Supreme Court Opinions: Recent Episodes
SCOTUS Opinions
Hear the opinions from the United States Supreme Court presented in their entirety, but with citations omitted. This podcast is not affiliated with the United States Supreme Court or its staff in any way. Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scotus-opinions/support
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?
The case was decided on June 27, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Texas’s age-verification law for sexually explicit websites triggers only intermediate scrutiny and is constitutional because it merely imposes an incidental burden on adults’ protected speech while serving the state’s important interest in shielding children from harmful content. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
H.B. 1181 requires commercial websites where more than one-third of content is “sexual material harmful to minors” to verify visitors are 18 or older through government ID or transactional data. The First Amendment permits states to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective, and this power necessarily includes the ordinary means of enforcing age limits through verification requirements. Because no person has a First Amendment right to access obscene-to-minors content without submitting proof of age, the law directly regulates only unprotected activity. Adults retain their right to access this protected speech after verification, making any burden merely incidental rather than a direct content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny.
Under intermediate scrutiny, laws must advance important governmental interests unrelated to suppressing free speech without burdening substantially more speech than necessary. Texas’s interest in protecting children from sexually explicit content is undoubtedly important, even compelling. Age verification represents a traditional, widely-accepted method of reconciling children’s protection with adults’ access rights; similar requirements exist for in-person purchases of sexual materials and numerous other age-restricted products. The specific methods H.B. 1181 permits (government ID and transactional data) are established verification methods already used by pornographic websites and other industries. The law need not adopt the least restrictive means available, and Texas’s decision to initially target websites with higher concentrations of sexual content while excluding search engines represents a reasonable legislative choice that survives intermediate scrutiny.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that strict scrutiny should apply because H.B. 1181 directly burdens adults’ access to protected speech based on its content, and that the majority’s creation of a new “partially protected” speech category contradicts four prior Supreme Court precedents applying strict scrutiny to similar laws.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a district court issue a nationwide (universal) injunction that blocks enforcement of a federal executive order beyond the specific parties involved in the lawsuit?
The case was decided on June 27, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue universal injunctions that prohibit enforcement of executive actions beyond the parties before the court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts possess only those equitable remedies “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time of the founding. The Court finds no historical precedent for universal injunctions in English equity courts or early American practice. English equity courts operated through party-specific proceedings, where relief was limited to those actually before the court. While bills of peace allowed courts to adjudicate rights of dispersed groups, these involved small, cohesive groups and bound all members—unlike universal injunctions that protect non-parties without binding them. The historical absence of universal injunctions until the mid-20th century confirms they fall outside traditional equitable authority.
The complete relief principle permits courts to fashion remedies that fully redress plaintiffs’ injuries, but complete relief does not equal universal relief. Courts may award relief that incidentally benefits non-parties when necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs, such as in nuisance cases where divisible relief is impossible. However, prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Order against individual plaintiffs’ children provides them complete relief without requiring nationwide application. For state plaintiffs claiming administrative and financial harms, the Court remands for lower courts to determine whether narrower injunctions could provide complete relief, such as prohibiting enforcement within plaintiff states or treating affected children as eligible for federally funded benefits.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing that courts must not expand the complete relief principle to recreate universal injunctions under a different name and that relief should be tailored to redress only plaintiffs’ particular injuries.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, warning that lax enforcement of third-party standing requirements and class certification procedures could create loopholes that undermine the Court’s holding against universal injunctions.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion explaining that while universal injunctions are improper, plaintiffs may still seek classwide preliminary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) or ask courts to set aside agency rules under the Administrative Procedure Act, and emphasizing that the Court will continue to serve as the ultimate arbiter of the interim legal status of major federal actions.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that universal injunctions have deep roots in equity’s history through bills of peace and taxpayer suits, that the Executive Order is patently unconstitutional under the Citizenship Clause, and that limiting injunctive relief will leave constitutional rights meaningful in name only for those unable to sue.
Justice Jackson authored a separate dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s decision creates an existential threat to the rule of law by allowing the Executive to violate the Constitution with respect to anyone who has not sued, effectively creating zones where executive compliance with law becomes optional rather than mandatory.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Did Congress violate the Constitution in the way it delegated power to the FCC to collect Universal Service Fund money, and did the FCC violate the Constitution by letting a private, industry-controlled company make those collection decisions?
The case was decided on June 27, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme that allows the FCC to collect “sufficient” contributions to fund universal-service programs does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Communications Act directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support universal-service programs, which sets both a floor and a ceiling on the agency’s authority. The FCC cannot raise less than what is adequate to finance the programs, but also cannot raise more than that amount. Congress provided adequate guidance by specifying whom the programs must serve (rural and high-cost areas, low-income consumers, schools, and libraries) and defining which services qualify for subsidies. To receive funding, services must be subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers, be available at affordable rates, and be essential to education, public health, or safety. These conditions create determinate standards that meaningfully constrain the FCC's discretion.
The FCC’s use of the Universal Service Administrative Company to help calculate contribution amounts also passes constitutional muster. The Administrator operates subordinately to the Commission, which appoints its Board of Directors, approves its budget, and retains final decision-making authority. While the Administrator produces initial projections of carrier revenues and Fund expenses, the Commission reviews, revises if needed, and approves these figures before setting the contribution factor. The arrangement mirrors the permissible structure approved in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, where private parties could make recommendations to a government agency that retained ultimate authority.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the outcome but emphasizing concerns about delegations to independent agencies.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, expressing skepticism about the viability of the private nondelegation doctrine as an independent constitutional principle.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, arguing that Section 254 impermissibly delegates Congress’s taxing power by failing to set a tax rate or meaningful cap on collections.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?
The case was decided on June 27, 2025
The Supreme Court held that Parents challenging the Montgomery County Board of Education’s introduction of certain “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with the Board’s decision to withhold parental opt outs from that instruction, are entitled to a preliminary injunction because the policy poses “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices parents wish to instill. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Montgomery County Board of Education introduced LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks into its elementary school English curriculum and initially allowed parents to opt their children out of related instruction. When the Board rescinded this opt-out policy, citing administrative burdens and concerns about classroom disruption, parents from diverse religious backgrounds sued. The Court applied the principle from Wisconsin v Yoder that government policies violate parents’ free exercise rights when they “substantially interfere with the religious development” of children by placing them in environments “hostile” to their religious beliefs with “pressure to conform” to contrary viewpoints. The storybooks present normative messages about same-sex marriage and gender identity that directly contradict the religious teachings these parents seek to instill. Combined with teacher guidance that encourages specific responses reinforcing these viewpoints, the curriculum creates precisely the kind of “objective danger to the free exercise of religion” that the First Amendment prohibits.
When a burden on religious exercise matches the character found in Yoder—substantial interference with parents’ ability to guide their children's religious development—strict scrutiny applies regardless of whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable. While schools have a compelling interest in maintaining an undisrupted educational environment, the Board’s no-opt-out policy fails narrow tailoring. The Board continues to permit opt-outs for other curricula, including family life and human sexuality instruction, and provides parallel programming for other student populations. The Board cannot create administrative burdens through its own curriculum design choices and then cite those burdens to justify denying constitutional rights. The availability of private school or homeschooling does not cure the constitutional violation, as public education is a public benefit that cannot be conditioned on surrendering religious exercise rights.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion arguing that the Board’s policy represents an impermissible attempt at ideological conformity comparable to that rejected in Pierce v Society of Sisters, and that sex education for young children lacks the historical pedigree necessary to override parents’ fundamental rights.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that mere exposure to ideas conflicting with religious beliefs does not constitute a Free Exercise violation under established precedent, and warning that the majority’s ruling will create administrative chaos for public schools while effectively granting religious parents a veto over curricular decisions traditionally left to democratically elected school boards.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the structure of the U-S Preventive Services Task Force violate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, and if so, is the provision that insulates the task force from the Health & Human Services secretary’s supervision severable from the rest of the statute?
The case was decided on June 27, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that members of the U-S Preventive Services Task Force are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is consistent with the Appointments Clause. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Secretary of HHS can remove Task Force members at will, which provides “a powerful tool for control” because officers’ “presumed desire to avoid removal” creates “here-and-now subservience.” Since Congress granted the Secretary appointment power and placed no statutory restrictions on removal, the Secretary may remove Task Force members at will. Additionally, the Secretary has statutory authority to review and block Task Force recommendations before they take effect through his general supervisory authority over the Public Health Service under 42 U-S-C § 202, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, and his rulemaking authority under § 300gg-92. The Affordable Care Act requires a minimum one-year interval before recommendations become binding, during which the Secretary can direct that recommendations not be “in effect” or establish formal review processes. Task Force members therefore “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by” the Secretary.
Congress vested appointment authority in the Secretary through two statutes read together. First, the 1999 statute gives the AHRQ Director power to “convene” the Task Force, which naturally includes appointment authority given the requirement to ensure members have “appropriate expertise.” Second, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, ratified by Congress in 1984, transfers “all functions” of Public Health Service officers to the Secretary, including the AHRQ Director's appointment power. The statutory requirement that Task Force members be “independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure” does not create for-cause removal protection or prevent secretarial supervision, but rather ensures members are not unduly influenced by outside professional affiliations and can exercise independent judgment in formulating initial recommendations, consistent with the standard model of Executive Branch adjudication.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch, arguing that Congress has not explicitly vested appointment authority in the Secretary and that Task Force members are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Medicaid Act’s “any qualified provider” provision unambiguously confer a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider?
The case was decided on June 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) of the Medicaid Act does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under 42 U-S-C § 1983. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
Federal statutes create individual rights only in “atypical cases,” and 42 U-S-C § 1983 provides causes of action for deprivation of “rights,” not mere “benefits” or “interests.” To prove an enforceable right, plaintiffs must show the statute clearly and unambiguously uses “rights-creating terms” with “an unmistakable focus” on individuals. This is a “stringent” and “demanding” test that spending-power statutes are especially unlikely to satisfy because spending-power legislation is “much in the nature of a contract” requiring States’ voluntary and knowing consent to private suits.
Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) lacks the required clear rights-creating language. The provision states that Medicaid plans must “provide that…any individual eligible for medical assistance…may obtain such assistance from any…qualified” provider. This language addresses state duties and may benefit providers and patients, but lacks the clear “rights-creating language” found in the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act provisions upheld in Talevski. Congress knows how to create clear rights, as FNHRA shows by giving nursing-home residents “the right to choose a personal attending physician.” The any-qualified-provider provision contains no such language. The provision’s exceptions confirm this reading—States may exclude providers “convicted of a felony” and “determine” which convictions qualify, which makes sense if the provision addresses state duties to the federal government but creates problems if it confers individual rights.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion arguing that the Court should reexamine more broadly its § 1983 jurisprudence, which, he claimed, bears little resemblance to the statute as originally understood.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, arguing that the any-qualified-provider provision readily creates an enforceable right under a faithful application of the Court’s unambiguous-conferral test. She criticized the majority’s requirement that Congress mirror the specific language of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act rather than apply the established test for whether a statute unambiguously confers rights, and she warned that the decision continues a pattern of weakening Reconstruction-era civil rights protections.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provision apply to a defendant whose original sentence was imposed before the Act’s enactment, but was later vacated and resentenced after the Act took effect?
The case was decided on June 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that because a sentence “has...been imposed” for purposes of § 403(b) of the First Step Act only if the sentence is extant (i.e., has not been vacated), the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act’s enactment. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
When Congress employs the present-perfect tense (“has been imposed”), it addresses whether something has continuing relevance to the present, not merely whether it occurred as a historical fact. The present-perfect tense can refer to either “an act, state, or condition that is now completed” or “a past action that comes up to and touches the present,” but in both senses it conveys that the event in question continues to be true or valid. A sentence has been imposed for § 403(b) purposes only if it remains extant—that is, has not been vacated. This interpretation aligns with background legal principles that vacated court orders are void ab initio and lack prospective legal effect.
Background principles confirm this interpretation. When interpreting statutes, courts recognize that Congress legislates against certain unexpressed presumptions, including that vacated court orders are treated as though they never occurred. Just as defendants with vacated prior felony convictions are not precluded from possessing weapons under the federal felon-in-possession ban, § 403(b) retroactivity does not exclude those whose prior sentences have been vacated. The statute’s use of present-perfect rather than past-perfect tense, especially when adjacent provisions use simple past tense, reinforces that only past sentences with continued validity preclude application of the Act’s new penalties.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, arguing that the present-perfect tense in §403(b) refers to the historical fact of whether a sentence had been imposed as of the Act’s enactment date, regardless of subsequent vacatur.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?
The case was decided on June 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Petitioner Ruben Gutierrez has standing to bring his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Prisoners convicted in state court have a liberty interest in demonstrating their innocence with new evidence under state law. When states create postconviction procedures, they can create rights to other procedures essential to realizing those rights. Under Skinner v Switzer, a prisoner may bring a § 1983 due process claim alleging that a state's DNA testing statute unconstitutionally prevents him from obtaining testing, even though he cannot directly challenge state court denials of his testing motions. To bring such a suit, the prisoner must demonstrate judicial standing to sue.
The standing analysis follows Reed v Goertz, which requires three elements. First, Gutierrez adequately alleged an injury: the prosecutor's denial of access to DNA evidence. Second, prosecutor Saenz caused this injury by refusing to release evidence in his custody for testing. Third, if a federal court declares Texas’s procedures unconstitutional, that judgment would eliminate Saenz’s justification for denying testing, thereby removing the barrier between Gutierrez and the evidence. The declaratory judgment would change the parties’ legal status and redress Gutierrez’s injury by eliminating the allegedly unlawful basis for the denial.
The Fifth Circuit erred in two fundamental ways. First, it improperly focused on the limited declaratory judgment the District Court ultimately issued rather than on Gutierrez’s broader complaint. Gutierrez’s complaint challenged not just Article 64’s limitation to actual innocence claims, but multiple barriers the statute creates—including its virtually insurmountable standard for parties to crimes, its refusal to consider new evidence, and its prohibition on testing solely to challenge death eligibility. Standing depends on the allegations in the complaint, not on the particular relief a district court later grants.
Second, the Fifth Circuit wrongly transformed the redressability inquiry into speculation about whether the prosecutor would ultimately provide the evidence. Under Reed, a declaratory judgment need only eliminate the prosecutor’s reliance on the challenged provision as a justification for denying testing. The Court rejected the notion that redressability requires certainty about the ultimate outcome. That a prosecutor might find other reasons to deny testing—just as the prosecutor in Reed had multiple grounds for denial—does not defeat standing to challenge specific reasons as unconstitutional. Courts regularly allow plaintiffs to challenge improper legal grounds for discretionary decisions even when the decision-maker might reach the same result for different reasons.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?
The case was decided on June 20, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not protect former employees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an employer's alleged act of discrimination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Title 1 of the A-D-A makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against a “qualified individual” based on disability regarding compensation and other employment matters. The statute defines a “qualified individual” as someone who "can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” The present-tense verbs—“holds,” “desires,” and “can perform”—signal that the law protects individuals able to perform a job they currently hold or seek when discrimination occurs, not retirees who neither hold nor desire employment. The statute’s definition of “reasonable accommodation,” which includes job restructuring and modifying facilities for employees, reinforces this interpretation by referencing accommodations that make sense only for current employees or job applicants, not retirees.
The A-D-A’s structure further supports this reading through its examples of discrimination in Section 12112(b), such as “qualification standards” and “employment tests,” which clearly aim to protect job holders and seekers rather than retirees. Additionally, comparing Title 1 with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act reveals that while Title VII protects “employees” without temporal qualification, the A-D-A’s use of “qualified individual” linked to present-tense verbs indicates protection for current job holders or seekers only. The Court’s precedent in Cleveland v Policy Management Systems Corporation anticipated that someone may fall outside the A-D-A’s protections if she can no longer perform the job.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, expressing concern about litigants changing their arguments after the Court grants certiorari.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that Title 1’s prohibition on disability discrimination should not cease when an employee retires.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor in parts, arguing that the majority misreads Title 1 by viewing it through “the distorted lens of pure textualism,” incorrectly using the qualified individual definition as a temporal limit it was never designed to be, and thereby rendering meaningless the A-D-A’s protections for disabled workers’ retirement benefits just when those protections matter most.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
The case was decided on June 20, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the PSJVTA’s personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not impose the same jurisdictional limitations as the Fourteenth Amendment because the federal government occupies a sovereign sphere dramatically different from that of state governments. While the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisdictional limits protect interstate federalism by ensuring states do not exceed their territorial boundaries as coequal sovereigns, these federalism concerns are inapplicable to the federal government, which possesses both nationwide and extraterritorial authority. The Constitution authorizes the federal government alone to regulate foreign commerce, prosecute offenses against U.S. nationals abroad, and conduct foreign affairs. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment permits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the federal government’s broader sovereign authority than the “minimum contacts” standard required under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The PSJVTA represents a permissible exercise of this authority because it narrowly targets only two specific foreign entities that have longstanding, complex relationships with the United States involving terrorism concerns. The statute’s jurisdictional predicates—payments to imprisoned terrorists and their families, and activities conducted on U.S. soil—directly implicate important federal policies aimed at deterring terrorism and protecting American citizens. The political branches’ coordinated judgment in enacting this legislation warrants judicial deference, particularly given the statute’s limited scope applying only to ATA cases and its clear notice to the PLO and PA that specified conduct would subject them to U.S. jurisdiction. Even assuming a reasonableness inquiry applies under the Fifth Amendment, the PSJVTA satisfies it given the federal government’s compelling interest in providing a forum for terrorism victims, the plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining relief, and the absence of any unfair burden on these sophisticated international organizations that have litigated in U.S. courts for decades.
Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch as to Part II, arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes no territorial limits on the federal government’s power to extend federal jurisdiction beyond the nation's borders.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge the EPA's approval of California regulations that require automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles?
The case was decided on June 20, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA’s approval of California regulations that require automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles because invalidating the regulations would likely redress their monetary injuries from decreased fuel sales. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The California regulations force automakers to limit average greenhouse-gas emissions across their vehicle fleets and manufacture a certain percentage of electric vehicles, thereby reducing demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. Article III standing requires showing injury in fact, causation, and redressability—meaning the plaintiff must demonstrate actual harm caused by the defendant that judicial relief would likely fix. When government regulation of one business predictably causes downstream economic injuries to linked businesses, commonsense economic principles support finding that invalidating the regulation would likely redress those injuries by removing the regulatory impediment to the injured party’s sales.
Record evidence confirms that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the fuel producers’ injuries, including: California’s own estimates showing the regulations would cause substantial reductions in gasoline demand exceeding $10 billion by 2030; California’s statements that the regulations are “critical” for emissions reductions and that without them fewer electric vehicles would be sold; EPA's affirmation that California “needs” these standards; and five automakers’ intervention predicting that absent the regulations, competitors would sell fewer electric vehicles to gain market advantage. The Court rejected arguments that fuel producers needed expert affidavits or declarations from automakers to establish redressability, explaining that requiring such evidence would improperly make standing depend on alignment between plaintiffs and regulated third parties.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have vacated and remanded for the D.C. Circuit to reconsider based on corrected facts about when the regulations expire.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing the Court applies standing doctrine inconsistently by accepting commonsense inferences for business plaintiffs while demanding more evidence from civil rights plaintiffs.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When revoking supervised release and imposing a prison sentence, may a district court consider the sentencing factors in 18 U-S-C § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely, “the seriousness of the offense,” “promoting respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—even though these factors are not explicitly referenced in the supervised release statute?
The case was decided on June 20, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that in deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release, a district court may not consider the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment for the offense when revoking supervised release. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
When determining whether to revoke supervised release, district courts must consider eight of the ten general sentencing factors listed in 18 U-S-C § 3553(a). The statute specifically excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution for the defendant's underlying criminal offense. This omission creates a strong negative inference under the well-established principle that expressing certain items in a list excludes others not mentioned. The statutory structure reinforces this interpretation, as neighboring provisions governing other types of sentences explicitly require courts to consider all § 3553(a) factors, while the supervised release provisions uniquely exclude retribution.
This exclusion aligns with supervised release’s rehabilitative purpose in the criminal justice system. Unlike fines, probation, and imprisonment, which serve as primary punishments, supervised release provides postconfinement assistance to ease defendants' transition back into society. Courts must therefore focus on forward-looking sentencing goals—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—rather than backward-looking retribution. District courts may consider the nature and circumstances of the original offense only as they relate to these permissible purposes, not as grounds for additional punishment based on the offense’s seriousness.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that courts should not consider retribution for any purpose in supervised release proceedings.
Justice Jackson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the outcome but criticizing the majority’s discussion of what constitutes “offense” as unnecessary and confusing.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, arguing that the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) merely makes its consideration discretionary rather than forbidden and warning that the majority’s interpretation creates impractical requirements for sentencing judges.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Hobbs Act require a federal district court to accept the Federal Communication Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?
The case was decided on June 20, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act does not preclude judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretation in district court enforcement proceedings, and district courts must independently determine whether the agency's interpretation is correct under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
Courts may grant pre-enforcement review of agency orders through three types of statutes: those that expressly preclude subsequent judicial review in enforcement proceedings (like the Clean Water Act), those that expressly authorize review in both contexts, and those that remain silent on enforcement proceedings (like the Hobbs Act). The Hobbs Act falls into the third category, which triggers a default rule allowing district courts to independently assess agency interpretations. The Administrative Procedure Act codifies this presumption of judicial review, stating that “agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement” unless prior review was adequate and exclusive. The phrase “determine the validity” in the Hobbs Act refers specifically to entering declaratory judgments in pre-enforcement proceedings, not to the broader process of evaluating an agency interpretation’s correctness in enforcement actions.
The Emergency Price Control Act precedent from Yakus v United States does not control because that wartime statute contained two provisions working together: exclusive jurisdiction language plus an express prohibition against other courts considering validity. Congress chose not to include this second, prohibitive provision when enacting the Hobbs Act six years later, demonstrating its intent not to preclude enforcement-stage review. Practical concerns about potential court disagreements do not override statutory text and administrative law principles, as circuit splits followed by Supreme Court review represent the ordinary judicial process. Requiring all potentially affected parties to challenge every agency order within 60 days or lose their rights would be impractical and unfair, particularly for entities that did not exist when orders issued or had no reason to anticipate future enforcement proceedings.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that the Hobbs Act's grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to appellate courts to “determine the validity” of agency orders plainly precludes district courts from making such determinations in enforcement proceedings.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Tennessee law restricting certain medical treatments for transgender minors violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment?
The case was decided on June 18, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Tennessee’s law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Equal Protection Clause does not require heightened scrutiny because Tennessee’s law does not classify on any bases that warrant such review. The law contains only two classifications: one based on age (allowing treatments for adults but not minors) and another based on medical use (permitting puberty blockers and hormones for certain conditions but not for treating gender dysphoria). Classifications based on age or medical use receive only rational basis review—the most deferential standard of constitutional review. The law does not classify based on sex because it prohibits healthcare providers from administering these treatments to any minor for the excluded diagnoses, regardless of the minor's biological sex. When properly understood as regulating specific combinations of drugs and medical indications, the law treats all minors equally: none may receive these treatments for gender dysphoria, but minors of any sex may receive them for other qualifying conditions like precocious puberty or congenital defects.
The law satisfies rational basis review because Tennessee’s legislature had reasonable grounds for its restrictions. The state found that these treatments for gender dysphoria carry risks including irreversible sterility, increased disease risk, and adverse psychological consequences, while minors lack the maturity to understand these consequences and many express later regret. Tennessee also determined that the treatments are experimental with unknown long-term effects, and that gender dysphoria can often be resolved through less invasive approaches. Under rational basis review, courts must uphold laws if there are any reasonably conceivable facts supporting the classification. States have wide discretion in areas of medical and scientific uncertainty, noting that recent reports from health authorities in England and other countries have raised similar concerns about the evidence supporting these treatments for minors.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, arguing that Bostock v Clayton County (in which the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex includes discrimination based on transgender identity or sexual orientation) should not apply to Equal Protection Clause analysis and criticizing deference to medical experts who lack consensus and have allowed political ideology to influence their guidance on transgender treatments for minors.
Justice Barrett authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, arguing that transgender individuals do not constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack the “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” of a “discrete group” and because suspect class analysis should focus on a history of de jure (legal) discrimination rather than private discrimination.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can retailers who would sell a new tobacco product seek judicial review of the FDA’s denial of a manufacturer’s marketing application under the Tobacco Control Act?
The case was decided on June 20, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Tobacco Control Act’s provision that “any person adversely affected” by the FDA’s denial of a marketing application may seek judicial review extends to retailers who would sell the new tobacco product, not just the manufacturers who applied for approval. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The phrase “adversely affected” is a term of art in administrative law that the Court has consistently interpreted broadly. When Congress uses variations of this phrase across different statutes, the Court presumes it carries the same meaning as in the Administrative Procedure Act—covering anyone “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.” Congress reinforced this broad interpretation by using “any person” rather than limiting review to “the applicant.” The Court’s precedents from other contexts, including employment discrimination and fair housing cases, confirm that “adversely affected” encompasses more than just the direct recipient of agency action. Retailers face a direct, significant impact from denial orders because they lose the opportunity to profit from selling the product and face criminal penalties if they sell it without authorization.
The statutory structure confirms Congress intended different scopes for different provisions. While the Act limits challenges to withdrawal of existing approvals to only “the holder of the application,” it uses the broader “any person adversely affected” language for initial denials. This deliberate use of materially different terms creates a presumption that Congress intended different meanings. The FDA’s arguments focusing on the application process and confidentiality provisions cannot override the plain language Congress chose for the judicial review provision.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, arguing that retailers fall outside the statute’s zone of interests because the premarket approval scheme involves only manufacturers and the FDA, with no mechanism for retailer participation.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Should challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program be heard exclusively in the U-S Court of Appeals for the D-C Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?
The case was decided on June 18, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that EPA’s denials of small refinery exemption petitions from renewable fuel requirements must be challenged in the D-C Circuit because they are locally applicable actions based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Clean Air Act establishes a tripartite venue system for reviewing EPA actions. “Nationally applicable” EPA actions must be challenged exclusively in the D-C Circuit, while “locally or regionally applicable” actions ordinarily belong in regional courts of appeals. However, locally or regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” must be reviewed in the D-C Circuit if EPA finds and publishes that such basis exists. To identify the relevant “action” for venue purposes, courts must look to the specific statutory authority EPA is exercising rather than how EPA packages its decisions. Each EPA denial of an individual refinery’s exemption petition constitutes its own “action” because the Clean Air Act allows each small refinery to petition EPA separately and requires EPA to act on each petition. An action is “nationally applicable” if it applies on its face throughout the entire country; alternatively, it is “locally or regionally applicable” if it applies only to particular places. EPA’s denial of a single refinery’s exemption petition applies only to that specific refinery in a particular location, making such denials paradigmatically locally or regionally applicable actions.
