journals in those fields: history and theology. I was very, very pleased with that. It becomes slightly more difficult for my critics to pretend that I’m some crank. Yeah, I’m a crank with an Ivy League university published book that’s reviewed very favorably in all the major journals. Try again.
Up to that time, I had written for some libertarian outlets here and there. I gave my first paper ever, actually, at a Mises Institute conference in 1998 on the presidency. But I wasn’t widely known. But then The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History came out and that generated some controversy. It really was the breakout book for me. To this day, there are plenty of libertarians out there who swear by it.
The fashionable libertarians didn’t care for it because I refuse just to repeat 88.7 percent of the standard narrative of American history and dissent from only the other 11.3 percent. I think the standard narrative is all wrong on major things. I don’t mean they get the names and the dates wrong. I mean the way it’s interpreted and understood is all wrong and the cause-and-effect relationships are all wrong. Certainly that’s true with the New Deal and the Depression and the Fed and all that. So I took some heat for that book, but who cares? It was a New York Times bestseller for 12 weeks.
JD: Is that series published by Regnery?
TW: Yes. They ended up making a whole series of Politically Incorrect Guides. That had all been contingent on the success of mine: they said if mine had bombed, then they were going to cancel the series, but if mine was successful, they would do a series.
JD: One of your most stressful books to write because of time sensitivity was Meltdown, and it’s the book you’re best known for.
TW: Yes, Meltdown was also a New York Times bestseller. The problem was, it was a book on the financial crisis, but it had to be brought out quickly because well, every-body and his brother was going to write a book on the financial crisis and all those people were going to be more famous than I was. So the publisher said: yours will have to be the first book out for this to work.
My book immediately before Meltdown had been published by Random House, but I went to Regnery with this one because I knew they had the ability to turn a book around fast if they wanted to. And I said, I want to write the free-market answer to what caused the financial crisis.
Initially they rejected the proposal. And I went back thinking, “Yeah, maybe nobody would want to read that.” And then a few days later I said to myself, “No, hold on a minute, stop that, this is a good idea.” And I went back to them and said, “Wait a minute. I love you guys, but you’re dead wrong about this. This is going to sell.” And they accepted it the second time. I’ve never heard of that happening. I mean, the gall of me to go back a second time!
They accepted it but they said: the advance is going to be pretty modest. I said I didn’t even care because I’d just earn the royalties outright from the sales. And I was right. Meltdown was on the New York Times bestseller list for 10 weeks. A book on the economy! That’s hard to get people to buy.
And yeah, what they initially said to me was: you’ll have to write it in three weeks. I said, are you kidding me? You want me to write a book in three weeks? I credit the Mises Institute, frankly, with giving me the knowledge and the training so that I could turn a book like that around quickly because I did have the core knowledge. Obviously I had to research the contingent facts of this particular case, but the model of what makes an economy collapse like this, I already knew. So, I came back with: I can do it in five weeks. So we settled on four weeks. I had a month to do it.
It was horrifying, Jeff. It was a horrible, horrible project. I didn’t enjoy one bit of it. But you can’t argue with success. I was already doing pretty well because of the success of other books, but this thing, the publicity went nuts.
This was a turning point for me. I used to go to events and some attendees may have read a few of my articles. But after Meltdown it went berserk. After Meltdown and speaking the previous year at Ron Paul’s Rally for the Republic, that huge event with many thousands of people at the Target Center in Minneapolis — the combination of those two things had amazing results.
For instance, I remember being at CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Conference) 2009 and standing there with Dan McCarthy of The American Conservative. We were having a little chit-chat in the room our event was going to take place in before people were allowed in. Then the doors were opened and people came in and Jeff, it was the most bizarre thing. I was mobbed with people who wanted to have their picture taken with me, who wanted me to sign something. And eventually I just looked over at Dan and said, what’s happening here?
And that’s basically what now happens every time. It’s weird because I walk down the street and no one knows who the heck I am. Occasionally somebody will say, hey wait a minute, you’re Tom Woods. That does happen and my kids get a kick out of it. But in these circles, that is what happens to me wherever I go. Meltdown started that.
JD: Like it or not, you are a bit of a new media figure in the same sense as like a Stefan Molyneux and maybe not as big, but in the sense of a Jordan Peterson. Talk about that. You’ve sort of transitioned from these books into podcasts and other more popular content. But it’s all mixed up with what we’re going to call new media.
TW: Yes, it’s true. Who could have guessed that I would be a podcast host, given that nobody knew what a podcast was not too long ago? And now I can’t imagine my life without it. That’s how my day goes. I start the day by interviewing some interesting person, or by just talking into a microphone for a while. It’s a weird feeling to say to myself, in effect: I have a topic I feel like talking about today, so I’m going to turn this microphone on and speak into it, and later today tens of thousands of people will listen to what I said. That’s weird to me.
JD: If you had a live audience of 1,000 people for a speech, that would seem thrilling.
TW: Of course. I have had that from time to time, but that’s rare. It’s hard to get people to come out for an academic speech — or even a non-academic speech. It does happen, but it’s hard. I do five episodes a week and I have a lot of people who say they just listen every day. It’s part of their routine. They get in their car, they turn their device on, there’s a new Tom Woods episode and off they go to work.
I’m glad to be able to do that. I feel like most of these episodes teach people valuable stuff. They will be able to defend themselves better after they’ve listened to my episode. We cover everything under the sun. And I’ve been on TV, but I lived out in Kansas for a long time. If you’re not living in Manhattan or some central place like that, it’s just not going to happen. They don’t always want to have people on via satellite. Plus there would be times when I would actually be invited onto a show and I would not even want to do it because it would mean two days of travel.
