PersuMedia Minutes : Recent Episodes
PersuMedia LLC
PersuMedia Minutes offers podcasts of selected PersuMedia analyses on Iran, China, and the MENA region. PersuMedia provides media research, OSINT, analysis, AI-driven analytics, and strategic communications consultancy.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (12-18 JUN 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (05-11 JUN 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (28 MAY - 04 JUN 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (22-28 MAY 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (15-21 MAY 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (7-14 MAY 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (1-7 MAY 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (24 - 30 APR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (17 - 23 APR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (10 - 16 APR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
Iran may have acted out of necessity rather than a desire to escalate or reshape the region. The Iranian regime is struggling to manage internal expectations and maintain support amid increasing disillusionment.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (03 - 09 APR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (27 MAR - 03 APR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (29 - 26 MAR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (13 - 19 MAR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (05 MAR - 12 MAR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (28 FEB - 05 MAR 2024) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
This Issue Watch of the Week episode covers the most pressing issues in the Iranian media (FEB 21- FEB 27) covered by PersuMedia analysts for Iran Daily Summary.
Observers from across the political spectrum have seemingly reached a consensus that despite a détente with Riyadh, the Arab world’s dominant power, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and most other regional countries remain tense and ineffective. Link
Iran faces increasing domestic and international pressure to demonstrate flexibility in negotiations with the U.S. over sanctions. www.persumedia.com
Iran’s effort to redefine its relationship with "resistance forces" and dissociate itself from their actions will not prove easy.
Are Beijing's newly announced joint naval exercises with Iran and Russia and expanding defense partnerships with Saudi Arabia a way to deflect US criticism? Or is China pursuing a strategy that plays to its strengths?
As Iran is pulled into the political black hole of totalitarian rule, it may be heading to its own destruction. One may hope that the steady demand for change from an oppressed population will, over time, weaken the Paydaris’ planned Islamic state until it, too, disperses into the mist. https://www.persumedia.com/
China’s rising concerns about conflict in the Red Sea have led it to increase pressure on Iran, threatening vague consequences if the Houthis are not restrained. This episode will take a look at what’s at stake for China and what they may - and may not - be willing to risk. https://www.persumedia.com/
From the perspective of a military superpower, China has not been doing great in the Middle East. But from the perspective of a conservative economic powerhouse with a long-term plan, it's doing a great job.
Tehran has gained its gaudy hard power at the cost of Iran’s long-term development and economic strength. It may be little comfort right now to Israelis defending the border with Lebanon or Western forces trying to keep open the Red Sea, but with every missile it fires off, Iran becomes just a little bit poorer and weaker. https://www.persumedia.com/
Is the cure worse than the disease? China's reaction to the Houthis disruptive activities has been consistently negative, but relatively muted. They seem far more concerned that US and UK retaliatory strikes will lead to a regional escalation.
The concerns are not exaggerated; the US and Iran have now both taken direct military action against perceived allies of the other, and tensions are rising along the Lebanese border between Hizballah and Israel.
The war in Gaza has extended into the New Year like a nasty hangover and, as it continues to throb, calls for the United States to take more robust military action grow louder. Particularly galling to many is the threat to shipping posed by the Iranian-allied Houthis of Yemen, who have promiscuously fired off missiles and drones at commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
As the historian Olmstead noted, when Cyrus entered Babylon in 539 BC, the world was already old. It’s older still now, and if we are aware of its antiquity and its history, we must surely be aware of the constant tension between pragmatism and ideology and not puzzle too much over the fact that humans individually or collectively are capable of wondrous and paradoxical things. Round and round they go, where they stop, nobody knows!
His Nibs is 84 and, in the past, has been treated for prostate cancer. With each passing year, the likelihood grows that he will shuffle off this mortal coil and, for the first time since 1989, the Iranian political establishment will need to select—or “discover” as the more hardline ones would have it—a new supreme leader.
https://www.persumedia.com/
With the collapse of the ceasefire and rising international opposition to Israeli operations in Gaza, the regional situation is changing rapidly, but China has remained consistent in its response and in its regional diplomatic efforts: focused on economics and diplomatic initiatives, causing consternation among a rising number of critics in Iran.
