Talking Talmud: Recent Episodes
Yardaena Osband & Anne Gordon
Learning the daf? We have something for you to think about. Not learning the daf? We have something for you to think about! (Along with a taste of the daf...) Join the conversation with us!
Rabah bar Avuha meets Eliyahu and asks three questions. The daf returns to its discussion of collateral and almost seems to undermine the concept.
When and how can a lender collect a security? The daf also contains a very strange baraita about what a lender must leave a borrower.
If one uses a shopkeeper or a money changer to hold on to a worker's wages - can he be paid this way, or can he go back to the employer to be paid directly? Of course, it's a machloket. Also, swearing that you weren't paid to be able to collect your wages - in contrast to the usual denial of claim. Which works to the protection of the employee.
If wages are withheld is it oshek or gezel? Does the prohibition against withholding wages also apply to animals and keilim?
The daf looks at the case of an ambiguous document and how do is payment determined. A new mishnah begins a discussion on the timely payment of employees
Is renter allowed to cut the branches of trees on a field he is renting? If a farmer wants to go to Eretz Yisroel and leave his rental earlier should he be compensated for improvement he made to the field?
Why did Rabbah bar bar Chana curse Rabbah bar Rav Nachman? The daf cites the biblical source for bar meitzra and explains why it is important.
The daf mentions that it is an Ein HaRah to have someone stand near your field and look at your crops. The many benefits of eating bread in the morning are listed.
Natural calamities... and how years with no rain (and therefore no produce) were characterized as "Elijah's years." Plus, calculating produce per the years of Shemitah (and Yovel) - and how that connects to redeeming one's conscrated ancestral lands. Plus, mishnah! Cultivating wheat when the crop fails is a challenge to pay back....
A new mishnah - does weeding a field have impact on the transaction of the farmer (vs. landowner). Also, what does a measure of one's load have to do with prayer or tefillin? Plus, one more mishnah on the terms of natural disaster for a field.
A “meta” daf. Rav Pappa shares what types of farmers the mishnayot on the previous daf discuss. The daf describes situations where lashon hedyot - text that people may typically use - and when it is accepted in a variety of halachic scenarios.
The 8th perek finishes with a discussion about replacing a rented house that fell. The ninth perek discussed the laws of sharecroppers and tenant farmers.
Who takes the mezuzot in a rented property? The daf discusses the mitzvah of sending a mother bird away to collect her eggs in a rented property.
The daf discusses the ownership of a tree that is uprooted and lands on someone else’s property. How much notice must be given before evicting a tenant?
The laws of transactions between buyers and sellers, in parallel to borrowers and lenders. With the example of a pregnant cow that was traded for a donkey... What happens when the parties take opposite positions with differing levels of certainty? Also, the Gemara delves into slaves in the slave market, worth different values - and a buyer and seller who disagree over which slave had been purchased. Plus, a new mishnah on selling olive trees, which then bear fruit. Whose olives are they?
Rav discusses a case when a slave brings the borrowed object to the borrower and how does that affect the borrower’s liability. If a stolen item can have different values what does the thief pay the owner?
If one person says to another - you owe me 100 dinar, and the other says, I only owe you 50, I don't know ow about the other half - which means he can't swear, because he's not sure... he has to pay the entire amount. That case has a parallel in our mishnah... plus, if you borrow a cow and also the cow owner's services, the question is when is the borrower (or renter) liable? What if there are several stints of borrowing?
Stories! Unexpected work related harm - gender dynamics and the unlikelihood of mice going after a cat. That is, circumstances of death that we don't expect. Plus, issues of an owner's liability and how to maneuver around it. Also, a new mishnah on how the borrower differs from the renter in terms of liability when a borrower (or rented) animal dies while being either borrowed or rented.
Rana bar Chama shares a series of astounding questions exploring when a borrower may or may not be liable. The response to the questions may be even more interesting than the questions themselves.
How do we derive the liability of a borrower for theft and loss? (Verses!) But the obligation to pay comes from logic. But Rav Hamnuna understands the liability of the borrower quite differently.
Conditions, as set by the guardians - which counters the inherent conditions for each of them, as established in the Torah. Plus, exemptions that allow different terms. Also, the case of borrowing (for example) a cow (for example) together with the owner's services.
A new mishnah: the rights of the worker to eat - but what if the value of the produce he eats is more than his wages? It's a machloket. Plus, fine-tuning the extent of these rights. Plus, a hidden scroll of Oral Law quoting Isi bar Yehudah. Also, when a worker ears while working, is that food on top of his wages or is he permitted to eat from that which is not his? Plus, the workers isn't always entitled to eat, nor does he have to, even when he's allowed.
More on muzzling... Can a court enforce a monetary requirement on one who didn't muzzle when it was needed? What other costs come along with the muzzling or lack thereof, in terms of violating the law (and deserving lashes) vs. incurring costs. Plus, mixing of species in many creative, unexpected ways. Also, 2 mishnayot: the rights of the worker who is not using all of his body to work to be able to eat on the job. Plus, the workers' obligation to return lost items to their employers - in the time that they can then eat the produce from the food on the job.
Trampling grain to remove the outer skin, and other threshing... Plus, the issue of muzzling animals, and how that's complicated by issues of terumah, ma'aser, ma'aser sheni, etc. And where prohibitions kick in. Also, muzzling a non-Jew's animal or having a non-Jew muzzle a Jew's animal (or castrate) - is the non-Jew included in the negative commandment or not?
The daf contains a series of baritot expounding the work “B’Disho” in order to teach a variety of different halachot. Then a discussion if a worker is allowed to salt or toast the produce being picked.
The daf discusses when does the obligation to tithe begin. Also what produce are animals allowed to eat.
This daf is the (or a) talmudic source for several of prominent midrashim about the patriarch Abraham and matriarch Sarah. Also, back to halakhah - dealing with the harvest. Plus, special terms for harvesting from a vineyard, and how they extend to other crops and produce that grow from the ground.
The daf shares the story of Rabbah bar Nachmani and his mysterious death. The Genara tries to understand why Rabbi Yochanom ben Matya uses the image of the Solomon’s banquet.
More aggadah - the suffering of R. Elazar, and not bring buried properly. With Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's reaction, and his own suffering. Plus, other experiences of suffering and empathy in the context of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi. Also, the question of people dying "before" their time. Plus, burial practices of these sages and families. Also, the exceptional scholarship and Torah commitment of Rabbi Hiyya. Plus, a hierarchy of other sages.
The daf shares the poignant story of Rabbi Yochanon and Reish Leikish: hiw they met and ultimately how they both die because of slight. The daf also shares about the life of Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai.
Closing chapter 6, starting chapter 7. First, 6: If one is a witness, one must come forward to give proof, and avoid litigants needing to take an oath. This law (of Isi ben Yehudah) is then put into practice in a series of example. And 7: More attention to workers rights, especially pertaining to food, while on the job, and also whether an employer can require his workers to work very early and/or very late in the day.
The daf poses a question about a person who finds a lost object and is the finder considered to be an unpaid shomer or a paid shomer. A new mishnah dealing with the laws around a broken keg but the Gemara has trouble reconciling a barita with our mishnah.
A dilemma - when one is exempt from the liability of a borrower, does that mean he has no liability or just as one who is paid to watch over it. Plus, why a donkey who isn't sold is a different case from a gift of pottery, for example. Also, the parameters of the paid guardian, and the requirements of an unpaid guardian, and the interaction with the one who owns the item being guarded. The formulation of statements may make the difference.
3 mishnayot! 1 - If one rents a cow to plow a mountain, but plows in a valley... how does that difference (and the reverse) make a difference in terms of liability? 2 - Renting a donkey to transport wheat, but barley is transported instead - and how either weight or volume may make a difference in terms of the renter's liability. 3 - Terms of renting vs. a paid guardian, plus terms of helping a poor person in this regard.
If a rented donkey dies midway through the journey, the renter pays a partial fee, and complains about the experience. But what if that donkey can be replaced? Plus, what if a donkey is rented for a man to ride, but a woman rides? She's considered heavier on the donkey... Also, renting a boat that doesn't make the journey, but sinks - the questions whether the rental was specific to that boat or any boat, which makes a difference for liability.
A new mishnah discusses what happens when something to a rented animal and who is responsible for unavoidable injuries. The gemara tries to determine if the first part of the mishnah is the opinion of Rabbi Meir
Rava's rulings in employment, in terms of setting norms, and what goes beyond all reasonable expectations. Plus, how people were trained not to renege on a contract, even an unwritten one.
The daf begins the sixth perek which discusses issues that may come up between an employer and worker. Plus Rav Nachmun tries to create a halakhic parallel with gitin which the Gemara does not think is a good parallel.
The last daf of the fifth perek wraps up the discussion of interest with two final mishnahs. The Genara after the first mishnah shares an opinion if Hillel that is not followed. Why does the Gemara share this opinion? The second mishnah discusses multiple transactions that could be seen as having an interest payment. The perek ends with a discussion of three groups of people who cannot find justice in the courts.
Contracting for produce in advance - even when the harvest or processing isn't finished, but the raw goods are already in the offing, and some number of steps are needed to complete the product. But whose process? Human handling or natural (or divine) ripening, etc.? Also, a series of cases to back the respective views of Rav and Shmuel. Plus, a new mishnah on lending seed wheat to one's sharecroppers.
Surcharges for sharecroppers - is that interest or not? Plus, real cases vs. theoretical ones. And the details of how those real cases are manifest.
The daf asks the question what happens if a non-Jew converts and was charged interest by a Jew - can the interest still be collected. A new mishnah discussed forward contracting and price setting of produce.
Some reflections by the sages on how bad it is to lend with interest - where the mishnah seemed to allow it after all, at least with regard to non-Jews. The distinction between righteous people and regular people provides good food for thought. Also, what happens when one has lend funds with a guarantor, and how interest can apparently become part of the transaction, including when a non-Jew decides to function in accord with Jewish law. But a Jew can lend out a non-Jew's money with the non-Jew's consent.
How being an orphan (minor) changes the terms of the prohibition against interest. Also, a new mishnah: fixed costs on what becomes a loan (via caring for an animal as an investment) cannot be paid back differently - to a Jew. When dealing with a non-Jew, extra payment is indeed allowed.
More on the partnerships of yesterday's daf, but in story form. Plus, a new mishnah on appraising animals and their progeny, and when adding sums to the costs smacks of interest and when it doesn't at all.
Rav Ashi shares a halacha about pledged property from the sages of Mechoza and explains the root of the word mishkanta. A new mishnah introduces iska and how it relates to a concern about interest.
A case where a woman instructs a man to go buy property from her relatives on her behalf, which gives rise to the relative's question whether he'll be able to buy the property back, if and when he gets the money to do so. Which in turn gives rise to a discussion of whether that re-purchase can happen, and then the fruits of the field in the interim is either fully fixed interest or possibly a "hint" or the "dust" of interest (which is a rabbinic prohibition). Plus, how does the sale compare to a loan under comparable terms? Also, delving into a case of fixed interest and, over time, a reduction of debt. Plus, loans canceled due to the shemittah year.
The daf discusses different scenarios where a states condition may or may not be binding. The terms asmachta is used but in a way that is different than how it has been used before.
The daf has two mishnayiot. The first describes circumstances when a higher price is allowed to be paid. The second discusses partial payment on a field and does the buyer or seller have access to the produce.
More on advance payments... Where the product has to already be in one's tradition (in contrast to gourds, for example, that still need to grow). Plus, a specified amount as an advance discount that isn't used immediately is later considered interest. Also, a new mishnah! One who borrows money from another cannot allow the lender to stay in his courtyard, for example, lest it smack of interest (with some exception, based on the circumstances).
Who is Rabbi Oshaya l, an amora, and what is his relationship with tannaitic literature. The daf discusses how a seller can use produce to pay a debt.
Is interest recoverable? It's a machloket, of course. Plus, how that plays out in the Jewish vs. non-Jewish courts, and the ways they functioned differently. Also, elaborating on the mishnah's case of rising market price, and a trade for another product, which (in this specific case) turns the seller into the borrower...
Chapter 5! A new mishnah, a new topic - moneylending, and the prohibition against taking interest. Also, the sidebar explanation for addressing the exodus from Egypt in the context of interest.
The final two mishnahs of the fourth perek deal with deceptive practices shopkeepers may not do because they hurt the buyer.
The daf tells one of the most famous stories in the Gemara - Tanur Shel Akhnai. But why this story appears and the lessons to be learned from the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the sages are often misunderstood. So why does this story appear in Bava Metzia and what does it teach us?
Consecrated items for which one bears responsibility are subject to price fraud, but when one is not responsible, price fraud is irrelevant. But what does it mean for the consecrated property to belong to God? What about the human dimension? Plus, taking advantage of market demands, for better and worse. Also, a new mishnah - on "ona'at devarim" -- oppression or exploitation or just plain obnoxious speech.
When is the capacity to take advantage of another not relevant? And if there's no risk of exploitation, is there any recourse to cancel the transaction for other reasons? Note the exceptions of consecrated property (hekdesh) and land... Also, what if transactions or loans are made in conjunction with consecrated property? The Temple has some flexibility with fluctuations in the costs of things - without it being exploitative.
A Mishnah lists cases where onaah does not apply and the Gemara discusses the scriptural sources for these categories.
2 mishnayot - Mishnah 1: Determining the differential to be considered exploitative, the amount to swear, and the amount to admit to owing money. Plus, 5 cases that depend on the equivalent of one perutah. Also, Mishnah 2: 5 halakhic categories for which "one-fifth" is relavant as an element of the halakhah.
The daf discusses what to do if one’s maaser sheini produce is worth less thana perutah and need to deconsecrate it onto coins.
A new mishnah! The erosion of minted coins, and its diminished value, with the potential for fraud in using it, as the metal is worn away. Subject to a dispute between our mishnah and a beraita. Also, the Gemara in the second part of the mishnah - garments vs. coins, and how they're handled in the village vs. cities, where the moneylenders were available to check the coins. Plus, the application of a "generosity of spirit."
A mishnah discusses if there is a time limit to claim price fraud. Also discussed if fraud can be committed by a person irrespective of a business or both? Rav and Shmuel debate if a seller can make a stipulation about price fraud in a sale.
Establishing ona'ah at pricing that is a sixth over the value - with that time frame to consult and complain as temporary recourse. When is the sale considered final? Is that time limit really necessary? Also, once there's fraud, does it matter how extreme the fraud is? (Yes) Or how long the deadline really is? A close reading of the mishnah helps explain the overcharge.
Reneging on a verbal commitment toward a sale - illustrative stories. Also, a new mishnah! On "ona'ah" - cases of taking advantage of another in a measurable way that is already determined to be problematic. Plus, terms whereby a customer can walk back terms that smack of ona'ah.
The daf explores the idea of Mi Sh’Para and what happens of someone reneges on a sale and the beit din cannot enforce the sale.
Defining "kinyan sudar" - a handkerchief version of halipin. Plus, "kinyan agav," where the act of acquisition is secondary and along the way of the acquisition of something else, usually movable items along with a purchase of land. Also, using exchange when you have no money or anything else of value to use for purchase.
More on exchange - including the question of using a coin as an indication of a formal act of acquisition. For it to work, he has to already have the coins in hand. Otherwise, it's too close to a sale. Also, Rav Nachman's opinion, the idea that money does effect the purchase by Torah law, and the exchange of money bags.
One who redeems ma'aser sheni on coins, and the desacralizes the coins to use them to buy the food in Jerusalem - how those coins can be exchanged, a dispute between Beit Shammai vs. Beit Hillel. Plus, the sourcing of the word "money" twice in the biblical verse. Also, when money is an exchange instead of a sale or a purchase payment.
The third perek finished with a discussion about whether intent to misappropriate a deposit is misappropriation. The fourth perek begins with a mishnah discussing how objects are acquired.
2 mishnayot! Additional cases of an object left with a guardian, and how various variables change the guardian's liability. Note the differences between a store keeper, a money changer, and a guardian. Plus, the complications of a change in value and the obligation to replace an unprotected item. Also, when one has to pay the increased value, for wine, for example. Plus, Rabbi Akiva's opinion upheld.
A new mishnah! When a guardian doesn't take good care to protect coins... when is he liable? With a focus on the verses that insist on proper supervision. Also, the blessing that only appears in that which is not obviously visible. Plus, storing money in a place that is protected from one potential threat, but subject to another one. Likewise, the question of whether negligence is relevant when a guardian puts the thing he's protecting under the protection of another. With a slew of cases to explore.
The daf discusses the last mishnah on 40 about whether a barrel being watched may be moved. A disagreement is presented between Rav and Levi if an act is considered misappropriation only if there is actual depletion of the object’s value
Two mishnahs detail how a shomer may deduct from the quantity of produce or liquids left with the shomer when it is returned to the owner.
More on the property of captives. When it's time to harvest from a captives crops, the court appoints a supervisor to take care of that, and then a relative takes care of future planting, and so on. But that kind of administrator would rarely be appointed for an adult. Also, the story of an old woman who has 3 daughters, and she and one of the daughters are taken into captivity. One of the other daughters has died, and left a minor heir. How does the old woman's property get handled? How does an apotropos fit in here, to help the minor?
A new mishnah! One who gives produce to another to watch - if it's lost or off, etc., the guardian can't touch the produce because he doesn't own it. But if he can sell it beforehand, he can preserve the value. But why can't he touch it? Plus, one small discussion about the tzedakah collectors when they don't have any poor people in need. Also, what are the responsibilities with regard to the property of those who have been taken captive.
A new mishnah! When a thief acknowledges the theft, but he's not sure from whom. Likewise, a deposit. Plus, a discussion of how far can one take the deceit? Also, what how can a thief pay back when he doesn't know from whom he stole?
When a guardian transfers the item he's watching to another guardian, without the knowledge or permission of the owner. Plus, a story about an elderly woman who watches the gardener's hose - how long does it take to establish trust for a second shomer? Also, a guardian who loses an animal, which then dies of natural causes. Is the guardian responsible for paying? It's a clear and clean dispute between Abaye and Rava.
The guardian who has lost something left in his protection can take an oath or pay back the value of the item that's been lost. Or in this case, when there are witnesses that the watched item was stolen. The burden of oath switches parties - and sometimes, they both swear. And then the question is, which swears first. Plus, the case of giving jewels to another person for safekeeping. Which carries its own drama. Also, a series of interesting cases once the property is seized. For example, creditor to creditor, as compared to an heir or a buyer. Plus, a new mishnah! Including borrowing and le sing cows, with all the responsibility involved.
The third perek of Bava Metzia is a classic yeshiva perek of HaMafkid. The perek deals laws of watching or borrowing someone’s object and what happens if that object is lost, stolen, or broken. The halachot of this perek are based on verses in Exodus chapter 22:6-14.
A mishnah asks whose lost item is more important for one to return - your father or your teacher. The Gemara discussed the merits of studying mikra, mishnah, and talmud and where one should concentrate one’s learning.
If one finds an animal's in a barn... when is one obligated to return it to the owner of the barn. Plus, a kohen doesn't have to become impure for returning a lost object. Plus, nobody needs to listen to parents who are instructing their children not to follow through on a Torah commandment. Also, take the burden off the overloaded animal. Also, "tza'ar ba'alei chayim" - the prohibition against causing harm to animals. But if the animal's well-being is the issue, what happens when there's also monetary loss? That is, once the values are competing, which takes priority? What about the biblical vs. rabbinic level of concern?
When you've returned a lost animal, and the animal runs away again, and you find it again, you have to return it multiple times - as understood from the biblical verse. Plus, the fact that the person who finds answers returns the lost item or animals doesn't have to make his identity known. Plus, the doubling of verbs in many cases in the Torah, and how the sages relate to that compound verb.
Found items of different materials - silver, copper, wood, and so on - can be used by the finder in different ways, depending on the substance. Plus, when can a finder disregard the lost item? Also, the sages' discussion of acting beyond the letter of the law, and why people should do so. Plus, relevance for agunot. Also, a new mishnah - with animals who have moved out of their usual spaces.
A dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, about whether one can use the funds from the sale of a found animal that isn't monetarily helpful. Also, one who finds scrolls... read them! Or roll them, if need be. Plus, what to do with things made from different materials. Plus, what to do with found tefillin? And what is one's responsibility to a Torah scroll?
More on distinguishing marks - and whether they are a Torah requirement or a rabbinic one. Also, how long must one hold on to a lost object? Also, pilgrims to Jerusalem could reclaim their lost items from a particular place. Plus, the formal lost and found location and process for the 3 pilgrimage festival - and why Jerusalem is special in this regard. Also, the process of declaring and proclaiming that you've found a lost object, and how Jewish history (and the rule of Persia and Rome) changed that process.
The biblical text for the requirements of returning lost objects, including which objects require returning. How, then, does the question of distinguishing marks come into play? The discussion begins with the documents of divorce, which may or may not be bound by the rabbinic enactment of distinguishing marks (when the divorce is a Torah command).
The daf has a few mishnahs dealing with a few halachot around lost objects? Does the location where a lost object is found determine ownership or if it lost? Does a lost object need a minimum value for it to be considered worthy of returning? Rava finally explains which mitzvot in the Torah are involved with a lost object.
A new mishnah - with a list of when a finder has to proclaim and declare the found item(s), so that the original owner can come forward. With debates over whether an item has a siman (demarcating the item) is near an item that doesn't have the mark. How did they settle these relatively ordinary cases? One example being a basket with or without a rim. Also, when one drops coins, and they are in a small (very small) organized pile of coins - vs. a scattered pile of kinds. Plus, a whole lot of conditions and configurations of the coins to be required to proclaim the find in case the original owner comes forward. Plus, one more mishnah and a question about the halakhic expertise of regular people.
A story about Mar Zutra the Pious, when a silver cup was stolen, and Mar Zutra finds the guilty party. Unidentifiable items go to the finder - if the finder found isolated objects, but several together require declaring the find in the hopes of the original owner coming forward. Someone who saves an object from wild animals - keeps it, because it would have been lost anyway. Likewise, finding an item in a public thoroughfare where hopes of recovery are immediately dashed. 5 questions are asked to determine whether to publicize the find or not. Plus several cases of application and apparent contradiction as to whether the finder keeps the found item or has to publicize that it's been found - notably, in the marketplace and in the Biran River.
Several sages were in an orchard, and a worker there gave them samples of fruit, but Mar Zutra did not eat. And then it seems that the orchard owner (Mar bar Isak, for a mini-Who's Who) may not really have wanted to provide fruit for his guests after all. Also, if one finds small sheaves in the public domain, the finder can keep them - even if they have an identifying mark. But when does the ye'ush - that despair of ever getting your lost object back - kick in?
The daf begins the second perek of the masechet which starts with a mishnah discussing lost objects and when the finder does or does not have to find the owner. Two key concepts are involved: ye'ush and siman. The Gemara presents a fundamental machloket between Abaye and Rava.
A new mishnah, still on returning lost documents. Beginning with letters that attest to a commitment of obligation or a repossession of property by the court, and more. Plus, when the matters are not clear and they will be set aside until Elijah the Prophet returns. Also, two towns of the same name - which is intended on a document?! Also, what happens when you find more than one document, whether in a bundle or a cluster? Whom do you return it to, and why?
The daf describes a variety of scenarios where documents are found and the different types of fraud that can be committed with a found document
A new mishnah! One who finds documents - bills of divorce, papers that free slaves, receipts, etc. - don't return them to the apparent recipient, in case they weren't actually given. Also, when the documents include names belonging to more than one couple - especially in a place where the caravans pass frequently vs. a place with few travelers, and less likely to find two couples of the same name. Plus, the question of whether she has received the ketubah... did she already receive her get? That may well depend on what the husband has to say - and maybe the time factor in how long since the get has been lost. Note that the dispute here is between texts, where the mishnah outranks a beraita.
Bringing property disputes to court, especially when one part denies part of the terms or what is owed. Plus, the role of witnesses. But we do people trust that the disputant/denier isn't lying? Plus, a concrete case. Also, if one claimed that there were no witnesses, then the claim is fundamentally (likely to be) meaningless. Plus, the role of the ketubah, in an era when it wasn't yet universal. Plus, how the ketubah functions in the discussion of debts, denials, and other economic transactions.
A robber who wants to go back and uphold the sale - so that he'll no longer be called a robber. Or so he'll be known as reliable and trustworthy). The question is what is the practical difference between these expressions of his goal? Also, if one finds a document of acquisition, one should return it to the owner, not the debtor. Plus, a payment plan as required in Neharde'a.
The case of one who buys land from a robber - what happens when the land has been improved? Who pays for that? Note that the robber may be able to pay back his theft with his land. Also, what if the buyer knows that the land itself does not belong to the seller (and then the owner comes to reclaim his or her land).
The case of repossessing property that has been sold, with or without a guarantee to the buyer. Plus, two accounts of each case, each of which turns the case around. Also, to what extent does the seller have the responsibility to ensure that the funds reach the right people, but don't look like interest. Plus, making sure that the buyer can legitimately buy the property without having to give it back to the seller's creditor.⁰
Found documents (eg, promissory notes) that show a lien on property - in the Gemara's commentary on the mishnah, trying to determine the specifics of the case of the mishnah. Plus, the impact of the case of the loan - where the document calls it into question. Plus, R. Eleazar and R. Yochanan dispute how to understand the dispute between R. Meir and the sages, about the promissory note.
Two mishnahs on this daf. The first deals with children, slaves, and one’s wife finding an ownerless object and to whom does it belong. The second deals with the case of a found document with a loan and to whom is it returned.
A new mishnah - on the acquisition effected by a courtyard. How does the transfer of ownership take effect? What if the "courtyard" is an open field? What if the owner isn't present to demonstrate intent and/or to guard it? Plus, the case of a divorce, where the husband's intent acquires the bill of divorce to the woman - unless her courtyard is sufficient.
One who does a formal act of acquisition to acquire something for someone else - the Gemara now says that won't work, in contrast to the previous Gemara. The comparison to a debtor and creditor explains why. Plus, a rider asking for the reins of the animal he's riding - where the language used makes the difference. Also, a new mishnah: one finds an item and another party seizes it - who has acquired it? Plus, proximity isn't enough to acquire an object. The illustration case is pe'ah, acquiring the produce from the corners of a field - where the acquisition might be accomplished by proximity, but it's private property, so that won't work. Plus, how the 4 amot (proximity) acquisition takes effect.
How does one NOT acquire an animal, using formal acts of acquisition that are effective in other circumstances. With a focus on animals. Also, how the formal act of acquisition for some property can be combined with the one for other property (for example, acquiring utensils together with the acquisition of an animal). Plus, the acquisition by one's property of other property, like a courtyard or a boat.
Using a formal act of acquisition to take possession of an object on behalf of someone else - works! (Pending discussion whether it really does, and how that connects to the 2 who have taken hold of the talit in the first mishnah of Bava Metzia. Also, the formal kinyan of taking hold of an animal's bridle - which is complicated when that animal had been the property of a convert who didn't have heirs. Thus, the real difference between taking possession of something that had a previous owner, as compared to found property.
The daf continues to explore the question if one cab consecrate an item not in one’s reshut. A baraita has an opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel that explains how a document can be split.
What if one complainant grabbed more of the disputed object before the judges? It depends, to some degree, on the reaction of the other party. What if they are making other claims of ownership before the court? Can one be considered an owner if the item is not in that party's possession? The answer is no, the burden of proof falls on the one who can't lay physical claim. But what happens if one party consecrates the item? As it happens, one party consecrated a bathhouse, which led the sages to bathe elsewhere, lest they violate consecrated property. But that's a difficult conclusion, practically speaking, so they tried to get a better answer, exploring the question of a possible bekhor - first born.
More on Rabbi Hiya and the kal va-chomer of agreeing to part of a claim - with an actual case! (including a partial agreement to a claim as established by testimony, which would require him to swear... unless he's a thief, and therefore exempt from swearing). Plus, "shevuat heseit." Also, the potential of shepherds to steal, tacitly, while the flocks graze elsewhere (but that's a private shepherd, not a public shepherd). Also, the fact that one who is suspected of thievery is trusted to take an oath (or maybe not).
Deriving the kal va-chomer reasoning got the stringent and lenient cases in testimony - and the strength of 2 witnesses (against the statement of the main person in question, eg, a defendant), in establishing the need for the party in question to take an oath regarding his claim. Also, different ways that one can confirm a partial claim and deny the rest - what happens then? When must an oath be taken? When must one may back what they've said they've paid (or the rest of it)? Plus, what happens when part of the terms are about a loan of land and part is vessels or utensils - when oaths for the sake.of one's claim about the transfer of land are not in use, without much explanation.
When two people claim ownership of an object, the "solution" is for both parties to swear an oath that each has nothing of the other's. Complicated by possible witnesses, and also the logic of a kal va-chomer. How much can testimony bring about - with regard to punishment and/or offerings on the part of the subject of the testimony.
An introduction to Bava Metzia, and to the first chapter. Plus, the famous first mishnah - with 2 people laying apparently equal claim to a found object. Or two are riding on an animal and both claim ownership of the animal. They both swear and divide the item - to the extent possible, when there's no other way to ascertain the accuracy of each's claim.
Stealing from another is like taking a part of the soul of the owner of the item stolen. With proof texts, of course - including the biblical term, "hamas," which is not the meaning we know nowadays. More, extortion. In the context of the story of King Saul, the city of Nov, and the killing of kohanim. [Where's Where: Mehoza] Also, a new mishnah, on who owns the remnants of things when handled by specialists (the launderer, the carder of wool, a carpenter or chiseler, for example). With possible implications for where the crafting was done. Plus, the growing of certain plants and using them or not. And there the tractate ends, in medias res, so to speak.
4 mishnayot: Paying back an original owner should not take place in a deserted area. And: does one have to pay when one can claim ignorance of a need to pay back (certainty vs. unsure bring relevant). And: Stealing a lamb from a flock and returning it before anything happens to it - what happens if the owners knew? What happens if they didn't know? Rav, Shmuel, R. Yochanan, and R. Hisda has answers. And: The assumption that a wife isn't lying to her husband when selling animals in the marketplace - but let the buyer beware!
Case reports and the rabbis' rulings: what happens when one Jew turns in another Jew to the authorities (specifically, objects). [Who's Who: Rav Kahana] A story: one who wants to show another's straw to the authorities, against better advice, and pays for that intent with his life. Which leads to a discussion of why the harsh response, including a window into the ways of the rabbinic academy. Plus, the drama between R. Yochanan and R. Kahana. Also, more cases of informants and thieves and the need (or not) to pay back. Plus, a new mishnah with an overflowing river.
The daf discussed what are the obligations when traveling with a caravan. Bonus: the daf instructs us on what to do if your caravan is being trailed by a lion.
The decree of the marketplace - takanat ha-shuk. Where something stolen in the marketplace leads to ye'ush (despair) and new ownership, and difficulty in requiring payback by the new owner to the original owner. Also, a new mishnah - when one has a barrel of wine and another has a barrel of honey, and the wine owner pours out the wine to offer the barrel to the slavage the honey. That wine owner can't claim the honey owner owes him for the wine, unless there was a stipulation and agreement in advance. Also, donkeys crossing a river, where one leaves his own donkey to help save the other more expensive donkey....
A case of a Jew who is excommunicated because he's caused harm to another Jew, but via a non-Jew: selling a field that borders the property of Jew to a non-Jew. Plus, bees! And what happens when an aviary is on the border of one's property. Also, the Gemara's read of the mishnah's case of the bees. And to what extent casual conversation may count as testimony. And a second mishnah: When you see your stuff in someone else's possession. To what extent is robbery an issue in the place? That will determine whether the current owner needs to swear that he didn't steal them.
The daf describes when and how people are excommunicated if they do not listen to the beit din. A new mishnah discussed using funds we assume are stolen. The daf discusses if one may steal from a non-Jew.
When a thief steals food and feeds it to his children... they don't have to pay back. If he leaves it to the children, and they haven't eaten it yet, the question of how much they have to pay, or return, is subject to a dispute. Also, the case with an urgency to be resolved, which provides exceptions for who pays what back to whom, with apparent compassion for the one(s) who has to pay back.
More on the priestly watch families - Yehoyariv and Yedaya - and why each gains or loses, in the event of a robber who swore falsely giving the guilt-offering via one family and the monetary payback via the other. Also, a new mishnah to start the final chapter, chapter 10: When one steals an object, and that object ends up with a third party - that third party doesn't owe the original owner. Plus, the relevance of ye'ush, despair, with regard to lost (or stolen) objects.
A new mishnah which discusses the case on a previous daf of a robbed convert and the asham, principal, and chomesh that mist be brought. The Gemara lists the 24 gifts that are given to the Kohanim.
A new mishnah reviews cases where the principal and chomesh are paid. The daf later discusses the unique case of a thief who steals from a convert with no heirs.
More cases of false oaths, paying double, paying a fifth... yet not paying both double and a fifth (only one kind of fine per instance). Also, a case of an unpaid guardian, where the object he's guarding is stolen, and he can take an oath that he wasn't negligent or he can go to court, toe to toe with the thief.
One who falsely claims that a thief stole collateral - the obligation to pay fines for that false claim only once the false claim is proven. Which leads into a discussion of "agreeing to part" of a claim. The discussion is based on the biblical words, "ki hu zeh," which the Gemara explains needs rephrasing. Which is a dramatic statement for us to learn. Also, a review/introduction of the 4 shomerim (guardians, custodians).
Rav Huna teaches a statement of Rav about payment after one takes an oath and which cases this Rav’s statement applies. Rabbi Yochanon explains the verses in Exodus 22:6-8 and the importance of having certain verses next to each other.
The daf contains an assorted collection of Rava’s teachings. Ben Azzai discusses the case of a witness who could have helped a litigant but swears falsely that he has no information to help him.
What it means when one appoints an agent to receive payment via a repentant thief, for example. Especially if there are witnesses to the appointment. Of course, it's a machloket. Also, delving into the fifth extra that the robber pays his victim. Why does he owe extra? And to whom does he owe extra? Plus, fathers and sons who owe and swear, perhaps falsely.
A story used to assess halakhic stance: flax that is purchased, but not acquired, and then appreciates in value, and the shopkeeper sold it, with the intent to give the money to the original owner (Rav Kahana, in this case). What are the implications for ownership, interest, and the rights to the flax? Plus, how this can come to smack of robbery... Also, a new mishnah, where a thief swears falsely about what he's taken, and therefore has to pay a fifth above the principle he must pay back anyway.
A discussion between two Amoriam (Rav Yosef and Rav Huna) reveals that the order of how mishnayot were studied is different than how they were written down. Can a father consecrate his family’s possession? Can tefillin consecrated?
Moving on from dying wool to carpentry: a chair vs. a bench. Also, what is the status of dye once it has been applied to wool - when it's coloring the wool. With cases from shemitah, the jubilee year, orlah, and more. Plus, the limitations on a dead body rendering a home impure - including whether the person bled in the home before he died.
The daf continues its discussion about moneychangers and coins. Finally the daf has the mishnah that has been quoted many times about wool that was dyed the wrong color and other errors made by an expert craftsman.
The Gemara continues to discuss if a craftsman acquires a kli he makes an improvement on and relate this to a disagreement between R. Meir and the Rabbis. The daf also explores the category of shochet as a expert. What knowledge did Shmuel expect from his student?
If one throws another's coin into the Mediterranean Sea, when is that exempt from paying back and when must you? Also, what if one burns a promissory note? Doesn't that cancel the debt, because there's no proof of the loan. Also, the indirect causation of damages - when is one liable for it, and when not (dina de-garmi). Also, the case of bread (chametz) that is stolen and returned after Pesach, so the item no longer has value - what is the thief obligated to pay, if at all? Plus, how this case leads into a discussion of shor ha-niskal, the ox that is to be judged for death because it killed a person - and is also prohibited from benefit. Plus, a new mishnah about when a craftsperson damaged the item one left for repair.
Comparing slaves to land and to movable objects - unpleasant comparisons, but useful in trying to understand whether one can steal another's slave. Plus, what happens if one squats in a courtyard of a friend from whom he has borrowed money? It smacks of ribit/interest. Also, more cases about changing money with regime change. Will paying back a loan be based on the coinage or the value of it at the time of the loan? Plus, you can't desacralize ma'aser sheni money
When a thief improves what he's stolen and sells it or leaves the object to his heirs... the buyer acquires the right to that improvement. But what about if the thief is an idolator? Plus, what counts as an improvement? (With a palm tree as a case study) Also, a new mishnah, where the change to the animal is that it ages... or is reduced in value because of external reasons. Plus, the Gemara's discussion of aging leading to an increase in value.
The daf explores Rebbe Meir’s approach to the question of whether change to an object effects acquisition. A question to consider: does the robber gain from among an enhancement?
The Daf continues its discussion on shinuy koneh and why the Halacha follow R. Shimon Ben Elazar. R. Yehudah HaNasi constructs a takana to encourage more people who steal to repent.
If one person invites another to injure himself (or herself), both the physical injury and the damage to a family's reputation. Plus, when one invites another to cause damage to that first person's property. Also, a purse of charity funds that was stolen, and the guardian was not liable - but why not? Also, the beginning of chapter 9: with a focus on stealing an object and making changes to it.
Last mishnah of the chapter: When one injures another, and pays compensation, he still isn't forgiven until the victim offers it -- as learned from the interaction between Avraham and Avimelech. At the same time, however, the victim is not allowed to hold a grudge. Also, 17 (18?) teachings or adages that were clearly known in the world that Rabbah bar Mari provides the sources for them in the Torah. Including poverty follows the poor, and if a friend calls you a donkey, prepare a saddle for your back.
Is there an assessment by the court to establish damages? Certainly, if the injured party is killed, the item is assessed to be a potential tool to kill, but what about if it's just an injury? Recall the "pit" that has a measure at which it's considered potentially killing (10 tefachim), but where less than that, the owner is only responsible for damages, not death. Also, is it permitted for a person to injure himself? What about cutting down his own trees? Under what circumstances are these acts that cause harm to oneself or one's property permitted?
A bit more on Takanat Usha. Plus, a man who strikes his slave and the slave dies, the owner is punished with capital punishment. Also, a very long mishnah, with a price list, as it were, for various injuries and the appropriate compensation. Plus, more on Rabbi Akiva (starring in the mishnah), as to whether a witness can be a judge.
The daf entertains the idea that a woman may sell her ketubah to pay damages to someone she injured or to her husband she injured. The daf finally explains why this discussion about ketuvot appears in Bava Kamma.
The daf tried to determine why slaves are disqualified from being witnesses by comparing slaves to other categories of people. In the middle of the daf is an incident with the mother of Rav Shmuel bar Ava if Hegronya and what happened to her melug property after her death.
A new mishnah! It spells out a good number of cases that entail paying the 5 compensations, and when one would be exempt, including what happens when one strikes a parent and does or does not cause a bruise. Also, the Gemara here - beginning with one who injures a minor daughter (vs. an adult son), and carrying through to a trust for a son... and other monetary support.
On Boshet - humiliation. And how this compensation is assessed. Plus, which sage's opinion is represented in the mishnah. Also, a new mishnah- when one humiliates people on specific categories - a naked person, a blind person, and more - depending on when there is intent. The question of the degree of objectivity regarding what is considered humiliating is key. Plus, the Gemara narrows the apparent cases from the mishnah.
The daf continues the discussion in different types of payments when a person injures another person specifically repui and boshet and how each is calculated.
When the Torah says, "an eye for an eye," how is that the Gemara concludes that the perpetrator compensates for the damage with money, rather than coming after him physically? Also, the deep topic of how to assess damages - to compare the injured party to a slave, which was, perhaps, logical, but nonetheless off-putting. Also, this particular assessment was only done in Israel, and not to be used in Babylonia.
Finishing up chapter 7... With more on the prohibition against Greek wisdom, and the language, as well as other "foreign" languages. Also, starting chapter 8, with the 5 categories of payment for personal injury.
The daf lists the 10 rules set up by Ezra HaSofer when he resettled the land. Plus there is mention of 10 rules only for Jerusalem. The daf returns to the discussion of what animals may not be raised in Eretz Yisroel by sharing an event that may explain why pig is the biggest non-kosher taboo.
A barita describes ten rules established by Yehoshua when Bnei Yisroel settled the land. Another barita discusses how all of the tribes’ portions shared equal topography.
More on the prohibition against raising certain small animals. Plus, the story of a pious person who had pain in his heart, and the doctors had no cure except for fresh goat milk from the source. Also, the respect paid to rabbis by each other, and the prohibition against owning a cat (especially white cats; black cats might be okay). Plus, signing on the dotted line to purchase a home in the land of Israel, even on Shabbat.
How a thief can take formal possession of an animal even while on the owner's property, depending on when the thief leaves that property, for example. Plus, a discussion of why the ganav is treated more stringently than a gazlan is. Also, a new mishnah: specific animals that were not allowed to be raised in the land of Israel. Including specific details of sheep, goats, chickens, and dogs, among other small(ish) animals, including what may be the original leash law.
How does the prohibition against mating diverse kinds of animals impact the fourfold or fivefold payments. Plus our favorite halakhic animal the Koy appears on the daf. A new Mishnah discussed what happens when only part of the animal is sold after it is stolen.
A tiny page of Gemara on amud left, with a massive amount of commentary by the Baalei HaTosafot - on the red heifer, and a parallel discussion from the tractate Hullin. Specifically, on whether the meat of kodshim and dough can join together to form a minimum measure (spoiler: they do not). Also, more on the slaughtering that takes place with the animal that has been stolen.... and how an animal that has been improperly slaughtered can be accounted for.
The daf examines the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and his distinction between payment of the fourfold or fivefold fine in the case of a korban with achraut versus a korban without achraut. Rabbi Yochanon and Reish Lakish disagree how to understand Rabbi Shimon and what is the significance that this discussion quotes amoraim from Eretz Yisroel?
[Who's Who: Rabban Gamliel and Tavi] The case of witnesses and admission, and when in that timeline one's obligation to pay a fine kicks in. Plus, the involvement of the court in the payment, and how far the court (and the witnesses) can go in charging the penalty. Plus, the thief's admission. Also, the different functioning of admission, and whether it gets one out of paying or ropes one into paying more.
More on the disagreement between Abaye and Rava on the Mishnah from 70a. The daf then shares a new Mishnah which is the inverse of the Mishnah on 70a.
Rabbi Yosi's opinion on the witnesses who saw the theft and the slaughter or sale. Plus, a conversation about the generations of dispute in this arena. Also, Rava on the potentially conspiring witnesses.
More on the halakhot about slaughtering an animal that was stolen or consecrated, but slaughtered in the wrong place in the Temple - such that the slaughtering itself considered the very last moment, because otherwise, the act that is considered the moment of slaughtering would complicate the prohibitions against certain animals, like one stolen or consecrated. Also, a new mishnah: When a person steals an ox or a sheep - and there are witnesses to that effect, and also to the fact that the thief then slaughtered the animal or sold it, and then the witnesses are found to be conspiring witnesses - they need to pay the complete pay-back. Plus, all the permutations of when the witnesses saw what.
The daf discusses a three way disagreement between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yochanan HaSandlar on the status of food cooked on Shabbat and how it relates to our case of slaughtering on Shabbat. Rava tries to understand the case if a stolen ox owned by two people but the thief increases his crime to only one of the owners.
A practice from Neharde'a - where writing a document of agency or power of attorney was not permitted. (With the discussion of what the issues were) Also, a new mishnah - about stealing and then slaughtering it, when does one need to pay the penalty of the 4 or 5? Including the return of "kim leih be-derabbah minei" - when one I'd only given the harsher punishment for two violations in one act.
More on R. Yochanan's position... and attempts to determine whether he really held the position ascribed to him. With a counter from chases in another mishnah: kerem revai, orlah, graves - all of which were demarcated spaces so that people wouldn't fall into violations of impurity on the one hand, but theft on the other (which leads back to R. Yochanan). Also, more on those pious, righteous, discreet people who would act to deconcretize to protect the ignorant from stealing... in this case, taking it further, to the poor and making sure that they aren't stealing. But what if the items are being held by a thief? Also, more on the implications of the various cases in the shemitah year.
Selling a stolen animal and the penalty incurred during the time when the owner is or is no longer hoping to get the animal back - subject to a machloket on whether the despair of the owner getting the animal back. The extra 4 and 5 payment only kicks in once the theft is "forever." After despair, the thief takes full possession, and the original owner is compensated. There is an important discussion here regarding whether the animal is sold or slaughtered. Plus, note R. Sheshet's view and R. Nachman's view. Also, a clearly articulated dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish - until the reasons for their dispute are put through the wringer, and nothing is clear anymore. Including why a thief (and also an owner) would consecrate a stolen animal.
Is a changing an object a mechanism by which someone can acquire an object or does it always maintain its identity as the original object? Why does the rule of fourfold and fivefold payment only apply to the sheep and ox?
How a thief acquires a stolen item, via the thief's changing the item or the despair of the owner that it will never be recovered (the thief still has to compensate the owner for the item). Plus, Abaye's arguments against the impact of despair on the thief's taking possession of that which he has stolen. Also, the difference between a "ganav" (who steals with stealth) and a "gazlan" (who steals brazenly), and which is more likely to cause despair.
When the thief pays back what he owes plus the double, is the value assessed from the time of theft, or from the time of judgement? What if the value of an animal stolen increases? Also, what about the stolen item undergoing significant change while in the possession of the thief? That process means that the thief actually acquires the stolen item. But this is difficult. The thief comes out ahead! Plus, a comparison to Yaakov in the house of Lavan.
What do the different animals mentioned in the verse teach us about these categories of theft? Also, the question of whether the main case in the verse is theft or a custodian who claims theft - which makes a real difference - and the two interpretations are read through every detail.
What happens when a person comes to collect the item that another US safeguarding, and the guardian says - it was lost (or stolen). The guardian can be asked to swear to the veracity of his claim. But then other means (witnesses) attest to the fact that that claim was a lie. What kind of compensation does he have to pay the owner? Also, an investigation into baraitot that teach the handling of a thief - if he's found or not. And running through the text, the ongoing dispute whether the case is a thief or a claim of theft. And how do the biblical verses teach the details of the false claim?
The case of one who gives a gold coin to a woman, and tell her that it is silver - what is she obligated to pay if it's damaged? Or lost or stolen? Given that she has no idea that the coin is gold (maybe she wouldn't have agreed to watch over a silver coin). Plus, some confusion by Rav about R. Yehudah's teaching. Also, 2 new mishnayot, one to end the chapter, and another to begin the new chapter. Reconnecting to Chanukah candles and the damage caused by fire - flax on a camel and a shopkeeper's Chanukah candles, as is mentioned earlier in Bava Kamma too. And the opening of Perek HaMerubah - the penalties for stealing an item, for damaging after theft, and when those penalties are not put into play.
Several mishnayot. Beginning with more on fire, if it crossed a public road, a river, a wall - barriers that usually prevent the spread of fire. With a delving into issues of the wall. Plus, recognizing different kinds of fire. Also, fire set on another's property. And what about if that fire destroys things that were hidden, such that the fire-setter wouldn't have known to expect them to be there? It's a machloket if he has to pay.
A Mishnah describes the ways in which someone is liable for damages caused by fire. Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha gives an aggaditc and halachic interpretation of Shemot 22:5. The daf also shares a halachic inquiry from King David leaving the learner to ask what can be learned from this question?
More on R. Nachman's assessment of damages for the chopped-down tree, and his arrival at one-sixtieth of the value. Plus, the story of wearing black shoes like a mourner in the home of the exilarch, and how it can be a sign or piety or arrogance. With a test case to determine the difference going back to this kind of 1/60th. Also, 2 mishnayot about damage to one's produce in another person's yard, or as brought to the threshing floor, plus fire in the hands of those who can't be responsible enough for preventing damage by fire.
An animal that wanders into someone's private property and causes damage - the owner of the animal is liable. But if the animal caused damage because it gave birth, that is a case that begins with negligence, but the damage is because of an accident, as it were. Perhaps that means the animal's owner is exempt from paying because the damage was unavoidable. Or should the owner have guarded the animal even more carefully? Also, the case of a person who cut down a date palm, one of three in a little grove, and the case is brought to the exilarch for adjudication. Until the perpetrator rejects the civil authority, and the cad comes before R. Nachman.
The daf explores a disagreement between Rabbah and Rav Yosef over the status of person watching a lost object. Rabbah compares this to a Shomer chinam who is not liable if the object is lost or stolen. Rav Yosef compares this to a Shomer Sacher who would be liable if the object is lost or stolen.
4 violations for which a person is not liable in the human court, but the heavenly count will take an accounting. Also, specific treatment of some of the cases in the mishnah regarding liability - if a sheep enclave has been broken, whether by robbers or animals, the owner of the sheep is exempt from any damage they might cause. If robbers stole the sheep, then the robbers are responsible for their damage. If one designates a shepherd to care for thr sheep... how far does his responsibility go? Plus, the sharp question of returning a lost object, but before its returned - what is the status of the person returning? How much responses that person haevfoe the item itself?
An apparent tangent about why the first account of the Ten Commandments in the Torah has the word "good," and the second account does not. Plus, if you see the letter tet in a dream (with some caveats), it means good will befall you... Also, the 5th perek, with a new mishnah - what happens when one's sheep are damaged? We seem to have moved on from the oxen, at least in part, and the concerns are different, specific to the animal. And not only because they don't have horns to gore.
The Gemara discusses the case of a blind or deaf Ox that causes damages. Then a new Mishnah that teaches there are eight times in the Torah where a specific animal is mentioned in relation to a law but the law applies to all animals and birds. The Gemara questions when the word Kol is used is it to be understood as inclusionary or part of a generalization, specification, generalization sequence.
Rabbi Natan has an interesting calculation for damages when both the ox and pit are responsible. Rava discusses a case where the damagers are person, ox, and pit and all the different types of damages each one needs to pay or is exempt.
A pit and its passersby - where one person covers a cistern, the next person does not...who's liable? And at what point is the owner's covering of the pit recent enough to make him exempt from paying damages? What happens if a pit is open because it is being expanded, and the noise of the construction startles an ox so it falls into it - the owner will be liable (or not), depending on which direction it falls in. If the animal falls on the vessels it is carrying, then the owner of the put is not liable for that damage. Plus, an ox that is a deaf-mute, cognitively impaired, or a minor... Also, if an ox breaks through a damaged cover to a pit... Is the owner of the pit liable, or was the ox just unexpectedly heavy? What if the cover works to protect an ox from falling through, but doesn't protect camels, is the owner negligent? Also, why are the camels in the Gemara here, but not the mishnah? Could the case cover all animals, or is that too much to expect?
A case of an ox that falls into a 6-tephachim deep irrigation ditch, which injured it, perhaps fatally. Plus, a new mishnah about a pit that has 2 owners - and their respective liabilities. Where the order of their actions makes a difference in terms of obligation to pay. And which ends up being a very specific case. Also, the discussion shifts to filling bottles with water that they both can draw and then the old discussion of "bereirah," designations that help define responsibility.
The dad shares a very well known story about Nechuyna who dug ours and how Rabbi Hanina Ben Dosa saves his daughter. A new Mishnah explains more halachot about the digging of pits. The Gemara then discussed a disagreement between Rav and Shmuel about what actually is the cause of death when a person or animal falls into a pit and the answer is surprising!
A new mishnah, this one more challenging, in that it deals with miscarriage (and women in general). A person hits a woman and she miscarries, he pays her husband accordingly. What happens when the damage is done by an ox? How is the value of the lost pregnancy evaluated? With difficult elements... Also, the Gemara in this mishnah - addressing the question of assessing the value of the fetus (or rather, the value of the woman who has miscarried). Probing the question of whether the woman's value increases or decreases because of the potential child... Including an unusual perspective of R. Shimon ben Gamliel, and as explained by Rava. Plus, another disturbing exposition by R. Sheshet regarding the husband getting payment in place of the wife or even their heirs - reducing the child of the lost pregnancy, beyond the technical need to assess worth for monetary compensation. Also, another mishnah, this time on "bor," pit.
The Daf discusses a statement by Rava that if an Ox crouches and causes damage the owner is exempt from paying damages. Kofer appears again on this Daf with a discussion of three interpretations of the Mishnah’s statement that if the ox falls into a pit and kills the homeowne’s father or son the owner of the ox pays kofer.
What happens if someone brings property into someone else's private domain, without permission, then the homeowner is exempt from paying for any damage to that property. With all expected ramifications... Permission to be there makes a difference, but what if the owner didn't watch his property well? Also, if one brought produce I to another's domain and the homeowner's animal was injured - by slipping on the produce or by eating it, there are many questions regarding liability - and who is responsible for making sure that the animal didn't do damage to the produce) (or that the produce didn't harm the animal).
Chapter 5, and its opening mishnah: If an ox (a "tam" ox) gores a cow, and the cow was pregnant and the calf is found outside of the cow, is that because of delivery or because of the goring? With real implications for paying damages. And vice versa, if a cow gored an ox and delivers a calf (or it was aborted because of the goring). Plus, turning to Somchos's view of disputed property being divided between the claimants vs. the majority view that the burden of proof is on the one claiming he's due. Also, reading the verses that teach this level of responsibility (not the legal verses, but narrative). Plus, the question of when the learning requires biblical verses to teach these details or is common sense sufficient.
2 mishnayot: one on the timing of the court's decision regarding an ox that has killed and might need to be out to death, and how that impacts the value of the carcass. Plus, the 4 guardians (shomerim), and how they undertake the role of the owner. Also, what must one do to guard a mu'ad ox, sufficiently? The only certainty is when the ox has been put to death. But with dispute, of course.
Mishnayot! If an ox goes to do one thing, including intending to kill another who is not the one who was killed, the ox is "exempt." Plus, when subsequent damage (or death) to something the ox is accustomed to doing... It's not really considered the ox's intent to damage/kill. Also, the verse that establishes how a person is held accountable for premeditation. Plus, a mishnah on the different categories of owners of a killing ox, and which owners (according to whom) are still fully liable.
When a slave or freeman is killed unintentionally the fine and Kofer imposed on the owner is not paid. The daf also discusses what happens when someone dies by fire unintentionally.
The daf brings a disagreement between Rav Asi and Rabbi Akiva on paid damages for a killed Eved Caanani. The Gemara quotes a barita discussing how a lifer payment on a woman killed by an ox goes to her heirs and not her husband and why.
The Daf begins with a Mishnah that states an Ox that kills a person is stoned and other relevant halakhot. The Gemara shares a careful reading of a verse in Exodus about whether any benefit may be derived from a killer ox.
Establishing "kofer," the payment paid by the owner of a mu'ad ox that killed a person - as a measure of atonement. Or is it just part of damages? That's a machloket, or a machloket whether it's a machloket! Plus, the question of the stadium ox - what is the degree of its innocence? Can it be offered on the altar as a sacrifice?
A new mishnah: How does the status of the owner have impact on the obligation to pay damages in the event of one's ox goring another? Specifically, one who is considered halakhically responsible, as compared to "heresh, shoteh, ve-katan," the deaf-mute, someone who is cognitively impaired, or a minor. In the event of an ox trained to fight (as in bull-fighting), an ox that kills a person isn't put to death. Also, the handling of the above kinds of cases with an apotropos - an agent appointed by the court to be the responsibility for the 3 who aren't held liable for damages. Who does the shift in a person's status have impact on the animal's status (being mu'ad, and reverting to tam, for example).
Some aggadata... Addressing the verse that teaches the Jew vs. non-Jew's goring ox and the obligation to pay. Which explains why a Canaanite's ox would incur full damages. Plus, a discussion of the obligation to keep commandments that they didn't want to keep - and the lack of reward for them. And the principle that those who are commanded get greater reward for fulfilling those commandments. Also, the death of a daughter of a sage who comes from a family of converts, and how Ulla first refuses to go to comfort him, and then does, with some difficult language, including why God didn't have the Israelites go to war with Moav, in the wilderness of the Book of Numbers.
How the ox becomes mu'ad, and how am ox can be expected to gore some, but not others (including with regard to other species). Also, how frequently, and in what pattern, does an ox need to gore to be mu'ad? What about monthly goring, or plus a day? Also, a new mishnah about who owns the animals - Jews, the Temple, and non-Jews.
A new Perez starts off with a Mishnah discussing what happens with damages payments when a tam ox gores multiple oxen owned by multiple people. The Gemara examines if liability can be moved from the owner to someone else.
Cases of damage by the animal vs a person - where the question of who is liable that can be less pleasing to the person who has suffered damage, and might not get paid back. Specifically, when does a person's intent make a difference with regard to paying damages (or getting paid for them)? Plus, a new mishnah: One ox chases another ox, which is subsequently damaged, and the owner blames the other ox, but that ox's owner claims the damage took place in some other way. Who wins? The one seeking payment has to prove his case. Another case: two oxen chasing two oxen, of different sizes. How to identify which damaged which? Which is tam vs mu'ad, etc.? The Gemara puts all of this in the context of Sumchos' view that any dispute is solved by dividing the property.
A discussion of the goring oxen, with monetary values attached - which raises the question of appreciation and depreciation, and how the changes in value may have impact on how the damages are evaluated. Plus, two mishnayot on the daf, the first of which introduces (as it were) the monetary values of oxen that gore each other - which an application of the biblical verse regarding these cases. Also, the valuation of an ox's carcass, as part of the payment. Plus, the case where the valuation of a "tam" ox could be more strict than a "mu'ad" ox, which is startling. Also, the second mishnah: how an owner is obligated for that which his property does, contrasting an ox with a slave.
A new mishnah: Oxen that gore each other - who pays how much depends on which animal is how damaged, and then depends on the status of the oxen. Likewise if an ox gores a person, or a person an ox. Except that Rabbi Akiva disagrees, and the Gemara addresses why. Also, a second mishnah, on the question of the value of the carcass of the ox - and, again, Rabbi Akiva has a different view - this time, disputing Rabbi Yishmael.
3 new mishnayot: the first, about the damage of a person with a barrel and the other with a beam, who collide in the public domain. If the beam damages the barrel, when, if ever, does the beams owner have to pay damages? Which leads the Gemara to draw a parallel to a husband who injures his wife in sexual intercourse. And the next mishnah: When rushing in the public domain, when one is held liable for damages, and one is credited for greeting the Shabbat Queen. And lastly, entering another's domain, and causing damage - what happens when manslaughter is the result? Note the cities of refuge that appear a few times on this daf.
If someone falls and then causes another person to be injured are they liable? Do they need to warn the people behind them?
2 mishnayot! The first one addresses damage caused by something put in the public domain - specifically, one who hides something damaging or makes a fence out of something damaging (like with thorns), when others are damaged, the owner needs to pay full damages. The Gemara narrows the application of the mishnah's more general case quite a lot - how can water do damage on the ground in the public domain? The second mishnah addresses the carting of fertilizer that benefits from the trampling of pedestrians to the public domain. And the concept that the first one to claim an ownerless item becomes the owner. Plus, another mention of Chanukah candles and the liability of a shopkeeper for damage caused by them, depending on their placement.
The daf clarifies cases of negligence and what is the liability if an owner for an object one declares ownerless but then damages someone.
[Who's Who: Ben Bag Bag] The Gemara brings a lot of cases to argue that one cannot take the law into his or her own hands - even when it comes to making a new path in the public domain. Plus, the donation, so to speak, of one's property to expand the public use, it remains with the public domain - he can't take it back. Also, a new mishnah: a jug that breaks in the public domain, which leaves damaging elements - the liquid or the shards of pottery.
The seocnd perek closes with a series of outlandish accidents that try to help define the parameters of liability. The third perek begins with a Mishnah discussing what happens if someone leaves an object in a reshut harabim.
More on kal va-chomer logic, and several apparently relevant examples (of damages) when it is not applied. Plus, a new mishnah - and how a person is always responsible for the damage he or she causes.
First, a long mishnah - paying damages for the ox that damages. Depending on where the damage took place. But what impact does the location have, once you're paying full damages? The public domain is less strict for common damages, and more strict for "keren," the less expected damage. But there are limits - where the derived law is the same as the sourced law. Plus the application of the logical tool of "da-yo" - the fundamental position that the logic of a kal va-chomer can only be applied as far as it can (with whatever dispute), and not to apply to logic without limitation. On this daf, the logic is explored in the context of ritual impurity.