The “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies because EPA’s statutory interpretation and economic theory formed the core basis for its denials. A “determination” refers to EPA’s justifications for taking action, and determinations have nationwide “scope” if they apply throughout the country as a legal matter or nationwide “effect” if they apply as a practical matter. An EPA action is “based on” such a determination only if that determination lies at the core of the agency action and forms the primary explanation for EPA’s decision—requiring more than but-for causation. EPA’s interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” and its RIN passthrough theory constitute clear determinations of nationwide scope because they apply generically to all refineries regardless of location. These determinations formed the core basis for EPA’s denials because EPA used them to reach a presumptive resolution to deny all petitions, then considered refinery-specific factors only to confirm it had no reason to depart from this presumptive disposition. Where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver of its decision, making EPA’s confirmatory review of refinery-specific facts merely peripheral by comparison.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, arguing that the Clean Air Act’s substantive provisions do not call for EPA to make determinations of nationwide scope or effect when acting on individual small refinery hardship petitions, and that the majority’s new test will make simple venue questions unnecessarily difficult and expensive to resolve.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?
The case was decided on June 18, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that falls under the Seventh Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
PLRA exhaustion operates as a standard affirmative defense subject to the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The usual practice requires factual disputes regarding legal claims to go to a jury, even when a judge could ordinarily resolve such questions independently. Because Congress legislates against the backdrop of established common-law adjudicatory principles, and because the PLRA remains silent on whether judges or juries should resolve exhaustion disputes, this silence constitutes strong evidence that courts should follow the usual practice of sending factual disputes to juries when they are intertwined with the merits.
At the time Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996, well-established precedent required that factual disputes intertwined with Seventh Amendment claims go to juries. Two lines of cases support this principle. First, in cases involving both legal and equitable claims, Beacon Theatres established that judges may not resolve equitable claims first if doing so could prevent legal claims from reaching a jury, because judicial discretion must preserve jury trial rights wherever possible. Second, in subject matter jurisdiction cases like Smithers v Smith and Land v Dollar, courts may not resolve factual disputes when those disputes are intertwined with the merits, as this would risk deciding the controversy’s substance without ordinary trial procedures, including the right to a jury. When the PLRA was enacted, the usual federal court practice across various contexts involved resolving factual disputes intertwined with the merits at the merits stage itself.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh, arguing that the majority’s statutory interpretation contravenes basic principles because the PLRA’s silence cannot confer a jury trial right, and that the jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment does not depend on factual overlap between threshold issues and the merits.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered these issues:
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Can a nonparty challenge a federal agency’s “final order” under the Hobbs Act’s judicial review provision?
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Do federal nuclear laws allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to store spent nuclear fuel at off-reactor sites?
The case was decided on June 18, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that a facility to store spent nuclear fuel at a private off-site location requires a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and only parties to the Commission’s licensing proceeding may obtain judicial review of the licensing decision under the Hobbs Act. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Hobbs Act provides that any “party aggrieved” by a Commission licensing order may seek judicial review in federal court. The Atomic Energy Act establishes how one becomes a party to a Commission licensing proceeding: a person must either be the license applicant or successfully intervene by requesting a hearing and being admitted as a party by the Commission. Simply submitting comments on a draft environmental impact statement does not confer party status, just as filing an amicus brief in court does not make one a party to the case. When the Commission denies a petition to intervene, that decision itself is subject to judicial review, but the denied petitioner cannot later challenge the underlying licensing decision.
The narrow exception for ultra vires review—where an agency acts entirely outside its delegated powers—does not apply here. This exception requires agency action that violates a specific statutory prohibition, not merely a disagreement about statutory interpretation. Additionally, ultra vires review is unavailable when adequate statutory review exists, as it does here through the ability to appeal intervention denials and, for successful intervenors, to challenge final licensing orders.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, arguing that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act explicitly prohibits storage of spent nuclear fuel anywhere except at reactor sites or federally owned facilities, and that Texas and Fasken qualified as parties under the Hobbs Act because they participated in the environmental review portion of the NRC’s licensing proceeding.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have exclusive jurisdiction to review an Environmental Protection Agency action that affects only one state or region, simply because the EPA published that action alongside actions affecting other states in a single Federal Register notice?
The case was decided on June 18, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act requires that EPA state implementation plan (SIP) disapprovals be reviewed in regional circuit courts rather than the D-C Circuit when they are "locally or regionally applicable" actions not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court applied a two-step framework established in EPA v Calumet Shreveport Refining to determine proper venue under the Clean Air Act’s venue provision. First, courts must identify the relevant EPA “action” and determine whether it is “nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally applicable.” An “action” under the statute means a particular exercise of EPA authority undertaken pursuant to a particular Clean Air Act provision, determined by reference to the underlying statutory provision rather than how EPA presents its decision. Here, EPA’s disapprovals of Oklahoma’s and Utah’s state implementation plans constitute separate “actions” because the Clean Air Act treats individual SIP approvals and disapprovals as discrete actions under Section 7410. Each SIP disapproval applies only to the specific state that proposed the plan, making them “locally or regionally applicable” actions—the prototypical example of such actions under the statute.
Because the SIP disapprovals are locally or regionally applicable, the Court proceeded to the second step: determining whether the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies to require D-C Circuit review. This exception requires that EPA’s action be “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and that EPA find and publish this basis. Although EPA made the required finding, the Court held that EPA’s disapprovals were not actually based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. The exception applies only when “a justification of nationwide breadth is the primary explanation for and driver of EPA’s action.” Here, EPA’s disapprovals resulted from predominantly fact-intensive, state-specific analysis of each SIP’s contents, producing unique lists of deficiencies for each state. The four nationwide determinations EPA cited—including use of updated modeling and a 1% contribution threshold—were merely analytical tools that aided EPA’s review rather than primary drivers of the disapprovals.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, agreeing with the judgment but following a different analytical path as explained in their dissenting opinion in a companion case, Environmental Protection Agency v Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) apply to all second habeas petitions, or only specific types of second petitions?
The case was decided on June 12, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that when a district court enters judgment on a first federal habeas petition, any subsequent habeas filing qualifies as a “second or successive application” subject to the strict requirements of §2244(b), regardless of whether the first petition is pending on appeal. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes significant procedural barriers for second or successive habeas applications. These restrictions prohibit relitigating previously denied claims and permit new claims only when they rely on new retroactive constitutional law or present previously undiscoverable facts establishing innocence. Additionally, petitioners cannot file successive applications directly with the district court but must first obtain authorization from the court of appeals after making a prima facie showing that their petition satisfies one of §2244(b)(2)’s narrow exceptions. The phrase “second or successive application” constitutes a term of art that applies to filings seeking adjudication of federal claims on the merits, not merely to all filings made second in time.
The entry of final judgment, not the pendency of appeal, marks the dividing line between first and second or successive habeas applications. While amended petitions filed before judgment do not trigger §2244(b), and Rule 59(e) motions represent a limited continuation of the original proceeding that merges into the final judgment, new habeas filings submitted after judgment constitute second or successive applications even during appeal. This rule advances AEDPA’s purposes of conserving judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and lending finality to state court judgments. Allowing petitioners to file unlimited new applications during appellate review would encourage inefficiency and make it difficult to produce a single final judgment for appeal. Historical habeas doctrine before AEDPA provides no clear guidance, as courts inconsistently treated new filings during pending appeals.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a proceeding under 26 U-S-C § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes become moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding?
The case was decided on June 12, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under 26 U-S-C §6330 to adjudicate disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS once the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.
Section 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code grants taxpayers the right to a hearing before the IRS can levy (seize and sell) a taxpayer’s property to collect unpaid taxes. At this hearing, a taxpayer can raise issues about the levy, including the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability, and the appeals officer makes a “determination” about whether the levy may proceed. The law then permits review of this “determination” by the Tax Court. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to reviewing the determination whether a levy may go forward, not every dispute considered at the hearing. If there is no longer a proposed or ongoing levy—for example, because the taxpayer’s liability has been zeroed out during the pendency of the appeal—there is no determination left to review, and thus, no case or controversy for the Tax Court to resolve under §6330.
The reasoning rests on several points: (1) The statutory text and structure focus the collection due process hearing and subsequent Tax Court review on the levy alone; (2) The default rule in tax litigation is that challenges to tax liability must proceed as refund suits after payment, except where specifically authorized exceptions, like the collection due process review, apply; and (3) The statute does not authorize the Tax Court to issue refunds or declaratory judgments unrelated to stopping a levy. Therefore, after the IRS drops the levy because the tax debt has been satisfied, any continuing disputes about liability or overpayment must proceed through a refund suit in district court, not in the Tax Court under §6330.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Tax Court retains jurisdiction over all issues addressed in the IRS’s determination—including disputes about underlying tax liability—even after a levy is abandoned, and that stripping jurisdiction in these circumstances creates opportunities for the IRS to evade judicial review and leaves taxpayers without meaningful remedies for erroneous IRS actions.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?
The case was decided on June 12, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the statute that provides combat-related special compensation (CRSC) to disabled veterans establishes its own settlement process for claims, which supersedes the Barring Act’s default six-year statute of limitations for most claims against the federal government. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
In the context of government claims, “settling” a claim means determining whether the claim is valid and, if so, computing the amount the claimant is owed. Congress does not need to use explicit wording such as the term “settle” to establish this authority; it is enough if, taken as a whole, the statute authorizes an agency to decide both whether a person is entitled to payment and how much payment is due. The CRSC statute gives the relevant military secretary the power to determine eligibility and the exact compensation owed based on statutory formulas. By establishing a comprehensive, self-contained scheme that charges the secretary with both validating claims and setting the payment amount, the statute creates a separate claim-settling process.
Because the CRSC statute authorizes the relevant officials to determine both entitlement and the amount of CRSC payments, the law functions as “another law” with its own settlement mechanism under the Barring Act. As a result, the default 6-year limitation period of the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC claims, regardless of whether the CRSC statute contains its own explicit time restriction. This ruling clarifies that Congress can displace default government claim procedures—including limitations periods—when it provides a comprehensive statutory process for resolving specific claims, as it did for CRSC benefits.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Must a party who files a notice of appeal during the period between when their original appeal deadline expired and when the court reopens their time to appeal file a second notice after the reopening is granted?
The case was decided on June 12, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require a timely-filed notice of appeal, and a notice filed after the original deadline but before a court grants reopening relates forward to the date reopening is granted, making a second notice unnecessary. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
When civil litigants miss appeal deadlines, federal law provides two exceptions: courts may extend the deadline for excusable neglect or good cause, or reopen the appeal period when a party entitled to notice does not receive it within 21 days of the judgment. The reopening provision creates a new 14-day appeal window starting from the court's reopening order. While a notice filed after this 14-day period cannot confer jurisdiction, a notice filed before reopening is granted is merely premature rather than late. Congress legislated against established common-law principles that premature but adequate notices of appeal relate forward to the entry of the document making an appeal possible. For over a century, courts have applied this principle to avoid dismissing appeals on technicalities when no doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, and to which court.
The statute’s silence on pre-reopening notices means Congress expected the longstanding relation-forward rule to continue applying. Requiring a second notice after reopening would serve no purpose beyond “empty paper shuffling” when the original notice already provided clear notice of the intent to appeal. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure support this interpretation, as Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4) codify the principle that premature notices should relate forward when they do not prejudice opposing parties. The 1993 amendments specifically eliminated restrictions on relation-forward to avoid creating traps for litigants, especially pro se litigants who often fail to file second notices. Rule 4(a)(6)’s silence on relation-forward does not create a negative implication prohibiting it, particularly given the Rules’ emphasis on securing just determinations and disregarding errors that do not affect substantial rights.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, arguing the same result could be reached without relation-forward principles by treating the filing as a motion with an attached proposed notice of appeal.
Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, arguing the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted because the Rules Committee is already studying this issue.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?
The case was decided on June 12, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Schoolchildren bringing claims related to their education under either Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not required to make a heightened showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
When the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was amended in 1986, Congress explicitly declared that nothing in the IDEA “shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under” the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, or other federal laws protecting disabled children's rights. This provision directly repudiates judicial attempts to create special barriers for educational discrimination claims. The Eighth Circuit’s rule requiring schoolchildren to prove “bad faith or gross misjudgment”—rather than the standard deliberate indifference required in other disability contexts—artificially limits disabled students’ ability to vindicate their rights under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Neither statute’s text suggests that educational services claims deserve different treatment than other disability discrimination claims. Both laws use expansive language applying protections to “any person” alleging discrimination, without distinction based on the type of claim.
The heightened standard originated in 1982 when the Eighth Circuit attempted to “harmonize” the IDEA with the Rehabilitation Act, reasoning that courts should defer to educators unless they departed grossly from professional standards. This Court made a similar harmonization attempt in 1984, holding the IDEA was the exclusive remedy for educational claims, but Congress swiftly overturned that decision. The Eighth Circuit’s continued application of its heightened standard conflicts with Congress’s clear directive that the IDEA does not limit other federal antidiscrimination laws. By imposing a higher burden of proof for educational claims compared to other disability discrimination contexts, courts effectively read the IDEA as restricting the independent rights and remedies that Title II and Section 504 provide to disabled children.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, suggesting the Court should consider in a future case whether intent to discriminate must be proven for all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, not just educational ones.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, emphasizing that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require no showing of improper purpose or animus because discrimination against people with disabilities often results from thoughtlessness rather than malice.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Must plaintiffs prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
The case was decided on June 5, 2025.
The Supreme Court ruled that the FSIA itself provides the sole basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign states and their instrumentalities, without the need to establish "minimum contacts" under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court emphasized that the FSIA's provisions govern the extent to which foreign states can be sued in U.S. courts, and that the statute's specific rules supersede general constitutional principles regarding personal jurisdiction.
This decision clarifies that when a foreign state or its agency is subject to suit under the FSIA, the standard for personal jurisdiction is determined by the FSIA's provisions, not by the constitutional "minimum contacts" test typically applied in domestic cases.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a state violate the First Amendment’s religion clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state’s criteria for religious behavior?
The case was decided on June 5, 2025.
In a unanimous decision on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, affirming that the Catholic Charities Bureau (CCB) is entitled to an exemption from Wisconsin's unemployment insurance tax. The Court held that the state's refusal to grant this exemption violated the First Amendment by discriminating against religious organizations that do not engage in overt religious activities.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion, emphasizing that Wisconsin's approach improperly favored organizations that proselytize or serve only co-religionists, thereby violating the principle of government neutrality in religious matters. The Court noted that CCB's mission, while providing secular services such as housing and job training, is rooted in Catholic teachings and operates under the auspices of the Catholic Diocese of Superior. The decision underscores that religious organizations cannot be denied exemptions based solely on the secular nature of their services.
This ruling aligns with the Court's broader trend of expanding religious liberties and may have implications for other religiously affiliated organizations seeking similar exemptions.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)’s stringent standard apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint?
The case was decided on June 5, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group need to demonstrate “background circumstances suggesting that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
The case was decided on June 5, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that In a unanimous decision on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Ames v Ohio Department of Youth Services, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation without imposing a heightened evidentiary standard for plaintiffs from majority groups. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision, which had required Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to demonstrate "background circumstances" suggesting that her employer discriminated against the majority group. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, writing for the Court, emphasized that Title VII's protections apply equally to all individuals, regardless of group membership. The ruling allows Ames's discrimination claim to proceed in lower courts.
This decision clarifies that plaintiffs alleging discrimination under Title VII need not meet additional burdens based on their majority status, thereby potentially broadening the scope for future employment discrimination claims.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can U.S. gun manufacturers be held liable for violence in Mexico under theories of proximate causation and aiding and abetting, based on their domestic production and sale of firearms that are later trafficked to Mexican cartels?
The case was decided on June 5, 2025.
In a unanimous decision on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of American gun manufacturers, including Smith & Wesson, dismissing a lawsuit filed by the Mexican government. Mexico had accused the companies of facilitating illegal firearms trafficking that contributed to cartel violence within the country.
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Elena Kagan, emphasized that the 2005 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) provides broad immunity to gun manufacturers against lawsuits arising from the criminal misuse of their products. While PLCAA includes an exception for cases where a manufacturer knowingly violates federal or state laws related to firearm sales or marketing, the Court found that Mexico's allegations did not meet this threshold. Specifically, Mexico failed to demonstrate that the manufacturers knowingly aided or abetted illegal trafficking beyond lawful commerce practices.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the National Environmental Policy Act require an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority?
The case was decided on May 29, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to consider the environmental effects of federal projects by preparing a detailed environmental impact statement (E-I-S), but it does not impose substantive limits on agencies’ decisions. NEPA only applies to the environmental consequences of the proposed project itself, not to impacts from future or geographically separate projects that the proposed project might cause. The Surface Transportation Board complied with NEPA by addressing the environmental effects of constructing and operating an 88-mile freight railroad in Utah. NEPA did not require the Board to evaluate environmental impacts from increased oil drilling in the Uinta Basin or increased oil refining along the Gulf Coast—both of which were separate activities outside the Board’s regulatory control. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-3 majority opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett.
NEPA’s role is procedural: it ensures agencies and the public are informed about potential environmental effects but does not direct agencies to reject projects with environmental downsides. Courts reviewing an E-I-S must apply a “rule of reason” and defer to the agency’s decisions about the scope and detail of environmental analysis, recognizing that such decisions depend on scientific, technical, and policy judgments that fall within the agency’s expertise. Agencies have discretion to omit analysis of speculative or weakly connected effects—particularly when those effects depend on future decisions by other entities or fall under the authority of other regulators. The Board’s choice not to analyze upstream drilling or downstream refining effects was reasonable because those were not part of the project under review and because the Board lacks the authority to control such activities.
A mere possibility that a project might lead to additional development does not impose an obligation under NEPA to assess all environmental impacts of hypothetical, unrelated projects. Even if a project’s effects are foreseeable, NEPA does not make one agency responsible for evaluating the far-reaching environmental costs of others’ conduct unless those effects are directly caused by the agency’s decision and fall within its regulatory scope. Therefore, the Board’s approval of the railway project, based on an E-I-S that focused on the rail line itself, satisfied NEPA’s requirements.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, agreeing that the Board was not responsible for assessing the environmental effects of oil production because it lacked authority to regulate those downstream and upstream activities.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can deception to induce a commercial exchange constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme?
The case was decided on May 22, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the fraudulent-inducement theory is consistent with the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U-S-C §1343, and does not require proof of economic loss to the victim. The Court affirmed the convictions of Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. for wire fraud, finding that their scheme to use a disadvantaged business as a pass-through entity to secure government contracts involved material misrepresentations to obtain money, satisfying the statute's requirements. The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that a fraud conviction requires intent to cause economic loss, clarifying that §1343 focuses on schemes to obtain money or property through deception, not on the victim's net financial harm. The ruling resolved a circuit split, affirming that fraudulent inducement is a valid basis for wire fraud convictions when it targets traditional property interests.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in A.A.R.P. v Trump.
The case was decided on May 16, 2025.
To summarize, the President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of the Tren de Aragua (T-d-a), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees, along with a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas, sought injunctive relief against their summary removal under the AEA. The detainees were being held in U.S. detention facilities and were notified of their imminent removal.
The District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against their removal. The detainees then moved for an emergency TRO, which was not promptly addressed by the District Court. Consequently, they appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal, citing insufficient time given to the district court to act. The detainees also applied to the Supreme Court for a temporary injunction.
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and found that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the District Court's inaction had the practical effect of refusing an injunction, given the extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable harm faced by the detainees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that due process requires adequate notice and time for detainees to seek habeas relief before removal. The Government was enjoined from removing the detainees under the AEA pending further proceedings and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Barnes v Felix.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?
The case was decided on May 15, 2025.
In Barnes v Felix, the Supreme Court rejected the “moment-of-threat” doctrine when evaluating excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that this doctrine, which limits analysis to the precise moment an officer perceives a threat, improperly narrows the required inquiry. Instead, courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances,” including relevant events and context leading up to the use of force, to assess whether an officer’s actions were objectively reasonable. The Court emphasized that excluding prior events conflicts with the fact-dependent, context-sensitive approach mandated by the Fourth Amendment.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.
The case was decided on April 30, 2025.
Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U-S-C §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.
Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U-S-C §5538(a) and 10 U-S-C §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?
The case was decided on April 29, 2025.
In this case, a group of over 200 hospitals claimed that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) miscalculated their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) adjustments, which provide additional funding to hospitals treating a high percentage of low-income patients. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the phrase "entitled to supplementary security income (SSI) benefits" under subchapter XVI. The hospitals argued that this phrase should include all patients enrolled in the SSI system at the time of hospitalization, even if they were not entitled to an SSI payment during that month. HHS, however, interpreted it to mean patients who were eligible to receive an SSI payment during the month of hospitalization.
The Provider Reimbursement Review Board denied the hospitals' request for additional reimbursement on procedural grounds, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services denied relief on the merits. The District Court rejected the hospitals' claims and granted summary judgment to HHS. The D-C Circuit affirmed, concluding that SSI benefits are about cash payments for needy individuals and that it makes little sense to say individuals are entitled to the benefit in months when they are not eligible for a payment.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that an individual is "entitled to SSI benefits" for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitalization. The Court reasoned that SSI benefits are cash benefits determined on a monthly basis, and eligibility for such benefits is also determined monthly. The Court affirmed the judgment of the D-C Circuit, respecting the specific formula that Congress prescribed for calculating the Medicare fraction.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U-S-C § 1229c(d)(1)?
The case was decided on April 22, 2025.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.
The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?
The case was decided on April 17, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that To state a claim under Section 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements listed in that provision itself: that a plan fiduciary knowingly caused the plan to engage in a transaction involving goods, services, or facilities with a party in interest. The plaintiff is not required to plead that the transaction does not qualify for an exemption under Section 1108. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Section 1106(a)(1)(C) establishes a clear, categorical prohibition on certain transactions between a pension plan and a party in interest. ERISA’s structure places relevant exemptions, including those for reasonable and necessary services under Section 1108(b)(2)(A), in a separate statutory provision. Because those exemptions are laid out apart from the prohibitions and refer back to conduct already defined as unlawful, they function as affirmative defenses. As a result, plan fiduciaries who wish to invoke an exemption bear the burden of pleading and proving it. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are not obliged to anticipate and refute every possible statutory or regulatory exemption.
Reading exemptions as affirmative defenses also aligns with longstanding legal principles and avoids unworkable results. Requiring plaintiffs to negate all exemptions—especially when ERISA includes 21 statutory and hundreds of regulatory exemptions—would be impractical and unfair, particularly because the relevant facts are often in the defendant’s possession. Procedural safeguards such as pleading requirements, discovery limits, and Rule 11 sanctions enable federal courts to deter and manage meritless litigation without shifting the pleading burden to plaintiffs. Consequently, only the elements in Section 1106(a)(1)(C) must be pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.
Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and authored a concurrence, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?
The case was decided on April 2, 2025.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, upheld the Second Circuit's ruling that Horn's loss of employment and associated economic damages qualified as injuries to "business or property" under RICO. The majority concluded that the statute permits recovery for economic harms directly resulting from racketeering activities, even if those harms stem from personal injuries. Justice Barrett emphasized that "injured" in the context of RICO simply means "harmed," and thus, economic losses like lost wages are recoverable. citeturn0news12
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson concurred, highlighting that RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. In dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, expressed concern that this interpretation could broaden RICO's scope to include traditional personal injury claims, potentially federalizing state tort law. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented separately, suggesting the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Was the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?
The case was decided on April 2, 2025
The Court unanimously held that the FDA's decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Specifically, the Court agreed with the FDA's assessment that the manufacturers failed to demonstrate that the benefits of their flavored products to adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. This ruling reversed a prior decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had found the FDA's denials unwarranted. The Supreme Court's decision underscores the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products, particularly those appealing to younger audiences, in line with public health objectives.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?
The case was decided on March 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Gun Control Act of 1968 authorizes the ATF to regulate weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers that can be readily converted into functional firearms. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
Weapon parts kits qualify as “weapons” under the statute when they contain all necessary components to build a gun and their intended function is clear. Everyday language permits describing incomplete objects by their intended use, just as a disassembled rifle remains a “weapon.” The statute reinforces this understanding by treating starter guns as firearms even though they require modification. A kit like Polymer80’s “Buy Build Shoot,” which can be assembled in about 20 minutes using common tools, meets the law’s definition because it can be “readily converted” into a functioning firearm, just as a blocked-barrel starter gun qualifies when easily modified for live fire. While not all kits may fall under this definition, the statute clearly covers at least some, making a facial challenge to the rule invalid.
The definition of “frame or receiver” also includes partially complete versions that can be finished quickly with standard tools. Ordinary language and the statute’s serialization requirements support this reading, as identification numbers are required on unfinished frames and receivers. Law enforcement has long treated such components as regulated firearms, and even the challengers conceded that some unfinished frames fall within the law’s scope. While some objects may be too incomplete to qualify, the statute reaches at least those requiring only minimal work, making ATF’s rule facially consistent with the law. Concerns about unintended consequences under the National Firearms Act are misplaced, as the government disavowed any authority to classify AR-15 receivers as machine guns, and the doctrines of lenity and constitutional avoidance do not apply where the statute’s meaning is clear.
Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson each joined the majority opinion and also wrote separate concurring opinions.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each authored dissenting opinions.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor’s tax payment to the United States under 11 U-S-C § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?
The case was decided on March 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates sovereign immunity for the federal cause of action created by §544(b), but it does not take the additional step of abrogating sovereign immunity for whatever state-law claim supplies the “applicable law” for a trustee’s §544(b) claim.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?
The case was decided on March 21, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of 18 U-S-C §924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
In United States v Castleman, the Court held that “knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.” This principle applies equally to §924(c) cases where injury is caused by omission rather than affirmative action. There is no meaningful distinction between acts and omissions, as deliberately causing harm through inaction still qualifies as "using" force, just as a person can "use" rain to wash their car by leaving it outside. Moreover, murder—the prototypical “crime of violence”—has long been understood to include liability for omissions, such as when a parent refuses to feed their child, resulting in death.
Interpreting the elements clause to exclude crimes of omission would exclude traditional violent crimes from its reach, contradicting the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” that Congress intended to capture. Additionally, the word “use” does not necessarily require affirmative action; when someone deliberately causes harm through inaction, they are employing force as their instrument to accomplish their purpose.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the prohibition in 18 U-S-C § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?