Tehran may be frustrated by its Arab and Muslim partners’ disinterest in oil boycotts and breaking relations with Israel, but Iranian leaders know they have a much greater chance of gaining a hearing, and perhaps changing minds, if they stay inside the tent instead of sniping at the Arabs from outside.
They’re ba-ack. Still trying to resist the tide of social change in Iran, the Nezam has deployed vigilantes—hejabban (“hejab guardians”)—to public places to police women’s fashion. For the past year since the Women, Life, Freedom protests that rocked Iran, Tehran has puzzled over how to enforce increasingly unpopular traditional notions of female modesty without reigniting civil unrest. More
The welcome, if temporary, silencing of the guns in Gaza this past week has given us a short respite from the dominance of foreign events in the Iranian news media and a chance to focus on the prosaic workings of the Iranian government. In particular, the administration of President Ebrahim Ra’isi is in the midst of putting together a budget for the coming Persian year and presenting it to the Majles.
After weeks of diplomatic effort, China was nowhere to be found in the negotiation of a temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Is this a failure on the part of Chinese diplomacy, or does it simply reflect Beijing's more limited objectives? Has Chinese diplomacy really been harmed in any way? This week with Guy Burton, expert on Middle East Policy and author of the book "China and Middle East Conflicts: Responding to War and Rivalry from the Cold War to the Present."
As Americans prepare to celebrate Thanksgiving this week, the announcement of a short truce in the war in Gaza, along with a partial exchange of hostages and prisoners, shone through the gloom as a rare bit of good news from this otherwise unhappy crisis. More on our website.
Recent comments from US officials have urged China to "temper" Iran's response to the Israeli siege of Gaza and support for Hamas in the wake of the October 7th attacks on Israel. But is China ready, willing, and able to do so?
While keeping an eye on Iran’s efforts to extend its power and influence across the region, like the boiling, swelling outer layers of a red giant, remember that the fervor and ideas that have fueled the revolution are largely spent, and the Nezam’s core is shrinking. (link)
Observers too often become overawed by what the “mountain” might do, and discount how much sense it makes for it to bring forth a mouse.
China's Special Envoy to the Middle East Zhai Jun is criss-crossing the Middle East in an effort to support regional peace efforts, but their continued lean towards the Palestinian side may have unintended consequences.
The Gaza War and Iran’s role in it may indeed provide Iran with new opportunities and leverage to use against its neighbors, but it will not brake Iran’s continued decline.
With the Gaza crisis now in its third week, most media attention, in the West at least, is focused on the hard choices facing Israel and its ally, the United States. Israel, understandably, wants to destroy Hamas, but it is doubtful whether such a goal can be achieved, and even if it can be, Israel needs to figure out how to govern Gaza once Hamas is gone.
China has taken a relatively neutral stance towards the recent violence in Gaza, refusing to condemn either Israel or Hamas outright, but focusing a great deal of attention on the Israeli occupation and lack of a Palestinian state as the root cause of the conflict. How will this balancing act affect its prospects in the region?
The brutality and violence of Hamas and Iran’s uncompromising support for it have become yet another issue dividing the regime from the people. The Nezam has made the destruction of Israel a pillar of its identity as a revolutionary regime, giving the Iranian people one more reason to reject the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.
A central question is the degree of Iranian foreknowledge and active participation in the planning and organization of the Hamas offensive. As of this writing (podcast), the Israeli and US governments suspect an Iranian role, but admit that they have no evidence or proof of active Iranian involvement.
Whatever the calculations are that Khamenei and Ra’isi are turning over in their lizard brains, they are keeping their options open and their powder dry. The next few months may reveal how committed they are to détente with the Saudis and staying in good favor with China.
At the end of the day, faced with shrinking regional room to maneuver as the Middle East, true to historical form, becomes more penetrated by international players and increasingly independent and emboldened regional ones, Iran can be expected to resort to a “spoiler” strategy.