More on how an ox shifts from being "tam" to "mu'ad" - is the ox or the person whose somewhat negligence has given it room to gore? Also, the case of a person who uses a second party's dog to cause harm to a third party - who's responsible from a financial perspective? The Gemara attempts to resolve the dog case with the ox case.
Are there categories of damagers who the course does help with the valuation of the damages? Where category is the borrower in? The daf also includes sevens teachings of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar
Does a cow’s mouth belong to the owner and if a cow eats someone else’s property is the damage taking place in the damager’s property - the mouth of the cow? The daf has a Mishnah describing the difference between tam and muad b
The daf presents a makhloket between Rabbi Yochanon and Reish Leikish on the how fire damages. The Gemara also mentions a Jewish holiday that usually does not get a lot of space in the Gemara.
How does the owner of an animal that caused damage by eating pay for that damage? Specifically when the animal turns its head to eat from the side - even though it's a public domain kind of damage. Also, a new mishnah: what happens when a dog or a goat jump from a roof and damage vessels upon landing? What if they fell, instead of jumping? What if they had no option to land elsewhere? Who, if anyone, is liable for damages?
What if your animal eats food from the pack on the back of another animal? Or comparable damage. Who's responsible? Is this standard behavior or not? Is it like walking and damaging or standing and damaging or jumping and damaging, which is another category, or might be. Also, what about the case of a squatter - and what happens then? Does the owner know? Is rent involved? Is squatting causing any harm or monetary loss?
More, yes, on attenuated causation. [Who's Who: Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah] What about a wagging tail? Does the animal's owner need to hold on to the tail to prevent any potential damage? That seems a bit much. Also, a new mishnah - with additional considerations, such as whether the damage takes place in the public domain. With a greater focus on "shen," tooth, eating.
Why are chickens pecking at a rope from which a bucket will drop, if they peck through? Will that make a difference as to how much the owner of the chickens would have to pay? Soumchos says the chicken owner should pay full damages - is that the reason the chicken case would need full damages? Is it just following his opinion? Also, can the case of tzrurot (pebbles) ever become a case of "mu'ad," and therefore entail full damages or not? Is that Soumchos' rationale? What about other cases of potential "tzrurot" - attenuated causation in the case of droppings (dung), which damage. We're left with the question whether the case of the pebbles is closer to "regel" (trampling) or to "keren" (goring)?
Wrapping up the first chapter - with some aggadata doing some analysis of biblical verses that seems to connect to the halakhic topics at hand in both the first chapter and the upcoming second one. Also, the opening mishnah of Chapter 2: investigating "regel," the damage an animal does in the course of its walking. With an additional focus, which comes out in the Gemara too, on tzrurot - pebbles, and the degree to which the animal and its owner is responsible for the attenuated causation that's leading to damage. Plus, opening the question of when two parties are both essential to the breakage of an item, but neither did it alone - is the first contributor or the second considered liable (spoiler: it's a machloket).
The daf discusses how different wild animals are damagers and can they ever be not considered muad. The Mishnah finally spells out some of the differences between tam and muad.
Why do we need three proofs to determine that women are included in the laws of damages. A Mishnah discusses other types of damagers.
The daf finishes up it’s discussion of the second Mishnah in our Masechet by discussing the 4 rules of damages attributed to Rabbi Shimon Ben Elazar. A new cryptic Mishnah appears on this daf exploring how damages are assessed.
What happens when Kodshim cause damage and are they considered property? The daf comments in what to do about duplicate mishnahs.
Rav Nachmun issues a halahkic ruling about orphans and the repayment of loans. The daf explores when do kodshim kalim becone subject to meilah and thereby except from damages.
The daf discusses what is mean to cause some of the damage and what liability that incurs for the damager. Then the Gemara presents scriptural sources that the damaged party needs to deal with the damaged object.
The compensation for damages is supposed to be from the best land... Or from money (cash). Or even from bran? Which is it? Plus, the case if two brothers who inherit and have to pay their father's creditor. Plus, what so we spend on a mitzvah. Also, a new mishnah! When is one liable to pay compensatory damages when ones property causes damage? Negligence is a good rule of thumb. And other complicating factors regarding the property, including, possibly, depending on the owner, including that person's status and/or capabilities.
When a buyer purchases land from a seller that owes money the owed money stays with the sold land. The daf explains different ways the buyer can make sure the seller’s debt is paid off.
The daf provided 4 possible different cases that explain the what is common between the four types of damagers described in the Mishnah. Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva each read a verse in Shemot differently and each interpretation impacts how damages are calculated.
The daf discusses what type of damagers are not in the britot from daf 4 and how damage can be done through speech. The daf also started to create some distinctions between different categories of damagers.
The daf establishes 3 damaging activities that an ox can do (keren, shen, and regel), and the differences between each of them that can be applied elsewhere too. We then have two britot that expand the list of damages.
The daf comes to an understanding of Rav Pappa’s statement that some Toladot and different than the Av. The daf then explains a disagreement between Rav and Shmuel on the meaning of the word ma’veh.
A new Seder and a new Masechet! The Masechet begins with a discussion of the main categories of damagers and the relationship between the Avot (categories) and Tolodot (subcategories) of damagers.
The daf begins with a Mishnah that raises some difficult questions. The last Mishnah of the Masechet and Seder discusses what professions are desirable and should be taught to one’s son. The Masechet ends with a beautiful passage on the study of Torah and the hope it brings to a person’s life.
The daf has a very open discussion about sexual temptation and sin by giving example from the Tanamim and Amoraim
The daf discusses Rabbi Yochanan’a concept of chazakot and when one does not to bring a witness to prove something. Later the Mishnah discussed the laws of yichud or seclusion.
Two mishnahs; First mishnah - when the timing of an agents betrothal for a woman and a father's (or her own) conflict... What is the status of that kiddushin? Second Mishnah - if a man returns with a family how does he prove their lineage
A kohen whose kiddushin is with a woman who is prohibited to him and who is the intimate with her - he gets two counts against him, one for each prohibition. The idea is that kiddushin is prohibited for the way it leads to a prohibited sexual relationship. Also, a new mishnah about how a father and even both parents can't declare their child (or child-to-be) a mamzer.
A new mishnah about challals, challalot, and their progeny, and whom they can marry. Likewise, converts. Following the lineage quality of the father... Also, a beraita regarding liability for multiple sins - specifically, kohanim who get involced with the various prohibited relationships. But how many women is the given kohen being intimate with?
A new mishnah - checking back the lineage of a woman who marries a kohen, namely 4 women which equals 8, when you consider 4 generations on both sides. Though some families, who were in various kinds of public service, were exempt from some of those checks, because they wouldn't have been eligible for those roles if their lineage had been blemished. But why davka the women and not the men? Also, fights about lineage brought out the insults from others. Plus, the position that converts cannot be Jewish kings, with potentially painful implications for other roles of leadership as well. And recognition of how uneven treatment of converts were in different communities.
More on the Shetuki also sometimes known as a Beduki. The daf also discussed the status of the Cutean and who they may or may not marry.
A new mishnah, with more on who's allowed to marry whom. The people who are prohibited from marrying others can (maybe!) marry each other. Also, the need for Gemara to explicate the mishnah. Plus, can the progeny of the couple that marries (who are prohibited to others) marry a kohen?
The daf explores these two categories of children and how this status impacts the ability to marry who they want.
Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi tasks Levi with characterizing several different segments of society. Plus, more comments from R. Yehudah HaNasi, on his deathbed. Also, more tracking the lineages of the Babylonians, and Rabbi Meir's opposing view on the purity of the various lines in contrast to the sages in general. With practical implications. Also, how the mamzerim will (or will not) become pure in the time of the World to Come. And the shift in meaning for the word "mamzer."
Comparisons between the land of Israel and Babylonia - regarding lineage and the purity thereof, during the return to Zion, Shivat Zion. With the given that we don't investigate a family's purity. Plus, some cases of people not marrying because of the concern of the purity of the lineage of their potential mates.
The time when a visit to a butcher shop led to excommunication, a change of status (from free man to slave), and a matching of halakhic wits between Rav Nachman, R. Yehudah bar Yehezkel, and a little Yalta for good measure.
More complications of personal status, including, or especially with regard to mamzerut and slaves - plus, how their union works to cancel mamzerut. Plus, a non-complimentary description of slaves. Also, beginning the 4th chapter: with a mishnah listing the complicated lineages of those who moved from Babylonia to Israel.
Additional discussion of yesterday's discussion - on R. Akiva's opinion that all prohibited relationships result in mamzer progeny. But there are some difficulties with that approach. Plus, more on the progeny from other liaisons, including intermarriage in the contemporary sense of it, and which parent determines the child's status.
A new mishnah - complications in halakhic status of children as compared to the father vs. mother. Even when the marriage itself is prohibited, the children follow the problematic status parent. Also, what happens if the couple is not Jewish, from different tribes or countries (eg, or religions). When does the status follow the male, and when the female?
While the daf discusses whether one or two witnesses are needed to prove an ervah the daf discusses the story ad Yannai and Shimon ben Shetach. Plus a disagreement between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva which demonstrates the genius of Rabbi Akiva’s exegesis
A new mishnah - with a series of cases: when there's a dispute between a man and a woman as to whether he betrothed her (and the implications of betrothal, which prohibits them to some of each other's relatives, for example). Which of them is to be believed? Or rather, how do we handle not knowing whom to believe? Also, an Amoraic dispute on at least one of the cases in the mishnah: with Rav saying the man should be forced, apparently to give a get, and Shmuel saying he should be asked to give a get.
More mishnayot - more cases of a father betrothing his daughter (who is not the age of majority). What if the father says he has done so - when is he believed or not? Also, one who says at the time of his death that he has children (keeping a wife who has no children with him from needing to do yibum) - he's believed. If he claims to have brothers (giving her the need for yibum), he's not believed. Plus, a father who has several groups of daughters, from two wives, how to handle unspecific statements of betrothal regarding those daughters?
3 mishnayot! Each with unusual, surprising conditions for betrothal, and when they donor don't work.
If a man betrothes a woman and explains that he was mistaken in his thinking about different aspects of her identity, they remain betrothed. She wasn't acting under false pretenses. But not so if they weren't eligible to be betrothed at the time that the man makes conditions on the betrothal, the conditions coming true are not enough - because they weren't eligible to begin with. Plus, a condition to betroth an unborn daughter. Also, the question of that which doesn't yet exist vs. that which does exist, but isn't eligible yet - for example, terumah!
Irregularities in a field that is to be used for kiddushin - how do they change things? Plus new mishnah on the double conditions of Gad and Reuven. Plus, the dispute between R. Meir and R. Hanina ben Gamliel.
The parallels between the regular case of betrothal and other topics. Plus, specific conditions - based on specifics of money - what he has, what she can trust that he has. The specific phrasing of the conditions can make a difference. Depending, course, on the behavior of the shaliach, and retroactive kiddushin... Plus, if the condition is the 30 days for when betrothal kicks in, and what he really means by it. And similarly with regard to other conditions.
A new chapter, and a new mishnah - when a man appoints an agent to betroth a woman on his behalf, and instead the agent betrothed her to himself. With examples and commentary, and some confusion.
The daf introduces a new concept of tovat hana and asks can one take a payment for a mitzvah?
On the ox that is condemned to death - how do we know that its hide is prohibited from any benefit? As "et" was interpreted by the sages, including R. Akiva's famous inclusive interpretative approach. Also, sourcing the prohibition against benefitting from a nazir's hair or meat and milk cooked together.
More on the second tithe, ma'aser sheni - as a paradigm of deconsecrating the produce, and redeeming it, eventually. For example, you can't (or shouldn't) use ma'aser sheni money to purchase an animal outside of Jerusalem. Also, a new mishnah, with prohibited items that cannot be used for kiddushin -- because they are prohibited for benefit (items that a user can't get any benefit from, without incurring a violation).
More on the dispute between R. Yehudah and R. Meir. With a mention of Shekalim - and how wandering animals are understood to have been designated for various sacrifices. Plus, the question of deconsecrating consecrated property, and if/when that is possible. Plus, the mechanism by which that deconsecrating worked.
More on what can and cannot be used for betrothal, specifically among the sanctified property, specifically the garments of the kohanim - that have not worn out. And what about the worn out garments? When does me'ilah (misuse of consecrated property) kick in? Also, the question of whether the walls of Jerusalem are consecrated, and if so, does that mean stones loose from the wall are subject to me'ilah? With more dispute between R. Meir and R. Yehudah.
A long beraita that is brought into the discussion of when betrothal with a portion of some sanctified or dedicated portion works, or doesn't. Plus, how this parallel text to our Gemara is relevant to understand the differences of opinion. Also, more analysis of the cases of the mishnah - specifically, using the second tithe (maaser sheni) for betrothal. In contrast to other gifts to God/kohanim, which are effective for betrothal.
A deep dive on 5 women, including 2 sisters, who are given a basket of figs as a means of betrothal. Rav taught 3 of the 4 halakhot that the specifics of the case teach. Note the chronological restructuring of the personalities here. Also, several cases of attempted betrothal where the ownership of the betrothal item is iffy, to say the least. Also, a new mishnah - on a kohen using kodshim as an item for kiddushin (the mishnah says no, with a dispute between R. Meir and R. Yehudah. Which leads to an important follow-up by R. Yehudah when R. Meir dies, and R. Yehudah doesn't want to countenance his students. Plus, one of those students making R. Yehudah's concerns come to life. And R. Yosi's defense and explanation of the questions R. Meir and his students were addressing.
A dispute between Abaye and Rava, whether a betrothal works if there's no consummation with sexual intercourse. Plus, how is this impacted by an attempt betrothal of two woman who can't be "co-wives" to begin with. Also, explaining the rationale of both Abaye and Rava, including complicated cases of betrothal to support the rational of each.
If you think your positions in your mind without articulating them, then they don't count, even when it's a positive commitment. Also, 4 new mishnayot: betrothal via shaliach with conditions, like the location of betrothal. What if she has "vows," for example, as a lien, etc. She needed to be forthcoming monetarily. She needed to divulge any relevant details... or blemishes might be grounds for divorce (not as blemishes, but as undisclosed information). Plus, betrothal with less than the value of a perutah. Likewise, kiddushin for 2 women who are related in such a way as to prohibit kiddushin, via figs, plus they were shemitah produce.
A conditional kiddushin - where a statement is made as a prerequisite to the betrothal. With implications for lineage status (yuchasin). Plus, a rich man who claims to be poor and vice versa. Also, 10 measures of all kinds of things that were given to the world, where specific countries or entities got 9 of those measures (beautiful Jerusalem, for example). Plus, a mishnah, continuing the discussion of conditional betrothals, where the conditions are not met and the betrothals do not take effect.
A dispute on the question of whether kiddushin works via a loan, on an oral agreement. Plus, transferring the right if collection. Also, betrothal with a document - when does it work, and when not? All via beraitot trying to understand Rav's opinion on betrothal. Also, a new mishnah: a man who betroths a woman with a cup of wine, but it turns out to be honey, or other cases of mistaken identity, as it were - that betrothal does not take effect.
Betrothing with a loan does not work - but why not? What is the rationale for the mechanism not bringing about kiddushin? Perhaps the loan itself is never really considered owned by the borrower who would use it for kiddushin. Plus, how she feels about the sum total of the betrothal and the need to scrounge for it can have impact on whether the kiddushin takes effect. Also, Rav's view on the loan not working for betrothal. Plus, a disagreement over a loan that has not yet been spent. If it hasn't been, the lender can recall the loan. But is that really acceptable?
A new mishnah: a betrothal via a date (the fruit). But is it worth a perutah? Can the value of the individual dates accrue? What if she eats them as he gives them to her? How are we to make sense of this mishnah? Also, a gift to a sister is obviously collateral, a deposit. Why would he say "kiddushin" (in this case)? How did the sanctity of a kohen's food make a difference? What about the challah that is given as flour? How complicated can that flour be whether it's challah or not? Won't it get mixed up? What does the kohen know about whether he can separate the challah from that new dough? Doesn't everyone need to pay attention to these details?
A couple of cases of betrothing a daughter - with a cup of wine, with a package of vegetables in the marketplace. And who's doing the betrothing? The father of the daughter to the father of a son is a complicated question. And the marketplace complicates matters because it (or the vegetables themselves) may be lacking in respect. Plus, when the mother and father of the daughter each want their daughter betrothed to a relative of each respective side. Also, terumah! Namely, how the minor might be allowed to continue eating terumah, or not. Specifically, if a minor accepts kiddushin without her father's knowledge. What are the implications to the betrothal? With a dispute over the meaning of the father's silence (or lack of protest) at the immediate timing.
On the case of a father betrothing his daughter - a series of disputes on how this works. Which leads into a "reality" story account of the yelling in the beit midrash. Also, what about a minor who accepts kiddushin, not her father's doing? Plus, the complicated case of bringing a case before Shmuel and then Rav - when the get is needed, plus mi'un, where the action (or marriage, or betrothal) can be rejected.
More on the topic of sending an agent to do a sin - in this case, specifically, murder. With parallels to King David, in his efforts to hide his affair with Batsheva. Also, can a shaliach (agent) be a witness? Some key disputes flesh out the concerns.
How do we know shelichut (appointing an agent) works, with some pushback as to whether it should work at all. Plus, the idea of benefitting another person, and whether action taken on another's behalf is necessarily shelichut. Also, who is responsible for damages in the process of shelichut - the agent or the one who appoints an agent? Note the important principle that there's no agent for a sin, because the agent himself needs to heed God's instructions over and above those of the person who would appoint the shaliach.
A new chapter, with a new mishnah: Both men and women can betroth/be betrothed directly or via an agent. With investigation of these cases. Plus, the famous pronouncement that marriage is better than being alone, with the halakhic ramifications. Plus, discussion of a father betrothing his young (but not too young) daughter. Also, a discussion of agency in the context of betrothal, though it begins with a return to the discussion of an agent for divorce.
Starting with mitzvot that are done in this world, and the reward for them comes in the next world. Eg: Honoring your parents. Plus, the impact of how we handle our mitzvot in the environment around us, such as sending away the mother bird. Also, a new mishnah - those who learn Torah and refine their behavior won't come to sin too easily, while those who don't aren't even part of the community. Plus, another discussion of theodicy...
More on the discussion of orlah outside of the land of Israel, with some sharp disagreement by the sages. Plus, according to those who say there is orlah outside of Israel, how should it be treated? Also, when a couple of sages spot someone planting kilayim - and how they react to him. Also, a new mishnah! On the value of doing mitzvot, including the rewards that are known for them. And the challenge of watching one who should be getting long life die in the process of doing those mitzvot - and the conclusion that the key is the World to Come. Plus, the death of Hutzpit the Translator.
The Children of Israel were given several mitzvot at the time they entered the land, so the Gemara focuses on their experience just before this time. For example, how close to the land of Israel were they when they stopped eating the manna? It's not as obviously "40 years in the wilderness" as one might think. Plus, tracking the date via Moshe's death on the 7th of Adar. Plus, how it is known that he was born on the 7th of Adar too, and the righteous implications of that. Also, more on the mitzvot that were to be practiced in the land of Israel, and some select few that apply outside of the land too - specifically with regard to debts and relinquishing debts.
Mitzvot that depend on the land only apply in the land of Israel. Mitzvot that are not dependent on the land apply everywhere. But orlah and kilayim also apply everywhere. And R. Eliezer says "chadash" - and the question is whether he is being more machmir, in adding another mitzvah to the list, or swapping it out. What does "land-dependent" mean? Because not all of these mitzvot seem quite dependent on the land! Plus, a deep dive into R. Eliezer's position, and R. Akiva's question on him.
Rava and Abaye on Isi's position regarding women not making bald spots on their heads. Plus, the Jewish people as treated like children, in their relationship with God, as compared to when the relationship is there, but the epithet is not (depending on their loyalty). Also, a new mishnah - on how women, for the most part, did not participate in the actions connected to offering sacrifices, except for that connected to sotah and a female nazir.
And now, sources for why women are obligated in negative commandments, including 3 verses that teach different component parts.
How do we know that women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments? It's learned from tefillin, which is linked to learning Torah. Or tefillin could be linked to mezuzah - but that would make women obligated in tefillin! Also, delving into the mitzvah of Re'iyah, which is specifically for males - implying that women are obligated in other positive time-bound commandments. But maybe that's just Hakhel? Note that there's no middle ground between a women under her father's auspices or her husband's. But the original examples do seem to provide the source in the most simple (albeit complicated) manner.
More on giving honor - to Torah scholars. Standing before those who brought first fruits vs. Not standing before Torah scholars - what a difference a mitzvah makes. Plus, when scholars don't stand up for scholars, and the insult that can provide. Which R. Yehudah HaNasi takes more mildly than the scholars who are hot under the collar. Plus, why standing before another person honors that person. Also, a series of more complicated cases: what happens when the son, who should stand before his father, is his father's teacher, so the father should stand before the son. What if the person to honor is riding? What about standing for a Sefer Torah? There are different and overlapping kinds of honor - all of which are being established in an objective way, and removing the personal factor.
More on kibud av va'em, honoring one's parents. How far must one go? What about correcting a parent's error? Plus, the example of the 4 deaths of the court. Also, several sages and the acts of honoring parents that each does, and whether one can forego the honor.
Lots of nuggets of stories in this daf - beginning with defining the lengths one must go to fulfill the mitzvah of honoring one's parents. Dama ben Netina was just that considerate. Plus, the valuable red heifer. Also, the difference between being commanded for a mitzvah and being exempt, as per R. Yosef, who was blind. Also, the practices of several sages in terms of honoring their respective parents. [Who's Who: Rabbi Abahu] What about when one's parents honor their adult child, instead of accepting the honor from him - what can he do? Plus, what happens if you've grown up without parents?
The Gemara shares some beautiful passages about the importance of reaching Torah to one’s children and how to teach. The daf also discusses why teaching a son a trade and to swim are an obligation for the father
A doozy of a mishnah, especially with regard to gender wars. What mitzvot are women obligated in, and what mitzvot are they not obligated? With some specifics for men, boys, fathers for sons, sons for fathers. (How to swim, circumcision, etc.) And where do the mothers and daughters fit in? Plus, the rules regarding teaching Torah. (Where are the girls?) Also, the story of the demon in Abaye's beit midrash, and R. Acha bar Yaakov's vanquishing of it.
More on devolving oaths - gigul shevuah. With various cases of swearing that one is not a slave... Also, defining halipin, exchange - what it is and what it is not.
Cases of acquiring movable items along with land - from tithes of growing produce along with rent to several different kinds of documents - and whether the transaction is by virtue of the document, or after it. The Gemara then moves on to discuss how the concept of Gilgul Shevua is learned from Sotah.
The daf has a Mishnah discussing how land and houses are. acquired. The Gemara introduces the concept of agav and how moveable property should be sold with land.
The elders in Nezonya did not show up to R. Hisda's shiur. R. Hamnuna goes to rebuke them. They complained that R. Hisda didn't answer their halakhic question - regarding the blemish of castration (whether it's go-free damage, or not). And then they're rude to R. Hamnuna. But the question is raised regarding overt injury as compared to hidden injury - including the tongue. Also, the kinyan of "meshichah," pulling, "mesirah," transfer, and "hagba'ah," - raising up. Regarding large animals, small animals, etc.
Ways that Canaanite slaves go free. Including when a slave is injured seriously, permanently, in an external way, based on the biblical verses, but not only. Plus, the cases when, despite injury, the slave does not go free. Plus, lesser injuries. Plus, the case of the owner who is a doctor and inadvertently does harm to his own slave in the process of treatment. Also, does the slave who goes free need a "get shichrur," a bill of emancipation, on top of the injury in one of the 24 limbs listed.
More on slaves' emancipation - and how that works as a matter of transaction. Even if he's not cognizant of it, it's to his benefit - and actions in his own interest can be done without his knowledge. Also, the sages allow the slave to free himself with the money of others. Because otherwise, the funds are immediately acquired by the master when they arrive in the slave's possession. But can you give a gift to a slave with a condition removing the master's possibility of ownership? Of course, it's a machloket.
More on "retziyah" - and the obligation of a master to the slave's family. Plus, a description of piercing the slave's ear, and where the slave who adds to the time of service goes wrong. Also, switching to a Canaanite slave - what are the means of acquisition?
The Gemara continues its discussion comparing the redemption of fields and houses during Yovel. The daf then shares a baraita that explains many of the halachot of retziah. Finally a discussion about the kohen who becomes a slave.
Abaye compares himself to Ben Azzai [brief recall of Who's Who]. How does one figure out the purchase price of redeeming a slave? Plus, treating a slave leniently. What about a Jew working for an idolater? Also, a mnemonic to help remember the cases of partial redemption.
Can a father tell his minor daughter to go accept her own betrothal that she isn't old enough to accept herself? Plus, the marriage that follows the time of a maidservant - to the master - and how that kiddushin can kick in, switching the relationship from marriage to slavery. With props to marriage over and above slavery, given the comparison.
Redeeming the maidservant against "his" will - but whose will? The master or the father? What about the strike against the family's good name in the servitude itself?! Plus, a maidservant isn't sold a second time. Also, she can't be sold to a second master - with interpretation of a phrase in the verse being essential.
The daf explores a few different opinions on how much severance must be paid to a freed slave.
Gemara discussed some key differences between female and male Hebrew slaves. The daf also looks at which slaves are eligible for a severance gift and what might that teach us about biblical slavery.
More on the gezerah shavah between "sachir" and "sachir," with regard to how this indentured fellow goes free - aside from the jubilee year, which is already specified in the verse. But Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi doesn't use this gezarah shavah, so why not? And why the disagreement over this? Plus, how does a gezarah shavah really work? How does one be freed from one owner only to be enslaved to the relatives who freed him?
Recapping Yevamot, to explain the first mishnah of Kiddushin. With a deeper dive into the halitzah case on this daf - namely, how do we know she frees herself with halitzah? Plus, a story of R. Tarfon's beit din for a woman who comes for halitzah. Also, the economics of Jewish (Hebrew) slaves, usually as a matter of paying off debt. What about the sale of a female Hebrew slave? How does that compare to the acquisition of kiddushin?
More cases of possible kiddushin. For example, betrothal with a mat of myrtle branches - to no response by the woman who takes the mat. Is that silence a matter of acquiescence or rejection? How would she knows the details of that kind of silence? Also, what about a designated sin-offering on the woman's behalf post childbirth? What if she dies in childbirth? Plus, what about a loan where the debtor dies - and whether the creditor can always collect the loan.
How much is a perutah actually worth? How do we define its value, given fluctuating currencies and given the different value of items in various places. Also, what happens when the value diminishes over time? Plus, how can some cases of actual effective kiddushin be valued at less than a perutah (Shmuel's opinion vs. that of R. Hisda). Plus, R. Hiya's wife's efforts to leave him.
The Gemara does a deep dive on Beit Shammai’s opinion that for Kiddushin to take place with money it must be at a value of at least a dinar. Several opinions are offered to help understand Beit Shammai’s reasoning.
Investigating the precise moment that sexual intercourse functions as betrothal. With practical implications. Also, a story of terumah and chuppah. [Who's Who: Yochanan Ben Bag Bag] Plus, the modesty of clear language and addressing difficult (sexual) topics directly.
More interesting cases - to illustrate the halakhah. How far do they go toward kiddushin? (Spoiler: Not kiddushin). Plus, kiddushin with a shtar/document. Note - it's not worth even a perutah, nor is it a bill of sale, in that it comes from the woman's husband-to-be, and not her father (or herself, once she's an adult). Note the requirement for consent. Also, does the document need to be written for this woman specifically, like divorce, or not so, like betrothal via money?
Betrothal with money has to be with something that has a clearly defined value. With a parallel to pidyon haben - redemption which also needs to be of a certain value. Also, what happens if the woman takes the money a man offers her for kiddushin and she destroys the money? Is that rejection of kiddushin, or is it too late? Or does she owe him the funds?[NOTE: If the second part of today's daf sounds familiar from yesterday's daf, you are not wrong. It was a good we will share (maybe) at the siyum for Kiddushin. In the meantime, check Daf 7 soon for a renewed second half.]
A series of cases of possibly effective kiddushin, and the effect of the formal act of acquisition (kinyan). What does it mean that marriage is effected through an act of acquisition (as one buys property). Also, what happens if the woman takes the money a man offers her for kiddushin and she destroys the money. Is that rejection of kiddushin or is it too late? Or does she owe him the funds?
Other formulations that may or may not work for betrothal. What if the couple is talking about betrothal? Is that enough to betroth her? Also, the case of one who wants to betroth a woman with the money he's already lent her. Or the benefit of that loan.
Can each of these three ways of betrothal imply the others? Or can any two imply the third? Or do we need all three of them stated explicitly? Also, what about chuppah? Shouldn't it work to bring about a betrothal? The Gemara works out why not. Plus, the actual process of betrothal via "money."
Honing in on the language, specifically with regard to a girl's coming to physical majority. Plus, the question of superfluous words - with regard to letting a slave (or maidservant) go free. Also, investigating the source of betrothal taking place with money - is it logic or is it a verse?
The use of "derekh" - ways - in the mishnah, and a probe into why this term and not another. With parallel cases with a "zav" and an "etrog." What do the explicit cases (3 and 2 ways that a woman comes in or out of marriage) come to exclude? Plus, an investigation into the money that is used for betrothal. And the move from under her father's auspices.
Embarking on the new relationship, with the new tractate, as it is established by a transactional arrangements. The mishnah begins with the formal act of acquisition can be accomplished in one of three ways: money, contract, or sexual intercourse. The mishnah also outlines how she goes free from that bond too. Considering the rationale behind this kind of take on marriage, and the sense of it without the emotional side of things. The Gemara delves into the precise language of the mishnah, and the care with which the words were chosen and understood.
A new mishnah on this last daf! Specifically, under what circumstances is a husband allowed to divorce his wife - of course, a machloket, this time, between Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva (based on interpreting a verse). Plus, 4 ways to understand the word, "ki," in the biblical text. Also, ending the tractate with the full emotions of divorce - in sorrow and some measure or regret - a husband shouldn't continue to stay married to a wife he hates, but he then is hated by God (with a distinction between first and second marriages).
When rumours about a woman's conduct abound - when would she need to be divorced? How do we investigate rumors?
More on signatures on a get on the wrong place. Plus, a verse referring to the Children of Israel being long in the world - 3 generations. Also, another aggadah - about the number of generations before the destruction of the Temple (based on the list of Jewish kings who did some form of idolatry), which is understood to be 7. Also, 2 mishnayot, one about when a forced get is acceptable and one about the strength of rumors with regard to betrothal or divorce.
More on a joint get, where the date per divorce may make the difference (a dispute between Resh Lakish and R. Yochanan). Plus, a new mishnah - what happens if the signatures of the witnesses are in both Hebrew and Greek, under different sides of the get, in different orders, because of the different directions of the languages (dispute between Rashi and Rambam). Also, another mishnah, where the witnesses sign on different locations of the get document. Among other possible confusions.
2 mishnayot bookend this daf, with some "end of the tractate" outlandish cases: 3 types of gittin that are not good, but they are good enough to prevent children from a future marriage from being mamzerim. Basically, when the text is lacking in some way. Plus, why witnesses sign a get - namely, to prevent the husband from denying the get, for example. Also, the Gemara attempts to determine when the husband's handwritten get suffices and when it does not. Also, 2 husbands sent 2 wives divorces via messengers, but they have the same names. Or even more... Now what?
A mishnah with the case of a husband who gives his wife a get with a stipulation that she will be divorced as long as you doesn't go on to marry someone she isn't allowed to marry anyway (her father, his father, and so on). Plus, a case of a husband who gives his wife a get with the stipulation that she doesn't marry someone where the marriage would take hold, but it's still prohibited (like a divorcee to a kohen). Also, a mishnah that delves into the essence of the get, and divorce altogether - the severance of the bond between the husband and wife.
More other conditions that a husband might stipulate in a bill of divorce - for example, if he stipulates that she now marry another specific man -- then the divorce will take effect. But does that work? Or what if the condition is something that isn't humanly possible? Or on condition that she do a sin against the Torah? Also, what about when the condition is written into the get? Isn't that automatically a problem? It may actually depend on where in the get it's written (or said, for that matter) -- namely, it has to be stipulated after the "toref" of the get - the part with the people's names and the date and so on.
After R. Eliezer died, 4 sages (Tannaim, of course) went to refute his statement with regard to divorce stipulations, each one in turn. Plus, all of the developments of the discussion in their wake, including issues of kehunah, and more, specifically because of concerns that the marital bond remained extant.
NOTE: In a first for Talking Talmud, rather than the usual conversation or tag-team, Yardaena is the sole voice here. Anne's phone died literally as she went to record. But Yardaena covered the material beautifully. Please God, we'll be back tomorrow and following, in our usual form.
Chapter 9! A new mishnah - a divorce with the vocabulary of "ehla" - permitted to any man, but rather except... But doesn't that language stipulate a condition, in which case, how do they proceed? Is it a get on condition that she can't marry someone specific? Or does it specify whom she can marry?? A parallel case of "negaim" - house tzara'at - can help explain this "ehla." Also, betrothal with the exclusion of everyone except for one, and that one does the same betrothal. But how strange - to be betrothed to two people!
A mishnah: A man writes a bill of divorce for his wife and then changes his mind - to what extent does that initial writing have impact in her availability to a kohen, say, in the event that he then died, and she wanted to remarry as a widow. Plus, the narrative of such a case... Also, another mishnah: Does a couple that is getting divorced need a second get if they stayed together in an inn? Plus, a hierarchy of authority with R. Yochanan. And a third mishnah: A bald get, with signatures that are not visible because of the folds of the get.
A long mishnah (or a series that are published together): If a get is written with a name of a place that is not legitimate... Or other goofs in location... If other details are wrong... When is the get not a get? Plus, how a get that is not a get can really mess up a second marriage, and children from the second marriage. Plus, co-wives are treated like the divorcing woman too. Also, a deeper dive into the country that is not legitimate, and other countries as named in divorce. Plus, Rabbi Meir's approach in creating mamzerim.
A woman who stands on top of the roof and her husband throws the get to her - under what terms is she divorced, and when is she not? Plus, the connection to space, as per Eruvin, and Shabbat in general -- and does the domain have impact on whether the divorce is a divorce. Also, a new mishnah: when one wrote a get long advance - usable or not?
2 mishnayot: If a husband says his wife should take a promissory note from him, it's fundamentally a get, but it won't actually function to divorce her. If she comes across it, or she discovers it, it doesn't count. If he's sleeping, and has the get, all the more so, it's not being given to her... Though there are exceptional cases. Also, if the husband throws the get to his wife, the question of how close it get to her, as compared to him, will dictate whether they are divorced. To what extent are they really measuring the distance from where the get fell?? Plus, what if he throws her the get and he's tied a strong around it to be able to pull it back to him - then they aren't divorced. But if she's really got a firm grip, and he can't pull it anymore, then they are divorced.
The phrasing of one who tells others to write a get for his wife if he doesn't return by a date certain - unclear whether that can be a kosher get. Plus, noting how precise this timing really is. Also, a new mishnah in the new chapter: one who throws the bill of divorce to his wife and it lands next to her - whether she's divorced may depend on where she is (her courtyard, yes; his courtyard, no). But if he owns the place, he can transfer the ownership of the place in order to provide her with the get. With implications if he is very ill.
More on conditional divorce. Specifically, that the woman should do things for others. Plus combined conditions with witnesses. Also, a condition with regard to the time it takes a husband to return home... the condition is cancelled. Plus, the geography of Israel, north and south. Also, a new mishnah -a new condition - if he doesn't come back by the end of their time, or if he died before the condition of his not returning has happened... She's either not divorced or she has the limbo status, depending on timing.
The daf explains how a condition is supposed to be formulated based on a famous example in Tanakh. A new Mishnah continues to discuss conditional getts but this time the condition involves other family members.
A new mishnah: A case where the divorce is conditional on a woman paying a sum of 200 dinar. Plus, other conditions. What happens if they're not fulfilled? Plus, a dispute as to when the conditional divorce kicks in - from the time she receives it or from the time she fulfills the condition? Also, a deep investigation into the text of the mishnah itself and the vocabulary used in the condition. Plus, what if he's just levying conditions to bother her? That seems to be allowed!
A tosefta on conditions that might prevent a get from bring valid - when one is too specific with a condition. (With very precise formulations). Plus, to what degree would uncommon things be included in a condition? Also, a new mishnah on an I'll man who gives his wife a conditional divorce - in the event that he dies, they are divorced - but in the interim, they must refrain from sexual intimacy.
More on the different readings by R. Meir and R. Yosi. When are verbal instructions to a scribe acceptable? The verse seems to imply that the husband's voice is necessary... Plus, a new mishnah: How a husband can formulate a conditional get in the event of his death. How to make it valid?? More, in trying to understand R. Yosi both supports his view and raises questions on it. Plus, a side bar and prooftext regarding the olive oil of non-Jews.
A deaf-mute who can communicate in writing, who wants to appoint one to write a get for his wife - because he can communicate, the court appoints on his behalf. [Note: The skipping and choppiness in Anne's recording is something we've never encountered before, and we didn't realize it was happening. You have our profound apologies.] Plus, mute vs deaf vs deaf-mute. Also, how the scribe(s) writing the get becomes relevant in the context of a shaliach, and a verbal directive for get.
Talmudic ronouncements about what diminishes a person's strength - with verses from Psalms as prooftexts. Plus, what not to do while standing. Plus, an assortment of things that will bring a person to death, if done in a particular order. Also, the case of the person who has some kind of temporary insanity and the implications for a get that is commissioned by him.
Talmudic medical remedies, which may or may not work (we don't know). Certainly, there was some scientific method, while others seem much farther flung. For example, writing Levi backwards, as compared to curing bleeding from the mouth, depending on whether it sticks to a straw, and therefore is understood to have an ailment of the lung or alternatively of the liver. Note also that the gemara supports the remedy with a claim from a mishnah. Also, remedies for the heart. And others that may smack more of the placebo effect.
A story with R. Sheshet - in his visit to the exilarch, where he has concerns about the uprightness of the servants, who were not careful with kashrut (in particular, eating a limb from a live animal). With sends them into a fairly graphic show-and-tell, whereby R. Sheshet makes his point, the exilarch accepts it, and the servants try to harm him in return. But he triumphs each time. Also, a deep investigation of the stories about King Solomon and his encounters with demons, 3 stories of which are here, including building the Temple and throwing King Solomon out of the kingdom.
How does R. Yehudah HaNasi side with R. Yosi against R. Meir and Hanina Ish Ono? Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi defends himself, and that leads into a characterization of each of the Tannaim. Plus, a new focus on R. Shimon, and his connection to R. Akiva. Also, in the end, a verbal direction for a shaliach to write a get does work, but should not be done (with explanation why not). Plus, the first mishnah of the new chapter - what happens if the man designating the writing of a get is not in his right mind, so to speak.
A series of mishnayot. 1. At first, when someone was to be taken out to be executed, they'd write a get on his behalf, even if he was abbreviated in his instructions. And that was extended to others. Plus, a story about Geneiva - another appearance in Gittin! Also, pre-death gifts in the context of gittin. 2. Concern about shedim, demons, who might trick one into giving a get. 3. A healthy person who designates a scribe to write a get, but doesn't say anything about delivering it - is that mocking the wife or an unfortunate circumstance? 4. Designating witnesses from among a group that include one who wouldn't be a kosher witness (eg, one's son) - how does that work?
Two mishnayot! But first, a quick note on the tearing of the get document. Plus, how minors can acquire property... with 3 stages of development. Also, a new mishnah, with several cases - including the important detail that a minor cannot designate a shaliach, and R. Elazar's point that a woman (then) could be divorced against her will. Also, another mishnah with implications regarding eating from terumah. Plus, the implications of a get going into effect at a place specified.
Two mishnayot: 1. A woman who appoints a shaliach to accept her get for her needs two sets of witnesses to ensure the divorce goes through. Likewise, when are the main parties in a transaction believed over a third (objective) party, and when the reverse? 2. The case of the na'arah hame'orsah - a minor girl who is betrothed and needs a get to be free of the betrothed. Her father needs to accept the get. Plus, a minor girl who can safeguard her get can get divorced.
When a woman tells a shaliach to go get her get, and he goes the husband, tells him, and the husband hands it over "as she said," but R. Nachman maintains that she's still not divorced. The Gemara then discusses why he says this, and also where his analysis may go wrong (and she would be divorced). Where the wording and process are essential. Also, may a woman appoint a shaliach to accept a get? It's a machloket. But don't we need to be stringent and be careful lest she not really be divorced, and this could become a case of adultery or even chalitzah, depending.
More on the interactions between Jews and non-Jews -- specifically in the context of shemitah. How much encouragement can a Jew give a non-Jew? Plus, how a Jew must avoid a double greeting Plus, a story with Geneivah, the sage who causes some consternation, including now, using a double-greeting. Also, a new chapter (6), with a new mishnah, and a return to divorce and messengers bringing bills of divorcement as designated, and receiving them on behalf of the wife. With very specific instructions to the messengers.
On the interactions between Jews and non-Jews. Also, a new mishnah, on lending utensils to this who are not careful about Shevi'it. Also, the case of a mother-in-law, a son-in-law, and demai (food that may not have been tithed). Note the lack of "cancel culture."
The people who lived in the Galil wanted to know if they could read from the Torah for public reading from a chumash (a scroll of only one of the 5 books of the Torah). Turns out, it wasn't an easy question. Plus, can a scroll of one parsha be written for the sake of teaching children? The answer depends on whether you think the Torah was given as a while or piecemeal. Plus, Queen Helene's sheet of gold with the parsha of Sotah on it, for the kohen. But what about writing down the Oral Torah? Also, a dispute between Rav and Shmuel - how to irrigate which field when? Plus, a story of Abaye's need for irrigation, and issues of the priority of water, and battles over water distribution.
The daf describes the continuity of leadership from Moshe Rabbenu to Rebbi to Rav Ashi. Two mishnahs and the Gemara introduces the idea of Darchei Shalom.
Wrapping up the dapim about the destruction of the Temple. First, on a beautiful (Jewish) child in prison in Rome, as visited by R. Yehoshua ben Hananya. [Who's Who: R. Yishmael Ben Elisha] Plus, another story of destruction, as siblings who were separated and enslaved were nearly forced to marry each other for the sake of their beauty. Also, a story to illustrate a verse from the prophet Mikhah, on how insidious corruption had become and can be. PS: We've overcome the app problem, thank God, at least until the next time 🙄
On Onkelos -- the famous translator, who converted to Judaism. The Gemara here presents his investigations prior to conversion, wherein he consults some dead and ostensibly wicked non-Jews: Titus, Balaam, Jesus. Titus advises him to fight the Jews, not join them. Also, concern about the small size of the Land of Israel, and the way it's going to expand as needed. Plus, other famous converts - Na'aman, Nevuzadran, Haman's descendants, Sisera's descendants, Sennacharib's descendants... Shmaya and Avtalyon, from the "Zugot." Also, reading Rome into the Genesis narrative, with Jacob and Esau standing in for Israel and Rome, and the evil wrought by the empire.
[NOTE: The audio cuts out here and there - as noted several times, the app is giving us (Anne especially) problems - but we've double- and triple-checked, and the content is there, despite the occasional blip]
Another very long daf with the stories about the destruction of the Second Temple. Encountering some of the personalities of that era... During the time described, there was a serious famine, which is important backdrop. Also, Rabbi Tzadok fasted for a very long time in his prayer for the salvation of Jerusalem. Which brings us to the story of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai, and how he fundamentally saved Judaism being destroyed along with the Temple. Note the conflict among the Jews - Zealots and the main faction - including, in opposition to Rome. And what happens to the Roman leadership at this time, especially after Titus' disgusting behavior in the Holy of Holies.
NOTE: Apologies for the late release. This time, massive machine error, in a complicated way. Hopefully now resolved... A new mishnah - a deaf-mute woman who was married off by her father when she was a minor... Can she get divorced? What happens with regard to terumah? Plus, a beam is stolen and used in the construction of a building... Which leads us to Takanat HaShavim - people can pay money rather than destroy the construction. Also, Takanat HaMizbeah. Plus, a sin-offering obtained by theft doesn't work... Also, the Sikrikon... a non-Jew who obtained Jewish lands... when does that kind of sale work? The order of operations may well make a difference. Plus, and perhaps most importantly, the story of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza, whose story is emblematic of baseless hatred. Plus, some extra discussion.
A long discussion comparing R. Meir and R. Yehudah, on damages, when committed inadvertently. Plus, what if a man paid another back with terumah? Where is the penalty for one who acts be-shogeg? How does the dispute play out? The penalty? Also, what happens when there's pigul at the hands of the kohen?
A new mishnah! One who renders another's produce impure or mixed in ways that it can't be used... Plus, unrecognizable damage - is it tested as damage for payment or not? Also, a talmudic treatment of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, over when one is penalized for a violation, for example, of unrecognizable damage, or even Shabbat. And the Gemara's resolution of that apparent contradiction.
Orphans who rely on a caretaker - with implications whether that caretaker is appointed him by the father, by the court, or no formal appointment, as yet. That person is responsible for making sure that their fields are tithed appropriately. Plus, the apotropos needs to swear that he hasn't taken anything he shouldn't have. Plus, the responsibility when it comes to mitzvot. [Who's Who: Rabbi Meir] Plus, a story of how R. Meir protected orphans from malfeasance by an apotropos. Also, how the property of orphans is like that if consecrated property. Plus his responsibility to represent them well, but to what extent does that mean he can use their funds, without it being misappropriation? Plus, is R. Nachman being too lenient or too stringent with regard to the orphans vs. the apotropos?
A case of a person who has 2 daughters and 1 son as heirs - the case has its own complications, but the crux of the matter is how much of a given was it that the daughters would inherit from the estate to provide for the daughters' dowries? Also, when one volunteers to return lost property, the finder doesn't have to swear that he's returning everything he found (or who would ever return anything). Why is swearing (or not) a matter of tikkun olam? Plus, how to handle a singular opinion.
How to handle different kinds of people who are owed money, one of which is a woman collecting her ketubah, in a case where heirs also want to connect their inheritance. Also, what happens when property has a lien on it and the debit still wants to pay someone else back or make a gift. Plus, death-bed legacies.
More on collecting compensatory damages from the best quality of land. Plus, the comparison to paying for damage done to consecrated objects, which sounds like an obvious case of "paying from the best," but it's not that simple, after all. Also, a focus on why paying the ketubah from ziborit, the worse quality of land, is tikkun olam, and actually a protection for the woman. Plus, how much commentary on the expectations of Talmudic society, and the question if what is innate and what is society prevailing upon people's norms.
One who purchases a field from his father, but then the Jubilee year complicated the issues of inheritance vs. purchase. Which leads to a dispute between Rabbi Meir and R. Yehudah with R. Shimon. Also, a new chapter: paying compensatory damages must be paid out of the best land, while loans and IOUs are paid from intermediate land, and the ketubah is paid from the worst quality of land -- established because of "tikkun olam" (but is that all the cases, or just the last one?).
If one sells oneself and one's children to non-Jews, the children can be redeemed after the father dies, which leads into a famous story about Resh Lakish and his origins as what is often translated as a gladiator, perhaps a brigand. And how he came to be a great chavruta/bar plugta (regular arguing partners) with R. Yochanan. Plus, the way Resh Lakish died basically destitute. Also, a new mishnah: when one sells his field in the land of Israel to a non-Jew, which invalidates the agricultural mitzvot, for example. Plus, a discussion of the sanctity of the land - what biblical verses attest to God's holy ownership of the land that lead to the obligation of those mitzvot.
3 mishnayot - on tikkun olam. 1. A man who divorces his wife because of a bad reputation, which turns out to be false - they still can't remarry. But what happens if the divorce is because of a vow? 2. A husband who divorces an aylonit - what happens when she remarries and has children with the second husband? 3. One who sells himself and his children into slavery to non-Jews, is not to be redeemed, though the Gemara softens this.
A slave ran away from his owner in the Diaspora and made his way to the land of Israel, where the owner pursued him to bring him back. Does that work, or does he need to free the slave? Plus, the story of Abaye who has lost his donkey and identifies it only by its white belly, which is accepted as an identifying mark only because of who he is, not because it's that specific, as so many donkeys have white bellies. Also, a new mishnah: captives and the value for which they are to be redeemed. And another mishnah: more cases of tikkun olam, for the betterment of the world. Plus, destroying the Torahs of non-Jews or those who seek to corrupt the Jews.
A slave owned by a Jew who is sold to a non-Jew, never mind the penalty in place from the mishnah (on yesterday's daf). The Gemara provides different reasons for why a slave might end up with a new non-Jewish owner - including a Jewish owner trying to pay off debt, or the Sicarii taking the slave as property... Plus, the question of tithing in the context of another taking the property - what happens to the slave who comes alongside? Also, when a slave is sold with the specifics in a document... and the details may not align with the immediate reality, specifically when that means a purchaser who lives outside of the land of Israel.
What happens when a half-slave gets betrothed to a fully free woman? Or vice versa? Plus, does a half-slave have heirs? Also, playing out the halakhah of a contradictory mishnah. Plus, a new mishnah - with a penalty to one who sells a slave to a non-Jew, and the factor of the Diaspora.
A person who is still half a slave and half freed, as done by the master... Can he aquire himself for himself? What about when a master gives his property to two slaves? Can they free each other? 2 beraitot establish a dispute on the issues. Also, what are the limitations on the case of the slave - specifically, of course, terumah.
2 mishnayot: 1. A slave whose owner uses him as a payment of debt to another person, but then is freed before he functions as that payment. What happens?? A tikkun olam decree to keep the peace - and ensure that the slave remains free. Plus, rereading the mishnah by the Gemara - in two ways (by Rav and Ulla). 2. A slave who is half-freed and half-slave... an in-between status that is not easily resolved. How should this person function? It's a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, and - unusually - Beit Shammai is upheld by Beit Hillel, for the sake of the good of this person.
When a slave-owner's conduct has impact on the slave's status. To what extent can a man free a female slave in order to marry her? Plus, the stories of R. Dimi, who traveled between Israel and Babylonia - to address the case where heirs are pushed to free the slaves if their benefactor. Also, a slave owned by 2 people, one of whom frees his half of the slave, but the other owner does not go along with freeing him. To the extent that he transfers his ownership to a minor - rather than free his half of the slave. And then that minor, presumably a younger child, is prevailed upon (via jangling coins) to give up the ownership. Plus, the formulations of the statement that one is freeing a slave - several versions are all acceptable. Also, what happens when a master and a slave dispute whether the master indeed freed the slave? And how valuable an admission in court counts - like 100 witnesses.
When one renounces ownership of a slave, the slave goes free, but still needs a get shichrur, bill of manumission - and then he can marry a Jewish woman. Plus, what happens when a death leaves slaves without clear owners. Also, why there is a "get" for divorce and also a "get" to free a slave.
An uncomfortable daf, given our modern sensibilities regarding slavery. Note that the Amoraim themselves owned slaves; it wasn't just a biblical practice. Note also, these are "avadim Canaanim," non-Jews who come to live among Jews, and are required to keep some Jewish practices (or perhaps shouldn't be kept as a slave). Some stories, and the halakhic positions that emerge from them. Plus, what if freeing one's slaves violates a Torah commandment? How do we understand the freeing of a slave to make a minyan?
The daf continues to discuss Prozbul and how it relates to a plant in a pot. Then we have a new Mishnah which continues with the topic of loans and Shmeitah.
A disagreement between Shmuel and Rav widow’s taking an oath or a vow to collect her Ketubah followed by a series of stories illustrating this Halacha. The daf ends with a clarification of the Mishnah.
The daf shares a series of stories when the rabbis needed to help make sure a Get was given and received. Amud has 2 mishnayot. The first Mishnah discussed the importance of names in the Get. The second Mishnah takes us back to Nedarim and Ketubot
The daf describes why Rabban Gamliel need to make a takana for Tikkun Olam. What does Tikkun Olam mean in the world of the Talmud.
Once the Get is with a Shaliach can the Get be voided by the husband and how must the husband express that wish to void the Get? The daf also discusses if that same Get can be used again once the husband voided the Get.
What information can we trust as not changing? For example, that the husband stays alive, after he's sent a get. So too one who separates tithes. Plus, there's a time frame on that kind of given - often only the first 24 hours. Note the brevity of the mishnah. Also, a discussion of the east wind. And winds coming from other directions, and how strong they can be, as well as how much impact they can have. Plus, Geneivah, who on the one hand seems to have learned a lot of Torah, but he's known to not be a nice person. And further discussion about the Amoraim, as they sit and chat... Plus, 3 things that disintegrate in the wake of the strong wind.
A new mishnah! On the concept of "chazakah" - including trusting that people are still alive. But what if the person dies? There are questions of inheritance... including questions of borrowing and lending in the context of the kehunah. Also, getting permission from a debtors heirs to continue the terms of a loan. Plus kindness to the orphaned heirs to help them pay back the debt.
2 mishnayot: first, a shaliach who gets sick. What's he supposed to do to make sure the get reaches the wife? He can appoint another shaliach in his place - depending on the husband's designation of him as a shaliach. Also, establishing the power of the shaliach.
When a shaliach brings a get from the husband to the wife, the assumption is that status quo ante - the husband is presumed to remain alive, and other similar conditions (eg, one's right to eat terumah). Plus, a key dispute that reflects personal approach, within the debate. Plus, why only men did semicha (laying on if hands) for the sin-offering, and women did not. [Who's Who: R. Yehudah ben Prata] Also, different cases, including a besieged town and a ship at sea... when does one presume the person there is alive or did, or get the stringencies of both cases?
What happens if the shaliach for a get loses the get? It depends how much time passes before he finds it, assuming he does. Could the get have been replaced in the interim, for example? What happens if the players in the get have the same names as others who are getting divorced. Also, Rabbi Zeira finds a contradiction to our mishnah in a baraita. Which turns out to be a bit lesser as compared to a mishnah contradicting a mishnah... But the baraita is the clearer contradiction this time. Which helps clarify the halakhah here, including how long a get can be lost without it becoming problematic.
A new mishnah! And a template for a divorce, as well as other transactions, and the question of what blanks would need to filled with the right names and the date and so on. But templates don't really work for gittin. Plus, how the get is actually written. Also, what does it mean that the sages decreed... They wanted to prevent quarreling. They wanted to prevent conflicts over the same name. Or putting the divorcing couple on the spot. Plus, "agunah" (in contrast to modern examples). How iron-tight can the decree go?
When a man wants to divorce a wife, and he has at least two, and he doesn't want to specify which one, and devises a plan for, let's say, whichever one comes to greet him first - the Gemara says, no. The get needs to be written in her name - they can't discover after the fact which wife was, lo and behold, the divorced one. But there many other circumstances where retroactive clarification does work.
What happens when the woman is her own shaliach for her get? She needs to show up to a stipulated court, and when does the divorce kick in? Also, what if the get is written in the name of the woman, but someone else has the same name - can it be used for the person with the same name? Plus, every time a get is invalidated, she still can't marry a kohen.
Three mishnayot: Who can write a get? Basically, everyone, even the unexpected categories of people - including a woman writing her own get. The implication of that is that the writing matters less than the signing of the document. Note, of course, that the get must be written for her sake. Also, everyone can deliver a get, except for 5 categories of people including one who is blind and one who is a non-Jew. But what if one of these ineligible people changes status? There are circumstances that would permit the delivery of the get. Plus, why a blind person couldn't deliver a get - even though he should recognize the relevant parties' voices. Also, a third mishnah on the trustworthiness of women - and the delivery of divorces from overseas.
A discussion about ma'aser in the context of perforated pots - where the perforation is in the land of Israel, but the pot is outside the land. What gives plants their primary nourishment - ground or air? We might have resolved the science of this by today, but they were figuring it all out, still. It becomes a real puzzle when to tithe, but the focus is definitely on the land of Israel. Also, the injunction against writing a divorce on a substance that invites forgery. Which brings us to 3 different stages of tanning animal hides, and each is measured to line up with carrying on Shabbat, and its measures.
A note on the viability of a courtyard "accepting" a bill of divorce on behalf of the woman being divorced. Also, the opinion against writing a get on living things, and the biblical support for this approach. Plus, the counter-use of the same verses for the opposite view. Also, a new mishnah on the get itself - can't be attached to the ground - and when it can be detached from the ground itself. Plus, all the details that go into it.
Chiseling or embossing the letters of a get - with the example of the kohen gadol's front piece. Can a get be written on gold, and let that count also as the ketubah? Also, figuring out Rava's position, his argument on himself, and the way a woman might give up the value of her ketubah for a get (not written on gold). Also, what about writing a get on a Canaanite slave's hand - now what?
A get can be written with any substance that lasts - and the mishnah provides a list of them. A get can be written on any substance too - with a dispute over whether that includes living creatures and (lehavdil) slaves. Plus, R. Yehudah, who took great pains to read and sign his own documents, even when he could have managed otherwise. Also, when confusion creeps in to the delivery of a get - depending on the shaliach, on a throwing by the husband, etc. Plus, a whole lot of unusual cases.
When does the counting period begin for a woman fromJ the time of her divorce until she can remarry... What about travel time? ie when the get is given or when it's written? Plus, a discussion of partial payment... of the ketubah. Also, when does the get need to be signed? Right when it was written? Or in the next day? 10 days later? Plus, what about group signing?
When two shlichim are used for a get. Plus metaphorical treatment of Persia, Rome, and Babylonia, and comparison of them insofar as who was good for the Jews. Also, a new mishnah and the requirement that a date must be included on documents, at writing and signing, which means the timing matters on a Jewish calendar in terms of the date switch at sundown. Also, Abaye and R. Yosef on issues of dates of the bills of divorce - even of the get isn't good, for some of these issues, a future child is not a mamzer. And the application of "lechathilah" and "bedieved" makes a real difference. Plus, the case of a husband who cuts the date out of the divorce - but we're not worried about this kind of trickery.
More on needing two combining elements - in divorce, writing and signing - but other combinations in other arenas of halakhah. For example, two people dunking in a mikveh of exactly 40 se'ah. Also, the case of 2 people bringing the divorce from overseas - with more factors to potentially invalidate the divorce. Plus, when the rabbis jump in to protect all documents.
One who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, as a shaliach - various ways the get will end up invalid. With the attendant disputes and resolutions, including protecting other documents from a leniency that applies only in the case of divorce. Also, borrowing from other halakhic areas: how arenas combine or divide with legal partitions, as per eruvin. To what extent can the different arenas allow various parts of a scenario to combine.
The case of appointing a shaliach to deliver the funds to pay back a debt - with a dispute by Rav and Shmuel whether the person can call back the shaliach. Plus, the logical inference of "migo," or "since." Also, the story of R. Sheshet, his consignment cloaks, and R. Yosef bar Chama as the collector of funds. Also, the difference between "taking" and "acquiring." Plus, what happens if something happens to the sender or recipient along the way? A good deal of discretion in these matters was left to the shaliach.
A man appoints another man to be his shaliach to deliver either a divorce or a document that frees a slave... And then the man dies before the shaliach gets to the recipient(s), and there's no need to give the document - in contrast to one who owes money and is using a shaliach to deliver. Even after the man dies, the funds need to reach their designated recipient. So the Gemara attempts to apply the case to flesh out the details in a way that makes sense. Also, the case of the creditor, the debtor, and the creditor's creditor. And how timing can have impact on the transfer to pay back the loan. Can the debtor negotiate new terms? Why does this system work? Because it's already part of halakhah.
A slave who has unintentionally killed someone and been exiled to a city of refuge, how will he provide food for himself? How are his earnings to pay for himself or for his master? Plus, what happens if it's a man's wife who is exiled to the city of refuge? Who and how is she provided for? Can she even go out to work? Shouldn't she be staying at home? (No) Also, what stipulations can be made between a master and his slave? Plus, issues of compensation - medical expenses? Lost earnings? What finds go to a slave, and what to the master?