The case was decided on March 21, 2025.
In Thompson v United States, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that 18 U-S-C § 1014, which criminalizes knowingly making "any false statement" to influence financial institutions, applies exclusively to statements that are factually untrue, not merely misleading. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, emphasized that the statute's use of "false" indicates a focus on statements that are "not true." The Court highlighted that while some misleading statements may also be false, the statute does not encompass all misleading statements. Consequently, the Court vacated Thompson's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?
The case was decided on March 4, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act does not authorize the EPA to include “end-result” provisions in wastewater discharge permits. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
First, while rejecting San Francisco’s broader argument that all limitations must be “effluent limitations,” the Court focused on §1311(b)(1)(C)’s authorization of “any more stringent limitation” necessary to meet water quality standards. The terms “limitation,” “implement,” and “meet” in this provision require the EPA to specify concrete actions permittees must follow, not merely mandate end results without guidance. A proper “limitation” is a “restriction imposed from without,” not a directive that forces permittees to determine compliance measures themselves.
Second, Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 backward-looking approach that had directly penalized polluters for water quality violations. The CWA’s “permit shield” provision, which protects compliant permittees from penalties, would be undermined if end-result requirements could expose permittees to massive penalties despite following all specified steps. Additionally, the EPA’s interpretation offered no solution for fairly allocating responsibility among multiple dischargers affecting the same body of water. Determining necessary compliance steps is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has provided the agency with sufficient tools to make these determinations without resorting to end-result requirements.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U-S-C § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U-S-C § 7261(b)(1)?
The case was decided on March 5, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Department of Veterans Affairs’ determination that evidence regarding a disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a factual determination subject to clear-error review by the Veterans Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The statute at issue, 38 U-S-C §7261(b)(1), requires the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. This provision does not establish a new standard of review but instead directs the Veterans Court to review such determinations under the standards in §7261(a), which provides for de novo review of legal questions and clear-error review of factual findings. Determining whether evidence is in approximate balance involves both legal and factual components, as the VA must marshal and weigh evidence while also applying the legal “approximate balance” standard. Because this determination is primarily factual, clear-error review is appropriate.
Petitioners argued that the Veterans Court should review the "approximate balance" determination de novo, comparing it to judicial review of probable-cause determinations, but this analogy is flawed. The probable-cause inquiry involves substantial legal reasoning and constitutional concerns, whereas the VA’s assessment of evidence balance is specific to each case and lacks broader legal implications. The statute's language does not support imposing de novo review, nor does the canon against surplusage justify a different reading.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does an award of the “defendant's profits” under the Lanham Act allow a court to require the defendant to disgorge profits earned by legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates?
The case was decided on February 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act limits recovery of profits in trademark infringement cases to those earned by the named defendant, not its separately incorporated affiliates. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The text of the Lanham Act authorizes recovery of the “defendant’s profits,” which refers only to profits of parties named in the lawsuit. This interpretation aligns with fundamental corporate law principles that treat separately incorporated organizations as distinct legal entities with separate rights and obligations, even when they share common ownership. While exceptions exist through corporate veil-piercing doctrines, Dewberry Engineers never pursued this legal pathway. Courts may not, as the lower courts here did, disregard corporate separateness and treat a party and its non-party affiliates as “a single corporate entity” when calculating the profit award.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?
The case was decided on February 26, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) is a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b), and therefore may be reopened by the district courts. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Court's reasoning focused on interpreting the phrase “final judgment, order, or proceeding” in Rule 60(b). A voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a “final proceeding” because it terminates the case, making it “conclusive” and the “last” filing on the docket. Although "final" in appellate jurisdiction contexts is interpreted narrowly, that would should not be interpreted so narrowly here because Rule 60(b) serves a different purpose. Additionally, the term “proceeding” encompasses all steps taken in an action, including voluntary dismissals. To read “proceeding” as requiring judicial determination would strip the term of independent meaning, since judicial determinations would already be covered by “order.”
Historical context further supports this interpretation. Rule 60(b) was based on a California provision that had been interpreted to apply to voluntary dismissals. The rule speaks in ascending order of generality—”judgments,” then “orders,” then “proceedings”—suggesting “proceeding” should be broader than the preceding terms. This interpretation prevents voluntary dismissals without prejudice from falling into a procedural “no man’s land,” where they would neither be considered interlocutory nor final, leaving parties without recourse to correct mistakes in dismissal.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?
The case was decided on February 25, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s failure to correct false testimony violated the Due Process Clause under Napue v Illinois. A conviction that relies on false evidence, knowingly allowed by the prosecution, requires reversal if there is a reasonable likelihood the falsehood affected the jury’s judgment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The prosecution allowed its key witness, Justin Sneed, to provide false testimony about his mental health and medical treatment. The new evidence showed that Sneed was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium, facts that were withheld from the defense. At trial, Sneed falsely claimed he was never treated by a psychiatrist and received lithium mistakenly. This falsehood was material because Sneed’s testimony was the only direct evidence implicating Glossip, and impeachment of his credibility could have influenced the jury’s decision. The prosecution had prior knowledge of Sneed’s mental health treatment and still failed to correct the misstatement when it was made to the jury.
Correcting this false testimony would likely have changed the jury’s assessment of Sneed’s reliability. Additionally, the prosecution’s violations extended beyond Napue: it suppressed exculpatory evidence, interfered with witness testimony, and allowed destruction of key physical evidence. Given these cumulative errors and their impact on the fairness of the trial, Glossip is entitled to a new trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of the attorney general’s confession of error was based on a misapplication of federal law.
Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U-S-C § 1988?
The case was decided on February 25, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that a party that receives a preliminary injunction but does not obtain a final judgment on the merits before a case becomes moot is not a "prevailing party" eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U-S-C §1988(b). Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The term “prevailing party” in §1988(b) refers to a party who obtains enduring judicial relief that conclusively resolves their claim on the merits. Preliminary injunctions do not qualify because they merely preserve the status quo temporarily while predicting likelihood of success—they do not conclusively determine rights. Importantly, a “prevailing party” traditionally means one who "successfully prosecutes the action" or "successfully maintains" their claim "at the end" of proceedings, not one who achieves temporary success at intermediate stages.
External events that render a case moot do not transform a preliminary injunction into the kind of judicial success that warrants attorney's fees. For a party to “prevail” under §1988(b), both the change in legal relationship between parties and the permanence of that change must result from judicial order, not from outside circumstances.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?
The case was decided on February 21, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from 42 U-S-C §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 5-4 majority holding that Alabama may not enforce an administrative-exhaustion rule.
When a state law or rule functionally immunizes government officials from suits under § 1983, that law is preempted and unenforceable. Section 1983 ensures that individuals can seek a federal remedy for violations of their constitutional rights. Alabama’s exhaustion requirement, applied to delays in benefits processing, creates a procedural barrier that prevents claimants from ever challenging those delays under §1983. This precedent follows decisions in Haywood v Drown and Howlett v Rose, which held that states cannot erect procedural obstacles that effectively nullify federally guaranteed rights. The Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling in this case violated that principle by conditioning § 1983 suits on completing the very process claimants sought to challenge for unreasonable delay.
Characterizing Alabama’s rule as “jurisdictional” does not change this result. A state cannot use jurisdictional labels to avoid compliance with federal law, especially when the rule in question operates as an immunity provision. Nor does the potential availability of mandamus relief in Alabama courts justify the exhaustion rule, as requiring claimants to complete state-mandated processes before suing simply reinstates the same barrier. Because Alabama’s exhaustion rule functionally immunizes officials from § 1983 suits regarding administrative delays, it is preempted, and the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined in part.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered these three issues:
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Does historical commingling of assets suffice to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
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Must a plaintiff make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference?
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Does a sovereign defendant bear the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA?
The case was decided on February 21, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that an allegation that a foreign sovereign liquidated expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with other funds, and then used some of those commingled funds for commercial activities in the United States cannot alone satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the expropriation exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The expropriation exception requires plaintiffs to establish a clear trace between expropriated property (or the proceeds from its sale) and property present in the United States in connection with commercial activity. While money is fungible, merely stating that proceeds from the liquidation of an expropriated asset were once mixed with other funds is insufficient. To satisfy the FSIA’s requirements, plaintiffs must show that specific funds or assets linked to the seized property are currently in the United States or were used for identifiable commercial transactions there.
This interpretation aligns with the FSIA’s structure and purpose, which generally adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, shielding foreign states from suits arising from public (rather than commercial) acts. Congress designed the expropriation exception to conform closely to international law, avoiding excessive interference in foreign relations. The requirement to trace specific property reflects this cautious approach. Accepting the commingling theory alone would excessively broaden the FSIA’s expropriation exception, potentially undermining sovereign immunity principles and inviting retaliatory measures from foreign nations.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In the unanimous decision of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the False Claims Act (FCA) to reimbursement requests made under the E-Rate program, a federal initiative subsidizing internet and telecommunications services for schools and libraries. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that such reimbursement requests qualify as "claims" under the FCA because the government provides a portion of the funds disbursed by the program.
The case was decided on January 21, 2025.
Brenda Andrew was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and was sentenced to death. During her trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence about her sex life and personal failings, which was later conceded to be irrelevant. Andrew argued in a federal habeas petition that this evidence was so prejudicial it violated the Due Process Clause.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) upheld her conviction, finding some of the evidence about her extramarital affairs relevant but acknowledging that much of the other evidence was irrelevant. Despite this, the OCCA deemed the errors harmless. Two judges dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence undermined the fairness of the trial.
In federal court, the District Court denied relief, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that Andrew failed to cite clearly established federal law. The Tenth Circuit majority acknowledged the precedent set by Payne v Tennessee but dismissed it as a pronouncement rather than a holding. Judge Bacharach dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence deprived Andrew of a fair trial.
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Tenth Circuit erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that Payne established that the Due Process Clause can protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the trial court's admission of irrelevant evidence was so prejudicial as to render Andrew's trial fundamentally unfair.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violate the First Amendment?
The case was decided on January 17, 2025.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act do not violate TikTok’s First Amendment rights.
First, the Court determined that intermediate scrutiny applies because the law is content-neutral; it targets TikTok not based on the content of speech on the platform, but because of China’s ability to access sensitive data from 170 million U-S users through its control of ByteDance. While laws that discriminate among different speakers often raise First Amendment concerns, TikTok’s unique characteristics—its massive scale and susceptibility to foreign adversary control—justify treating it differently from other platforms. The law does not reflect a preference for certain content or viewpoints, so it is subject to intermediate scrutiny. In other words, the law must further an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest.
Under that test, the law was sufficiently tailored to serve the government’s important interest in preventing China from collecting vast amounts of sensitive user data. Congress had substantial evidence of the extensive personal information TikTok collects and China's ability to compel Chinese companies to surrender data. Rather than banning TikTok outright, the law allows the platform to continue operating if ByteDance divests it to eliminate Chinese control. While there may be less restrictive alternatives like disclosure requirements or data sharing restrictions, Congress retains latitude to choose its preferred regulatory solution so long as it does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve its goal.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law?
The case was decided on January 15, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Federal jurisdiction is based on the operative complaint, which means that when a plaintiff amends their complaint, courts look to that amended version to determine jurisdiction. Federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they are part of the same case as federal claims. However, this supplemental jurisdiction flows from the existence of federal jurisdiction; when federal claims are eliminated, there is no longer any basis for supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
This principle applies equally to cases that were originally filed in federal court and those that were removed from state court, as the supplemental jurisdiction statute (28 U-S-C § 1367) makes no distinction between the two situations. When Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove all federal claims after removal, the federal court lost its basis for federal question jurisdiction. Without any federal claims remaining, the court also lost supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Therefore, the entire case had to be remanded to state court.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence?
The case was decided on January 15, 2025.
The Supreme Court held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to show that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The default standard of proof in American civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence, and courts only deviate from this standard in three specific circumstances: when a statute explicitly requires a heightened standard, when the Constitution requires it, or in certain rare cases where the government seeks unusual coercive action against an individual (like revoking citizenship). None of these exceptions applies to FLSA exemption cases. The FLSA itself is silent on the standard of proof, which typically means Congress intended the default preponderance standard to apply. The case does not implicate constitutional rights, and it does not involve unusual government coercion; instead, it is akin to Title VII employment discrimination cases where the Court has consistently applied the preponderance standard.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, clarifying that courts apply the default “preponderance” rule unless Congress alters it or the Constitution forbids it.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Secretary of Homeland Security's discretionary decision to revoke an approved visa petition under 8 U-S-C §1155, based on a determination that a prior marriage was a sham.
The case was decided on December 10, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that Revocation of an approved visa petition based on a sham-marriage determination is the kind of discretionary decision that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do Florida S.B. 7072’s content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment, and do the law’s individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment?
The case was decided on July 1, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Under precedents like Miami Herald v Tornillo, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v Public Utilities Commission, Turner Broadcasting v FCC, and Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, when a private entity engages in expressive activity, including curating others' speech, government interference with that activity implicates the First Amendment.
Specifically, the First Amendment protects entities engaged in expressive activities, including compiling and curating others' speech, from being forced to accommodate messages they prefer to exclude. This protection applies even when the compiler includes most items and excludes only a few. The government cannot justify interfering with a private speaker's editorial choices merely by claiming an interest in improving or balancing the marketplace of ideas. These principles likely apply to the content moderation practices of social media platforms like Facebook's News Feed, indicating that state laws regulating these practices may face significant First Amendment hurdles. However, this analysis may not apply to all of the laws' applications, so it is important for courts to conduct a thorough examination of the laws' full scope and their constitutional and unconstitutional applications in a proper facial challenge analysis.
Texas's regulation of social media platforms' content moderation policies aims to alter the speech displayed on these platforms, reflecting the state's disapproval of the platforms' current content selection and moderation practices. However, under the First Amendment, Texas cannot impose its preferences on how private entities curate and present speech, as this would amount to government control over the expression of ideas.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the majority opinion in full and authored a separate concurrence.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in part and authored a separate concurrence.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?
The case was decided on July 1, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a former U-S President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority, at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court majority, concluded that a former President has some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. This immunity stems primarily from constitutional separation of powers principles and precedents recognizing similar immunities in civil contexts.
The President has absolute immunity from prosecution for actions taken pursuant to his exclusive constitutional powers, such as pardoning offenses or removing executive officers. This absolute immunity exists because Congress cannot criminalize, and courts cannot review, the President’s exercise of these core constitutional authorities.
For official actions outside the President’s exclusive constitutional powers, there is at least a presumptive immunity from prosecution. This presumptive immunity is rooted in the need to ensure the President can perform his duties without undue caution or distraction, as established in cases like Nixon v Fitzgerald. The government may attempt to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that prosecution would not unduly intrude on executive functions. However, evidence of immune official acts cannot be used to prove liability for unofficial acts, as this would undermine the purpose of the immunity.
Finally, drawing on Clinton v Jones, the Court affirmed that the President has no immunity for actions taken in an unofficial or personal capacity.
To apply this framework, courts must carefully analyze alleged conduct to determine whether it qualifies as official or unofficial. The Court rejected both Trump’s argument for broader immunity absent impeachment and conviction, and the government’s contention that the President has no immunity from criminal prosecution whatsoever. Instead, it established a nuanced approach requiring case-by-case analysis of presidential conduct to determine the applicable level of immunity, if any.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence to highlight that he believes the Special Counsel’s prosecution of Trump may be unconstitutional because there are serious questions about whether the office of the Special Counsel was properly “established by Law” as required by the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate opinion concurring in part to argue that rather than framing the issue as “immunity,” the Court should have adopted a two-step analysis for assessing the validity of criminal charges against a President for official acts: first determining if the relevant statute applies to the President's conduct, and then evaluating whether prosecuting the President under that statute would unconstitutionally intrude on executive power.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented because she believes the majority’s decision to grant former Presidents broad immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts is unjustified by constitutional text, history, or precedent, and dangerously places the President above the law.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented because she believes the majority’s creation of a new “Presidential accountability model” that sometimes exempts Presidents from criminal law for official acts fundamentally alters the balance of power, undermines the rule of law, and risks incentivizing presidential abuses of power.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U-S-C § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?
The case was decided on July 1, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that an Administrative Procedures Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U-S-C §2401(a) until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The text of 28 U-S-C §2401(a) states that a civil action against the United States must be filed "within six years after the right of action first accrues." The Court interpreted this language according to its traditional meaning in the context of statutes of limitations, concluding that a right of action "accrues" when the plaintiff has a "complete and present cause of action"—that is, when the plaintiff has the right to file suit and obtain relief. For an Administrative Procedures Act claim, this requires both final agency action (as specified in 5 U-S-C § 704) and an injury to the plaintiff (as required by 5 U-S-C § 702).
The Court rejected arguments that APA claims should be treated differently from other civil actions against the government, emphasizing that § 2401(a) uses standard accrual language that had a well-settled meaning when it was enacted in 1948. The Court also distinguished § 2401(a) from other statutes that explicitly start the clock at the time of final agency action, noting that Congress chose different language for §2401(a). By interpreting "accrues" consistently with its traditional meaning, the Court concluded that an APA claim does not accrue until the plaintiff has both experienced an injury and the agency action causing that injury has become final.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented and was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe.
In this case, the court considered these issues:
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Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs?
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Should the Court overrule Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?
The case was decided on June 28, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. Chevron U-S-A Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is overruled.
Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court (which also decided the consolidated case, Relentless, Inc. v Department of Commerce).
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 requires courts to "decide all relevant questions of law" when reviewing agency actions. This means courts should use their own judgment to interpret laws, not defer to agencies' interpretations. The Chevron doctrine, established in the 1984 case Chevron U-S-A v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., contradicts this principle. Chevron required courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes if those interpretations were reasonable. Chevron was based on a flawed assumption that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies whenever a law is ambiguous. This assumption doesn't reflect reality and goes against the traditional role of courts. Chevron has been difficult to apply consistently and has led to confusion in lower courts. It has also been gradually limited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Thus, Chevron should be overruled because it contradicts the APA, is based on faulty reasoning, has proven unworkable in practice, and hasn't created the kind of settled expectations that would justify keeping it in place. However, this decision does not necessarily overturn the specific outcomes of past cases that used Chevron. Those outcomes would need to be challenged separately.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined as to No. 22-1219.
Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of No. 22-451.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a city’s enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment?
The case was decided on June 28, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has historically focused on what punishments may follow a criminal conviction, not on what behaviors a government may criminalize. Although, in Robinson v California, the Court prohibited criminalizing the mere status of drug addiction, that case is distinguishable from laws that prohibit specific conduct like public camping. The Court has previously declined to extend Robinson to cover “involuntary” acts resulting from a particular status. For example, in Powell v Texas, the Court declined to prohibit punishing public drunkenness by alcoholics, even though their conduct might be considered involuntary.
Expanding Robinson’s narrow holding would risk turning the judiciary into the ultimate arbiter of criminal responsibility across diverse areas of law, a role for which the Eighth Amendment provides no guidance. Such an expansion would lead to practical difficulties, as demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's attempt to implement this approach in Martin v City of Boise. Cities have faced numerous challenges in determining who qualifies as "involuntarily" homeless and what constitutes "adequate" shelter under Martin. These judicially created standards have proven unworkable and have interfered with local efforts to address homelessness, ultimately undermining the democratic process and federalism principles.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 18 U-S-C § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?
The case was decided on June 28, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that to prove a violation of 18 U-S-C §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court focused on interpreting the scope of 18 U-S-C §1512(c)(2), particularly how it relates to §1512(c)(1). Applying the canons of statutory interpretation, particularly noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, the “otherwise” clause in (c)(2) should be read as limited by the specific conduct described in (c)(1). If (c)(2) were as broad as the government claimed, it would render (c)(1) and many other specific obstruction statutes superfluous, which goes against principles of statutory interpretation.
Next, as to the historical context of the statute, it was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address specific issues like document shredding in the Enron scandal. An overly broad interpretation of (c)(2) would criminalize a wide range of prosaic conduct and give prosecutors too much discretion. Moreover, the Court traditionally avoids broad interpretations of obstruction statutes that would create “coverall” provisions.
Finally, the Court concluded that (c)(2) should be interpreted more narrowly, in light of (c)(1), to primarily cover acts that impair the integrity or availability of evidence for use in an official proceeding, rather than all forms of obstruction. This interpretation better respects Congress’s role in defining crimes and setting penalties and avoids potential constitutional issues arising from an overly broad criminal statute.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Bankruptcy Code authorize a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent?
The case was decided on June 27, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
Applying the ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation to Section 1123(b)(6), which is a catchall provision allowing "any other appropriate provision" in a bankruptcy plan, the Court reasoned that this provision should be read in light of the specific provisions that precede it, all of which concern the debtor's rights and responsibilities. Therefore, Section 1123(b)(6) cannot be fairly read to grant the radically different power to discharge debts of non-debtors without affected claimants' consent.
The broader context of the Bankruptcy Code further supports this conclusion. Discharges are generally reserved for debtors who place their assets in the bankruptcy estate, and even then, certain types of claims (like fraud or willful injury) cannot be discharged. The Sacklers, as non-debtors, seek greater protection than the Code typically allows for actual debtors, without meeting the Code's usual requirements. Congress has only explicitly authorized third-party releases in asbestos-related bankruptcies, suggesting that such releases are not generally permissible in other contexts. Therefore, Section 1123(b)(6) does not authorize the nonconsensual release of claims against the Sacklers, who are non-debtors in Purdue Pharma's bankruptcy case.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U-S Constitution?
The case was decided on June 27, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that when the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to this SEC enforcement action. The claims are "legal in nature" and closely resemble common law fraud actions. The substance of the claim matters more than its statutory origin or which branch of government brings the action. Moreover, the civil penalties sought are punitive in nature, which is a type of remedy traditionally provided by courts of law rather than courts of equity.
Second, the "public rights" exception to the Seventh Amendment does not apply here because this case does not fall within the narrow categories of matters that have historically been exclusively determined by the executive and legislative branches. The mere facts that Congress assigned the matter to an agency and that the government is the plaintiff do not change this outcome. Unlike the novel regulatory scheme in Atlas Roofing, these SEC fraud claims have close analogues in traditional common law actions that were historically adjudicated by courts with juries.
Because this action is essentially a common law fraud suit seeking punitive remedies, it must be heard by an Article III court with a jury, despite Congress assigning it to an administrative proceeding. This conclusion preserves the constitutional separation of powers and the role of juries in adjudicating traditional legal claims.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?
The case was decided on June 27, 2024.
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and vacated its earlier stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction against Idaho’s abortion law.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion that was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Justice Kagan opined that EMTALA requires hospitals to provide abortions in certain health emergencies that Idaho’s law prohibits, creating a clear conflict where federal law preempts state law.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion that was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh. She explained why she believes the Court should dismiss the case and vacate the stay, arguing that the dispute has narrowed significantly since the Court initially granted certiorari, making it inappropriate for immediate Supreme Court resolution.
Justice Jackson concurred in part with the Court’s decision to vacate the stay and lift the injunction, agreeing with Justice Kagan’s analysis that EMTALA preempts Idaho’s law. However, she dissented from the Court’s decision to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, arguing that the conflict between state and federal law remains significant and that the Court should have resolved the preemption issue now rather than delaying a decision.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Alito argued that the Court should have decided the statutory interpretation question and rejected the government’s novel interpretation of EMTALA rather than dismissing the case and allowing the injunction against Idaho’s law to take effect.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: should the Court stay the EPA’s federal emissions reduction rule, the Good Neighbor Plan, and are the emissions controls imposed by the rule reasonable regardless of the number of states subject to the rule?
The case was decided on June 27, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the EPA’s enforcement of the Federal Implementation Plan against the applicant States is stayed pending disposition of the applicants’ petition for review in the D-C Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
There is a four-factor test for deciding whether to grant a stay: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court focused primarily on the first factor—likelihood of success on the merits—and concluded that the applicants (states and industry groups challenging the EPA's rule) were likely to succeed in arguing that the EPA's Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) was “arbitrary” or “capricious” under the Clean Air Act.
The EPA failed to adequately explain why its emissions reduction requirements would remain appropriate if fewer states were covered by the plan than originally intended. Commenters had raised concerns during the rulemaking process about what would happen if some states dropped out of the plan, but the EPA did not sufficiently address these concerns. While the EPA did add a “severability” provision saying the rule would continue to apply even if some states dropped out, this did not actually address the underlying issue of whether the emissions requirements would still be justified with fewer states. Because the EPA likely “ignored an important aspect of the problem” by not explaining why its emissions reduction requirements would remain appropriate with fewer covered states, the applicants were likely to succeed in having the rule "reversed" as arbitrary and capricious, justifying the stay pending further review.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the applicants are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the EPA’s rule. Justice Barrett rejected the Court’s theory about EPA’s failure to explain as underdeveloped, plagued by significant procedural obstacles, and contradicted by evidence in the record. Justice Barrett argued that the EPA’s methodology for calculating emissions limits appears to be independent of the number of states covered, and that the Clean Air Act’s stringent harmless-error rule would likely prevent the applicants from prevailing even if there were a procedural error. She also criticized the majority for granting emergency relief based on a theory that was not fully briefed or argued.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: does 18 U-S-C § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?
The case was decided on June 26, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that Federal law, 18 U-S-C §666, proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court identified six main reasons that 18 U-S-C §666(a)(1)(B) is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute:
a) Text: The language of §666 closely resembles the federal bribery statute (§201(b)) rather than the federal gratuities statute (§201(c)).
b) Statutory history: Congress amended §666 in 1986 to model it after the bribery statute, not the gratuities statute.
c) Statutory structure: Unlike other laws, §666 does not separate bribery and gratuities into distinct provisions.
d) Statutory punishments: The penalties in §666 align with those for bribery, not gratuities, and would create inexplicable sentencing disparities if applied to gratuities.
e) Federalism: Interpreting §666 as a gratuities statute would significantly infringe on states' rights to regulate their officials' conduct.
f) Fair notice: The government's interpretation would create ambiguity and potentially criminalize innocuous behavior without clear guidelines for state and local officials.
The Court rejected the government's argument that the inclusion of the term "rewarded" in §666 indicates it covers gratuities. Rather, the word "rewarded" serves to close potential loopholes in bribery cases.
Because §666 prohibits bribes but not gratuities, state and local governments may choose whether and how to regulate gratuities for their officials within constitutional bounds.
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the Court’s opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the federal government’s request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users’ First Amendment rights?