Bashar al-Assad has had a rough decade (to say the least), but on September 22nd, 2023, the future must have seemed bright for the once-disgraced Syrian president as he posed shaking hands with Xi Jinping at the West Lake State Guesthouse in Hangzhou. What are the implications of China's most recent diplomatic move in the Middle East?
The fact that unrest in Iran has been kept at bay while, at the same time, elite concern is rising suggests that the level of popular unrest is not the metric we need to watch, but the level of elite unrest.
One recent article in a respected journal darkly intoned that, thanks to the unstinting support of Russia and China, the Nezam is in a “triumphant” mood and “feeling more powerful and more secure than it ever has.” Really? What Iran are you looking at—because the one we see isn’t quite so full of itself and sanguine as such articles portray.
Last week’s news that Iran had joined BRICS and concluded several deals with China was welcome news for supporters of the Islamic Republic’s “Look East” policy, but new details - and old realities - suggest that any celebration may be premature.
Savoring the ignominious US retreat from Afghanistan two years ago, the newly inaugurated Iranian President Ebrahim Ra’isi declared that the American defeat there was “an opportunity to restore life, security and durable peace.” As Khamenei’s lieutenants treat the Taliban with kid gloves, do they perhaps reflect that in this case their cynical hedging may have turned an opportunity into a threat?
China has been doing well with deepening its ties with all of the countries in the region recently, but some of the other dividends expected from the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran agreement, like peace in Yemen, seem increasingly in doubt.
Iran’s agreement to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia suggests that it was driven by the political and security crisis of the Women, Life, Freedom protests last year. Facing the most acute challenge to the Nezam’s authority in forty years, Tehran sought to reduce external pressure on Iran and give the government the breathing room to suppress or coopt domestic opposition. Read more here.
The United States is moving forward with plans to officially designate China as a developed, rather than developing country, which could have implications for how China is treated under US law. China, in turn, strongly asserts its status as a member of the so-called "Global South" and the "Developing World." But as China looks more and more like a world power in regions like the Middle East, how long can this idea be maintained?
A surprisingly social constructivist sentiment from an arch-realist. Is this what we see happening in Iran? Are Iran’s pundits and political elites finally reimagining Iran’s identity as compatible with working within the system as opposed to being rigidly and ideologically opposed to it? Is their reimagining a reflection of official policy?
No doubt the prisoner swap means some money will be freed up for the use of the IRGC and other instruments of the regime’s power—Iran has always prioritized the security of the Nezam—but given the magnitude of Iran’s economic needs any such funds are unlikely to give Iran a decisive advantage or dangerous new capabilities it does not already possess. Read more here.
Iranian officials made an unusually frank admission about the lackluster state of Iran-China state-level economic cooperation this week, but the view from Beijing is much more positive. Our very own Bill in the China Shop helps make sense of the competing narratives - who is really to blame for the lack of Chinese investment in Iran?
Iranian observers have been looking a little enviously at Saudi Arabia’s recently concluded summit in Jeddah that brought together representatives from more than forty countries and international organizations to discuss the Ukraine war and Kyiv’s ten-point plan for peace. Read more here.
In this episode of Reading Beijing, Bill Figueroa (Bill in the China Shop) shares his latest thoughts and reflects on recent PersuMedia analysis: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRI, and BRICS; All Blind Eyes are on Xinjiang; Iran’s deepening economic dependence on China.
The risk for the Islamic Republic is that its success is a narrow one. As we have noted before, the Nezam is something of a “hedgehog” in that it focuses on one big thing—regime survival. At that it has succeeded, but is it an achievement upon which further triumphs may be built? Read more here.