So I’ve gotten to this point not because I was on Glenn Beck, but just through, frankly, elbow grease and also the help of the Mises Institute and Lew Rockwell and getting exposure there. And Ron Paul, of course. I had some connection with him and he’s been very kind in spreading the word about what I’m doing.
JD: As Austrians and libertarians, we sort of had to create our own media, right? If you were Tom Woods 30 years ago, you wouldn’t have these platforms available.
TW: It’s amazing. It’s true because the media wants the debate to occur between different varieties of social democrats. What possible reason would they have to feature somebody like me, except to take a few of my sentences out of context and ridicule me?
These days, by the way, you can even have fun if some-body tries to do that to you. I recommend that when major media come to you for an interview, you say, “All right, but I just want you to know, I’m going to be recording our conversation and if what you publish is not an accurate reflection of what was said, that’s going to be my next day’s podcast episode. Everybody will hear everything I said and they’ll compare that with what you wrote.” So even though it’s still not an even playing field between the New York Times and you, it’s a lot more even than it used to be.
JD: I want to go back to some of your books about Catholicism. You weren’t born Catholic. You’re a Catholic convert, but clearly Catholicism’s had a big impact on you. You’ve written a lot about the church itself, but you’ve also written about the intersection between church teachings and economics. Why all the Catholicism in your work? What motivates this?
TW: Well, each one has its reasons. When I published that book with Columbia, that is an outgrowth of my doctoral dissertation. When I set out to write that, I wanted to write something that had never been covered before. That really is what you’re trying to do in a dissertation: advance your field in some way, make an original contribution. But it’s hard to find subject areas where nothing’s been said because everything’s been said about everything because there’s so much subsidizing of higher education.
So I was looking at the Progressive Era and I wanted to know why were there no critics of the Progressive Era in my textbook. What I found is that Catholics were saying: there is something wrong with John Dewey and his views on education, and there’s something wrong with William James and his views on philosophy, and so on.
And moreover, totally missed in most tellings of the history of the Progressive Era is many progressive intellectuals were saying, “Look, we all know religion is dead and nobody believes in that anymore, but at the same time we need some kind of ethical system that can bind us all together. So we’ve got to derive some kind of new secular ethic. It has to be an ethic that’s based on non-dogmatic thinking where we emphasize flexibility and open-mindedness.” So I wrote about the Catholic response to this sort of stuff. No one had written about this before. The Journal of American History said, wow, this invites further study, what Woods has dug up here. I found that very interesting.
I also wanted to write a dissertation that I wasn’t going to hate every minute of. I knew I couldn’t write a libertarian dissertation. That’s just not going to happen. This was the next best thing.
With Catholic social teaching, I had to write The Church and the Market because there was just so much nonsense written in that area. I needed to explain how you can be a hardcore Misesian and a Catholic. Plus, every single thing these self-proclaimed defenders of Catholic social teaching were recommending was going to make the lives of the poor worse. So I had to write that book because those people were making me crazy.
I also wrote a little book on Catholic liturgy because I prefer the old Latin Mass — not just for the language, but for the whole ritual. So I had to write a little book called Sacred Then and Sacred Now because when that Mass became more widely available under Pope Benedict XVI, I didn’t want a whole bunch of barbarians showing up and ruining it — by demanding that they stand in the sanctuary and do the biblical readings or distribute Communion or whatever. So I wrote this little history of it, complete with a step-by-step guide.
And then I guess the other one was How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization.
JD: A pretty bold title.
TW: It is. I love bold titles. A lot of the ideas that go into making the West what it is come directly from the Catholic church. Naturally a great deal come from classical antiquity, but even there they were often filtered by the church. I also think that the history of the church and science is so badly misreported, that that needed to be covered as well. The Church’s role in history has been so badly misunderstood and mangled — I’ll put it this way: you’d have a better chance of learning Austrian business cycle theory from Paul Krugman than you would Catholicism from the standard account that you get on television. So, it’s all part of the same thing: when there is a conventional wisdom that is fundamentally at odds with what I know to be true, I can’t stop myself until I write a book about it. I suppose part of the reason that I’m on Twitter so much is that I’m not writing books these days, so that instinct to go after error is coming out in rather less productive manifestations.
JD: But even the whitewashed version of history that left-progressives rail about still posits a Protestant work ethic and Yankee ingenuity. That’s what built America, not those Catholics with all their kids.
TW: Yes, I get that. And by the way, I’ll just say I totally understand and am not in any way upset about nineteenth-century Protestants who said: we don’t want all these Catholics moving in and transforming our society. I totally sympathize with that. I wouldn’t call them “bigots.” I would say, “Sure, why would I want to do that to you? You have your society with its mutual under-standings and longstanding ways of living; why would I want to barge in and take that away from you? I’ll find some other place to live, and maybe we’ll get to know each other and these fences between us will melt.” But I’m not the sort to say, “They were such bigots in the nineteenth century because they weren’t dying to spend time with people like me!” How self-centered is that — as if their worth and moral standing derive from whether they wanted me to move in. That’s just narcissism. I totally understand how they felt. That’s normal.
Learn more about Tom Woods at TomWoods.com.
Money spent on "luxuries" goes to support ordinary people who use profits from luxury goods to make a living and support their families.
Original article: It's OK To Buy Your Pet a Halloween Costume (and Other Luxuries).