More on non-Jewish involvement in divorces and other documents. Rava introduces an example specifically with Persian non-Jews, but did Jewish witnesses know the Persian to be sure they're accurate? Indeed. How to ensure that the documents can't be forged? Also, at what point can one who's giving a get retract the document? For divorce, it's possible to do, but not for freeing a slave - where the shaliach accepts the document on behalf of the slave, as it's to the slave's benefit. But divorce is not automatically to the woman's benefit, so the shaliach doesn't accept the document on her behalf when she's not present.
2 mishnayot: First, the question of witnesses of "Kutim" - which usually invalidates a document, with exceptions, of course. Plus, an emendation of the mishnah by the Gemara. Also, documents that are produced in non-Jewish courts are valid - with exception. Plus, "dina de-malkhuta dina" - the law of the land is the law. Plus, speech as speech acts.
The contracts a person makes on his death bed, signing over property to his slave, including freeing him. But then he recovers. So what happens to the slave? Also, a new mishnah: one who delivers a get from overseas, but without a declaration. If there are witnesses, that works. But what if one is deaf? (In the ancient category and all that entailed). Plus, exceptional cases.
Is Syria like the Land of Israel when it comes to freeing a slave? Yes and no. Also, a freed slave who has the document that frees him doesn't automatically grant him property, for example. With parallels to the woman and her bill of divorcement. Plus, a comment on the term "emancipation."
[Who's Who: Mar Ukva] Mar Ukva, the exilarch, asks whether he is allowed to turn over Jews to the non-Jewish (Babylonian) government - the reasons they are upsetting him are unclear, but he is clearly bothered by them. The response: even when you know you have enemies, keep yourself quiet. Plus, follow-up on the idea that God will ease the unpleasant situation, instead of people taking matters into their own hands to bring the other parties to the authorities. Also, a discussion of the crowns that were worn by the brides and bridegrooms, and how it became prohibited (citing Sotah!) - and whether it's a rabbinic or Torah prohibition (a suggestion by R. Hisda, in the absence of his teacher R. Huna). Plus, why the brides were able to continue to wear garlands.
The Gemara discusses how does one establish that a get was written lishmah. There is also a lengthy discussion about verifying gittin written in Bavel and what does this passage teach about the relationship between Eretz Yisroel and Bavel.
More on the declaration that the get was written and signed in the shaliach's presence - but what if there are two shlichim? What if the shaliach is the woman herself? What if the shaliach is the husband himself? Also, the concern for mamzerut that emerges from an ineffective delivery of a get - does the lack of a proclamation get in the way if the get?
On the dispute between Rava and Rabbah - why a shaliach needs to proclaim that the get was written and signed before him. Plus, the locations from where the proclamations had to be made, and the implications with regard to the land of Israel vs. outside of the land. Also, the implications of travel within the same country, and how that doesn't involve said declaration.
How many people must witness the shaliach's statement that he was present for the signing and giving of the get (2 vs 3)? And why. But isn't one witness enough, under these conditions? Wouldn't a woman also be sufficient under these conditions? Also, whose opinion is the basis for the mishnah's position? Plus, the Torah (d'Oraita) level and rabbinic level to the issues of gittin/divorce.
Introducing divorce. Including how the verses on divorce in the Torah provide the details of halakhic divorce, most saliently that a man gives a woman a divorce, and the reverse is not acceptable. Also, the first mishnah, and its description of how one can use an agent or emissary (shaliach) to convey a get (bill of divorce) and it will be an effective divorce. With geographical details that define the land of Israel, and certain requirements for witnesses.
Wrapping up Sotah! So much had changed in the wake of the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash... Plus, a new mishnah, at the very end - poignant in what was lost with various wars and deaths. And the Gemara shifts the focus to Babylonia.
High Priest Yochanan cancelled several practices from the Beit HaMikdash, beyond Sotah and Eglah Arufah: the "Awakeners" and the "Strikers." As well as several other things (Urim veTumim) that were lost in the wake of the destruction of the Temple. Which get explanation on this daf. Plus, a question on the panning of music on this daf. Also, the use of the Urim veTumim in the era of the prophets. Plus, the end of the era of prophecy. Plus, the measuring stick of a Bat Kol.
[Who's Who: Yehoshua Ben Perachiya] Plus, his story, including fleeing to Alexandria. Also, the story of the apostate who doesn't belong in teshuvah anymore, and may be Jesus. Also, what happens in the event that the killer of the person that was going to lead to the eglah arufah is determined? Before the heifer? After the heifer? Also, the cancellation of Eglah Arufah, Sotah...
A new mishnah! Going through the process of establishing the heifer whose neck is to be broken, in contrast to some of the details of the red heifer, through to the statement that is to be made by the elders, as a matter of innocence and atonement. Plus, a kal va-homer regarding the way the heifer might (or might not) become invalid. Also, what is the Eitan Valley? What is lost in this kind of murder? Plus, the idea of walking your guests out, just as escorting one out of the city has no measure. Plus, how the elders left the city to go die - in contrast to the body found that entails an eglah arufah. With a challenge to our co-learners to write up the contrasts if the city at the end of the daf
On the dispute between R. Elazar ben Yaakov and our mishnah, with regard to who goes out to confess over the eglah arufah - which leadership? And the verses that get him to his position. Also, when the dead body is found in a pile of stones, among other cases, there wouldn't be an eglah erufah. The halakhic rationale here is derived from the parallel to Shikhcha, the forgotten gleanings from the field. Plus, the pronouncement that Jerusalem does not do eglah erufah, even if it's the nearest city, but otherwise, they literally measure the body to the various potentially relevant cities - with a dispute whether the key focus is the body or the head of the body, and what part of the body is the point of measurement?
More on the exemptions from going into battle - the Gemara says the order of the exemptions themselves teach us of the proper order of how we should live. Also, the ways one may be fearful in going out to war, and how that's a good excuse, until a certain point if no return. Plus, defining when war is an elective and when it's obligatory. And the implications for other activities when involved in the mitzvah (or war or otherwise). Also, the eglah erufah takes center stage. Plus, a key dispute about which leadership goes out to take responsibility with the heifer and the site that the slain body is found.
The exceptions of the people who won't go out to war because they are built or planted or married, and so on. Plus, subcategories of these mainstay exemptions. Also, the examination of these basic exemptions by the Gemara.
Chapter 8! On the anointed kohen who is designated to lead the people before and into war, and what he says. Plus, the difference between the enemy that is external to the Jewish people, in contrast to conflicts between the various tribes. Also, how the people felt the Philistines in the battle with Goliath.
How many Torah readers can there be, and what concerns the sages about multiple readers. Plus, in the new mishnah: Hakhel, the 8th year of the shemitah cycle. How did it work? [Who's Who: Agrippas I] Also, the Gemara's reinterpretation of a line of the mishnah that really turns it on its head.
On two of the Temple practices - specifically, how the congregation would daven or meditate on verses while the kohanim were blessing the people. Plus, how "amen" was not said in the Beit HaMikdash, and what was said instead (and when). [Who's Who: Rabbi Abbahu] Also, the blessings by the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, plus the ceremony of him reading passages from the Torah as well.
More on Birkat Kohanim. Plus, how R. Elazar Ben Shamua achieved a truly ling life - in never using a synagogue as a shortcut, among other respectful aspects of his comportment. Also, what the people say in response to the kohanim when they are duchening (saying the priestly blessing in shul). The formal response brings the people to bless God who has blessed them.
On Birkat Kohanim - the priestly blessing - and how it was said in the Temple and outside of it. Including the responses by the people. Also, the case of eglah arufah - a found murdered body - and why it would happen. And the role of the kohanim there. Plus, coming back to permutations of Birkat kohanim, even in shul.
More on the discussion of Yosef and Yehudah, getting God's name inserted into their names. With some debate over what Nachshon ben Aminadav overcame to jump into the sea first. Were the tribes fighting to jump in, or to avoid the sea wholly? Plus, deriving information (not only halakhah) from the biblical text. Also, what exactly happened during the blessings and curses? With some mathematics and calculations to count up how many mitzvot are associated with each blessing and curse. Multiplied by the people, and then some.
Bringing a verse to life - a winged flying insect that helps (or does not help) the Israelites when they crossed into the land of Israel to conquer it. Also, what about the tribes on Mounts Gerizim and Eval, and how that parallels the kohen gadol's breastplate. Also, midrashim on Yosef... and Yehudah, how both of them were righteous and we're therefore treated to letters from God's name to be added to their names. Plus, how Yosef nearly sinned with the wife of Potiphar, but didn't.
More on the spies. Why people wanted to hear from Calev more than they were willing to hear from Joshua. Plus, trusting God when it comes to conquering the land with His assistance. The midrashim establish the sins of the spies, I spades. And then suggests otherwise. Also, a description of how the people and the ark crossed the Jordan River. Which leads to the story of Uzza.
The splitting of the Jordan River reminded the nations around of what they'd heard of the splitting of the Red Sea, and were still afraid, all these years later. Also, Moses' sending out of the spies, and how they were looking to shame the land from the outset. Also, a discussion of Calev, whose report on the land was dramatically different from nearly all the other spies, and he made a detour to Hevron. Plus, a focus on Yehoshua (Joshua) as well, and the difference between them.
On the fact that Tefilah can be said in any language - because it's a request for mercy. But can one really pray in... wait for it... Aramaic?! Plus, the way to pray as an individual... in Hebrew! Plus, a guest appearances by Caligula, and the message from a heavenly voice in Aramaic! Plus, the appearance of the Angel Gabriel, who clearly knew Aramaic, when others seemed not to. Also, determining where the Israelites were , with regard to the Land of Israel during those blessings and curses, as well as the Kutim (or Samaritans) whose interpretations were sometimes very far afield from rabbinic Judaism, and sometimes, dovetailed exactly.
Chapter 7! Passages that are read out that can be recited in any language, as compared to those that need the Hebrew. Plus, a long description of the blessings and curses on Mount Gerizim and Eival. Plus, the difference between a mitzvah that has an utterance as compared to one that has both speaking and saying. What is to be said loud? And what quietly? Including the Amidah. Including one who is suffering - so people can pray on that person's behalf.
A daf that opens with aggadata: Job's worship of God from love, as explicated in the text. Plus, Abraham's worship of love of God. As compared to the one who serves God out of fear. Also, the 6th chapter, with its single mishnah. On witnesses and the question of a woman who has secluded herself, and who is considered a reliable witness - to establish her as a sotah or prevent her from becoming a sotah, for that matter.
A debate on whether one is allowed to cause non-hekdesh food to become impure. Plus, a quick mention on the debate regarding the status of the Shabbat boundary. Also, intensive interpretation of the Song at the Sea.
On the interpretation of the verses that address the women we cannot marry kohanim - or is it those who can't eat terumah? Delving into the fine points of the text for the sake of the interpretations. Plus, R. Yochanan ben Zakkai's handling of halakhah when he didn't have the proof he thought he needed and would one day (theoretically) get. Including a comparison (attempted) to a tivul yom.
A deep dive into R. Yehudah HaNasi's position that the water check the paramour just as it checks the woman. Also, a long beraita on the way of being rendered impure, in the event if infidelity - the logic of how the sotah-woman is treated accordingly. Which raises questions on R. Akiva and on R. Yishmael.
Finishing one chapter and starting the next. Wrapping up some possible cases - for the relationships where the husband isn't present or available to continue with sotah proceedings, but his warning to her negates her claim on her ketubah even though she doesn't drink the bitter waters. Also, a mishnah that lists many of the halakhot that were taught in the Beit Midrash when R. Elazar ben Azariah took over the leadership, when Rabban Gamliel was deposed. The laws are far-ranging, though beginning with Sotah, and reporting the prowess of R. Akiva, in solving some issues that R. Yochanan ben Zakkai (who was no longer alive) predicted would be resolved by subsequent generations.
More on women who would (or would not) drink the bitter waters. Plus, the forbidden relationships - for which the husband's warning is valid, and she can become a sotah - despite all the rationales that might suggest otherwise. Also, the kohen's wife who does need to drink the waters, and in the event of her acquittal, goes home to her husband, even if she had some kind of negative reaction to the waters (that still is not a guilty verdict).
Two dilemmas relate back to the very long mishnah: 1. If a woman violates some aspect of modesty standards or practices, does she get a warning before she loses her entitlement to her ketubah? 2. What about the prohibited marriages - do they get warned, once we know they're not going to drink and also won't get their ketubot? The Gemara suggests several explanations for these dilemmas, still coming off the mishnah. Also, the nature and effect of the warnings - how it protects the women, and when they can be retracted (and when not - how subjective are they allowed to be?).
Another long series of mishnayot now discussing situations where a woman does not drink the Mei Sotah. The Gemara further discusses some of the biblical sources for the Mishna’s rulings.
A series of mishnahyots presented as one long Mishnah begins with different laws around menachot which leads into a mishnah discussing some halachic differences between men and women. Why does this mishnah appear in Masechet Sotah?
The Gemara addresses the categories of those who erode the world - we focus first in the "perushot," abstemious women. Specifically, a chaste girl who prays all the time, aiming to protect those who might come to sin because of her. Which is fully impressive, except for one who is masking destructive behavior (as in the case of Yochani bat Retivi). Note the real implications of ancient hypocrisy on our modern era as well. Also, the meaning of a child who is not carried to term, and what that case may represent in more abstract problematic terms, not the least of which is being able to pasken halakhah and refrains from doing so.
What merit could stave off the death of a guilty sotah? Perhaps the merit of Torah study (but how much merit does that really get her?!). So presumably the merit of doing a mitzvah - but do mitzvot really protect those who do them? Plus, the role of King David's advisors. Also, the commentary on the positions of Ben Azzai and R. Eliezer in the mishnah. Also, how to expand on the vulnerability of Torah study. Plus, a classic example of a "chasid shoteh" - a pious fool, and where he goes wrong.
A new mishnah: The woman can walk back her plan to drink from the bitter waters until the very last minute, when the Name of God has already been erased, after which point, she'd be forced to drink. And then, if she's guilty, she basically explodes inside out, and she is removed from the Temple. But if she has merits, then her death will be delayed. Which leads to the oh-so-important dispute over whether a man must teach his daughter Torah to help ensure that she have such merit - or perhaps he should not, lest it teach her licentiousness. Plus, a list of wrongheaded folks who "erode the world." Also, the nature of the scroll of the sotah's trial. Plus, comparison to other scrolls, like the Torah itself, as well as another sotah's scroll. Likewise, the question of parallelling the sotah's scroll to bills of divorcement.
A new chapter! The new mishnah delineates the process of the kohen taking the meal-offering from the sotah, and waving the basket it's in together with her. But does this happen before or after she drinks the bitter waters? It's a machloket. Also, another machloket on this process in the Gemara on this mishnah.
Different scenarios of the sotah case - especially where things go wrong in brining her to drink, etc. Which all are held in abeyance, as far as their solutions go. Also, a new mishnah on the sotah's affirmation: Amen, amen. Plus, the role of a husband in putting conditions and warnings on his wife, which is only acceptable during the time they're actually married. Also, the possible cases of adultery.
A daf with 2 mishnayot. First, on the kohen's writing the scroll that will be dipped in the water and erased - what is the portion of text from the Torah that will be written there? It is, of course, a machloket. Also, what can (and cannot) this text be written on?
More on the sotah's water - and how earth (and ashes) need to be added to it. Plus, the mesorah/tradition on the writing of this document, as well as that of divorce, and more. Which gives us tradition overriding logic, as we also say in Nazir. Also, the order of the dust in the water (or is that water over dust?), and the parallel to the purification process with the parah adumah, the red heifer.
The ingredients of the meal-offering "always" include oil and frankincense - except for when they are excluded (sin-offerings, in particular, plus the sotah's offering). Also, the process of the water, the Name of God, and the process by which it would be erased. Plus, various purification processes, and some that are never allowed to be used again.
On Moshe's burial - and how the Romans didn't find the place either. Also, interpretations of how people can come close to God, including mirroring His attributes. Which leads back to the burial of Moshe. Also, a new chapter with a new mishnah: The sotah's meal-offering, carried by her husband in an Egyptian wicker basket, to tire her out, and get her to the point that she'll confess, rather than drink the bitter waters. Plus, the sages' assessment of her meal-offering as suitable for her alleged offense, as well as the attempt to protect her.
On retrieving Yosef's bones to rebury him in the land of Israel, as promised at the end of the Book of Genesis, and the role of Serach bat Asher. Also, on the burial of Moshe - whose burial was so different from that of Yosef, and not only because he can't go into the land of Israel, even after death. Including several interpretations why Moshe couldn't complain to the Israelites, regarding the land and his lack of entry. "Based on the camel is the person's stature."
More exegesis of the Torah's verses on the opening on the story of the Exodus - beginning with Yocheved's pregnancy with Moshe (some of which presupposes knowledge of other midrashim). Tracking her pregnancy, and then the birth of Moshe. Also, the calendar of these events, including the date of Moshe's birth (Nisan? Sivan?)
Verses that are explicated on this daf are also found in the Haggadah - timely, this round of daf yomi, as we learn this daf on Passover. On the righteous women in whose merit the Israelites were redeemed from Egypt - with a focus on the women who promoted their own intimate relationships with their husbands, and also ensure ongoing fertility. Plus, the midrashim on the midwives of the Torah, and how Pharaoh schooled them in killing thr boy babies - which they did not do.
5 people who each had a trait that was to their credit, but they ended up brought down because of that same trait. Not surprisingly, beginning with Samson. Plus, a king's gout. Also, a deep dive into the story of Yehuda and Tamar.
The sages teach that the sotah-woman gets her just deserts, in alignment with her own actions. She doesn't get what she wanted, and what she had is taken from him. Likewise, other creatures in Tanakh have the same comeuppance - beginning with serpent of the Garden of Eden and carrying through several personalities, especially in King David's orbit. Plus, following the actions of the sotah-woman with her punishment. Also, other cases of measure-for-measure, including as punishment, but also as reward. Including tending to Yosef's bones, among several other cases.
The kohen takes hold of the clothing of the sotah-woman, and uncovers (or dishevels) her head. There was concern that a particularly attractive woman would be overly on display for such a process - with comparison to another case where the sides of the dispute about this seem to reversed. Plus, a woman who wore white garments would be re-clothed in black, and if she looked good in black, she'd then be re-clothed in ugly garments. Plus, jewelry would be removed. Also, a new mishnah: according to a person's actions, so is the person's punishment - measure for measure, as it were. Just as she prepared herself for sin, so is she punished accordingly, with the same vocabulary to mimic her actions. Plus, the 4 kinds of deaths by the court, when capital punishment was warranted - and the replacement deaths in the absence of the Temple and Sanhedrin.
The daf has a Mishnah describing how how the Sotah is brought to Jerusalem and how the public participated. The daf also explains what biblical stories were taught to the Sotah so that she may learn that a confession is admirable.
A new mishnah! At what point is a woman who's a sotah not permitted to eat terumah? Plus, a list of the women who are not allowed to eat terumah. Also, R. Sheshet's position on the case of a woman who was thought to be a sotah, but then two witnesses to her infidelity answer the question of her status, and the water she drinks isn't determining her innocence, because the witnesses confirm it independently. Also, how does the timing of the meal-offering of the sotah have impact on her status, especially if witnesses come forward to make her status as an adulteress certain, and leaving her with no need to test (and the meal-offering superfluous). Plus, the question of whether she committed adultery while in the Temple, to a more or less brazen extent.
Learning from the Divine, and God's choice of the lowly bush and the lowly mountain - against arrogance, and in favor of humility. But maybe some "arrogance," or comparable trait is necessary, at least for Torah scholars. Also, a halakhic discussion regarding the point at which the warning the husband gives his wife kicks in to have impact in their marital life.
How long is the seclusion that counts as suspect, for the husband to bring his complaint against his wife? The ways the Gemara measures time are far from the question of intimacy, though that underlies the discussion. Plus, the handling of a dispute between R. Akiva and Ben Azzai, or so it seems. [Who's Who: Ben Azzai] Also, a focus on Netilat Yadayim, and why the little things matter.
On the warning the husband gives his wife - and the multiple levels of anger in the process. Including the private/public dynamic of this accusation and sotah altogether. Plus, the focus on relationships. Also, the insidious destructive power of bringing licentiousness behavior home, or anger for that matter. With a recognition that there are different expectations for men and for women. Plus, Joseph and Mrs. Potiphar, and the exhortation for moral, ethical behavior.
Introducing the sotah-woman, a unique Torah status that isn't in play in the absence of the Temple. From the verses to the rabbinic focus on witnesses to what appears to be unfaithful behavior on the wife's part as accused by the husband. Plus, the connection between a Nazir and a sotah, and the order of the tractates. Also, the way the husband gets the process underway. Plus the debate over whether a person gets the spouse he (or presumably she) deserves, based on personal conduct, or whether the match is made before the couple is even born, with destiny (or Divine Providence) trumping any actions on the part of the people.
The Gemara goes on in its discussion about seminal emissions and various stages or levels of impurity. Including the "zav" status of a convert. A final mishnah: on Shmuel the prophet - was he a nazir or not?? (Does "morah" in the text mean razor, as it does in the context of Nazir, or "fear," which would make the man fearless, in a powerful re-read of the text). Also, the case of sages bentsching (saying Grace after Meals), and the discussion turns to the one who blesses vs. the one who answers "Amen," in terms of which is preferable. Plus, closing with the repeated passage of the Torah scholars who increase peace in the world. Note the mnemonic of "bonayich."
A new mishnah: One who finds a dead body that is lying in the manner of Jewish burial, and takes it from there, together with some of the dirt... Likewise, if he finds two bodies. But if he finds 3, what he's got there is a cemetery. Which in turn gives "legs to the matter," a halakhic concept regarding likelihood that we've seen before. Also, another mishnah: Regarding the likelihood that someone would be impure from tzara'at, which can result in a presumption of impurity (or purity, when possible!).
The status of floating impurity... the puzzles of the circumstances when it would extend impurity and when it would not. Plus, the implications for purification, as needed. Also, a nazir and a person busy preparing a Korban Pesach walk together by a "an impurity of the deep" (tehom)? Now what? Well, it depends on the point of their process of purification to begin with. Which leads to what might be the most polite, civilized (interactive) dispute we've seen in the Gemara.
A Nazir who has reached the point of shaving, and then encounters impurity - depending on the kind of impurity, he might need to cancel the nezirut days. But if it was utterly unknown (tehom), he doesn't redo the nezirut. Plus, the case of a person who goes to dunk in the water of a cave, and while there, encounters a dead body - he may or may not encounter impurity. Potentially depending on what the status had been prior to the encounter. Also, the case of the person who can't pass a dead body in the street, because it's literally blocking his way. Which opens up all kinds of issues with regard to whether the person walking can remain pure or not.
Developing the principle that "erkhin," valuation of people, doesn't apply to non-Jews, including the exegesis from the verses on valuation. Also, 2 mishnayot on amud bet: regarding the stringency of the slave, in contrast to the woman's nezirut. Plus, more on the slave's vows, and how they are intertwined with the requirements of the master.
The nazir's hair removal by a razor, specifically.... plus the metzora's shaving: 4 shavings from impurity. Also, the new (and final) chapter, 9: The laws of nazir do not apply to non-Jews, but women and slaves can indeed become nezirim. And the woman's nezirut is more stringent than that of a slave. Plus, the Gemara explains the exclusion of non-Jews from nezirut.
A new mishnah - with a nazir who may have come in contact with a dead body, and who also may have been a Metzora. What is his purification process going to be? How many days must he wait to purify from each of these possible impurities? Also, how the shaving and sacrifices will have impact on the person with these 4 competing possibilities of nezirut.
Continuing the question of a man shaving the body parts that were usually shaved only by women, in violation of the verse that prohibits men and women from wearing the garments of women and men, respectively. The discussion shifts to focus on the garments of one sex prohibited to worn by the other, and the abomination of that practice. Plus, the question of girls and women wearing pants (trousers), and how the bar inherently moves in society. Also, what happens if the person who vows to be a nazir can't do it? Depending on the vow and the timing maybe ask for a volunteer....
A discussion of tzitzit! In the context of shaving, and the mechanisms by which these positive and biblical commandments work. Plus, sha'atnez. And tekhelet. Also, a person can remove hair from his body with a razor - except for the so-called corners of the face. But then why is there mention of the person who does this getting lashes? How can that be?!
Opening with questions about the nazir's status - pure or impure? Namely, a third party observed one of two nezirim come in contact with impurity, but he's not sure which. They both have to take action (including sacrifices) accordingly. Also, addressing the general practice of doubtful impurity - which is derived from the case of the sotah woman, as per the private domain.
More on the counting of the nazir and R. Hisda's ruling. Plus, the impurity from a dead body - that would require shaving for a nazir - would be a violation if one entered the Temple. The transmission of the teachings of some details here is ascribed to specific heritage - a direct line of passage down from one to the next, without always mentioning all the people along the way. Also, the question of the source for the ritual impurity issues - is it a point of heritage, a transmitted halakhah? Or is it something that can be concluded logically?
If you leave the Land of Israel in a box, will you become impure? It's a machloket. Also, how to continue counting the days of nezirut after purification.
A new mishnah with the impurities that do NOT make a nazir need to shave - despite his contact with the impurity, it doesn't negate his nezirut. Also, focusing on the ritual impurity of all the lands outside of the Land of Israel: is the issue the land itself, or the air of those lands?
Insight into how the rules regarding purity and impurity changed over those early generations. Also, a dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish regarding the impurity of a limb that is separated from a body (whether live or dead), that doesn't have a measure of flesh on it.
Creepy-crawlies and the impurity of them leads to the question of what happens if you eat portion of the creepy-crawly, and not its entirety? (in terms of impurity, not kashrut). Plus, the apparent "souls" of the creatures. Also, R. Akiva is at odds with the sages (though he comes around eventually) for 6 ways if being impure (or not, if you're the sages). Plus, a story of a box of bones which didn't have enough of the key bones from one person to render another impure. [Who's Who: Todros the doctor] Plus, the importance of the spine and the skull.
More with the gore. When does the dust from a decaying corpse impart impurity? Also, what about substances within a woman's body that are not of her body, and are also impure - will those substances combine for impurity or not? NOTE: Potentially disturbing - discusses a woman who has died and her unborn child too.
A gory section on "netzel," a measure of which would render the nazir (or others) impure. Basically decomposing elements of a dead body - which was essential information, lest one become impure via contact with the small measure. Plus, the relevance of an animal's willingness to eat that which is impure (which people clearly would not eat) - or which is no longer impure. Also, the question of how liquids or liquidy solids (honey, batter) combine to render a vessel impure, and how that has implications for melting fat from a dead body.
A focus on amud bet: When the nazir shaves on having become impure via 3 different ways of a dead body rendering one impure. And then the text lists many various parts from the dead body. And then the nazir needs to redo the count of pure days of nezirut. [Who's Who: Rabbi Meir] When critics were bothering R. Akiva - delving into a precise wording of the mishnah - from among the students. When R. Meir dies, R. Yosi is quiet. But he needs to address the topic of the measure of flesh that can cause impurity - from the dead body. Plus, the rivalry among the Tannai - to make sure the right version of the mishnah was disseminated.
One long discussion on the daf... First, on the nazir who's not supposed to become impure, but when would he? Plus, what is the mechanism to derive these halakhot (textual parallel vs. logical inference)? A discussion that continues through the daf. As does the parallel to kohanim, and the kohen gadol, specifically. Plus, the case of the sister.
The last mishnah of chapter 6: what if the nazir becomes impure in the process of bringing the post-nezirut offerings? Plus, the story of a nezirah who exactly had this concern. (It's a machloket). Also, chapter 7 and a new mishnah, focusing on different levels of impurity. Plus, the anointing oil.
A mishnah on the process of the sacrifices; A nazir who cooks the shelamim sacrifice, or overcooks it, and the kohen takes it with the unleavened bread, and the nazir waves them around, after the kohen puts it on his palms, having already shaved his head. And then the Gemara brings in additional machloket to understand the importance of each stage - would not waving cancel the nezirut? The korbanot? But what about how shaving doesn't cancel? Or what about a bald nazir? Plus, another mishnah on the procedure of bringing the sin-offering plus shaving, and what happens if things were done out of order, for example.
2 mishnayot - 1. On the sacrifices that the nazir must being as part of the process closing off the nezirut. Plus, why a female nezirah doesn't shave post-nezirut in a public setting, and why she is in a different class from a sotah-woman. Also, 2 - Once he cuts his hair, he puts the hair on the fire, if he's in Jerusalem, and the korbanot are on the fire. And then gravy or sauce from the korban would be added to the hair.
The first Mishnah on the daf compares the three Nazir prohibitions and how each one has its own stringency. The second Mishnah describes how a tamei Nazir undergoes the process of purification.
What verse teaches the limitations on the kohanim about coming into contact with a dead body? The kohanim not only are not supposed to come in contact with impurity, and then they do, they also engage in a measure of profaning their extra holy status (it's not a bad thing, just a thing). Plus, a dispute based on the nuance between two verses, as per the differences between a kohen and nazir as well. Also, if a man's head was cut off, a kohen cannot become impure for that person, even when related, because the body needs to be intact for a kohen to be allowed to be impure for him. With exceptions, especially a "met mitzvah."
Tongue in cheek: what really counts as shaving? How much hair can be left, with what tool, etc. Plus, 3 mishnayot: intent for hair removal is salient, dirt would cause hair to fall out, likewise shampooing. And lastly, a nazir who violates his restrictions is only given multiple sets of lashes if he makes it clear that he hasn't forgotten the prohibition, and is going to violate it anyway.
After exploring the opinion of the Rabbis on daf 40 the Gemara explores the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and how he learns that a metzora must use a razor to shave. Then the Gemara goes back to the Rabbis.
A detour to a mishnah in the Tractate Negaim, which connects the nazir, the metzora (one with tzara'at), and Levites - who are all required to shave their heads, and completely, and specifically with a razor. But how do we know it must be a razor? Also, more about a razor and other implements to remove a beard.
A new mishnah - shaving a nazir's head cancels the count of the 30 days of nezirut. Removing hair in any way means lashes, but the question is how does hair grow? With implications for which growth was cut off, if another cuts it off him (and how many days are left to his nezirut). Plus, the proofs from both halakhah and reality, as well as the rationale for R. Eliezer's opinion.
The measure of a "revi'it" never includes a combination of permitted and prohibited foods, except for the case of nazir, which has an explicit comment in the Torah to allow for the combination to make the greater prohibited quantify. Plus, the 10 cases of a revi'it, 5 of which are red, 5 of which are white. Also, the lashes that a nazir can accrue.
Rabbi Akiva teaches that the prohibited food combines with the permitted one to make the whole thing prohibited - specifically for the nazir, and he derives it from the laws of meat and milk. Plus, the role of "chidush," how innovation applies here. One question is how the meat and milk combine - how is that flavor transferred? Cooking bring of paramount importance. Plus, the kashering process. And plus, halakhic principles for Kashrut, including "ta'am ke-ikar."
When permissable foods combine with grape products that are off-limits to a nazir - how do the combine (or not) to be the amount that is prohibited? The permitted food combines with the prohibited (it doesn't have to be a full measure of the prohibited food). Plus, what are the implications for an offering on the altar? But the sages aren't all in agreement as to how this works. Abaye, in particular, poses many questions from areas of halakhah that are farther afield. Including the position of the individual's stipulation: "she'ani omer."
Details of what of grapes are prohibited to a nazir, including the minimum amount that would make the nazir obligated for violating his prohibition. Plus, a dive into the logical inference of the general to the specific, and how it applies in this case. Also, the example of general/specific from using ma'aser sheni money in Jerusalem.
The Koi. A halakhic conundrum - is this animal a behamah (domesticated) or chayah (wild)? Plus, the context of people taking vows based on the halakhic status of the koi. Are they nezirim or not? Also, opening chapter 6: beginning with what is actually prohibited to the nazir, including all of the different component parts of the grape.
First, a mishnah - a brainteaser of 6 people who take conditional vows of nezirut, depending on determinable unknowns. The question of whether those vows kick in depending on the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Plus, some talmudic revision of the phrasing of the mishnah. Also, the absence of talmudic text on Amud Bet. Plus, a brief review of the Baalei HaTosafot.
One who vows to be a nazir, then regrets it, and wants out - but the sage he asks to dissolve the vow tells him he must continue. Plus, how this regret lines up with consecration that was done in error. Also, what about animals that are stolen and/or blemished, and how that changes things (or doesn't) for a nazir's vow. Plus, the early practicing Jews and how they apparently didn't know about the destruction of the Temple! (And therefore people got stuck in the middle of their periods of nezirut).
What happens if you consecrate something in error? Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai dispute the outcome - not consecrated and consecrated, respectively. Also, delving into the side of Beit Shammai, and the rationale of priority when it comes to consecration, whether that which is more valuable or that which is indeed first.
Finishing chapter 4... with a new mishnah. A man can use his father nezirut funds for the final korbanot but a daughter cannot. But in general, a son cannot use his father's funds for his own offerings - this is an exception. Also, a series of questions at the end of the Gemara in that mishnah, with particulars about cases of nezirut, for which the Gemara does not have answers.
The Gemara presents a series of potential practical differences between the approaches of R. Yochanan (an inherited tradition - halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai) and Resh Lakish (a matter of education). Also, the value of taking the vow of nezirut (for a change), including R. Hanina's vow.
A new mishnah: Can a husband still revoke his wife's vow of nezirut at the time that she's bringing the final sacrifices at the conclusion of her nezirut? In contrast to earlier discussions, it seems that he cannot do so, this late in the game. The Gemara then probes the opinions of R. Akiva and R. Eliezer. Plus, a discussion of wigs, potentially being distasteful to a husband, in contrast to the comparable products today. Also, another mishnah: a father can make a vow to establish nezirut for his minor son. Which the son can then negate, with all the expected ramifications for the funds or animals that were set aside for his sacrifices, in the event that they were.
R. Nachman's position on a designated animal that ends up being blemished - already consecrated for the nazir's offerings. Is it to be treated like an unallocated animal or an allocated one? R. Hamnuna questions whether the blemished animal could be treated like unspecified funds. Plus, Rava's objection to R. Nachman - via a son and father needing to bring their own respective sin-offerings, as per a verse.
Unspecified funds - including the sin-offering funds - can be rededicated for voluntary offerings, with the nazir as an exception to the usual sin-offering rules. Can these bird offerings be redirected? Plus, the role of the Dead Sea. Also, a talmudic revision of a passage that makes more sense.
More on specified (and unspecified) funds that have been set aside by one undertaking nezirut. The funds that were going to the sin-offering cannot be accessed for anything else, including voluntary offerings. How do we know this detail with regard to the nazir? There's a dispute whether it's derived from a verse or if there's no need for that kind of explication. And then the question comes back the usability of the funds. Also, more on the process of swapping funds for the animal.
A woman's vow of nezirut can be revoked by her husband up until the time that she brings the post-nezirut sacrifices. But what happens if she's consecrated them, and not yet sacrificed them, and then he revoked the vow? What happens to those animals? Plus, what would it mean that she has her own property? Also, the 4 occasions where the nazir's sacrifices are not accompanied by bread.
Can a person intentionally commit a sin but still perform a good dead? The Gemara explores how intentionality impacts the meaning of our good and bad deeds, with an eye to Lot, Tamar, Yael, Lavan, Balaam and more. (With sexual transgressions providing the extreme examples)
More on a woman who vows to be a nezirah, and another woman says she'll follow in her footsteps - what happens to the vow of the second woman if the husband of the first woman dissolves her vow? Also, the case of the man who undoes his wife's vow of nezirut, but he upholds his own vow. Plus, the difference between a question and a statement - boiling down to inflection and tone, beyond the words themselves, no less.
More on friends who join on to another person's vow of being a nazir. Does "And I" refer to the statement by the first person or that of the second person? Are these statements all linked together or not? With implications for whether the vows are binding on all of them in the same way. Plus, a comment on talmudic methodology and the lengths the Talmud goes to in attempting to answer its questions. Also, a woman who vows to become a nezirah, and her husband says, And I! - Is there any way for him to undo her vow?
A new mishnah: when witnesses come to court to testify about another person's vow of nezirut. Plus contradictory witnesses. With a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai on how to square the contradictions. Also, moving on to the new chapter, 4: another new mishnah: where one person takes a vow as a nazir, and subsequent people say that they each are too, then they're all nezirim... except that if the first person is released from nezirut, then those who said "and I!" are no longer bound either. Likewise, other wordings that indicate the same. Plus, the amount of time it takes to greet another is the limit on how quickly others chime in to the first person's vow. Note the discussion between R. Yehudah HaNasi and Resh Lakish.
When nezirut is prevented or interrupted by impurity, when does the count begin? Of the 4 opinions, whom do we follow? Plus, an immediate new case of a woman who takes a vow of nezirut, and then becomes impure, and her husband revokes her vow of nezirut. Now what does she need to do? Also, a religious, philosophical take on what it means to take the vow of a nazir. Also, Rava and Abaye on the start time/impurity issue. Plus, a new mishnah - someone who took on many stints of nezirut while outside the land of Israel, and then comes to the land, how much nezirut must be observe? From when and for how long? [Who's Who: Helene HaMalka, Queen Helene] - who took a vow to be a nazir (at least) 7 years.
The complications of different impurities affecting a nazir, and how he only needs to bring one korban to purify from all the impurity. Also, the dispute between R. Yosi and R. Yehudah -- on the question of sanctification of the nazir on the day that the count resumes - either the 7th or the 8th day. With elegant reads of the verses to delineate each side of the dispute.
The ongoing dispute between R Yochanan and Resh Lakish, over the declaration of nezirut in the cemetery - when the vow takes effect. Also, more on the person who takes on nezirut in a cemetery - when is he required to shave? And what happens between when he takes the oath and when the nezirut kicks in, if indeed he first must leave and purify before he can even begin the count?
A new chapter! And 2 new mishnayot. Opening with the case of one who takes a vow of becoming a nazir, but without specifying the number of days - as compared to one who does articulate "30 days," and what happens when each person shaves his head on the 30th day. What about a vow that sets up two periods of nezirut, to be consecutive. When does shaving become acceptable? Plus, what are the implications with regard to his becoming impure? Also, the case of one who takes the vow to be a nazir while in a cemetery - the count can't start until he's left the cemetery and become pure to begin with.
A new mishnah: on a compound vow of becoming a nazir when a son is born to him, and also for 100 days. How do those two elements of the vow work together, overlap, preempt, or delay each other? Also, how Rav expresses his contradiction of the mishnah. How does the timing line up with haircutting and mourning, in that event. Plus, the comparison to the count of Hilkhot Niddah, the laws of family purity, which also has a count and a requirement of being able to become pure.
Someone who vows consecutive periods of nezirut, as well as a vow for when his son is born... The Gemara figures out how to play out those consecutive or overlapping terms of nezirut. Complicated by one who has a case of tzara'at as well. Also, the lashes a nazir who violates his vow is subject to.
A new mishnah - one who takes a vow to become a nazir once he has a son. The he has a son. He's a nazir. But other progeny would not make him a nazir. What happens if the woman miscarries? Plus, the possibility of confusion between two different children. Also, conditions for consecutive or overlapping terms of nezirut.
Introducing a parallel to conditions in nezirut vows to the betrothal of a woman via a shaliach/emissary. Plus, a parallel to the birds to be designated for sacrifice. And the uncertainties that can creep into such cases. Plus, a new mishnah: when someone commits to "shave half a nazir" - paying half of the cost of korbanot that a nazir must offer.
Can a person vow a nedrei if nezirut for only one of the nezirut prohibitions? Was the language of becoming a Nazir part of colloquial speech?
When a vow for nezirut is conditioned upon an external event, such as the positioning of a cow or a door, and whether the vow will be upheld. Plus, the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai continues. Also, Rava's understanding of the role of the cow in this kind of case, plus his revision, as it were, to include the possibility of both the cow and the door.
Chapter 2: One who uses unusual expressions in taking on nezirut (for example, including refraining from dried figs in the vow), and whether that has impact on the assumption of nezirut. A machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Also, specific definitions of the korbanot mitigate against just deciding whatever sacrifice one wanted to offer, for example. Misspeaking for such a thing is allowable to some extent, but the vow for nezirut is expected to comply with the definition, as people know what a nazir is, and shouldn't have introduced external details.
A new mishnah: One who takes on being a nazir using euphemistic language - may indeed take on nezirut for his whole life, with some question as to how often he might be eligible to cut his hair/shave his head - depending on the phrasing used to undertake the nezirut. Likewise, one can undertake longer periods of nezirut, depending on phrasing. Also, one who undertakes nezirut "forever" can also delimit the time, depending. With the possibility of one long nezirut or multiple repetitions of 30-day periods of nezirut. Plus, different ways of counting, and different shapes of houses supporting the different ways of counting.
3 mishnayot on vowing to become a nazir. First, how to specify the term of nezirut, and how the default remains 30 days. Plus, measuring distance between places based on how long it takes to travel there. Also, the language used itself can make the difference, including when not to default to 30 days, but that doesn't mean adding on an hour or a day in your vow necessarily works.
More on the machloket between R. Matanah and Bar Peda. The practical difference between their views is one who becomes impure on the 30th day, because if it's only 29 days, the impurity shouldn't negate the entirety of the nezirut. [Talmudic concept: miktzat ha-yom ke-kulo] Plus, the Gemara lines up this dispute with another one, by tannaim. Also, the impact of growing one's hair long, which takes a minimum of 30 days. Which also raises the question of whether the word, "until" is inclusive of the day mentioned, or not.
On Avshalom, son of King David, and nazir. He cut his hair once a year, which is derived from a verse. Or was that every week?? Plus, a new mishnah: the default nezirut is 39 days long -- which leads the Gemara to probe how we know 30 days (and not 29, for that matter - which is a machloket between R. Matanah and Bar Peda.
2 mishnayot - beginning with taking a vow like the nezirut of Shimshon (Samson), with different phrasings that all refer to him. But why use all the details?! Also, what's the difference between this kind of nazir and a regular nazir? Beginning with sacrifices, and hair-trimming, and the issues of becoming impure from contact with the dead. Plus, of course, the way one becomes a nazir. Also, the story of Shimon HaTzadik and the beautiful nazir.
A note on Rivan, the son-in-law of Rashi, who takes his place, as it were, in Nazir. || Wording the vow to become a nazir - with a plan to become "beautiful." Is that enough to count as a nazir's vow? Is that physical beauty or the beauty of mitzvot? Plus, the beauty if long curly locks. Also, a new mishnah: mentioning part of nezirut counts as a vow to be a full nazir. And the Gemara explaining the views represented in the mishnah (R. Shimon vs. Rabbanan). Plus, how can the vow of the nazir contradict the requirement for kiddush over wine on Shabbat?!
An introduction to Nazir, including its placement in Seder Nashim, and following Nedarim. An introduction to chapter 1, including the biblical source for nezirut. And the opening of the masekhet, with discussion of how one takes on nezirut with an articulated statement, and the ambivalence about this optional asceticism, which will be discussed at greater length going forward.
The case of a woman who says to and about her husband that he divorced her - is she to be believed? Also, narrative preceding halakhah with regard to the behavior that follows potentially misspoken words, especially as pertaining to the marital bed and its aftermath.
The Gemara presents Rav Pappi’s version of the machloket between Rabbi Natan and the Chachamim. Plus the last Mishnah of our Masechet!
3 mishnayot, addressing how the father can revoke a daughter's vows, with what terms and what exception, what to pay attention to, etc. Plus, the 9 women whose vows are upheld and can't be revoked. Also, conditional vows that complicate the lives of everyone, and whether they can be revoked or nullified.
When the sages contradict their own opinions, specifically via a parallel case if inadvertent homicide and a blind person, as compared to Nedarim. Also, a new mishnah: when a father wants to give money or property to his daughter, but not to her husband, his son-in-law. That is, the question of whether what she acquires is also immediately acquired by him.
The case of a man who discovers later that he didn't have all the details at the time he revoked a vow. With a parallel to tearing keriyah in mourning, and introducing how long it takes to revise the information of the situation. Plus, a mishnah about a woman who swears off figs and grapes, and that vow is revoked apparently partially - is that sufficient? Plus a second mishnah on one who doesn't know he has the right to revoke a vow, and later discovers it - does he get an extension of time to do so? What if he knows he can revoke vows, but doesn't know that what he'd just heard was a vow?
In memory and tribute of our teacher Rabbi Moshe Kahn z"l || More on the question of a vow about something that doesn't yet exist, in parallel to a field that is to be consecrated in the future, and why that parallel doesn't work... Until the Gemara figures out how it could work as a legitimate parallel. Also, what exactly does a husband own in the relationship, as tricky as that question may feel to us today? Does the wife have ownership over her body? The produce of her hands? Plus, a new mishnah: if a man mixes up who made the vow he's going to revoke, or he mixes up the nature of the vow, what exactly is his role here?
A new mishnah - a woman who makes the things she produces off-limits from her father, brother, in-laws... The husband can revoke the vow. She can't take those same things away from her husband. But what if she made more than the required amount, and that's the part she was making off-limits to her husband? He should still revoke the vow. Especially if they get divorced one day, and that vow would then kick in. Also, the Gemara on this mishnah, and how Shmuel decides the halakhah according to R. Yochanan ben Nori, but then Shmuel seems to contradict his own view elsewhere, with regard to making vows (or consecrating) that which is not yet in effect.
A woman who has sworn off benefit from people, and can still eat from the agricultural mitzvot of charity, but it doesn't mention ma'aser ani. But is that lack of mention because she can't eat from ma'aser ani? What are the implications of demai (uncertainty with regard to whether tithes have been taken). Note that ma'aser ani doesn't have kedushah, as some other such mitzvot do. Also, the question of when one can designate the recipient of such gifts to the poor may carry monetary value (or not).
What did R. Yochanan mean about partial revoking of vows? With the parallel to nezirut, and how it can't be separated in its vow. Plus, when a woman swears off benefit from others, and the husband cannot revoke that vow, she can indeed eat from leket, shikhcha, and pe'ah - because they're mitzvot. Is the husband included in the "everyone" though? (It's a machloket)
More on the husband's revoking his wife's vows, and how he cannot do so when it comes to a vow she makes pertaining to a third party. Though when the vow can be extended as pertaining to his household, then he can revoke. Also, if one makes a vow that includes self-affliction and no self-affliction in the same vow (e.g., two loaves of bread, one of which is affliction to miss out on and another which is not), the husband can only revoke the part of self-affliction. And veering into the question of nezirut.
Why are the children of Torah scholars not themselves also Torah scholars? With several possible answers. Also, going back to a wife's nedarim that do not involve self-affliction. The husband can then revoke the vows if they pertain to the couple's relationship, but if they pertain to her connection to others, he cannot revoke them. But if her vows pertain to both of them, he can revoke them.
A study of self-affliction: what is "inui"? What needs to be prohibited from oneself? With bathing as the example. Also, the question of how not bathing is suffering (or not, as the case may be) in the context of Yom Kippur, and where the karet punishment might kick in. Note that discomfort and affliction may not quite define halakhic "inui."
Finishing the 10 chapter of Nedarim on the husband who revokes his wife's vows, as needed. And... beginning chapter 11, with a new mishnah on a vow taken by a woman that afflicts her, and which her husband or father can then revoke. Some of which might affect him or their relationship. Which means that the vows that bring about self-affliction need to be explored and defined. Also, some rationale why the husband can revoke self-affliction vows and those that would have impact on their relationship or life together, the later right only lasting for the duration of the marriage.
Again, nullifying vs. revoking - hatarat vs. hafarat nedarim. As learned from "zeh ha-davar," as worded in the biblical verse. Plus, a gezerag shavah with regard to a vow of consecration that can be annulled. Plus, the festivals as paralleled to the vows (or vice versa). Plus, the sources for the conclusion, whether logic or verses or gezerah shavah. Also, when a husband refrains from immediate revoking of his wife's vow with the intent to annoy her - though the plan is clearly that he will eventually revoke to.
Revoking and annulling vows on Shabbat - the latter, specifically for things needed that same Shabbat. Plus, revoking vows at night - but why does this need to be stated? What happens when the vow is made on Shabbat? Wrapping up these issues, or almost. Also, can judges nullify a vow while standing? Rabban Gamliel dismounted his donkey to adjudicate a case... Does that answer the case? Plus, the sin in vowing, and the source for it.
More on the question of whether one can nullify vows in advance. With a parallel to the impurity and purity of seeds. Also, a new mishnah, on the "day" that the vow can be revoked. Plus, the Gemara on how to define the day - is it 24 hours or specifically the calendar date that the vow is made.
A new mishnah: Vows that haven't yet been made can't be ratified in advance. Revoking in advance is a machloket, however. But how would revoking in advance actually work? Also, can a man revoke his wife's vow before she's even made them?
A new mishnah: A woman waiting for yibum - can the yavam revoke this woman's vows? Which leads to the question of where the man gets the authority to revoke the vows. And the return of "ma'amar." Plus, the obligation of the yavam to the yevamah.
More on whether a father or husband can revoke a woman's hear he didn't hear. What if the man is deaf? With recourse to the example of an unmixed grain sacrifice (minchah) as a parallel. Also, a new mishnah on the women who wait the appropriate time period after betrothal - can that husband-to-be revoke her vows or not yet? Plus, the d'Orayta or deRabbanan divide.
When a husband divorces his wife after she's taken a vow, does the divorce function as upholding or ratifying the vow, or is it just silence? With the practical difference being if she divorced and remarried immediately, with implications for the second husband's ability to revoke that vow. Plus, a new mishnah - on the practice of a father revoking any and all vows that his daughter made under his auspices before she was ever betrothed, so that she marries with a clean slate. Also, how one can revoke a vow he didn't hear.
A woman who takes a vow while betrothed, divorces that same day, gets betrothed to another that same day - the father can revoke her vow and the second (or last in this kind of chain) can revoke it. That is, she is always under her father's auspices, as a young woman, or under her husband's, but she hasn't aged into her own authority. Plus, the verses that explain the bottom lines of these cases. Also, a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the nature of revoking the woman's vow.
More on the husband/father revoking vows - with a parallel to the vow of becoming a nazir. Declaring oneself a Nazir bring a vow, of course. The point comes, though, when the man cannot revoke it - once he's confirmed it, it's upheld - or so it seems at first blush. Also, a new mishnah, which introduces new parameters for the difference between the father and the husband - specifically (again), if the father dies. Plus, the sources for this authority, and the complications of the shifts in the woman's status. Plus, the waiting period between betrothal and marriage, and the implications of it.
The right to revoke a woman's vow, as it transfers between husband and father (or not), in the event of the other's death. Also, the question of whether one can pose a question to a sage to revoke her vow - comparable to nullifying vows as we've seen in the past. Plus, the question of exchange/temurah.
When a man revokes his betrothed's vow, is he removing the vow or weakening it? How does the father's revoking impact the vow? Plus, the timing of the betrothed's revoking or upholding the vow. Plus, how that timing works with the father's involvement, including if the father dies.
Another quick December 31 request for support for Talking Talmud. || Introducing the halakhit pertaining to a husband and father being able to revoke a girl or woman's vows. Revoking being a different treatment of the vow than a sage's annulling a vow. And with recognition that this treatment of a woman's vows may be troubling. The daf introduces the most complicated case of a betrothed young woman, under the auspices of both her father and her husband at the same time, and both are needed to revoke her vow. Plus, the biblical verses that provide the sources of these cases.
Note: Plug for 2022 year-end contributions to Talking Talmud (details and link to contribute on FB or WhatsApp). Two mishnayot: First, an opening to release a person from his vow against eating meat, for example, if he can be asked: had you realized that would include Shabbat and holidays, would you have made this vow? Note that a vow that is partly nullified is wholly nullified. Likewise, exceptions to the general vow can be used to undermine and nullify that vow. Also, the possibility of undoing a vow because of the fear of shame to the family members because of his vow, then that same vow can be dissolved. Plus, one who takes a vow on false premises has not made the vow (not that the reality changed, but the vow was based in something false to begin with). And what if the reality changed? That well may be room to dissolve the vow. Plus, the challenge of the relationships and the value of undoing vows because of them.
Dissolving a vow that pertains to another person can only be done in the presence of that other person. With a proof from Moses and Jethro - and Midian and Egypt. Plus, a story about Nebuchadnezzar and his shame before Tzidkiyahu. Also, 3 mishnayot: openings to annul a vow, beginning with new developments. For example, a vow to keep out if certain property because of a dog or a snake, with the subsequent discovery that the dog/snake died, and the vow is no longer relevant. Plus, an opening to dissolve a vow because if the injunctions in the Torah against bearing a grudge (if the vow is rooted in a grudge). Also, the case of a man vowing that his wife won't benefit from him without realizing he'd need to pay her ketubah - and then be left with nothing. Had he but known, he wouldn't have made such a vow, of course.
Chapter 9. With a new mishnah, introducing the process of removing, annulling, dissolving a vow. The question arises as to how one demonstrates regret, or what makes a person regret a vow. For example, feeling bad before one's parents, before God. Plus, other future developments that lead to regretting the past vow - so many vows would never be made if the future were known as to the impact. Note R. Eliezer's apparently more lenient view with regard to vows here. Also, the need to go to get a vow annulled with a story to the sage... Which, again, raises the concern of messing with all vows. And how much shame might get in the way of needing to annul the vow - with regard to the risk of lying. Note also the mixed feelings when it comes to nedarim, with an apparent goal of taking care with our speech.
What happens when one swears off wine for the year and then the year turns out to have an extra month? What happens if the person swearing off the wine specified Adar in his vow - but didn't specify Adar I or Adar II, then what are the implications for the length of the vow? Also, what happens when the vow specifies Pesach? Given the presumption of wine on the first night if Pesach. Plus, Ezra's decree about garlic. Plus, other vows specifying meals, etc. Do we hold people to this kind of extreme language?!
Several stories about Rabbi Tarfon, including his reputation, and how he made use of it. [Who's Who: R. Tarfon] Also, harvesting as a time that defines or limits a vow - with mention of several different harvests. Likewise, referring to the rainfall as a way to define time (we didn't know it would happen when we recorded, but this day in Israel is a representative very rainy day).
The Gemara continues its discussion around nedarim of time and how do we define a section of time. Why is the fig harvest considered the end of summer?
Chapter 8. When one vows to make wine off-limits, but with a time factor - today, this week, this month, and so on - it's off-limits until the end of that same day, week, month, and so on. But "a day," "a week," "a month" means for the specific length of time. Also, applying these details of time to other situations of vows - "today" vs. "one day," for example. Plus, avoiding the language of nedarim.
Concluding the discussion of whether something prohibited can lost that status. Recall the ability to annul a vow! Plus, the implications of a terumah-hullin mixture, and the possibility of reversing its status. Also, what happens when that which is planted has already been tithed? When it grows again, do you have to tithe again? When do you cross the line into taking too much?
More on the onion and the way it grows - does the prohibited part forbid the permitted part, or vice versa? Note the Talmudic, halakhic concept: Davar she-yesh lol matirin - a way to permit something that was forbidden. How that concept is applied elsewhere, especially with regard to mixtures, and here. Also, weeding with a Kuti/Samaritan, who is not considered reliable for taking terumot and maaserot, with implications for shemitah concerns as well. All of these concerns seem to kick in for the kind of bulbs that grow over themselves, as it were, as compared to beans, which are transformed.
A long mishnah: One who declares certain foods to be off-limits will have different restrictions, depending on the phrasing. Plus, how far into the future does one's vow extend? Also, when a husband swears off his wife's productivity. Or does so for a set amount of time (the same "until Pesach" deadlines that we've seen in the past). Note that the Gemara doesn't address the whole if the mishnah; rather, it focuses on the vow against the productivity of the wife's hands. Plus, the question of uprooting an onion during the 7th year (shemitah), for replanting in the 8th year. How does that growth have impact on what has been prohibited by the vow? Which raises the question, post-growth, can food lose its forbidden status?
3 mishnayot: When one swears off a house - going into the attic of a house may or not be included in that vow, as prohibited (a dispute between R. Meir and the sages). Also, one who swears off a bed, which may or may not include a "dargash." Plus, defining "dargash." Also, swearing off entrance to a city - which includes its environs, apparently, while the inside/outside of a house are more specific to the doorjamb.
More on the terms we use. One who swears off "dagan" may include a particular bean, and not just the 5 grains, because of the way that bean is stored. Plus, the story of Mar bar Shmuel and the stipulation in his will. Also, character development for Rava from R. Yosef. Also, swearing off clothing, and the implications for non-garments, and for things made of the same kind of thing as garments, but when it's not garments. Likewise, the implications of carrying on Shabbat for "garments" - namely, if it's not considered carrying, it's considered wearing, and vice versa.
Chapter VII: Swearing off "vegetables" - does that include gourds? What about legumes? What drives whether the term "vegetables" is more or less inclusive? Also, the implications for punishment if this vow is violated technically are significant. Namely, the question of whether one would get lashes. Also, implications for me'ilah. What happens with different (correct) names for meat - when that meat is hekdesh?! Whose fault is it?
More vows about food in 3 new mishnayot. Does swearing off dates include silan (date honey)? What about winter grapes and their vinegar? It would seem that the way we refer to the different foods and their derivatives may make the difference, as to whether it is included in the vow against the food. But is there really a dispute in the mishnah? Also, one who swears off wine can still have cider (wine from apples) - the default understanding of the term "wine" means from grapes. Likewise, "oil" meant olive oil. Likewise, "honey" means from bees. Likewise, "leeks," as compared to another variety of leek. And so on with other general terms, and the question of what is included by those terms, as specific or category. Also, cabbage and asparagus. Grits and pottage. Pottage vs. garlic. Plus different ways of preparing lentils. Among other phrasings that include or don't include various pairings of foods.
Food vows in the mishnah - first, swearing off milk (does that include whey?), or swearing off whey (does that include milk?). Plus, R. Tarfon, meat, and more. Also, one who swears off grapes (what about wine?) or olives (what about olive oil?). To what extent does the general casual phrasing have impact on the reach of the vow?
A racy daf. Bar Kappara talks to R. Yehudah HaNasi's daughter, apparently provoking her. Ben Elasa was the son-in-law to R. Yehudah HaNasi, and he was invited to the wedding of R. Shimon, son of R. Yehudah HaNasi. And Bar Kappara asks provocative questions of R. Yehudah HaNasi, some of them less table-talk than others. [Who's Who: Bar Kappara] Also, 2 mishnayot, with attention to the precise meaning of the words used when making a vow - common use and expression vs. literal use of a term, which is the intent of one's vow?
Biographical details about various sages, with a focus on R. Akiva, including his marriage, and the dynamic with his father-in-law, Kalba Savua. Plus, the Jerusalem of Gold ornament. Note the Nedarim context here of the very familiar narrative. Also, the insult to R. Yehoshua that he is ugly, despite his glorious Torah. Plus, another insult to Shmuel, and the consequences of that.
Another granular mishnah. One who swears off cooked food can still eat roasted food or undercooked food. Cooked means prepared with heat that you eat with bread, as per the practices of yore. Likewise, one who swears off food made in a pot - boiling, specifically, or moving on to any food that's cooked in a pot. Also, the porridge eaten in Babylonia, with bread. Plus, table manners and the effect of different foods.
Starting with a long mishnah: the phrasing of the vow prohibiting benefit makes a real difference, even in private property. What happens when the property is available for public use? How can one be sworn of use or benefit from them? The mishnah defines municipal works in this context. Plus, different locales have different expectations and requirements. Also, on the people of the Galilee - whom the Gemara calls "contrarians," who regularly made nedarim, swearing off each other's property! Plus, a second mishnah - with the case of a grandfather who swears off benefit from his son, which makes things difficult when the son is marrying off the grandson. A work-around is needed.
When the vow is on a specific property, how long would one be prohibited from benefit? For example, what if the property changes hands? For that matter, can one prohibit something even after it's gone from his own possession?! Also, a discussion of the off-limits property, with a question raised by Rami bar Hama. Namely, how effective is a vow when the relevant property changes hands? With several attempts to address the dilemma.