Iran’s political system has become a marvelous machine for obscuring and diffusing responsibility. And when that doesn’t work, one can always resort to outright lies. The Nezam was Orwellian before such behavior became all the vogue. Read more here. <--
It is nonetheless interesting that Iran has thrown a bigger fit over the Russian statement than they did over the Chinese statement last year. In part that may be due to the sting of a second “betrayal” by a “strategic partner,” and in part, perhaps, because of Russia’s checkered track record in Iran. But Iranian officials can be tougher on Russia than on China because they know that Russia needs them almost as much as they need Iran. Read more here <--
As the year progresses, Iran’s political players increasingly are likely to factor into their decisions how a given action or event may affect the succession to Khamenei, because the outcome of the succession may strongly influence their own political fortunes. Buckle up—it’s likely to be a bumpy flight. Read more here <--
Two issues explored in the PersuMedia Daily Summary this week illuminate the extent of the Islamic Republic’s failure, and of the Nezam’s moral bankruptcy. Read more here <--
Congruent worldviews, paranoia, and shared interests may be the attraction that brought together the Islamic Republic and Putin’s mafia state, but necessity is the cement binding them to one another. Read more here.
My mother didn’t raise a son dopey enough to predict that renewed contacts between Iran and the United States will succeed in putting brakes on Iran’s nuclear program or birth a détente that reduces Iran’s provocative behavior in the Levant or its military assistance to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. But the fact that Iran is even willing to entertain the idea of some sort of interim nuclear agreement, which it had rejected publicly last year, represents movement on its part. Read more here <<--
The idea of decentralizing government and the economy is hardly new in Iran; one can find proposals going back to the Constitutional Revolution early in the 20th Century. The experience of the protests last fall may have given new impetus to the idea of decentralization. The relatively heavy fighting the security forces had to engage in to suppress the protests in Kurdish-majority areas and Sunni-majority Sistan and Baluchestan, in particular, may have focused minds in the IRGC and among the less dogmatic principlist politicians. Read more here <<--
“There is still fire beneath the ashes” is a phrase one frequently hears to describe Iranians’ continued anger and desire for change despite the fragile public calm that replaced last fall's protests. It is a reminder that surface appearances may be misleading and that a demand for change may reignite on short notice. Although the Nezam was quick to declare victory over “the enemies’” latest effort to overthrow the Islamic Republic, it is likely that many in the ruling establishment in Iran know better. Read more here <<--
Rising temperatures and escalating rhetoric culminated in an hours-long shootout at the border between Iranian border guards and the Afghan Taliban this past weekend, illuminating a long-running problem that is only going to get worse. Read more here <<--
In this episode of Reading Beijing, Guy Burton gives us his impression of Sino-Palestinian relations in the context of China's larger set of regional entanglements and relations with other major powers. Dr. Burton walks us through the history of these relations and how they are impacted by China's close relations with Israel, competition with the US, and the particular way in which it engages (or doesn't) with key stakeholders in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The economic failures of the Islamic Republic of Iran are legion and well-known. Beset by high inflation, lack of transparency, political interference, international sanctions, and epic corruption, the Iranian economy will hobble the ambitions of the Nezam and the prosperity of the people well into the future. This is an important weakness, but it is not the only one holding back the Islamic Republic. Perhaps equally as debilitating as its economic poverty is the Nezam’s poverty of imagination. Read more here. <<--
China continues to tout its economic ties in the Gulf this month, from a new low-carbon steel processing facility in Saudi Arabia to a series of meetings with Iranian officials and media campaigns promoting investment in the Iranian economy. But as investment continues rapidly in Saudi Arabia, Iran has received little but platitudes and diplomatic meetings, showing little has changed since the Iran-KSA agreement vis-à-vis China’s economic engagement with the region. Read more here. <<--
We shouldn’t let the apparent dazzle of the Nezam’s hard power distract us from Iran’s intractable, debilitating weaknesses. It is ironic that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who publicly and assiduously has warned against repeating the Soviet “mistake” of instituting reforms and trusting the United States, has instead copied the Soviet mistake of building a large military establishment while letting the economy wither. Read more here. <<--
Iran’s détente with Saudi Arabia and perceptions of victory in Syria and Yemen may have strengthened the Nezam’s confidence that it would be negotiating from a position of strength. Moreover, after the Mahsa Amini protests, there seems to be a greater recognition among the conservative realists that they need to reach out to the Iranian people and regain their trust. Read more here.