The case was decided on June 26, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that Respondents—two States and five individual social-media users who sued Executive Branch officials and agencies, alleging that the Government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment—lack Article III standing to seek an injunction. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court concluded that the petitioners lacked standing for two main reasons:
First, the plaintiffs failed to establish a clear causal link between their past social media restrictions and the actions of the government defendants. Most of the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that their content was restricted due to government pressure rather than the platforms' independent moderation policies. Even for Jill Hines, who made the strongest case, the connections were tenuous and did not clearly show that her restrictions were likely traceable to government coercion rather than Facebook's own judgment.
Second, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a substantial risk of future injury traceable to the defendants' actions. By the time of the lawsuit, most of the government's communications with social media platforms about COVID-19 and election misinformation had significantly decreased. Without evidence of ongoing pressure from the government, it was speculative to assume that future content moderation decisions would be attributable to the defendants rather than the platforms' independent policies. The Court also found that an injunction against the government was unlikely to affect the platforms' content moderation decisions, creating a redressability problem.
The Court emphasized that at the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must make a clear showing that they are likely to establish each element of standing, which the petitioners failed to do based on the evidence presented.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
The case was decided on June 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle applies to both facts that increase the maximum sentence and facts that increase the minimum sentence.
In Erlinger's case, determining whether his prior offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions (as required by the Armed Career Criminal Act) involved finding facts that increased both his minimum and maximum potential sentences. Therefore, this determination should have been made by a jury, not a judge.
This factual determination does not fall under the narrow Almendarez-Torres exception, which allows judges to find only the fact of a prior conviction. The occasions inquiry requires going beyond simply identifying prior convictions and their elements. While there may be practical concerns about prejudicing defendants by presenting evidence of prior crimes to juries, these can be addressed through procedural tools like bifurcated trials. Constitutional requirements cannot be set aside for efficiency or practicality reasons.
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Samuel Alito joined and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined in part.
Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?
The case was decided on June 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The doctrine of consular nonreviewability holds that federal courts generally cannot review visa denial decisions made by consular officers, but there may be a narrow exception for decisions that abridge fundamental constitutional rights (the Court assumed but did not decide the possibility of such an exception). However, the right to bring a noncitizen spouse to the U.S. is not deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition, as required by the Glucksberg test. Throughout the history of U.S. immigration law, the admission of noncitizens, including spouses, has consistently been treated as a matter of sovereign discretion rather than individual right. While Congress has the ability to prioritize family unity in immigration policy, there is no constitutional requirement to do so.
Thus, U.S. citizens do not have a fundamental right to have their noncitizen spouses admitted to the country, nor do they have procedural due process rights in the visa proceedings of others.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?
The case was decided on June 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
Consent decrees have a dual nature; they embody agreements between parties (contractual) and are enforceable as judicial decrees. While intervenors can present evidence and objections, they cannot block a consent decree merely by withholding consent unless the settlement affects their claims. Additionally, a consent decree cannot dispose of the claims of nonconsenting intervenors without their agreement.
Here, the Court needed to determine whether the United States has valid Compact claims and if the proposed consent decree would dispose of those claims. Its interests in the Rio Grande Project and compliance with treaty obligations constitute distinctively federal interests, justifying its intervention. However, the proposed consent decree would resolve the United States’ claims without addressing its allegations, making it inappropriate for approval without the United States' consent.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the federal government seeks to prolong this original jurisdiction dispute, a form of litigation usually reserved for disputes between States, over the objection of both Texas and New Mexico.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?
The case was decided on June 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that when an expert conveys an absent lab analyst’s statements in support of the expert’s opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial hearsay,” that is, out-of-court statements introduced for their truth. The key question is whether the non-testifying analyst’s lab statements were introduced for their truth or for another purpose. The Court rejected Arizona’s argument that the statements were only used to show the basis of the non-testifying expert opinion, not for their truth.
Evidentiary rules do not control whether a statement is admitted for its truth; this is a constitutional question. When an expert conveys out-of-court statements to support their opinion, and those statements only support the opinion if true, then the statements have been offered for their truth. The jury cannot evaluate the expert’s credibility without assessing the truth of the underlying statements.
In this case, the expert’s testimony relied entirely on accepting the non-testifying analyst’s statements as true. His opinions were predicated on the truth of what the analyst reported about her lab work. Allowing this practice would undermine previous decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and allow easy evasion of the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, the non-testifying analyst’s statements were introduced for their truth, violating Smith's confrontation rights if the statements were testimonial. The Court remanded for determination of whether the statements were testimonial by looking at each statement’s “primary purpose.”
Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch did not join the Court’s analysis of when a statement is “testimonial,” and each wrote separately to explain how they differed.
Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, arguing that the majority unnecessarily complicated the matter and should have found that the testimony sought to prove the truth of the statements and was, therefore, inadmissible hearsay subject to the Confrontation Clause.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 18 U-S-C § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?
The case was decided on June 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that when an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fundamental but not unlimited. When examining a challenged regulation, the Court considers whether it is consistent with historical principles, not necessarily identical to historical laws. The key factors are why and how the regulation burdens the right.
Section 922(g)(8) fits within this tradition. Historically, two legal regimes addressed firearms violence: surety laws and “going armed” laws. Surety laws allowed magistrates to require bonds from individuals suspected of future misbehavior, including firearm misuse. “Going armed” laws prohibited carrying weapons in a way that terrified the public. Both regimes targeted individuals who posed threats to others’ safety.
Section 922(g)(8) is relevantly similar to these historical laws. It applies to individuals found by a court to threaten others’ physical safety, just as the historical laws did. The burden it imposes—temporary disarmament based on a judicial finding—is also consistent with historical practice. While not identical to historical laws, Section 922(g)(8) aligns with the principles underlying the Second Amendment and historical firearm regulations aimed at preventing violence.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, opining that the Court correctly applied its decision in Bruen, but she continues to believe that Bruen was incorrectly decided.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, emphasizing that while Section 922(g)(8) can be constitutional in some applications, the Court’s ruling is narrow and leaves open many questions about the law’s constitutionality in other specific circumstances.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to review the proper roles of text, history, and precedent in constitutional interpretation.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, noting that two years’ after Bruen, it is now clear that the unclear legal standard established in Bruen is difficult for lower courts to apply.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, acknowledging lower courts’ struggle to apply Bruen but pointing out that in this case, the Court settles on just the right level of generality
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that not a single historical regulation justifies the statute at issue.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?
The case was decided on June 20, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Court considered the Fourth Amendment issue. A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim can proceed even when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge. This is because a pretrial detention must be based on probable cause, and if an invalid charge causes a detention to start or continue, the Fourth Amendment is violated, even if a valid charge also exists.
Second, looking at the common law tort of malicious prosecution, which was analogous to Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims when §1983 was enacted. Historical evidence shows that courts assessed probable cause on a charge-by-charge basis, and a plaintiff could bring a malicious prosecution claim for groundless charges even if they were coupled with well-founded ones.
Based on these two lines of reasoning, the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's categorical rule that barred Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims if any charge was valid and concluded that courts should evaluate such suits on a charge-by-charge basis.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, reiterating Justice Alito’s prior opinion (in which Justice Thomas joined) that a “malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the Fourth Amendment.”
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports a malicious prosecution claim.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Diaz v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?
The case was decided on June 20, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that expert testimony that “most people” in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about “the defendant” and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) is a narrow exception to the general admissibility of ultimate issue opinions established by Rule 704(a). It only prohibits expert opinions about whether a specific defendant had a particular mental state that is an element of the crime or defense. It does not bar testimony about the mental states of people in general or groups that may include the defendant. Moreover, the language of Rule 704(b), particularly the word “about,” supports the conclusion that the rule targets specific conclusions about a defendant's mental state, not just any testimony related to mental states. This interpretation is further supported by the context of Rule 704(a), which allows opinions embracing ultimate issues, making Rule 704(b) a narrow exception to that broader rule.
Justice Kentanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion to emphasize that, as Congress designed it, Rule 704(b) is party agnostic.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the majority’s interpretation allows prosecutors to put an expert on the stand to testify as to what “most” people like the defendant think when they commit a legally proscribed act and then merely convince the jury that the defendant is like “most” people and convict.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Garland v Cargill.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U-S-C § 5845(b)?
The case was decided on June 14, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a “machinegun” under 26 U-S-C § 5845(b). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock does not fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” The phrase “function of the trigger” refers to the physical movement of the trigger that activates the firing mechanism. With or without a bump stock, a semiautomatic rifle requires the trigger to be released and reset between each shot. The bump stock merely accelerates the rate of fire by causing these distinct trigger functions to occur in rapid succession, but it does not change the fundamental operation of the firearm. Each shot still requires a separate trigger function.
Second, even if a bump stock-equipped rifle could fire multiple shots by a single trigger function, it would not do so “automatically” as required by the statute. Firing multiple shots with a bump stock requires ongoing manual input from the shooter, who must maintain the right amount of forward pressure on the rifle’s front grip. This additional manual input goes beyond the “single function of the trigger” specified in the statute. In contrast, with a traditional machinegun, simply holding down the trigger causes continuous fire without additional manipulation. Because a bump stock requires this extra physical input, it does not meet the “automatically” requirement of the statutory definition.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion suggesting that Congress can amend § 5845(b) if it wants to treat semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks as the same as machineguns.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the majority adopts a narrow understanding of “machinegun” that is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and unsupported by context or purpose.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Campos-Chaves v Garland.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the government provide adequate notice under 8 U-S-C § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information?
The case was decided on June 14, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that because each of the noncitizens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Justice Samuel Alito authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
The phrase “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” in §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) means that either a paragraph (1) notice to appear (NTA) or a paragraph (2) notice of hearing can suffice to defeat rescission. The word “or” is typically disjunctive, and the statutory context supports this reading. The notice that “matters” for purposes of rescission is the one that informed the noncitizen of the time and date of the missed hearing at which they were ordered removed. This aligns with §1229a(b)(5)(A), which ties “the written notice” to the specific missed proceeding. A paragraph (2) notice can stand alone and provide valid notice, even if the initial NTA was deficient. The terms “change” and “new” in paragraph (2) do not require a prior compliant NTA.
Here, the noncitizens received proper paragraph (2) notices for the hearings they missed, even though their initial NTAs lacked time and place information. Therefore, they cannot seek rescission based on defective notice. While the government must still provide an NTA, noncitizens who receive only a paragraph (2) notice must attend the hearing or face removal in absentia. They can raise issues about incomplete notice at that time.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Jackson argued that the majority’s interpretation misreads the plain text of the statute and ignores the indispensable role of a compliant notice to appear (NTA) under §1229(a)(1). She contends that a paragraph (2) notice cannot stand alone and presupposes a valid NTA, as evidenced by the statute's structure, language, and context. This reading aligns with the Court’s previous statements in Pereira and Niz-Chavez, and the majority’s different interpretation disrupts Congress’s carefully crafted removal scheme, which balances efficiency with fairness and procedural integrity.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in United States Trustee v John Q. Hammons Fall 2006.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the U.S. Trustee issue refunds for the extra fees paid by debtors in certain districts to address the lack of uniformity identified in Siegel v Fitzgerald?
The case was decided on June 14, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that refunds are not required; rather, prospective parity—i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward—is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v Fitzgerald. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
To determine the appropriate remedy, the Court considers what Congress would have intended had it known about the constitutional problem. Congress has demonstrated a strong commitment to keeping the U.S. Trustee program self-funded through user fees, as evidenced by the 2017 fee increase and the 2021 Act maintaining elevated fees. Providing refunds would significantly disrupt the statutory scheme by transforming the self-funded U.S. Trustee program into a $326 million bill for taxpayers. It would also likely exacerbate the existing fee disparity. Moreover, Congress chose not to impose higher fees retroactively on Bankruptcy Administrator districts when it amended the fee statute in 2021, indicating it did not intend such a remedy. Thus, Congress would have wanted prospective fee parity, which is what Congress itself implemented in the 2021 Act.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the Court’s decision undermines the importance of constitutional remedies and may have far-reaching negative consequences beyond the bankruptcy context. Justice Gorsuch would conclude that under traditional remedial principles, Hammons should receive a refund for the unconstitutional fees it paid.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in FDA v Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.
In this case, the court considered these issues:
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Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use?
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Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious?
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Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?
The case was decided on June 13, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s regulatory actions regarding mifepristone. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff doctors and medical associations, none of whom prescribe or use mifepristone, do not allege direct monetary injuries, property injuries, or physical injuries from FDA's actions relaxing the regulation of mifepristone. Rather, they have legal, moral, ideological, and policy concerns about abortion. While these concerns are legitimate, they do not suffice on their own to confer Article III standing to sue in federal court.
Given the broad and comprehensive conscience protections guaranteed by federal law, the plaintiffs have not shown that FDA's actions will cause them to suffer any conscience injury. Additionally, the causal link between FDA’s regulatory actions and the alleged monetary and related injuries (e.g., diverting resources, increased risk of liability suits, potentially increasing insurance costs) is too speculative or attenuated to establish standing. Finally, the medical associations have not demonstrated organizational standing. Thus, even if true that no one would be able to challenge FDA’s actions if the plaintiffs cannot, the Court has long rejected this “if not us, who?" argument as a basis for standing.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion reiterating that associational (or organizational) standing is simply another form of third-party standing and that the Court should, in another case, explain just how the Constitution permits associational standing.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Vidal v Elster.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
The case was decided on June 13, 2024.
Steve Elster sought to register the trademark "Trump too small" for use on shirts and hats, drawing from a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused registration based on the "names clause" of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the registration of a mark that identifies a particular living individual without their written consent. Elster argued that this clause violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the PTO's decision, but the Federal Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Federal Circuit's decision, holding that the Lanham Act's names clause does not violate the First Amendment. The Court found that while the names clause is content-based, it is not viewpoint-based, as it does not discriminate against any particular viewpoint. The Court also noted that the names clause is grounded in a historical tradition of restricting the trademarking of names, which has coexisted with the First Amendment. The Court concluded that this history and tradition are sufficient to demonstrate that the names clause does not violate the First Amendment. The Court emphasized that its decision is narrow and does not set forth a comprehensive framework for judging whether all content-based but viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions are constitutional.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Starbucks Corp. v McKinney.
In this case, the court considered this issue: What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?
The case was decided on June 13, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that when considering the NLRB’s request for a preliminary injunction under §10( j), district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Section 10( j) authorizes a federal district court “to grant . . . such temporary relief . empowers courts to grant equitable relief, there is a strong presumption that courts will exercise that authority in a manner consistent with traditional principles of equity. For preliminary injunctions, the four criteria identified in Winter encompass the relevant equitable principles. Nothing in §10( j) displaces the presumption that those traditional principles govern.
The traditional rule is that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear showing that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” “These commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a ‘practice with a background of several hundred years of history.’ ” When interpreting a statute that authorizes federal courts to grant preliminary injunctions, the Court “does not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles.” Absent a clear command from Congress, then, courts must adhere to the traditional four-factor test articulated in Winter.
Section 10( j)’s statutory directive to grant injunctive relief when the district court “deems” it “just and proper” does not jettison the normal equitable rules; it simply invokes the discretion that courts have traditionally exercised when faced with requests for equitable relief. Furthermore, §10( j)’s text bears no resemblance to the language that Congress has employed when it has altered the normal equitable rules.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Connelly v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax?
The case was decided on June 6, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a corporation’s contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation’s value for purposes of the federal estate tax. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
A share buyback at fair market value does not economically impact any shareholder. Although the remaining shareholders have a larger ownership percentage in a less valuable company following the buyback, the value of their holdings remains the same. Moreover, a hypothetical buyer of the shares pre-buyback would pay full price, knowing they could later redeem the shares from the company at that same fair market value.
Furthermore, the deceased shareholder's shares must be valued just prior to death, before the buyback occurs, not after. At that point, the life insurance proceeds are still a company asset that increases share value. The Court rejected the argument that the buyback obligation is a liability that offsets the life insurance asset, noting that a stock buyback by definition reduces a company's value and concentrates ownership among fewer shares. Consequently, in this case, the company's obligation to buy back the shares using life insurance proceeds does not reduce the taxable value of the deceased shareholder's stock at the time of death, as the insurance remains a company asset at that point.
While acknowledging that this decision could make succession planning more challenging, the Court pointed out that shareholders could have used alternate arrangements, such as a cross-purchase agreement, to avoid this particular tax outcome.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Becerra v San Carlos Apache Tribe.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?
The case was decided on June 6, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) requires the Indian Health Service (IHS) to pay contract support costs for activities tribes carry out under self-determination contracts, including costs incurred when spending program income from third-party payers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, affirming the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
ISDA Sections 5325(a)(2) and (a)(3)(A) require the Indian Health Service (IHS) to pay “contract support costs” to tribes that take over healthcare programs the IHS previously operated. These costs cover reasonable expenses tribes incur to ensure they comply with their contracts with IHS. The tribes' contracts require them to collect and spend “program income” (like insurance payments) to carry out the healthcare programs they took over. When tribes use this program income as required and incur administrative and overhead costs as a result, those costs fit squarely within what the law defines as reimbursable “contract support costs.”
The Court rejected IHS's arguments that Section 5326 prohibits paying these costs. That provision was meant to prevent IHS from paying costs related to separate contracts tribes have with other parties, which isn’t the situation here. Rather, here, the contract support costs are directly attributable to and associated with the tribes' contracts with IHS, because those contracts themselves require the tribes to collect and spend the program income that generates the costs. Therefore, ISDA requires IHS to pay the contract support costs the tribes incur from spending program income as their IHS contracts demand.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett. The dissent argued that ISDA’s contract support cost provisions do not extend to the costs associated with spending third-party income, emphasizing that the majority’s interpretation could lead to significant financial implications and potentially disrupt the allocation of federal funds.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Truck Insurance Exchange v Kaiser Gypsum Co.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?
The case was decided on June 6, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that an insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a “party in interest” under 11 U-S-C §1109(b) that “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 8-0 opinion of the Court (Justice Samuel Alito did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case).
The text of § 1109(b) is broad, providing a non-exhaustive list of “parties in interest” who have a direct financial stake in the outcome of the case. The plain meaning refers to entities potentially concerned with or affected by the proceeding. The historical context shows Congress has consistently acted to promote greater participation in reorganization proceedings. Section 1109(b) continues this tradition by using the capacious term “party in interest.” The purpose of § 1109(b) is to promote a fair and equitable reorganization process by allowing a broad range of interests to intervene and prevent dominant interests from controlling the process.
Applying these principles, insurers like Truck are parties in interest because bankruptcy proceedings can affect their interests in many ways, such as impairing their contractual rights or exposing them to fraudulent claims. Truck's potential financial harm from the plan gives it an interest. Giving insurers like Truck an opportunity to be heard is consistent with § 1109(b)'s purpose, as they may be the only ones with an incentive to identify problems with a plan that puts them on the hook financially. The lower court's "insurance neutrality" doctrine, which looks only at whether a plan alters the insurer's contract rights or quantum of liability, is wrong conceptually and too limited practically in ignoring the many other ways plans can affect insurers.
Thus, the text, history, and purpose of § 1109(b) support the understanding that financially responsible insurers like Truck have a sufficiently direct stake to be "parties in interest" entitled to be heard.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Thornell v Jones.
In this case, the court considered this issue: What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?
The case was decided on May 30, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that when a capital defendant claims that he was prejudiced at sentencing because counsel failed to present available mitigating evidence, a court must decide whether it is reasonably likely that the additional evidence would have avoided a death sentence, which the court does by evaluating the strength of all the evidence and comparing the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones needed to prove his counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced the outcome, meaning there was a reasonable probability that absent the errors, the sentencer would not have imposed the death penalty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit failed to properly apply this standard in three ways: (1) It did not adequately consider the serious aggravating circumstances in Jones’s case; (2) It applied an unsound rule prohibiting comparative analysis of expert testimony; and (3) It incorrectly suggested the sentencer cannot find mitigating evidence unpersuasive. Weighing the mitigating and aggravating evidence itself, the Court determined that most of Jones’s mitigating evidence was already presented in state court and the new evidence was not substantial. In contrast, the aggravating circumstances—multiple homicides, cruelty, financial motivation, and murder of a child—are given great weight under Arizona law. Past Arizona cases with similar aggravating factors resulted in the death penalty even with significant mitigating evidence. Therefore, there was no reasonable probability that Jones’s additional evidence would have changed the sentencing outcome.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that while she agreed that the Ninth Circuit “all but ignored the strong aggravating circumstances in this case,” the majority “unnecessarily” reweighed the evidence itself rather than remanding it to the lower court to decide in the first instance.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Cantero v Bank of America.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When are state laws that regulate national banks preempted under federal law?
The case was decided on May 30, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, state laws are preempted only if they discriminate against national banks or “prevent or significantly interfere” with a national bank’s exercise of its powers, as determined by the standard articulated in Barnett Bank v Nelson. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court vacating the Second Circuit’s judgment for failing to apply the proper preemption test.
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed by Congress in 2010, establishes the controlling legal standard for determining when a state consumer financial law, like New York's interest-on-escrow law, is preempted with respect to national banks. Dodd-Frank expressly rejected the position that all state laws regulating national banks are automatically preempted. Rather, a state law is preempted by the National Bank Act only if: (1) the state law discriminates against national banks as compared to state banks; or (2) the state law "prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers." In Barnett Bank v Nelson (1996), the Court explained the test for “prevents or significantly interferes with” requires courts to make a practical assessment of the nature and degree of interference caused by the state law, guided by the Court's precedents. Because the Second Circuit failed to conduct this nuanced analysis and instead employed a categorical test that would preempt virtually all state laws regulating national banks, the Court vacated its judgment and remanded the case for analysis in a manner consistent with the Barnett Bank standard.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in National Rifle Association of America v Vullo.
In this case, the court considered this issue: does a New York regulator’s discouragement of companies from doing business with the National Rifle Association after the Parkland school shooting constitute coercion in violation of the First Amendment?
The case was decided on May 30, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the NRA plausibly alleged that the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Government officials are free to criticize particular viewpoints and try to persuade others, but they cannot use state power to punish or suppress disfavored speech. Under the 1963 case Bantam Books v Sullivan, the key question is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the government official’s actions could reasonably be understood as a threat of adverse consequences aimed at coercing a private party to punish or suppress someone else's speech on the government's behalf. Factors to consider include the official's regulatory authority, the language and tone of the communications, how they were perceived, and whether they referred to adverse consequences.
Here, the NRA plausibly alleged coercion based on Vullo’s broad regulatory and enforcement powers over entities like Lloyd’s of London, her alleged statements pressuring Lloyd’s and other insurance entities to cut ties with the NRA and other gun-promotion groups in exchange for leniency on unrelated infractions, and how those entities reacted to that pressure. Although Vullo was entitled to enforce state insurance law, she could not leverage that power to stifle the NRA’s advocacy. At this preliminary (motion to dismiss) stage of the case, a court must assume the NRA’s factual allegations were true, so the Court rejected Vullo’s arguments that she was engaged only in government speech and legitimate enforcement.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion to reiterate that the Court merely reaffirms a well-settled principle: “A government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.”
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion to highlight the distinction between government coercion and a violation of the First Amendment—specifically that the fact of coercion, without more, does not state a First Amendment claim.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Brown v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?
The case was decided on May 23, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, Precedent and statutory context support the Government’s interpretation—that the federal and state definitions of a drug must match when the state crime was committed. ACCA is a recidivist statute that looks backward at a defendant's prior convictions to gauge their culpability and dangerousness. Treating state and federal drug offenses differently based on later changes to drug schedules would lead to strange results.
Second, the Government's interpretation best fulfills ACCA's objectives. A defendant's prior serious drug convictions indicate a risk of future dangerousness, even if the drug is later considered less dangerous. The fact of the earlier conviction, not the legislature's subsequent judgment, is what matters for ACCA's purposes.
Jackson's reliance on the reference canon and the principle that the law setting the penalty is the law in place when the crime was committed is misplaced. ACCA's reference to the Controlled Substances Act is specific, not general, and treating Jackson's prior convictions as ACCA predicates is consistent with the current law.
Additionally, Brown's textual argument based on ACCA's use of the present tense, noting that this was likely a stylistic choice. Brown's reliance on the Schooner Peggy principle is misplaced because ACCA itself has not changed during the litigation.
While the Government's interpretation may have some limitations, such as not capturing pre-1970 drug convictions, this is not absurd given the comprehensive regulatory scheme introduced by the Controlled Substances Act in 1970. The rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is not grievously ambiguous after considering context, precedent, and statutory design.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in full and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that, notwithstanding the majority’s contrary contention, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) definitively answers the question presented here, establishing that courts should apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearms offense that triggers ACCA’s potential application.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Coinbase v Suski.
In this case, the court considered this issue: when parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, does an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?
The case was decided on May 23, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that where parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
When a court faces a situation where parties have agreed to two contracts that conflict on the question of who decides the arbitrability of disputes—the courts or an arbitrator—a court must determine which contract governs. Parties can form multiple levels of agreements concerning arbitration, leading to different kinds of disputes: first-order (merits of the dispute), second-order (whether they agreed to arbitrate the merits), and third-order (who decides the second-order question). This case involves a fourth-order dispute: which contract applies when there are conflicting agreements on who decides arbitrability. This question must be answered by a court, not an arbitrator. The severability principle does not require parties to challenge only the arbitration or delegation provision, and the issue of California state law is outside the scope of the question presented.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Alexander V South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map, which has the effect of moving tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander, even if the legislators’ purported intent was merely a political gerrymander?
The case was decided on May 23, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the district court’s finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina’s first congressional district was clearly erroneous, so its racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings are reversed. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
To prove unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, a plaintiff must show that race was the “predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.” To make that showing, a plaintiff must prove that the State “subordinated” race-neutral districting criteria such as compactness, contiguity, and core preservation to “racial considerations.” Racial considerations predominate when “race was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised” in the drawing of district lines. However, when partisanship and race correlate, a constitutionally permissible partisan gerrymandered map can look very similar to a racially gerrymandered map. District courts must presume that legislatures acted in good faith in drawing a districting map. Here, the plaintiffs provided no direct evidence, and only weak circumstantial evidence, of a racial gerrymander. The four experts whose testimony the plaintiffs proffered, and on which the district court relied, are flawed because they “ignored certain traditional districting criteria” such as geographical constraints and the legislature’s partisan interests. Further, the plaintiffs failed to provide a substitute map that shows how the State “could have achieved its legitimate political objectives” while producing “significantly greater racial balance.” An alternative map of this sort is crucial in helping plaintiffs disentangle race and politics. In light of the weak circumstantial evidence of racial gerrymandering and the absence of an alternative map, the district court's finding that race predominated the redistricting map was clearly erroneous.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part, arguing that the Court’s review of the expert reports exceeds the proper scope of clear-error review. Justice Thomas argued that the district court’s failure to evaluate evidence reflecting the correlation between race and politics with the necessary presumption of legislative good faith and its failure to properly account for the plaintiffs’ failure to produce an alternative map are alone reversible legal errors.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, criticizing the “picking and choosing evidence to its liking.” Justice Kagan argued that rather than giving the district court’s view of the evidence “significant deference” as is required by “clear error” review, the majority inverts the clear-error standard by using the presumption that a legislature acted in good faith and by treating any “possibility” that favors the state as “dispositive.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Smith v Spizzirri.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act give district courts discretion to dismiss a lawsuit when all claims are subject to arbitration?