Continuing the mishnah... With regard to joint ownership. What if only one is prohibited from the benefit of that which jointly owned? It's the same rationale for prohibition or permission. Likewise, what about property or tools that are leased to the public (eg - a bathhouse or an olive press) - it will depend on whether the owner who has sworn off another getting benefit depends on whether the owner actually has any rights to the leased property/tools. Also, what happens when one says another can't get benefit, imposed on another, as compared to one taking a vow upon oneself. The Gemara here is looking at the subtleties of the vow, of course. Plus, the Gemara on that bathhouse or olive press - which is leased - when the holding is partial to begin with
Closing chapter 4. Retracting a statement of hefker is not effective when the declaration of hefker took place before 3 people - then it's automatically ownerless (and according to biblical law, one witness would be enough for immediate effect, but the sages required 3). Also, chapter 5: where jointly owned property may be subject to vows swearing off benefit, and the question of whether that shared ownership means one must be stringent with regard to the potential benefit, or whether one can assume that the shared ownership means there's no real way to lose the benefit.
On the rules of "hefker," declaring something ownerless. And how it removes this issue of being unable to provide benefit (or not). How long is a declaration of hefker into effect? And when can that declaration be retracted? That is, if nobody else has come along to claim the "ownerless" property. Also, timing that is designed to protect against swindlers. Plus, when the Torah requirement for tithing and the rabbinic standing overlap in ways that leave produce untithed when it should be tithed.
A new mishnah: When one wants to borrow a cow (!), and the cow isn't available, which leads the would-be borrower to swear off the cow ever coming to plow the field. But when one who has sworn of benefit from another and is truly in need, the one who can't give CAN work around the prohibition and vow via indirect benefit to the other. But R. Yosi doesn't like the indirect giving as a work-around. Which makes the Gemara explore why he doesn't. Is it just timing? The way he conceives of hefker? The way he conceives of vows?
One who swears off benefit from his friend cannot enter the friend's field or benefit from his produce. But a shemitah year changes those terms. Plus, how the phrasing her lines up (or doesn't) with the position of Rav and Shmuel, or perhaps R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish - specifically with regard to the impact of shemitah on the benefit factor. Plus, swearing off benefit means no lending/borrowing, or selling/buying. Even though only one direction is "benefit"
More on illness and its impact (like forgetting all of one's learning), plus stories about the sages. Including R. Yosef. Plus, insight into the writing or compiling of the Mishnah. Also, the challenges of forgetting, as per R. Hiya - and the remembering by a lowly laundryman. Also, two mishnayot on the extent to which one can be near another person and not violate the swearing off of benefit.
The sages falling ill and getting visitors. Including when nobody visited R. Helbo. But how curative are such visits! And how much harm does one do when not praying for another's recovery. Plus, Rava gets sick and wants to keep it quiet. Until he finally agrees - go out and announce it, and let them pray (or rejoice). Also, the Shechinah visits the sick too. Plus, a question of whether the visitor sits, stands, sits on the floor, etc. - in the presence of God, as the Shechinah is visiting too. Plus, a sidebar on rain and mikvaot, and the given lands.
A mishnah from Daf 38, and the Gemara on it - one who is the subject of someone else's vow swearing off benefit from him. How would this have impact on a visit to the sick, in either direction? It seems an indirect benefit... One possiblity is standing instead of sitting, while visiting. Plus, "benefitting" from fruit during a shemitah year. Also, where in the Torah do we find the mitzvah of visiting the sick? Plus, there's no "measure" to visiting the sick - with several interpretations of what that means.
Prophets are rich, says the Gemara. Just see Moses, Samuel, Amos, and Jonah. Including prooftexts. Plus, R. Yehudah HaNasi and his wealth too. Also, a new mishnah - when a person swears of benefitting from another, what relationship can they still have? Including during a wedding between the families of both people.
What benefits can accrue from Torah when one swears off benefit from a given person? The Gemara shows the monetary loss. Plus, the dispute over whether teachers of children are paid for childcare or for teaching them skills. Also, analysis of the dispute. Plus, what about girls, when boys were the only ones in school? Also, how do the ta'amei hamikra (trop) fit in? Aren't they part of the text, essentially?
The daf explores an very existential question: can we perform an action on someone else’s behalf for their benefit without their knowledge?
A dilemma posed to R. Nachman: when one swears off property, does that make the use of that property its own violation, as per me'ilah, the violation of property consecrated to the Beit HaMikdash? Also, the new mishnah: what is included and excluded when one swears off benefit from another person? What can the limited person still do for or with the other? For example, the role of a kohen that goes beyond personal benefit... When can he function in his official role, even for one who has sworn off benefitting from him, and when can he not?
A mishnah on the previous daf leads into a discussion of what is excluded when one swears off benefit from another. Including returning a lost object, for example, and how benefit should go to the Temple treasury. And the dispute that arises in this question. Plus, an important assessment of these passages as difficult, which leads to considerations of different manuscripts or editions before the different commentators. Also, the complications this emerge from swearing off benefit - specifically, one swears off from another's benefit from his loaf of bread, and then gives that same loaf as a gift. What is the halakhah in such a case? Along with a dispute on the implications of this case.
A new chapter! The only real difference between one who swears off benefit from his friend and one who swears off the food of his friend is only a matter of walking over, on his property, for example (and whether items not connected to food prep would be allowed or not). Plus, who taught this mishnah? (R. Eliezer). Also, another mishnah...still on food prep, and a question on what might be rented, and that connects. Plus, swearing off and yet getting benefit. With complicated parameters. Plus, the case of Hanan.
More on the importance of circumstances. Specifically, the story of Moshe and God's wrath at his apparent delaying the circumcision of his son. Plus, more on Moshe, and God's wrath. Also, the completion of Avraham via brit milah, and the covenant with God. Plus, the significance of gematriya in names.
More mishnayot! One - a person who makes a vow not to benefit from those who "rest" on Shabbat - who is included and excluded from this category? Or a vow not to benefit from those who eat garlic... Which links back to a decree from Ezra, specifically to eat garlic on Shabbat. Likewise, one who goes up to Jerusalem. All being connected to Jews vs. Kutim. Two - Swearing off benefit from those who are descendants of Noah, which sounds like everyone, but comes to exclude the Jewish people. Three - Swearing off benefit from those who are descendants from Abraham, which sounds like it means at least all of the three main monotheistic religions, but also turns out to exclude the Jewish people. Four - One who swears off benefitting from a Jew... Can one do business with a Jew after that? Five - Swearing off benefit from "arelim," the "uncircumcised ones" does not include an uncircumcised Jewish person. Plus, how this phrasing differs from promising to get benefit from those who are circumcised. Also, a discussion of the circumcision, including how brit milah takes precedence over Shabbat, and how Moshe did wrong in not circumcising his son (Tziporah did it). Plus, the completion or perfection of circumcision for Abraham.
A whole lot of mishnayot. One: A person who swore off benefit from seafarers. Or land-dwellers. But who's included in these sweeping statements? Two: One who swears off benefit from those who benefit from seeing the sun. But again, who is included here? The wording is specific. Exposed to the sun includes the blind, of course. Three: One who swears off the dark-headed. But whom does that exclude? Four: One who swears off benefit from those who are born. As compared to those who have not yet been born.
More on the consecrated trees... If they're consecrated until they're felled. What does that time stipulation do to the neder? And then they need to be reconsecrated, with ongoing renewal. But that's debate (whether they need to be redeemed). Where does the sanctity go? Plus, the comparison to kiddushin, betrothal, and the sanctity of marriage. Plus, the comparison to korbanot. Also, how stipulations with regard to timing in a neder matter. And again the application to kiddushin. And likewise, with regard to korbanot.
A new mishnah! Taking a vow to protect yourself from thugs who you feel are putting you in danger, and you take a vow to protect yourself. With a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, how far that goes. Plus, the law of the land is the law (assuming that doesn't mean laws made against Judaism). Also, another mishnah! The need to redeem saplings (for example) that have been consecrated - with various parameters. Plus, the vows people take in a time of need - like, the protect the saplings, plus the case of the tallit. Namely, promises made as recompense for getting saved.
[Announcement on Donation Opportunities] Vows that are not fulfilled because of circumstances beyond one's control. With the example of a court case, a man who filed documents in his favor, and he assures the court he'll return with a vow that the documents will be null and void if he doesn't come back in time. That's how certain he is that he'll come back. Which leads to an important dispute between Rava and R. Huna - is his vow upheld, despite the fact that he was prevented from return by circumstances beyond his control. Plus, a new definition of "asmachata" - a strong statement/promise to emphasize ones agreement. But is the asmachta actually binding? And is this case an asmachta case?!
More on accidental vows. When part of the vow remains in force, but not all of it - depending on how much regret the person making the vow explains. Plus, a machloket about vows based on a machloket about designated sacrifices. Also, swearing people off something in a way that includes people because they are similar to others, in which case, the question becomes what happens to all of the people included if/when a vow is untied. Plus, an example of swearing off onions because of health concerns, which are then determined to be healthful... So that vow becomes null and void.
Do people use their own language when formulating a vow? Or are they more likely to rely on a formula? What kind of pitfalls are there (or potentially so) in one's own language? Also, a new mishnah, on unwitting vows. That is, when one makes a statement that is based on a mistaken premise. Plus, R. Akiva's innovative statement about vows - that nullifying a vow in part nullified it in full.
Do the rabbis agree with R. Elazar Ben Yaakov from the mishnah or not? What if a person can't fulfill a vow because of circumstances beyond his control? What about a host and a guest, where the meal doesn't happen... Are such vows actually vows? [Who's Who: R. Elazar ben Yaakov] Also, a new mishnah, on vows of exaggeration, and the problem with them.
How dissolving vows seems to have been a common occurrence. Also, the Manny expressions of regret. Also, both Abaye and his wife want the daughter of Abaye's wife to marry someone from their respective sides of the family. And even Abaye makes an extreme vow that needed to be dissolved. Also, a new mishnah: invitations and disclaimers. Plus, cancelling future vows in advance. Including Rosh Hashanah stipulations. There's a tension between wanting people to be careful with their language, and also to make sure that they aren't stuck.
Another case of dissolving a vow... because your deeds are known in heaven. Also, comparing making a vow to building an altar. Plus, an investigation into anger, and the harm that being angry does to oneself. And this sense of anger permeating the events of the writing of all the books after the 5 books of the Torah and the Book of Joshua. Plus, on how one gets our of a vow - R. Nachman and the annulment and regret.
Chapter 3! The opening mishnah addresses nedarim that are not real vows, but look and feel like a neder, and therefore should not be said. Exaggerations or circumstances beyond one's control, among others. Plus R. Tarfon on unclear, conditional formulations. Also, how and why those who utter these not-vow vows need to see a Torah scholar in order to get out of them. Plus, the stories of those who needed that kind of consultation exactly.
A new mishnah! With various vows and caveats thereof. Including the famous injunction not to prolong conversation with a woman (!). Also, a list of proper behavior on the part of parents to ensure that their progeny are not damaged, with a moment to reflect about non-scientific cause and effect. Plus, Ima Shalom's stance against the Gemara's puritanism. [Who's Who: Ima Shalom] Also, a rebuke to sexually explicit speech when it's not in the right context. Plus, a discussion of how the cause/effect above could have come from the ministering angels, as originally presented there. Plus, the positivity of this daf.
Consecrating property, even when it has questionable status, as compared to vows, when there is doubt as to the status - both result in stringency. But that seems to be a matter of disagreement. Plus, how this pertains to nezirut. Also, finally introducing the nezirut of Shimshon (Samson), including God's designation of Shimshon as such.
Challenges to R. Huna, and answers to the challenges. More on the stringencies of a neder vs. an oath. Plus, the sin of swearing falsely, and how it doesn't really have a way to repent, in comparison to not fulfilling a vow. Also, unspecified nedarim are treated stringently. Plus, the clear indication of idolatry in a vow immediately negates the vow, because of the Torah's prohibition against idolatry. Also, the difference in casual implication regarding Temple vows in Judea vs. the Galilee.
A vow within a vow! (But not an oath within an oath). Also, how that kind of vow applies to a nazir (and the debate about it). Plus, being a nazir and also swearing off grapes (which a nazir cannot have anyway!). Also, how to count off 2 periods of 30 days of nezirut.
A new mishnah - paralleling vows (nedarim) and oaths (shevuot). They take effect on different things. Plus, wording swearing off things with a standard formulation as well as its inverse, converse, etc. And another mishnah, determining when neder is more stringent, and when shevuah is.
A series of refutations to R. Yehudah's position against conditional nedarim. Which leads us to the difference between a neder and a shevuah. Plus, the drama between a husband and wife, when he swears off her benefitting from him, with deadlines of Pesach and Sukkot, and the question of whether she goes back to her father's house.
A new chapter! Including vows vs. oaths. And a new mishnah: when the vow doesn't work - for example, swearing off edibles that are already prohibited by the Torah. So why are these statements treated as vows? But this way lies confusion. What happens when is a vow valid, but also knocked down? And what happens when one uses a Torah scroll as part of the vow, or as a prop for bow? How precise of a citation must one make? Plus, another mishnah - with bows that verge on the absurd.
More on precise phrasing of neder - making an oath by association, given the terms invoked. Plus, a new mishnah that expounds on comparable examples. Also, is a neder worded to obligate a person or with regard to that person's limbs that do the activity.
What is the Torah source for a vow of prohibition (swearing off something, with the formula of a vow). Specifically as a sign of mourning. With the example of Gedaliyah ben Achikam (namesake for Tzom Gedaliyah). Also, what if one takes a neder on something that would have been permitted vs. that which was forbidden anyway? Plus, the assortment of terumah breads and the korban todah.
Another new mishnah - one who designates the food being eaten as non-kosher food, or consecrated, or disqualified from being eaten in some way, depending on exactly what the status is supposed to be, the food becomes off-limits. Note the significance of the oral pronunciation with regard to language play. Also, what if the language used is associative, rather than specific?
Is taking the vow of Nezirut considered to be an admirable action or is the Nazir a sinner? The Gemara discusses the precision of language when it involves nedarim.
A new mishnah! Formulating vows in the style of other vows - like the wicked, like the righteous, like a nazir, like for a korban. Also, defining and distinguishing between Neder and Nedavah. And how does nezirut compare? Plus, the story of Shimon HaTzadik. [Who's Who: Shimon HaTzadik]
Can one take an oath that one will fulfill mitzvot, which are presumably already incumbent on the person who would be taking the oath? What if the oath is to learn Torah, or a specific section of Talmud, for example? Also, more on excommunication, but this time, when the actions take place in a dream - does that excommunication count? And how can it be annulled?)
When an utterance of a statement take effect to have impact on the halakhic status of a thing, and how precise that kind of statement needs to be. Plus, R. Akiva on lashes (or not) to one who violates an oath, given the phrasing of the oath. Also, the language of "menudeh," detaching from something, which is fundamentally excommunication. Plus, how that phrasing includes God's name, and how excommunication can be required and also be annulled.
More on Abaye and Rava on ambiguous statements, when they're binding, and how potential consecration results in much more stringent care with regard to the effect of one's words. Also, can one marry via a partial statement? Or an ambiguous one? Shouldn't there be a hekesh link between the two? What about Pe'ah? Which moves us further into the precision of language.
First, Shmuel's understanding of the mishnah. Also, partial declarations, and when they count as binding and when they don't, especially with regard to the bill of divorce... and nezirut. And the dispute between Abaye and Rava on these statements, and how each can be read to line up with the defense of the opposite position too.
Renewing the question of how a nazir can violate the prohibition against delaying. Plus, the korban chatat (sin-offering) of a yoledet (a woman who has given birth) and the potential parallel to Nazir. Also, a man's nullification of his wife's or daughter's vow of nezirut. Plus, when one swears off another with specific details vs. more generally.
The biblical source for the variety of statements that count as full or regular vows, developing the "hekesh," a linkage, between nedarim and nezirut. But why require the hekesh at all? This particular connection seems evident in the biblical text regarding nedarim anyway. This hekesh relies on the phrasing of the Torah being presumed to align with the way people speak. Also, the two Torah prohibitions that one violates when one breaks a vow. And again, how nedarim align with nezirut with regard to these violations (where nezirut seems to only have one of the prohibitions, not both).
Introducing Nedarim. The importance of our words and the meaning of what we say. Plus, the significance of Kol Nidrei, and the annulment of vows. Also, the first mishnah - which itself is a challenge, with a lot to address, where imitations of vows and partial vows both still count as vows, with regard to their binding nature. Plus, the Gemara's concern about the way the mishnah was constructed.
On the Land of Israel and the massive size of its fruit - peaches, grapes, etc. Also the way the sins of the area's residents led to much smaller fruit the following year. Plus, the comparison of the Land of Israel to a deer. Also, the story of when R. Zeira went to the Land of Israel, and could not find a ferry, and how he managed to cross the river anyway. Plus, dirt on the grave. Also, why the Land of Israel and its beauty is the end and cap to Ketubot.
When Rabbi Zeira wanted to move to the Land of Israel, it raised a lot of ire - to the extent that R. Yehudah says doing so was a violation of God's exile. Which leads us to the 3 oaths (from Shir HaShirim) that seem to deter group aliyah, at the very least, and is the basis of some portion of Orthodox Jewish anti-Zionism (or non-Zionism). Plus, Ulla and his death outside of the Land of Israel. Also, when it comes to the resurrection of the dead, where one dies (in the Land of Israel or not) may make a difference (it's a matter of dispute). Also, the experience of the resurrection of the righteous in Jerusalem, in a blossoming joyous way.
A long daf, with some mishnayot, and a few key points from the Gemara. First mishnah: Another Admon statement, regarding people in conflict with promissory notes and bills of sale that seem to contradict. Do the dates of the transactions make the difference? Mishnah 2 (and the last of the Admon statement mishnayot) - the case of 2 people with IOUs for each other. But how can it be that one who is owed money would borrow money from the person who owes him? Mishnah 3: 3 areas of land where people lived in the Land of Israel (Galil, Transjordan, and Judah) - and one spouse cannot force the other to move to a different region. Mishnah 4: A spouse CAN force the family to move to the Land of Israel from the Diaspora. And likewise from Israel to Jerusalem, establishing the "kedushah" element in this decision, as well as the question whether there's an actual mitzvah to live in Israel. Plus other locations with halakhic distinctions - specifically, Cappadocia - specifically, how the currency value may make a difference for marriage and divorces that take place with Israel and [Where's Where: Cappadocia]. Which leads I to the discussion about the ketubah being rabbinic or a Torah obligation, with apparent practical implications for this particular case.
More mishnayot, with the statements of Admon: When one promises a dowry, but goes bankrupt and can't provide it, the son-in-law can't be forced to marry the daughter. But Admon acknowledges that the daughter is stuck in a bind. But does the halakhah follow Admon? Also, another complex mishnah, as Admon's decision on the case makes clear - when one contests the ownership of a field, even though he has signed on the bill of sale to someone else. How can he still legitimately claim that it's his field? Plus, a distinction between witnesses and judges in their capacity as notaries. And lastly, a third mishnah: When one is overseas, and the path to that person's field is lost - because of needing to go through other fields to get there, and he's been gone long enough... How does he reestablish a path to his field? Either he's entitled to make the most direct path, or he needs to pay the other owner(s) to be able to make the path again.
3 mishnayot, the first with a statement by Hanan, and the following 2 with statements by Admon. First, if a man supports a woman whose husband is overseas and then asks that husband upon his return to pay him back - should he get it back or not? #2 - Someone who dies and leaves behinds both sons and daughters, the sons inherit and the daughters are provided with mezonot. But the daughters come first, if the estate is small. #3 - When one is said to owe another person jugs and oil, and says he only owes the jugs - and never had the oil. This is a case of "modeh ba-miktzat" (a key halakhic concept), which may mean this borrower needs to take an oath.
A case of a husband who goes overseas and a wife who wants "mezonot" while he's gone - and the question is whether the court will award her the funds for sustenance from his estate - it's a dispute between Rav and Shmuel, with a daf of challenges to Shmuel's opinion. Though if he dies overseas, there's no dispute, and she would be awarded the mezonot. Plus, a difference of approach between the judge Hanan and the Bnei Kohanim Gedolim regarding whether an oath need be taken. Plus, different kinds of vessels, as per R. Zvid, and the impurity of some, vs. the effect of glaze.
In the context of disqualifying judges for bias, Rav Anan turns down a gift AND sitting on the gift-giver's case. Plus, the case of bikkurim and Elisha. The discussion addresses how slight a shift in process can bias the proceedings. Also, Elijah the Prophet and his teaching of Rav Anan. Plus, during years of famine, a request for prayers for mercy by R. Yosef leads to another discussion of Elisha. And the drama of 2,200 students. Plus, the massive population of sages and students in Babylonia - and the "orphans" who remained at the end of the sessions. Also, parallels to Shekalim.
A new mishnah, starting the final chapter of Ketubot, 13, with mishnayot organized according to the statements of specific ancient judges, with some question regarding exactly when they lived. Which introduces the case of a wife whose husband has gone overseas, and she petitions for sustenance (mezonot), and then she would take an oath regarding her ketubah if he were to die overseas - with a dispute whether she'd need an oath to get the mezonot too. Also, the severity of bribery for judges - why that is the case, and what judges must do in the face of potential bias.
More on R. Yehudah HaNasi, his illness, the prayers on his behalf, and his death. Also, the final mishnah of the perek - how long can a woman claim her ketubah? And what if she's gone home to her father's house? Plus, a real-life application of the mishnah in the lives of the sages, and how an appeal to the courts by a woman trying to collect her ketubah pans out.
A mishnah on a widow and how the heirs of her husband provide for her. And then the application of the halakhah to the widow of R. Yehudah HaNasi or his message to his heirs before he dies, which accommodates her - and the honor that is due her. Also, note the role he plays in handling his death, his memory, and his succession. Plus, a bat kol praising those who went out for his funeral.
How do we each financial agreements? Do they need to be written down? Can we write them down? How can we prove their terms if they're not written? Plus, a prooftext for this discussion, apparently for both writing and speaking, from the "sharp ones," who make the condition of only providing for the wife's daughter as long as the couple stays together. Also, who should raise a daughter, the mother and her family or the father and his family? There's a story of a case that took place that illustrates the Gemara's approach here as an example of very dark self-interest.
The Gemara wants to understand why there is a repeat of a discussion that appears in Yevamot. Amud bet starts a new perek with a Mishnah that discusses a husband’s responsibility to continue to feed his wife’s daughter even after they divorce.
The mishnah from 99 - assessments of property made by judges that may or may not be accurate. What happens when their assessment is off, as compared to market value? How do judges compare to the widow here, in terms of assessing the property? Plus, what is the role of a shaliach in this kind of transaction? Also, how these cases compare to other rabbis' handling them in practice. Plus, the mishnah at the end of 100 - a reprisal of Yevamot, with a list of women who don't get a ketubah.
Making sense of yesterday's impossible mishnah. Specifically, what it means that she's sold property for less than it's worth, and why that's such a problem. Also, when you appoint a shaliach, an agent, to sell property in your behalf, and the shaiach doesn't listen to your instructions. What happens then? How specific do the instructions need to be to be considered official or binding?
When a sale (a woman selling her late husband's property, for example) takes place outside of the court, does she need to an oath? Does she need to make a public announcement? Can she simply go ahead and sell the property? Also, a new mishnah: a widow whose ketubah is worth however much its worth - when she sells property, the value she attains is her ketubah. But if she overshoots the value of the ketubah, the sale may be null and void (or, according to other opinions, she gives the sum back - or rather, to the heirs).
Several cases showing how one sells property for the sake of sustenance, but then is entitled to other monies. For example, a widow who sells or rents out the land that she's inherited for the same of regular income. Plus, the case of one who sells property and then wants to repossess it for her own ketubah! Also, what happens when one prepares to sell something for the needed cash - what happens if the seller no longer needs that cash? Is the sale null and void, or too bad for the seller? Also, 2 mishnayot! First, a widow can sell her husband's property without worrying about court - but a widow from betrothal needs to go to court. Furthermore, a woman who sold or mortgaged her ketubah needs to deal with court.
A new mishnah: a widow is provided for from the orphans' inheritance of the estate. Plus, a Gemara that queries the particulars of the widow's status, based on the mishnah's wording. Also, the kindnesses a widow does for her husband's heirs. Likewise, the services a student provides for his teacher, not including those practices done by a slave. Also, how a widow is paid - with movable property, etc. What if she doesn't claim her rights? When does she forfeit mezonot? But upon whom is the burden of proof regarding what she's been paid and what she's entitled to?
A new mishnah - where a husband sells the field that is the guarantee of the ketubah (for two wives, no less). Note the importance of the formal act of acquisition here (kinyan). Plus, the woman's ability to give up her right to a field that is supposed to guarantee the ketubah - but why? Plus, speech acts in this halakhic context. Also, when a man bequeaths his property to a woman who is unmarried, with the stipulation that she leave it to a specific person, but then she marries, dies, and her husband inherits that same property. Now what? There are a variety of views on this scenario, which leads to convolutions of repossession. Plus, closing the chapter - applying the principles to a creditor.
The case of two brothers or business partners who together are in conflict with a third individual - how to adjudicate the case. Plus, R. Nachman on the case of many wives each taking an oath, in Sura specifically - how each woman ends up functioning as a shaliach, or representative, for the others. How do these two kinds of cases compare? Plus, the dynamic between the two brothers or business partners showing up to court. Also, the mother of Rami bar Hama wrote a deed of transferring property, first to Rami, and then later in the day, to his brother, Mar Ukva bar Hama. Which transfer document wins? If the time stamp isn't relevant where they are (not Jerusalem!), then why does the time of day make a difference? Did something happen to make her change her mind? Plus, the potential significance of different judges.
A math word problem, as it were, beginning with a man who was married to 3 women, who each had ketubot of different value - and the man died. And other comparable scenarios, with payments to be puzzled out. With parallels to business investments and liquidation. Plus, how the Amoraim flesh out the details of the mishnah. Also, a deeper dive into the parallel of shared business investment, with uneven contributions. When are their returns identical, despite the uneven contributions, as per Shmuel, and when are their returns proportional? Plus, another mishnah - a man who's married to 4 women, and dies. How are those women each to collect their respective ketubot, given the other women's presence? Note that the Jerusalem ketubot included not only the date, but also the time of the day, as salient for the extreme case to determine policy.
The case of a man who sold the rights to his mother's ketubah - on the presumption that she'll actually get it. And on the basis that he's not backing out even if his mother objects to it, but the son himself objected, once she died - as if on her behalf. Plus, what happens with the transfer of property with and without a guarantee for the purchase? Also, determining the extent of the rights of one who has purchased property with a guarantee, despite a creditor coming after the seller. What's the order for collection? Plus, a brief look at the Rishonim on this case.
Defining "motar dinar." Also, a mishnah that delves into cases where motar dinar is relevant, and how it's applied. Plus, a mnemonic that is a guide for the topics going forward. Leading to discussion of the case of a buyer of mansions off a debtor, and how to handle the inheritance of debt.
Dedicated to the complete and speedy recovery of Noa bat Tova. || We're ending a chapter and beginning a chapter, with mishnayot at both points. The last mishnah of chapter 9: Being a minor isn't a free-for-all, in terms of getting out of responsibilities - in this case, specifically, a ketubah. Likewise, a non-Jew who comes into a marriage with a contract and that is upheld even in the Jewish context. Plus a discussion on how to read the mishnah - was it misread to be too specific about the ketubah. Also, the first mishnah of the 10th chapter: when one has more than one wife, how the ketubot are doled out, in the event of the husband's death. Also, what happens if one of the wives dies first. And the parallel to collecting or paying a debt, regardless. Plus, 3 different principles that are learned from the cases in the mishnah, in terms of the rights of inheritance and the order of it.
A new mishnah - a case of a woman who has her get, but has not yet received her ketubah. She's entitled to it, and he can't just claim he already paid it, at least not without taking an oath. Plus, a pruzbol situation. Note that in the "time of danger," when there were decrees against mitzvot, the Jews would destroy the documents, and being able to procure them became obsolete, during that time. Also, one can bring witnesses to attest to the fact that the couple no longer lives together, etc., if she wants to collect her ketubah after divorce AND death. Plus, the need for a receipt. And another mishnah: a woman who has 2 bills of divorce and 2 ketubot - remarriage to the same marriage, and divorce again.
More on how a woman collects her ketubah. And more on when she's collecting from a property with a lien on it, in comparison to orphans who collect their inheritance from property with a lien on it - by taking an oath. Plus, how loans are parallel cases in terms of taking an oath - how should such an oath be formulated? Also, analyzing R. Shimon's position from the mishnah, with parallels to the disagreement of "Hanan and the sons of the kohanim gedolim."
What if a woman needs to take an oath to receive her ketubah? What if the husband stipulates that she'll never need to take an oath? And what do you do if you need to collect the debt from a case where no oath is possible? Especially if orphans are involved. Plus, when a woman gets a partial payment, for example, who is then responsible for proving either she is still owed more or that she is not? Also, what happens if the woman accepted a partial payment of her ketubah, and she did so before witnesses? Cam we assume that all of it was paid, whether before witnesses or not? Are they trying to swindle each other or is the disagreement sincere? Plus, a comparison to oath-taking in the context of debtors and creditors, in civil matters. Plus another comparison to transactional cases that don't need witnesses.
NOTE: If you count the pages of daf yomi, today is daf 1,000 in this cycle (if you count the days, the count didn't work as smoothly, go figure - assuming it's our (Anne's) human error. || Ameimar issues a ruling on a man paying his debts - who gets land, who gets money, when he owes both a creditor and the payment of a ketubah? What if funds are not available? Plus, 2 mishnayot: when a husband can make his wife swear to her honesty. And when a husband stipulates that he cannot make her take an oath.
How do we establish ownership of property? Consider a good number of cases demonstrating practical financial law -- and precedent. Including what happens when one party is considered unreliable with regard to oaths. Note the role of the daughter of R. Hisda (wife of Rava). Plus, the weight of a judge's assessment. Also, cases of no designated heir, where it's surprising that the person who died had specific property in his possession (pearls, silver, silk). Or alternatively, when the person who dies has indeed designated an heir, but there might be confusion about that person's name.
A new mishnah: what happens when a person dies and several people have claims on his money - whose claim is met first? Also, how the sages who debate the above the question accept or prioritize each other's views - with R. Tarfon and R. Akiva as the case in point.
[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Tuesday, September 27, the second day of Rosh Hashanah] A new chapter! Can you relinquish something that is your right to own? Specifically, can a husband recuse himself, as it were, from his wife's property? Or does it remain his for the produce of it, as those are the Torah's terms? Plus, whoever owns the given document is at a disadvantage - to what extent does the husband retain his rights? Also, a brief reflection on mortality, given how people handle their land (and how easily, or not so easily would they sell, depending on the commonality of consequences?). So, beyond the question of whether the adjustment to the Torah contract could even work, there's also the question of whether one would actually try!
[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Monday, September 25, the first day of Rosh Hashanah] More connections between yibum and the granting of a woman's ketubah, and other property considerations, as the yavam technically gets his hands on the property of the dead brother. Plus, a question how the yavam can come into control of her property - isn't it hers? Resh Lakish responds definitively that, yes, it's hers (which emends the mishnah!). Also, how the ketubah puts a lien on the husband's property - and how it was a surety for the wife even when the ketubah was a specific item, rather than the sum it came to be later. And how the sages made sure that divorce wouldn't be too easy, lest it be the result of a (normal) fight between the couple. Plus, the decree by Shimon ben Shetach establishing a ketubah that protects the woman better. [Who's Who: Shimon ben Shetach] PS: What are the implications for decorative ketubot?
[Shanah tovah! This episode is for Sunday, September 25, Erev Rosh Hashanah] Who said halakhot were to be derived from the language of the ketubah? The mishnah connects the ketubah issues to that of sotah - the case of a woman suspected of adultery. The comparison leads to a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, regarding the terms of one's ketubah. Also, the question of whether a yevamah can collect her ketubah from the first husband while the yavam is alive? What would it mean for that money to be available? Moreover, how would everyone feel if that were put into practice? The mishnah is treated as important good advice.
How much food counts as "eating"? In terms of getting benefit from the property. What if one's animals eat? Also, back to husbands and wives and shared property - when it's worked by sharecroppers. Plus, a mishnah about a woman awaiting yibum, and in the interim, she inherits property. Who has the right to it?
A woman on the verge of the second marriage who wants to keep her property from the clutches, as it were, of the new husband, and makes a gift of it to her unmarried daughter. Then the daughter gets married, the stuff goes to the husband, the daughter gets divorced, and the mother wants her property back. Can she get it back? R. Nachman tears up the document establishing the gift to the daughter. So is it really ever a gift? Also, a new mishnah: if a married woman inherits movable property and land, so the husband gets the benefits. And another 2 mishnayot: what if the wife has elderly slaves? How does that work with the husband's rights? Plus, who pays for the costs of property? A good deal of complications regarding the property that comes into a marriage, and then becomes estate planning, essentially.
Chapter 8! With a new mishnah, of course. On usufruct property that a wife brings into the marriage, and the husband has the right of the produce of the property. For example, when a woman inherits prior to her betrothal. But what happens if she's already betrothed? It's a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Plus, an expressed discomfort with the halakhah as it's determined here. Plus, what if he doesn't know about the inheritance?! Also, a mishnah that is compared to Takanat Usha - on this kind of property, specifically. And again, what if the husband didn't know about the property she inherits? So much is property law, so much seems to be decided on a case by case basis, which is not always our norm.
3 mishnayot on the daf! The first continues the discussion of blemishes - this time, if the husband develops blemishes, and a possible distinction between major and minor blemishes. Plus, description of an illness, and how they dealt with contagion and efforts at prevention, via both medical and spiritual efforts. Also, the story of R. Yehoshua Ben Levi, and his encounter with the Angel of Death. [Who's Who: Rival/R. Yehoshua Ben Levi]. Including the possibility of death being suspended. And the story of righteousness and humility, and how powerful that truly is. Plus, the healing waters of the Euphrates, among other medicinal cures.
More on the blemishes. Noting that people with blemishes did indeed get married - even when there was knowledge of them in advance. Plus, some classic Gemara discussion and logic on a husband's claim regarding a preexisting blemish, and why preexisting alone doesn't decide the case. Also, the transactional basis of these marriages - and two parallel cases to them: 1. Transferring ownership of animals. 2. The status of an animal that is examined to be shechted. (With a hint to the much larger discussion of kinyan, a formal act of acquisition). Also, note the question of the burden of proof.
Physical blemishes that can negate a betrothal - parallel to those of the kohanim and service in the Beit HaMikdash. Which is itself parallel, to some degree, to the animals that are disqualified from being offered as sacrifices. Including - for the woman - sweat, bad breath, moles, a large gap between her breasts, or larger breasts to begin with. Also, a mishnah on these blemishes and when they invalidate the betrothal.
How betrothal is brought into effect in expected (a ring) and unexpected ways - the benefit of forgiving a loan. Plus, the impact of sexual intimacy on the need for divorce. Also, the role of nedarim or blemishes as conditions in the betrothal. Which is where the chacham, a wise scholar, and a doctor might get involved to change the facts on the ground. Plus, protecting the integrity of the get.
A machloket between Rav and Shmuel on the previous mishnah: whether a conditional betrothal requires a get if the condition is not met. And the ramifications of those different approaches. Plus, several cases where it would seem clear that a get is not warranted - but that a get is required nonetheless. Possibly at a rabbinic level of requirement, which seems particularly difficult, as compared to the Torah standard that would leave her free to marry anyone.
A mishnah on the practices of Dat Moshe and Dat Yehudit, and defining them by their practices, in the context of a woman who violates either category, and can then be divorced with her ketubah. Also, another mishnah! Conditional betrothal, and the ramifications when the conditions are not met.
A puzzle of language. In the context of a discussion about the husband who vows in such a way that his wife is sworn off something to such a degree, and in an unspecified way, that they are supposed to divorce and she gets her ketubah. Namely, the idiom that kicks the oath into effect... Also, a new mishnah! On other vows that the husband might make for his wife - when the vow stands, for how long, and when it leads to divorce/her getting her ketubah. Plus, consideration of the protection of the woman, Ina significant way.
A new chapter, a new mishnah! If a man takes a vow that his wife won't get any benefit from him, they divorce and she gets the ketubah - with some dispute over the time frame. Likewise, if he swears her off eating from produce, they divorce, she gets the ketubah, and there's dispute over the timeframe. Likewise, a case where he swears her off adornment or perfume. Also, various parallel cases (Gittin, Nedarim) that inform what the husband swears off in these cases - including when one writes a get to prevent aginut. And the ability to use a third party to provide the benefits that one might truly need.
A dispute and conversation between R. Yehudah HaNasi and Rav on the inheritance and transference of property - with an eye to dowries. Also, the right of a daughter to receive the dowry from the estate when she marries - is she an heir? Or is she a creditor? Plus, another story between R. Huna and a letter - on inheritance from elsewhere. And one final mishnah - using a third party to pay his daughter's dowry.
The discussion of charity begins in Pe'ah, with a focus on how poor one must be to receive tzedakah, when the expectation is that one downgrade, and when one doesn't have to go that far. Plus, an underage girl who is married off by her mother or brothers can come back and collect the funds from her respective family members. Also, financial advisories for those who don't have money, but live as if they do. Plus, the politics of inheritance. When is a lien placed on property by the court and when was it not? Especially given the need to support women and girls.
A husband's requirement to provide clothing for his wife, even when her father has written her off. Also, stories illustrating these issues. Including those of Mar Ukva, plus [Who's Who: Mar Ukva] With a focus on inheritance, and how to do so in a dignified way.
A new chapter! A new mishnah! Which provides the text of the "equation" for what each spouse owes the other, including what funds paying back humiliation might come directly to the woman. Except that R. Yehudah Ben Beteira revises that position wholly. Which opens a good deal of discussion in the Gemara. Plus, a variety of humiliating practices that lead to compensatory payment. Also, adding conditions to the ketubah, based on the movable property, and more. Plus, the economics of the ketubah with regard to the dowry she brings in to the marriage. Also, stories about the actual negotiations, including Nakdimon.
To what extent do the provisions for a woman include wine? The answer seems to depend on whether she's accustomed to drinking wine - clearly, some women did drink and others did not. The implications of "too many" cups of wine for her behavior are presented rather dramatically. Plus, a story of Homa, Abaye's widow, who puts in the request with Rava for her wine, even though her husband wasn't accustomed to drink. That interaction leads to drama with Rava's wife, who was the daughter of R. Hisda and Homa. Also, other provisions for the woman, including mattresses, pillows, clothing, etc. Which should still be respectable, at least.
More on wives deemed "rebellious." An assortment of rabbis needed to adjudicate a case of a moredet and whether she needs to give up her wardrobe. [What's What: Ika de-amrei] And the answer is not clear at all. Plus, the question of when the moredet can get divorced. Also, a mishnah on what it means to provide for a wife's food, including specifics about the kinds of foods and their amounts. Plus, the implications for a house with tzara'at, food with tzara'at, etc.
Part of the famous story of Rabbi Akiva - the story of his years of Torah study and his wife's possibly surprising years of support. Also, a new mishnah: a woman who rebels against her husband (or a man who rebels against his wife) is penalized financially, with regard to the ketubah. What is the rebellion? It's a dispute whether she's refusing the marital bed or refusing to fulfill her responsibilities at home (and likewise, a man's refusal would be either conjugal relations or the sustenance/mezonot that he should be providing).
A few disputes between Rav and R. Yochanan, including how a groan can break your whole body, and how that's a matter of the Jewish condition, in terms of perpetual anguish. Also, a man's obligation for the frequency of a wife's conjugal rights, depending on his profession. Plus, stories of sages who prioritized their studies over the families and the dramatic (and sometime dire) outcomes.
Dedicated in the memory of Dr. Dodi Tobin z"l. || A series of what amounts to recommendations by the sages for a healthy diet during pregnancy. Including how a mother's diet of etrogim made the child smell good, to the extent that the child was used to spice. Plus, more marriage politics around nursing, which are apparently eternal. Also, just how delectable all kinds of food, meat and wine and mushrooms and turnip and even pomegranates can be, to drive people beyond distraction in their desire and appetite for the food. And how the way one treats the waiters is indicative of one's righteousness - and if one is righteous enough, Elijah the Prophet just might pop by for a visit. Plus, the next mishnah. And - 2 sages with comparable names. And a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai that brings us back to pregnancy and nursing.
The Gemara discusses its understanding of some developmental milestones and explains how infants recognize their mothers. When can nursing mothers remarry?
A husband cannot consecrate a wife's earnings after all. How is this case parallel to swearing off the use of something? Is it really comparable to the terms of marriage? Also, shifting to what the woman has to provide in marriage - with great specificity. Plus, nursing.
What if a wedding is delayed and one of the couple is a kohen? What happens to the terumah and the woman's ability (or lack thereof) to eat from it? Also, a new mishnah: on whether a husband can consecrate his wife's earnings before she's earned them.
More on the chuppah, and the end of the marriage ceremony. Also, a new mishnah: preparation for the wedding and marriage could easily take a year in advance. Likewise, can he provide her mezonot from terumah? What happens when kohanim marry non-kohanim? Plus, the Gemara's study of the preparatory period prior to marriage as understood from the biblical Rivka. Also, the given here seems to be planning a marriage to a minor that will take place once she's reached the age of majority, which seems to turn other passages we've seen in the Gemara on their head.
Reactions to R. Elazar ben Azariah's opinion regarding "umdana," assessment of intent, specifically with regard to the ketubah. Plus, the sages on the sages, specifically on their respective halakhic expertise. Plus, the focus on different scenarios of how those views might play out - including the emotions surrounding the wedding night... Which is normally, indeed, at night, even when the chuppah itself is not necessarily. But pinpointing the moment of being required to pay the additional sum of the ketubah is not so simple.
A new chapter (5), a new mishnah: on the value of the ketubah, and the possibility that the husband add to the baseline sums of 200 dinar for a virgin and 100 for a widow/divorcee. The question of whether she'd get that extra if they were only betrothed is a machloket. Also, the question of whom to follow in that machloket -- spoiler: R. Elazar ben Azariah, on his convincing presumption about the intent to marry. Plus, terumot and ma'aserot, and R. Shimon Shizuri's on intent and assessments.
Ending chapter 4: beginning with some of the geographic differences in talmudic times - and how different places had different practices. Which leads to a dispute between Rav and Shmuel, which each paskened like the practice in either Jerusalem or Yehudah - that is, the Babylonian communities followed the various Israel practices. With a divide between Nehardea and Mehoza. Plus, a series of cases of what happens when there's a conflict over who inherits how.... Including when different rabbis paskened differently for the same issue - 4 stories, with wrinkled of depreciation, etc.
Pre-wedding negotiations, and how they were manifest back in the day. Plus, the economic focus of marriage. Also, the question of how long a man or his estate provides for female children - until she's an adult, until she's married, or both?!
When is a husband obligated to redeem his wife? To be sure, it depends, and it's a machloket. Also, more generally, redeeming people for ransom, including the question of redeeming captives for more than they're even worth. Likewise, the discussion veers to whether a husband would need to pay more than the ketubah value. Plus, what does a husband have to pay for a wife's medical treatment? Is there a cap on his monetary obligation? Note also: bloodletting of the world then. Also, a new mishnah, on how children inherit the ketubah money, what's standard in the contract, and what's different for boys and girls.
Truly, a doozy of a daf (again, rape). But first, establishing the minimum standard of the ketubah (a mishnah!). Likewise, the standard that a man has to redeem his captive wife. Note the planning for the captive wife scenario - which seems far beyond the pale today. Also, the Gemara on rape, on Shmuel's father's take on rape, and Rava's sharp and extensive rejection of Shmuel's father's view.
[What's What: Usha] Also, not giving TOO much tzedakah, and the source for that. Plus, the decree that a man's obligation to educate his son is more gentle before the child is 12, though from 12, the father should harass his son, within every inch of his life. Plus, what should be taught at the age of 6, and when kids start fasting. (Note the "neis nistar," as we have a daf about school curricula as schools start in some US locales, a week before Israel should start, and more). Plus, how Rav provided food for some orphan girls.
A new mishnah! On "mezonot" - sustenance - that a father turns out not to be obligated to provide for his daughter. But how can that possibly be? The Gemara distinguishes between obligation and mitzvah. Also, the discussion of a decree that a man provide for his children while they're minors. Which leads to a list of complaints to various sages by community members about particular fathers in their midst who aren't providing for their children. At what point does the court insist that a father actually pony up and pay for his children's sustenance?
What does a wife owe her husband? What does a husband owe his wife? From her earnings to her conjugal rights. Which term means what? Each sage who weighs in has rationale and verses to back himself up. Plus, how the Jewish couple is enjoined to avoid the "Persian practice," of sexual relations while fully dressed. Also, a new mishnah: granular details on the chuppah, and responsibility.
Contractual relationships that a woman (even a girl) has with her father and then, presumably, eventually, her husband. Including the source for the father's "right" to his daughter's earnings. Also, the "sustenance" (mezonot) that a husband provides for his wife. And again, the transactional dynamic of earnings for provisions, dowry for burial, etc.
More on the case of defamation of a woman by her husband. What happens, practically, when one brings such a case? The husband goes to the court, and then the question is whether there are witnesses to the effect that she was had an affair. Also, doesn't the death sentence on her head contradict her collecting the ketubah money?! Also, what is the relationship between the daughter and the father? What about the relationship with the husband?
The case of Motzi Shem Ra - defamation - from a husband against his wife. Namely, his accusation that she has had an affair and has not slept with the husband. She gets a death sentence, and the question is whether she'll be strangled or stoned. This dynamic of his defamation and her (potential) adultery is both concerning and dramatic. Also, the terms and setting of her stoning. Plus the parallel to one who committed idolatry.
The woman's ketubah can function as a lien, fundamentally, on the man's property. In the case under discussion, of a woman who is betrothed/married twice, do the terms of the second ketubah supplement or replace the terms of the first one? When it comes to regular (non-ketubah) documents, R. Nachman says the second replaces the first. But is that the case for ketubah? Also, a new mishnah: the defamer. Specifically, the implications of defamation for converts - namely, in the case of a husband bringing a suit against his wife (or betrothed). Likewise, for one who doesn't have a living father - as the defamation is an offense against him.
R. Avina asks R. Sheshet about the case where a girl's brothers provide for her from the father's estate. Since her father would have gotten her earnings, maybe the brothers should as well... But that's not so clear. Plus, does a man care more for his daughter or his wife, in the precarious circumstances after his death? Also, when the woman has been injured physically in the event if rape.... Plus, to what degree can the sons stand in for their father, with regard to their sister? Plus, a new mishnah.
A new chapter, a new mishnah. In the event of a seduction or rape, the compensation for degradation, humiliation, and the fine go to her father. Unless he has died and then there's a machloket whether the funds go to her brothers or to herself. Plus, the Gemara's assumption that seduction involves her decision to participate - and yet he must pay compensation. Which calls into question the assumption that she's a willing participant. Also, the ongoing machloket between R. Yosef and Rabbah [Who's Who: Rav Yosef].
Closing the chapter, with a new mishnah. If someone stole, and then comes clean, he doesn't have the pay the additional fine (eg: 2x the object stolen. Basically, those compensation packages that include payment plus fine, the perpetrator can be exempted from the knas (fine). Why isn't rape on this mishnah? Also, the second half of the mishnah takes us into the Laws of Damages, and a goring ox.
3 mishnayot: 1. An orphan who is betrothed and then gets divorced - and is then raped, what penalty does the rapist get? [Who's Who: R. Elazar ben Shamua] Also, defining "boshet"/humiliation. And how to determine the paymenyin compensation for having caused boshet. Plus, the fixed sum as established in the Torah. Also, a father who can sell his minor daughter... and why he can't receive any penalty in the event of her rape.
There are women who might use the talmudic era version of barrier birth control, including a pregnant woman, a nursing woman, and especially with concern for the minor... So the Gemara defines who is a minor. Plus: "God protects the fools." Also, a new mishnah: what is the difference between a seducer and a rapist? Including the rapist marrying the woman he raped. Plus, the Amoraim consult the women in their lives - an interesting recognition that the "women's voice" was necessary.
A new mishnah! A young woman who is betrothed and then divorced - in the event of rape, would she receive a fine? And who would receive it, if yes? It's a machloket, of course. Also, assessing whose view is represented in the mishnah - beginning with R. Akiva. What do the verses about the fine teach? Plus, juggling source material....
A female convert needs to wait 3 months post-conversion before getting married, to be sure she wasn't pregnant prior to marriage. But not everyone agrees. Perhaps she doesn't need to wait at all. The concern being whether she would have protected herself from promiscuity before conversion. Even to what extent would she work to prevent conception, in the event of promiscuous behavior? The women in this case certainly have some measure of agency. Also, the "eglah erufah"! Even the murderer needs to be treated with respect.
A series of cases where divorce or annulment is taking place - when does the wife receive the penalties, for example, if she's been a victim of rape or seduction - especially if she's only betrothed, and presumed to be a virgin. What about a minor? What about an aylonit? What if she's simply older and her hyman is no longer "intact" (without sexual encounter)? What about a blind woman? Also, a new mishnah, specifically on the women who would not have a fine be laid to their fathers in the event of their being raped. What about molestation that isn't full rape? It's still a violation, but is it always going to have the worst-case-scenario consequences?
Gezarah shavah! Where does the Torah specify all of the people who would deserve lashes as a punishment? From a gezarah shavah - of one or another, which is a puzzle, because a gezarah shavah should be clear and unique. Plus, the Gemara seems hesitant to learn from this gezarah shavah. Also, delving into the details of this gezarah shavah, once it's been established. Specifically, harm to a person vs. animal, harm on weekday vs. on Shabbat, and more.
If one slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, that's a violation of Shabbat or Yom Kippur, but the animal is kosher for others to eat. Which seems to line up with the view of R. Yochanan HaSandlar. And the Gemara is going to mull his view and why it lines up here better than the opinions of others do. Also, a novel insight regarding a fine that came together with a punishment that deserves the death penalty - now what? Plus, the classic "ba ba-machteret." All of which comes together to teach the sanctity of Shabbat, except for the burglar to one's home. Even in the same moment. With a surprising absence of need for warning about that sin of killing the intruder.
The impact of warning on sin, punishment, and how it works with plotting (conspiring) witnesses. But how can conspiring witnesses ever get a proper warning?! Unless the warning comes much earlier. But there's some concern about warning witnesses, and messing with their commitment to bring witnesses. Another rationale for not warning the conspiring witnesses is to render their case such that they become impossible to kill, on the basis of their testimony. Also, the apparently reasonable, and yet absurd question of how death is more severe than lashes. Plus, a prooftext from the Book of Daniel, and the attempted death (and not lashes) in Nebuchadnezzar's fiery furnace.
A deep dive into a dispute between Ulla and R. Yochanan about not paying and getting lashes, both, for the same event. Plus, a brief discussion of damages in general. Are those damages (5 categories) relevant for all kinds of harm? Also, the mishnayot can be interpreted to mean different cases leading to different punishments, which eases their dispute. Which leads back to one punishment per action - when all the details line up for corporal punishment, as the verses prioritizes things. Note - the value of the damage also makes a difference. As does the presence of witnesses and warning, and so on.
The Gemara discusses at in great detail all the different steps involved with the actions of walking, standing, and throwing and how they relate to the melacha of carrying.
The case of illicit relationships and the penalty that would need to be paid - which did not align with the view of R. Nechuniyah ben HaKaneh. He draws the connection to a shabbat violation that comes together with a monetary penalty, and how the perpetrator is only obligated on one punishment (and how Abaye and Rava understand his approach). Also, what happens if a zar decides to eat terumah (a karet violation), and stole it from a kohen - shouldn't he be exempt from paying for terumah because of the more extreme punishment. But what if you could get the terumah back? What if the terumah was liquid terumah??
Chapter 3! A situation of rape... Which was treated differently back in the day. In this mishnah, the penalty that a man who rapes a girl (whose presumptive status is that she's a virgin) needs to pay to her father. Plus, the penalty for engaging in an arayot relationship. Also, a dispute about the potential relationship between the man and the woman if the woman's status is questionable - can a marriage between them take effect? Will it work? What about when there are kohanim involved? What if a widow was raped by the kohen gadol?
The Gemara makes assumptions about couples that have divorced to protect them against future inappropriate intimacy. Also, a mishnah on adults who recall key information from childhood, and whether their testimony about those past events is legitimate. Plus, the "ketzatzah."
A mishnah: A city that was conquered - the women who were married to kohanim are now forbidden to their husbands. But if there were witnesses that the women were unscathed, they are believed, even if they aren't usually considered credible. Plus, a counter example to weaken the strong mishnah statement, via barrels of wine, even during wartime. What if circumstances indicate that they were protected? The sages know they want to be lenient in these cases - let's call it, "magical halakhic thinking." Also, the very sad story of a kohen who couldn't testify about himself. [Who's Who: R. Zechariyah Ben HaKatzav] || Talmud Principles: A person can't testify on his (or her) own behalf.
Some historical context for kohanim and leviim, and who got to collect the terumah and ma'aser rishon when... Note the penalty of Ezra with regard to those who did not return to the land of Israel in the time of Shivat Tzion. Plus, kohanim getting their tithes on the threshing floor. Also, a new mishnah: a woman who is imprisoned by non-Jews to get her husband to pay his debt - she's allowed to return to her husband after he pays and she's released. Unlike a "captive woman." But if she's imprisoned for a capital offense, and then later freed, she can't go back to her husband, even if he's not a kohen. The circumstances seem to depend on the degree of Jewish autonomy, and who is governing the non-Jewish world. Plus, an example of such a case in Ashkelon, which calls the claim about the non-Jewish immorality into question.
A focus on terumah, with the distinction of how that was applied in the land of Israel, as compared to in Babylonia - where terumah derabbanan was in play. Also, it was contingent on the "chazakah" status as kohanim. Note also different kohen practices as establishing kohanim as such, in the various places. Also, how were the kohanim actually established in practice? Various narratives illustrate the ways.
What happens when 2 people claim that each other is a kohen? Is that sufficient, or is a third person needed to corroborate, such that each person has 2 witnesses confirming his status as a kohen? The answer is found in donkey drivers or merchants, who are presumed to be more likely to collude, among other examples of trustworthy business practices (or not). Also, other practices by kohanim that seem to attest to their legitimate status as kohanim... but are they enough??
What happens if witnesses as to a woman's captivity only show up after she's already married (as per the mishnah)? The Gemara explains that the mishnah doesn't mean actually married. And if she has witnesses who can corroborate that she was unscathed - that is believed. Likewise, if there are witnesses that she's NOT unscathed, she's supposed to leave her marriage (especially if she's married to a kohen). Plus, a case of events that took place - actual captive women. With Shmuel knocking his father, and with his father winning, after all. Also, a paid of witnesses who each said they were pure - they can testify on behalf of the others, but not for themselves. Plus the full range of permutations, so that all basis are covered. Including what happens if the party, or some parties, are kohanim, or people waiting to be established as kohanim.
What is a "Beit Din chatzuf"? When the court isn't quite proper, but its acts are upheld. Also, a new mishnah who speaks about herself as having been married and is now divorced - we know that she is believed. And what of this principle of the same mouth permitting and prohibiting, where's its source? Plus, backing up one's statement with a rationale. Also, keeping the hordes away with a false claim of marriage. || Talmudic Principles: chatikha de-isura; amatla.
Starting with the mishnah on the bottom of the previous daf - the case of witnesses who testify to their own handwriting and also to that if the co-witness - that's credible and upholds the document. But what if they only speak to their own handwriting, and not the other guy? It's a machloket whether the authentication of the other guy, beyond his own corroboration, is necessary. Also, can a witness become a judge? Does a judge need to have been able to be a witness? The discussion begins with the witnesses for the new moon. There are open questions here, specifically whether a judge can be a witness for non-Rosh Chodesh cases (like documents) and a hierarchy of each rabbi asking up, to the next one with greater knowledge.
More on witnesses, and how they prove themselves as reliable. What about when their signatures need validation? What if they are challenged? Plus, a real tangent to a discussion on mounds of dirt that were near the city or on the path - whatever that precisely means - and when they were considered ritually impure.
Defining and explaining the "shtar amanah" - and why a document of "trust" is not to be believed in terms of monetary transactions. How does one prove payment, however? The documentation for loans ends up being key. It's a commitment to good faith, though it's not binding. Also, a case of witnesses who signed and died before the document was needed. People came and attested to the signatures - that they were the handwriting of the witnesses who had died. But the claim is that they signed under duress. Which complicates matters, of course.
What happens when two parties have a monetary claim? What level of responsibility is expected for one to be able to stake a legitimate claim? Why does the Gemara talk about a katan, a minor, bit who is clearly past the age of majority? Also, on witnesses - where they claim the signed under duress, then? What does it mean to be compelled to sign sworn testimony? When does testimony line up with this, or does ? || Talmudic Principles: Modeh ba-miktzat. No self-incrimination.
A famous Beit Hillel/Beit Shammai dispute, on how one dances before a bride - what is one to say? From praise for the bride, the Gemara moves to praise for the sages. Also, interrupting daily life not only for weddings, but also for funerals, though the king's entourage still takes precedence. And when to interrupt Torah study.
The second chapter of Ketubot! A woman who is widowed or divorced testifies that she was a virgin when they married - and the husband testifies that she was a widow then. Which needs witnesses as to how she was dressed when she left her father's house. Plus, other indications of the time. But what if there are no witnesses? Then he is credible (not Rabban Gamliel's approach, it seems at first blush). Also, a discussion of how the majority of brides are virgins. And that majority should negate the need for testimony! But there were extenuating circumstances that make the testimony relevant. || Talmudic Principles: ha-peh she-asar hu ha-peh she-hitir.
More on "the majority" - from its classic case of kosher butchers and one non-kosher butcher. The implications and value of the principle for Halakhah at large. Also, the case of the abandoned baby - how do you determine who the baby is, whether Jewish or non-Jewish? What about the baby's lineage? That is considered a different category, as compared to saving the baby's life. What are the practical implications of assuming the baby is Jewish or not Jewish? The role "rov" plays in these kinds of cases is significant, with regard to what kind of assumptions the community can make, and what they need to do, going forward.
Returning to the mamzer and the hallal. Specifically, a widow who had been married to a man from a kohen family, but of questionable lineage, for all that. That questionable lineage is the potential problematic lineages that can get "mixed in" with those whose lineage is not problematic. Also, the mishnah at the end of the daf: the case of a young girl to fill up jugs with water - and is raped there, but the identity of the rapist is unknown. Depending on the status of the majority of the people in that locale, she will be able to carry on and marry anyone she might have married prior to the rape. Note the impact on the assumptions that are able to be made about the given populations.
A case of mukat eitz, and whether she is believed (and what the value of her ketubah would be). Also, the case of a woman speaking to a man - which gives rise to suspicion as to seclusion... What is the nature of their relationship?! And what complications kick in if the woman is pregnant, if she claims the (unknown) father is a kohen, if she herself is the daughter of a kohen, etc.? What about this woman's claim with regard to her daughter's eligibility to marry a kohen? Plus, the reliability of this woman's claims. And also, what is the status of the child of her pregnancy without a known father - and the definition of a "shetuki." || Talmudic Principles: Ein apotropos le-arayot.
3 mishnayot! The case of a man who eats in his father-in-law's home in Yehudah, specifically, after betrothal, and with no witnesses that the betrothed couple was not along together... the husband-to-be can no longer make a claim against the wife's virginity. With the location being key. Also, how the kehunah has impact on the ketubah value. Also, when a husband brings a complaint against his wife's virginity, and she maintains that she was raped after the betrothal - which he doesn't accept. The mishnah presents two strong opinions, and the Gemara tackles the question via examples elsewhere in Halakhah. || Talmud Principles on This Daf: minhag hamakom, bari ve-shema, migo.