Mehdi Nasiri, a former appointee of the supreme leader in the ultra-conservative Kayhan and the Friday prayer leaders’ policymaking council, blames Ali Khamenei as the man responsible for the country’s problems. Hardline outlets are rushing to discredit Nasiri by questioning his sanity and sincerity.
In this inaugural episode of Reading Beijing, Bill Figueroa discusses the current state of Sino-Iranian relations following the Iran-Saudi normalization agreement with Jacopo Scita, an Iran-China policy expert at Bourse and Bazaar. Bill and Jacopo talk about what's driving the recent surge in Sino-Iranian trade, as well as the dramatic story of last week's tanker seizures.
Labor’s relative irrelevance in past episodes of protest in Iran, however, does not mean Iranian workers are destined to be perpetual damp squibs. Since the turn of the new Persian year in March, PersuMedia has documented the rising frustration of workers as they realize that the government is swindling them, big time. Read more here.
It has been a dramatic week for Iran-China watchers, as news emerged that Iran’s seizure of an international oil tanker bound for the US was in retaliation for US seizure of an Iranian oil tanker bound for China. More...
Today, there is a growing trend of open criticism of the Supreme Leader. Last month, Principlists were drawing attention to Khamenei’s “generous support” for the administration of President Ebrahim Ra’isi and implying that the incompetence of Khamenei’s fair-haired boy was weakening the Nezam and distancing it from the people. Read more here.
While Mohammad Eslami, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), is voicing optimism about the progress of negotiations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and reformist outlets remain hopeful that Oman can play a positive role in reviving the JCPOA talks, some JCPoA opponents insist the key to neutralizing sanctions depends on Iran’s regional partnerships, not the nuclear deal itself. For more articles and podcasts, click here.
The triumphalist mood in Tehran continued apace this past week. As reported in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, principlist media and commentators are giddy with what they perceive to be a series of cascading successes they attribute to their “Look East” policy. Read more here.
As a controversial street name, which was the center of Tehran-Riyadh tensions, undergoes a change to welcome the Saudis back to their diplomatic offices in Tehran and Mashhad, hardliners are having a hard time accepting the reality of pragmatism. For more articles and podcasts, click here.
The past month has been largely a happy one for Iranian foreign policy. Taking advantage of Washington’s focus on competition with the great powers, Riyadh’s dissatisfaction with the limits of US solicitude for the interests of the Saudi monarchy, and Beijing’s interest in scoring easy points against Washington, the Islamic Republic has succeeded in reducing tensions with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, opening up the potential for Arab trade and investment in Iran, and obtaining breathing room for Iran’s wheezing economy and volatile society. However, not all is well in the neighborhood. We have reported on the deteriorating relations between Iran and Azerbaijan for several months, especially during the past couple of weeks. Iran may be singing Kumbaya with the Gulf Arabs for now, but trouble is brewing up north. The trouble in the South Caucasus bears at least a family resemblance to the shifting geopolitics in the Persian Gulf. Read more here.
MP Gholamreza Montazeri’s prescription is for the government to get out of business—literally. He wants the government to hand over economic activity to the private sector whose role he considers indispensable to a solution to Iran’s economic woes. Listen in to learn about varying opinions on Iran's economic situation. For more information and analysis, click here.
We tend to be a little hard on Iran’s reformists. We follow their debates and report their arguments because they are the main foils to the hardliners and are willing to highlight some hard truths about the Islamic Republic that the principlists would rather not discuss. Nonetheless, we can be downright dismissive of the reformists as political actors. Might we be selling them short? Read more here.
PersuMedia provides media research, open-source intelligence, AI-driven analytics, and strategic communications consultancy. Here are top notes from Iran Daily Summaries published on 01 and 02 April 2023.
Domestic debates continue over who should take credit for the latest regional diplomatic “achievements” and whether the involvement of the country’s security chief and veteran diplomats instead of President Ra’isi’s ministry of foreign affairs means that the Nezam has lost hope in the “revolutionaries.” Learn more here.