The case was decided on May 16, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that when a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that a court “shall” stay proceedings when an issue is subject to arbitration. The word “shall” creates a mandatory obligation that leaves no room for judicial discretion. The term “stay” means a temporary suspension of legal proceedings, not a conclusive termination. The statutory text surrounding “stay” in Section 3 indicates that parties can return to federal court if arbitration fails, which would not be possible if the case were dismissed.
Even if district courts have inherent authority to dismiss proceedings subject to arbitration, Section 3 of the FAA overrides that discretion and requires a stay. The FAA’s structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. The FAA allows immediate appeals of orders denying arbitration but not orders compelling arbitration, reflecting Congress’s intent to move parties to arbitration quickly. Dismissing a case would trigger an appeal that Congress sought to forbid. Finally, staying a suit aligns with the supervisory role the FAA envisions for courts, allowing them to assist in the arbitration process as needed. Keeping the case on the docket avoids the costs and complications of filing a new suit to invoke the FAA's procedural protections.
Thus, Section 3 compels the district court to issue a stay and does not give the court discretion to dismiss the suit.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution?
The case was decided on May 16, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau satisfies the Appropriations Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Appropriations Clause provides that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Article I, §9, cl. 7—in other words, government spending must be authorized by an act of Congress. Historically, the word “appropriation” requires identifying a source of public funds and authorizing the expenditure of those funds for designated purposes. The practices of the English Parliament after the Glorious Revolution, the American Colonies, early state legislatures, and the First Congress varied widely in their specificity, duration, and structure, but all met these basic requirements.
The statute authorizing the CFPB’s funding likewise contains the necessary elements of a valid appropriation under the Appropriations Clause. It identifies a source of funds (the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System), sets a maximum amount that can be drawn, and specifies the purpose for which the funds can be used (to pay the CFPB’s expenses in carrying out its duties). Furthermore, the CFPB’s funding mechanism is analogous to some of the broad, open-ended appropriations passed by the First Congress. Therefore, the CFPB's funding statute satisfies the requirements of the Appropriations Clause.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett joined, noting that CFPB’s funding scheme would have been acceptable not only in the late-18th century, but also any other time in our Nation’s history.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, endorsing judicial restraint. She pointed out that “when the Constitution’s text does not provide a limit to a coordinate branch’s power,” courts “should not lightly assume that Article III implicitly directs the Judiciary to find one.”
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Appropriations Clause imposes more stringent obligations on Congress to monitor and control the expenditure of public funds and the projects they finance.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Harrow v Department of Defense.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U-S-C § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?
The case was decided on May 16, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U-S-C § 7703(b)(1), is not jurisdictional. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
As a preliminary matter, procedural requirements are typically not treated as jurisdictional unless Congress clearly states otherwise. This sets a high bar for finding a procedural rule to be jurisdictional.
The language of § 7703(b)(1) itself does not suggest that the 60-day deadline is jurisdictional. Although the deadline is stated in mandatory terms (“shall be filed”), the Court has repeatedly held that this is not enough to make a time bar jurisdictional. The provision does not mention the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction or authority to hear untimely claims. Nor does 28 U-S-C § 1295(a)(9), which grants the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB “pursuant to” §7703(b)(1), automatically make the 60-day deadline jurisdictional. However, the Court found that the phrase "pursuant to" has multiple meanings and does not necessarily indicate strict compliance with every requirement of §7703(b)(1). Finally, this case is distinguishable from Bowles v Russell, which held that the deadline for filing an appeal from one Article III court to another is jurisdictional, because this case involves an appeal from an agency to a court, not from one court to another.
Because Congress did not clearly state that the 60-day deadline in §7703(b)(1) is jurisdictional, and the language and context of the relevant statutes do not compel a jurisdictional reading, the deadline is a non-jurisdictional procedural requirement.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v Nealy.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Under the discovery accrual rule applied by the circuit courts and the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U-S-C § 507(b), may a copyright plaintiff recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit?
The case was decided on May 9, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Copyright Act’s statute of limitations provision establishes a three-year period for filing a copyright infringement suit, which begins to run when the claim accrues. This case assumes that a copyright claim accrues upon discovery of the infringement (the “discovery rule”), rather than when the infringement occurred, although the Court has not definitively resolved which rule applies. If a plaintiff has a timely claim under the discovery rule, the Act’s remedial provisions do not impose any separate time limit on the recovery of damages. Those provisions state, without qualification, that an infringer is liable for either statutory damages or the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits.
The Second Circuit’s view, relying on language from the Court’s decision in Petrella v MGM, that damages are limited to the three years prior to filing suit, even if earlier infringements are timely under the discovery rule, lacks textual support and effectively nullifies the discovery rule. The Court’s decision in Petrella does not support such a damages cap, as the Court merely described how the limitations provision works when a plaintiff, as in that case, has no timely claims for infringing acts more than three years old. In contrast, if a plaintiff like Nealy in this case has timely claims for earlier infringements under the discovery rule, he may obtain damages for those infringements, as the Copyright Act contains no separate time-based limit on monetary recovery.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the discovery rule of accrual, which the majority assumes without deciding in this case, is decidedly incorrect, and thus that any decision that relies on that rule is likely to soon become a “dead letter.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Culley v Marshall.
In this case, the court considered this issue: What test must a district court apply when determining whether and when a post-deprivation hearing is required under the Due Process Clause?
The case was decided on May 9, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that in civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally requires notice and a hearing before the government seizes property. However, the Court’s precedents differentiate between real property, which can be neither moved nor concealed, personal property risks being removed, destroyed, or concealed before a civil forfeiture hearing. Thus, as the Court recognized in United States v $8,850 and United States v Von Neumann, a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing provides the constitutionally required process after seizing personal property. For such personal property, a separate preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing is not required. In contrast, in United States v James Daniel Good Real Property, the Court held that the government must ordinarily provide notice and a hearing before seizing real property that is subject to civil forfeiture. Here, the property subject to forfeiture is a vehicle—personal property—so a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing is all the Due Process Clause requires.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, agreeing in large part with the majority’s reasoning and conclusions but writing separately to highlight some of the many larger questions this decision leaves unresolved about whether, and to what extent, contemporary civil forfeiture practices can be squared with the Constitution’s promise of due process.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority’s opinion is too broad and prevents “lower courts from addressing myriad abuses of the civil forfeiture system.” She, on the other hand, “would have decided only which due process test governs whether a retention hearing is required and left it to the lower courts to apply that test to different civil forfeiture schemes.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in McIntosh v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a district court enter a criminal forfeiture order when the time limit specified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has already passed?
The case was decided on April 17, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a district court’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s requirement to enter a preliminary order imposing criminal forfeiture before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
There are three types of time limits: jurisdictional deadlines, mandatory claim-processing rules, and time-related directives. Jurisdictional deadlines completely deprive a court of power to act if missed, while mandatory claim-processing rules regulate the timing of motions and claims, and if properly invoked, bar the relevant action after the deadline passes. Time-related directives, on the other hand, encourage prompt action but do not deprive an official of power to act if the deadline is missed.
Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a time-related directive for several reasons. First, the rule’s language contemplates flexibility by allowing for exceptions when compliance is “impractical” and using indeterminate language like “sufficiently in advance.” Second, unlike other parts of Rule 32.2, this provision does not specify a consequence for noncompliance. Third, the rule governs the conduct of the court, not the litigants, which is more characteristic of time-related directives than claim-processing rules. Thus, a district court’s failure to enter a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing does not deprive it of the power to order forfeiture.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Muldrow v City of St. Louis.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a signification disadvantage?
The case was decided on April 17, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant. Although the judgment vacating and remanding the case was unanimous, Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court, which was joined by five other Justices.
Nothing in Title VII’s text requires a transferred employee to show that the harm they suffered was “significant.” Rather, as long as the transfer left the employee worse off in some way with respect to their employment terms or conditions, and was made because of a protected characteristic like sex or race, it violates Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination. There is no basis for reading a heightened “significant harm” standard into the statute. Title VII targets employment practices that treat a person worse because of a protected trait, without distinguishing between significant and less significant harms. While concerns about frivolous lawsuits are valid, courts have other ways to dismiss meritless claims without imposing an extra-textual "significant harm" requirement.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment suggesting that the majority misinterpreted the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, below. Justice Thomas argued that the appeals court’s language requiring “a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage” is not a heightened-harm requirement.
Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment criticizing the majority for failing to clarify the degree of harm required under Title VII, arguing that there is “little if any substantive difference between the terminology the Court approves and the terminology it doesn’t like.”
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that while he agrees with the majority in rejecting the “significant employment disadvantage” requirement, he disagrees with its new standard requiring “some harm.” Justice Kavanaugh provided an example of a situation that clearly violates Title VII but may not satisfy the majority’s “some harm” requirement: “We are transferring you to the Cincinnati office because you are black. But your compensation will not change.” Any transfer on a discriminatory basis—no matter how quantifiable the harm—should be a violation of Title VII.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in DeVillier v Texas.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a party sue a state directly under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
The case was decided on April 16, 2024.
The Court did not resolve the question presented because the case’s underlying premise was incorrect; the property owners adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their Takings Clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause guarantees the right to just compensation when the government takes private property for public use, but the Supreme Court has never clearly held that the Takings Clause itself creates a private cause of action for damages.
However, the Court did not need to resolve this question because the case’s underlying premise—that the property owner had no cause of action to seek just compensation—was incorrect. Texas state law provides an inverse-condemnation cause of action that property owners can use to bring takings claims under both the Texas Constitution and the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause. The state assured the Court that it would not oppose any attempt by the property owners to amend their complaint to pursue this state-law cause of action. Therefore, since the property owners have an available avenue to seek just compensation, the Court remanded the case to allow them to pursue their Takings Clause claims through the Texas inverse-condemnation cause of action.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Rudisill v McDonough.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?
The case was decided on April 16, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to the statutory 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
Section 3322(d), which discusses “coordination of entitlement,” does not apply to veterans like Rudisill because he already has two separate entitlements and is not seeking to coordinate or convert them. Further, the election mechanism in § 3327 is optional, and Rudisill does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make this election. Finally, the consequences of making a § 3327 election, as outlined in §3327(d), only apply to individuals who actually make that election, which Rudisill did not do. Therefore, Rudisill retains his two separate entitlements, subject only to the overall 48-month cap on total benefits.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, expressing concerns about the justifications for the “veterans canon” of statutory interpretation, which favors veterans when interpreting ambiguous statutes related to veterans' benefits. Justice Kavanaugh questioned whether such a canon is consistent with the practical realities of the legislative process and the judiciary’s proper role in interpreting spending laws. He suggested that the Court may need to address the justification for this and other benefits-related canons in a future case.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that under the plain text of the statute, Rudisill’s Post-9/11 benefits should be limited to the amount of unused Montgomery benefits he had at the time he elected to switch.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Sheetz v El Dorado County.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a monetary exaction imposed by a local government as a condition for a building permit exempt from the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements established in Nollan v California Coastal Comm’n and Dolan v City of Tigard, simply because the exaction is authorized by local legislation?
The case was decided on April 12, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that the California Court of Appeal erred in holding that the Nollan/Dolan test does not apply to permit conditions imposed by legislatures.
The Takings Clause requires the government to provide just compensation when it takes private property for public use, and this applies equally to all branches of government. Neither the text of the Constitution, the historical understanding of eminent domain (the power of the government to take private property for public use), nor the Court's own precedents support exempting legislatures from the requirements of the Nollan/Dolan test. This test, which is based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, requires that permit conditions have an “essential nexus” to a legitimate government interest and be “roughly proportional” to the impact of the proposed development. These principles apply consistently across physical takings, regulatory takings, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, regardless of whether the condition is imposed by a legislature or an administrative agency.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, pointing out an antecedent question that was not raised in this case: whether the permit condition would be a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting context.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion to argue that the Nollan/Dolan test cannot operate differently when an alleged taking affects a “class of properties” rather than “a particular development.”
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined, clarifying that the Court has not previously decided—and in this case explicitly declined to decide—whether “a permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v Moab Partners, L. P.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement?
The case was decided on April 12, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b–5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders “statements made” misleading. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The plain text of Rule 10b-5(b) bars only half-truths, not pure omissions. Specifically, it prohibits omitting facts necessary to make “statements made” not misleading. There must first be an affirmative statement before determining whether additional facts are needed for clarity and completeness. The Securities Act of 1933 lends further support for this understanding because it expressly creates liability for pure omissions in registration statements, while the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) lack similar language. This difference suggests Congress and the SEC intentionally chose not to create liability for pure omissions under Rule 10b-5(b).
The Court rejected the argument that pure omissions are inherently misleading because investors expect full disclosure under Item 303, explaining that this interpretation would improperly shift Rule 10b-5(b)’s focus from fraud to disclosure requirements. It also dismissed concerns about creating “broad immunity” for fraudulent omissions, noting that plaintiffs can still bring claims for half-truths and the SEC retains authority to enforce disclosure rules. Rule 10b-5(b) only targets fraudulent misrepresentations and misleading statements, not the mere failure to disclose required information absent any related statements.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Bissonnette v LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC.
In this case, the court considered this issue: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?
The case was decided on April 12, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
In Circuit City v Adams, the Court held that Section 1’s exemption covers “transportation workers” based on the characteristics shared by the specific categories of “seamen” and “railroad employees” mentioned in the statute. In the more recent Southwest Airlines v Saxon case, the Court rejected an “industrywide” approach, emphasizing that the focus is on the work the individual performs, not the industry of their employer. The Court reasoned that imposing a “transportation industry” requirement would lead to complex line-drawing problems about what counts as that industry. Moreover, the statutory text and precedent do not support limiting “seamen” and “railroad employees” to particular industries. While there is a legitimate concern that Section 1 might be read too broadly, transportation workers play a direct and necessary role in the interstate transport of goods, ensuring that the exemption remains appropriately narrow. Therefore, the appeals court erred in compelling arbitration solely because the workers were in the bakery industry.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in FBI v Fikre.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Are respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List moot, given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information”?
The case was decided on March 19, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Mr. Fikre’s removal from the Government’s No Fly List mooted his 42 U-S-C §1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Mr. Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
While a court with jurisdiction is obligated to hear cases properly before it, it must also dismiss cases that have become moot. However, a defendant’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct renders a case moot only if the defendant can show the conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur. This burden applies equally to governmental and private defendants.
Based on the uncontested factual allegations at this stage of litigation, the government’s declaration that Fikre will not be relisted based on currently available information does not establish that he would not be relisted for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future that allegedly led to his original placement on the No Fly List. What matters is not whether a defendant repudiates past actions, but what it can prove about its future conduct. Although this case is only in preliminary stages of the litigation, and relevant facts may emerge or change, under facts as alleged, the government failed to meet its burden of proving mootness.
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, wrote a concurring opinion to clarify that the Court’s opinion should not be understood as requiring the government to disclose classified information to prove mootness, as this could undermine significant national security interests. Rather, non-classified information or information obtained in discovery from the plaintiff in this and other cases may be sufficient to show that the allegedly unlawful listing is unlikely to recur, thereby proving mootness.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Wilkinson v Garland.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U-S-C § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)?
The case was decided on March 19, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that an immigration judge’s discretionary decision that a given set of established facts does not satisfy 8 U-S-C § 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D)’s jurisdiction restoring exception for “questions of law.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The application of the statutory hardship standard to an established set of facts presents a quintessential mixed question of law and fact. While this determination requires close examination of the facts, under the Court’s precedent in Guerrero-Lasprilla v Barr, a mixed question that requires factual analysis is still a mixed question and therefore a “question of law” that courts have jurisdiction to review.
The Court rejected the government’s arguments that Guerrero-Lasprilla should be limited to judicially created standards, that the statutory history precludes review, and that a primarily factual mixed question is a question of fact. Nothing in § 1252(a)(2)(D) suggests “questions of law” is limited to only certain types of mixed questions. While courts still cannot review the underlying factual determinations, the application of the hardship standard to those facts is reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact, albeit under a deferential standard of review given the factual nature of the inquiry. The Third Circuit’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review hardship determinations was therefore erroneous.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, expressing skepticism that Congress intended the phrase “questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) to encompass all mixed questions of law and fact, as the majority concluded. However, she agreed with the majority’s judgment based on the controlling precedent of Guerrero-Lasprilla.
Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion in which he agreed with Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent that while Guerrero-Lasprilla was correctly decided, the majority erred in this case by reading the language in that case too broadly.
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court’s broad reading of “questions of law” in Guerrero-Lasprilla defies common sense and would result in the exception nearly swallowing the rule, which Congress could not have intended when it enacted §1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D). He contended that the hardship determination is overwhelmingly a factual question that should not be classified as a reviewable “question of law.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Pulsifer v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Must a defendant show he does not meet any of the criteria listed in 18U-S-C § 3553(f) to qualify for a sentence lower than the statutory minimum?
The case was decided on March 15, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a defendant must satisfy individually each of the three conditions of the “safety valve” provision of 18U-S-C §3553(f)(1) to be eligible for sentencing relief. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court acknowledged that each party offered a grammatically permissible reading of Paragraph (f)(1). However, the text and context of that paragraph, as read against the Guidelines more generally, support the Government’s reading. Pulsifer’s reading—that a defendant is eligible as long as he does not have all three characteristics in combination—would render part (A) superfluous, since a defendant with a 3-point offense under (B) and a 2-point violent offense under (C) would always have more than 4 criminal history points under (A). Additionally, Pulsifer's reading would allow relief for some defendants with more serious criminal histories while denying it to those with less serious records, contrary to the provision’s purpose of sorting defendants based on the seriousness of their prior offenses. Finally, the rule of lenity does not apply because there is no genuine ambiguity in the statutory language because, while there are two grammatically permissible readings, the context supports only one of those readings. Thus, Pulsifer was ineligible for safety valve relief because he had two prior 3-point offenses.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the majority for engaged in “implicit distribution,” reading words into and out of the statute to manufacture a superfluity problem that does not actually exist. Justice Gorsuch further argued that the majority elevated unexpressed congressional purposes over the statutory text and dismissed variations in Congress’s use of ‘and” and “or” as sloppy mistakes, even though Congress expressly distributed phrases elsewhere in the statute when it wanted to.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in O'Connor-Ratcliff v Garnier.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a public official engage in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social media account, which the official uses to communicate about job-related matters with the public?
The case was decided on March 15, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment—that 42 U-S-C § 1983’s state-action requirement was satisfied because of the “close nexus” between petitioners’ social media pages and their positions as public officials—is vacated, and the case is remanded in light of Lindke v Freed.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Lindke v Freed.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?
The case was decided on March 15, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under 42 U-S-C § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person “who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives someone of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Thus, to establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show actions attributable to a state, not those of a private person. Sometimes, state action is clear, but other times, the line between private conduct and state action is more difficult to draw. State officials retain their own First Amendment rights to speak about their jobs as private citizens. To determine whether an official was acting in an official capacity or as a private citizen on social media, courts must look at factors like whether the account was designated as personal or official, whether individual posts expressly invoked the official's state authority, and the immediate legal effect of the posts. Additional contextual factors like the official's use of government staff to make posts may also be relevant in unclear cases. Because the U-S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied a different test, the Court vacated its judgment and remanded the case.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Trump v Anderson.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualify Donald Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus from appearing on Colorado’s 2024 presidential primary ballot?
The case was decided on March 4, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that, while states have the power to disqualify state officials under Section 3, they lack the authority to enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court decision that had excluded former President Donald Trump from the state's 2024 Republican primary ballot based on Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution does not delegate to the states any power to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices. The Fourteenth Amendment itself only speaks to enforcement by Congress under Section 5, and it would be incongruous to read the Amendment as silently granting enforcement power to the states.
The Elections and Electors Clauses also do not implicitly authorize states to enforce Section 3 against federal candidates. Historically, it has been Congress, not the states, that has enforced Section 3 against federal officeholders. Allowing states to do so could lead to conflicting and disruptive outcomes in federal elections, especially presidential elections. Responsibility for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests solely with Congress.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, pointing out that the Court did not need to decide the question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced. Justice Barrett argued that resolving that more complicated question would and did “amplify disagreement . . . in the volatile season of a Presidential election”
Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson co-authored an opinion concurrring in the judgment but arguing that the Court departed from the principle of judicial restraint, which calls for deciding only as much as necessary to dispose of the issues in a case. By going further and announcing “novel rules” for how federal enforcement of Section 3 must operate, such as requiring specific legislation enacted by Congress, the majority unnecessarily decided momentous constitutional questions not before the Court, effectively limiting future efforts to disqualify presidential candidates under Section 3.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Great Lakes Insurance SE v Raiders Retreat Realty Co.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract unenforceable if enforcement would conflict with the “strong public policy” of the state whose law is displaced?
The case was decided on February 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable in this case. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Constitution confers federal jurisdiction over all maritime cases to ensure uniformity across the United States, with federal courts deriving maritime law from various sources such as judicial opinions and scholarly writings. In the absence of established maritime rules, federal courts possess the authority to formulate new, uniform maritime rules. Relevant to this discussion, federal maritime law presumes the validity of choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts. The precedent set by the Wilburn Boat case, which permitted state law to address the absence of uniform federal maritime rules, does not extend to choice-of-law provisions. Therefore, contrary to Raiders’ argument, state law does not serve to fill any gaps in this context, reinforcing the federal rule's presumption of enforceability for choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to argue that the Wilburn Boat precedent rests on flawed premises and is at odds with the fundamental precept of admiralty law.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in McElrath v Georgia.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?
The case was decided on February 21, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was found by a jury to be not guilty by reason of insanity. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being tried or punished more than once for the same offense, establishing that a verdict of acquittal is final and prohibits any future prosecution for the same offense. An acquittal includes any decision demonstrating the prosecution’s failure to provide sufficient evidence for criminal liability, making such a verdict inviolable and irreversible. This principle is crucial, ensuring the finality and integrity of jury verdicts in protecting defendants’ rights.
In this case, the jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on a malice-murder charge constitutes an acquittal, because it signifies the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence for criminal liability. Notwithstanding Georgia law to the contrary, the determination of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes rests on federal law, rendering the state’s characterization non-binding. The validity of an acquittal remains unaffected by the consistency of jury verdicts or any speculation about the jury's reasoning, which is consistent with the jury’s exclusive domain to decide on guilt or innocence and the Double Jeopardy Clause’s outright prohibition on multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion to clarify that the Court’s decision does not express any view about whether a not-guilty verdict that is inconsistent with a verdict on another count and is not accepted by the trial judge constitutes an “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Murray v UBS Securities, LLC.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Under 18 U-S-C § 1514A, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief?
The case was decided on February 8, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that a whistleblower who invokes §1514A must prove that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer’s unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that his employer acted with “retaliatory intent.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 includes a provision that protects whistleblowers, explicitly prohibiting employers from engaging in retaliation, such as firing, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or discriminating in any way against an employee's employment conditions “because of” the employee's engagement in protected whistleblowing activities. A whistleblower must first demonstrate that their whistleblowing was a significant factor in the alleged adverse employment action, and then the burden shifts to the employer, who must prove that they would have made the same adverse employment decision regardless of the whistleblower's actions.
First, the word “discriminate” in the statute does not inherently require “retaliatory intent,” which refers to animus or prejudice. Further, to require a whistleblower to prove “retaliatory intent,” as UBS argues, would ignore the statute’s mandatory burden-shifting framework. Contrary to UBS’s contention, innocent employers will not face liability for legitimate, nonretaliatory personnel decisions. The burden-shifting framework precludes that outcome. Thus, A whistleblower who invokes 18 U-S-C § 1514A must prove only that his protected activity “was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.”
Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, reiterating the Court’s rejection of the “animus” requirement does not eliminate the intent requirement of the statute.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v Kirtz.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States?
The case was decided on February 8, 2024.
The Supreme Court held that the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) waive the sovereign immunity of the United States. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
As a sovereign entity, the United States is generally immune from suits seeking money damages—under the doctrine known as “sovereign immunity”—unless Congress chooses to waive that immunity. Courts understand Congress to have so chosen only if they find “the language of the statute” is “unmistakably clear” in allowing such suits. One way a statute may have such “unmistakably clear” language is when it creates a cause of action and explicitly “authorizes suit against a government on that claim.” The FCRA satisfies this stringent test.
The FCRA’s requirements apply to “persons” who, like the federal government here, furnish information to consumer reporting agencies. Sections 1681n and 1681o create a cause of action for money damages to consumers injured by “any person” who willfully or negligently fails to comply with the statute’s directive. Section 1681a provides a definition of “person” that includes government agencies, which applies to the entire Act. In the presence of such “unmistakably clear” language, no separate waiver provision is needed.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Acheson Hotels, LLC v Laufer.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel?
The case was decided on December 5, 2023.
The Supreme Court vacated the case as moot because Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits in lower courts with prejudice due to serious misconduct by her lawyers. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the court vacating the case as moot and declining, despite Acheson’s request to the contrary, to resolve the still-live circuit split on the question of standing.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment arguing that he would reach the standing issue and resolve that question in the negative.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson author an opinion concurring in the judgment, explaining that she concurs only because of the Court’s precedent of vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals below “when mootness occurs through . . . the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.” In her view, however, vacatur is not appropriate in situations, as here, where the parties did not provide any equitable basis for vacatur.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in 303 Creative LLC v Elenis.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does application of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
The case was decided on June 30, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs that convey messages with which the designer disagrees. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The First Amendment exists to protect an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” and individual liberty, which means the government generally cannot compel a person to espouse its preferred messages. The wedding websites Lorie Smith seeks to create in this case are “protected First Amendment speech.” Colorado's law, intending to enforce non-discrimination, would compel her to express messages contrary to her beliefs.
Although public accommodations play a key role in promoting civil rights, these laws must bow to constitutional imperatives and cannot be used to compel individuals to express messages they disagree with.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, lamenting that, “the Court, for the first time in its history, grants a business open to the public a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of a protected class.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Department of Education v Brown.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do these two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan? In addition, is the Plan an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the Secretary of the Department of Education?