Different categories of women, including converts, captives who were freed, and maidservants - who were expected to have has sexual intercourse, given the circumstances of their lives - unless they completed those statuses prior to being 3 years and one day old. Then they are considered virgins. Plus, recanting one's childhood conversion (for example). Also, a cases where the unions do not result in a virgin's ruptured hymen. And the status of "mukat eitz," where the hymen has been ruptured, but not via sexual intercourse. Plus, the question of when a claim of virginity is to be expected or not relevant. With implications for the ketubah money.
Why was the ketubah instituted to begin with? What about the groom who claims she wasn't a virgin? Is he automatically believed, so he can get out of paying the ketubah? The ketubah protects her in the event of divorce, and this claim isn't likely to be made lightly. Also, 6 practical cases of how this claim of a new bride not being a virgin is rejected, in protecting the woman. Plus, a mishnah on betrothals that are not consummated, where the ketubah is 200 dinars. Note the word play/derivation of "almanah," widow.
What happens when a bridegroom claims that his new virginal bride seemed not to be a virgin after all? Particularly when there's already strife between the couple. And the complicated situation is reminiscent of the story of David Batsheva, where what seems an act of adultery isn't used to keep them apart. Also, further discussion of what happens if the new bride is not a virgin, and the implications for the ketubah. And how the same halakhah may have been applied in different ways in different places.
The 7 Berakhot in full. Plus, a practical account of weddings where sages said 5 or 6, and not 7. What is their disagreement? It would seem about the nature of the creation of humanity. Also, for the 30 days following the wedding, the couple has the status of newlyweds, which has bearing on the groom's ability to make the wedding blessing - that happiness is his portion. And in some ways, for a year. But when does that joy begin? Betrothal? Wedding preparations? Part of the concern is whether a wedding might be cancelled, despite betrothal.
The prohibition against the wedding night for a virgin to be on Shabbat, and permitted on a festival. But why is it permitted then? How does it apply across the board to everyone? Plus, a specific case about a historical case. [Who's Who: Helene the Queen] Also, Sheva Berachot - the blessings of a wedding that require a minyan for recitation. But how do we know that there's a requirement to have 10? It's learned from a biblical verse. But it's a machloket which verse that is. Plus, the time of these Sheva Berachot.
Still fighting with the tech. So many apologies!! || A disturbing daf - where we begin our discussion with the Gemara's case of prepubescent marriage (on Shabbat). The case is fairly straightforward - in terms of injury to the virgin on Shabbat, and Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai dispute how long the couple can rely on her prepubescent state to prevent concerns of the impurity of Niddah. Similarly, the case of a girl who is the right age/stage for puberty, but hasn't yet menstruated. Also, a discussion of the bridegroom who is exempt from saying Shema on the wedding night (from Wednesday night through to Saturday night, if the bride is a virgin and they haven't consummated the marriage) - a case that has its parallel on Berakhot 16b, and Rabban Gamliel who did say Shema. Note how the framing of the discussion is very different.
Anne here: Apologies for the late release, and in a new masekhet, no less! My phone seems to be the culprit. Obviously, I'm working to rectify. || A challenging daf... Strange in terms of Hilkhot Shabbat and unintended consequences - and the virgin bride. Specifically, breaking the hymen would be a epind on Shabbat, but why can't their first night be Saturday night? Why do "calculations" or planning get in the way? Some kinds of thinking and planning, even on teaching, are indeed acceptable on Shabbat. And yet... enough things block the shabbat marriage. What are the sages' intentions in exploring the unintended act in Shabbat - and the wedding? Also, a piece of Aggadah - acclaiming the righteous people for accomplishing even more than God, in creation. Including what people need to do to be righteous, and also why this passage is here in this dad's context.
When the time of severe mourning or a "chuppat niddah" changes the wedding night. Similarly, how her standing as a virgin can make a difference. Also, a focus on mourning and the leniencies (if there are any) for the bride or groom in mourning.
Talking about... divorce. In the context of unavoidable circumstances. For example, when a husband gives his wife a conditional divorce, to prevent her from being on limbo, or needing yibum. Also, some historical context. The sages stipulations regarding day of marriage was from the time of Ezra - because before then, the court met every day, and any woman could marry on any day. The sages or elders themselves delved into every detail pertaining to the wedding. Plus, an answer to why the virgin couldn't marry on Sunday. Also, what happened during a time of danger (oppression)? And how a Friday wedding for a virgin might risk breaking Shabbat. And how the Roman oppressors took the virginal brides (which seems to contradict the mishnah...so why is it the mishnah??).
Introducing the tractate of Ketubot, including the question of defining virginity. And diving right in to the first mishnah - what day of the week is reserved for virgins to marry, as compared to widows? What if there are interferences to this schedule? From the bride's niddah status to the groom's illness to the bride's illness - at what point does his obligation to support her (as per the terms of the wedding) kick in? When an unavoidable circumstance takes place, maybe he is obligated - but also, how unavoidable unpredictable does the interference need to be?
Another daf of mishnayot (3 of them), and then closing Masekhet Yevamot. First: Testimony as to a person's death can be seen in candlelight or moonlight, or hearsay from a "bat kol," a "heavenly" voice (in this case, where the voice is heard without finding the speaker later, in contrast to other bat kol stories from the heavens). Also, a story from Neharda'a because of intercalating the year... When the question of testimony from one witness was raised for discussion - and R. Yehudah ben Bava's view vs. that of Rabban Gamliel the Elder. Plus, a group of leviim who go traveling, leave their sick friend at an inn, and accept the innkeeper's testimony regarding the friend's death, but it's a little more complicated to accept her as reliable, and the discussion then is why her credibility is in question at all. And finally, closing the tractate: how scholars teaching Torah beings peace to the world, yes, really.
Opening with another mishnah on the identification of bodies - specifically, if one fell into water. Depending on the conditions, one may well be presumed to have survived such a fall. What's the difference between bodies of water that clearly have boundaries and those that do not? Also, the story of the daughter of Nechuniyah the digger of cisterns, who fell into the Great Cistern, and how R. Hanina ben Dosa knew she was fine, though it took her some hours to get out. His reasoning doesn't quite hold up, as R. Abba points out to him. Plus, a final mishnah, which points to the casual comments of women or children or even non-Jews, as to the death of a given person.
The CSI episode: How those testifying to the death of a person were able to identify the given body as dead. Even seeing that wild animals were eating the person is not enough to be sure he didn't make it. Likewise, more than 3 days after a death, depending on circumstances, risks decomposition impeding identification. Plus, the story of how one changed his appearance with wax - to the point of not being recognizable. Also, even though severe wounds will presumably lead to death, the person who is dying is not considered dead until he has truly died - to wit, he won't render anything impure until he dies (which doesn't mean he's going to live). The Gemara discusses how a seriously injured person who's been torn up might actually be saved. For example, cauterizing the wounds. Plus, what happens when one's injury is via a white-hot knife?
Starting the last chapter of Yevamot... A woman travels with both her husband and a co-wife, and when she returns, the claim is made that her husband died. Can she marry, or does she have to do yibum? But what about the impact of the co-wife? What if the co-wife is pregnant (and then there would be no need for yibum)? Similar questions arise with regard to other comparable demographics. At the end of the day, the likelihood of pregnancy implies that there is no yibum. Thus, defining "majority," and exploring its implications. Also, the case of 2 yevamot and what happens for each woman when the other claims that her husband has died? The slim chance that the husband is alive leaves them each in limbo as potentially needing yibum. Similarly, the case of witnesses to a husband's death - but what of the death of the yavam? Parsing out the cases, depending on who is in which position, etc. - for example, waiting for confirmation to the death. But what if there are other brothers? Potential yevamim. Which leads to applying all the different concepts and terms throughout.
More mishnayot! Two women who are married to the same man and one claims he has died, and the other says he has not - the status of the women is largely dependent on their respective claims. What if the disagree only in the manner of his death? What if there are third-party witnesses who contradict? Also, a couple that travels and the wife comes back and says the husband died - her testimony will change her status, but not her co-wives. What if she claims that her father-in-law died too (but the 5 relatives of the other day kicks in)? Also, the case of a man who betrothed a woman, but not which women he betrothed... what is to happen to all of them? What about the same case with an act of theft instead of an act of betrothal? How does the thief make restitution? Plus, the case of a woman who travels with her son and her husband, and the both died... The order of their demise has implications for her need for yibum.
Mishnayot! A women who testifies that her husband has died can remarry, but does she get the ketubah money? It's a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, and one that Beit Shammai wins. Also, the 5 women whose testimony is not believed regarding a man's death because they are too likely to have it in for his potential widow. Plus, the difference between a bill of divorce and the testimony to a man's death. Also, a woman remarries on the basis of a witness's testimony and another witness comes and contradicts that testimony - she stays remarried.
When a husband and wife have quarreled, it calls into question her testimony in the event if his death. But the Gemara acknowledges that bickering can be part of marriage, and that too-extreme statements promising divorce, for example, can be said in the heat of the moment, without it meaning anything of significance about the marriage itself. Including the narrative of how people chose the right course of action, with an awareness of the court's bias, as it happens in the given case. Also, a new mishnah: When a woman has the right to give her own testimony on her husband's specifically when it's the time of the grain harvest (or is that specifically? It's a machloket!). With some discussion of why the grain harvest was a reasonable time for the wife to be telling the truth.
Cases that make the mishnah of the previous daf tangible and practical, including the case of immolation (apparently) of a man on his wedding day, where his wife scres out to bring everyone's attention to him.... But then he's unrecognizable. Is she believed? Could the husband have escaped alive? Another case makes it clear that the real topic is not marriage, but testimony: the division and claiming of sesame plants. How can each plant be correctly assigned to each true owner? Plus, a mnemonic or code to designate the various statuses of foodstuffs (terumah, chullin, etc.). The question is: how do we (or they) substantiate claims?
How does the Gemara approach families with different levels of observance. We also start a new perek today which explores the parameters of single witness testimonies regarding another person’s death.
A deaf-mute woman is not entitled to a ketubah. Why not? What is the rationale? It seems to be left to the husband to decide. Illustrated by a story of R. Malkiyu, who established a ketubah for a deaf-mute woman, even though it wasn't mandated. Also, exploring the deaf-mute man who cannot divorce his wife, but the deaf-mute woman can be divorced - which is the the obvious case here? Note, not only is marriage considered different when it comes to men and women, but that is also the case for divorce. Also, with additional implications for the talmudic deaf person.
Apologies for the late release - technical difficulties that never happened before and are unlikely to happen again. Thank you for understanding. || The end of chapter 13: when one swears off various things - specifically with implications for marriage, including one who swears off having any kind of relationship with Jews. What are the baseline assumptions in taking a vow? Had she thought it through? Does anyone think it through to that extent? Also, a mammoth mishnah, tracing all the possible cases of the new chapter, 14. The cast of characters here is: men and women of the status of halakhic competence, deaf-mute men and women, and sometimes siblings, sometimes not. How do these factors after scenarios of a husband who died without children? [Who's Who: R. Yochanan ben Gudgeda]
1/3 of the way through the Talmud!! Another daf with 2 mishnayot, one long with little Gemara, one shorter, with a lot of Gemara. First, another case of 2 orphan minor girl's who are married to one man - what happens when the yavam sleeps with both of these potential Yevamot? And other comparable cases (deaf-mutes again, etc.). Also, a mishnah on divorce with these minor wives - which must wait until they are older. Likewise, what about an unconsummated yibum? Before or after 30 days? Which opens the discussion on the implications and timing of consummation and seclusion.
How to change a rabbinic kiddushin to a Torah-level kiddushin? Plus, a story of kidnapping, essentially, from the moment of marriage - or chuppah, at least. Which leaves a second marriage in her case as not significant. But is this story representative?! Kidnapping isn't a normal marriage. Also, a new mishnah: a man who is married to two minors who are orphans, and he dies - what is the yibum/chalitzah status?
A new mishnah! Can a couple that divorces remarry each other? How does that affect yibum? And a other mishnah: A case of two brothers who are married to two minor sisters. What happens in the case of one of the brother's death (if he dies without children)? Likewise, the case of deaf-mute women. Namely, rabbinic kiddushin. But an adult and a minor mixes things up. Also, the sages take on more detailed cases, including refusal, which isn't necessarily encouraged. Plus, a message to judges, and how careful they must be.
A mishnah from 107b: defining a minor girl, who would then need to and be able to refuse a betrothal organized by her mother or brother. She needs to have a level of understanding of what's going on. The Gemara gives us way to determine whether she has the ability to take enough responsibility to protect it... The sages are adding layers of protection but establishing by okaying limitations. Plus, another mishnah: How a divorce establishes prohibitions.... again, that protect her. When a minor girl's refusal is compared to get.... Her refusal is less strong, but the timing of either or both makes a difference.
A new chapter, a new mishnah, and a new topic: miyun - refusal. When a minor girl is in the charge of her family who wants to marry her off - she's allowed to refuse the husband, and nullify a betrothal that has been established between them. The question is whether this kind of refusal works both for a (regular) husband and for a yavam. Also, how many men can she refuse in this way? Also, spotlighting a minor girl's refusal of the yavam, with the implications for his brother (a three-way machloket).
During the process of yibum/chalitzah - when a yevamah refuses to stand because she's refusing yibum, and insisting on chalitzah. The sage then advises her how to maneuver to ensure that she isn't stuck in an unwanted yibum - but does that work? And if it does, is it ethical? Also, a new mishnah, the last of the chapter. It reviews specific procedure of chalitzah in court. Plus, R. Hyrcanus and reading the passage of yibum/chalitzah.
Levi goes out to teach Torah in a village, and the people stump him with 3 questions, two of which are about chalitzah. Plus, the family of Eli (and descendants) and God's anger and promise that they would die young - and how Torah and/or gemilut chasadim proved an antidote. Also, a scene of the beit midrash, R. Yehudah HaNasi, and a sage who is rebuked by a shamash as not being on the level, but as a student, he really was.
2 new mishnayot, on more practical details and requirements of chalitzah. 1. Can you do chalitzah at night? Can you do chalitzah on the wrong foot? Plus, how does it compare to tzara'at in certain requirements? 2. What if only 2 of the 3 component elements of chalitzah are completed? Is that chalitzah valid? Well, it depends on which of the 3 are completed (removal of the shoe, spitting, reading of the Torah passage). What is/are the core element(s) of chalitzah?
The Gemara springboards off the "foot" that wears the chalitzah shoe to biblical verses that include the Hebrew word, "regel" that come to be interpreted euphemistically. Including a focus on the story of Yael and Sisera. Also, what about the case of tzara'at and its quarantine time, with the question of implications for chalitzah.
More on the practicalities of chalitzah. To what extent does the chalitzah close the door on the relationship between yavam and yevama? Plus, testimony as to what shoe was in use for chalitzah, and why there was a machloket over the shoe. Also, how do we know that the root of the word "chalitzah" means to remove (as in, removing the yavam from the yevama)? Including Rabban Gamliel's scorn at a poor effort to interpret the "removal" as God turning His back on Bnei Yisrael.
Chapter 12! On chalitzah. The process of what happens before the court, and what kind of shoe the yavam needs to be wearing, and even what happens if he's an amputee. Also: Real life examples of chalitzah (in marked contrast to the absence of real life examples of yibum) || The video of crafting the chalitzah shoe: youtube.com/watch?v=6QzT_li3moE&ab_channel=AllDaf
More on how people received their terumah. Specifically, the different categories of people who can eat terumah, but can't get it in the standard way - something in their status holds each of these people back... Also, a long mishnah: What if a woman doesn't wait 3 months after the death/divorce from a previous husband to remarry, and she conceives and delivers. Which raises questions whether the baby is from the first or second husband, which raises questions as to who this baby's siblings are, questions of inheritance, matters of the kehunah, and so on. The doubt is only between these two men, but the mishnah eventually takes it farther in terms of unknown paternity: "sh'tuki."
Chalitzah, "just in case" - when it's not clear that everyone's relationship is what it appears to have been. Also, a long mishnah: the cases of the "mixed-up children" - which is makes it really difficult to know who needs yibum and who is prohibited from doing yibum. Plus, who got to pick up their terumah at the threshing floor.
A child born to non-Jews is understood halakhically to be not related to his father. To the extent that identical twins are not considered related. Plus, the story of Niftayim the convert, who didn't have to be concerned about the illicit sexual familial relations. Among several proofs that make the same point. Plus, 2 statements by R. Akiva, including one point about converts and one about Jonah the prophet. Also, a mishnah of the mixed up cases of which child belongs to whom. What are the implications for yibum?
First, a story about R. Yochanan, about attribution in his name. A concern that goes back, as it were, to King David and Psalms. Also, a new chapter, with its opening mishnah: a man who rapes or seduces a woman is not knocked out of the running of marrying her relatives. Was this leniency a good thing? Plus, riddles (mind benders).
3 mishnayot on the daf... Mishnah 1: Complicated scenarios to explore the parameters of testimony on a spouse's death that is determined to be incorrect. Including multiple marriages, and multiple reported deaths. Plus, the case of a woman who needs yibum and a 9-year-old brother sleeps with her (ahem) before other (older brothers), and he negates his brothers as possible yavamim. Mishnah 2: More on the 9 year old and a yevamah. Mishnah 3: Other cases of a minor in the context of yibum.
A dispute between R. Yehudah and R. Yosei on a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai over cases of a husband who believes his wife to be dead, and sleeps with either the mother-in-law or the sister-in-law, and how those scenarios would impact his marriage, in the event that the wife turns up alive, after all. Plus, the rationales for the approach to permit the couple to return to each other. Also, R. Yosei. On a case of two couples, where the wives are sisters, and the testimony on disappearance that is found to be mistaken. What are the implications for the couples to be able to return to each other? And who is disqualified from being with whom? Note how complicated and ambiguous the mishnah that this Gemara works off of to interpret is.
A serious challenge to the validity of one witness - but not because it's only one person, but because of who it is. Also, the opposite case - where the wife travels, is testified to have died, he marries her sister, and then she comes back. What do they do? Because he's not allowed to marry his wife's sister!
First, a brief comment on Daf 91: the reading of the woman's get. Next: Establishing a vow or acquiring something that is not yet in existence in the world, which seems like R. Akiva's position. Except that R. Nachman bar Yitzchak presents a contradictory opinion in the name of R. Akiva himself (after a long chain of names of Tannaim). Which leads to other examples of treating that which does not yet exist as if it exists - where the halakhah is upheld. Which leads to a dream, as an explainer. Really. Also, when it comes to one witness to the death of a woman's husband that she's allowed to remarry - is that because the likelihood of lying in such a situation is unlikely or to enable her to marry... Plus, she'll investigate carefully because of the implications for herself. In which case, what would that testimony do for yibum? What if she especially likes her brother-in-law? Can we still assume there's no lie here?
The Gemara addresses what it means for the court to have an opinion - for example, if the court stipulates that the woman who has one witness testifying that her husband has died can remarry. A comparable example is brought with regard to the time that Shabbat ends, based on the darkness of the day - which might be the fault of clouds. In both cases, as it turns out, the court's ruling is in error, but are they the same? Also, a new mishnah: a case where a woman's husband and son travel overseas, and the husband died and then the son dies. Or the reverse. When does yibum kick in? What if it turns out that the testimony is backwards? What about a betrothal to a new man, and then the husband turns up alive? She goes back to the first husband, and the get from the man who betrothed her isn't a full divorce.
In the case of the woman who has remarried after the testimony that her first husband has died, but not with the consent of the court - she can go back to her first husband, once it is determined that he is alive. Which leads to a debate about the way to talk about the halakhah, and how one should not appropriate another's opinion without naming him. Plus, a comparison to rape that sounds difficult to modern ears, but actually leads to rendering a decision in the woman's favor. Also, the question of establishing fact on the basis of two witnesses - what, really, could she have done?! Except the Gemara brings 6 challenges to that same premise. The case of divorce being a sharp question here, including an example where the women getting divorced is criticized for not checking the text of the get, apparently herself. Plus, a "bald get."
The case of a man nullifying a bill of divorce in the presence of the court, while a messenger was bringing the wife the get - he can't do this (she won't know about it!), but if he did it, does it count or not? The court's ability to decide whether his nullification takes effect seems dependent on kiddushin taking place with kesef, money, or an item of monetary value. The question of rabbinic power is very much in play. Plus, a series of examples of the rabbinic level of law, when in comes up against Torah-level laws. Including rabbinic corporal punishment (lashes) as serious enough punishment to protect people from violating Torah law. Plus, one who rode on a horse on Shabbat, violating a rabbinic law, and was nonetheless stoned, as it had been a Torah violation, to strengthen the seriousness of Shabbat violation. Plus, a married couple who were intimate in a public setting, and the man is flogged, again, beyond the requirement.
Why did the rabbis decide that women need a ketubah in marriage to begin with? And when is the absence of a ketubah helpful? Also, a new understanding of our mishnah, specifically with regard to a child born being a mamzer - in the context of terumah, impure produce, and improper designation of sanctity. Plus, to what extent is there a human component even in the determination or designation of mamzerim? And under what circumstances do those rabbinic stipulations or decrees override (and undermine) the Torah edicts?
How stringent are the standards of accepting the testimony of those who testify that a woman's husband has died? There are advantages and disadvantages to being "lenient" and accepting one witness's account, for example, depending on whether complications develop later, like that testimony turning out to have been wrong. Which leads to a discussion about witnesses in general, and their reliability. Also, a beraita on the case of a prohibited woman... With possible cases including kohanim, of course, and testimony about the husband having died. There are times the decision will be stringent, of course, and the kohen would be forced to separate. Including what happens when new witnesses follow some time later and say that the husband is alive. That is, no malice, but conflicting accounts, especially over time. Plus, establishing the testimony of women against that of men.
A series of marriage, a series of children, and how the status changes in her relationship to kohanim change her permissions, as it were, for terumah. Also, introducing the 10th chapter, and the cases that leave the relevant parties in limbo. But the mishnah presents this as pretty serious, even if the people didn't worry too much about it. Plus, the details that fray the marital bond, while the information they provide....which of course leads to halitzah in place of yibum. Note that "presumed dead" meant something different back in the day.
Revisiting: Who can eat terumah? Specifically, the women who may have a relationship with a kohen, in various stages (including pregnancy), or various considerations of his status as a kohen. Plus, Ma'aser Rishon, which is the tithing that goes to the leviim. Can the comparable women re terumah eat ma'aser rishon? Note also that those who are excluded from terumah or ma'aser respectively are called "zarim," strangers. Also, a dispute between R. Akiva and R. Elazar Ben Azariah regarding whether ma'aser rishon is given to the kohen instead of to the levi. Tracing through the dispute entails biblical and rabbinic material, as well as practical example from the time of the sages. Plus, the "proof" from the family of R. Tzadok. Plus, additional probing the respective perspectives of R. Akiva and R. Elazar ben Azariah, given that neither convinces the other, despite support from biblical verses and logic and experience.
R. Pappa and R. Hina arrived in Hintzvu, where R. Idi bar Avin lived. When they got there, they were asked: Can the daughters of kohanim who are eligible to marry kohanim marry those who have been disqualified from the priesthood? R. Pappa and R. Huna answer differently, with different inferences, and R. Idi bar Avin gives his own answer (where was he when the other rabbis first arrived?). [Who's Who: R. Idi bar Avin] Note the importance of knowing one's ancestors, to a degree that most don't nowadays. Also, is the ketubah part of the marriages that shouldn't be happening to begin with? And what about the secondary arayot that are prohibited by Divrei Sofrim? Does that cancel a ketubah?
Chapter 9! A very long mishnah... Categories of women who were permitted to their husbands and prohibited to the yavam. And the reverse: prohibited to the husband and permitted to the yavam. Including kohanim and mamzerim as possible complications... Also, forbidden relationships that are prohibited on a rabbinic level - "Divrei Sofrim," secondary prohibitions that come to protect the Torah prohibitions. What benefits are allowed or dropped in such prohibited relationships?
More from Rabbi Yosei. [Who's Who: R. Yosei Ben Halafta] On prolonged labor, and how it relates to grafting, from a halakhic perspective. Plus, the tumtum, one who has indeterminate sexual organs, or ambiguous genitalia. Note skepticism regarding a tumtum's 7 children's paternity. And again, are all tumtums to be concluded to be male?
More on whether terumah in this day and age (post-Temple) is d'Orayta or deRabbanan. [What's What: Seder Olam (Rabbah), here, unusually, used to support p'sak.] Also, a discussion on the sanctity of the Land of Israel, and how it doesn't lapse. Plus, more on the androgynous, with the implications for an androgynous kohen's spouse, in terms of eating terumah. The Gemara seems to treat androgynous as male, by default, which begs the question re an androgynous who identifies more as female.
More on terumah, in a new mishnah: a saris chamah kohen who marries the daughter of a Yisrael... Can she eat terumah?! Or if he's an androgynous. Or a tummy who is considered male.... What if the food is cakes of dried figs? Can you count them separately?
Returning to a baby born in the 8th month, which is considered a danger to the child, and perhaps the mother. Can such a child survive? Plus, the prolonging of a fetus in the womb. [Who's Who: Rava Tosfa'a] Also, defining and determining a "saris chamah," and why it's all moot nowadays.
More on King David and the Givonim. Also, the disturbing story of the sons of King Saul and their maltreatment of converts. Also, more on the men whose injured or damaged genitalia won't let them father children. And an unusual mishnah, where a tanna's inquiry gets two responses and an example before the mishnah returns to the details of halakhah.
Converts and their subsequent generations. What happens when a second-generation Egyptian convert marries a first-generation Egyptian convert? Is their child considered third generation or second generation? It seems to depend which party is the father and which the mother - whom does it follow? It's a machloket. With the example of an animal designated as a korban chatat that is pregnant, and how the decisions re the animals may have implications for the family of the generations of converts. Also, on the natin and mamzer - in terms of marrying those who are born Jewish. Plus, another case of gezarah shavah. And the story of the Givonim (with more to come tomorrow).
More on Ammon and Moav. Why are they excluded? Plus, why is a Jewish woman supposed to say within? Also, King David's prayers in Psalms, and some of the placement of the Ammonite and Moavite women, and his own lineage. Also, the complications that can result for an Ammonite family, though the women are kosher to marry those who are born Jewish. But when the halakhah contradicts the authoritative view, the sage is told to take his suggestion outside of the beit midrash... Lest it be misunderstood to be the halakhah. Though it is kept in the Gemara itself.
Two mishnayot: Several parties are prohibited from marrying those who are born Jewish, but can still marry converts to Judaism or freed female slaves. Beginning with a male with damaged genitalia and shifting to the Givonim, who have a rabbinic decree against them, or at least those who are capable of having children. Also, converts from Ammon and Moav are forever prohibited from marrying women who are born Jewish, while their female counterparts are allowed to marry men who born Jewish. Edomite and Egyptian converts are prohibited for 3 generations only. But the practical halakhah is likely different. Plus, the attention paid to David (who is not yet king) and his lineage - on both sides.
Some opening audio issue, but it resolves quickly. Why do we need 3 verses to teach us about terumah? The Gemara explains why we need all 3. Also, the next discussion of wounded or crushed testicles, and the implications for not only marriage, but also eating terumah, and so in. With some extensive discussion about the possible nature of the injury, and what happens if it's congenital.
Resh Lakish's explication of the text, in providing the source for ma'aser sheni becoming impure and then available for use to anoint one's body. Which aligns with what is done for the living and the dead in the same way. Plus, the various interpretations of the biblical term that accounts for the above as well. Also, another derivation from a verse - about impure kohanim who must purify before they can eat terumah. Likewise, who has to bring korbanot as "bar kapparah," those who need atonement (zav and metzora) - when is their time of purification? A range of times are able to be derived from the verse. And, another mnemonic... for where terumah is treated more stringently than ma'aser sheni. Plus, some thoughts on why these topics are getting so much attention.
A detour to some agricultural mitzvot, albeit still as compared to terumah. Ma'aser sheni, bikkurim, etc. Plus, a person in the acute period of mourning - an onen - who is exempt from mitzvot: prohibited or permitted in ma'aser sheni and/or bikkurim? Plus, the value of a mnemonic.
On not circumcising in the Midbar, after leaving Egypt. Categories of those with physical issues that may prevent one's eligibility to eat terumah.
A classic dispute between R. Akiva and R. Eliezer, with regard to explication of the biblical text. Also, delaying a sick baby's brit milah for 7 days, which has implications for the Korban Pesach, which is its own conundrum. Plus, 7 days on the calendar vs. 7 periods of 24 hours. Also, the uncircumcised and the purification sprinkling of the parah adumah, and the implications for Pesach, as well as how it's all derived.
Closing the 7th chapter... On a strange situation where the difficult status grandson permits the grandmother to eat terumah, but the kohen gadol grandson disqualifies her, bringing some emotion into the scenarios. Chapter 8: An uncircumcised kohen cannot eat terumah, nor those who are ritually impure. A kohen who has injuries to his genitalia, but after circumcision, can eat from terumah, but they do not permit their wives from eating terumah, because they aren't supposed to be marrying Jewish women. Though the nature of this disqualification is not entirely clear at this time. Plus, a deeper dive on gezerah shavah.
Those kohanim whose progeny are to be disqualified from eating terumah will disqualify their mother - according to R. Yosei. The machloket here pertains to how many generations after conversion the newcomers from select nations must wait to be considered full Jews (nations that have less than ideal history with Bnei Yisrael, as it happens). Plus, a very long mishnah of cases of sexual liaisons by kohanim with women that do not permit her to eat from terumah. And a myriad of cases in this vein.
About that 9-year-and-one-day-old boy, in the case when he has questionable status - his child cannot marry into the kehunah (with some machloket on the issue). The question of converts from various nations is a prominent concern here. Also, linking of halakhot to various verses, with different methods for doing so, specifically the explication of the "vav" in the verse.
A new mishnah - a bat Yisrael whose husband is a kohen, and he dies while she is pregnant - a case that raises all kinds of questions about the status that the pregnancy itself changes or doesn't. For example, who can eat terumah may be dependent on the phenomenon of her pregnancy. Which leads into a discussion of the pregnancy, and its impact. Plus, a second mishnah - on the forbidden relationship with the kohen, but from the male side, and the impact shifts to a question of yibum (and still terumah, of course).
Chapter 7! And a new mishnah: Who can't eat terumah, even once married to a kohen? Plus, defining nichsei m'log and nichsei tzon barzel. And the real-life ramifications of these properties coming into a marriage. Plus, the story of nichsei tzon barzel that weren't returned to the wife (widow) after all - but why not?
More on p'ru ur'vu... A man is commanded in this mitzvah, and women are not, according to the Tanna Kama, but R. Yochanan ben Beroka says women are obligated too. Which means the Gemara needs to figure out why his position is not upheld by halakhah. Plus, reading the text of the Torah without vowels. And the the Gemara tries to line up R. Yochanan with the opinion of R. Yochanan ben Beroka, but R. Ami and R. Asi gently indicate that he did not agree. Plus, actual questions of divorce for the sake of the woman having children that came before the various sages that initially suggest she has the mitzvah after all, but then the Gemara explains her desire for children in ways that need not rely on a mitzvah for children.
More aggadah - familiar interpretations of Genesis, for example...where Avraham takes Hagar to wife after 10 years of no children with Sarah. The man's obligation of p'ru ur'vu becomes an issue only when he has not had any children for lo those long 10 years. She can remarry too though; it might not be her issue. Also, the Gemara's cases of problematic circumstances that don't require "chazakah" to avoid. Plus, the medical issues potentially pertaining to brit milah. Also, the prayers of Rivka and Yitzchak for children, and the famous interpretation about their lineage. Plus, the rationale of suffering for the righteous - in that God wants their prayers. Also, the sterility caused by R. Huna's lectures!
A daf of aggadah...5 statements of R. Eliezer, including about the creation of Woman, and Adam's extreme means of recognizing her as his mate. Also, a statement if theodicy, perhaps, that the tribulations that other nations have caused Bnei Yisrael as a negative model for them. Plus, some characterizations of the sages and their wives. Also, decrees that seem to be against Jewish celebration of Babylonian holidays, with specific cause and event of bad things... Which is not a comfortable approach nowadays.
Be fruitful and multiply - 2 interesting aggadot involving R. Yochanan. Do children born prior to one's conversion to Judaism count for the mitzvah? Also, recall R. Yochanan's 10 sons who died.... Plus, R. Akiva on learning Torah in one's old age, as compared to doing so in your youth. And what happened to his own students.
4 mishnayot! Practical details about kohanim and whom they can marry. For example, a kohen who is betrothed a widow, and is later appointed to be the kohen gadol, he's fine, they can marry. Plus, a story to make the point: R. Yehoshua ben Gamla. Also, how the kohen gadol cannot do yibum, only chalitzah. Also, the case of the aiylonit and the kohen gadol and the mitzvah of p'ru ur'vu. Plus, the kohen gadol is actually not supposed to marry too young of a girl. Also, a man may not disregard the mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying when he gets married - unless he already has children. The details of which, are of course, disputed by Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.
A kohen whose sister dies... Recognizing that kohanim don't become impure in mourning anyone other than the 7 relatives, but the sister seems to be an exception, that her status has impact on his becoming impure on her behalf. Why her status makes a difference is not clear. Also, the case of a convert before the age of 3 years and one day, who is considered fit to marry a kohen, whereas older converts are not. Which also raises a lot of questions. Plus, the example from the war in the Book of Numbers, and the special way they determined who was fit to join the Jewish people then.
A new mishnah - this time, on the marriage restrictions on the kohen gadol, the high priest. He is not permitted to marry a divorcee... Nor a grown woman, which of course needs a lot of unpacking... Nor a woman whose hymen is not intact - the focus here is most definitely on virginity. What was the reality of all this for the kohen gadol? And to what degree did the sages expect any of these cases to happen? But why is she described as being "not a grown woman"? A clear dispute, and the majority position is that she can be an adult,
Issues of relationships (betrothal, for example) that are inappropriate with a kohen, but now she's in one - and even if she's the daughter of a kohen - can she eat terumah? What is the dispute here between the tannaim over the impact of the stages of marriage on her partaking of terumah? Also, applying the discussion to cases of yibum and ma'amar. And expanding the discussion on terumah.
Disqualifications for marriage - with a focus on a "patzua daka," a man with crushed testicles, and the ramifications of this status, especially if the man is a kohen - can his wife eat from terumah, for example? Also, the eligibility of a 3 year old girl for marriage (wait, what?).
When a bat Yisrael marries a kohen, is then entitled to eat terumah, and he is then excluded from being able to eat terumah - what about her? What if he dies, and they have no children? May she continue to eat terumah? Plus, the implications for her. Also, in the case of a wife of a kohen who is raped.... What happens to their marriage? Is the issue the second man (unwanted though he was)? What about the Impurity? The kohen who stays with this wife is supposed to be flogged. What does all that mean about kohanim?
The punishment for "all the prohibited sexual relationships" is stated as karet, and then the punishment for prohibition of one's sister is separate. Why? What if they were all violated "be-he'elem echad," in one time period of forgetting. Also, how do we know that a woman (not yibum) would be betrothed via sexual intercourse? The answer relies on the Torah's use of the same term in disparate cases.
A little sexually explicit... as is technically reasonable, given the essence of yibum. To what extent does yibum take place if either party is asleep? What if sexual intercourse takes place in other ways without intent? Also, beginning the act of intercourse, as compared to completing it - what are the implications for yibum? Plus, what if the woman is in niddah (where even an initial stage will be problematic)?
When a yavam and a yevama consummate the relationship, that's yibum and now they're married. If they do chalitzah, they're done. But that seems to be only when either action is taken initially, and when not complicated by other actions. 3 divergent opinions on the different permutations here. Also, a new chapter, and the unexpected cases of a man who sleeps with a woman without knowledge or intent, and various permutations of that.
What happens when the couple that has ma'amar between them sleep together before they formalize yibum? A discussion of lashes - makat mardut and the other times the sages imposed them. Also, the specifics of ma'amar - perhaps making yibum a little more tasteful.
NOTE: It's not you, it's us. Several events coincided to render the past several weeks very hectic for us (in different ways). Please God, we'll go back to releasing the episodes first thing in the Israeli morning in the next few days, at worst. || Why does Rabban Gamliel say there's no divorce after divorce, or betrothal after betrothal? But also, how do betrothal and cohabitation interact....? Plus, the sages disagreement with Rabban Gamliel. Also, a defective cohabitation - how does that compare to Levirate betrothal? Also, a general consensus that ma'amar is very effective. And tracing the sources of each rabbi who signs on for this position.
The fifth chapter! Plus, the options of ma'amar, get, chalitzah... and, of course, yibum. And how the may follow one from the other, as it happens. Note - a long mishnah here establishes the basic cases and basic principles - for example, once ma'amar has been done, it can't be done again in that same context. The Gemara basically establishes where Rabban Gamliel and the sages agree and disagree.
A new mishnah! And more on mamzerim, even an introduction to the status. Plus, a genealogy scroll that includes mention of a person as "mamzer." Also, the second half of the mishnah... The impact of a woman who dies on her sister's permissibility to marry a whole slew of people. Also, spotlight that lineage scroll. With insights, as it were, from the prophet Isaiah. What does his position, as presented in the Gemara, imply about prophecy? Plus, another extra meta comment about the mishnah.
The daf discusses Eshet Yifat Toar with an interesting twist from Rabbi Akiva. The daf ends with a theological discussion about converts.
Continuing the conversion conversation... How to be sure that a conversion in Israel will be accepted outside the land? Including the case of one who claims about himself that he's truly a concert, and not in accord with halakhah. How can he testify against himself? What can his testimony do against his children? How do we know whom to trust about their own Jewishness? Plus, why would someone want to convert to Judaism? And - an overview of the process and challenge of converting. Plus, a midrash on the dialogue between Ruth and Naomi.
A long daf... When Jewish women became pregnant from partial converts (men who had been circumcised, but not yet dunked in a mikveh). Similar issues turn up with wine and cooking... So: decrees against the wine and the food, and that the children of such unions were mamzerim. All of which decrees by R. Yochanan do seem to be in line with his approach. Also, R. Eliezer's position on this status (circumcision without dunking) is that the person is a full conversion, and vice versa too. But the sages required both. But where are these principles derived from? Forefathers, foremothers? But women don't require circumcision. How do R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua line up on this machloket? Plus, the generation that left Egypt and the issue of circumcision.
Cases a union between a non-Jewish father and a Jewish mother - what are the implications for the children (or are there any)? Rav takes a strong position that is indeed the halakhah - that the children are "kosher." Plus, the talmudic equivalent of a camel dancing on the head of the proverbial pin - meaning, thr law has to be upheld to be trusted. Also, other ramifications for the kosher progeny of a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father.
A case: 4 brothers married to 4 women, and some of the brothers died... Can a brother do yibum more than once? When is chalitzah done instead? What does an "invalid" status mean? Also, a man who remarries the woman he'd divorced, after she is divorced or widowed by someone else. Can they stay married? What is the status of children? Note Rabbi Akiva's difficult (and rejected) position regarding who is a mamzer.
More on the methodology of halakhic decisions, via a case of ritual impurity and the possibility thereof for carding combs for flax and wool. And the implications of unattributed mishnayot. Also, betrothal within the 3 months, plus a whole lot of cases of how people would wait or not wait for the 3 months. Plus, the implications of a waiting period for those who are in the 30-day mourning period for a spouse - as drawn from the parallel with Tisha B'Av, and the sense of personal mourning that should apply in both settings.
Two scientific points of interest - the 7 or 9 month baby, suggesting 1 month wait is all that is needed to determine paternity, not 3 months. What are the implications of these assessments? Including the woman's incentive to lie. And a deeper dive into the 7/9 months. Plus, pregnancy while nursing. Also, following some of the halakhic guidelines to determine the rulings of the Tannaitic literature, including or specifically, when there's a machloket.
The ramifications of chalitzah for the relatives of the pair doing chalitzah. Also, what happens when a widow awaits yibum or chalitzah, and those other relationships are already getting put into play? Also, the widow must wait 3 months for yibum or marriage, to see if she might be pregnant with her dead husband's child. Why defer betrothal, though? Plus, in the landed area of Yehudah, they may have been involved... And that waiting period is considered necessary for couples of this nature there. Which is also going to be the case for chalitzah. Plus, lest there be confusion over which women is which.
First, a timely comment on chametz on the altar, and matzah too, for that matter, for an episode release after the first day of Pesach (as that day's daf). Also, what is the goal of yibum, what is accomplished? Plus the implications for inheritance. Also, how doing chalitzah has impact on other potential relationships, prohibiting some relatives of each to the other.
Is a yibum marriage a full marriage? For leaving it, it would seem so - requiring divorce and not chalitzah. And the woman who is now divorced from the yavam is treated as a divorced woman in regular cases. Also, a new mishnah that could pass for the tractate's opening mishnah - about how yibum works, who is obligated, etc. For example, one who is obligated by the yavam and tries to pan it off on someone else...(specifically, his brothers). Plus, how specific amoraim connected to each of the people who encountered yibum, with actual practical cases. And some open questions on the structure of this masekhet.
Cases of questionable inheritance, which need some real calculation and navigation to determine who should inherit what (particularly property). Plus, a new mishnah - where a yevamah-to-be inherits prior to yibum... Which complicates the inheritance she bequeaths as well. Also, when a husband died before a Sotah woman has a chance to have her test to determine whether she has committed adultery takes place - what happens is a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, which aligns with the issues of inheritance earlier on the daf.
The babies who are born at 7 months or 9 months - with a paternity question. Why get into the 7-month baby possibility? That seems to be introducing complications for no good reason. But how much of this is determined by a majority of women? Depending on when they know they're pregnant... What are the real norms here? Also, a ln important discussion that begins with preventing mamzerim, and ends with not marrying someone you intend to divorce. Along the way, some rabbis put out the call for a (second) wife for just a day...
On Resh Lakish, in contrast to R. Yochanan - on the 3 times we follow Resh Lakish. Including regarding inheritance regulations, as compared to those of a gift. Also, what happens if there's yibum between a yavam and a yevama before waiting to see if she is pregnant from the brother who died....? The Gemara debates them needing to divorce and separate forever, or separate until they know if there's room to permit them to be together...and whether the sages agree or disagree. Including when the child does or doesn't survive for 30 days or more.
The case of a female convert or a freed maidservant... With the inappropriate presumption, though possibly accurate, that prior to their change in status, they were promiscuous, or at least presumed to have been so. Which leads to a discussion of the contraception that promiscuous women would have used. Which is relevant to the discussion when the woman knows her freedom is coming to take great care against getting pregnant. It would seem that R. Yosei contradicts himself in terms of whether the woman needs to wait 3 months... As well as other methods of supposed contraception. Also, a new chapter. The yavam has to wait 3 months after the brother's death to be sure that the widow isn't pregnant. What happens if yibum is done sooner? What if they do chalitzah? What if she is pregnant? What if the baby is born and survives? What if the baby doesn't survive?
More on two women who marry two men, and get switched before the nisuin part.... Which leads to a broader discussion of one trying to do a mitzvah who ends up doing a sin, and the machloket on that between R. Yehoshua and R. Eliezer. In this case, mixing up babies who need circumcision, one on Shabbat. What korbanot would need to be brought? Plus, a case of terumah for the child of a kohen from a union that is not permitted to a kohen. And another key case: chametz that is terumah on erev Pesach (yes). What's the sin-offering liability for one who is trying to do the right thing. Their dispute is maintained throughout. Also, some spicy Gemaras - when the married women have separated from their husbands, and they cannot do yibum or have halitzah or remarry until 3 months have passed, to make sure that she isn't pregnant from the first husband. Then the Gemara gets into the possibility of her getting pregnant, depending on how many times the couple has slept together. Plus, those women from the house of R. Yehudah HaNasi, who were known as "Tamar," because they broke their hymens to make pregnancy possible the first time (though this is not the science, of course). Plus, a woman who has been alone for 10 years and hasn't had sex throughout that time, which seems to be an indication that she will not bear children afterwards, even in the event that she marries later - if she had had intent to never marry again. But for those who want to marry again, this contraception, as it were, won't kick in (as per R. Hisda's daughter with Rava).
More on simultaneous prohibitions. How the dispute between R. Hiya and Bar Kappara seems to ride on two different teachings by R. Yehudah HaNasi, respectively. But the difficulties in understanding these passages are purportedly resolved... And then left in place. Also, a new mishnah with a strange case: multiple levels of prohibition, perhaps the most possible for a sexual relationship... But then there's a practical case too. And a meta comment on how Halakhah is not designed for wicked people.
If a brother did ma'amar with his brother's yibum, and then divorced that Levirate betrothed, leaves the possibility of yibum for the third brother, with the co-wife. But the woman who had ma'mar and then a get is in a complicated position. (And corresponding other cases). Plus a new mishnah, with another case (well, set if cases) - and bumping up against the claim that the mishnah isn't supposed to be changed. Also, the difference of approach between R. Yosei and R. Shimon, on eisher ach vs achot ishto. Which boils down to one prohibition following another prohibition, and the question is which wins, or does one?
When it's not clear that a couple has either gotten married or (a different couple) divorced... where witnesses are essential. Plus, the case of Bar Shtaya and his property and testimony that can't be used as determinate. Also, a new mishnah, with another yibum case - this time, where 3 brothers are married to 3 women who are not related to each other. It's a case of ma'amar, 2 husbands (brothers) who die, and the question of 2 yibum bonds to two men (or is that even a thing).
5 mishnayot, with templates of 3 brothers, two of whom marry two sisters, and the third brother marries an unrelated woman. The cases play out the different variables and their implications for yibum and chalitzah for the remaining family members. Plus, a mishnaic comment on the 15 co-wives from the first mishnah of Yevamot.
A new mishnah - that facilitates a deeper dive into ma'amar, the Levirate betrothal. Via a case of 3 brothers, and the complications there that get in the way of yibum. Plus, the language of "kiddushin," a formal act of acquisition, and how ma'amar compares to kiddushin. Also, the undoing of vows that a husband can do for a wife.... Can a yavam do so for a shomeret yavam, a woman who awaits yibum? How strong is the bond between them to allow for this? And lo and behold, ma'amar has a role here too.
Trigger warning there is a discussion about rape in today’s daf. In today’s daf we learn who can decide what is in the canon of Mishnah and who can argue with who. How do forbidden relationships have a different standing if the connection (from mother to child) is via rape.
A case where chalitzah is expected, but the man gives a get instead -- or where there's a yibum betrothal (ma'amar). Consider the layering of procedure and requirement that clouds the question of the practice at the Torah level of requirement. Also, the case of 2 sisters who had been married to two brothers, with one brother remaining to dispatch the yibum requirement. With a focus on Rav's opinion, and whether he contradicts himself.
Finishing chapter 2, and starting chapter 3, with a mishnah apiece. First, a case where a woman was able to leave her marriage - are any of the people involved in the case in court allowed to marry her? The answer - in sweeping terms for which there are of course exceptions - is no. Ulterior motives, and all. But with an important caveat or few. Plus, chapter 3 returns us to cases of yibum. For example, 4 brothers, two of whom married two sisters, where those two brothers then died, and the question is how yibum or chalitzah kicks in for the sisters. And the consequences when the parameters are changed, such as forbidden relationships messing with the yibum cases.
The daf discusses a few different scenarios where a woman is released from her marriage but someone involved with the end of her marriage may not marry her afterward.
On the mitzvah that is on the eldest of brothers to do yibum. Plus, what is the purpose of yibum?! (Finally?) What does it mean to carry on a dead brother's name? Also, when a man is suspected of having slept with a non-Jewish maidservant or a non-Jewish woman, who is then set free or converts to Judaism (respectively)... He can't marry that woman. What's the rationale and how far does it go? Including when ulterior motives negate the conversion, and when they seem not to.
A study of the divergent opinions of R. Yosi and the sages on the progeny of a non-Jewish maidservant, or of an idolatress. The child apparently inherits the status of the non-Jewish maidservant, regardless of the Jewish paternity. Which means that siblings aren't siblings, on a technical logistic level. But the non-Jewish slaves did have some connection to mitzvot, which makes the exclusionary verses inherently important. But how did this all work out practically?! Also, a new mishnah - with several complicated, and yet fairly clear, yibum cases. Which still pose very puzzling questions.
On the status of converts, particularly with regard to the secondary forbidden relationships. Also, a mishnah: how different statuses of one's brother have impact (or don't) on issues of yibum. Plus, the implications of having a non-Jewish mother. Also, the issue of mamzerut, the progeny from illicit sexual relationships, and the impact on yibum. NOTE: The conference mentioned in the episode is on Wednesday, March 30 - Anne had the date wrong.
King Solomon and his proverbs and the way he gave "handles" to the "basket" of Yevamot (among other details of halakhah. Note also the list of the secondary forbidden relationships - in full (as much as a beraita can be). [Who's Who: R. Hisda] Plus, a Chaldean astrologer. Plus, the secondary forbidden relationship of the daughters-in-law.
A new mishnah that establishes some principles about a yevamah... which is established by means of hypothetical examples that can be head-spinning, to be sure... Including principles regarding various sources of prohibition (mitzvah, sanctity). Until the Gemara asks what this principle really adds! Which brings us back to the eilonit, and the implications of those who are connected to her. Also, the widow and how a kohen gadol is prohibited from yibum with her. Part of the question is how far in the process of betrothal, marriage, and consummation took place before the first husband died. Which, eventually, brings the discussion to the conclusion of halitzah.
The kind of case we've been dealing with, but with ma'amar, not full yibum - with an entrance to probe R. Shimon's opinion further. Also, more on ma'amar - including the case of ma'amar when she doesn't know about it (does that even work? It's a machloket).
A lengthy discussion on how to understand the mishnah: R. Huna, R. Yehudah, R. Yehudah Ben Beteira, R. Meir, and Rabban Gamliel. So first, a view of each of their opinions. Also, a new mishna, tracking yibum cases of two brothers, who are each married, one dies, one does yibum, and now has two co-wives, the widow and his original wife. What happens if he dies? And a third brother was only born after the marriages and yibum? What if there was only ma'amar, not yibum?
Concerns about those with questionable lineage, which sparks a discussion about the 10 Tribes that were exiled in the era of the prophets. Including the question of Jewish heritage in a small amount, and the question of mamzerut that might emerge from the more questionable relationships... But how likely was this really?! The question is also whether the child is one if a couple who are idolators (or an idolator who married a Jew). Also, a new chapter, and new mishnah: the case of brothers who were not alive at the same time - how does that case of yibum work out?
The question of whether the co-wives of a daughter would be permitted to the brothers... As answered in the time of R. Dosa ben Hyrcanus, in accord with Beit Shammai (which is a startling alignment). He was elderly and rather homebound, so he wasn't available for consultation or elaboration on his psak, so eventually, a crew of rabbis make the trek to his home. And the Gemara presents what seems to be the entirety of their visit and inquiry. Plus, the harsh language among brothers... (and then we meet him too). Also, lessons from Haggai the prophet, about the case of the co-wives of the daughter, the tithing in Jordan, and details about whom we accept how easily for conversion. Specifically, two groups of people who would have thought to have factors that would invalidate them as possible converts -- but the names of these groups are similar to two groups that were indeed valid to convert, which muddies things. Which leads into questions of different standards, how much Jewish practice does it take to be considered Jewish, etc. Plus, a discussion of the non-Jews and their desecration if the first Beit HaMikdash, which is held against the Tarmodim (one of the groups), and the violence against women in war... With implications for Jewish lineage...
More on Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel... Specifically, did the members of Beit Shammai actually follow the approaches of Beit Shammai. Note also the affinity of other sages for either given approach - for example, Rabbi Tarfon (and his opinion, in contrast to R. Yochanan ben Nuri). Rabban Gamliel should be following Beit Hillel... But is introduced here as a follower of Beit Shammai?! Plus, several more cases by which to investigate the question of whether Beit Shammai people followed the rulings of Beit Shammai, or did they follow Beit Hillel, as per the bat kol (heavenly voice) that said everyone should be following Beit Hillel?
More on the disputes of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, with the serious implications of a potential "mamzer" status for a child of a forbidden relationship (or perhaps not). That is, they disagreed, and followed their respective approaches for actual practice. What about the bat kol (heavenly voice) that said the law is in accord with Beit Hillel?
How we derive the exemption of the co-wives with regard to the yavam. Plus, a new mishnah! The 6 cases that are more stringent than the original mishnah's 15 cases. And the disputes here between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, and the implications of those differences of approach that come to pass, and those that do not.
More cases of yibum, of course, including that of the eylonit. Also, 3 cases where an attempt, such as it was, at contraception was recommended - including details that do align with modern science, and others that do not: a pregnant woman, a nursing woman, and a "ketanah," a status that is narrowly defined and involves further discussion.
Two complicated yibum situations, with regard to the co-wife, and whether there are other relationships that would exempt the co-wife. Say, the sotah. Or a divorcee. Note: "Sotah" in this example means a woman who inadvertently committed adultery, and not the usual definition of a woman who is suspected of having committed adultery. And divorcee here is specifically remarrying her first husband after having been married to someone else.
Another yibum case - including when one brother dies before the other is born leads to a mnemonic how to keep this particular complication straight: "died, was born, does yibum" x2 - in a family of many brothers. And if the brother doing yibum dies... another brother should be taking it on. Yaakov is brought as an example - a strawman, and with echos of the biblical Yaakov. Also, when a woman exempts her co-wives, and other cases when she doesn't - ie, it's not "across the board" and is contingent on a legitimate marriage. Plus, how halitzah has impact on the yibum relationship. Plus, more on the Levi/Rebbi complaint/defense about the 15 cases in the opening mishnah.
Disturbing daf: Warning - discussion of rape. The question if the strange case of a wife who is raped by her father-in-law, which yields all kinds of complications for those who accept the possibility of the case (as compared to the Tanna who basically calls the question itself idiotic). Plus, a discussion of why there are 15 cases in the opening mishnah instead of 16 cases. Also, charts are needed for amud bet. Where the yibum becomes complicated with regard to the various possible cases - or are they prohibited? 6 cases leave the woman permitted to one brother, but not another - again, connected via the rape of the mother, not marriage. Plus additional interpretations of the same case. And the challenges of this particular daf....
The way yibum is pulled out of the category of "arayot," the illicit sexual relationships. Where the prohibitions seem to add up, until we realize how narrow a scheme the issue of yibum is, and we don't extend it further beyond the exception. And then the Gemara tries to knock down the rationale it's built up, via the specificity of the language in the biblical verse that teaches yibum. Until that inference is knocked down... All for the sake of handling the co-wives in the best way (prohibited when prohibited, but not beyond the specific prohibition). Not to take this kind of exception lightly!
More on the contradictory cases where a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment that has a punishment of karet - until that very line of inquiry is upended and rejected as a principle. So the Gemara takes another stab at explaining the rationale behind yibum and the "extra" word of "aleha" in the verse about yibum. Which brings us to hermeneutical derivation of k'lal u-p'rat u-k'lal. Also, how does the logic actually pan out? The Gemara illustrates it with another case - a metzora and the Temple... Which carries some complicated ritual to be able to reenter the camp... But what happens if that same person becomes a baal keri, just in time to not be able to bring the Korban Pesach... Now what?!
What specific mitzvot can override Shabbat? Shouldn't one fear the Beit HaMikdash itself? That would theoretically have impact on what you can/have to do, since there's no fear of Shabbat in that same way. But there is reverence for God that is then later applied to the Temple? What kind of reverence is due to the place where the Temple stood? Namely, don't use the Temple as a shortcut. Plus, going back to the question of a positive commandment pushing aside the negative one. R. Yosi and R. Nachman then debate the implications of "moshvoteichem." Plus, the complications in the addition of the benefit. Bottom line: Can one, must one put a criminal to death, for a court-imposed sentence?
When the mitzvah and the prohibition essentially come together, as with shaatnez and tzitzit - such that the positive commandment overrides the prohibition. Where else does this happen? For example, the metzora and the prohibition against shaving pe'ot. What about a kohen who's a metzora? With all concomitant objections. Of course, it is also relevant and present in the context of yibum and the prohibition of "eshet ach," the wife of one's brother. Also, the question of whether a positive commandment can override a negative commandment that has a punishment of karet? For example, brit milah on Shabbat. The Korban Pesach. The Korban Tamid. All in all, the power of deriving halakhah from the biblical text.
How do we interpretation biblical verses that are juxtaposed, or simply in proximity to each other? Do we extrapolate details from one verse and apply to the context of the other verse? Or is that too much to assume? Of course, the discussion uses the case of the yevama to discuss this principle, and establishes that a yevama cannot be forced to marry a yavam whom she doesn't want to marry. A third option for relying on this method of interpretation is to apply it only for the Book of Deuteronomy, which of course prompts the question why that is, and an understanding that Deuteronomy is said by Moshe, as compared to the rest of the Torah. Plus, the examples that support R. Yehudah's rejection of interpretation that depends on juxtaposition (semukhim).
Why are the co-wives described as "exempting" one another from yibum, when really those potential cases of yibum are prohibited? One suggestion is that that language would have suggested a need for halitzah, and once there's a need for halitzah, there's a risk of presuming yibum was possible, when it wasn't. Another suggestion: Plus, the strong connection between halitzah and yibum. Also, the Gemara asks why these 15 cases of co-wives don't include 6 more stringent cases of illicit sexual relationships (which we know from the Torah, and will discuss those cases later in Yevamot). Plus, some discussion on the transactional nature of the yibum relationship.
Diving right in... Introducing Masekhet Yevamot and Seder Nashim! Defining the case of yibum, the Levirate marriage. Defining halitzah. Defining tzarot. Also, beginning with the first mishnah, which presumes knowledge of the basic yibum case, and how co-wives negate the need for yibum for other co-wives - 15 different cases of relationships. Note that the requirement of yibum cancels the prohibition of a woman marrying her husband's brother... And it does not cancel the other illicit sexual relationships. But by virtue of being co-wives, the possibility of negating the prohibition of marrying a brother is often cancelled. Note: Charts will be your friend!! You may want to see Hadran's charts of these 15 cases that make each of them, and the co-wife issues visually accessible: hadran.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Yevamot-english.pdf (it's available on Hadran in Hebrew as well).
The backup vessels of the Beit HaMikdash did not include a backup mizbeach (altar). But they assumed everything was impure because of the kohanim who were amei ha-aretz, which means that the mizbeach didn't need purification. The question is what mechanism kept it pure? Also, the fire of Gehenna has no power over Torah scholars, as can be inferred from the case of the fire salamander. Nor even over the sinners of Israel, as can be inferred from the golden altar. HADRAN ALAKH Chagigah and Seder Moed
The daf discusses a variety of different scenarios where an Am Ha’areaz can or cannot be trusted. What happens to all the Keilim in the Beit HaMikdash after the regalim.
Why the Galileans weren't considered reliable with regard to purity and impurity. And possible solutions that would have enabled them to bring their goods to Jerusalem - like a movable tent for those who consider that to be immune to bring rendered impure. Or perhaps a tightly sealed cover would do the trick. Plus a comparison to the purification waters from the red heifer. Also, on the relationship between an am ha-aretz and a chaver, including when the chaver is a kohen. Plus, when one family includes both populations. And the complications those dynamics entail. Plus, how those divisions would have impact on the Temple.
4 more stringencies for kodesh over terumah, including what happens when only one hand is pure and the other hand impure, and how consecrated foods that are dry have a different status. Also, a new mishnah with a stringency for terumah over kodshim, specifically in the context of grape pressing and olive pressing for wine and oil, in the area of Judea.
More on the purity/impurity stringencies... Trying to make sense of the list of them, by their numbers. One who carries something that has impurity because of the way it came in contact with someone who was impure can also carry terumah, but not kodshim. This stringency is based on a one-time occurrence of things going wrong. Also, another stringency focuses again on the possibility that an am ha-aretz would render a chaver's vessels impure - including the very unlikely case. Plus, the final stringency of the daf, that has support in a biblical verse, unusually here.
The daf discusses how the Chaver and Am HaAretz interact with each other. How many different parts of a klei are there?
The starts the delve into the maalot. Why does kodesh have extra stringencies over terumah?