The budget for the new year implies the Iranian regime intends to stay the course rather than undertake difficult and divisive reforms. Depending upon how long Iran is willing to exercise restraint toward the Saudis and the GCC, it may be able to extract some badly needed investment from the other side of the Persian Gulf. Read more here.
Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia came to the negotiating table at China’s urging. Rather, both sides seem to have assessed that it was in their best interests to reach an agreement and to do it in Beijing. For Tehran, the benefits are obvious...
Despite much nice talk by Iranian leaders in the past three months and some real progress in easing tensions with its neighbors, the budget suggests that Nezam’s basic strategy has not changed. Funding for the police, intelligence services, and prisons has increased by between 44 and 55 percent; the budget for Islamic Propagation is up by 53 percent. This suggests Tehran will continue its policy of robust coercion coupled with “exposition jihad,” Khamenei’s forlorn hope that, with more and better advertising, he can persuade Iranians to buy the Edsel that is the Islamic Republic. Read more here.
On March 10th, China announced that it had brokered an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations, re-establish embassies, and respect one another’s sovereignty. While many analysts claim this is good news for the Middle East, others disagree. Read more here.
Aside from the embarrassment of China’s role as its midwife, a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia serves US interests: it decreases the risk of conflict in the region, improves prospects for an end to the ruinous war in Yemen, and holds out the promise of greater Iranian restraint in the employment of its client militias in the region. These are cause for concern and were deployed as arguments against the JCPOA, because it did not explicitly restrain such behavior. This agreement, at least in part, addresses those objections. Much as we hate to say it, in so far as China is able to hold Iran to the agreement, it is doing Washington a favor. Read More.
So Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with China’s help, have agreed to resume diplomatic relations that were disrupted seven years ago and to return to bilateral agreements signed in 1998 and 2001. In the process, they will reopen their embassies in the respective capitals in less than two months. What would this mean, and what would it entail?
The recent reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia has drawn praise from both factions in Iran, the conservatives and the reformists. While hardliners highlight the development as a setback for the U.S., reformists argue that the agreement signals the defeat of radicals. But no matter how they come down on the deal, both sides acknowledge that it will likely increase China’s influence in the region.
The Iranian media began to fawn on Ra’isi and his foreign policy following news of an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to end years of geopolitical hostility and revive ties in a deal mediated by China.
In what seems like an escalation on Iran’s political scene, members from various political factions and groups are openly calling on the Ra’isi administration to resign, citing the dire economic situation which they blame on massive management. Read more from this week's newsletter here.
Will the IRGC, always suspicious of the JCPOA, oppose Ra’isi if he makes concessions to revive the JCPOA negotiations? Will Khamenei continue to support Ra’isi? How much opposition would Ra’isi face from a principlist Majles? And, finally, can Ra’isi offer something that would entice a deeply skeptical US Administration to come back to the table, especially with the next US presidential election on the horizon? Read more here.
Who is to blame for poisoning schoolgirls in Iran? Pundits compared current government reactions to the January 2020 downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane in which the Nezam came clean after three days of flip-flopping. Some recalled the role of state institutions in the horrendous serial murders of the 1990s. Can the standoff between the establishment and the citizenry be resolved? Read more here.
IRGC unhappiness with Ra'isi's management could, at a minimum, influence Khamenei’s perception of the president. Moreover, IRGC disfavor would be a significant handicap to Ra’isi’s prospects for succeeding Khamenei as Rahbar. Read more here.
The captain of the Titanic allegedly responded with “What iceberg?” when asked why he was not changing course to avoid it, providing a historical archetype for the Nezam’s headlong rush toward the unknown. The continued state of tension over hijab, the deteriorating economic conditions, and the Nezam’s tenacious adherence to failed policies despite the extreme loss of public trust suggest that those at the helm of the Islamic Republic are similarly unable or unwilling to acknowledge the multiple dangers facing the Nezam.