The case was decided on June 30, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Respondents lack Article III standing to assert a procedural challenge to the student-loan debt-forgiveness plan adopted by the Secretary of Education pursuant to Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act). Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.
For a plaintiff to have standing, they must establish: (1) a concrete and particularized injury, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant's action, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Here, the “fairly traceable” element fails. The respondents' injury is not “fairly traceable” to the plan enacted under the HEROES Act, as they have not established a direct link between the HEROES Act plan and their desired outcome of a more favorable loan-forgiveness program under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). Any link is too tenuous and speculative to establish standing.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Biden v Nebraska.
In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do Nebraska and other states have judicial standing to challenge the student-debt relief program? 2. Does the student-debt relief program exceed the statutory authority of the U.S. Secretary of Education, or does it violate the Administrative Procedure Act?
The case was decided on June 30, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Education does not have authority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to establish a student loan forgiveness program that will cancel roughly $430 billion in debt principal and affect nearly all borrowers. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Court concluded that Missouri has standing to challenge the student-debt relief program. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest, like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Here, the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government corporation created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market, an estimated $44 million a year in fees, and the harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is an injury to Missouri itself.
Second, the Court determined that the HEROES Act’s authorization of the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs under the Education Act does not extend to canceling $430 billion of student loan principal. The Act permits the Secretary to “modify” statutory provisions but only “moderately or in minor fashion” as the term is ordinarily used. The “modifications” challenged here create a novel and fundamentally different loan forgiveness program that Congress could not have intended to permit. And the power to “waive” does not remotely resemble how such power has been used on prior occasions, where it was simply used to nullify particular legal requirements.
Third, the Court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic justified the unprecedented nature of the the debt cancellation plan. Citing its recent decision in West Virginia v EPA, the Court expressed hesitance that Congress could have intended to confer such authority on the Secretary and not retain it for itself.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Abitron Austria GmbH v Hetronic International, Inc.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Lanham Act permit the owner of a U.S.-registered trademark to recover damages for the use of that trademark when the infringement occurred outside the United States and is not likely to cause confusion in the United States?
The case was decided on June 29, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act extends trademark protection only to claims where the infringing “use in commerce” is domestic. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, U.S. laws are generally presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This presumption helps avoid conflicts with other countries and is premised on the idea that Congress typically legislates with domestic matters in mind. To apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts apply a two-step framework. First, a court must ask whether Congress has explicitly indicated that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. If not, then the second step is to ask whether the lawsuit seeks a permissible domestic or impermissible foreign application of the law.
Applying that two-step framework here, the Court concluded that the Lanham Act applies only to claims where the infringing use is domestic. First, neither § 1114(1)(a) nor § 1125(a)(1) explicitly indicates that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. They prohibit the use “in commerce” of protected marks that are likely to cause confusion. A mere reference to “foreign commerce” does not make a statute extraterritorial. Second, the focus of the statute is on the “use in commerce” that is likely to cause confusion, which is domestic conduct.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion to elaborate on what it means to “use a trademark in commerce.”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, in her view the Lanham Act extends to activities carried out abroad when there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v President and Fellows of Harvard College.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions? If so, does Harvard College’s and UNC’s race-conscious admissions process violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
The case was decided on June 29, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the Harvard and the UNC admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion.
First, the Court concluded that Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) had organizational standing because it is a voluntary membership organization with identifiable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith.
Second, while the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was to ensure that laws apply equally to everyone, regardless of race, both the Supreme Court and the nation failed to uphold this principle, most notably in Plessy v Ferguson, which sanctioned “separate but equal” facilities. However, the landmark case Brown v Board of Education overturned this, and the equal protection principle has since expanded to various areas of life. Any exceptions to equal protection must satisfy “strict scrutiny”; that is, the government must show that the racial classification serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
In Regents of the University of California v Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion became the touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based admissions, reasoning that diversity in the student body could be a “compelling state interest,” but that race could only be used as a “plus” in admissions and not as a quota. In Grutter v Bollinger, the Court adopted Powell's viewpoint, while also setting limits to ensure race-based admissions did not result in stereotyping or harm to non-minority applicants, and stating that such race-based programs should eventually come to an end.
Harvard’s (and UNC’s, in the consolidated case) race-based admissions systems fail to meet the strict scrutiny, non-stereotyping, and termination criteria established by Grutter and Bakke. Specifically, the universities could not demonstrate their compelling interests in a measurable way, failed to avoid racial stereotypes, and did not offer a logical endpoint for when race-based admissions would cease. As a result, the programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court noted that nothing prohibits universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university.
Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh each wrote a concurring opinion.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined (except Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case against Harvard).
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Groff v DeJoy.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is inconvenience to coworkers an “undue burden” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such that it excuses an employer from providing an accommodation requested for religious exercise?
The case was decided on June 29, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for the unanimous Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on religion, and subsequent regulations issued by the EEOC required employers to make reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would cause “undue hardship” to the employer. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer who uses a seniority system to assign shifts to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee’s religious practices. The Hardison decision also inadvertently established a “more than de minimis” test for hardship; courts interpreted that decision to mean that any cost or hardship “more than de minimis” justifies denying a religious accommodation. Revisiting that interpretation, the Court rejected the “de minimis cost” standard and adopted instead a “substantial increased costs” standard consistent with the spirit and language of Title VII.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Counterman v Colorado.
In this case, the court considered this issue: To establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, must the government show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement?
The case was decided on June 27, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.
While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, it allows for restrictions of so-called “true threats.” A true threat is determined by the recipient’s perception, not the speaker’s intent. However, to prevent chilling protected speech, there must be a subjective mental-state requirement. This means that the speaker’s understanding of the threat is crucial. A recklessness standard—where a person consciously disregards a significant risk that their words might harm another—is the appropriate measure for true threats because it strikes a balance between safeguarding free speech and addressing genuine threats. In Counterman’s case, the government used only an objective standard, without considering Counterman’s understanding of his statements as threatening, in violation of the requirements of the First Amendment.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Sotomayor would not reach the question whether recklessness is sufficient for true-threats prosecutions generally.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority for relying on New York Times Co. v Sullivan instead of applying the First Amendment as it was understood at the time of the Founding.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that true threats do not enjoy First Amendment protection, and nearly every other category of unprotected speech may be restricted using an objective standard.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Mallory v Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a state registration statute for out-of-state corporations that purports to confer general personal jurisdiction over the registrant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The case was decided on June 27, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania law requiring out-of-state companies that register to do business in Pennsylvania to agree to appear in Pennsylvania courts on “any cause of action” against them comports with the Due Process Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the main opinion of the Court.
The outcome in this case is controlled by the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., which held that suits based on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction do not deny the defendant due process of law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded otherwise based on its erroneous belief that the Court had “implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire in International Shoe Co. v Washington. However, rather than displace Pennsylvania Fire, International Shoe merely paved an additional road to jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Thus, the facts of this case fall squarely within Pennsylvania Fire, and there is no due process violation.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion noting another precedent, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, which she finds “particularly instructive.”
Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito agreed with the plurality that exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the state registration statute does not violate the Due Process Clause, but he opined that the statute might be unconstitutional on other grounds not before the Court.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Brett Kavanaugh joined, arguing that compelled state registration does not constitute “consent.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Moore v Harper.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Under the U-S Constitution, does the state legislative body, independent of any constraints by state courts or other laws, have sole authority to regulate federal elections?
The case was decided on June 27, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
First, the Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review the case. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its previous judgment did not moot the case because there remains a live dispute between the parties.
Second, the Court concluded that the Elections Clause does not grant state legislatures exclusive authority to regulate federal elections. Judicial review has been an accepted practice since Marbury v Madison, and under the Court’s precedents, the Elections Clause authority of state legislatures is subject to checks and balances provided by the state constitution. State legislatures are not wholly independent bodies, and they are bound by the constraints imposed by the state constitutions.
Third, state courts have the authority to interpret state laws affecting federal elections, but they cannot sidestep federal law. The Court declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court in this case overstepped its authority because that issue was not properly before it.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that while the Court need not answer the question of which standard a federal court should employ to review a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause, there are three standards from which to choose that all convey the same point—deference but not abdication.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the question presented in the case was moot, and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in United States v Texas.
In this case, the court considered these issues: 1. Do the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law? 2. Do the Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act? 3. Does 8 U-S-C § 1252(f)(1) prevent the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U-S-C § 706(2)?
The case was decided on June 23, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge immigration-enforcement guidelines promulgated by the Secretary of Homeland Security that prioritize the arrest and removal of certain noncitizens from the United States. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.
For a plaintiff to establish standing, they must show that they have suffered a real, specific injury that was caused by the defendant and that the court can remedy. While the district court had concluded that the states would suffer an injury in the form of additional costs due to the arrest policy in question, the Supreme Court pointed out that the injury also has to be "legally and judicially cognizable"—in other words, that it should be a type of dispute that courts have traditionally been involved in resolving. The states failed to point to any precedent or historical practice that supported their claim to have standing in this particular issue.
Second, the Court acknowledged that there are good reasons for federal courts to avoid these types of lawsuits, one of which is the Executive Branch’s discretion in deciding whom to arrest or prosecute, which falls under its constitutional Article II powers. Additionally, the courts generally lack the standards to judge the appropriateness of such enforcement decisions, which can be influenced by various factors like resource constraints and public safety needs. This conclusion does not mean that federal courts can never handle cases involving the Executive Branch's decisions about arrests or prosecutions. Indeed, certain circumstances might warrant a different standing analysis; for instance, if there are claims of selective prosecution based on discrimination, or if Congress has explicitly made certain injuries legally recognizable.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the states lack standing not because of the “cognizable injury” aspect of standing, but because of the redressability requirement.
Justice Barrett authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined, also arguing that the case should be resolved on redressability grounds.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Texas does have standing.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Coinbase, Inc. v Bielski.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal?
The case was decided on June 23, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that a district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 9 U-S-C §16(a) on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court recognized in Griggs v Provident Consumer Discount Co. that an appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” The Griggs principle controls the outcome of this case. If district courts could proceed while an appeal on arbitrability is ongoing, the benefits of arbitration, such as efficiency and reduced costs, would be lost and parties could feel pressured to settle to avoid district court proceedings they initially sought to avoid through arbitration.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, and in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. Justice Jackson pointed out that when a federal court of appeals conducts interlocutory review of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at the trial court level for the trial judge to make particularized determinations at their discretion. Justice Jackson argued that this discretionary decision-making process promotes procedural fairness, and there is no reason to remove that discretion in this case.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Samia v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does admitting a codefendant’s redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on context violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?
The case was decided on June 23, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause where the confession as modified did not directly inculpate the defendant but used the descriptor “other person” and the jury was instructed to consider the confession only as to the codefendant. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Historically, a non-testifying codefendant’s confession was permissible if the jury was instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing defendant. The Court in Bruton v United States, recognized an exception to that general rule, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a non-testifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. However, the Court established certain outer limits on the Bruton rule. For example, in Richardson v Marsh, the Court did not extend the rule to confessions that do not name the defendant, although, in Gray v Maryland, the Court clarified that some redacted confessions might still be directly accusatory if the redaction is evident.
Here, the confession was redacted to avoid naming the defendant, aligning with the Bruton rule and differing from the confession in Gray. The Court declined to further extend the Bruton rule, reasoning that its extension would disrupt historical practices and necessitate extensive pretrial hearings, potentially leading to mandatory severance in joint trials when introducing a non-testifying codefendant's confession. This would undermine the role of joint trials and the significance of confessions in the legal system.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the majority opinion except the historical discussion, which, in her separate concurrence, she argues is beside the point. She would limit consideration to the meaning of the Confrontation Clause at the time of the founding and reach the same conclusion.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the non-testifying codefendant’s confession in this case inculpated the defendant in the same way that the Court recognized it would in other cases. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for “permitting an end-run around the Court’s precedent and undermining a vital constitutional protection for the accused.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in United States v Hanson.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the federal prohibition on encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain violate the First Amendment of the U-S Constitution?
The case was decided on June 23, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the federal law criminalizing “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration—forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits a significant amount of protected speech compared to its legitimate applications. The federal laws at issue, 8 U-S-C § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) prohibit “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration, but in this context, they refer to the specialized legal terms of solicitation and facilitation, not their colloquial meanings. Because (A)(iv) targets only the intentional solicitation and facilitation of specific illegal acts, and these acts are generally non-expressive conduct, it is unlikely to stifle protected speech.
Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority’s opinion in full but wrote separate concurrence to criticize the facial overbreadth doctrine, which he argued “lacks any basis in the text or history of the First Amendment” and “distorts the judicial role.”
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the majority “departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation” to interpret the “encouraging or inducing” as meaning something much narrower than the words plainly mean.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Arizona v Navajo Nation.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the 1868 Treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States impose an affirmative duty on the United States to secure water for the tribe?
The case was decided on June 22, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the 1868 treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation reserved necessary water to accomplish the purpose of the Navajo Reservation but did not require the United States to take affirmative steps to secure water for the Tribe. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court.
To succeed on a breach-of-trust claim, as the Tribe asserts here, it must establish, among other things, that the text of a treaty, statute, or regulation imposed certain duties on the United States. The 1868 treaty did not do so. While it did impose a number of specific duties, such as to construct a number of buildings on the reservation and to provide teachers for schools for at least 10 years, the treaty said nothing about any affirmative duty for the United States to secure water for the Tribe. The Court declined to infer such a duty to secure water, particularly when the treaty imposed no such duty with respect to land.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion highlighting the confusion over the definition of a “trust relationship” and calling upon the Court to clarify its meaning in future cases.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch characterized the case as the Navajo Tribe simply asking the United States to identify the water rights it holds for them, and, if the United States has misappropriated the Navajo’s water rights, to formulate a plan to stop doing so prospectively. Under this characterization, the dissenters would allow the Tribe’s case to proceed.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Yegiazaryan v Smagin.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States state a cognizable claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act when it suffers an injury to an intangible property?
The case was decided on June 22, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleges a “domestic injury” for purposes of filing a private civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U-SC. § 1964(c), when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The “domestic injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits comes from the Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v European Community. However, the RJR Nabisco Court did not explicitly define a “domestic injury,” so the Court adopted a context-specific approach that considers the injury's circumstances—an approach consistent with that case. Applying this approach to Smagin’s case, the Court found his injury to be domestic. The majority of the alleged racketeering activities that prevented Smagin from collecting his judgment occurred in the U-S, targeting a California judgment.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Jones v Hendrix.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a federal inmate who did not challenge their conviction on the ground that the statute did not criminalize their activity subsequently apply for habeas relief after the Supreme Court retroactively invalidates the circuit precedent on which the inmate relied in not challenging their conviction?
The case was decided on June 22, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a §2241 habeas petition. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
The majority first clarified the relationship between §2255 and §2241 in the context of federal prisoners challenging their sentences. Congress introduced §2255 to allow prisoners to challenge their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than through a habeas corpus petition under §2241. While the saving clause in §2255(e) preserved access to §2241 in specific situations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) added restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions. The saving clause does not permit prisoners to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions, even if they are challenging a new interpretation of a criminal statute.
The majority found unpersuasive arguments by both Jones and the federal government regarding when §2255 might be considered “inadequate or ineffective,” thus allowing recourse to §2241. AEDPA’s restrictions reflect Congress’s deliberate choice to balance finality with error correction in the justice system.
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan jointly dissented, arguing that Jones presents the precise type of mismatch contemplated in §2255(h) and would those remand for the lower courts to consider his claim under the proper framework.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing that §2255 requires that Jones’s petition alleging legal innocence should have been considered on the merits.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Pugin v Garland.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under the Immigration and Nationality Act?
The case was decided on June 22, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony is an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of an “aggravated felony.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.
An offense can be categorized as “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) without a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding. This understanding is supported by dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. Obstruction of justice can occur even if no formal investigation or proceeding is active. The phrase “relating to” in the statute further broadens its applicability, ensuring it encompasses offenses connected to obstruction of justice, irrespective of a pending investigation. Even if certain provisions might require a pending investigation or proceeding, §1101(a)(43)(S) has a more expansive definition. Historical interpretations do not mandate a pending investigation for obstruction of justice. The rule of lenity, which favors defendants in ambiguous criminal laws, does not apply because traditional interpretation tools clearly defined the statute’s intent.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full but concurred separately to note that when Congress inserted the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice” into §1101(a)(43)(S), it might well have been referencing a specific and previously designated category of offenses of obstruction, many of which do not have a pending-proceeding requirement.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Court “subverts” the commonly understood meaning of “obstruction of justice.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in United States ex rel. Polansky v Executive Health Resources, Inc.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the government have the authority to dismiss a False Claims Act lawsuit brought by an individual on behalf of the government if it initially declined to take over the case, and if so, what standard applies?
The case was decided on June 16, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that in a qui tam action filed under the False Claims Act, the United States may move to dismiss under 31 U-S-C § 3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened—whether during the seal period or later on; in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.
Section 3730(c)(2)(A) provides that “the Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the relator,” so long as the relator received notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Contrary to the government’s contention in this case, this does not mean that the government may dismiss the action without ever intervening in the case. Neither the text or subparagraph (2)(A) nor the broader context supports this understanding.
But Polanksy’s contention—that the government may dismiss only if it intervenes during the seal period—also fails. Under § 3730(c)(3), the government can intervene either during the seal period or “at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” If the government successfully intervenes, then it becomes a party to the litigation with the attendant rights, including the right to dismiss.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the default rules in civil litigation, and nothing warrants a departure from those rules here. Thus, in assessing a motion to dismiss an FCA action over a relator’s objection, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation—Rule 41(a).
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, calling upon the Court to consider, in an appropriate case, whether the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II of the U-S Constitution.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the FCA does not permit the government to dismiss a qui tam action after it has declined to take over the action from the relator at the outset.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Lora v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does federal criminal sentencing law require a man who was convicted and sentenced for his role in a drug-trafficking-related murder to serve consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences?
The case was decided on June 16, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the bar on imposition of concurrent sentences in 18 U-S-C §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not apply to a sentence for a §924(j) conviction; a §924(j) sentence can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Under 18 U-S-C § 3584, a federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has the discretion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, § 924(c) provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” Lora was convicted under § 924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” The limitation of subsection (c) applies only to that subsection and not to subsection (j), and Congress could not have intended subsection (j) to incorporate subsection (c)’s penalties in addition to its own. Subsection (j) covers a more serious offense, so the resulting flexibility in sentencing is consistent with the statute’s design.
The Court thus vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, which held that subsection (c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences applies to violations of subsection (j).
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v Coughlin.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogate tribal sovereign immunity?
The case was decided on June 15, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian tribes. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court.
To abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress must make its intent to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” The statute at issue here contains such unmistakably clear language.
First, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental units” for certain enumerated purposes. Section 101(27), defines “governmental unit” as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” This definition “exudes comprehensiveness from beginning to end,” and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code support this understanding as well. Federally recognized tribes are “indisputably” governments, so the § 106(a) unequivocally abrogates their sovereign immunity.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas reiterated an argument he has made before that to the extent that tribes possess sovereign immunity at all, that immunity does not extend to “suits arising out of a tribe’s commercial activities conducted beyond its territory.”
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s clear-statement rule requires the statute to expressly mention Indian tribes in order to abrogate their sovereign immunity. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not, he would hold that it does not abrogate federally recognized Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Smith v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a criminal trial’s improper venue as to one count require vacatur of the convictions for other counts?
The case was decided on June 15, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
When a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may normally be retried, unless retrial would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Neither text nor precedent suggests that if a defendant is tried in the wrong venue (in violation of the Venue Clause), the appropriate remedy is an exception to the retrial rule. The purpose of the Venue Clause is not the convenience for the defendant, as Smith argued, but to be near the location of the alleged crimes.
Similarly, a trial conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district (in violation of the Vicinage Clause) does not preclude retrial. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights, and nothing about the Vicinage Clause suggests it should be treated differently.
Smith’s situation does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. That Clause prohibits retrial of a criminal defendant when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s “criminal culpability had not been established” but does not affect trials that terminate “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offence of which the defendant is accused.” Reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses is the latter type because it does not adjudicate the defendant’s culpability.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Haaland v Brackeen.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the Indian Child Welfare Act’s restrictions on placement of Native American children violate anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment?
The case was decided on June 15, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is consistent with Congress’s Article 1 authority and does not violate anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment; the parties lack standing to litigate their other challenges to ICWA’s placement preferences. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court has consistently recognized the “plenary and exclusive”—though not absolute—power of Congress to legislate with respect to Indian tribes. The challengers claim that ICWA infringes on the states’ authority over family law, but Court precedent establishes that when Congress validly exercises its Article 1 powers, federal law preempts conflicting state family laws. While the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to regulate custody proceedings of Indian children, the Court has interpreted the Constitution to authorize Congress to regulate “Indian affairs,” which is broadly inclusive.
The anti-commandeering arguments similarly fail. Two of the challenged provisions apply not only to government entities, but also to private parties. A demand that public or private actors can satisfy does not require the use of sovereign power and thus does not violate anti-commandeering principles. A third challenged provision requires the states to maintain certain records related to child placement and provide them upon request to the Secretary or the Indian child’s tribe. This provision also does not violate anti-commandeering principles, which apply “distinctively” to a state court’s adjudicative responsibilities. Congress may impose ancillary recordkeeping requirements related to state-court proceedings without violating the Tenth Amendment.
Finally, while the challengers also raise equal protection and non-delegation challenges to ICWA’s placement preferences, they must first show they have standing by demonstrating that they have suffered an injury in fact that is “‘fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” The challengers cannot make this showing and thus lack standing on these claims.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined in part, to elaborate on the history of the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that because there is no express constitutional provision that authorizes Congress to enact ICWA, it must be unconstitutional.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s decision is contrary to the best interests of the children affected.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v Talevski.
In this case, the court considered this issue: May a plaintiff file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, which was enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause power?
The case was decided on June 8, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may file a federal civil rights claim for violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Court first considered whether FNHRA can create rights enforceable through Section 1983. Section 1983 allows private parties to sue for deprivations of any any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. The phrase “and laws,” without modifiers, means that the rights at issue need not fall within a specific category (e.g., civil rights) or through a specific power of Congress.
The Court then considered whether FNHRA unambiguously created a right to be enforced via § 1983 and concluded that it does. A law unambiguously creates a right enforceable via § 1983 if “the provision in question is ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ and contains ‘rights-creating,’ individual-centric language with an “unmistakable focus on the benefited class.” The provisions at issue here addressing unnecessary restraint and predischarge notice pass that stringent test; they unambiguously confer rights on residents of nursing-home facilities.
Finally, the Court considered whether FNHRA creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. While FNHRA does have a complex enforcement scheme, that scheme is not incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983 and does not suggest Congress intended to preclude § 1983 enforcement.
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion to point out two questions the petitioners could have raised but did not and called for the resolution of those questions another time in another case.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, cautioning that while she agreed with the disposition in this particular case, courts must “tread carefully before concluding that Spending Clause statutes may be enforced through § 1983.”
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion arguing that laws passed pursuant to Congress’s spending power cannot secure rights within the meaning of § 1983.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that while FNHRA does create individual rights, the remedial scheme of the Act forecloses enforcement of those rights via § 1983.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Jack Daniel's™ Properties, Inc. v VIP Products LLC.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead entitled to heightened First Amendment protection?
The case was decided on June 8, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The parodic use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, not the threshold Rogers test, and is not automatically excluded from a claim of trademark dilution. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. In a typical infringement case, the question is whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” In a typical dilution case, the question is whether the defendant “harmed the reputation” of a famous trademark. However, even before answering these questions, courts apply a threshold test developed by the Second Circuit in Rogers v Grimaldi, Under the Rogers test, when a trademark infringement claim targets an expressive work, the claim must be dismissed unless the complainant can show either (1) that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or (2) that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”
The Rogers test is limited, however. It does not insulate from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use of trademarks as trademarks. A primary purpose of trademark law is to protect against consumer confusion about source, and the risk of consumer confusion is highest when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark, as VIP did with Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. The parodic nature of VIP’s use may affect the ultimate determination of the likelihood of consumer confusion, but it does not automatically shield the use from claims of dilution. Thus, dismissal of the infringement and dilution claims under the Rogers test was erroneous.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, to warn courts to view surveys, such as the one provided as evidence of consumer confusion in this case, with caution and as merely one piece of a multifaceted analysis of the likelihood of confusion.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Although the Court’s decision left the Rogers test intact, Justice Gorsuch warned lower courts to view it “with care” and expressed doubt that Rogers is “correct in all its particulars.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Dubin v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a person commit aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense?
The case was decided on June 8, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that A person commits “aggravated identity theft,” if he “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of—rather than merely peripheral to—what makes the conduct criminal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The meaning of each of the two key phrases—”uses” and “in relation to”—depends heavily on context. First, the very title of Section 1028A(a)(1), “Aggravated identity theft,” suggests that identity theft is at the core of that provision, particularly in contrast to a neighboring provision with a much broader title and scope. The language of 1028A(a)(1) further supports this reading. The provision applies when a defendant “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses” another’s identification without lawful authority. From this context, it is clear that “uses” refers to conduct akin to theft, rather than its broader meaning of “virtually any function.” Finally, the list of predicate offenses suggests that the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality, not just a peripheral feature.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argues that the statute is too vague and the majority’s opinion does little to clarify its meaning.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Allen v Milligan.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan for its seven U-S House seats violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?
The case was decided on June 8, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The district court correctly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Alabama’s redistricting map likely violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The Court’s decision in Thornburg v Gingles sets out a three-part framework for evaluating claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. First, the plaintiffs must prove that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district (measured by criteria such as contiguity and compactness). Second, the plaintiffs must show that the minority group is politically cohesive. Third, the plaintiffs must show that under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is not “equally open” to minority voters.
The majority applied that three-part framework to the facts in the record and agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their challenge. The plaintiffs submitted maps demonstrating the traditional districting criteria, and the district court found “no serious dispute” that Black voters are politically cohesive or that the challenged districts’ white majority consistently defeated Black voters’ preferred candidates.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion except for a discussion of the difference between race-consciousness and race-predominance. He concurred separately to emphasize and clarify four additional points.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full, and Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Samuel Alito joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that Section 2 of the VRA does not require Alabama to redraw its congressional districts so that Black voters can control a number of seats proportional to Black voters in its population.
Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Gorsuch joined arguing that the majority’s understanding of Gingles—specifically its understanding of the phrase “reasonably configured” within the context of the first precondition—is flawed, and that a correct understanding would lead to a different result in this case.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Slack Technologies, LLC v Pirani
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading?