More on the purity/impurity issues with regard to clothing. What does it mean to have a constant awareness of your garments? And how little inattention it takes to render a garment impure! Plus, the wives of "chaverim" who switched their clothing, and fendered their garments impure. Also, the questions posed to one who is generally very careful, but knows that she hasn't had complete intent and attention, to determine the status of a garment. Also, the new chapter, and its opening mishnah of stringencies to protect the various items that were at risk of coming in contact with impurity.
More on intent when immersing in a mikveh -- and just how far that goes. Specifically, will dunking one hands in a mikveh, for example, render one's hands pure? Or must you have that purification aim in mind at the time of immersion? The rules for Chillun (regular food) vs. sanctified food turn out to be different. Plus, the case of a large enough wave that falls on a person and vessels that need immersion. Also, more on that middle ground of ma'aser, as entailing greater purity than chullin, but less than the kodesh of korbanot. Plus, an investigation into the source of the opinion underlying the mishnah (from a previous daf) - including the issue of the garments of those who are very careful to not come in contact with impurity.
A new mishnah: Washing hands prior to eating non-kodesh food, for ma'aserot, for terumot; and for kodesh (korbanot) or for a chatat, you need to dunk. But what if you've dunked for the purpose of eating regular food? You're presumed to be pure for the level of food that you dunked, but not for anything that requires a greater level of purity (whereas if you are pure for a higher level, you are considered pure for the lesser requirements as well). Also, a hierarchy is present for the potential impurity of one's garments. Plus, the experience of Yosi ben Yoezer and Yochanan ben Gudgedah. Also, do you really need to wash your hands if you're going to eat regular food?! And what about for ma'aser? It's all compared to a passage in Bikkurim. And opens the question what foods we wash our hands for and why.
A new mishnah! With a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai (with some background on their disputes), over whether semichah - the laying of hands on the holiday. Beit Shammai says the fully burnt offerings can't be brought on the holiday anyway, because they aren't eaten. But when the festival of Shavuot falls out on Shabbat, and there is a korban olah (that is fully burnt), then when can you bring it? Since Shavuot doesn't have any Chol HaMoed! Note the historical context to the Shavuot debate - because the Sadducees insisted that every Shavuot fall out on Shabbat, where the sages did not. Plus, a mnemonic for 6 halakhic differences between Shemini Atzeret and Sukkot - with a focus here on tashlumin. Also, the life lesson: if you aim for too much, you won't achieve it, but if you keep your goals modest, you'll meet them - a principle learned in the context of the number of days of these holidays.
On demons, angels, human beings, and animals. Also, on how people should not attempt to look in the prohibited 4 directions, or aspects of the functioning of the heavens, the future, etc. Rather, we focus on this world. Plus, not looking at a rainbow, whether for reasons that disparage the phenomenon or for those that elevate it. Also, the question of one who is overcome by a desire to sin - what should he do? When should he dress in black and go find a place where he can sin? Also, the mishnah and semichat yadayim - the laying on of hands. Plus, [Who's Who] The Zugot (from Pirkei Avot). But what are the details here? Machloket! Specifically, on whether semikhah was required when. Essentially, the first recorded dispute. Plus, [Who's Who: Yehudah Ben Tabbai... and Shimon ben Shetach.
Such a rich daf! First, the story of "Pardes," the four who entered the Pardes and came out with very different reactions (Ben Azzai, Ben Zoma, Elisha ben Avuyah, and R. Akiva). What happened to them is helpful, and perhaps essential, to understanding how people function in the world, when they confront that which is difficult, or metaphysically challenging, and the like. Also, Elisha ben Avuyah's conduct as Acher (Other), the apostate whom R. Meir still regarded as his teacher. And what that means for both R. Meir and Acher himself.
How angels were created, daily, for the purpose of singing the praises of God... Or via the utterances of God. Plus, R. Akiva's foray into aggadic interpretation and the double rebuke he receives for his efforts. Also, how R. Yochanan ben Zakkai taught, or didn't, the Ma'aseh Merkavah to R. Elazar ben Arakh. And what happens to R. Elazar ben Arakh when he delves in on his own, including the creation of angel(s), and the connection of his enterprise to Avraham Avinu. Plus, the rainbow in the cloud when R. Yehoshua and others were learning Ma'aseh Merkavah.
Delving into Ma'aseh Merkavah, when we're not supposed to learn it at all... Who should not be studying Ma'aseh Merkavah? Perhaps everyone, but broad strokes may be acceptable, or acceptable for a select few. Plus, the words of the Torah are not to be taught to a non-Jew. And how R. Elazar defers his opportunities to learn Ma'aseh Merkavah. Also, the purported hiding of the Book of Ezekiel, and the way it was accepted for study - but with some possibly innate danger, nonetheless. Plus the term "chashmal."
Delving into "Ma'aseh Bereishit" - including the order of creation, heavens or earth first? It's debatable, by Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel: top down or bottom up? The later sages arrive at a resolution. And yet, the discussion of the Rakiya (firmament) is still rather beyond what we can make sense of. Also, a dispute between R. Yishmael [Who's Who] and R. Akiva, who have significantly different approaches in interpretation of the Torah. In this case, R. Akiva is presented as the student of Nachum Ish Gamzu, and the function of "et" to teach additional halakhah, or in this case, the discussion of the way of creation.
On the illicit sexual relationships bring explicitly listed in the Torah - even that list leaves out some prohibited relationships. Plus, a statement by the mishnah on the essence of the Torah that the Gemara understands to be both explicit and derived details of halakhah. Also, chapter 2: Limiting the public study or discourse on certain topics, from the sexually illicit relationships to Ma'aseh Merkavah, and the metaphysics of the Divine. With some caveats, of course. Plus, other topics to avoid.
A range of mitzvot, beginning with hatarat nedarim, that the mishnah claims are not well sourced in the text of the Torah. The Gemara than contradicts this premise of the mishnah, for each of the mitzvot or categories of halakhah discussed - by means of examples of biblical verses to back up the defense. The question then is why does the mishnah make this claim?
Tashlumin - making things up, from sacrifices and beyond. What happens if you can't make it up? Plus, how tashlumin play out after Sukkot, at the point when you can no longer make it up. Also, the difference between theft, for example, and the child who is a mamzer - which status cannot be undone. And how can you make up the korban, when you actually can? Also, delving further into the essence of what it means to be able to make something up - and when you cannot. For example, an individual's responsibility vs. that of the congregation. [Who's Who: Bar Hey Hey and Ben Bag Bag] plus, more from Bar Hey Hey, beyond tashlumin. And what does it mean to serve God with 101 tries, as compared to only 100 tries.
What monies can be used to pay for the korbanot of a festival, in particular, the Chagigah shelamim? And when you you need to lay out money, can you combine money from your own pocket with your ma'aser sheni money? Especially when you need more than one animal to feed the family. And why ma'aser behamah animals could not be brought on yom tov. Also, a mishnah! What happens when you have many mouths to feed and not much money? Or vice versa? Or little of either, or a great deal of both? Plus, can those who are advised to bring many korbanot shelamim bring a large animal instead of several small ones?
A dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish on the mitzvah here of seeing and being seen. Note the parallel passage to Masekhet Peah, on those mitzvot which have no limit - including "ra'ayon," which needs defining in the context of Re'eiah. What is the extent to which we need to bring what we bring to God? Anthropomorphism par excellence. Also, a new mishnah - on what monies can be used to pay for what (when sacred property (ma'aser sheni) and when "hullin," non-sacred property).
Who is a minor? The Gemara follows the mishnah's discussion of the abilities of the child - to ride on his father's shoulders to the Temple, or to walk holding his hand. But how did the child get to Jerusalem to begin with? Clearly, his mother brought him, as she comes to Jerusalem to fulfill her own obligation of simcha, rejoicing. With support for this presumption in the biblical story of Chana and Shmuel. And the Gemara then extrapolates to connect children's obligation and exemption to that of adults. Also, explaining the dispute in the mishnah between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding the expense of each sacrifice by understanding their fundamentally different approaches to the nature of korbanot, and the "original" sacrifice. Plus, a dispute between R. Yishmael and R. Akiva that unpacks the original dispute even more fundamentally.
The story of R. Yochanan who encounters a man who is picking less ripe figs and leaving the ripe figs. And the rationale and value of picking the figs that weren't quite ready becomes a springboard for some heavy hitting philosophical discussion of how God takes some people before their time, the question of hidden wrong-doing, and the possibility of trusting people that nothing inadvertently wrong has taken place. The object lesson is found in the trust Rava gives his wife, who (as it happens) is the daughter of R. Hisda. Also, more on the see-and-be-seen aspect of this mitzvah, and how it compares to Hester Panim, God's hidden face in the world, and the Jewish experience over all. Note again, the anthropomorphism. And God's pain, as it were. Plus, the story of R. Kahana hiding under Rav's bed.
A halakhic discussion and an aggadic discussion. First, a study of why those who are excluded from the mitzvah of Re'eiah, even when the exclusions are rather self-evident (women, tumtum, androgynous, plus a slave who has not been freed). Second, one who is blind and can't see, even in one eye, is exempt from appearing, or from the obligation to be seen - which introduces a large measure of anthropomorphism... And highlights the distance between God and the Jewish people, in the era of the sages, as compared to the biblical Temple relationship. To wit, the verses that made the sages cry.
On the list of people who are not obligated in the mitzvah of Re'eiah is the "deaf" person, a category which is expanded to include those who cannot hear but can speak, and those who can hear but are mute. How does their obligation differ from the obligation of others, including as that obligation is present in the mitzvah of Hakhel. Which spawns the question of whether those who cannot speak cannot learn. Also, a philosophy of learning, as found on this daf, that entails a different kind of hearing, namely, from the heart. Including how teachers learn from students, with an explicit focus on R. Elazar ben Azariah, and a cycling back to the mitzvah of Hakhel. Which leads into the absolute must of being able to hear others, even when you don't agree. A critical Gemara in understanding the purpose and implications of learning altogether.
Introducing the closing, shortest tractate in Moed. On the holiday pilgrimages to Jerusalem with the specific sacrifices that were required for those days. What it means to celebrate underlies these factors of the mitzvot of the day, in term so rejoicing. Also, the mishnah that introduces the tractate, the mitzvah of "re'eiah" - going up to the Beit HaMikdash on the holidays. Everyone is obligated in this mitzvah - except for the long list of those who are not. Plus, disputes by Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding how we define a "katan," a minor, with regard to this specific going up to Jerusalem. Does the child need to be able to walk or not, for example?
Departing the body upon burial becomes the purview of the mourners and the deceased, both. We say: Go in peace, in contrast to the good wishes for the living: Go to peace - there's more to go and do, for the living. Plus, the importance of the language we use at this time, as based on biblical verses. Also, a closing note on occupying yourself with prayer and Torah study, and an ever increasing movement forward and upward. Plus, the notion that death isn't the end of our doing good, then in the World to Come.
Lifespans, by the sages' estimation, and the biographical detail that we are lucky enough to happen upon, now and again, in the Talmud. Plus, the encounters of various sages with the Angel of Death. Also, the process of honoring the deceased. Plus, the future of death (or absence of a future for death, in the time of redemption). Also, the comforting by the sages of R. Yishmael, when his son's died. And at this "shiva visit," Rabbi Akiva spoke last, and from personal experience. Plus, the need for empathy, and the connection the mourning Jerusalem and the Temple.
The daf continues to discuss mourning rituals and can and cannot be done in the house of an Avel. What do these descriptions teach us about daily life in the times of the Taanaim? The daf explores whether a person can grieve excessively and how is that determined
Tearing keriya - rending one's clothes. For whom do we tear? Starting with father, mother, and teacher - as learned from the prophet Elisha and his relationship with Eliyahu. Plus, tearing keriya as mourning for the Beit HaMikdash. Also, the specifics of tearing keriya for more than one person at once - which may have been as horrific as it sounds, or perhaps the Gemara is exploring the parameters of tearing keriya, though it sounds morbid. Plus, when the tear can be mended afterwards (but not with regard to one's parents).
The mourning practices are not put into play during Chol HaMoed, though if the person who died is a sage or a righteous person, the Chol HaMoed exemption shifts to acknowledge the more communal mourning. Note also the attempt to explain the WHY of one's children's deaths - which the Gemara explores in ways that fly in the face of our understanding (or lack thereof) of why such things happen. Also, the eulogies of the sages - in their poignancy and strength, and perhaps surprising detail, and even supernatural effect.
NOTE: This episode discusses infant mortality. But first, additional discussion of the rites of mourning, and how some become optional on Shabbat. This rites are less clear than some of the previous ones, because of various customs. Tearing garments is supposed to be a sign of greatest sorrow - including how some sages (like Shmuel) tore for their colleague/teachers (like Rav). Also, how we keep our loved and respected ones, even through our grief. Now, to the most difficult part: The details of the burial of a newborn (until 30 days). And then the details for an infant (until a year). And then the details for a year old... Which is fundamentally the same level of mourning as that for an adult. The details here are prescriptive and descriptive, perhaps, but theological or existential.
Do we actually mourn on Shabbat? Some things are cancelled because of Shabbat, while some things are upheld. And some measures depend on the practices of the given community. Plus, the question of remarrying after the death of a wife, including the possible needs of young children who have lost their mother.
What is the significance of the thirty day mourning period? How do we mourn our community leaders?
Outlining the practices (and prohibitions) of the mourner - including some that are very familiar - and a notable exception to accommodate the needs of the community. [Who's Who: R. Yosi bar Halafta] Plus, stories of rabbis who were in mourning and taught Torah publicly anyway. This moves us into a different realm of avelut. Also, the prohibition on a mourner wearing tefillin - and how that plays out over the week, given location, company, and so on. Plus, the mourning of Moshe Rabbenu. With some discussion of the demographics of the Gemara's mourners.
How does the mitzvah of rejoicing on the holidays align with the sorrow during a period of mourning? And how does these conflicting emotions play out over the various holidays? Plus, when news of a death in the family came late. And the verses that teach shiva. Also, how much mourning is undertaken by one who hears about the loss more than 30 days after the death takes place? The answer is a sole voice dissenting against the many - but in this case, the one dissenting position is upheld. Why? Plus, the rituals of mourning for those who are not the 7 close relatives, including wearing makeup (or not, as the case may be).
Collecting on a debt, or to pay a poor scribe - either is permitted writing on Chol HaMoed. Other scribal issues are left until after the holiday. [What's What: The scroll of Ezra/Azarah] Plus, tefillin, mezuzahs, and tzitzit on Chol HaMoed. Also, the way holidays truncate shiva and sheloshim.
Cutting nails on Chol HaMoed - and the implications of seeing long nails on another person. Plus, the connection to covenant, even going back to Abraham and Isaac. Also, the documents allowed to be written on Chol HaMoed. [Who's Who: Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili] From the documents that include betrothal and divorce arises a discussion of destiny, and from there to how much can be held against a person who hasn't even done wrong (yet). Plus, maligning Moshe Rabbenu.
[Who's Who: R. Yehuda bar Yehezkel.] How should the sages handles an excommunicated Torah scholar who was out of line in what must have been a serious way, where the sage who headed up the excommunication is no longer available to walk it back? Take it to the next greatest sage, even if you have to travel to do so. Though he delegated the investigation, and the sub's conclusion was rejected in the end. Also, haircuts on Chol HaMoed - for example, keeping the count of the mourner, and how the days of mourning fall out on the calendar.
Narratives of cases that align with the halakhic details of daf 15. What happens when one is ostracized, and what kinds of ethics do we expect from the sages?
A systematic approach to the various statuses of people and the range of activities that those same categories of people may or may not do, or must do. Plus, a "deeper dive" into the way each of those categories of people is permitted or required or forbidden to engage in learning Torah. (With apologies for some audio glitch that doesn't really hit the content that badly, but we aren't pleased, and would have made sure it didn't happen if we could figure out why it does!)
Chapter 3. Who can shave and take a haircut on Chol HaMoed? Who can do laundry? And what items can be laundered? Plus, oddly, a newborn who can have a haircut on Chol HaMoed. Also, the positive commandment of celebrating the holiday as a community, and how it can override an individual's obligation in mourning, for example. Which begins to open up the conversation about mourning in the context of Chol HaMoed too.
A Canaanite slave and the value for such a person to be a member of a Jewish household. Plus, 3 mishnayot. So, no large purchasing land or large animals, etc., unless it's for the needs of the holiday, for yourself, or to provide the most basic of income to the seller. And other activities that are prohibited, but context will determine whether there's room to permit them. Also, emmer wheat.
The atmosphere of Chol HaMoed, and what can be done by whom... Sometimes, even that which is technically permissable isn't advisable, especially depending on who you are. Also, one who is in the process of making wine, when interrupted... either one should continue over Chol HaMoed, or one should pause the process, both approaches being concerned about "davar ha-aved." Plus, one can harvest to protect the fruit from thieves or to protect flax from getting wrecked - as long as it wasn't planned for Chol HaMoed specifically.
Constructing a layman's railing, or plaster the oven, and other such labors at the amateur level, even if a professional might also do them, where the professional work is not acceptable on Chol HaMoed, but the homegrown version is permitted. Plus, the noisy construction that took place in Jerusalem until Yochanan the High Priest curtailed it. Note also the connection to "davar ha-aved" - to preventing significant financial loss - and what is permitted when. Also, chapter 2! One who is interrupted from an ongoing process of labor (here, specifically, turning over olives for olive oil), whether because of the death of a close relative or an accident or false reports by one's workers.... That task can be continued on Chol HaMoed. Consider the connection being made here between the mourning period and Chol HaMoed, and also how the halakhot differ with regard to each period of time
Can one build or refurbish a millstone on Chol Hamoed? How does intention play a role on Chol Hamoed?
The daf discusses how Bnei Yisroel were allowed do eat and celebrate during the dedication of the Beit HaMikdash. Why does a Bat Kol come to reassure the people that they were correct to eat on Yom Kippur. What does this daf tell us about sin, repentance, and the purpose of the Beit HaMikdash
3 mishnayot: Burial over Chol HaMoed, with a real difference of approach as to what it means to bury over the holiday. Also, digging a crypt or building a grave over Chol HaMoed in advance of a death is not allowed, but adjusting one that already has been prepared is acceptable. Plus, a laundry pond. Also, the issues pertaining to getting married over Chol HaMoed - a series of explanations why it's not allowed.
We finally leave agricultural law and now discuss tzaraat. Can a Kohen examine tzaraat on Chol Hamoed and why is this an issue when examining a mezorah is not a melachah
In an agricultural society, the farm makes sense as the focus of Chol HaMoed activity... Including uprooting kilayim - but did they really do that? Isn't that already done in Adar? Of course, the Gemara resolves it, but raises the question why the kilayim were specifically relevant to Chol HaMoed... On the side of cheap labor. But then how much do you have to uproot to rid yourself of kilayim? Plus, 2 mishnayot - one on watering trees and plants, according to the Chol HaMoed schedule. And one on trapping moles and mice that populate one's field, even on Chol HaMoed. [With apologies for my sneezing - the mic is sometimes a little too sensitive! - AG]
More on cisterns... And their role in serving the public need for water as compared to an individual's need. So can a cistern really be dug on Chol HaMoed or not? Which leaves us with the "Anatomy of the Psak" on this. Also, the marking of graves, and the need to be careful with regard to tumah and taharah. Different parts of the body were specifically marked, for this practical halakhic consideration. Plus, Beit HaPras, the field strewn with bones.
The Beit Din of Rabban Gamliel, and the parameters of shemitah, and how they are derived. What can be done before Rosh Hashanah, including when it comes to saplings, and how might that differ from mature trees? What does it mean that Rabban Gamliel's court nullified these prohibitions? What mechanism of halakhic reasoning even allows for that?! Clearly, not everyone agrees. R. Yishmael and R. Akiva simply have different methods of interpretation, which practical applications. Plus, why we don't irrigate a field with rain water, because, really, what's the great exertion in that? If the water comes from a running stream that is constantly fed from a pool - that seems to be good enough for irrigating in Chol HaMoed. But of course, there's machloket over this irrigation question as well... Where the difference in rainfall in Babylonia and Israel may make a very practical difference.
Another detail of introduction on Rashi's commentary on Moed Katan. Plus, shemitah, and how does that line up with avot and toladot, as compared to Shabbat. Also, how to determine which details of shemitah are to be prohibited and which are not, based on the principle of k'lal u-p'rat u-k'lal. Also, plowing before the Rosh Hashanah of shemitah.
An introduction to the new tractate, and its focus on Chol HaMoed. Also, the first mishnah, with a discussion of irrigating a field over Chol HaMoed, and also during a shemitah year, and what is permissible and what is not. Specifically, via natural springs, and not via collected rain water or a deep well. The Gemara focuses on the distinctions drawn in the mishnah, with the implication of how labor intensive is the effort going to be to be permitted on Chol HaMoed. Plus, the parallel to the melakhot of Shabbat, and the handling of kilayim there... And now here. All of which serves to establish this "middle ground" of neither a regular weekday, nor a full holiday or Shabbat.
The final daf of Megillah! Several details about Torah reading and the scroll itself, in the name of Rav Shefatya. Also, the outrage of touching a Torah directly. Plus, rounding out the tractate. [Unfortunately, an update on Anchor, the app we use to record, seems to be doing the opposite of improving the audio. Please God, we will figure out what has changed as we go to record Moed Katan]
All the different Torah readings of all the holidays of the year. Including a mention of the second day of yom tov in the Diaspora. Plus, more on the ma'amadot and the Torah readings thereof. Also, the Torah reading of fast days, which includes a reading of the curses (against those who sin against God), and the way to read those passages.
Which shabbatot actually line up to have these 4 parshiyot read? Charting out the passages and the dates may be helpful. Also, when do we interrupt the regular order of the weekly parsha for the sake of the special parshiyot? And how far does that actually go? Is this a matter of the Torah reading or the Haftarah? Making the case in both directions. Plus, another mishnah on the special Torah readings of various holidays.
On the Shechinah and Its travels with Bnei Yisrael. And also the path back, the rebuilding after the destruction that was wrought - which accounts for the Shechinah's ongoing presence, perhaps. Plus, the moving of mountains at the time of the giving of the Torah. Also, the mishnah of the 4 parshiyot - the 4 special shabbatot around Adar, with special Maftir readings.
Dedicated to the health and well-being of Yehudis bas Hinda, who, at 102, joins the rabbis of the daf with exceptional longevity (thank God). But what was the secret of each of these various rabbis' living to longevity? Each has a different reason (or several). Also, a new mishnah - including not making a shul into a shortcut. And how the sanctity of a synagogue remains even after the space is not being used as a synagogue any longer. Plus, making sure grass doesn't grow in a functioning shul.
Selling Torah scrolls. What can you do with the funds since you can't purchase other scrolls (not Neviim or Ketuvim)? And what about the cloths with which we (they) wrap(ped) the scrolls? And on through the various cases. Plus, selling a Torah scroll to marry off a daughter, and NOT selling a daughter off for food. Also, 2 more mishnayot, on what can be sold and not - holy objects that are owned by the community - and cannot be sold to an individual. Plus, the 4 things a shul cannot be sold for the sake of establishing in place of the shul.
Chapter 4! Selling one property or item requires using those funds to purchase something that has a greater level of sanctity. From a town square to a synagogue to an aron kodesh and onward. Also, a discussion of the sanctity of Jerusalem. And more on this element of kedushat hamakom - sanctity of place. Plus, the story of Rami bar Abba and his desire to use the parts of an old synagogue for the new one he was building. Not such a simple thing to do, according to the rabbis.
YEAR 3! The potential for heresy... from blessing God for everything, including the bad to see ding away the mother bird. And the decrees to protect shul, basically. Also, the texts that are read and not translated, or surprisingly read AND translated, or neither. What texts are considered inappropriate for a public reading?
The translator! And the experience of Torah reading in shul, back in the day. Noting that skipping text in a Torah reading was iffy... Plus, how the person who will lead the prayer connects to the person reading Haftarah. And what is the etiquette for reading the Torah, for leading prayer, for duchening (if a kohen). And what about a blind man? Also, the prohibition against a kohen with blemishes, especially, but not only, on his hands, going up to bless the congregation. Plus, other impediments blocking participation in various ways. Also, the danger of round tefillin.
Women and aliyot. Not what you think it's going to be... until then it is. Naming Kavod Tzibur. Plus, the Maftir aliyah. Naming Kavod Torah. Also, a new mishnah on those elements of liturgy that we don't do without a minyan. Plus, how we learn that a minyan is made of 10 men, and the controversy in that learning.
Dividing the Torah's text into aliyot, including very technical parameters of 3 verses in a particular section of the text, as a minimum - and what happens when those parameters cannot be met. Specifically, the Torah reading for Rosh Chodesh. Also, the story of Rav and the question of his prostrating (or not) on a stone floor in prayer, and the fact of his prominence in the community.
Chapter 3! Details pertaining to reading the Megillah... And reading the Torah. Including the original system of aliyot to the Torah. Also, how those aliyot are established within the Torah's text itself. Plus, the 10 batlanim (again).
Another 2 mishnayot. First, mitzvot that need to be performed during the day... cannot be done prior to Netz HaChamah, the sunrise (after the earliest daybreak). Also, the mitzvot that need to be done during the day on specific days, and throughout the day.
The Megillah cannot be read out loud by heart and fulfill the reading of the megillah, but why not? What are we accomplishing by making sure we read the written words? And what about the Written Torah? Can it be read or written without a text in front of the reader or writer? What are the parameters for engaging with the Bible by heart?
2 mishnayot - when do mitzvot need to take place, from Megillah to a whole host of other mitzvot? What about a walled-city resident who goes to an unwalled town, or the reverse? Which leads into the nature of what we do that season, remembering Amalek and so on. Also, who can read the Megillah, and who cannot. And why "deaf" means something different from the expected "deaf-mute" who so often appears in rabbinic literature.
The Megillah cannot be read out loud by heart and fulfill the reading of the megillah, but why not? What are we accomplishing by making sure we read the written words? And what about the Written Torah? Can it be read or written without a text in front of the reader or writer? What are the parameters for engaging with the Bible by heart?
Chapter 2! Reading Megilat Esther out of order and other ways to not fulfill your obligation of hearing the megillah on Purim. And some ways to make sure you have fulfilled it. Including the materials used for a megillah via which one fulfills one's obligation (or not). Also, the blessings of the Amidah - out of order? Which brings us to a conversation about how the Amidah was established. [Who's Who: Shimon HaPekoli]
More on the personalities of the Megillah. Starting with Haman and Mordechai and an extensive expansion on how Haman must do the king's will and honor Mordechai. Also, connecting the story of Yosef and Binyamin to that of Esther, beginning with the clothing.
On the last of the prophets, and the way the Gemara affiliates Mordechai with Malakhi. Which leads to an investigation of the big names of the day and their chronologies, specifically during this era of Shivat Zion. Again, with the conservation of biblical personalities. Also, the 4 exceptionally beautiful (apparently) women. What really links these 4? Plus, when Esther braves an audience with Ahashverosh, and she's supported by angels, and he then extends his scepter to her, in parallel to the midrash about the daughter of Pharaoh, and her reaching for the baby Moshe. Also, why doesn't Esther get the king alone? Why does she need Haman to be present? (A lot of opinions, as Chazal chime in)
The list of the 7 prophetesses, and the sources that prove them to be such: Sarah, Miriam, Devorah, Avigayil, Chana, Huldah, Esther. With lots of little tidbits about what it means to be a prophet, and nuggets if information about the women. Including one amora's apparent ambivalence with at least a couple of these prophetesses.
On Mordechai... and his generation. On Esther... and why she is called both Esther and Hadassah. And what was her relationship with Mordechai? Also, the modesty of Rachel and her generosity with regard to her sister Leah, and the inheritance of that same trait. Plus, the justification of Yaakov's trickery before Lavan. And how that led to the modesty of Esther.
More explication of Megillat Esther, from the description of the king's feast, his guests from Persia and Medea (or the reverse, as the case may be). Plus, the decree against the Jews. Also, extensive discussion on the Vashti story, and why Ahashverosh was so angry with her. Plus, the sources for all the midrashim about how the beautiful Vashti became ugly.
Explicating the name "Ahashverosh," and connecting its owner to Nebuchadnezzar. Plus, the 127 provinces of his realm. Also, how do we calculate the 70 years of the Babylonian Exile? When is the starting point, and when did it end? Chronologies and kings' genealogies work it out.
More distinctions between "this" and "that," in this case, Shiloh vs. Jerusalem. Plus, exegesis of the Megillah text, beginning with, "It was in the days of Ahashverosh," and how much meaning can be ascribed to the wording of "vayehi."
On the Torah scrolls themselves - beginning with the scribal arts, and what it takes to make sure that writing is a holy book. Plus, the Targum. Also, the Gemara's presentation of the story of how the Torah was translated into Greek. Plus, 2 more mishnayot of "ein bein" distinctions.
5 mishnayot, comparing and contrasting and delineating... For a variety of unexpected topics, including oaths, bodily fluids, and scribal requirements for a Sefer Torah and more.
Establishing Purim as a holiday for the generations, and Esther as a book to be read. Plus, including the Book of Esther in the canon of Tanakh. Also, how to give matanot la-evyonim and mishloach manot. And some narrative to flesh out the expected generosity in the above. Also, the story of Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira's excess on Purim that lead to a miracle and a refusal to rely on a miracle thereafter (perhaps getting drunk on Purim isn't such a good plan - or obligation). Also, a couple of mishnayot, distinguishing between key days, including Shabbat and Yom Kippur, and the punishments thereof. [Note: Some wonky audio at the beginning, but it (mostly) clears pretty quickly]
Aligning Tiberias and Tzipori (and Ginosar) with other places named in the Bible (of course, debatable). One of the ways of proving the case was from eulogies for those who had enough renown to be mourned in both Israel and Babylonia. Plus, a note that Edom was used as a stand-in for Rome, and antipathy to Edom reflected Chazal's antipathy to Rome. Also, differences between Adar I and Adar II. And the special parshiot that are read a few weeks before Purim and thereafter. (What if you goof in the timing??) And important proximity to Nisan (which is to say, Pesach) over Shevat* (recorded as Tevet in a verbal typo).
A new mishnah! What is considered a "large city"? [Including What's What on the "10 batlanim"] And how these days of gathering carry implications as joyous days (with regard to fasting and eulogies). Plus, several statements in the name of R. Abba (and R. Shmuel), on how we keep track of time. Also, the actions of R. Yehudah HaNasi... On Purim specifically, and the many actions that bring joy... and when we fast, and more. Why was planting on Purim acceptable?
The Gemara notes: The women were part of the miracle of Purim, and are therefore obligated in reading the megillah. Also, speaking about the specific day on the given day. Plus, a question on intergenerational Gemara conversation. And reading the megillah at night and in the day. Also, questioning the mishnah's moving of the day megillah would be read. Plus, why we don't read megillah on Shabbat, ever.
Translations of the Torah into Aramaic, the vernacular of the time - the authoritative versions were ascribed to Onkelos (on Torah) and Yonatan ben Uziel (on Prophets). [Who's Who - for both of them] Also, the place of reading the megillah in comparison to other mitzvot, from learning Torah to caring for a "meit mitzvah" to welcoming a bride. Plus, the factor of publicizing a miracle.
Introducing... Megillah. What are the dates when Megillat Esther may be read - beyond the 14th (Purim) and 15th (Shushan Purim). Which brings us the categories of the cities, towns, walled cities, and villages. Plus, the linguistic analysis that allows for all those possible dates.
Closing the tractate with the joy of the 15th of Av, including the burial of Beitar, and the girls dancing in the vineyard, with the young men who seek them out - a little less selfless and judgemental than we might have thought. Plus, the dancing of the righteous, and the salvation wrought by God, for them.
The mourning practices of Tisha B'Av, a clear prescription for the experience of the day. Including not learning Torah. Plus, customs for Erev Tisha B'Av. And the impact of the mourning practices. Also, shifting to happy days - the 15th of Av and Yom Kippur, including why these days are considered joyous - some reasons as the essence of the given day, and the historical events affiliated with the day.
The various historical events that took place, as accepted by tradition, on the 9th of Av, including some wrenching stories, including on the topic of intentional martyrdom.
Rosh Chodesh Tevet had no ma'amad service. Why would this day be exempt? What was to be expected on Rosh Chodesh? Plus, Hanukkah. How is it different from Nisan? Where does Hallel fit in? Plus, what happened on the 17th of Tammuz
Ma'amadot - and their Torah source. The cycle of groups coming from Jerusalem, Jericho, and locations throughout the Land of Israel. Plus, what is essential for the korban to happen? As connected to the songs that were sung in the Temple every day. Also, the connection between Creation and the ma'amadot, and the interaction between Avraham and God, at the brit bein ha-betarim. Also, reading korbanot as part of davening in the morning. And who gets prayed for when. Among other tidbits.
The fourth and final chapter - including the historical fasts. Another very long mishnah, beginning with Birkat Kohanim, the mishmarot, ma'amadot, and more. With a Gemara dive into the Birkat Kohanim (which is at the beginning at the mishnah, but also shifts focus to Yom Kippur, which is also at the end of the mishnah).
R. Hanina Ben Dosa, pious miracle worker, appears here again. Plus, back to rain... When a rabbinic leader decrees a fast, and the outcomes are different. What accounts for that, and what kind of pleading with - or rebuke to - God brings the rain? Also, depictions of the heavens and the clouds as choosing what to do, where to go. Plus, the comparison of righteous people to a date palm and a cedar tree, and why both metaphors are necessary. [Who's Who: Shmuel HaKatan] Also, regarding his decrees, including calling a fast. How close of a connection between prayer and response - what's cause and effect, what's laudable and what leads to ambivalence?
The charity collectors would hide from Elazar of Birta, because he would divest himself of everything, and they didn't want to let him go that far. Even when he was looking to buy a dowry for his daughter, and he only brings home some wheat - which multiplies exponentially. But he won't accept the goodness of that miracle either. Also, more miracles... which seems lesser, as compared to the natural progression of things. Which means we pray for nature to go our way, without supernatural intervention, which seems a little contradictory.
More of Choni (or Honi) the Circle-Maker's story, including the rest of his life, and the inheritance (or presumed inheritance) as told with regard to his grandchildren. Which includes discussion of his righteousness, his scholarship, and his miracles, of course. A much more poignant sad story than we usually think of this figure. Which complicates matters for his grandchildren, as presumed heirs to the affinity for rain.
More narrative. Rabbi Beroka and Elijah the prophet - when they met, first in the marketplace... Plus, the significance of black shoes as non-Jewish attire. And the accomplishment of those who cheer people up, with comedy. Also, what events call for crying out? Including for Shabbat? Of course, it's a machloket how quickly the situation is considered dangerous.
The potential positive impact of the righteous. Beginning with Nachum Ish Gamzu, who was blind, and a 4-limb amputee, with boils, in a bed with its feet in water to keep away the ants, in a dilapidated building, no less. He knows the building won't fall on him. But when they take him out, it indeed falls on everything inside. But why did he suffer like this? The Gemara says he said - he brought it on himself with an act lacking in compassion that he couldn't fix. Note also that Nachum Ish Gamzu taught R. Akiva. Also, when the righteous receive a message in a dream. And for whom do miracles happen? The ordinary people who tick with extraordinary kindness, which have tremendous impact.
A daf of stories... Nakdimon, and trading in water, when no rain had fallen. In comparison and contrast to Choni ha-Me'agael. Also, a presentation of curses, which are then turned into blessing - Achiyah HaShiloni, in contrast to Balaam. His words - those of the Jewish prophet - are more welcome than those coming from the non-Jew. Plus, another "ugly rabbi" story - and the value of flexibility. Also, what it means when R. Huna appeared to rely on a miracle...
A new chapter, with a new marathon mishnah: The long process of increased severity of fasting and going public with it, etc., only applies to troubles from a lack of rain. But when it comes to plague, for example, God forbid, the most extreme crying out is put into play right away. Plus, the environs around a city that is going through this process join in. Also, the story of Choni the Circle-Maker. With some if the Gemara's discussion on this long mishnah, including some of the theology, what we're praying for, and so on.
A potential conflict between the days when one can read Megilat Esther and days that are dedicated to Nikanor and to Trajan. What are these days (Yom Nikanor and Yom Turianos), and whatever happened to them?
More working off the long mishnah - beginning with discussion of the watches of the kohanim, and when they would need to cut their hair and launder their clothes - to make sure they're presentable while on the watch. Among other populations, and how frequently they cut their hair to make sure they don't get scruffy in appearance. Based on nazir. Also, days when eulogizing is not permitted, as connected to the daily offering (even in its absence), and the dynamic with the Sadducees. The month of Nisan follows suit, because of the dynamic with the Baitusim. There's joy in the success of the rabbis over these sects.
Following the mishnah's order if the day, with a mnemonic to help one remember in order. For example, why do they go out to the square? Why do they wear sackcloth? Why ashes? The rationale for each step is somewhat disputed, and the practical difference in each dispute is articulated. Note how foreign this process is as compared to our contemporary practice. Plus, 2 important figures who are involved in this ritual - the elder and the shaliach tzibur, with side notes for the sage, and the various hierarchical standings. And the impact these details have on repentance, including going back to the king of Nineveh. Coming back to the shaliach tzibur, the skill set makes a difference to how davening happens.
Chapter 2! With all the mishnah of the chapter. The mishnah goes through the order of the activities in a day of fasting for rain. Plus, a comparison to the people of Nineveh, and their repentance. Plus, the qualifications for leading the congregation on this day. And the order of the prayer itself. Also, the role of the mishmar in this fast. Plus, limitations on these designated fast days.
The hot topic of whether women who are pregnant or nursing should be fasting when it comes to fasting for rain. Also, a reflection when. There was (non-rain) trouble for the community, and 13 fasts didn't improve the situation. But more fasts would have been truly onerous on the community. Or.... That's a machloket. Plus, the people of Nineveh serve as a model for those who need live in a place where rain is needed when it's not the rainy season in Israel and whether that warrants "asking for rain." Likewise, they are a model for how turning away from sin should be done.
How did the mishah in of mourning develop and why are their differences? The practice of saying Aneinu is an integral part of praying on a fast day but where to place it is a question.
One cannot take on a fast of a few hours and call it a fast - it doesn't count in that regard. And separating from a community fast is not acceptable either - so joining in a small part of that fast in solidarity is, however, acceptable. With supports and arguments against this position regarding partial fasts. Including a rule of thumb making sure that one takes a fast upon oneself from the day before. When exactly? It's a machloket, though pegged to the afternoon. Plus, an important turning to Megilat Taanit, as the official calendar of holidays. Also, the case of high quality meat enticing someone who is fasting, and when whether one can break the fast and make it up another time, based on how badly you want to eat it. Plus, a "fast because of a dream," to provide an antidote, as it were, for a bad dream (even on Shabbat). Plus, a new mishnah: more serious fasting for rain by the community. Which includes limiting activity as well. Where fasting isn't fasting, as we like to say.
Suffering through famine should save the person who chooses to do so from a strange death. Plus, other outcomes of famine, like avoiding sexual relations to avoid having children during years of famine. Also, separating from the community, and the negative consequences thereof. Also, the Gemara says - anyone who fasts is called a sinner (which seems to contradict the premise of the tractate!). Where does the Nazir, as one who abstains, fit into this equation? Asceticism isn't the goal of the fasting for rain. This spectrum of delving into the enjoyment of life to one who intentionally chooses to refrain or abstain.
A dispute between R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua over the source of rain - from the heavens or the oceans. Plus, a new mishnah: when we really start asking for rain, including in the Diaspora. Also, what happens if rain doesn't fall, though it is the rainy season, and the asking for rain has begun? First, individuals will fast. If it still doesn't rain, then a communal fast will be called. With the terms of these fast days. Plus, don't misjudge your own worth, as one who is eligible to be an individual who fasts for the good of the community. Also, don't delve into halakhah when you're traveling, lest it disturb the camaraderie of traveling - and how far that goes.
More on Resh Lakish, including a discussion of reward and punishment, and the relationship between the books of the Torah and those of Ketuvim. Also, the leaders of Israel (Moshe, Sharon, Miriam), and the gifts they received. Also, back to rainfall - and the proof of how it can fall at the behest or in the merit of one individual. Including the particulars of the clouds (and drizzle) that herald (and follow) rain.
One must understand Mishnah before going on. And the way to make sure you know enough is to study more. Which brings us to Resh Lakish's practice of reviewing Mishnah 40 times. R. Ada bar Ahava would review 24 times. [Who's Who (in part): Resh Lakish] Also, the dilemma of what to pray for when confronted with both famine and plague (may we never know this situation). But why can't you pray for two things at the same time?! We have biblical verses to teach that. Plus, in a time of religious persecution, when fasting was not allowed, they decreed a fast as part of their prayer to end the persecution, and they'll actually fast once the persecution is over. Also, an open question whether this tractate verges to the spiritual/metaphysical or to the practical, if religious.
How does rain compare to the resurrection of the dead? How does rain compare to Torah? How does rain compare to creation? Also, Torah is compared to wine, water, and milk - why? Plus, the famous trade of insults between the daughter of the Roman emperor and R. Yehoshua (in which wine figures prominently). || Note: Apologies from the delay in releasing the podcast today - it seemed there was a problem with the audio file, but then it resolved. In the meantime, it has rained in Jerusalem, at least, and we may be in for a rainy few days, thank God (an unusual attitude for those accustomed to rainfall all year long, to be sure).
Different types of rain: depending on volume and timing. First, the Yoreh. And Malkosh. And why both have to be for a blessing, from Heshvan to Nisan. With several explanations, based on the biblical text. Also, Reviya, fruitful, fertile rain that makes mud, enough to seal a barrel. Also, what if rain comes down in some part of the country, but not elsewhere - is that considered rain being withheld, or really not? It's a machloket, but it also gets resolved. Plus, when do we make a blessing over the rain, and what blessing is it? [Dedicated in prayer for rain in the Land of Israel]
When does the season of asking for rain end? Of course, it's a debate, but a mild one, and contingent on biblical interpretation. Which leads into a structured conversation about the meaning of various, diverse verses between R. Nachman and R. Yitzchak. With a focus on idolatry, and then the sharp questions on Shmuel's apparently divinely engineered death, the unfairness of it, and how he wasn't as young as we think. Also, the best blessing in the world.
An angry Torah scholar is presumed to be angry because of the Torah itself - that one's sensitivities have been refined. Is this a positive commentary on anger? Also, 3 who made requests of God that were inappropriate - Eliezer, Avraham's servant; Shaul; Yiftach - all of which have unintended or lasting consequences for women. Plus, asking for rain vs. mentioning rain - appropriately!
Revisiting a topic from Sukkah: pouring out libations - of strong drink, of wine, of water. And how the Gemara derives the 2 libations from the text. Plus, whose opinion is represented in this discussion of 7 libations over 7 days. Also, the conclusion of a tradition - Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai - with 3 details, including the libation material here. Also, mentioning the rain and God as Provider of rain, in contrast to clouds and wind, which are never withheld, and which are secondary to rain. What is beneficial specifically, and what are happenstance? For example, snow, drizzle, and more. All of which is making sense of the natural world.
A new tractate! Speaking of fast as prayer, specifically when the Land of Israel needs rain. The mishnah opens with the question if defining the rainy season - namely, when do we start praying for rain? Too early, and it's a sign of a curse over Sukkot. So the distinction becomes between asking for rain and mentioning the fact that God is the One who provides rain. Also, where we mention God's role in bringing rain in the Amidah. Note the connection to Berakhot. Plus, God's role in rain, in life, and livelihood.
Reading the last daf.... More on Musaf of Rosh Hashanah. And how to pray: fix your prayer in your mind before you begin. [Who's Who: R. Yehudah bar Yehezkel] R. Yehudah davened intermittently... And a shaliach tzibur could fulfill the prayer obligation of those working in the fields.
Figuring out the order of the various shofar blasts. Which depends on biblical verses and the sounds of each blast - what makes a teruah a teruah? Also, the requirements of who blows how many shofar blasts over the course of how long. And where multiple shofar blasts may be completely fine for filling one's obligation - indeed, it is the obligation - or may contradict it and require another round. Plus, shofar vs. shofar blessings, which takes priority and why? Also, when a shaliach tzibur (chazan, prayer leader) can help another (congregant) pray, on behalf of the community, or the individual. The tractate seems to have shifted focus to the expectations of the service...
Going back to the mishnah that says water and wine can be used on Rosh Hashanah, to clarify the sound of the shofar. But urine is prohibited for the same case. Also, are women included with the kids who are allowed to blow a shofar for fun on Rosh Hashanah, or are they prohibited from doing so? Also, how the shofar is blown - how many blasts, what did they sound like, how long were they, android in what order? Plus, the emotion of the shofar blasts - whimpers or wailing - and the model for this of Sisera's mother.
A 5-mishnah daf. Opening with the structure of the Amidah for Musaf on Rosh Hashanah, including the shofar-blowing that takes place interspersed during this prayer. Also, the configuration of each section for Rosh Hashanah (malkhiyot, zikhronot, shofarot) - and the obligation for each. Also, the verses of these sections do not mention punishment, by design. Also, moving on from the content of Musaf to the way it unfolds in shul - with the shaliach tzibur and the person blowing shofar. Plus, how the non-Jewish authority prevented shofar-blowing (or tried). Plus, why we don't say Hallel on Rosh Hashanah. Also, prioritizing shofar-blowing... Or not quite. Also, why blowing shofar doesn't take precedence over other mitzvot, particularly the violation of melakhah for the sake of the shofar (ie, we don't do it).
The daf opens with the Levites' Shir shel Yom, which are in our siddur today too. Also, the Shechinah, as exiled with the people - with real changes to the Second Temple because of those shifts. The Sanhedrin was exiled too, if course, with the list of locales here. Also, a new mishnah, on another if Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai's decrees. Specifically, the court stays in its seat even if its head has gone traveling. The Gemara presents a case that counters this decree, or so it would seem. Plus, the commonality of these decrees by R. Yochanan ben Zakkai.
More of R. Yochanan ben Zakkai's decrees. Lulav, Yom Henef (Omer). The changes are made to remember the Mikdash, but how is that allowed to begin with? There's a verse for that. Also, the witnesses on Rosh Hashanah have far more complications than the usual Rosh Chodesh. Including the special psalms as sung by the Levites. And, of course, the daily sacrifices. When they accepted the witnesses all day long, there was too much risk of error. Which happened.
The shofar-blower must also have intent to dispatch the community's mitzvah obligation. Plus, a mishnah that describes the Israelites' successful war against Amalek, and what causes what. Plus, the serpent on the banner. Plus, praying for the sick. And then back to halakhah, and who can blow shofar for others? Also, opening the 4th chapter: the difference between how the shofar was blown in the Temple and elsewhere, the difference between how the shofar was blown on Shabbat (or not). Specifically, R. Yochanan ben Zakkai's decrees, and the way he implemented them.
Blowing shofar in a pit or elsewhere with an echo - distinguishing between who fulfills the obligation and who does not. Plus, a Gemara revision. Also, what happens if one hears part of the shofar blast in the pit and part out of the pit...or if it's just at the break of day... And can a tekiyah be divided to count for two? Bringing us back to the question of intent, which is most discussed in the context of shofar. Also, whether you need intent to break halakhah, to transgress a mitzvah, to sin.
First, a comment on the maidservant from yesterday's daf. Then, more on the trumpets and shofarot, and why we blow a longer blast on the shofar when it is accompanied. How do we relate to sound, and our experience of listening. Also, a new mishnah on both the physical shofar and its sound. A cracked or broken shofar is invalid for the mitzvah of shofar. Also, one who blows from the bottom of a pit or a cistern - can one fulfill the mitzvah? What if you happen to walk by shul during shofar-blowing? What is the role of intent? What is the role of the shofar?
The key mitzvah of Rosh Hashanah: shofar! And we start with the "instrument" itself. And why the horn cannot come from a cow. Plus, a lot of word play and puzzlement regarding unusual terms that are then defined by R. Yehudah HaNasi's maidservant. Also, the different types of shofar used at different times of year - from different animals. And chatzotzrot vs. shofarot.
Parallel to a story in Berakhot, the mishnah here has an episode starring R. Gamliel and R. Yehoshua, about new moon testimony. Where one day's testimony seems contradicted by the next day's experience. How do we handle the human capacity for error? Also, how we can't compare courts, especially across generations, with biblical examples (it's not an insult to today; it is about authority). Plus, a new mishnah in a new perek - the court and everyone sees the moon, without sanctifying the day - how does this case play out, and why are all its elements in the mishnah? And what happens if the judges are the ones to see the moon? And why can't the moon be sanctified at night? With various permutations as loose ends to close the topic, even if it's at the beginning of a new chapter.
The court asks witnesses about what they saw, regarding their testimony about the moon - and the celestial bodies change position over the course of a year, so the answers really would be different. How the sky actually looks makes a difference for the sake of accurate testimony. Plus, the formal sanctification of the new moon: Mekudash! But how critical is that part. Also, using a pre-fab poster, as it were, to quiz the witnesses regarding what they saw in the sky. Which raises questions about making images of the moon - out of concern for idolatry - and leads to answers as well.
Burning wood for the Rosh Chodesh torches, including from coral wood, which leads to a tangent, including a story about diving, and sinking a ship to get down there and pull up the coral. Plus, individuals contributed to the torch notifications. And a discussion about blocked roads making the way longer to travel in Babylonia. [And some brief audio wonkiness, with our apologies - nothing was off when we recorded, as far as we could determine]. Also, a new mishnah, on the witnesses would come to the court and be examined in Beit Yazek - where there would be a feast set up for the witnesses - incentive! And a decree was made to allow the witnesses to be able to go home (and so too any "helpers," who should not be deterred from helping because they wouldn't be able to get home after helping). Plus, another new mishnah, on the way the witnesses would be interrogated, and also treated well, with respect.
Father and son who saw the new moon should both go to testify, even though it's not clear that they can be paired together as witnesses. Which leads into a discussion about who can't be witnesses. Including the discussion about women. And what can be done on Shabbat to facilitate the witnesses' travel to the Beit Din. Also, the second chapter of the masekhet: How important is it that the court trust the witnesses? There's a historical shift in the answer to that question. Including the description of how the court spread the word of the new moon - hilltops and mountaintops, and the corruptability of the system.
What happens if a community misses the notification about Rosh Chodesh? One can keep track to some extent to which months would be "full," and which incomplete. Plus, Levi's trip to Babylonia. Also, the connection to the second day of yom tov, and how this sanctification of the new moon affects Tishrei and Nisan. Also, desecrating Shabbat to get to the court to testify about the new moon. And getting to the court in time for Tishrei and Nisan. And the difference between post-Temple and Temple periods of time. Plus, when the clear weather keeps a witness home. And when many witnesses go, but don't keep the extras home. Plus, clarify the term for "clear." And Moshe as close to God.
Ulla traveled from Eretz Yisrael to Bavel, and he told the Babylonians how the Beit Din in Israel had added a day to Elul, which would insert a weekday between Rosh Hashanah and Shabbat, which would be so great for them in Babylonia. The questions are: why having that extra day would make a difference, and why especially in Bavel. Also, how are those witnesses treated? Namely, a process of intimidation that was employed judiciously, based on how the court wants the date to fall out, with regard to the holidays. Plus, when the witnesses are encouraged to lie (or close). And how the pattern of the length of the months falls into place (29.5 days needs to shake down to months of both 29 and 30 days, plus 4 extra days). Plus, defining the molad.
Update with information on the 17 Tammuz (clarification on yesterday). On the holidays that are written in Megilat Taanit, as compared to other holidays... It seems that the Torah holidays have fewer stringencies around them as compared to the rabbinic ones found in the megillah. Why?
Is one's judgement or sentence mutable? The Tannaim dispute this - in a concrete way, regarding two people who had the same circumstances, yet one was saved and the other was not. What was the difference between them? Perhaps the way they prayed. Perhaps the timing of the decree against them. Plus, the same concerns for the collective, as compared to the individual. Also, a decree against Eli's descendants... How it was averted and when it was not. Also, the new mishnah - moving on with the calendar, and how Rosh Chodesh was established. Plus, the fast days, as established in the wake of Rosh Chodesh. And What's What: Megilat Taanit. Plus, a fast day on Chanukah!
Those who sin against God in a variety of ways go down to Gehinnom, and what happens after that (how long and for what degree) depends on the sin. With all the fear that that induces. Plus, a dig by Rava at Mehoza as sinners. Also, and acknowledgement of God's kindness, and His tipping the scales with mercy, when possible. Plus, leaders who inspire fear for the wrong reasons, and their comeuppance. Also, a strange story of R. Huna and R. Pappa, and recovery from near death, and an encounter with the Divine. Plus, series of verses about the righteousness of God, and also His forgiveness. Also, God teaching Moshe how to ask for mercy with the 13 attributes of God, which would surely be impossible but for the fact that God trained us in it. To what extent is judgement reversible? Perhaps it's not as simple as we would hope.
The second mishnah of the masekhet: 4 judgements of the year, on grain, fruit, water, and people. Which leads into a greater discussion of the judgement of each, including the timing of that judgement. Also, the call out to God, whether via water libations or the voice of the shofar. Indeed, why the shofar? Why the blasts that we know well? Including the concern of confusing the Satan, and what happens when we do not confuse him. Plus, how God judges us, knowing our future too. Also, 4 ways to tear up a negative decree.
More on the new year for an etrog... Specifically, on etrogim that are from the 6th and 7th years of the shemitah cycle. And the 8th year. Including the concerns of removing the produce from your possession, as needed. And the ongoing efforts to puzzle what's required for each year. Also, trees that bear fruit twice in one year. And those trees that bear fruit before the 15th of Shevat - specifically, olives, dates, and carob - which are disputed whether they are counted according to the time of ripening or the time of picking. With a sidebar to a debate over white figs. Plus, efforts to create the debate between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish that didn't happen, because R. Yochanan said nothing, whether in acquiescence or rejection.
Tracing a sugia... on the specifics of tithing produce that takes root before Rosh Hashanah, and the question of tithing produce that is "mixed." Can the produce be combined for the purpose of tithing? Which question opens up reason to delve into Shmuel's position, and that of R. Shimon Shezuri. For example, how solids and liquids may not be the same with regard to mixtures. Also, the new year for the trees! When does the winter season really begin? Plus, the story of an etrog that was picked at such a time that 2 tithings were reasonable. In accord with both sides of the machloket re the new year for trees. In what ways are etrogim akin to both trees and vegetables?
The Gemara's premise have a tradition that grain that has reached 1/3 of its growth before Rosh Hashanah, and is then harvested on Sukkot, is credited to the previous year. But how do you know when it has reached a third of what it will come to grow? But R. Zeira stipulates that the sages were precise and exact and always correct in their measurements. Which is a strong statement, that needs some unpacking. Also, following a sugiah through the daf (the growth of produce for the first third of its growth) including more of R. Zeira's objections (and his appreciation for R. Hanina's retort).
When do we start counting the date for vegetable ma'aser? And does that date work? [What's What: Terumot and Ma'aserot, an overview] Also, nedarim - taking oaths, to swear off something - and how they are counted against a yearly calendar. Namely, is that year counted according to Nisan or Tishrei? (There's no machloket, as it turns out).
When is the future redemption going to happen? Tishrei or Nisan? It's a machloket! Which basically means 2 models of redemption, going beyond timing. Plus, a study of the creation of the world, and how that worked - specifically, or especially, how the fruit trees came to have fruit, and what that means about the way we relate to and experience God in this world. Also, regarding that cancellation of oppression and labor in Egypt... in Tishrei - which seems to include a long time lag before redemption in Nisan. Biblical verses are used to establish each detail here, of course. But it still seems like too much time passing...
If one plants or grafts in the time right before a shmitah year can affect the timing of orlah. 30 days before Rosh Hashanah may count as a year, but what if the coming year is a shemitah year? And what if it's less than 30 days before Rosh Hashanah? Also, how far can one day be extended? Does it count for a year or only for a month? Plus, the position that the world was created in Nisan, not Tishrei.
Adding from the profane to the holy - specifically in the realm of time. Specifically, adding to the sabbatical year on both sides, before and after. A biblical verses teaches to cease plowing in advance, and refrain from harvesting afterwards, according to R. Akiva. [What's What: Apparent biblical repetition teaching new details] In this case, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael learn different halakhic details from the same verse. R. Yishmael learns the "extending the holy time into the profane" from the fast of Yom Kippur, which begins a little earlier than the absolute start-time of Yom Kippur. And which is derived from a biblical verse. Also, on the Jubilee year - when slaves go free, and the shofar is sounded... How much is in the hands of the court? Is the shofar what is required? What does this liberty mean? The sages take different approaches, but the real issue is about biblical interpretation, and less because of an underlying difference of approach with regard to the Jubilee itself. Also, the question of what happens in the Diaspora depending on the Jubilee in the Land of Israel.
Ma'aser Behemah - tithing the animals. With joy. On the first of Tishrei, as interpreted from the biblical text. Which of course yields a dispute. And doesn't involve the facts on the ground, somehow. Though it does entail the cycle of time, and why it's important to mark the calendar. Also, a day of judgement in Tishrei! With a "covering" hiding the moon. Plus, the power of the process of Rosh Chodesh, and the human decree that defines Rosh Hashanah. Including judgement for the whole world (with Israel/Jews judged first).
On the first of Nisan as a "rosh hashanah," going beyond the original mishnah. Pus, sources from verses - though they weren't stipulated as such from the beginning! [With apologies for some wonky audio - that does smooth out soon enough... mostly.] Plus, Rosh Hashanah for Shekalim - purchasing by the end of the old year before this date. Communal offerings are to be paid for from the new contributions from the very first of Nisan. Though the offering counts if it was funded from the previous year. But the difference between communal offerings and private offerings is significant. Also, the new year for renting houses for unstipulated leases. As long as there's at least a month for the rental to apply. But why not have the Rosh Hashanah for rentals be the first of Tishrei?! The rationale pertaining to the rainy season seems very contemporary in that people don't want to have to be wondering about their housing once it turns cold.
More on neder/nedavah offerings - specifically when a person must replace a lost or stolen dedicated item. Note that tzedakah vows don't have the year (as discussed) grace period to fulfill the donation. Also, issues of the calendar that emerge from that grace period of 3 festivals - namely, how a year may not include all three festivals! Which is exactly how the calendar came to be established with months of differing lengths. Plus, women and the festivals and positive time-bound commandments.
More on the timeliness of offering consecrated items. But why does the Gemara need to get just this granular in detailing the Korban Shelamim brought on Pesach? Could it be like the Korban Pesach?! Also, the distinction between a vow to give a gift (to the Temple, as consecrated) and the offering of a gift-offering? It's all in the discussion of a replacement or substitute.
On the corruption or lack thereof of Koresh (Cyrus). Is Koresh commissioning sacrifices and so on for his own selfish purposes? But isn't prayer often selfish in that same way? Or was he plotting to burn down the Second Temple as it was being built? Also, the prohibition against missing the timeliness of certain korbanot and other mitzvot. The 3 pilgrimage festivals have their own timeline to determine when vows kick in (eg, starting with Pesach and counting 3 festivals, or maybe just the one festival that follows that vow). Plus, the way Shavuot counts as 7 days for some issues, including avelut, even though it would appear otherwise.
Counting the years for kings... How does the mishnah know that the kings' rule is counted from Rosh Chodesh Nisan?The Gemara tracks through biblical verses... Twice. Once, via a beraita. Plus, the fact that non-Jewish kings' rule is counted via Tishrei, and why that is. But what about Koresh (Cyrus)? He's a non-Jewish king whose rule seems to have been counted according to Nisan. Ah, but he was good! Or was he? Plus, the Gemara conflates him, Daryavesh (Darius), and Artaxerxes as one - which may solve the contradictions between records of Persian history and the Jewish tradition. Also: the rabbinic approach of "conservation of biblical personality."
Some introduction to Rosh Hashanah, and why we mark time. The term "Rosh Hashanah," meaning the head of the year, is not really used in the Bible, yet in the rabbinic literature, there are 4 "new years." Some time is marked by astronomy (and math) - imposing structure from the outside - and others are based on the physical reality of growth and development. Diving in to the first mishnah, we find 4 different heads of the year to mark time counting different things. The first of Nisan and the first of Tishrei get the most attention, but the first of Elul and Shevat (or the 15th) also count. All of which have practical implications, especially for matters of tithing. Plus, how do we count from the time of the exodus from Egypt? And what does it mean that the world was created in the middle of the year?