These instances of “monkey see, monkey do” by the Nezam underscore Khamenei’s commitment to taking Iran down a totalitarian path to preserve the Islamic Revolution. The Nezam views the “Iran-Russia-China triangle” (as one hardliner put it) as one based on shared authoritarian values. From Khamenei’s standpoint, though, that doesn’t matter—if the people try to rise up, he can “look East” for the technology and techniques to thwart them. Unrest? The Chinese have an app for that. Read more here.
Going into the meeting, Ra’isi was undoubtedly aware that since the 25-Year Iran-China Strategic Cooperation Agreement was signed in March 2021, Chinese investment in Iran has failed to materialize. Over the years, although some signs of increased diplomatic and economic engagement have been seen, little progress has been made in attracting Chinese capital. This is likely due to sanctions and ongoing unrest in Iran, contributing to a sense that Iran was a risky environment that would likely yield poor returns.
This past week continued to see a push from establishment conservatives—whom we glibly branded as “the old guard”—and from reformists for a course correction by the Nezam. This effort may eventually gain momentum and force the Nezam to recalibrate its policies. But so far, this pressure has left unmoved Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Read more here.
While Iran’s protests seem to have quieted down after the regime adopted a multi-pronged approach to cracking down, including mass imprisonment, scare tactics and savagery with allegations of rape and shooting at protesters’ eyes by Basij forces, death sentences, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns, analysis by Nezam-affiliated media outlets and research groups indicates another round of protests in Iran is around the corner.
Concerned about participation in next year’s important elections for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, Bahonar advises the authorities to open up the system to criticism and allow people to protest legally. Read more here.
During this past week, a number of prominent moderates and traditional conservatives in Iran issued warnings about the direction the country is headed and the need to change course. Although we characterize the emerging debate as one between “moderates” and “hardliners,” we also might consider it a struggle between the revolution’s “old guard,” who helped pull down a tyrant who had lost the support of the people, and a cohort of mostly younger apparatchiks who have known only the revolution and for whom obedience to authority is the guiding ideal. Read more here.
Based on the statements that can be gleaned from official and semi-official sources, what can be said about China’s approach to economic development? How do Chinese policymakers view themselves and their place in the world, and how does this influence development policy alongside more pragmatic geostrategic concerns? Read more here.
The Iranian Nezam’s prickly sense of exceptionalism and contempt for its neighbors' sovereignty has long contributed to its isolation abroad. Now its increasingly exclusive definition of who is an “insider” fit to enjoy the privileges of citizenship in God’s government is isolating the Nezam from its own people. Read more here.
The Nezam may be at an inflection point, and the political pendulum in Iran ready to swing closer to the center. But will it be too late? Even if, under pressure from the moderates, the administration of Ra’isi drops its more unreasonable demands and tries to reach a deal on the JCPOA, it may be trying to board a train that has left the station. Read more here.
Concerns are rising about the destructive impacts of radicalism on the lives of the Iranian people. Still, the actions of the so-called super-revolutionaries may conveniently provide grounds for the return of moderate politicians to power. Read and listen more here.
Iran’s relations with the Western powers are in a downward spiral as Iran continues to assist Russia’s war in Ukraine, violate human rights wholesale at home, and issues intermittent squawks of triumph over its latest nuclear advance in violation of the JCPOA. Read more here.
With Iranian relations with Afghanistan fraught with tensions over water rights and border clashes, and the American’s out of the picture, Chinese officials have taken the opportunity to appear statesman-like and downright humanitarian. Read more here.
One characteristic that sets the past four months of protests in Iran apart from previous episodes of civil unrest, is the Nezam’s muddled and at times inconsistent response to the challenge. Access the Weekly Newsletter here.
The spectacle of Xi Jinping in Riyadh was enough to convince the Iranian political establishment that their Look East strategy was failing to deliver results as China leaned towards their Arab rivals. Read more here.
Using the anniversary of the killing of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani as an opportunity to showcase his regional achievements, hardline outlets expressed confidence that robust diplomacy could strengthen Iran’s position in the region and beyond. Read more here.