The case was decided on Jun 1, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that to state a claim under §11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must allege the purchase of “such security” issued pursuant to a materially misleading registration statement. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired “such security.” Normally, the word “such” refers to something that has already been described, but because there is no clear referent in Section 11, the Court looked for clues from the statutory context.
First, the statute refers to “the” registration statement in imposing liability for false statements or misleading omissions. The definite article “the” suggests that the plaintiff must acquire the security. Second, the statute repeatedly uses the word “such” to narrow the law’s focus, suggesting “such security” refers to a specific security registered under the particular statement that allegedly has a falsehood or misleading omission. Still other provisions further support the understanding that “such security” means a security issued pursuant to the allegedly misleading security statement.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Glacier Northwest, Inc. v International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt a state-court lawsuit against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property during a labor dispute?
The case was decided on June 1, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt Glacier’s state-court lawsuit alleging that the union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The position of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is that while the NLRA generally recognizes the right of workers to strike, it does not protect from liability strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable harms caused by the sudden cessation of work.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Accepting the allegations here as true, the Union failed to take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property, as the Union knew that concrete is highly perishable and, if left to harden in a truck’s drum, will cause significant damage to the truck. Because the Union knew of this risk—and indeed intended that result—the strike went beyond the conduct protected by the NLRA. Because the strike was not protected by federal law, the state tort claims were not preempted.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas would reach the same conclusion that the state-court claims are not preempted based on adherence to the Court’s decision in ___. He wrote separately to emphasize the “oddity” of the “broad pre-emption regime” in the case the majority relied on—San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, —and suggesting that the Court reassess its holding in that case.
Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would reach the same conclusion based solely on the Court’s longstanding position that the NLRA does not immunize strikers who engage in trespass or violence against the employer’s property.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, pointing out that the test in Garmon is only whether the conduct at issue is “arguably” protected by the NLRA, as determined by the Board. She criticized the Court for stepping in to make that determination instead of allowing the Board to do so.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in United States ex rel. Schutte v Supervalu Inc.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act?
The case was decided on Jun 1, 2023
The Supreme Court held that the False Claims Act’s scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs, not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Both the text and common-law origins of the False Claims Act support an understanding of the scienter as focusing on the subjective knowledge of the defendant. It describes a three-part definition of the word “knowingly” that largely tracks the common-law concept of scienter for fraud: actual knowledge, deliberate indifference, or recklessness. Each of these concepts pertains to the defendant’s lack of an honest belief in the statement’s truth when making the claim, not what a defendant might have thought afterward.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Tyler v Hennepin County.
In this case, the court considered these issues: First, does taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause? Second, is the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?
The case was decided on May 25, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Tyler plausibly alleged that Hennepin County’s actions violated the Takings Clause and thus that her claim can go forward.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property without “just compensation.” This does not prevent the government from collecting taxes, or from taking action to enforce the collection of taxes. However, the government may not, as Minnesota purported to do by statute in 1935, extinguish a property owner’s interest in property when she falls behind on her property taxes. English law, from which the U.S. Constitution derives much meaning, has long proscribed the taking of more from a taxpayer than she owes. Moreover, Supreme Court precedents and Minnesota law itself, in other contexts, recognize the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to the surplus in excess of the debt owed.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, addressing the second question presented, which the majority declined to address. In Justice Gorsuch’s view, Hennepin County’s actions likely also violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Dupree v Younger.
In this case, the court considered this issue: To preserve the issue for appellate review, must a party reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment?
The case was decided on May 25, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that a post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
In Ortiz v Jordan, the Court held that a party whose sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge was rejected at the summary judgment stage must reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it for appeal. That decision was based on the reasoning that the factual record developed at trial supersedes the record existing at the time of summary judgment.
When the motion for summary judgment is based on a purely legal question—rather than on the factual record—no subsequent proceedings in the trial court supersede conclusions of law. Thus, when a pure question of law is resolved in an order denying summary judgment, the party need not reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it on appeal.
The Court did not decide whether the issue Dupree raised on appeal is purely legal, so it remanded the case for the Fourth Circuit to answer that question.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency.
In this case, the court considered this issue: What is the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act?
The case was decided on May 25, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The Clean Water Act extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States—i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment reversing and remanding.
In 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly enforce the Clean Water Act, initially defined “the waters of the United States” differently. By 1980, they had adopted identical definitions, which encompassed “all waters that could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Since then, they have repeatedly sought to define and redefine “waters of the United States” through rulemaking procedures.
Despite this history, the Court found that the meaning of “waters” in the CWA encompasses “only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.” The mere presence of water is too broad; such a definition would include puddles and isolated ponds. Thus, wetlands are not per se “waters of the United States”; rather, only those with a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters fall within that category.
Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion in full but concurred separately, along with Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing the importance of curbing the expansion of federal authority through agency action.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh disagreed with the Court’s “continuous surface connection” test because, in his view, it “departs from the statutory text, from 45 years of consistent agency practice,” and from the Court’s own precedents.
Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Kagan lamented that, in her opinion, the majority “substitutes its own ideas about policymaking for Congress’s.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion inCalcutt v Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When an agency commits legal errors may the reviewing court apply the correct legal rules to the record in the first instance?
The case was decided on May 22, 2023.
In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that when an agency commits legal errors, the reviewing court must remand the case to the agency, not conduct its own review of the factual record.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Amgen Inc. v Sanofi.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do Amgen’s two patents satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause—that is, describing the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention?
The case was decided on May 18, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Amgen’s two patent applications—purporting to cover all antibodies that bind and block the PCSK9 receptor involved in LDL cholesterol metabolism—fail to satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court affirming the judgment below.
It is well established that the enablement requirement means that if a patent claims an entire class of process, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. While the specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a claimed invention, it must not be too broad. Amgen’s specification fails to enable all that it has claimed, even allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. It described 26 antibodies by their amino acid sequences, but it claims to monopolize an entire class of antibodies not described. Thus, its claim is too broad.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v Goldsmith.
In this case, the court considered this issue: What is the proper test for whether a work is “transformative” under the first factor of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine?
The case was decided on May 18, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that he “purpose and character” of the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF)’s particular commercial use of Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of the musician Prince does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The fair use defense to copyright infringement promotes creativity by recognizing that some secondary works make unauthorized use of original works but serve a different purpose, add new expression, or convey new ideas. Andy Warhol’s “Orange Prince,” one of the Prince Series that was derived from the photograph by Lynn Goldsmith, appeared on the cover of a Vanity Fair magazine commemorating the late musician for a fee of $10,000—all of which to AWF and of which Goldsmith received none. In contrast, Goldsmith’s photographs were licensed and used on several other magazine covers commemorating Prince.
AWF’s use of Orange Prince on the cover of Vanity Fair served essentially the same commercial purpose as Goldsmith’s original. Thus, the first fair-use factor—the purpose and character of use, including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit purpose—weighs against the conclusion that AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph for the specific purpose of a magazine cover commemorating Prince was fair.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, emphasizing the narrowness of the majority’s opinion and its appropriate focus on the specific use challenged.
Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, criticizing the majority of stifling creativity and disregarding the reality that creativity relies upon the borrowing of works that came before.
Note: The Court’s opinion here included pictures and paintings. Those images are not captured in this recording. I encourage you to find the opinion online and review the images referenced here. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Ohio Adjutant General's Department v Federal Labor Relations Authority.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 empower the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias?
The case was decided on May 18, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because the state militia was acting as a federal agency when it hired and supervised dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), the FLRA has jurisdiction only over labor organizations and federal agencies. The FSLMRS defines “agency” to include the Department of Defense. Dual-status technicians are defined by statute to be employees of the Department of the Air Force or Department of the Army—both of which are components of the Department of Defense and thus plainly within the jurisdiction of the FLRA. By hiring and supervising these employees, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General were acting as a federal agency.
Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that while the Guard may act as a federal agency, exercise the authority of such an agency, and function as an agency, is not actually an agency and thus is outside the jurisdiction of the FLRA.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Santos-Zacaria v Garland.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 8 U-S-C § 1252(d)(1) bar a court of appeals from reviewing an immigrant’s claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals had engaged in impermissible factfinding because the immigrant had not exhausted that claim through a motion to reconsider?
The case was decided on May 11, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Title 8 U-S-C § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional provision; it does not require an immigrant to seek a motion to reconsider, which is a discretionary form of review, only remedies available as a matter of right. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The language of § 1252(d)(1) is substantially different from jurisdictional provisions found elsewhere. Absent a clear statement that Congress intended the forfeiture rule to be jurisdictional, courts should not interpret such rules as jurisdictional because of the potentially harsh consequences of doing so. Thus, § 1252(d)(1) is best understood to require a noncitizen to exhaust only those remedies available as of right.
Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims?
The case was decided on May 11, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Nothing in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico enjoys from legal claims. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court.
If Congress wishes to abrogate sovereign immunity, it must do so using “unmistakably clear” language in the statute. The Supreme Court has found such language only in two types of situations: when a statute expressly states that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity, and when a statute creates a cause of action and authorizes a lawsuit against a government based on that cause of action. There is no such language in PROMESA, nor does it create a cause of action for use against the Board or Puerto Rico. Even § 2126(a)—which provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise arising out of PROMESA . . . shall be brought” in the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico—does not amount to a clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Puerto Rico lacks state sovereign immunity, which would make the question of abrogation superfluous.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Percoco v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking owe a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud?
The case was decided on May 11, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking can be convicted of honest-services fraud, but in this case, the jury instructions leading to Percoco’s conviction were insufficiently definite. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The jury instruction in this case required the jury to determine whether Percoco had a “special relationship” with the government and had “dominated and controlled” government business. However, these concepts are too vague to allow ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch agreed with the majority but expressed concern over the vagueness of “honest-services fraud” more generally, regardless of what jury instruction might be provided.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Ciminelli v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory of fraud state a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute?
The case was decided on May 11, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory cannot form the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes because the right to control is not grounded in a traditional property interest. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The federal wire fraud statute prohibits the use of interstate wires for “any scheme or orifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” When the statute was enacted, the common understanding of the verb “to defraud” related to property rights. Although lower courts have interpreted the statute to include interests unconnected to traditional property rights, the Supreme Court in McNally v United States held that the statutes protect only individual property rights. The right-to-control theory has no roots in a traditional property interest and thus cannot be the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes.
The opinions are presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in National Pork Producers Council v Ross
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a California law that prohibits the in-state sale of pork from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards violate the “dormant” component of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause?
The case was decided on May 11, 2023
The Supreme Court held that California’s Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment of the U-SCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
State laws violate the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause when they seek to “build up…domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and business of other States.” An antidiscrimination principle is at the core of the dormant Commerce Clause; an “almost per se” rule against state laws that have extraterritorial effects is unsupported. A state law that does have extraterritorial effects but does not purposefully discriminate does not necessarily violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Under the balancing test established in Pike v Bruce Church, a court must assess “the burden imposed on interstate commerce” by the state law and prevent its enforcement if the law’s burdens are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” A majority of the Court concluded that under this test, Proposition 12 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, concluded that the petitioners failed to plausibly allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce and thus voted with the majority. Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett, concluded that the petitioners did allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce, but the benefits and burdens of Proposition 12 are incommensurable.
Chief Justice John Roberts filed an opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the petitioners did allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce and that the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to the court below to decide whether the petitioners had stated a claim under Pike.
Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely agreeing with the Chief Justice but pointing out also that state economic regulations like California’s Proposition 12 may raise questions not only under the Commerce Clause, but also under the Import-Export Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Reed v Goertz.
In this case, the court considered this issue: When does the statute of limitations for a 42 U-S-C § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begin to run?
The case was decided on Apr 18, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that when a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begins to run when the state litigation ends. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that, in Reed’s case, the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim began when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, not when the state trial court denied DNA testing.
A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action.” When that occurs depends on the cause of action. The violation of procedural due process rights, as Reed alleged in this case, requires two elements: (1) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (2) inadequate state process. Thus, a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” for a procedural due process violation not at the time of deprivation, but at the time the state fails to provide due process. In Reed’s case, the State’s alleged failure to provide him with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted liberty interest in DNA testing.
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case for lack of standing. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case on the finding that Reed’s action presents no original Article III case or controversy between him and the district attorney.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that there are a number of points in the case at which the statute of limitations could begin to run—all before the denial by the Criminal Court of Appeals, and all leading to the conclusion that Reed’s claim is time-barred.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Turkiye Halk Bankasi A-S v United States
In this case, the court considered this issue: May the district courts properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution against Halkbank in this case based on the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
The case was decided on Apr 19, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that The district court has jurisdiction in this criminal prosecution; the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in civil actions against foreign states and their instrumentalities does not cover criminal cases. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.
18 U.S.C. § 3231 contains a broad jurisdictional grant: it gives district courts original jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” Absent a textual exclusion of foreign states, the most natural reading of that provision is that it includes them.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act covers only civil cases. It grants district courts original jurisdiction over “any nonjury civil action against a foreign state” as to “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity” and describes procedures and remedies applicable exclusively in civil, not criminal, cases. FSIA is silent as to criminal prosecutions. Its one provision that a “foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter” must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Act, which focuses exclusively on civil matters. However, principles of common-law immunity might preclude this criminal prosecution even if the FSIA does not. Thus, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s determination that the district court had jurisdiction, reversed as to its conclusion that FSIA granted immunity from criminal prosecution, and vacated and remanded as to the issue of common-law immunity claims.
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Gorsuch argued that FSIA alone dictates the answer to the immunity questions in this case and thus agrees with the majority as to all but the judgment to vacate and remand the question of common-law immunity.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in M-O-A-C Mall Holdings LLC v Transform Holdco LLC.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Does Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limit the jurisdiction of appellate courts over an order approving the sale of a debtor’s assets or instead simply limit the remedies available on appeal from such an order?
The case was decided on April 19, 2023.
The Supreme Court held that Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code—which restricts the effects of certain successful appeals of judicially authorized sales or leases of bankruptcy-estate property—is not a jurisdictional provision. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Congressional statutes often contain restrictions and conditions on relief, but absent a “clear statement” that a provision is jurisdictional, courts must not treat these restrictions and conditions as jurisdictional. Jurisdictional provisions limit the power of the district court, whereas other limitations bear on the rights or obligations of the parties.
Nothing in the limiting language of § 363(m)’s purports to “govern a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” First, the text does not address a court’s authority or refer to the jurisdiction of district courts. Second, the structure of the Code and context of § 363(m) suggest it is not jurisdictional. The provision is separate from other provisions in the code that address federal courts’ jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, and unlike other provisions, § 363(m) contains no “clear tie” to the jurisdictional provisions.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Axon Enterprise, Inc. v Federal Trade Commission.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedure, and existence, or must such challenges be raised first in the administrative proceeding?
The case was decided on April 14, 2023. The Supreme Court held that Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act (in 21-86) and the Securities Exchange Act (in 21-1239) did not preclude district courts’ ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to those agencies’ structure, procedure, or existence.
The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within the statutory structure,” and thus would preclude district court jurisdiction. The three factors are: (1) Could precluding district court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim? (2) Is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provisions? (3) Is the claim “outside the agency’s expertise”?
The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction.
First, preclusion of district court jurisdiction “could foreclose all meaningful judicial review” because Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over.
Second, the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutes’ review provisions because challenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either the enforcement-related matters the Commissions regularly adjudicate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against Axon and Cochran.
Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to express “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end.”
Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that he would reach the same conclusion as the majority by applying only 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Perez v Sturgis Public Schools.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (I-D-E-A) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require a student to exhaust his administrative proceedings against the school district even when such proceedings would be futile?
The case was decided on March 21, 2023. The Supreme Court declined to exempt a highly-compensated worker, paid on a daily basis with no guarantee of a weekly amount, from the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime pay requirements. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Wilkins v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Do the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (I-D-E-A) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require a student to exhaust his administrative proceedings against the school district even when such proceedings would be futile?
The case was decided on March 28, 2023. The Supreme Court held that the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Wilkins's and Stanton's lawsuit may proceed.
Jurisdictional rules tend to disrupt litigation, whereas procedural rules (including claim-processing rules) seek to facilitate the litigation process. Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the jurisdictional label, courts will view a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. As a general rule, most statutes of limitations are non-jurisdictional.
The 12-year statute of limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing in its text or context supports departing from the general rule that statutes of limitations are non-jurisdictional. Nor do any of the three cases the government cites definitively interpreted Section 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. Thus, the provision at issue is a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional one.
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the Court has long treated conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity, such as the one at issue in this case, as jurisdictional, and he would recognize the Court’s precedents as resolving the question.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Bittner v United States.
In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a “violation” under the Bank Secrecy Act the failure to file an annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or is there a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported?
The case was decided on February 28, 2023. The court held that The Bank Secrecy Act’s $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Bittner was subject to a fine only for each report he failed to file, not for each account he failed to report over that five-year period.
The plain language of Section 5321 addresses the legal duty to file reports, not of individual accounts or their number. The penalty the statute prescribes for nonwillful violations must therefore be based on the number of reports, not on the number of accounts. In contrast, for willful violations, the statute expressly considers a penalty on a per-account basis. The government’s guidance as to these provisions, as well as the drafting history, further support this understanding.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that “the most natural reading of the statute establishes that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation.”
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Delaware v Pennsylvania.
The Disputed Instruments, prepaid financial instruments used to transfer funds to a named payee, are sold by banks on behalf of MoneyGram and others. When these instruments are not presented for payment within a certain period of time, they are deemed abandoned. MoneyGram applies the common-law escheatment practices outlined in 1965 by the Supreme Court: The proceeds of abandoned financial products should escheat to the state of the creditor’s last known address, or where such records are not kept, to the state in which the company holding the funds is incorporated. MoneyGram does not keep records of creditor addresses but transmits the abandoned proceeds to its state of incorporation. States invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to determine whether the abandoned proceeds of the Disputed Instruments are governed by the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act (FDA), which provides that a money order or “similar written instrument (other than a third-party bank check)” should generally escheat to the state in which the instrument was purchased, 12 U-s-c 2503.
The Court held that the Disputed Instruments are sufficiently similar to money orders to fall within the FDA’s “similar written instrument” category. Being prepaid makes them likely to escheat. The FDA was passed to abrogate common law because, for instruments like money orders, the entities selling such products often did not keep records of creditor addresses, resulting in a “windfall” to the state of incorporation. Bank liability is not a trigger for exclusion, given that banks can be liable on money orders, which are expressly covered. Whatever the intended meaning of “third-party bank check,” it cannot be read broadly to exclude prepaid instruments that escheat inequitably due to the business practices of the company holding the funds.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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In this case, Cruz, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, argued that under the Supreme Court’s “Simmons” decision, he should have been allowed to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. The Arizona Supreme Court held that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme did not trigger Simmons. The Supreme Court subsequently held that it was fundamental error to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona.
Cruz sought to raise the Simmons issue under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which permits a successive post-conviction petition if “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable ... would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief, reasoning that a significant change in the application of a law is not a significant change in the law itself, focusing on whether Lynch was a significant change in federal law.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated. A state procedural ruling that is “firmly established and regularly followed” ordinarily forecloses review of a federal claim but the Arizona ruling rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-court procedural rule that it is not adequate to foreclose review of the federal claim. Although Lynch did not change the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Simmons, it did change the operation of Simmons by Arizona courts in a way that matters for Rule 32.1(g). The analytic focus of Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) has always been on the impact on Arizona law.
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In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a supervisor who makes over $200,000 annually, calculated on a daily basis, entitled to overtime pay, despite a regulation that carves out an exception for highly paid executives?
The case was decided on February 22, 2023. The Supreme Court declined to exempt a highly-compensated worker, paid on a daily basis with no guarantee of a weekly amount, from the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime pay requirements. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined.
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In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a bankruptcy debtor be held liable for another person’s fraud, even when they were not aware of the fraud?
The case was decided on February 22, 2023. The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code exemption from discharge for debts involving fraud precludes the partner of the individual who committed the fraud from discharging a debt, regardless of her own culpability. Justice Barrett filed an opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.
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Adolfo R. Arellano served honorably in the Navy from November 1977 to October 1981. On June 3, 2011—more than 30 years after he was discharged—he applied for disability benefits on the basis of psychiatric disorders that rendered him 100% disabled. He sought retroactive benefits from the day after his discharge, arguing that the one-year filing deadline to submit disability claims should be extended in his case because his mental illness had prevented him from filing his claim earlier.The VA Regional Office granted his claim, but only from the date the claim was received. The Board of Appeals rejected his argument, and the Veterans Court affirmed that decision, concluding that Mr. Arellano's claim was “squarely foreclosed by binding precedent” in Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which held that principles of equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1).
In this case, the court considered this issue: Can the one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged be extended under principles of equitable tolling?
The case was decided on January 24, 2023. The court held that Section 5110-b-1 is not subject to equitable tolling. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.
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In 2018, the Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), under which policy certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border of the United States were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. Known as the “remain in Mexico” policy, the MPPs faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment, but the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to enforce it.
In June 2021, the Biden administration sought to end the policy, but Texas and Missouri challenged that effort, arguing that rescinding the policy violated federal immigration law and that the policy change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. A federal district court agreed with the challengers and ordered the Biden administration to implement the MPPs in good faith or initiate new agency action in compliance with the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to block the lower court’s ruling, as did the Supreme Court.
In October 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new decision ending the policy supported by a memorandum explaining the decision. A district court again ordered DHS to continue the CPPs, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order. The Biden administration sought expedited review as to whether federal immigration law requires it to maintain the policy and whether the October decision to end the policy has any legal effect.
The case was decided on June 30, 2022. The Court held that the Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225 of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency action. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH joined. Justice KAVANAUGH filed a concurring opinion. Justice ALITO, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices THOMAS and GORSUCH joined. Justice BARRETT filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH joined as to all but the first sentence.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-954.
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The Trump administration repealed the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which established guidelines for states to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, and issued in its place the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which eliminated or deferred the guidelines. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule as arbitrary and capricious. One of the challengers, North American Coal Corporation, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to so broadly regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
The case was decided on June 30, 2022. The Court held that this case remains justiciable notwithstanding the Government’s contention that no petitioner has Article 3 standing, given EPA’s stated intention not to enforce the Clean Power Plan and to instead engage in new rulemaking. The Court also held that Congress did not grant EPA in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT joined. Justice GORSUCH filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice ALITO joined. Justice KAGAN filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices BREYER and SOTOMAYOR joined.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1530.
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Leroy Torres enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989. In 1998, he was employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as a trooper, where he served until his deployment to Iraq in 2007. In 2008, he was honorably discharged and sought reemployment by DPS. However, due to a lung condition he acquired in Iraq, Torres requested employment with DPS in a position different from the one he held before. Instead, DPS offered Torres only a “temporary duty offer,” which he declined.
Torres sued DPS in 2017, alleging that the agency’s failure to offer him a job that would accommodate his disability violated the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits adverse employment actions against an employee based on the employee’s military service. The trial court ruled in favor of Torres, finding that USERRA properly abrogated DPS’s sovereign immunity under Congress’s constitutional war powers. The appellate court reversed.
The case was decided on June 29, 2022. The Court held that By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in U-S-E-R-R-A. Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice ROBERTS and Justices SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH joined. Justice KAGAN filed a concurring opinion. Justice THOMAS filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT joined.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-603
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Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, a non-Native, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of child neglect, and he was sentenced to 35 years. The victim, his stepdaughter, is Native American, and the crime was committed within the Cherokee Reservation.
Castro-Huerta challenged his conviction, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that states cannot prosecute crimes committed on Native American lands without federal approval. Oklahoma argued that McGirt involved a Native defendant, whereas Castro-Huerta is non-Native, so McGirt does not bar his prosecution by the state.
The case was decided on June 29, 2022. The Court held that The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. Justice KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice ROBERTS and Justices THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT joined. Justice GORSUCH filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN joined.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-429
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In 2008, Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to crack cocaine charges, and in 2009 he was sentenced to 228 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the statutory penalties for most federal crimes involving crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress made these changes retroactive, and Concepcion moved for resentencing. The district court denied his motion, and Concepcion appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the district court was not obligated to update and reevaluate the sentencing factors.
The case was decided on June 27, 2022. The Court held that The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence. Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices THOMAS, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH joined. Justice KAVANAUGH filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice ROBERTS and Justices ALITO and BARRETT joined.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1650
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A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
The case was decided on June 27, 2022. The Court held that : Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the statute’s “except as authorized” clause. Once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts 1–A, 1–B, and 2.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1410
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Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice in order to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Engagement Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him.
Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The case was decided on June 27, 2022. The Court held the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts and , Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined and in which Justice Kavanaugh except as to Part 3–B. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-418
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In 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule eliminating the word “covered” from 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b)(2)(i), effectively amending HHS’s interpretation of the phrase “entitled to [Medicare]” in a subsection of the Medicare Act. This amendment affects the way HHS calculates its reimbursement to certain hospitals that serve low-income patients.
Plaintiff Empire Health Foundation challenged the 2005 Rule as part of a larger challenge to HHS’s calculation of its 2008 reimbursement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Empire based on a finding that HHS did not follow correct procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because of numerous mistakes that occurred during the notice-and-comment process. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that HHS did follow the correct procedures under the APA, but the rule is substantively invalid because it directly conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the phrase “entitled to [Medicare] is unambiguous.”
The case was decided on June 24, 2022. The Court held that in calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to Medicare Part A benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.
Credit: Oyez, LII Supreme Court Resources, Justia Supreme Court Center, available at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1312
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In 2018, Mississippi passed a law called the “Gestational Age Act,” which prohibits all abortions, with few exceptions, after 15 weeks’ gestational age. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the only licensed abortion facility in Mississippi, and one of its doctors filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the law and requesting an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO). After a hearing, the district court granted the TRO while the litigation proceeded to discovery. After discovery, the district court granted the clinic’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the law, finding that the state had not provided evidence that a fetus would be viable at 15 weeks, and Supreme Court precedent prohibits states from banning abortions prior to viability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The case was decided on June 24, 2022. The Court held that The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.
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In 1993, Michael Wade Nance robbed a bank, and, in the process of fleeing, killed a person. In 1997, a jury convicted Nance of murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence and rejected a petition for collateral relief. Nance then filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Then, in 2020, Nance filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State’s lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional as applied to him because of two medical issues. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Nance’s complaint, concluding that it was untimely and failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that because the relief Nance sought implied the invalidity of his death sentence, his complaint must be construed as a habeas petition, and because he had already filed an earlier habeas petition, it was properly considered a “successive” petition, over which a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
The case was decided on June 23, 2022. The Court held that Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined.