If someone has someone who owns produce in another city can make an eruv techumin to be able to have his produce brought to him - but that is not allowed. Rather, he needs to make his own eruv techumin. Likewise, guests who live beyond techum shabbat and couldn't get home, so they made an eruv. (the audio for Anne is a little wonky, but please bear with - the points are clear and then the audio settles down... And frankly, Yardaena's closing to the tractate is more important today - AG). Also, the case of animals that would graze outside all summer. But also - water the animals before slaughtering. The animals divide into flocks and "midbariot" - desert animals. Note - these are animals that never enter settled areas. A parallel case in fruit that are drying... All lead to a discussion of whether they would be muktzah. And the fact that R. Shimon doesn't accept a category of muktzah to begin with.
2 mishnayot on the daf. First, if one borrows a coal on yom tov, the coal can only be taken as far as its original owner - in contrast to flame (a similar parallel to consecrated items vs. flame). 5 different teachings were said about coal... and how a flame has to be burn something to exist altogether. Second, a pit or well that is owned privately - the water within it can only be drawn and carried as far as its original owner can go. If it's communally owned, then the limitations are as far as the whole populace. Plus, a case of people who came to the Land of Israel from Babylonia, who need the water made available to them.... The question arises: if one draws water for another, whose limitations will dictate how far that water can be carried? A machloket between R. Nachman and R. Sheshet.
R. Abba left Babylonia for the Land of Israel, and he prays that he (and his words of Torah) will be well-received. When he sits among the sages, they discuss our mishnah (from the previous daf). And the notion that secondary ingredients can be nullified with regard to carrying, etc. But the other sages do laugh at him. The question of what can be nullified depends on whether the different items of are the same type of thing or not (min be-mino). The Gemara does not explain why which ingredients should be negated/nullified, and which should not. Also, a carcass raises similar questions of what is negated and why - also raising the matter of the impurity of an animal that is not slaughtered correctly. Each case unto itself - the Gemara is not finding comparable cases by which to establish the halakhah. Even when the case includes issues of mixtures, the Shabbat boundary, impurity, and more - all in one case.
The practices that are prohibited on yom tov, as on Shabbat, whether because they are optional for that time or mitzvot - beginning with yibum and halitzah, as well as sanctifying produce and other to the Beit HaMikdash. Because what if one comes to write? What if it appears to much to be business practices? Also, how terumot and maaserot "fix" produce, and how this can become an issue on yom tov (challah, cough cough). Plus: A new mishnah, on the travel limitations on Shabbat or yom tov, and whose limitations determine how far one's property can be moved. And - another mention (of course!) of "bereirah" - retroactive designation, this time by Amoraim.
Spreading a mat over a beehive to protect it from the weather - the mishnah says it's acceptable; the gemara raises questions as to when and to what extent that is the case. The Gemara also makes it clear that the focus is the needs of people - to protect the honey, for example, whereas when there's little or no honey to be found, the question of the permissibility of protecting the beehive becomes sharper. Also, the muktzah that is set aside because it's disgusting. Abaye asks what to do, and then reasons it out for himself, to his eventual chagrin - specifically, the placement and inevitability of excrement. Plus, a new mishnah outlining the various ways we might think that Shabbat and yom tov are different, but are not - specifically, rabbinic enactments, optional practices (on that date), and even fulfilling mitzvot.
A long discussion on R. Nachman's position from the previous daf regarding how one demonstrates intent to tithe. Including timing. And the manner the fruit is used (dried vs. fresh). Which converges on "demai." And when we say food is ready to be eaten, before which point, the requirement for terumot and maaserot doesn't kick in. Also, a new chapter: one who dries fruit on the roof and then lowers it into the home through a skylight (for those for whom that was the particular architecture), that is acceptable on yom tov, but not on Shabbat. Likewise, you can cover produce, or jugs of wine or oil, to protect it from a leak, and went to protect against dirtying the home from the leak. Note that the Gemara delves into what verb should really be used as the first word in this mishnah. Plus, halakhot on the skylights, on how much produce can be lowered through the skylight. To answer, the parallel is drawn to a case of sacks of grain and guests from Masekhet Shabbat....and then debated.
A series of halakhot of what is permitted and not permitted on yom tov. Beginning with some details of shechitah - with concern that it should not appear to be done in the same way as during the week. Also, handling of an urn. And a baker's oven. How much apparent labor did they do back in the day on yom tov itself?! Also, when produce has been set aside, making it muktzah, but it's a shemitah year, and there's no tithing, then one can plan to use from that produce on yom tov. Plus, children who hide figs in a field on Erev Shabbat, and then forgot where they were, and forgot to take terumot and maaserot (not a shemitah year!), the figs are not available until after Shabbat when the tithing has taken place. And one who dries fig in the courtyard, the obligation for terumot and maaserot doesn't kick in until the figs are brought from the courtyard into the house. Which sets the stage for an interchange between Rava and Rav Nachman on these details, and the application of logic vs. mesorah, tradition.
A couple of puzzling aspects to the daf today: a woman should not enter a storage place for wood to take a firebrand. But this formulation is a little unexpected. Also, a new mishnah: A person can remove a small piece of wood to use as a toothpick. Likewise, items in the courtyard may be considered already prepared for use - or not, as compared to the items in one's home. Plus, the gemara on this mishnah - which doesn't address the mishnah directly. But releasing scent from branches is debated. Plus, a reread of the beraita cited by the Gemara, which does clarify a bit.
Two mishnayot on the daf. First, one cannot hollow out clay to make a lamp because that is making a vessel. Ditto making charcoal or a wick. Plus, Bar Kapra - all kinds of laws about wicks! Also, Rav Nathan bar Abba on several things cited in his name, including commentary on the Jews of Babylonia. [What's What: The eruv rav] Also, you can't cut paper to roast fish. And you can't set up barrels to provide a base for a pot to cook over a fire between the barrels. Among other such cooking issues. Plus, setting up a toilet, and why it's okay.
First, a couple of announcements. || A new mishnah: gathering (already chopped) wood for firewood is acceptable, depending on where you are gathering it from. How open to the public or wild is the space? In the end, of course, it's a machloket. Also, you can't chop wood on the holiday itself, or not with a tool that would regularly use for that purpose. This seems to contradict itself - so the Gemara concludes that text is absent from the mishnah. The issues are then divided into one of muktzah and one of the processing on yom tov. Plus, using bricks on yom tov... even when they're not cemented together.
One who carries wine jugs from one place to the next cannot do so in the usual, everyday way of carrying, but can in other ways. Likewise, wood and straw. But if there's only way to carry the thing, you can manage that way. The Gemara shifts to a discussion of women in particular singing and dancing and playing musical instruments when they really were prohibited to do so, but they weren't rebuked or stopped, lest they continue to do the wrong thing, and then do so intentionally instead of unwittingly. Also, at
2 mishnayot on the daf. One is not permitted to fill vessels at the grocery store to a measuring line on yom tov. Abba Shaul ben Botnit (short Who's Who) measured foodstuffs out in advance. The shopping on yom tov seems very foreign, but it seems to have been the norm. Plus, Abba Shaul ben Botnit and other grocers prepared jugs of oil and wine to check with the Temple treasurers that they weren't getting paid for goods they weren't providing (being stringently honest to the extreme). In the end, any potential extra is redirected to public works. Also, asking for a specific number of discrete items (eggs) on yom tov is acceptable. As long as no measuring is done, and no discussion of monetary value takes place.
3 mishnayot on the daf. If you're selling meat on yom tov (yes), you still need to avoid the weekday manner of doing so. For example, using a balance scale to weigh out the meat. Also, you can't sharpen a knife on the holiday in the usual weekday manner. But in unusual ways, one can - for example, if a knife is nicked over yom tov to begin with. That is, even though it's part of food preparation, and not food itself (of course, this is disputed). Plus, one can't ask a butcher for a specific amount of meat on yom tov, though one can arrange the purchase in advance of yom tov, and one can ask in generalities - and the Gemara provides the vocabularies used for those generalities.
More on the first-born animal - figuring out whether you can check for a blemish on yom tov itself. But what a temptation - to blemish your animal so you could have it for yourself (not the way it's supposed to be). Also, an animal that drops dead on yom tov can't be moved. Challah that has been rendered impure likewise has no value on yom tov. What was the status of the animal before it died? The answer to that will have impact on what can be done about both the animal, and the challah (which is known to be sanctified before it became ritually impure). Plus, one can't register to sign up for a not-yet-slaughtered animal, because it will look like conducting business. Rather, divide up the parts before yom tov. And pay the butcher afterwards. Likewise, one can't talk money, even as partnership for the value of meat. A percentage is fine, yes, but not the cost.
A case of the first-born male animal - bekhor - that is dedicated and given to kohanim to eat, unless it has a blemish. When is checking for such a blemish permitted, on yom tov? Also, can something be muktzah for only part of Shabbat, whether it gains or loses that status?
A new mishnah - an animal that is in danger of dying should not be slaughtered on yom tov. Or rather, there must be enough time in the day to eat from the meat after the slaughtering. Also, if you slaughter an animal out in the field, you can't bring it home as you usually would on a weekday. Plus, comparable stipulations regarding how garlic and onion are to be eaten, to avoid the appearance of being a glutton. Likewise, drinking. Plus, taking care with eating lupines - which are to cut off the feet of the enemies of Israel (ahem, Israel itself). And more - character traits of the Jewish people as a whole. Beginning, of course, with being strong-willed. Do the rules of the Torah subdue that nature? Does that nature allow the Jewish people to handle the Torah? Plus, another appearance of workday in the use of a particular chair, with exceptions - including Yalta.
Chapter 3 - It is prohibited to trap fish from fish ponds on yom tov, as is feeding the fish, but taking an animal from an enclosure for food on yom tov is permitted. But there's a direct contradiction to this statement regarding the animals, which the Gemara needs to resolve. Likewise, an apparent contradiction about birds, and when they are considered to be in an enclosure. Also, any catch in traps that are set prior to yom tov can't be eaten on yom tov, unless it's known that it was trapped prior to yom tov as well. Plus, a story of Rabban Gamliel, who declines a gift of fish from a non-Jew, while acknowledging that it would be permissible, which includes the chain of transmission from Tannaim to Amoraim.
Keturah - a type of melakhah that needs definition and application. Specifically, fire and incense. Plus, R. Elazar's leniencies vs. the sages. And the politics of leadership and wealth. Plus a new read of the Mishnah, in the light of the principle that "silence is an endorsement." Plus, the impurity of a 3-part pepper mill. Also, a child's wagon can be rendered impure. Plus, whether that wagon can be dragged in the ground - will it make a furrow and count as plowing? Or is it acceptable, given the lack of intent? (Depending on whom you ask) R. Yehudah contradicts himself, so the Gemara resolves the contradiction.
A story about Ulla - regarding Beit Shammai's stringency regarding a candelabra and vessels... and extinguishing a fire. Plus, Rabban Gamliel's leniencies.
The case of an animal that is jointly owned by a Jew and a non-Jew, is it permissible to slaughter that animal on yom tov (for yom tov)? And how does that relate to the discussion about animals that are nedavot - gifts to the kohen? Plus, the case of an ancient Jewish twin that has a non-Jewish army garrisoned there, relying on certain aspects of Jewish labor - but what about on yom tov? Also, a couple of new mishnayot towards the end of the daf: what about heating water for washing on yom tov? And: Rabban Gamliel on Beit Shammai's stringencies (when he accepts them).
Bringing an obligatory korban, as compared to a voluntary offering. Can one korban fulfill both? Which leads to a discussion on different implications of different phrasings of conditions. Also, the laying on of hands on a korban - where the students of Shammai bother Hillel. And Shammai's side actually got the upper hand.... which plays out in somewhat dramatic fashion, including ending on the majority view.
Further explication of the most recent mishnah: a vessel that has been immersed... and then dunked again. A dunking that does nothing is allowed, of course. And "from one group to the next" - brings us back to the Korban Pesach. But these superfluous immersions are puzzling. Also, a new mishnah: laying on of hands on a korban - on yom tov - permitted? It's another dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Which leads to the discussion regarding the focus of their dispute.
Immersing a vessel on Shabbat - a problem of carrying. But what if the immersion was possible in one's own courtyard? Or what about on yom tov, when carrying isn't an issue? Abaye probes all the possibilities, and permutations of the prohibition. Also, suggestions why dunking on yom tov would be prohibited, in its own right. Plus, another instance of ho'il, since.
When yom tov falls out on Shabbat, what should the Amidah prayer entail? As discussed in an era when the tefilah wasn't yet set. Also, more on the eruv tavshilin - to what extent do we penalize someone who didn't set up an eruv tavshilin? Plus, what is one supposed to do if one didn't prepare an eruv tavshilin? Also, what about dunking vessels or yourself to purify on Shabbat? Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai don't (fully) agree.
All of people's wealth is allocated to them during the time between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, except for the sums that are put toward Shabbat and the holidays and talmud Torah, which are not to be deducted from that allocation. Also, a dispute between Hillel and Shammai - how they treated each day and related to the preparations for Shabbat. Plus, the role of Shabbat as a covenant, even a private one. Also, the extra soul that is present on Shabbat. Plus, going back to eruv tavshilin, and pushing its limits.
Sending gifts on yom tov - if the principle was that anything that can be used on yom tov can be sent, then why does the Gemara say - anything that can be used on a regular day, not just yom tov, can be sent on yom tov?! Which introduces several cases of one who wears tefilin in the say of Erev Shabbat or erev yom tov, and when it gets dark, hides the fact that he's wearing tefilin. Of course, tefilin are a precious commodity, and need careful protection, from the elements, perhaps, but also from thieves, even Jewish ones. Also, the second perek! Which is largely about Eruv Tavshilin. Which provides the loophole that allows for preparation on yom tov for Shabbat. All of which safeguards Shabbat. And provides respect for the holiday. Plus, a story about R. Eliezer's class in yom tov, and a discussion of how to celebrate yom tov, and the responsibilities of the eruv tavshilin.
4 mishnayot on the daf, a series of disputes between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai with regard to food preparation for yom tov. The first, salt, and other spices (to crush them) - and introducing a discussion of "shinui," doing apparent melakhah a little differently, in this case, the mortar and pestle - size, material, and so on. Plus, a difference in location (Bavel, in particular). Also, preparing legumes, and skimming the undesirable refuse from the top, which would not be the way to that selection on Shabbat. Plus, sending gifts - fresh meat, in this case. Plus, textiles, garments, and the issue of sha'atnez. "As long as you need it for the holiday.
Terumot and maaserot - the holiness that is in the food, and how to handle it. Including how the foods themselves are usually prepared for eating. Plus all kinds of food prep for yom tov. Also, fixing the amounts of these gifts - must the amounts be precise? Or approximate? Terumah, ma'aser, and terumat ma'aser are treated differently.
Again, more Beit Hillel vs. Beit Shammai. This time, what can be carried from the private domain to the public domain. Including a child, including a lulav. What is the focus of their dispute? Might it be about what is usually permitted and can be extended? Or is the dispute over a difference between Shabbat and yom tov? Also, giving gifts to the kohen on yom tov - another Beit Hillel/Beit Shammai dispute. How far does that concern extend regarding other gifts? What if it's a matter of simchat yom tov? Plus, a couple of stories illustrating different opinions of what can and cannot be done on yom tov.
[For reasons unclear, several audio issues returned in this episode. The content is still readily available. In the spirit of the season, please forgive us and the app.] Another dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai on what can and cannot be done on yom tov. Including mortar and pestle, including tanning. Also, an investigation into the amoraic handling of the tannaitic dispute, and how Beit Hillel is always accepted.
Continuing from the attempted line up of the positions of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai by R. Yochanan, including his willingness to reverse their positions (the Gemara pushes back). Plus, a new mishnah! With a new machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, which may revolve around the questions of bereira, again (retroactive designation). And another mishnah too: you go to choose birds from the dovecote that you have already designated, and they are apparently not there... Now what? The birds need to be the ones that were designated if they are to be used in sacrifice. Plus other examples of designation vs. that which is not designated, where they get mixed and the mixture is not discernible.
Carrying a ladder on yom tov - muktzah? Not muktzah? To what degree? An apparently straightforward machloket. The Gemara makes it clear that there are other issues as well - including others' perceptions (mar'it ayin), which leads to discussion of other cases of mar'it ayin. Also, the story of R. Hiya's sons, and their misinterpretation of the Mishnah.
This episode is for Wednesday's daf. || Cases of unclear, obscure, indeterminable statuses: ashes from the hearth, in various permutations. Plus, other cares that are permitted because one angle is permitted even though another angle of the same activity is prohibited. Also: the Koi/Koy, an animal that may be a chaya (wild animal) and may be a behamah (domesticated animal) but really neither, as it has aspects of each, and yet also of neither. With the practical question of whether the blood would need to be covered on yom tov. In all cases, with regard to the koi, we rule stringently, because of the questions pertaining to this animal.
This is Tuesday's episode. || How do we know that a chicken has laid an egg? The Gemara connects laying/bearing with the time of conception, at least, in principle. The practical implications here are a little hard to bring to bear. Note also the implications of a male rooster being present. And how many barriers might deter the rooster. Plus, the case of one who slaughters a sacrifice on Shabbat or the holiday... How is one to treat the blood? Note that this discussion presumes that you have gone ahead with shichitah. Perhaps the mishnah could have been read differently.... Is the mishnah talking about a case of "after the fact," be-diavad, or an ideal lekhathilah situation? What needs to be done in advance to allow this to happen in the ideal fashion?
On Rosh Hashanah - how timely! - that was consecutive with Shabbat, where they forgot to make an eruv tavshilin (and then couldn't prepare for Shabbat). Can't one make the eruv tavshilin on the first day of Rosh Hashanah? Because maybe it's not yom tov at all! (because of the doubt of the day). But that possibility only seems relevant for the other yom tov sheni issues - in the Diaspora, but not Rosh Hashanah. Also, when does the egg become an egg? What about eggs found within the chicken?! Can the eggs found internally be eaten on yom tov, in contrast to the one that is laid on yom tov? Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai argue here, but apparently, not on this point.
Who's Who: Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai. Now, from the time of the decrees of R. Yochanan ben Zakkai, an egg that wasn't permitted on one day of Rosh Hashanah would indeed be permitted on the second day of Rosh Hashanah. Which leads to a discussion of the calendar differences between witnesses and the math of the calendar. Plus, a recognition of the difference between the Land of Israel, as compared to the Diaspora. And, of course, how it all applies to the egg. Also, why the egg case is specific to Rosh Hashanah, and not a problem for other holidays. Plus, why we trust the courts for sanctifying the new moon, as compared to the egg issue, which is at home.
When yom tov falls out on Friday or Sunday, and an egg is laid on the first day of the two consecutive holy days, can you eat it on the following day? Of course, the answer is a machloket, and the essence of he dispute seems to be whether the holinesses of the two days make one long holiness, or whether they are two distinct holinesses. Which also boils down to a discussion of preparation for Shabbat to yom tov, and vice versa, under this discussion. Also, the second day of holiday in the Diaspora, and the way the calendar works to set up how yom tov comes to be when it is.
[Edited to add: My apologies - I thought this posted hours ago, and was surprised to discover it pending still. -AG] What makes the egg that is laid on yom tov problematic? Well, perhaps it compares to other decrees - for example, to not pick fruit in violation of the prohibited labors on Shabbat/yom tov. But the cases are not entirely parallel to begin with - and the decree wasn't in place on both eggs and fruit equally. Maybe this issue is the liquid that seeps out from fruit... But how parallel is that seeping liquid from fruit really parallel to an egg? Or maybe there are other ways that the egg and fruit are similar. Also, the notion that the egg is off-limits because it counts as preparation - which might well then be a Torah-prohibition, for which even a doubt or question is treated with care and stringency. As compared to rabbinic prohibitions, which would be treated with greater leniency. That leads to a case for consideration of a chicken that isn't laid on the holiday, but that it might have come from a trayfa - a non-kosher bird. [What's What: safek d'Orayta le-chumrah, safek d'Rabbanan le-kulah, cases with a lack of clarity]
An introduction to this tractate, which is called, "Egg," but is really, fundamentally, about yom tov, the holidays. It therefore has overlap with the tractates of Shabbat, Eruvin, and more. Also: The opening mishnah - when an egg is laid on yom tov... Can you eat it? If so, when can you eat it? If not, what's the rationale for the prohibition? (Including the parallel to Shabbat) Plus, the authorship of the mishnah in this tractate is more complicated, as is evident by apparent contradictory texts, and reflective of more authors than simply R. Shimon.
A very full closing daf. Beginning with a focus on the day-to-day in the Beit HaMikdash, and distribution of the lechem ha-panim. Also, the blessings on the mitzvah of sukkah - including Shehechyanu. What's the order of these blessings? Which brings us to a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, including on the topic of tadir/eino tadir (how common is the practice?). Also, the case of yom tov falling out on Friday or Sunday (Saturday night), and the implications of that proximity. It should not surprise us that the Gemara deals with the exception before the rule. Plus, the mishmarot and the lechem ha-panim - and Bilga's mishmar, his so-named the watch. Plus their niche that was sealed. But why was Bilga's watch penalized?! The Gemara offers several explanations. Including the complicated story of Miriam bat Bilga. Note also the basic messaging for how we choose to live.
How what happened in the Temple made it into our liturgy. Specifically, how the musaf sacrifice is represented in the musaf prayer service. Which is necessarily based on the complications of an ambiguous calendar, when t days if each Jewish month can shift, depending on the witnesses who come to the Temple to testify to the new moon. Including our practice today if reading both possible day's passages. Also, dividing the mishmarot, and the division of sacrifices over the holiday. Plus, saying goodbye to the holiday, in the way the offerings first represent all of the nations of the world, and count down to the one sole offering on the last day of Sukkot. Also, one more mishnah - on the offerings and the mishmarot, how each mishmar was responsible for the daily sacrifices of that week.
More on the daily shofar blasts in the Temple: the case of Rosh Hashanah that falls out on Shabbat. This is not the case the mishnah uses, but why not? Shouldn't the mishnah be including all the possible cases? This daf suggests otherwise. Also, where Yom Kippur falls out in Erev Shabbat (yes, in the time of the Gemara, it could happen) - how did those shofar blasts work out? Plus, a discussion over how unanimous the p'sak here is (as in, unanimous or just R. Akiva). [We thought we'd conquered the audio issues, but there are 2 unexpected places of wonkiness. We're nearly there though, and we thank you for sticking with us.]
On the simchat beit hashoevah - and the quite acrobatic dancing and celebration. To the extent of injury... in juggling dangerous items. Could that injury have been a punishment? Also, daily shofar blasts in the Beit HaMikdash - from 21 to 48, depending on the day.
On the evil inclination... There are 7 names for the evil inclination, and the Gemara goes through each if the seven, where and who called it what. Plus, a "sipur aggadah" about Abaye and the yetzer hara. Alsi, more on the yetzer hara, that evil inclination: according to this Gemara, God regrets creating 4 things. Given how often the perfection of creation is discussed, the notion that creation is not perfect is an interesting approach in the Gemara. Plus, humanity seems to have been designed to sin.
The musicians in the Temple were the slaves of the Levites, or perhaps from distinguished families, or perhaps Levites themselves. Is the focus of the singing in the Beit HaMikdash these instruments, or actual singing? This Gemara turns our understanding of the music in the Temple on its head. Also, the famous comparisons that praise the joy of the simchat beit hashoevah, the beauty of Jerusalem, and more. Plus the light that would come from the Temple, from the menorot there. Plus a description of the water libations. And Alexandria's shul. Also, the women at the Temple - how they organized who would be where, to establish the Ezrat Nashim.
The 5th and final chapter of the tractate The music and joy of the simchat beit hashoevah - beginning with the flute, and carrying on for 5 or 6 days of Sukkot. The mishnah explains why 5 or 6 days in particular. The Gemara digs into the wording of the mishnah, and what the simchat beit hashoevah should be called. Which leads to a distinction between when the flute-playing for the simchat beit hashoevah would cancel Shabbat or not. Once the instrumental and the singing come together, that may be more than music, and become worship. Also, on the essence of song and the need for instrumental accompaniment - leading to whether the possible can be derived from the impossible. Unexpectedly, Moshe's flute had to be made of wood. Which conclusion draws on specific Gemara rules of interpretation.
A mystical text on the drain pipes in the Temple that were created during the six days of Creation. A challenging Gemara that, at base, reflects the position that everything is connected back to Creation. Also, a discourse on righteousness, and the value of doing charity and justice... and acting with kindness. The Gemara compares acts of justice and acts of kindness, to laud kindness as having 3 advantages over justice. [Unclear why Yardaena is heard here in stereo - Anne can assure you that she didn't sound that way during recording]
A 3-mishnah daf. On Hallel and the mitzvah to rejoice - both last for all 8 days. Thee Gemara is careful on its understanding of the biblical text. What is the difference between the first night of Sukkot and the eighth, the night of Shemini Atzeret? Perhaps the rejoicing is that much greater after some time in the moment of simcha. Plus, the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah for all of the seven days... How do you establish that you are still in your sukkah until the end of the holiday? Taking grew care to avoid adding to the mitzvah (bal tosif) inappropriately. Also, the final mishnah, on the water libation in the Beit HaMikdash, with details. Followed by a strange Gemara that seems to turn the rejoicing on its head.
Shemini Atzeret! What makes this day, named for its connection with Sukkot, a different holiday? Beginning with the blessing of Shehechyanu, and reflecting on a variety of distinctions between the eighth day and the week preceding it. Also, delving deep into Bikkurim, including a discussion on the ne d to stay overnight in Jerusalem at the time of bringing Bikkurim. Note: the waving of lulav is reminiscent in the waving of Bikkurim.
On establishing the halakhot of certain blessings, specifically on the mitzvah of sukkah - which brachot does one make, and when? And what about the brachot for many mitzvot that come to your hand at the same time? Which raise considerations of how the mitzvah of sukkah differs from the mitzvah of Jordanian. Also, on the minhag of children of finding the etrogim, and eating them. And other uses of sukkah materials, in terms of waiting to midday, or not. Note: if the children could use those etrogim, why not also the adults (the usual curiosity seems not to prevail here, though really anyone could use them). The sukkah is set aside for use until sundown at the end of the 7th day, but the expectation is that lulav/etrog will have finished being used earlier... What links these mitzvot?
On the aravah... They would gather the willow branches in Motza, and stand them around the altar in the Beit HaMikdash. They would blow the shofar. And recite pleas to God, and encircle the altar. But when Hoshana Rabbah fell out on Shabbat, they'd set up the willows in advance, in water, before they'd use them on Shabbat. Plus, some realia about the Romans' use of the town, Motza. Also, setting up the lulav with the various items in the manner of their growth. Plus, R. Shimon bar Yochai on righteousness. And the value of knowing who the sages are, and their personalities and their contexts, to better understand these texts.
The aravah in the Beit HaMikdash opens some avenues to the kohanim who have some kind of defect, and would be prevented from certain activity in the Beit HaMikdash. Plus, certain leniences of shmittah. Also, the underlying discussion of whether the aravah is a mitzvah from the Torah or a practice from the Nevi'im - a cross-generational dispute. Which leads to a discussion of the levels of halakhah and minhag... Which is then illustrated by cases, as they came before R. Eliezer bar Tzadok, beginning with the aravah, and moving to keeping shemitah down to the most careful details to traveling on Erev Shabbat.
On the prohibition of taking the lulav on Shabbat - the issue is moving the lulav, which is a rabbinic precept, as compared to the Torah mitzvah to take the lulav to begin with. This is a bit of a puzzle. But the concern extends to carrying the lulav when it isn't purely for the use for the mitzvah. Part of the question may be resolved by some calendar issues, and perhaps the percentage of those who took lulavim may have been far fewer than these days. And perhaps most significantly, the historical time frame that provides the context for the given rabbinic text. Also, the shift to the willow, the aravah. Which, against the same backdrop of Shabbat is suddenly introduced as a Torah mitzvah, as lulav is, through lulav has actual biblical verses commanding it! Which opens up a dramatic conundrum regarding how and why the aravah became a Torah mitzvah. Hint: It has to do with heresy. [Clear audio throughout, thank God. Maybe we have cleared this hurdle]
A woman and the lulav on Shabbat, including storing it in water. A minor who knows how to wave the lulav and the obligation that emerges because of that knowledge. And the new perek, with its list of a variety of Sukkot practices by number, and how those numbers are borne out. [Still working on the audio - with apologies. We need the app to update with the right changes, and we are looking into alternative recording options.]
[Some audio mess towards the beginning, but it mostly resolves pretty quickly. We're working on a permanent solution] When the Temple stood, the lulav was taken every day of Sukkot there, but only on the first day outside of the Temple. This is one of 9 decrees by R. Yochanan ben Zakkai, to establish and salvage Judaism after the destruction of the centralized force of Judaism. Similarly, he established a delay in eating from the new grain, "zekher le-Mikdash." Plus, an explanation (or two) for why things are indeed "zekher le-Mikdash" and seeking out the Temple. Also, the case of Sukkot that falls out to begin on Shabbat, and how the people would handle their lulavim to avoid carrying on Shabbat. Plus, giving a lulav as a brief present is effective, and isn't considered borrowing. The proof for this being the sages themselves, who only had one lulav among themselves. Also, the circumstances when carrying a lulav around with you while you go about your prayer and other mitzvot is acceptable, and when the lulav needs to be set down.
More on using items that have kedushah shev'it. But why doesn't a lulav from the 7th year have kedushah? Which teaches us that trees themselves (the wood of them) don't have kedushat shevi'it. The sanctity kicks in for that produce that is used for food. Which leads us into a sharp brief focus on what it takes for kedushat shevi'it to kick in. Also, how are you supposed to deconsecrate that which has kedushat shevi'it, once it's present? Naturally, that's a dispute - whether it can be done via redemption (redeeming kedushah is something that is used for other deconsecrations, such as ma'aser sheni), or only via purchase. The daf follows the dispute through its sources and rationale and argument against the other side.
A final point about Hallel and the blessings connected to it, with a distinction made between the one before and the one after the recitation of Hallel. Also, on shemitah, and what that means for the lulav and etrog, which, of course, grow from the ground and are affected by shemitah. The navigation of shemitah is more complicated when the purveyor of goods is an ignoramus, who is presumed not to know the details of shemitah.
The case of a traveler on Sukkot who doesn't have a lulav with him - when and how should he take the lulav? What about anyone who doesn't take a lulav in the morning? The degree of urgency to go take the lulav will depend on how late in the day it is. And, of course, this case is only relevant for chol hamoed. Also, the case of a slave, woman, or child reciting Hallel, and a man repeating after any of them, or responding to them - that works, but is not laudable. Note the variety as to how Hallel was said. Plus, can one fulfill the requirement of Hallel if you didn't even respond? Also, the story of Yoshiyahu to support the halakhic conclusion.
Anything that is present to beautify the 4 species will not be a barried to separate between the person doing the mitzvah and the mitzvah itself - in the context of "taking" the lulav. Plus, a bunch of halakhic positions about the 4 species by Rabbah and the risk of such a barrier. Plus, the difference between smelling and eating your etrog (and smelling the myrtle). Plus, on Hallel! And the various wavings of the lulav during Hallel. Why haven't we discussed waving until now? The waving of the offering of Shetei HaLechem informs how we wave lulav. Do these motions give us control over nature? Perhaps, as long as we don't invoke the Satan.
The many different ways that an etrog can be invalidated for use for the mitzvah of the 4 minim - with a focus on an unripe etrog, and the dispute about it. Also, on making sure that the etrog is beautiful - with a story about R. Akiva and his super-large etrog. His partiality to this etrog seems to point to the subjectivity of beauty, yet there do seem to be some objective standards as well. Plus, binding the lulav with its own species - a disputed point by those who would use other substances (including gold rings). Note the shaky kal va-chomer here about what materials are acceptable for the sukkah, as compared to the bindings of the lulav. Also, how much beauty is established here as the natural, unprocessed world - in tension with decorations of gold and silver.
It's the etrog's turn - one that is stolen or dry cannot be used for the 4 species. Plus, the various regulations that apply to the etrog as a fruit (terumot and maaserot, specifically). Plus, different kinds of blemishes on the etrog itself that invalidate it for the 4 species (or not). Plus, the size parameters for the etrog. Also, why "pri etz hadar" is known to be the etrog. Also, how to handle "demai," to turn benefit of poor people.
And now the willow - if it's dry, it is not kosher for the 4 minim, in the same formulation as the lulav and the hadas, which leads to defining what this "aravah, arvei nachal" is. Plus, how language changed, where names are confused or switched, and the change sticks. With possible implications in halakhah. Also, fulfilling the mitzvah of the 4 minim, according to an assortment of Tannaim, and to what extent the tops can be cut off, and why the etrog isn't bound with the others.
An existential question about mitzvot and if/when the items we use for mitzvot are disqualified from that use. Specifically, a myrtle branch, the top of which has been cut off. Can that disqualification be removed? (Even theoretically). But why would the berries disqualify the myrtle branch? (Blame the sense of beauty). Also, the question of timing: if diminishing the number of berries takes place before or after the myrtle is bound with the willow and lulav - when you reduce the number (before or after they're bound together) may make a difference. If something is disqualified from the outset, it is not permanently disqualified - and modification can make the difference. Plus, more on timing: can you diminish the number of berries on yom tov itself? In part, the answer may depend on your motivation for removing the berries. Which pushes us into the zone of Hilkhot Shabbat/Yom tov.
Lulavim from the Iron Mountain - are these kosher with an exception that is not, or not kosher with an exception that is? With a possible explanation why it's called the Iron Mountain. Plus, the length of the lulav, both for the waving of it and in relation to the hadas (myrtle) and aravah (willow). Plus, R. Tarfon's apparent extreme stringency with regard to the length of the 4 minim. Also, a new mishnah on the details of the hadasim. Plumbing the depths of what plant this needs to be, without really raising questions as to the identity of the myrtle.
What if you use stolen land to erect your sukkah? On the claim that at the resh galuta's home that this took place. Also, the case of a stolen beam - to be incorporated into the sukkah, which seems to have a much more lenient sentence than if it were used on a home. Basically, a plug to repent, at the very least. Namely, the thief returns only the monetary value of the beam, at least during sukkot itself. Also, the dry lulav - which is not kosher for the mitzvah, except for R. Yehudah, who seems not to be concerned about the beauty of the 4 species - surprising though that may be.
The third perek - and a shift away from the mitzvah of sukkah to that of lulav. We open with several ways a lulav is pasul, not fit to be used for the mitzvah. Including some of the requirements for a kosher lulav. Also, "mitzvah haba'ah be-averah" - the concept of not fulfilling one's mitzvah because its completion depends on a sin (in this case, theft). Halakhic theft including an element of "yei'ush" - despair of getting the stolen object back. Also, the circumstances under which borrowing a lulav is acceptable (and a stolen lulav is not). Plus, the merchants who sold the 4 species, who have to be careful in sourcing their wares too.
What does it mean to make your sukkah your established residence, and make your regularly established home into a temporary residence? Also, under what conditions would the rain drive one inside out of the sukkah? Plus, that rain in its capacity of Hashem rejecting our sukkot... Along with other natural events that are taken as omens (in the way that rain on Sukkot is a bad omen). What do we do with the scientific knowledge we have that explains some of those "omens," especially when we can predict when they're going to happen? Especially when the Gemara here pans homosexuality as the result of a bad omen - which largely offends our modern sensibilities.
A focus on the scholarly approaches and personalities of R. Eliezer and R. Yochanan ben Zakkai (Who's Whos from the Gemara itself). Also, the case of one whose body is in the sukkah and whose table is in the house (a sukkah that is just off the house). Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai dispute whether such eating counts for the mitzvah of sukkah. Plus, women, slaves, and minors are not obligated in the mitzvah of sukkah. A minor being one who no longer needs his mother (which is explained). And all of the above is capped off with a story by Shammai HaZaken. Then the Gemara spends great effort to explain why women are exempt.
How many meals must be eaten in the sukkah? The mishnah says: 14, day and night, each day. But that's disputed - between a meal a day and no set amount.... Which leads to a deeper dive into R. Eliezer's approach. Including not moving from one sukkah to another. What if you missed a meal? Can you make it up on Shemini Atzeret? Plus, a story about King Agrippas's steward, and how he only eats one meal per day. The claim is that one should push oneself to honor Hashem with the 14 meals. Plus, a man with 2 wives, and therefore 2 sukkot. Which seems to counter R. Eliezer's opinion, effectively... And yet he seems quite determined. But practically, what if you've hit that quota of required meals - do the extra need to be in the sukkah? The Gemara is not clear, though it seems obvious to us. Also, can you build a sukkah on chol hamoed? In a new place? In the same place, if the wind knocked it down? Which leads to analysis of R. Eliezer's approach vs. Rabbanan, and how they all use the biblical text to support, or as impetus, for the different views. Plus, how does the requirement for sukkah compare to that of lulav?
Additional conflicts that exempt a person from at least some mitzvot - on this case, the same people who are involved in the writing or selling of Torah scrolls, tefilin, mezuzot, and techelet are exempt from Shema, Amidah, tefillin, and so on. Also, travelers are exempt from sukkah. As are guardsmen. Plus, the idea that the temporary sukkah is akin to dwelling in your temporary house. Plus: Abaye and avoiding the Angel of Death.
Who needs to sit in the sukkah? Or who is exempt from sitting in one? One who is buys with another mitzvah is (often) exempt. Similarly, one whose eating is casual - for example, snacks. Specific cases of mitzvot exempt the doer from sukkah. Beginning with Kriat Shema. Plus a mourner burying his dead. Or the wedding party on the day of the wedding. Also, there's no rejoicing in a place with no meal. Plus, the efforts to avoid seclusion outside of marriage.
Remember "bereira"? It's here again. This time, in the context of a sukkah that relies on an animal being part of the sukkah. And wine that is in its wineskins, where terumot and maaserot have not yet been taken. Also, a shift to a discussion about gittin - Jewish divorce, and specifically the writing of the bill of divorcement. And the parameters of the writing of that divorce, as per the interpretations of the biblical phrasing. The back and forth here specifically is about the opinions of Rabbanan and R. Yosi HaGalili. Including defining the degree of severance between the divorcing couple. Plus, another mishnah: if you set up your sukkah between trees, the question is about the walls of the sukkah (without addressing the cover of leaves). Are the trees walls? Can they sway? They need to be tired down so that they, in fact, do not sway. Is this retroactive qualification of the tannaitic statement?
A general principle on when one can enter a sukkah (with an unusual base) on yom tov - it needs to be able to stand on its own, regardless of the tree that it is in, etc. Plus, this mishnah is attributed to R. Akiva, in contrast to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. Both of which depend on how much wind a sukkah is expected to withstand. Also, building a sukkah with an animal, both on an animal and using an animal as part of the walls of the sukkah (a contrast between the Torah requirements for a sukkah, and the rabbinic ones).
A new mishnah! A sukkah that is "meduvlelet" and with more shade than sun, is kosher. That is, a sukkah with sparse schach. Alternatively, a disordered sukkah. The dispute here is between Rav and Shmuel, and the question is how many factors are contributing to this sukkah. Also, when can layers of schach combine to be one roof, and when would they be considered one on top of another? Also, the Gemara picks up on the shade being greater... And addresses what happens if shade and sunlight are equal - an equation that already came up and the Gemara resolves the issue here by focusing on where the light is coming from. Plus, another mishnah - if you build a sukkah on a wagon, on a boat, on a treetop, on a camel.... all kosher.
Sleeping under a bed - is doing so an obstruction to fulfilling one's obligation of sleeping in a sukkah? Does it get in the way of the schach above? Part of this halakhic discussion includes the story of Tavi, the servant of Rabban Gamliel, who was not Jewish. His sleeping under the bed is used to "prove" that the bed is an impediment. Also, leaning the sukkah on a bed - does it need to stand on its own, or is this a kosher sukkah? It seems to depend on two factors: stability and the possibility of becoming impure.
In the ongoing discussion of the mats and their acceptability as schach, we find some rabbinic interlude, which brings us to: Who's Who: Rabbi Hiya. Plus, more on the mats themselves. The question of whether they are acceptable continues to revolve around the potential they have to be rendered impure - regardless of the variety of materials that can be used to make a mat. Also, a trans-Babylonia/Israel exchange that conclusively answers the question of the permissibility of the mats. Almost.
When something comes off a sukkah, it's treated like a sukkah - whatever does that mean? The Gemara offers 4 possibilities, including a discussion of shade vs. sunlight. Also, 2 mishnayot - the first of which is undermined by a contradictory beraita and R. Yosi's practice. The second mishnah allows for sukkah mats for schach, as long as they've been designated for schach use.
Lavud... What if you have a gap of less than 3 tefachim in the middle of the schach? Specifically, if your sukkah is larger than the minimum. Which leads to a discussion of the purity issues of a sukkah in this way, and the absolute heritage of how impurity works in this kind of case. Note the methodology here, in terms of seeking halakhic parallels (or not, as this case may be). Also, a couple of statements by R. Yehudah bar Ilai, including one about small kosher fish - where they can be eaten, and where not.
A mishnah with 3 cases of non-kosher sukkahs. And then the Gemara needs to figure out why all 3 cases are necessary. Also, some narrative about the sages having their discussions on the halakhot of sukkah, and the talk that happens around learning. Plus, What's What (Where's Where?) on the yeshivot of Sura, Nehardea, and more.
Looking for the stages that clarify the previous mishnah. A bed can, of course, be rendered impure and then be purified. Even if the bed is dismantled... Whereas, mats woven from various reeds and grasses - which are apparently too small. And lastly of those cases - digging into a grain pile to make a sukkah, depending on the measure of the hole you dig. Also, a new mishnah: wherein one lowers the walls of a sukkah to hover above the ground. How large the gap is will make the difference - in what amounts to a hanging sukkah. Which of course yields significant comparison to Eruvin, and specifically lavud.
A daf with 2 mishnayot. The first has 3 different disputes in the span of the one mishnah, which focuses on wooden boards that can be used for schach, depending on the finished product. How wide can the board be? What if you remove a board? And most importantly, perhaps, how do we apply other basic sukkah concepts to this new scenario of sukkah. Also, the second mishnah - metal skewers or bed rods for schach.... Plus one who digs a sukkah out of a pile of grain... Which poses a structural question about the mishnah. The next daf may have an easement to that structural difficulty. Also, the Gemara delves into the question of the poles being placed at a distance from each other equal to the width of the pole.
A follow-up to the hyssop/"eizov" discussion. Also, continuing the case of one who harvested grain and then decided not to eat it, but to use it for schach. Where both action and intent can be relevant, and action demonstrates intent. Plus, turning straw over with a pitchfork. Which leads into a comparison between the prayers of tzadikim and a pitchfork. Also, a new mishnah, and the question of wooden boards as schach - which involves a dispute by R. Yehudah and R. Meir, and is followed up in the Gemara with a dispute about the dispute by Rav and Shmuel. The whole topic, together with the previous mishnah establishes the boundaries of the range of permanence in schach. Plus, mention of the case of danger for a sukkah.
Binding things together entails more than one thing! Also, the hyssop (or "eizov"), and its uses in the process of purification. Also, materials that might usually be used for food (and therefore be able to be rendered impure) and use them for roofing, there are ways to use them in ways that won't be rendered impure. For example, grapes are obviously food, but the branches that they're on are never eaten. Once there's more inedible than edible, them you can use it for schach.
Schach - what can be used for it: the specific examples of the leavings from the threshing floor and the winepress, as delineated and derived from the biblical verses. But not the grain or the grapes themselves, as food can be rendered impure. The Gemara also discusses whether wine can be used for schach, and, interestingly, the fact that it is liquid is not a concern. Plus, another sukkah connection to Nechemiah. Also, bundles are not acceptable for schach, but unbundled should be fine. The storehouse isn't acceptable as a sukkah either... Note the need to do some active preparation that makes a sukkah a sukkah. [What's What: Ta'aseh, ve-lo min ha-asui.] Plus, the possibility of using arrow shafts for schach. Or wormwood leaves or licorice leaves (the former of which gets nixed).
Climbing plants on a sukkah - ivy? Grapes? Etc. When they are attached to the ground, they can't really be part of the schach, unless they were overwhelmed in quantity by schach that was not attached to the ground. Also, tzitzit! In parallel to sukkah. In this case, can a string that is tied to two corners be acceptable for tzitzit? Plus, the 4 species make an appearance here. Do they need to be bound together? What if the myrtle branch has berries? And finally, what is the source for the requirement that schach comes from that which cannot be rendered impure? With the accompanying verses - how the cloud provides God's protection on this earth, and the water in that cloud is not rendered impure. It's from the very beginning of creation!
[Some wonky audio from the app. Not throughout. With our apologies nonetheless.] What can't go over the schach: for example, additional shading, such as a tarp or a canopy. Any such thing that can be rendered impure cannot be kosher for schach. But if you are intentionally beautifying the sukkah with decorations, that should be fine. The discussion of roofing that can be rendered impure does get some attention here, but as a given. Also, an exilarch (resh galuta) story, with a sukkah and schach that was hanging down. And it was treated as not problematic davka. Plus, the case of a bed with netting over it. And the case of sleeping under one's bed in a sukkah.
Does the age of the materials being used to build a sukkah matter? How long on advance of Sukkot can one build a sukkah? What about intent? How do we define an "old sukkah"? The dispute is between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Just as a korban that is dedicated to be a festival-sacrifice, so to the building materials are consecrated when they are dedicated to be part of a sukkah. That plan to use the materials for a sukkah elevates them. Also, one who built a sukkah inside of a house or under a tree... doesn't really have a sukkah. With some exception. A sukkah built on top of another sukkah - the upper one should be fine, the lower one will depend on the configuration. Though there are ways that the shade from a tree over the sukkah would not be a problem for the sukkah. Plus, the challenge of learning the non-linear text of the Gemara on a non-linear way.
Serious math on the daf, geometry in particular. Squaring a round sukkah. Which gets into the math of circumferences... Which needs π (3.14....). Also, who can make a sukkah and be sure it will be kosher? Together with an a week to the question whether a sukkah has to be built for the express purpose of building a sukkah. Via mnemonic acronyms.
Defining sukkot - if you put schach on top of an alleyway, you can ha e a kosher sukkah - reviewing many cases, in ways that are reminiscent of Eruvin. Also, the need for more shade than sunlight for the sukkah to be kosher. And that shade needs to be coming from the roof (the schach), and not via cracks or gaps in the walls. Plus what is essential to a sukkah? There are ways that a sukkah is similar to a permanent structure. And other ways that it's clearly temporary. A list of sages each has a detail to contribute to these characterization.
Measurements! Barley. The vine. Fig. Pomegranate. Date. Olive. Also, a sukkah must have 3 walls - though that third wall can be as small as a tefach. This detail is subject to dispute, however. How is it derived? The spelling of "sukkot" is different and each spelling implies a new detail about the sukkot. Plus, the interwoven discussion on "halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai." Note the multiple entry points of interpretation, and how that seems to contrast with the halakhah as derived in the context of the Beit HaMikdash.
The minimum measurements of the sukkah coming off the aron brings us to a discussion of God's arrival to meet with man - but always 10 tefachim above the ground. And even Moshe and Eliyahu didn't make it higher than those 10 tefachim, either. All of which suggests that our time in the sukkah is, or can be, should be, an encounter with the Divine. Also, on the kaporet - back to measurements. With a concern that the effort to derive those measurements from too many different sources risks attempting to prove more than the text really allows. With the contemporary implication of: if you attempt too much, you won't manage any of it. Plus, halakhic partitions that are mesorah, not quite sourced...
More on the very tall 20+ amot high - what if you build a platform within it, raising the ground, as it were, so that it's less than 20 amot high on the inside? In what ways does this work to make the sukkah kosher? (via a few different cases, including some with a curved wall, no less). Also, what about a very small sukkah? Then you want more sunshine than shade, to make sure the shade isn't from overhang schach. Plus, other cases of size adjustment - specifically, digging down, so a less-than-10 tefachim high sukkah would end up at least 10 tefachim. Plus: R. Yaakov's radical sukkah. Also, the Gemara's emendation of R. Yonatan for R. Yochanan (in Seder Moed). And finally, where is the 10-tefachim measurement from, as a minimum?
Who's Who: Helene HaMalkah - Queen Helene - and her very high sukkah. Was it too tall to be a kosher sukkah? And how are women supposed to handle the sukkah? Also, a discussion over whether there's a machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, in terms of a large sukkah and a small sukkah - regarding the minimums and where is kosher. [What's What: Chisurei mechsera] Plus, how a tiny house can be so tiny that it's not considered a house, halakhically, with all kinds of ramifications for halakhot that pertain to houses. Plus, the interplay between Written and Oral Torahs.
An introduction to the tractate: Sukkah. Plus, the historical component, as compared to the ritual aspect. Note that the Talmud jumps right in, with the basic principles of what makes a sukkah. Plus, some observations on how sukkah and eruvin compare - recall the alleyway, and a slew of other details. Recall also that eruvin is deRabbanan, where sukkah is de'Orayta. Plus, the 20-amot rule, and how the tractate here presents the arrival at the halakhic details.
Concluding Yoma - with a return to a discussion of impurity on Yom Kippur, with the case of one who sees a seminal emission over the course of Yom Kippur. Plus, how potential impurity plays a role in one's experience of Yom Kippur. Also, the possibility of reassurance that one's teshuvah, repentance was accepted, a positive close to the tractate - albeit a very different experience of Yom Kippur, as compared to our experience in modernity.
[Some brief audio weirdness from the app at the beginning] Mechilah, forgiveness, and prayer: first, several stories of people getting insulted and then varying degrees of efforts to move past it. Also, a discussion of the confession and Neilah.
More on atonement, with a focus on repentance. For any number of lesser sins, repentance itself atones for them. But for more severe sins, such as taking God's name in vain, repentance is necessary, but atonement will only come through the experience of Yom Kippur as well. And we determine which sins are which in accord with the severity if the respective punishments. Also, a study of "chilul Hashem" - some details of which are surprising as compared to how the concept is applied colloquially in our own day and age. Which seems to be the opposite of increasing the love of God in the world. And wherein not treating people well increases the chilul Hashem. Plus, how great is the greatness of repentance, teshuvah. Note: The distinction between turning to God out of love or fear. And lastly, how specifically must we confess?
More on pikuach nefesh. The case of the person who is buried under a collapsed building. Painful, today, in the context of the ongoing search in Surfside, Florida. The discussion becomes a more abstract, yet very practical discussion of how we know when a person is alive. Which brings is to the development of a fetus and the question of the beginning of life in utero. And yet, the conditions may differ for pikuach nefesh. The structure of the first half of the daf is a bit unusual,as well. Also, the new and final mishnah of Yoma. Returning us to korbanot for the needs of atonement, and the role of Yom Kippur in that. Including the many ways that atonement takes effect. But you can't game the system - to plan on sinning, and having Yom Kippur atone for him. There are ways that the day takes care of atonement, and yet, for some sins, teshuvah is a critical element. But even teshuvah doesn't provide atonement without Yom Kippur.
Fake medicine and real medicine. First, the "fake" (or more home remedies): one who is in contact with a rabid dog, or bitten by one. What do we do for that person? It's a real ailment with a folk cure. And as for the "real medicine," one main issue is taking medicine over Shabbat - and not deferring doing so, even when we're so concerned about Shabbat. Note that if health is on the line, then get to it - including gedolei Yisrael. There's no need to look for someone else to do the melakhah for you. Plus, a slur against women and Samaritans, which opens up the changing culture discussion again. Also, the question of a Jew treating non-Jews on Shabbat. Plus, breaking down the door to save (or even just calm) a child.
A person who is I'll and might need food on Yom Kippur is fed according to the recommendations of experts. But if the person who sick contradicts the doctors, we trust the sick person more even than the doctors. Unless the more lenient position comes from the doctor - what if a sick person doesn't realize the degree of illness.. so then the experts win. And if there are no experts? Trust the sick person. Plus, a discussion of the modern day ramifications, and a couple of personal stories. Also, the classic mishnah in pikuach nefesh - one who is seized by a "bolmous" - an insatiable hunger: feed him what he asks for, until it has passed. What about when the medical circumstances are unclear - there are open questions about the reality. Despite the fact that there isn't a clear and definite need, the halakhah is clear: do all you can, until or unless you become certain that the person has already died (in that worst case scenario). Plus, a puzzling story...
Children are not supposed to fast, but we help them learn to fast and train them in it a couple of years before they reach the age of bar/bat mitzvah. Is that training a requirement? Does it mean the kids must fast in preparation, or are they easing into fasting by eating later than usual. Also, a pregnant woman who has a strong craving - you can feed her the food she wants, even on Yom Kippur. Certainly that's true of someone who is ill and thinks food is the cure too. The issue, of course, is the primacy of life and pikuach nefesh as a backdrop to even a pregnant woman's cravings. And then the Gemara talks about the exceptions to the principle of pikuach nefesh taking precedence - namely, adultery, idolatry, and murder. Here, the rational for giving up ones life rather than violate adultery (really, all sexual illicit violations) and murder, which have different reasons...
Can one measure that would violate Yom Kippur be combined from food and drink? The claim is no, and that is not disputed, apparently. R. Yehoshua says that if two different items are identical in volume and also in the type of impurity, they can combine for the sake of impurity - but only if both factors of sameness are in place. Also, the new mishnah. If one forgot it was Yom Kippur, and both ate and drank in that period of forgetting, then only one Korban need be brought. Which leads to a discussion of affliction, and how it is a positive commandment for the day of Yom Kippur. Plus, if you ingest edibles that aren't food, you're not obligated for the violation on Yom Kippur. For example: pepper, ginger.
More on the measurements. First, the classic olive: k'zayit. Note that the measurements are presented as Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. They are not the subject of dispute. What does come to the fore is a question of how we know that these undisputed measurements are the measurements. Plus, determining the liquid measure of one's cheekful. Also, the essential question of whether (or when) the measurements are objective and when subjective. The disputes here are both about authority (mishnah vs. beraita) and the subjectivity question. Especially when you factor in people like the giant Og of Bashan, the classic example of someone whose subjective measures are different from the average. Also, defining eating be its effect (settling one's mind) vs. the logistics of amount and time span. Including Abaye's insistence that the only thing that matters is settling one's mind.
On the "large date," which is thr amount of food it would take to violate eating on Yom Kippur. R. Pappa asks whether the large date measure includes the pit or not. R. Ashi compares it to a discussion about a barley grain, with or without it's husk, but that comparison is dismissed. Plus why additional measure, why not just the measure of en egg? How does the egg pertain to eating in a sukkah, and the date to Yom Kippur?
An interesting side discussion leads into a focus on what kinds of shoes are not considered halakhic shoes for the purpose of keeping the affliction of Yom Kippur. Plus, the case of the amputee, and whether a wooden prosthesis (leg) would count as a shoe on Yom Kippur or not. Also, remedies to help stay cool on Yom Kippur. And what can kids do or not do to keep some semblance of Yom Kippur?
Aggadot on Daniel and his dealings with some angels, including Gabriel. God's anger cools down enough to assure the continuation of Bnei Yisrael. More, Gavriel seems to have acted of his own accord - an oddity, apparently, for an angel - and is then subject to 60 curses, pulsei de-nura, with fire. Also, back to halakhah - some exceptions to the afflictions of washing and anointing.
More on the manna. Why did the manna come every day, instead of getting the full dole once a year, for example? 3 possible answers are given. Plus, a rejected interpretation by R. Elazar HaModai that is defended in full detail. Also: A shift back to Yom Kippur, and the 5 afflictions of the day. Which leads into an investigation of how we know 5 afflictions, and that these are they, with some other sidebars on how we know what is what. A real interplay between the biblical verses and the oral interpretation. Plus, an interpretation from the end of the Book of Daniel that sheds light on these afflictions. Perhaps also as comment on assimilation, and how to stand strong against the influences around.
A two-pronged talmudic plan to ease anxiety. In the context of the Israelites waiting for the manna in the wilderness. Also, when Bnei Yisrael complained about the wildness, and yearn for the "fish" that they had "for free" in Egypt, is that a literal or metaphorical complaint? If metaphorical, the analog is sexual promiscuity, which raises questions about the presumed behavior of Bnei Yisrael in Egypt... (were they actually promiscuous? did they actually have free fish, as slaves?) More importantly, the Gemara follows both of these approaches through all of the different texts, how each approach makes use of the verses that support itself, and also those that are used to support the other view. Plus, the use of the manna to resolve civil and marital disputes. Plus, how the dew preceded and then covered this flaky substance that may we'll have been the manna. And finally, an interpretation of the "bread of the mighty" that gets Rabbi Akiva a rebuke from R. Yishmael. And, finally, a comment on the quail.
Dedicated to Robin Katcoff by Jason Katcoff in honor of their 20th wedding anniversary. || Rounding out the end of Yoma, the Gemara turns to how Yom Kippur is to be observed "for the generations" - in the absence of the Beit HaMikdash. The mishnah on Daf 73 lists what we call the "inu'im" - eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing leather shoes, and conjugal relations. And then provides the measurements for how much eating or drinking would yield a full (karet) violation of Yom Kippur. Which is revised to be understood to be talking about a half-measure that would entail lashes, perhaps, and not karet. Plus,a side discussion of who is eligible to give testimony, nixing several kinds of people, including on who plays with dice (see video too). Also, an investigation into the concept of suffering or affliction, as required on Yom Kippur, including the question of how far we must go to afflict ourselves, and how we know "affliction" is about fasting. Plus, insight into the experience of the diet of manna in the desert.
On the kohen gadol, and his colleague, the kohen who is anointed for war (mashuach milchamah). The kohen gadol is excepted from certain practices, specifically with regard to mourning, because of the importance of his office and how he represents it. Also, who is the mashuach milchamah, and how does his role fit into our understanding of the kohanim? Also, the Urim ve-Tumim -- how does it work? How does one ask it for counsel? And how does it answer?
Preparing the holy fabrics for their use, given that they've all just been in use (the parokhet, the ephod, etc ). The fabrics are very lush and fine, with many-stranded threads. Sky blue and purple and red and gold... Also, how important Torah and scholars thereof are in the world, beginning with crowns in the Beit HaMikdash. Why this shift to focus on Torah now, though? We have some ideas.
The next day, after Yom Kippur, the man who accompanied the goat to Azazel meets with the kohen gadol, whether in the marketplace or at home, and confirms that the goat had been dealt with. His phrasing is different in the public vs. private places, however. Plus a discussion of how God brings life and supports it. Also, a new mishnah, this time on the bigdei kehunah without the Yom Kippur factor. With a historical twist, with a hint in the Book of Ezekiel to the halakhah that was in place long before he lived, and also learned long after.
On how the kohen gadol read from the Torah, especially given that part of what he reads is in Leviticus and part is in Numbers. He is careful to recite the latter by heart, so as not to burden the people there for the occasion, or a misleading appearance of something wrong in the text. Including how the Torah reading when Rosh Chodesh falls out on Shabbat Chanukah (3 Torah scrolls) is considered less problematic. Plus, a new mishnah that takes us to the end of the day, after the kohen gadol has read the Torah, finished off the korbanot of the day, smoked the incense, and prepped the menorah -- changing garments and washing/ consecrating his hands and feet several times along the way. And then he goes home.
The story of Shimon HaTzadik, kohen gadol, and Alexander the Great! Can bigdei kehunah be worn outside the Beit HaMikdash? Also, how do we handle the historicity of this narrative? And what messages does it have for the Jews themselves. Also, the position that God is great should be obvious enough, but a verse in Nechemiah suggests that the concept needs a little more unpacking... How is it that God is great, and that we acknowledge Him as great?