As we observed last week, the leaders of the Islamic Republic are trying to declare victory and return the country to business as usual. Should the regime impose a semblance of order and return to business as usual, it will find its inbox stuffed to capacity. It faces several knotty problems that, if unaddressed, will stoke discontent and may reignite protests. Read More here.
The spread of the protests and their persistence over three months, as well as the participation of different classes of society, have severely tested the stability of the Iranian regime. To order your copy of the PersuMedia Quarterly Executive Summary published on 30 December 2022, please contact us.
The Iranian regime plan to “fake it ‘til you make it.” In the new year, they may implement changes that have the appearance of reforms to try to win back the public; some have floated, again, the idea of returning to a parliamentary government system, and perhaps some reformists will be “rehabilitated” and allowed to run in the next Majles elections. But more and more Iranians see through the illusion. Although Khamenei and Co. know how to fake it, it’s getting harder and harder for them to make it. =>>Read more here.
Iran’s hardline media are acknowledging Chinese reluctance to do business with Iran for fear of sanctions. The shift in tone, reflecting a more realistic view of international Realpolitik, was evident in outlets like Khorasan and the IRGC-affiliated Mowj News.
The Iranian officials don't yet show signs of understanding how much their actions with Russia and against their own people have soured Western opinion and raised the political cost of the JCPOA to Western leaders. And as dire as Iran’s domestic and economic situations are, they don’t yet appear to be so dire as to cause Iran to reconsider its position. Until Western sentiment changes, or the Nezam’s ability to endure the pain of sanctions falters, the JCPOA looks to still be out of reach. Read more.
Despite Beijing’s upbeat tone, the scaling back in Africa, and the failure to follow through on investment in Iran, is consistent with Xi’s so-called “dual-circulation” strategy. Basically, the idea is to balance China's foreign trade with developing national industry, with a focus on quality global investments. This is good news for BRI nations who have their acts together, bad news for nations like Iran and those in Africa who don’t. Read More
Top Note: Nezam officials and functionaries are eager to uphold the impression that things are returning to “normal” in the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the fallout from the protests and the Nezam’s heavy-handed response continues to reverberate and influence public statements. It even extends into the realm of foreign policy, where Iran has fewer achievements to celebrate with every passing day.
Clever Ra’isi sought to secure his right flank and in June introduced a new “hijab and chastity” program, which, three months later provoked the most sustained period of antiregime unrest the Islamic Republic has experienced in forty years. Ra’isi’s so-called Neighborly, and Eastward Looking" policies made little progress. Read More
Most critics of the Islamic Republic's China policy continue to question Nezam's black-and-white international relations theory, which sees the West as evil and the East as friendly and aligned with Iran, but the latest developments with the “anti-Iran” statement from China have given critics at both ends of the political spectrum an opportunity to show their discontent with Beijing and the Nezam’s “soft” reaction. Read More.
Iranian sociologists talk of a “paradigm shift” in Iranian society and an out-of-touch regime that has not just failed to meet the needs of the people but has implemented policies—like increased enforcement of hijab—that harm Iranians. The fearlessness of Iran’s Generation Z has been frequently remarked upon. Many young Iranians now feel they have little to lose and, seeing no future in the Islamic Republic, demand its replacement with a secular democracy. Read More.
While the Nezam continues to wrestle with ways to rein in protests, some conservative religious leaders remain ardent in their stance demanding strict punishment for “rioters,” despite the Judiciary’s recent attempt to give the impression of showing “leniency” by releasing over 700 detainees, a number of whom participated in the protests.
The current struggle between the Iranian people and their clerical and military masters will leave its mark on the Islamic Republic. The outcome of the popular uprising over the regime’s brutal and capricious killing of Mahsa Amini is still uncertain. The succession to the aging Ali Khamenei is increasingly at hand.
In the last few weeks, China and the United States have repeatedly been at odds at the United Nations over issues related to Iran.
With unreliable partners like Russia, China, Belarus, and Pakistan, Iran’s neighborly policy and its shift to the East seem to be more fluff than substance.