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The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State.
The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request.
The case was decided on June 23, 2022. The court held that North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.
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The state of New York requires a person to show a special need for self-protection to receive an unrestricted license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch challenged the law after New York rejected their concealed-carry applications based on failure to show “proper cause.” A district court dismissed their claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
The case was decided on June 22, 2022. The Court held that New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.
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DaVita is the leading provider of dialysis treatment in the United States. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is a self-funded plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Patient A is an anonymous individual with end-stage renal disease who is a member of the plan and has been receiving treatment by DaVita since April 15, 2017.
The Plan defines three tiers of reimbursement, and dialysis providers are categorically in the lowest tier and are considered out of network, entitling them to the lowest level of reimbursement relative to all other providers.
DaVita challenged the Plan as violating the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which prohibits health plans from treating individuals with kidney failure differently in eligibility or access to benefits. The district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that DaVita had plausibly alleged that the Plan engaged in unlawful discrimination.
The case was decided on June 21, 2022. The Court held that Section 1395(y)(b)(1)(C) does not authorize disparate-impact liability, and the Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do not violate §1395(y)(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all covered individuals. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
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In 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Raymond Twyford of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. Twyford unsuccessfully pursued direct appeals and also filed a federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Twyford asked the federal district court to allow him to undergo neurological imaging to substantiate allegations of neurological problems due to childhood abuse, neglect, and injuries. The district court granted Twyford’s motion and ordered the prison warden to transport Twyford for his neurological imaging because the results might assist the court in exercising its habeas review. The warden appealed the order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The case was decided on June 21, 2022. The Court held that A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.
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Justin Eugene Taylor and a co-conspirator intended to rob a drug dealer, who ended up being shot during the transaction. The Government’s indictment charged Taylor on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
The indictment also alleged two predicate crimes of violence: the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Taylor was convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
On habeas review, Taylor asked the court to vacate his conviction and remand for resentencing based on the argument that the two predicate offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s § 924(c) conviction, finding that because the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).
The case was decided on June 21, 2022. The Court held that Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting opinions.
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The State of Maine relies on local school administrative units (SAUs) to ensure that every school-age child in the state has access to a free education. Not every SAU operates its own public secondary school. To meet the state requirements, an SAU without its own public secondary school may either (1) contract with a secondary school to provide school privileges or (2) pay the tuition of a secondary school at which a particular student is accepted. In either circumstance, the secondary school must be either a public school or an “approved” private school.
To be an “approved” school, a private school must meet the state’s compulsory attendance requirements (which can be demonstrated by accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or by approval by the Maine Department of Education), and it must be “nonsectarian in accordance with the First Amendment.”
The Carsons, Gillises, and Nelsons live in SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own but instead provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to an “approved” private school. The three families opted to send their children to private schools that are accredited but do not meet the nonsectarian requirement because they are religiously affiliated. Because the schools are not “approved,” they do not qualify for tuition assistance. The families filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the “nonsectarian” requirement violates the Constitution on its face and as applied. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the State and denied judgment to the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that it had twice before rejected similar challenges, and even though the U.S. Supreme Court had decided two relevant cases in the interim, those cases do not produce a different outcome here.
The case was decided on June 21, 2022. The Court held that Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part 1–B. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.
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The Hanford site was a federal nuclear production site in Washington State that operated between 1944 and 1989, producing substantial amounts of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste. The U.S. Department of Energy now oversees cleanup of the site, which is largely conducted by private contractors and subcontractors.
In 2018, Washington amended its state workers’ compensation laws specifically for these cleanup workers. The amended law creates a rebuttable presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases.
The federal government challenged the law as violating the principle of intergovernmental immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for Washington, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The case was decided on June 21, 2022. The Court held that Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there.
Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
The Court held that A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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Kevin R. George and Michael B. Martin are both military veterans who sought and were denied disability benefits several decades ago based on the straightforward application of a regulation. Since then, the regulation was overturned, so George and Martin sought revision of those denial decisions based on the “clear and unmistakable error” (CUE) by the VA.
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the motions, holding that it was not clear and unmistakable error to faithfully apply a regulation that existed at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The Court held the invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part II–C.
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Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation near El Paso, Texas. Under the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1987, the Pueblo agreed that its gaming activities would comply with Texas law. Another law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, also regulates tribal gaming operations. The Pueblo engaged in gaming activity that violated state law but not the IGRA, and Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the tribe’s gaming operations. The district court ruled in favor of the State of Texas, finding that the more restrictive Restoration Act controlled and prohibited the gaming operations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Court held that The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined.
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Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc., and agreed to submit any dispute arising out of her employment to binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, Moriana sued Viking on behalf of herself and similarly situated workers under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Moriana relied on a 2014 decision by the California Supreme Court, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which held arbitration agreements that waive the right to bring PAGA representative actions in any forum (such as the one between Moriana and Viking) are unenforceable. Viking moved to compel Moriana’s claims to arbitration, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis overruled Iskanian. The trial court denied Viking’s motion. The appellate court affirmed.
The Court held that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of P-A-G-A actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined. Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts 1 and 2. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part 3. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kavanaugh and in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to all but the footnote. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.
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The federal government reimburses hospitals for providing outpatient care to patients insured by Medicare Part B. Until recently, the government reimbursed all hospitals at a uniform rate for providing covered drugs. In 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reduced the reimbursement rates for certain types of hospitals (known as “340B hospitals”) because those hospitals can obtain the covered drugs far more cheaply than other hospitals can. HHS reasoned that it should not reimburse hospitals more than they paid to acquire the drugs.
Several 340B hospitals and hospital associations affected by the decision filed a lawsuit challenging HHS’s decision to lower reimbursement rates. The district court ruled that HHS had exceeded its statutory authority by reducing drug reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that HHS’s decision is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
The Court held that The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimbursement rates. The Court also held that absent a survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs, HHS may not vary the reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection. In May 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and detained him and initiated removal proceedings. Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding and deferral of removal based on fear of violence in Mexico. Six months after the start of his detention, he requested a bond hearing and challenged his continued detention without one.
The Court held that section 1231(a)(6) does not require the Government to provide noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part 1. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price.
The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a).
The Court held that only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body constitutes a “foreign or international tribunal” under 28 U-S-C §1782, and the bodies at issue in these cases do not qualify. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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Dexter Kemp and several co-defendants were charged and convicted of drug and firearms offenses. Kemp and some of the co-defendants appealed, but their sentences were affirmed. Some of the co-defendants, without Kemp, filed petitions for rehearings, rehearings en banc, and certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Over a year later, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied his motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Kemp argued that his petition was timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, which provides that if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court, the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of the denial of rehearing. The court denied his motion, finding that it fell under Rule 60(b)(1) because it alleged the court made a “mistake,” and that such motions must be filed within one year.
The Court held that the term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period.
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Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo tribe, pleaded guilty to an assault charge in the Court of Indian Offenses. That court is a trial court that exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans where there are no tribal courts to do so. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi on a charge of aggravated sexual assault based on the same underlying events. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.
Denezpi challenged his prosecution in federal court, arguing that it violated the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the Court of Indian Offenses is a federal agency. The district court ruled against Denezpi, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them.
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Respondents are aliens who were detained by the Federal Government pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that bears Aleman Gonzalez’s name—are natives and citizens of Mexico who were detained under §1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States illegally. They filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that aliens detained under §1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months’ detention. The District Court certified a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing.” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616, 629. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 766. Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the named plaintiff in the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He likewise reentered the country illegally and was detained under §1231(a)(6). He filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that §1231(a)(6) entitled him to a bond hearing. The District Court certified a class, granted partial summary judgment against the Government, and entered class-wide injunctive relief. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Flores Tejada v. Godfrey, 954 F.3d 1245, 1247. This Court granted certiorari and instructed the parties to brief the threshold question whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief under the INA.
Held: Section 1252(f )(1) of the INA deprived the District Courts of jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Pp. 3–10.
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Respondent Robert Boule owns a bed-and-breakfast—the Smuggler’s Inn—in Blaine, Washington. The inn abuts the international border between Canada and the United States. Boule at times helped federal agents identify and apprehend persons engaged in unlawful cross-border activity on or near his property. But Boule also would provide transportation and lodging to illegal border crossers. Often, Boule would agree to help illegal border crossers enter or exit the United States, only to later call federal agents to report the unlawful activity.
In 2014, Boule informed petitioner Erik Egbert, a U. S. Border Patrol agent, that a Turkish national, arriving in Seattle by way of New York, had scheduled transportation to Smuggler’s Inn. When Agent Egbert observed one of Boule’s vehicles returning to the inn, he suspected that the Turkish national was a passenger and followed the vehicle to the inn. On Boule’s account, Boule asked Egbert to leave, but Egbert refused, became violent, and threw Boule first against the vehicle and then to the ground. Egbert then checked the immigration paperwork for Boule’s guest and left after finding everything in order. The Turkish guest unlawfully entered Canada later that evening.
Boule filed a grievance with Agent Egbert’s supervisors and an administrative claim with Border Patrol pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Egbert allegedly retaliated against Boule by reporting Boule’s “SMUGLER” license plate to the Washington Department of Licensing for referencing illegal activity, and by contacting the Internal Revenue Service and prompting an audit of Boule’s tax returns. Boule’s FTCA claim was ultimately denied, and Border Patrol took no action against Egbert for his use of force or alleged acts of retaliation. Boule then sued Egbert in Federal District Court, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation for excessive use of force and a First Amendment violation for unlawful retaliation. Invoking Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, Boule asked the District Court to recognize a damages action for each alleged constitutional violation. The District Court declined to extend Bivens as requested, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.
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Since 1978, bankruptcy courts in the United States have operated under two programs for the handling of their proceedings — the Trustee program and the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Eighty-eight of the 94 judicial districts operate within the Trustee program, while the other districts (in Alabama and North Carolina) are under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. The former is part of the Department of Justice, while the latter is overseen by the Judicial Council of the United States.
Each program is also funded differently. The Bankruptcy Administrator program is funded by the judiciary's general budget, whereas the bankruptcy debtors in Trustee districts primarily fund the Trustee program. All Chapter 11 debtors, regardless of district, paid quarterly fees under a consistent formula until January 1, 2018, at which time the Trustee program experienced a funding deficit. To remedy that deficit, Congress passed the 2017 Amendment, which increased the quarterly fees for larger Chapter 11 cases in the Trustee program.
In 2008, Circuit City—then a national chain of consumer electronics retail stores throughout the United States—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Virginia, which is a Trustee district. As part of its liquidation plan, Circuit City was to pay fees to the U.S. Trustee until the close of bankruptcy. However, after the quarterly fees increased, Circuit City refused to pay the increased fees, arguing that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional because it creates nonuniform bankruptcy laws in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled for the Circuit City trustee, finding the 2017 Amendment violated the Bankruptcy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.
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Respondent Latrice Saxon, a ramp supervisor for Southwest Airlines, trains and supervises teams of ramp agents who physically load and unload cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country. Like many ramp supervisors, Saxon also frequently loads and unloads cargo alongside the ramp agents. Saxon came to believe that Southwest was failing to pay proper overtime wages to ramp supervisors, and she brought a putative class action against Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Because Saxon’s employment contract required her to arbitrate wage disputes individually, Southwest sought to enforce its arbitration agreement and moved to dismiss. In response, Saxon claimed that ramp supervisors were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act’s coverage. 9 U. S. C. §1. The District Court disagreed, holding that only those involved in “actual transportation,” and not those who merely handle goods, fell within §1’s exemption. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that “[t]he act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as that term was understood at the time of the [FAA’s] enactment in 1925.” 993 F.3d 492, 494.
Held: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies. Pp. 3–11.
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Petitioner Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries resulting in permanent disability when a truck struck her as she stepped off her Florida school bus. Florida’s Medicaid agency paid $862,688.77 to cover Gallardo’s initial medical expenses, and the agency continues to pay her medical expenses. Gallardo, through her parents, sued the truck’s owner and driver, as well as the Lee County School Board. She sought compensation for past medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost earnings, and other damages. That litigation resulted in a settlement for $800,000, with $35,367.52 expressly designated as compensation for past medical expenses. The settlement did not specifically allocate any amount for future medical expenses.
The Medicaid Act requires participating States to pay for certain needy individuals’ medical costs and then to make reasonable efforts to recoup those costs from liable third parties. 42 U. S. C. §1396k(a)(1)(A). Under Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, a beneficiary like Gallardo who “accept[s] medical assistance” from Medicaid “automatically assigns to the [state] agency any right” to third-party payments for medical care. Fla. Stat. §409.910(6)(b). Applied to Gallardo’s settlement, Florida’s statutory framework entitled the State to $300,000—i.e., 37.5% of $800,000, the percentage the statute sets as presumptively representing the portion of the tort recovery that is for “past and future medical expenses,” absent clear and convincing rebuttal evidence. §§409.910(11)(f )(1), (17)(b). Gallardo challenged the presumptive allocation in an administrative proceeding. She also brought this lawsuit seeking a declaration that Florida was violating the Medicaid Act by trying to recover from portions of the settlement compensating for future medical expenses. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the relevant Medicaid Act provisions do not prevent a State from seeking reimbursement fromsettlement monies allocated for future medical care. 963 F.3d 1167, 1178.
Held: The Medicaid Act permits a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care. Pp. 5–12.
Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-1263/
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The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed each prisoner's conviction and death sentence on direct review; each was denied state postconviction relief. Rejecting their petitions for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the district court found their ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims procedurally defaulted as not properly presented in state court. Each unsuccessfully argued that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel constituted "cause" to excuse the procedural default. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court reversed. Under section 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, section 2254(b)(1)(A), requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief. The doctrine of procedural default, a “corollary” to the exhaustion requirement, generally prevents federal courts from hearing any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts “consistent with [the State’s] own procedural rules.” Together, exhaustion and procedural default protect against “the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural rules,
Federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice.” Attorney error cannot provide cause to excuse a default in proceedings for which the Constitution does not guarantee the assistance of counsel except where the state requires prisoners to raise such claims for the first time during state collateral proceedings. Under section 2254(e)(2), when a prisoner is “at fault” for the undeveloped record in state court, a federal court may hold “an evidentiary hearing on the claim” in only two limited scenarios not relevant here and also must show that further fact-finding would demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is innocent. State postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the state-court record is attributed to the prisoner because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. When a federal habeas court convenes an evidentiary hearing for any purpose or otherwise reviews any evidence for any purpose, it may not consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner’s defaulted claim unless the exceptions in section 2254(e)(2) are satisfied.
Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-1009/
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Morgan, an hourly employee at Sundance's Taco Bell franchise, had signed an agreement to arbitrate any employment dispute. Morgan later filed a nationwide collective action asserting that Sundance had violated federal law regarding overtime pay. Sundance initially defended as if no arbitration agreement existed, filing an unsuccessful motion to dismiss and engaging in unsuccessful mediation. Months after Morgan filed suit, Sundance unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under Eighth Circuit precedent, a party waived its right to arbitration if it knew of the right; “acted inconsistently with that right”; and “prejudiced the other party by its inconsistent actions.”
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. A court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind and may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. Federal policy is to treat arbitration contracts like all others, not to foster arbitration. Courts may not create arbitration-specific procedural rules. Because the usual federal rule concerning waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. The proper inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right?
Primary Holding: Because the usual federal rule concerning waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.
*Credit: Justia US Supreme Court available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/21-328/
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During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign and consistent with federal law, see 11 CFR §110.10; 52 U. S. C. §30101(9)(A)(i), appellee Ted Cruz loaned $260,000 to his campaign committee, Ted Cruz for Senate (Committee). To repay these and other campaign debts, campaigns may continue to receive contributions after election day. See 11 CFR §110.1(b)(3)(i). Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) restricts the use of post-election contributions by limiting the amount that a candidate may be repaid from such funds to $250,000. 52 U. S. C. §30116(j). Relevant here, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has promulgated regulations establishing three rules to implement that limitation: First, a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made “at any time.” 11 CFR §116.12(a). Second, to the extent the loans exceed $250,000, a campaign may use pre-election funds to repay the portion exceeding $250,000 only if the repayment occurs “within 20 days of the election.” §116.11(c)(1). Third, when the 20-day post-election deadline expires, the campaign must treat any portion above $250,000 as a contribution to the campaign, precluding later repayment. §116.11(c)(2).
The Committee began repaying Cruz’s loans after the 20-day post-election window for repaying amounts over $250,000 had closed. It accordingly repaid Cruz only $250,000, leaving $10,000 of his personal loans unpaid. Cruz and the Committee filed this action in Federal District Court, alleging that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment and raising challenges to the FEC’s implementing regulation, §116.11. The District Court granted Cruz and his Committee summary judgment on their constitutional claim, holding that the loan-repayment limitation burdens political speech without sufficient justification, and dismissed as moot their challenges to the regulation.
Held: Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304.
Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/21-12/
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In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for discretionary adjustment of status under 8 U. S. C. §1255, which would have made Patel and his wife lawful permanent residents. Because USCIS was aware that Patel had previously checked a box on a Georgia driver’s license application falsely stating that he was a United States citizen, it denied Patel’s application for failure to satisfy the threshold requirement that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence. §1255(i)(2)(A); see also §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (rendering inadmissible a noncitizen “who falsely represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under” state or federal law).
Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry. Patel sought relief from removal by renewing his adjustment of status request. Patel argued before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “citizen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent necessary to violate the federal statute. The Immigration Judge disagreed, denied Patel’s application for adjustment of status, and ordered that Patel and his wife be removed from the country. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel’s appeal.
Patel petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, where a panel of that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. Federal law prohibits judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under §1255. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But see §1252(a)(2)(D) (exception where the judgment concerns “constitutional claims” or “questions of law”). The panel reasoned that the factual determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testified credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent himself as a citizen—each qualified as an unreviewable judgment. On rehearing, the en banc court agreed with the panel. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict as to the scope of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under §1255 and the other provisions enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Pp. 6–17.
Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-979/
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Boston’s City Hall Plaza has three flagpoles; one flies the American flag and another the state flag. The city’s flag usually flies from the third pole but groups may hold ceremonies on the plaza during which participants may hoist a flag of their choosing on the third pole. Over 12 years, Boston approved the raising of about 50 unique flags for 284 such ceremonies, most were other countries’ flags, but some were associated with groups or causes. In 2017, Camp Constitution asked to hold an event on the plaza to celebrate the civic and social contributions of the Christian community and to raise the “Christian flag.” Worried that flying a religious flag could violate the Establishment Clause, the city approved the event but told the group it could not raise its flag. The district court and First Circuit upheld that decision.
The Supreme Court reversed. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech so Boston’s refusal to let Camp Constitution fly its flag violated the Free Speech Clause. Employing a “holistic inquiry,” the Court noted that the history of flag flying, particularly at the seat of government, supports Boston, but Boston did not shape or control the flags’ content and meaning and never intended to convey the messages on the flags as its own. The application process did not involve seeing flags before plaza events. The city’s practice was to approve flag raisings without exception. When the government does not speak for itself, it may not exclude private speech based on “religious viewpoint”; doing so “constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.”
- Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-1800/
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Cummings, who is deaf and blind, sought physical therapy services from Premier, requesting an American Sign Language interpreter at her sessions. Premier declined. Cummings sought damages, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act. Premier is subject to those statutes because it receives reimbursement through Medicare and Medicaid. The district court determined that the only compensable injuries allegedly caused by Premier were emotional in nature.
The Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Spending Clause legislation, including the statutes at issue, operates based on consent; a particular remedy is available in a private Spending Clause action only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature. Because the statutes at issue are silent as to available remedies, the Court followed the contract analogy. A federal funding recipient is on notice that it is subject to the “usual” remedies traditionally available in breach of contract suits; emotional distress is generally not compensable in contract.
The Court rejected an argument that such damages may be awarded where a contractual breach is particularly likely to result in emotional disturbance. Even if it were appropriate to treat funding recipients as aware that they may be subject to rare contract-law rules, they would lack the requisite notice that emotional distress damages are available under these statutes. There is no majority rule on what circumstances may trigger the allowance of such damages.
- Credit: Justia US Supreme Court, available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-219/
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Davenport, convicted of first-degree murder following a jury trial where he sat shackled at a table with a “privacy screen,” argued that his conviction should be set aside because the Due Process Clause generally forbids such shackling absent “a special need.” On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing; jurors testified that the shackles had not affected their verdict. The federal district court found habeas relief unwarranted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Sixth Circuit reversed without analyzing the case under AEDPA.
The Supreme Court reversed. When a state court has ruled on the merits of a prisoner’s claim, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief without applying both the Supreme Court's "Brecht" test and AEDPA. Brecht held that the harmless-error rule for direct appeals was inappropriate for federal habeas review of final state-court judgments. A state prisoner must show that a state court's error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the trial’s outcome, AEDPA instructs that if a state court has adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief “unless” the state court’s decision was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” presented in the state-court proceeding.
The Court rejected Davenport’s argument that the AEDPA inquiry represents a logical subset of the Brecht test, so the Sixth Circuit necessarily found that he satisfied AEDPA. AEDPA asks whether every fair-minded jurist would agree that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only whether a federal habeas court itself harbors grave doubt about the verdict. The legal materials a court may consult when answering each test also differ. Even assuming that Davenport’s claim can survive Brecht, he cannot satisfy AEDPA. Nothing in Supreme Court precedent is inconsistent with the Michigan Court of Appeals’ reliance on post-trial testimony from actual jurors.
- Credit: Justia US Supreme Court. Available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-826/
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The IRS notified Boechler, a North Dakota law firm, of a discrepancy in its tax filings. When Boechler did not respond, the IRS assessed an “intentional disregard” penalty and notified Boechler of its intent to levy Boechler’s property to satisfy the penalty, 26 U.S.C. 6330(a), 6721(a)(2), (e)(2)(A). The IRS’s Independent Office of Appeals sustained the proposed levy. Under section 6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30 days to petition the Tax Court for review. Boechler filed its petition one day late. The Tax Court dismissed the petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the 30-day filing deadline jurisdictional.
The Supreme Court reversed. Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is a non-jurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. Whether Boechler is entitled to equitable tolling should be determined on remand. Jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited, must be raised by courts “sua sponte,” and do not allow for equitable exceptions. A procedural requirement is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” The text does not clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading; multiple plausible, non-jurisdictional interpretations exist. Non-jurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling and nothing rebuts the presumption here.
*Credit: Justia US Supreme Court: available here: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-1472/#tab-opinion-4571692
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Cassirer inherited a Pissaro Impressionist painting. After the Nazis came to power in Germany, she surrendered the painting to obtain an exit visa. She and her grandson, Claude, eventually settled in the United States. The family’s post-war search for the painting was unsuccessful. In the 1990s, the painting was purchased by the Foundation, an entity created and controlled by the Kingdom of Spain.
Claude sued the Foundation, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602, to establish jurisdiction. FSIA provides foreign states and their instrumentalities with immunity from suit unless the claim falls within a specified exception. The court held that the Nazi confiscation of the painting brought Claude’s suit within the FSIA exception for expropriated property. To determine what property law governed the dispute, the court had to apply a choice-of-law rule. The plaintiffs urged the use of California’s choice-of-law rule; the Foundation advocated federal common law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the choice of the federal option, which commanded the use of the law of Spain, under which the Foundation was the rightful owner.
The Supreme Court vacated. In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. When a foreign state is not immune from suit under FSIA, it is subject to the same rules of liability as a private party. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee the use of the same substantive law and guarantee the same liability. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Even the federal government disclaims any necessity for a federal choice-of-law rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims.
*Credit: Justia US Supreme Court at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/596/20-1566/
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The U.S. Constitution’s Territory Clause states that Congress may “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States.” In exercising its broad authority, Congress has maintained different federal tax and benefits programs for residents of the Territories than for residents of the states. For example, residents of Puerto Rico are typically exempt from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes but not every federal benefits program extends to residents of Puerto Rico. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applies only to residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 42 U. S. C. 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i).
Madero received SSI benefits while a resident of New York. He moved to Puerto Rico, where he was no longer eligible to receive those benefits. Unaware of Madero’s new residence, the government continued to pay him SSI benefits but eventually sued to recover more than $28,000. Madero argued that Congress’s exclusion of residents of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violated the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court and the First Circuit agreed.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. The Court applied the deferential rational-basis test. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the states for purposes of the SSI benefits program.
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Austin Texas specially regulates signs that advertise things that are not located on the same premises as the sign and signs that direct people to offsite locations (off-premises signs). Its sign code prohibited the construction of new off-premises signs. Grandfathered off-premises signs could remain in their existing locations but could not be altered in ways that increased their nonconformity. On-premises signs were not similarly restricted. Advertisers, denied permits to digitize some billboards, argued that the prohibition against digitizing off-premises signs, but not on-premises signs, violated the First Amendment. The district court upheld the code. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the distinction "facially content-based" because an official had to read a sign’s message to determine whether it was off-premises.
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the view that any examination of speech or expression inherently triggers heightened First Amendment concern. Restrictions on speech may require some evaluation of the speech and nonetheless remain content-neutral. The on-/off-premises distinction is facially content-neutral; it does not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment. A sign’s message matters only to the extent that it informs the relative location. The on-/off-premises distinction is more like ordinary time, place, or manner restrictions, which do not trigger strict scrutiny. Content-based regulations are those that discriminate based on the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. The Court remanded, noting that evidence that an impermissible purpose or justification underpins a facially content-neutral restriction may mean that the restriction is nevertheless content-based and, to survive intermediate scrutiny, a restriction on speech or expression must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”
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In this episode, we cover the Supreme Court's opinion in Thompson v. Clark. Here's a summary of that opinion. A plaintiff wishing to bring a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that Thompson satisfied that requirement and reversing the judgment of the lower court.
To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the suit or proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) the motive in instituting the suit was malicious—that is, for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice, and (3) the prosecution terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused. The purposes of this third element—favorable termination of the underlying criminal case—are: (a) to avoid parallel civil and criminal litigation, (b) to prevent inconsistent civil and criminal judgments, and (c) to prevent civil suits from being improperly used as collateral attacks on criminal proceedings.
Most American courts have considered a favorable termination to mean simply a prosecution that ends without conviction and cannot be revived. Thus, if the prosecutor abandons the case or the court dismisses the case without stating a reason, these satisfy the third element of a malicious prosecution claim. Acquittal of the defendant is not required. Respondents’ claims to the contrary are not persuasive.
Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito argued that the majority’s analysis is cursory and erroneously relies on lower court cases “heavily influenced by a mistaken reading of the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).”
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