Ending the 6th chapter. With mention of the focus on "outside of the camp." And the last mishnah if the chapter, and the attention paid to this part of the schedule of the day. How did they know when the goat reached the wilderness? 3 different takes on how and what was done. Also, the new chapter, which opens with the kohen gadol's choice of which clothing he wears... And the Torah reading if the day, which are still our Torah readings of the day. Is this Torah reading part of the Yom Kippur avodah?
Continuing the schedule of the day... Following the man who leads the goat out to the wilderness. He is accompanied along his way, with stops (10) along the way. And they offer food and water along the way, never mind that it's Yom Kippur. At the last booth, however, he stands alone, without the crowd. He then pushes the goat off the cliff, described in truly gory detail. He is observed, as a check on this procedure, both otherwise this is a solitary affair. The man who accompanies the goat and kills it waits in the last booth until the end of the day. Which leads into the question of when his garments are rendered impure. Also, finally, some philosophical underpinnings: the name Azazel, and what we infer from it. Including an unexpected universal bent, as well as a recognition of this goat and its treatment as one of the "chukim," one of the mitzvot for which we do not have a reason. Plus, the next mishnah on what is happening back in the Beit HaMikdash at this time.
More on the fact that any unused goats need to be left to die, rather than risk it being used the following year. Even under conditions that would be acceptable for reuse. Also, a new mishnah: the process of the day continues, with semihat yadaim (laying of hands) and confession, which will lead to atonement. And whether a kohen must lead the goat to the wilderness. Plus, details questions to R. Eliezer lead to evasive responses, and eventual a conclusion on the importance of rabbinic authority. Also, an important comment on those Babylonians....who are complained about, but remain in the Gemara.
Focusing on the details of many possible cases in a way that seems harried, and perhaps is a diversion from larger worries. Also, why do we pasture the goat that isn't used (when a second pair is needed), and let it die,rather than let it live? The rationale is a bit difficult... And the Gemara seems to struggle with the "waste" of the animal's life here too.
What happens if the se'ir ha-mishtaleach (the scapegoat) is disqualified? Whether because it's too young, or has a physical blemish, or because of the circumstances surrounding the day (for example, if the mother goat of the scapegoat were killed on Yom Kippur as well). How this works - or even was discovered - seems a logistical challenge, or few. Also, what happens if you need a new lottery for the goats - which of the 3 remaining goats needs to go to pasture to acquire a blemish to be redeemed (to remove the animal's consecration). Which leads to a machloket between R. Yochanan and Rav... And their reading of the mishnah.
What happens when the kohen gadol goes to slaughter the goats? What if he does so outside of the Temple, which might be fine for the Azazel, but certainly not for the sin-offering. Designation of an animal for sacrifice is what makes the difference. In this case, through the lottery. [Who's Who: Hanan the Egyptian] Lining up the long beraita with his views. Plus, the unusual status of the Azazel goat - it doesn't really have a parallel.
A focus on the goats of the Yom Kippur avodah. They have to be alike exactly - but how identical can they be? Which leads to the lottery to select each for its respective role. But what if one of these two goats dies? Before the lottery? After the lottery? Did a goat ever actually die under these circumstances (on Yom Kippur), or is the Gemara simply exploring the possibilities? Plus, the identity of this goat as the classic and first "scapegoat," and the Christian application of the concept to vicarious atonement. Also, the rationale for two goats, no fewer and no more, and identical, or close to it, but not necessarily (which is confusing and circular, yes).
The focus on the practical details, as opposed to philosophizing. Even though the focus is literally on atonement. That is, the phenomenon of atonement is functional here, a piece of the avodah. Rather than the need for it being a constant thought and topic of faith. Also, where does the kohen gadol restart the procedure if there is a need? Does he go back to the beginning, or can he pick it up where the avodah had been left off, mid-cycle. Plus, what happens when the procedure of particular Temple ceremonies cannot be carried out. For example, a Nazir who is bald (so he can't cut his overgrown hair). A metzora who doesn't have thumbs (for the kohen to sprinkle blood there, when he is purified from his tzara'at). That is, specifically issues that are not going to be resolved with time.
A new mishnah! On the order of the day, and what happens if the kohen gadol does things out of order.
Sprinkling on the "pure" of the altar - the Gemara puzzles out what this pure is. Possibly, the midpoint of the altar wall. Possibly, an indication of revelation, as the prooftext of a verse in Exodus suggests. Also, what happens when a Tanna changes his mind to agree with a different Tanna...?! Plus, what happens to the blood that runs off, into the Kidron River, no less? And if one uses that blood - as gardeners were said to do - how much so they have to worry about me'ilah (misusing that which was consecrated)?
Pouring the blood of the bull into the blood of the goat.... Into the smaller bowl. And then the smaller bowl or its contents are put into the empty one. To mix well. Rami bar Chama asks some questions that seem to be exploring, rather than trying to recall. Also: Blood on the altar, in very specific ordered directions. Where does he start, though? Even the path of the kohen gadol is subject to a tannaitic machloket. More, how does the Yom Kippur service line up with the daily, in terms of how familiar the kohen gadol was with all of these directions?
Another daf considering "hekesh," comparing verses and inferring halakhic detail. In this case, on what happens in the Sanctuary, but it's a hekesh on a hekesh, and that seems too much. Plus examining the way the learning itself came to pass. Until a reality check knocks down the "Gemara logic." Namely, an eyewitness account vs. the information derived from exegetical principles. Which is reasonable, but also surprising, given how much detail is discernible that isn't clear in other circumstances. Also, the Eretz Yisrael snobbery with regard to the Babylonian scholars.
Who's Who: The Baalei HaTosafot. What they do, and why they're here, on the daf. Plus, what one of these long comments by the Baalei HaTosafot has to say on our daf, specifically, on "yesh bereira" or not. Specifically, in the context of terumot and maaserot with Samaritans. With a pile of passages from the Gemara to support the claims of who holds what...
The sprinkling of the blood of the bull and of the goat, in great detail - as it also appears in the Yom Kippur liturgy. How does the kohen gadol count? Of course, it's a machloket. What IS the point of counting out loud? Plus, the bowls of blood from the bull and the goat, to be placed on the pedestal. Or the two pedestals. But there is no clear information whether there was one or two! Also, a parallel to horns for collecting funds - but just one, to ensure there won't be confusion, where labeling the horns is insufficient (for R. Yehuda). So too with the pedestal - labeling would be insufficient, to make confusion absolutely impossible.
What really happened with the ark? Was it exiled to Babylonia? Was it buried? How the biblical verses are used to support both views. And how Jerusalem and the Temple were mourned in the ark's absence. [What's What: Gematria] Also, the keruvim in the Temple, and the intimacy in that representation of the relationship between God and Israel. Plus other signifiers of differences between the Temples, reflective of that dynamic (for example, the curtains).
The deaths of Nadav and Avihu, the sons of Aharon, who die in a conflagration on the altar. The sages work hard to figure out what sin deserved this death, and one of them is presented on our daf. This particular reason seems extreme: namely, answering halakhah in the presence of Moshe, instead of deferring to him. Also, a prayer for a rainy and hot year, which seems incongruous. Which merits investigation. And then: a dramatic presentation of the aron (ark) that is utterly different from the burial account of the recent dad. Here, the ark goes into exile, without a whiff of a mention of the burial scenario.
How the kohen gadol needs to take a circuitous route to get to the Kodesh Kodashim... Or not. An the implications thereof. Also, that "amah" that at one time was a divider between the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies, and what kind of kedushah, and how we measure the space. Plus, verses of unresolved ambiguity, and Yossi ish Hotzal's take on this (his own identity ambiguous, given the number of names that are his). Also, the route of the kohen gadol from the Sanctuary to the Kodesh Kodashim, and his way back. Including his short (!) prayer on his way out. Plus: King Yoshiyahu and the burual of the ark, which was in the First Temple, and not the Second Temple.
On the kohen gadol's sin-offering - to what extent us it a communal offering and to what extent is it his own? With implications for whether temurah would work, among others. Also, a piece of architecture that defines and divides the Temples from each other and the Mishkan. Namely, there was an amah-wide space between the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies. Which raises the question of the degree of sanctity of that spot, whether it follows the inner or outer kedushah.
Sin-offerings that could not be offered as sacrifices, and therefore were left to die: 5 cases. A more brutal death, surely, than simply putting it to death.... Also: the korban of "par he'elem davar shel tzibur" (What's What). These sin-offerings, both individual and communal, attest to the need for sin-offerings... Namely, that people sin. Plus, a focus on Temurah - the exchange or substitution of a specific animal - here, comparing the stringencies of the original korban to the substitute, and vice versa.
What if a replacement kohen gadol is needed, whether because of death, Impurity, or anything else? Can the initial scooping done by the first kohen gadol count towards the second kohen gadol's completion of this avodah? Or does that not work? (Isn't the amount of incense taken specific to each kohen gadol's hands?!). Also, how the kohen gadol actually maneuvered all the movable parts - spoon, incense, coals... One of the most difficult rites in the Beit HaMikdash....
More on the incense. What happens if things go wrong with the basic incense plan? When is the incense invalid? When is it fine? (Shouldn't they know the answers here easily? But they don't). Also, the 4 aspects of the avodah with blood, with each animal, including moving the blood over, as here - with his left hand. So doing some of the avodah with his left hand seems to be fine... Or will it invalidate the service?
Note: Audio issues in the first 2 minutes, but then it settles down. ||. Chapter 5 - a new chapter, with a focus on the avodah that is done by the kohen gadol in preparation for, and then in the kodesh kodashim, hidden from the eyes of all. Beginning with the kohen gadol taking the amount of incense according to his own physical measurement. With a focus on right-handedness. Also, the story of Yishmael ben Kimchit, who was the kohen gadol, and had very large hands. He also ended up interrupting his service as kohen gadol because he was rendered impure... so his brother took over. Plus, the striking connection between the kohen gadol and his mother, surprisingly not his father. Also: the story of Kimchit and her 7 sons - each of whom became kohen gadol, and why that was credited to their meritorious mother.
On the different fires in the Temple. With a focus on R. Huna's position, on the conflation of issues between Yom Kippur and Shabbat. Plus, the override clause. To what extent, do we need to extrapolate? Also, the fire is never supposed to go out the mizbeach. What happens if/when it does? Who is responsible...?
Gold! 7 different kinds, or maybe 5, ranging in quality, and shade, and origin. Including the red gold for Yom Kippur, which reflected the red of the blood of the korbanot. Also, the fire of the altar, and the inner/outer issue - entailing careful analysis of the biblical text (on a vav and a hey, plus, mi-lifnei).
On the incense as a mechanism of atonement. Specifically for lashon hara, evil speech. Which aligns neatly, in terms of the scent and spread of it atoning for the spread of lashon hara. Plus, it's more comfortable for modern sensibilities that have a hard time with animal sacrifice. Also, on separating between the antechamber and the altar, the blood of korbanot vs. that of idolatry. But is this d'Oraita or deRabbanan? What confusion is this, where people can wander into the prohibited area, between the main hall and the altar... Could you really wander into the wrong place? Maybe that's the challenge itself. Plus, the silver and gold of the pan used by the kohen gadol for the coals - where there's only gold on Yom Kippur, and the silver of the rest of the year is supposed to ease the burden of covering the cost by the people.
The need to read the parah adumah verses very carefully, in terms of establishing what the halakhah is, and all of the details pertaining to the parah adumah, in its classic status as a "chok." Noting that the Amoraim remain puzzled... Plus, a new and very long mishnah... Comparing the kohen gadol's actions on Yom Kippur to "every day." Including some differences to ease the strain on the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur.
A dispute between Rav and Shmuel - who are Amoraim! - on whether the slaughter of the Yom Kippur Korban or the parah adumah can be done by a non-kohen. Namely, forgetting. Also, a zoom in on the slaughter of the parah adumah if done by a non-kohen. With a spotlight on the logic of how the non-kohen came to be excluded - just as a woman would have been excluded (it works, but also a little odd). They are working on the midrash halakhah that get them to the halakhic conclusion that they already know it needs to be.
A parallel to the lots selecting the goats - birds! Including Sotah. But also if one choose bird korbanot because of the expense. And then what happens to the birds... which seems to have different parameters from the goats of Yom Kippur, in any case. Also, with regard to the goats - the kohen gadol ties the red string on the head of the goat going to Azazel. He positions the goats, and then utters his confession. The Gemara's focus shifts to the wool used for the red string. Including the connection to the parah adumah. Including confusion, apparently, by the Amoraim (and us too), and the need to compare Yom Kippur to the birds and the parah adumah.
On whether the lottery is necessary as an element of the Yom Kippur device. Which leads to a dispute between R. Shimon and R. Yehudah,on the role of the Vidui, the confession, and atonement. Note that the dispute is about interpretation of biblical verses, and not about philosophy, per se, or so it seems. Also, a question for R. Akiva about switching hands after choosing the lots, and the risk of maligning the halakhic system. Plus, a comment on the generations of heretics.
The mishnah describes the procedure of the kohen gadol choosing the lots to determine which goat is to go God as a korban, and which to Azazel. The lottery receptacle had certain defining factors, including the fact that it wasn't large enough for more than the kohen gadol's two hands at one time, including the fact that it was unconsecrated, as it was made from wood. Also, Shimon HaTzadik (Who's Who, and then some), and stories about his tenure. Plus, whether the lottery receptacle selection is an indispensable element of the avodah.
The Gates of Nikanor - when they brought back the big heavy doors for the gate, there was a terrible storm, so they tossed one door to alleviate the effects of the storm, but Nikanor wouldn't let them throw the second one in too. What devotion he had to the Beit HaMikdash! Though the timeline is puzzling. Also, another account (parallel to the one in Shekalim) on the families that didn't want to share their trade secrets for the shewbread and the incense. Here, we have 2 more skilled individuals who wouldn't share the skills (music and writing). And a verse in Mishlei praising and disparaging people for their deeds gives these folks the critique. Plus, aggadot on the righteous and the wicked. Note that the verses about tzadikim are all citations from I Samuel.
How the Vidui is based on biblical verses. Also, the mishnah on the ordering of the kohanim, as well as the lottery to decide which goat goes to God as a korban, and which is sent to Azazel. Plus the gold accoutrements, under King Monobaz. Wherein the Gemara neatly follows the topics of this mishnah. Plus a focus on the goats.
Where and how the kohen sets up the animal for the korban of Yom Kippur, including semichat yadaim and the vidui confession, an element of Yom Kippur that lasts to this very day. Plus discussion of when a Korban is necessary, what the laying on of hands accomplishes, as per a dispute between R. Yosi HaGalili and R. Akiva, on the various sins and atonement. Plus, the Vidui itself, in much of its serious detail. Note: We apologize for the audio quality - we're not sure why it's so soft.
Beit HaParvah - what is this? Why is it called this, when Parvah seems to have been a sorcerer? How would a chamber of the Beit HaMikdash be named after a sorcerer?! And isn't this term anachronistic to begin with? Also, dedicating of one's own goods to the Temple - or that tunic that his mother made! A few different examples of this are introduced. Plus, various stories of functioning through poverty... And the famous story of Hillel, frozen in his spying.... The context of which is key, to note his great self-sacrifice for the sake of Torah. Which brings us to the point that poor or wealthy, or even wicked (!), there's no excuse to neglect Torah learning.
Procedural details about the day that is Yom Kippur: havitin, nisakhin, and more, based on the close read of the biblical verses. Also: When the kohen gadol is an "istanis," and the water for immersion is very cold, and it can be heated for this consideration - testimony to the sages' awareness of psychology and the phenomenon of what we call "highly sensitive people" today. How does this connect to intention? Namely, doing something that is prohibited unintentionally. As applied to brit milah and Yom Kippur. Plus, the mishnah at the end of the daf: the next garment change, immersing, washing hands and feet. And some detail about the percale count, as it were, of the linen garments - apparently, the finest of things. And he could add to the pool of funding if he wanted to - again, attesting to the attunedness to his preferences. Is this a contradiction in the terms of not being materialistic on Yom Kippur? Perhaps not, if not taken to the extreme.
What was the daily avodah (not the Yom Kippur part of the day)? Aligning the procedure with the biblical text that orders it, and ordering the day, at least as per the Amoraim. For example, cleaning out the ash (terumat ha-deshen) takes place before cleaning out the menorah's lamps. Which leads to the key point that we do not pass over an opportunity to do mitzvot. This aligns with the order of operations as compared to what task happens first, based on what you encounter first. This plays out in tefillin as well. And tzedakah. [Our apologies for the wonky audio. We did not know anything was going wrong in those moments!]
Why does the Gemara take so much time and space for the 5 immersions and 10 sanctifications of hand and feet washing in Yom Kippur? Interspersed, he changes his garments from white linen to gold to white to gold to white. What pageantry! What a way to establish the tempo of the day! Plus: What is the source of these 15 various washings? Is it from the Torah's account of Aaron's conduct ? Or is it a logical inference? And is this difference of approach and ambiguity the reason for the ongoing discussion on the washings?
Closing the debate between Ben Zoma and R. Yehudah, not wholly satisfactorily. The washing sanctification and the immersing was all done in a holy chamber near the kohen's chamber -- except for the first immersion of the day, which took place outside, in the water that arrived to the Temple via an aqueduct higher than the courtyard of the Temple. Also, a new mishnah! Continuing with the procedures of the day. Beginning with the kohen gadol's wardrobe change, more washing, and the Korban Tamid of the morning, shared with another kohen/other kohanim. Plus a Korban Minchah, more with blood, and the incense of the morning... and afternoon. [What's What: Istanis (again)] They would adjust the temperature of the mikveh, if the kohen gadol was sensitive to the temperature. The Gemara here responds to his human need.
A new mishnah focused in the kohen's washing of hands and feet, and immersing in the mikveh (10 and 5 times, respectively). With measures in place to preserve his modesty, of course. Which brings us to a dispute between Ben Zoma and R. Yehudah, with regard to how close to a risk of incurring later this washing avoids. What are they actually disagreeing about? Whether the washing (or lack thereof) invalidates the service itself. And how it increases the kedushah of his activity. Plus a distinction made between the first dunking and washing of the day, though the mishnah (and Ben Zoma and R. Yehudah) do not make that distinction explicit.
In memory of Yardaena's father, Dr. Michael Osband, z"l, whose yahrzeit is today. || Some "wise statements"... And accompanying reminders, as it were, to help remember the wise statements. For example, planning a sin is worse than a sin itself. And the mnemonic? The smell of a meat. Which needs some unpacking, of course. Also, the part we're skipping (explicit handling of Esther and Achashverosh's dynamic). Instead: the connection of Esther to the dawn. Should the megillah be part of the canon? Clearly, the one who holds that she is like the dawn believes the book is sanctified too. She is also likened to an ayala (deer), playing off ayelet ha-shachar (the dawn, the morning star). How righteous was Esther. (Plus, some Purim vs. Chanukah).
Why the non-kohen subject to death for setting up the logs. Is this activity its own separate act? Plus, this smacks of the Second Temple. And - the new chapter, with the mishnah beginning to account for the activities of the day of Yom Kippur, which are the activities that apply to every day, as it happens. Checking for daybreak. Bringing the kohen gadol to cleanse himself. Plus, connecting the Torah to the biblical Avraham - why doing so is legitimate and also important. Even to the presentation of Avraham learning in yeshiva (and many others too), though it seems anachronistic.
Arranging the wood for the fire - if a non-kohen does this, he is subject to death. If he did it, he should disassemble and reassemble it (which latter part makes no sense!). The kohen needs to step in and participate. But some nighttime activities are permitted to non-kohanim. Until it seems clear that everything is lined up with the daytime! Also, shouldn't the fact that a non-kohen could be put to death for this, isn't it enough of an activity to warrant a lottery? But it IS part of the lottery from the morning terumat ha-deshen. Which brings us back to the night vs. day tasks. And what kind of tasks get a lottery or not. Which is not entirely clear.
Lotteries #3 and #4, per day in the Beit HaMikdash! For the ketoret, incense, only those who had never done it before were eligible. A blessing of prosperity reaches those who have done it, so once seems to be enough. But the kohanim weren't eligible to do it very often to begin with, so the extra motivation to limit it to once ever may have other factors as well. Plus, the tribes that produce Torah scholars: Levi and Yissachar. But it's not clear how accurate that was (what about Yehudah?? What about Yissachar missing, as one of the 10 tribes)... Also, how many kohanim were to be involved in the daily handling of the sacrifices (from 9 to 12). Including why the water libation on Sukkot would take place in the morning.
The second lottery... A whole slew of tasks, and a question whether there's a new lottery for each task. Also, the details of every step of the way, and different details, per different opinions on what should be done. Note that this daf is heavy on the animal parts.
On the 4 services that if a non-kohen did them, he'd be deserving of a death sentence. Is terumat ha-deshen one of these 4? The dispute here is between Rav and Levi... And the discussion revolves around a k'lal u-f'rat u-kh'lal form of logic - the general and specific, as present in the biblical verse. What is the nature of this service, and its connection to the parokhet (vs. courtyard). Applying the rules of inference depend on the understanding of the verse. "Every thing pertaining to the altar." Plus, what it means to do a careful reading of the text. Note the leniency and stringency for the non-kohen. Also, more on the lottery, why we have several, and why they were done over the course of the day.
Follow up on why the thumb, and only one finger was acceptable for the lottery to be chosen to do terumat ha-deshen. Also, Revenge and holding a grudge are good, nay, necessary (!) for a Torah scholar. But that contradicts the verses in Leviticus, so the Gemara has to resolve this surprising statement. Including the Gemara's definitions of revenge and holding a grudge. Recognizing that people have different personalities and relate to this differently... There may be a difference between the default for the average Joe and that for the Torah scholar. Plus, a knife fight and death among the kohanim. With its comparison to the eglah arufah. Note the officially misplaced priorities, putting the laws of purity and impurity above (preventing) murder. Note also that being too lax or too stringent takes us far afield from what we're supposed to be doing.
The basics of every day for the kohanim in the Beit HaMikdash, beginning with clearing out the ashes from the previous day. They chose who did what by racing for it! That wasn't the best plan, so the started a lottery, to choose who got the job more safely. Also, the question of who would get up early was real. Plus, counting fingers or shards of pottery instead of counting people, to not violate the statement in Hosea on not counting Bnei Yisrael. Also, investigating King David and his punishment.
A discussion of the 10 miracles that took place in the Beit HaMikdash. Including the miracle that kept each person from hearing a neighbor's confession. Plus, other miracles that aren't on the first list, deliberating why not? Such as a study of the Cedars of Lebanon.
And now for some aggadah: Why hasn't mashiach come? Presumably because of the promiscuity and sin that were getting in the way of his arrival. And the Satan will stand as an accuser against the people - in this case, that they shouldn't deserve mashiach. But on Yom Kippur, the Satan has no sway to argue against Bnei Yisrael. Plus, a new mishnah, bringing us back to the work of the altar, in this case, truly the dirty work of clearing out the ashes of the mizbeach. At the rooster crowing (if that's what this expression means - it's debated in the Gemara here). Though it was down earlier on festival days. Also, elaborating on exactly that question of whether the crier in the morning was a rooster or a person, to rouse the kohanim, and have them project for the people as well. Plus, sound carries more in the nighttime than during the day.
More on preparing the kohen gadol before Yom Kippur. For example, assessing the fitness if the given kohen gadol in the lishkat ha-gazit - done by the Sanhedrin. Note how much attention was paid to determining whether the kohen was fit. What if he wasn't at risk of being a Sadducee, etc.? Why did they put him through such a rigorous preparation time, walking from end to end of the Temple, to get to the right chambers? Perhaps to make sure he's fit, or why would he bother? Maybe to keep a fit kohen humble. Plus: The story of a Sadducee who messed with the service of the incense, and what happened to him. A theological argument against those who defied the rabbinic approach. Note that the calf imagery is consistently connected to seeing and worshiping of God. Also, the efforts the regular kohanim would take to keep the kohen gadol awake: they would sing! "If Hashem won't build the house..." And the rest of the city would stay up with him! "Behold, the Guardian of Israel doesn't slumber or sleep." (With thanks to YouTube and the Shira Choir).
More on prepping the kohen gadol - reading the account of the service to him to make sure he's on top of the details he must do on Yom Kippur. The question of why he might not be on top of the details is a good one, and depending on when in history the year fell, the reason is different. Plus, on Erev Yom Kippur, the kohen gadol's food was managed and selected carefully. Also, reviewing the animals he needs to know on Yom Kippur - but to give him confidence, not shake it, on Erev Yom Kippur. What is his relationship with the kohanim, as compared to everyone else. Plus, noting the rabbis taking of wives. Also, keeping him up with the texts and topics most suitable to him.
The layout of the Temple - a contradiction between a mishnah in Tamid vs. one in Middot. Is this a debate in methodology or in content? Also, the oral nature of the tradition may have had impact here. Also, a shift to focus in how the kohen gadol chooses his food first,from sacrifices, from lechem hapanim, even. The process leads to what appears to be a contradiction in terms, a neat resolution, and some questions on tying up the loose ends here.
The layout of 4 different chambers and their functions in the Ezrat Nashim of the Beit HaMikdash. And the implications of the complicated functioning in the Temple. Also, on how the Mishnah came to be, including a sense that some tractates follow the rulings of given scholars. But note: by design, the text is an assortment of divergent opinions, without trauma. Plus, the terracing on the terrain outside of the Beit HaMikdash, reflecting on the sanctity of the Temple and the extent to which it was extended beyond the borders (and didn't) of the building.
On the lighting of the menorah... and how it is the Avodah, the worship, from dusk to dawn. Plus the order and interplay between the menorah lamps and the ketoret (incense). Also, sprinkling and throwing placing the blood on the corners of the altar, with different standards for the different kinds of korbanot. Plus, the learning of these details as compared to the physical experience of them.
A new mishnah! With more of the activities that the kohen gadol must do during the week before Yom Kippur. It is his main responsibility, after all. Plus, whose opinion is represented in this mishnah? Clearly, it's not R. Akiva, given his approach to the purification process. Also, on the incense, and the order of burning it as compared to the menorah.
On the backup wife for the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur (though it is basically rejected as a plan). He can be married to two women (even though it's an era when polygamy was still allowed) - but could he use a conditional divorce? Is that actually practical?! To what extent are they blase about conditional divorce? Also, some of the examples of where conditional divorce does not work, when the condition itself invalidates the very phenomenon of divorce. Plus, the case of aninut (sharp mourning) for the kohen gadol.
On the status of Jerusalem. Specifically with regard to ritual Impurity. How does the city itself compare to synagogues and batei midrashot? Is Jerusalem on the portion of the tribes whose portions are right there (Yehuda and Binyamin), or is it "everyone's"? What does it mean to be host, as compared to guest, when thinking of the holy city (and also on general)? Also, the "understudy" of the kohen gadol - when does the new status take place, depending on when the kohen gadol was disqualified? And how was the transfer to be evident to the rest of the people there? Perhaps a straw man, but apparently via his belt. The garments here just might make the man. Or perhaps he attains the kohen gadol status simply by virtue of doing the job. Plus, the question of what happens if the first kohen gadol can come back on the job? What happens to the understudy who has been elevated? It would seem he's in limbo (unless the first kohen gadol eventually dies...).
On mezuzot. In Mehoza. It was a Jewish city, so why didn't the town gates have a mezuzah? Or were they really gates? Or would that really matter for the need for a mezuzah? Plus a concern regarding checking mezuzot per the halakhic requirements, at the same time of danger. Also, a list of places that do NOT need mezuzot. And those that do, despite potential inferences from the biblical verse that would suggest otherwise. And some refection on the protection factor. NOTE: Some audio weirdness towards the very end - it resolves.
A historical bent, an awareness to the order of events and countries as they came into being. From Genesis on down. Which empire swallowed which? Also, a dispute of interpretation on Persia. And who gets to challenge R. Yehudah HaNasi?! Plus, the dispute about the mezuzah on the chamber in the Beit HaMikdash. How does that compare to sukkah?
Comparing the First and Second Temples. First, the numbers. Second, the grievous sins that brought each down. And how to characterize the different eras? Also, the revealed nature of the sins of the First Temple and the hidden nature of the sins of the Second Temple. R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish debate which generation was better... With an eye to a Third Temple. Plus, Rabbah bar bar Hannah helps Resh Lakish and gets puts down for his troubles. Resh Lakish faults the Jews in Babylonia for not returning to Zion when they could have done so.
More on the separation 7 days before Yom Kippur or the parah adumah (red heifer), as it happens, where each kohen then needs sprinkling as part of the process, but not on the fourth day. The question of when these 7 days fall out is left to the calendar for Yom Kippur, but rigged for the parah adumah. Plus, the chamber where the kohen would go to be sequestered in the Beit HaMikdash - what was it called and why? They changed every 12 months... Why?
Impurity is permitted in the context of the community -- the case of a kohen offering the omer korban, and it becomes impure. What to do if there is no other pure offering to replace the impure one? Which leads to a discussion about the status of Impurity. Also, the tzitz, that sits on the kohen gadol's forehead (and if not there, it doesn't have the power that it does when worn, or depending on the debate about it). Relevant also to the kohen gadol's personal worship. So... Is the tzitz what's important, or the kohen wearing it?
Back to the kohen separating from his family - why must he separate? Beyond the parallels we have already discussed, the concern is what if the kohen gadol's wife were possibly impure, because of a question pertaining to menstruation. Also, what about the risk of becoming impure because of contact with a dead body? But that kind of impurity will be overridden by the needs of the community. It's also less common of a risk than niddah Impurity, especially for a kohen who is careful about such things.
R. Yochanan vs. R. Akiva, on what elements of the inauguration of the Mishkan were essential,and whether any of those elements could have been cut, and the Mishkan still be valid. One key question being why this gets attention, given that it was a one-time event and there's no reason to think it will be repeated. Also, how did Moshe dress Aharon and his sons (which seems a comparable after-the-fact kind of question)? How did Moshe belt them?
A description of Moshe going up to Mount Sinai to get the Torah. What steps did Moshe need to take, in terms of sequestering before God invited him in. Also, the debate between R. Yosi HaGalili and R. Akiva, about what date was the giving of the Torah, with implications for time sequestered. But through all this discussion, where is the mention of Shavuot?! And yet, the holiday that commemorates the giving of the Torah is not discussed here; rather, it's the giving of the Torah and the steps Moshe took.
The language of "take yourself," for yourself, from that which is yours - in the kohen gadol's contribution (or participation) to the offerings. God wants us to give from our own. Plus, taking from the wood that is the community's or your own? (God seems to want our contributions when we're in good graces, and otherwise, as in this case of building the ark for the Luchot, all credit goes to Moshe). Also, R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish on the kohen separating off for the parah adumah handling. The differences between the Yom Kippur sequestering vs. the parah adumah sequestering - which presents 2 completely different reads of the material.
An introduction to Masekhet Yoma, and the events surrounding and on Yom HaKippurim in the Beit HaMikdash. Note the shift in orientation to that of the perspective of the kohanim. The first chapter opens with preparing of the kohanim for the day of Yom Kippur. Namely, separating from his home 7 days in advance, appointing understudies, and so on, within reason. Plus, the parah adumah (red heifer), the other korban for which the kohen would sequester for 7 days in advance. Also, the "mishmarot" of the kohanim.
Meat from korbanot that becomes impure - depending on what kind of korban, what kind of Impurity, and what degree of Impurity... all have impact on how to handle the impure meat. Also, the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai seems to be opining anachronistically on this daf... Plus, the korbanot musafim (the additional ones) for Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh - how they would be arranged on the altar. How did the order of offerings work? And how did they line up with the songs of the Leviim? There's precedence to both Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh, depending on which issue. Note: The principle of that which occurs more frequently taking precedence. And also the idea of publicizing the day being a key concern, as well.
NOTE: The app has again overlapped our voices We have contacted them, but no solution as yet. You have our apologies for this audio irregularity. || Venturing into a discussion of ritual purity - starting with spittle, and under what circumstances it would be considered pure or impure. Also, the parokhet - a main curtain in the Beit HaMikdash - what happens if it was rendered impure? It needs immersion in the mikveh, but no waiting after the dunking (rabbinic impurity). With discussion of how many strands were in the threads, and how many people were involved in dunking the parokhet. Plus, note the implications of purity/impurity on daily life.
More on things that are found, the status of which is unknown. Specifically, items found in dangerous settings, where the likelihood of the owner thinking that he or she would still get it back is negligible. For example, the clutches of a lion. Thus, they relinquish ownership: "ye'ush" - despairing of ever getting that item back again. Including public thoroughfares, which leads to the presumption that the majority of people in Jerusalem are Jewish, which has halakhic implications for found items, specifically when it comes to kashrut. Why not publicize things for their original owners to come claim them? It seems that there's no need, and doing so may not actually be desirable. Also, found animals were presumed to be offerings. 7 decrees by the court to address issues of the time - including a korban offered by a non-Jew. And now concerning the administration of korbanot in the Beit HaMikdash.
Things that are found, and you don't know the halakhic status of those things. For example, coins found out of place in the Treasury of the Temple... Sometimes, the lenient approach is taken, sometimes the stringent - and the mishnah provides the general rule of which is employed when. Also, coins that are found before animal dealers in Jerusalem - always presumed to be Ma'aser Sheni. Why would that be? If found on the Temple Mount - presumed to be "chullin" (not consecrated or designated in any way). Plus a whole host of other factors that might come into play in determining the status of the found items (including if it's meat!). The timing of the finding can have impact as well. Also, whether the context is a predominantly Jewish setting. The more you know about the circumstances, the more lenient the status can be assigned. Plus, a story about a person from Tzipori who bought meat via a non-Jew, which turned out to be non-kosher meat (because the butcher sold non-kosher meat to a non-Jew, making assumptions that the non-Jew would not need kosher meat).
The 10 menorahs of King Solomon - what was he thinking? Where were they placed in the Temple? Were they lit? Note the contrast in Shlomo's gold that needed refining and Moshe's menorah, the gold for which never needed refining, according to the daf. Also, the need for clarification retroactively - were specific coins designated in the Temple? The halakhic concept of identifying the unspecified after the fact is a key halakhic concept throughout Shas. Plus, Who's Who: Yehoyada.
When the waters of the sea overtook the land - when that happens and where. Including a play on words from the biblical text to offer an allusion to the areas of the Land of Israel that were overcome. Also, what happened in the wake of Nebuchadnezzar, from the activities of the people and that of the Divine. Comparing the two destructions... How evil is Nebuchadnezzar here? How frightful was the destruction?
Other things that were hidden away with the ark included the anointing oil. The Gemara provides both a recipe and the narrative of the miracle involved when Moshe made it the first time, and for all time. Also, the Luchot, the Tablets of the 10 Commandments, and what was written on them - a lot more debatable than we might have thought!
The 2 chambers in the Temple, one for secret donations and one for the vessels. Every 30 days, they'd review what had been donated, and figure out how best to use it. Also, a story of Nachum Ish Gamzu - on which he had reason to regret his plan to delay giving tzedakah, and loses the chance, to rather ill effect. Which becomes a treatise on suffering. Also, more on the items that were kept on the Beit HaMikdash. And the fact that the aron (ark) is already gone from there, and an indication of its hiding place, or what happened to it.
Nechunya would dig ditches for water, cool and warm, for the pilgrims to Jerusalem. Yet his child died of thirst. Plus another version that seems to be about him. Wherein a pious man (who gave everyone water) who would not accept consolation when his daughter died in water. Until that version is revised to show that she is saved. The Gemara is distressed at the notion that the righteous father would see suffering via his child. Plus, parallel stories about Beit Garmu and Beit Avtinasand the lechem hapanim and the incense, respectively, where they each stopped doing their tasks in the Temple, and Alexandrians were called in and they weren't able to do either task as well as the respective family members, so the family was called back in... Also, R. Akiva with perspective on personal honor.
Shifting from chapter 4 to chapter 5 (Anne misspoke). Every 30 days, they would set the prices for the goods in the treasury, with the Temple's price taking precedence over the market price. And if the foodstuffs would go bad, the merchant has to cover the cost - but the careful kohanim were not going to let that happen. Moving on to the next perek: A long list of which person or family was responsible for what task in the Beit HaMikdash. Including Petachya, who is said to be Mordechai (from Megillat Esther). Plus, a discussion of the evolution of Torah SheBe'al Peh - the Oral Torah. Including a focus on R. Akiva, as well as the organizing lists throughout the Talmud. Also, note the story of the donkey of R. Pinchas ben Yair. And that of Petachya with a deaf-mute. Plus, kohen dietary considerations.
One who consecrates all possessions with specifying what would be designated for what, then how should those possessions be handled? What if the person's possessions include animals that are fit to be sacrifices? (Spoiler: They'll be used as sacrifices). With a dispute between R. Akiva and R. Yehoshua - as to what happens with the sum total of the dedication. [Who's Who: R. Pappias] R. Pappias resolves the dispute, applying their respective views to two different cases. Also, swapping out a dedicated item for something else that will be more suitable, but it does not always work - What's What: Temurah.
The special ramp built for it with funds from machatzit ha-shekel... Or by the kohanim themselves?! But that may have been pompus... But Shimon HaTzadik and his 2 parot adumot. Surely, he wasn't pompous! [Who's Who: Shimon HaTzadik] The difference between arrogance and giving honor. The ramp, of course, is to help prevent the encounter with anything impure. Also, the extra, overflow - specifically when it comes to incense. The intricate process of removing the kedushah from the incense... Including the process of paying the craftspeople in the Beit HaMikdash. But with caveats - this transfer doesn't work in advance, for example.
Chapter 4! What is the machatzit ha-shekel used for? A clear list of public korbanot. Also to pay the guards who protected the extra growing grain during a Shemitah year. But whether those guards need to be paid or can volunteer is a matter of dispute. Which leads to a discussion of several families that donated the wood to the Temple. Plus, other things funded with the shekalim, including the parah adumah, the scapegoat of Yom Kippur, and even the red string from Yom Kippur. Great care was taken with the parah adumah, for example, so all of that needed to be paid for. The leftover funds went to purchases that could be resold a d give the new profit to hekdesh (except that R. Akiva disagrees; he does agree that it can be used to keep korbanot on the altar when none might be offered otherwise). (4 key opinions here) Plus: An aside on the archeological find of a shekel likely used for machatzit ha-shekel.
How the kohen handled the collected shekalim, with great care to make it impossible for a kohen to steal from the funds (again, no presumption of perfection!). With the focus on being blame-free before both man and God. Also, the practice of collecting in the house of R. Gamliel. As well as the collection and storage of the coins from farther afield. Plus, a list of traits to achieve all that a person can do to refine and perfect oneself. [Who's Who: R. Pinchas ben Yair] As well as R. Meir's map to achieve olam ha-ba. Both bring the practitioner to redemption.
A long, discursive daf. What happens to the shekalim of machatzit ha-shekel, when they get to Jerusalem? Also: What's What: Ma'aser Behemah. Which leads to a discussion re the proper dating for this mitzvah, and a machloket Tannaim. What year does the animal belong to, so to speak, and what is the date of tithing? Also, on the Tannaim themselves, and what it means to have a talmid-rebbe- friend relationship.... Also: Baskets marked indicating how they were marked. And the collector had to wear only clothes that couldn't inadvertently make off with the funds. This Gemara has one thing leading to the next, from machatzit haS-shekel to carrying on Shabbat to the 4 cups of Seder night. And spices wine... Plus, a matronita (Roman noble woman) story, wherein she is a foil to the shining glory of Torah, as seen on one's face.
What if you have collected funds for any specifically designated purpose (to ransom a captive, charity, burying the dead...)? It's a machloket, of course. Also, a story: How the sages conduct themselves, including asking after one's welfare. R. Yochanan and R. Eliezer. What matters to different people of Chazal. And as cast back on King David. What it means to quote in the name of.
A dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai: what do you do with the coins that exceed the value of the machatzit ha-shekel? Is the extra considered consecrated, or I it extra that can be used for anything? Consider the comparison between machatzit ha-shekel and a korban chatat - and the contrast between the fixed sum of the former and the variable value of the latter. Also, the ability the swap smaller coins in bulk for large coins of greater value. Also note how careful everyone was and needed to be with Temple property. Plus: The orthography of the Yerushalmi. Also, other areas of surplus, when money is set aside for a designated purpose, is considered a nedavah, a voluntary gift, as it were, within certain parameters. Including: lo and behold, including with regard to the Korban Pesach. Recall how a Korban Pesach can change to a korban shelamim. Note that the discussion about the 14th of Nisan was for the daf of the 14th of Nisan! And look at the interplay of the Yerushalmi here, on the Bavli of Pesachim, as it were.
What happened to the shekalim of those who lived outside of Jerusalem? How did they get all the coins to the Temple? Worse, what would happen if those coins were lost or stolen on their way to Jerusalem? Who owns the shekalim while en route? And if you're going to convert the coinage into that which is worth more, why use gold and not gems? All of which revolves around the level of responsibility of the people delivering the coinage, whether to the people who gave the shekalim or to the treasurers if the Temple... It depends on when in the process they are called to account. Also: Appointing someone to make your contribution of machatzit ha-shekel, and instead, he submits those funds for his own machatzit ha-shekel - how has he desecrated this Temple property? For that matter, in any case where the consecrated item (Ma'aser Sheni, for example) gets used for machatzit ha-shekel, you still shouldn't do it, but it's less severe than personal use. Of course, mishandling Temple funds is awful, but the fact that it could happen makes it necessary material in the Gemara here. The fact that the court could come after (most) people for collateral if he hasn't paid up his machatzit ha-shekel becomes salient.
On the mitzvah of machatzit ha-shekel... women and slaves and minors are not obligated to provide it, but they can donate if they want to - while non-Jews' donations in this category would not be accepted. Also, paying a premium on top of the machatzit ha-shekel: who pays, who doesn't have to? Plus: the dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish and R. Meir's approach regarding paying 2 machatzit ha-shekels, and the story of God forging the coin. Plus, on the Kuti, as a population that does not contribute to the census. But this is a real dispute, whether they are in the count or can't be.
The 15th of Adar ushers in the springtime, and all of the repairs that winter made necessary. So too, the courts open up. And also th administration of some judgements (including sotah and eglah arufah). And public waterworks. Also, when the sages (of the Yerushalmi) cite a verse about the person with tzaraat, and why. Plus, description pertaining to the wars of Gog and Magog, and the bones that would be in evidence and why marking graves is essential. Also, decrees regarding kilayim (mixtures in planting), to ensure the observance of these halakhot. Plus, the court's ability to declare fields ownerless... And the court's ability to establish a leap year (but not during a leap year). Plus: Moneychangers for machatzit ha-shekel, and when they would take a collateral (and when not). Even kohanim had to give the half-shekel. The role of the kohen demands our attention here.
What makes Shekalim different? Note that the Gemara on these mishnayot is Talmud Yerushalmi, the so-called Palestinian Talmud. Why is it here? Also, the content of Shekalim makes its placement in Seder Moed incongruous, at least at first read. || Opening with the proclamation for people to contribute their shekalim (half shekel) to the Beit HaMikdash, for upkeep, repair, public welfare, and even communal sacrifice. Also, why this contribution was collected when it was? Plus: Breaking down reading Megillat Esther on the 15th, for the walked cities, with different content and language than we know from the Bavli, as commentary on the mishnah. Note that we don't do the Adar mitzvot in the leap month of Adar I, but only Adar II. Also, were the people on the cities supposed to read Megillat Esther for two days?
The final daf of Pesachim! [At some point, the app acted up and overlapped our talking again; we hope that this is the last time this happens! (We've been on touch with the people at Anchor)] Notar and pigul - leftover korban and incorrect intent on the part of the officiating kohen.... Not all kohanim were as good as all other kohanim Thus, there were suspected kohanim (intentionally messing up the korbanot) and lazy kohanim (likewise, messing up the korbanot). The final mishnah: Blessings over the Korban Pesach and the korban chagigah - are they the same? Can one include the other? Where how the blood of the korban is handled may make the difference. The end here is a little jarring. After all, we were talking about the Seder; why are we back with korbanot? Perhaps hinting to the ideal of the Korban Pesach. Plus: Pidyon HaBen - regarding the blessing and who makes it. Plus, why we redeem the first born, and the context of Egypt.
More on the afikoman... And actual desserts. Also, the status of matzah in an era without a Korban Pesach. And what counts as an interruption of the meal? Including what counts as real sleep vs. dozing off? Plus, pigul and notar and re seeing the meat impure. Which Tanna was concerned about Impurity kicking in after midnight?
A verse about that which was concealed is understood to mean either that secrets of Torah were hidden away - as in details of Creation, or Ma'aseh Merkavah, or perhaps the meaning of mitzvot altogether. Note that God rejoices when He is "conquered" by people. For example, when Moshe convinces God not to destroy Bnei Yisrael. Also, more on Hallel. But with a twist - that God is rejoicing in us. First, Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, on down, each refusing to accept that they are deserving of His honor, until David - to whom more of the Tehillim are ascribed than anyone else. Plus, afikoman, which seems to be a delicacy that is eaten after the meal (of the Korban Pesach). A completely different meaning from our afikoman today.
A series of juxtaposed verses.... How difficult is it for people to acquire food?! "Etzev" and "itzavon" about Adam and Eve suggests the comparison. Similarly, a comparison to the protection by either God at one's job (of shepherding) or an angel, for getting food. Plus, other challenges, including going to the bathroom... as challenging as splitting the sea. So too, producing food. Is it hyperbole? Because that language for Adam and Eve is in the context of curses, no less. Also, disparaging the holidays is akin to idolatry. Also, indicting lashon hara, false testimony, etc. And back to Hallel... in the context of which, the Gemara discusses the story of Abraham and the fiery furnace. Plus, Egypt will have a gift for the messiah.
On the authorship of the book of Psalms - ascribed here to King David, though that is not a given by any means. Especially given that some of the events mentioned in Psalms predate King David. Yet, some ancient Hallel (which is made from psalms) seems to have existed forever, as it were. So when were these psalms written?! Also, what makes these passages personal to King David and also universal across the generations? And then, to this day, we're supposed to stop and say Hallel, praise to God, the night of the seder. Note - we are to give praise for God's sake, rather than for the sake of human beings. Plus, several historical events throughout Tanakh, at which points Bnei Yisrael said this praise. Also, the mishnah on the third cup of the Seder (at Birkat HaMazon). And the fourth, with Hallel.
Processing on the events of Seder night: cup #2. The mishnah interpolates the child asking Mah Nishtanah with the manner of asking found among the 4 sons. To be asked by anyone and everyone who can ask. Note the "5th" question on the meat of the Korban Pesach! Plus, the versions of the story of the exodus from Egypt that is to begin with the Israelites' historical disgrace, and concluding with praise, with both Rav's and Shmuel's take on which texts should be here. And, of course, also the 4 verses from "Arami oved avi." Note also the "modern" approach of the Seder, in terms of the appreciation for each personal imprint. Plus: Rabban Gamliel's implementation of that telling of the Pesach story in the halakhot that pertain to the Seder: Pesach, Matzah, Maror. And Hallel. And concluding Magid. Also, what about those who are missing any one of the senses that pertain to the fulfillment of a mitzvah? For example, those who are blind. What happened in the homes if the sages who themselves were blind?! Is the talking enough, or must there be a visual component? (Spoiler: It's the speaking part that matters; the visual elements are to be integrated into the narrative).
Figuring out the practices of the seder - Hillel's combination of matzah, maror, and Korban Pesach. Matzah and maror together ends up being a d'Orayta and d'Rabbanan mix, at least in our day, when it's not all a Torah level issue. Even though mitzvot should not be cancelling each other. Or maybe they're eaten consecutively, not together? This, Hillel's model becomes an ideal, but not the only way - as a memorial to the Temple. Also, what if you eating matzah and/or maror by swallowing, and without tasting it? Can you fulfill your obligations that'll way? Or under what circumstances? Also, "removing the table" - what is this and why? The question is how to fulfill the mitzvot, as compared to going through the motions. Including a whole slew of questions for those who need to fulfill mitzvot when they are not neurotypical....
It's the seder! First, the first cup, for kiddush. What should the order of the blessings be? [What's What: Tadir ve-she'aino tadir] Note that the dispute here is between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, where we have a given (from a bat kol, no less) that we always pasken like Beit Hillel. Which the Gemara acknowledges here as well, perhaps redundantly. Continuing along with the seder... the vegetable, the matzah, maror, haroset. Plus, the confluence of maror and karpas - suggesting that mitzvot require intent to be fulfilled. Except that mitzvot do not need intent. So how do we make sure maror is maror, and that karpas doesn't fulfill the maror obligation? Also, the examples of the cooked foods for the seder include... rice!
More sage advice. Rav's points include using animals barks and neighs as indicators of protection in the given locale (reminiscent of the animals at the beginning of Berakhot determining the watches of the night). Plus a mayor should not also be a doctor. Plus do not marry 2 women, or if you do, make sure you also marry a third. Also, business advice from Rav for a son who was not such a student. Plus, a focus on date beer. [Who's Who: R. Pappa] Also, praise to a bachelor who lives in a city, yet keeps himself from falling into sin (with 2 different reads of this text by us). And a more extreme case, about the shoemakers of prostitutes. Also, don't be a hypocrite. Come forward to give testimony. But not if you're the only witness, which gets interesting - including when hate is allowed. With no whitewashing, which itself is a strong message by the sages. And, finally, 7 ways of conduct that are not praised by the heavens.
Advice from the sages. We begin with some statements by R. Akiva. He demonstrates concern for the well-being of a poor person over the need to glorify Shabbat, for example. Also, the idea that publicizing the miracle - including with regard to the exodus form Egypt - should entail a bit more effort, including from a poor person. Also, advice that the Torah scholar and the temporal leader should not be the same person, for the sake of divided attention. Critique of going barefoot. Being modest with one's Shabbat bounty. And more. Plus, a metaphor about sexual intimacy, and the single-minded attention that intimacy deserves, and risks, when shared by those who have had previous (living) partners. Also, R. Yehudah HaNasi tells his sons: stay clear of a particular town (to help protect themselves, their values, their goals). Plus, R. Pappa on avoiding both cats and snakes. Also, R. Hanina ben Dosa's triumph over a demoness. Plus, the demons who lead horses astray on paths outside of a city - a negotiated place in the world.
Don't walk between two of the following: dogs, palm trees, women (nor should these go between 2 people). The concern is witchcraft, and the protection against it seems to be recitation of one biblical verses or another. Is this all a matter of superstition? Is there any truth to it? Also, Amoraim were walking together... and their order seems to have made a difference. Plus, destruction by "Meriri" - is that a demon? Other destructive force...? Again, the Today's verses are the protective force.
Demons and pairs, or even numbers. Yes, this daf is esoteric for us. Why demons prefer pairs is unclear, though adding any second one to the Oneness of God may be part of the story. But the 4 cups is an even number! Why is that okay? The sages have an answer. Moreover, clearly, there is a range of opinions on the existence and power (or lack thereof) of demons. Plus: The story of a divorced man and his apparent complaint of witchcraft against him by his ex-wife that he was (temporarily) protected from by his own attention to pairs. Until he drinks too much - in an even number of drinks.
Everyone is obligated in the mitzvah of the 4 cups, at the seder. But how will that work for children? It's wine! And they don't yet have an obligation in mitzvot! We give them nuts and treats on Erev Pesach, so that they come to ask questions [NOTE: As we have noted before, the Gemara uses "Erev Pesach" to refer to what we would call "Pesach night" or "Leyl Pesach." In this episode, we used the Gemara's phrasing as if it were about what we call "Erev Pesach" (the day before Pesach night), but the simple meaning of the next is Pesach night. The goal remains the same.] R. Akiva focused on the children's interest at the seder too. Also, the fulfillment of the mitzvah of simcha, joy, on yom tov, on the holiday, each according to his or her (stereotyped) preferences.
R. Sheshet would fast on Erev Pesach, to make sure he has an appetite later: "istenis." Also, even the poorest of Jews recline at the seder. What does the reclining of the 4 cups mean? There's a transformation from "we were slaves in Egypt" at the seder to the state of freedom. Including women, who were part of the miracle of the exodus from Egypt (with several possible interpretations of what that means, and a question on why this is mentioned altogether). Plus: Diluting the wine, and how forgiving the halakhah seems to be with regard to the 4 cups.
A review of how long one can say kiddush and havdalah, if one missed the ideal initial time. Ameimar repeats (and limits) Rava's statement. Ameimar in the house of R. Hisda was concerned that they didn't have wine for havdalah - according to the report of R. Hisda's sons. But when he discovered that they habitually (apparently) didn't have wine, he was willing to use the beer they gave him for havdalah. And from his conduct, we learn 3 principles about havdalah. Clearly, different people relate to wine - including how quickly they react to it - in different ways. Plus: Date beer! Which pains and soothes... Can it be used for kiddush? It seems to depend on what you're accustomed to drinking. Also, Agrippas. He clearly lived long before Ravina, who discusses his eating habits. If Pesach is about reaffirming Jewish identity, his significance is all the more palpable, as one who embraced Judaism and Jews (as compared to the Jews in Egypt at Pesach).
Remember the day of the Sabbath - that teaches kiddush of the day, but how do we know to make kiddush at night too? In fact, we should really be asking about the day and taking the night as the given. Until another approach is presented - for the source of kiddush at night. Note that the Gemara here is sussing out what is going to be the authoritative approach. Also, what kiddush should be made during the day, such that it will be different from that recited at night. R. Ashi in Mehoza is asked to make "Kiddusha Rabbah" - and he figures it out what they mean on the spot. Indeed, the wise one's eyes are in his head. Unusual, here, is that we see the inner workings of R. Ashi's thought process.
A story of a meal where the diners need to determine whether Shabbat has begun. Which leads to a discussion about the fact that Shabbat establishes itself, and incurs a need to make kiddush - which is not the same thing as people actually creating the sanctity of Shabbat. Also, can you make up the Friday night kiddush during the day of Shabbat? Plus, the confidence and humility of R. Nachman bar Yitzchak.
The content of Havdalah - making distinctions. But the point could be made so much more succinctly! Note the goal of having the essential theme of a blessing at its opening and closing. Plus, the value of sharpening our awareness of the distinctions in the world by articulating them. Also, "the children of the righteous," and the essence of these distinctions. Plus, the order of those distinctions that God has drawn.
What's the order of the different components of Havdalah? What ARE the different components of Havdalah? A lot of ordering and reordering, depending on which Amora's opinion. What it means for Shabbat to depart and the week to begin. Plus, the addition of the torch as "nicer." || Note, and with apologies, that the app again overlapped our voices in ways that didn't happen in real time.
R. Yochanan's opinion that one doesn't need to make a new bracha over food in a new locale. That is, no after-blessing nor prior to eating, even for the foods that do not need an after-blessing. But that's disputed, of course. And somewhat counter-intuitive, prioritizing the nature of the food or the meal over the logistics of location. Also, Birkat HaMazon over a cup of wine, and whether that can be combined over a cup that would have kiddush recited on it as well - which would be via a complicated scenario, wherein kiddush would take place after the meal...! Plus, why we don't bundle out mitzvot together. Except for when we do.
Kiddush! Why we make kiddush at home, after hearing it in shul, and why we make kiddush in shul, despite the fact that we're going to make kiddush at home too. Plus the requirement to have a meal in the place where you make kiddush, for kiddush to count. Also, how halakhah is quoted from an amoraic perspective, and how they put it into practice.
In not wrecking your appetite before the first yom tov meal, if you do start a meal on Erev Shabbat or Erev Yom Tov, how would it work? Do you interrupt the meal you're in to daven and make kiddush? There's a difference of opinion, of course. Would you interrupt for Havdalah, even according to those who say that you should for Kiddush? You can hide the table for Havdalah.
A neat solution for the lost Korban Pesach. Plus: the value of a science, for both the fool and the wise, including context! Also: Chapter 10! Coming to the matzah with an appetite. And the four cups, which demonstrates the freedom of Seder night (as well as the expense and how to handle it). That is, the class equalizer, at least in concept, of the seder. Plus, the Gemara's question about why Erev Pesach proffers a concern about appetite, and now every other holiday and Shabbat.
3 interesting mishnayot: 1. Designating an animal that never should have been consecrated for a Korban Pesach - what can be done with the animal? What if something gets in the way of the offering between the time of consecration and the time of offering? What if one becomes an onen - an immediate mourner? 5 Amoraim then address what the case is, of when one became an onen. 2. Animals that are mixed up, between which was for which korban. Now what?! Some measure of penalty seems in place, presumably for the fact that this was allowed to happen. 3. After a Korban Pesach has been designated, it gets lost, and all the parameters of one person going off to find it, while everyone else has designated another animal in the meantime, and all the possibilities thereof. Plus the cases of multiple confusions.
On Shmuel's discussion of a Korban Chatat, and the 5 cases when an animal that was designated for the korban can't be used, and it's put to death instead of living out its days grazing, until it gets a blemish anyway. Plus the policy of sending most out to graze, if disqualified. And the parallel application of these same cases to the Korban Pesach (they become korbanot shelamim), but still, most go to graze. With caveats on Shmuel's position. Plus, which factor wins out when there's a replacement korban?
The differences between the Korban Pesach brought as part of the Exodus from Egypt and the Korban Pesach that was offered every year.... Contrasting the in-person experience, as compared to the memorialization of the experience. Also, not substituting one animal for an already designated, consecrated animal, but what if have already done so?
More on Pesach Sheni - this time, how it differs from Pesach Rishon. And how they're the same, too. Plus, how the requirement of Hallel adds a new dimension to our theoretical experience of the Korban Pesach. Also, what happens when the Korban Pesach is brought when most of the community is impure, which means a lot of people who cannot enter the Temple... with different categories of Impurity, and the implications of that.
A journey into the heavens: the astronomy of the Talmud and that of today, post-Copernicus. Including a dispute between the Jewish sages and the non-Jewish sages if their day. Also, an interesting take on Nebuchadnezzar and a bat kol. And the distances of the earth to the firmament. Plus: 4 seasonal paths that the sun takes across the sky.
When is one obligated to bring a Korban Pesach on Pesach Sheni? Whether you'd get karet or not for missing Pesach Rishon... When does karet kick in? What about those whose obligation for the Korban Pesach kicks in between Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni? Can you be obligated in the second one that year at all?! Three opinions on Pesach Sheni, and the rationales for each of them. Also, how far is a "distant journey"? Plus: the dots on the tops of letters in the Torah.
More on the mourner in the immediacy of mourning, as another distinction between the Korban Pesach and other kodshim. In contrast to one who hears of a close relative's death more than 30 days after the death. Also, the case of a convert who converts on Erev Pesach, and the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. As part of the consideration of the many different populations and the application of who they are with regard to the Korban Pesach. Plus: 6 scenarios of rabbinic decrees and their own limitations. Now, the next chapter: On Pesach Sheni. And another dispute, this time between R. Nachman and R. Sheshet, hinging on their different takes on the exact same case and prooftext.
The case of one in immediate mourning (onen) and others who becomes unable to eat from the Korban Pesach, but are eligible at the time of schitah, they are included, as long as that group for the korban isn't only those ambiguous categories of status. Also, more on women and the Korban Pesach. For all that most include women, R. Shimon apparently does not.
The money for a Korban Pesach and a prostitute's (zonah) earnings/fees - can these be one and the same, or rather, how to relate to these cases. Why is this here now, what are the implications? Also, what can you do with the Korban Pesach funds? More, what is this economy? How far can the Korban Pesach funds go? Trading has a place, within reason.
What if the Korban Pesachs were jumbled, and one of them was rendered problematic. Now what? A "residual korban" might be a good solution, though how that would work is also a good question. Also, the laying on of hands for the korban, a distinction between the Korban Pesach and a korban shelamim (for men, anyway). Also, when a father apportions the Korban Pesach to "the child who gets to Jerusalem first" - whether that's "bereirah" (retroactive clarification) or a father's pedagogical tool. Also, registration for a Korban Pesach stays open as long as there's a k'zayit for each person. Also, one who registers for a Korban Pesach, and registers a buddy too, without the rest of the group's approval. Plus, one who takes more generous portions for himself... the halakhic implications to the very human complications of sharing a meal.
The dates in Babylonia - a matter of perspective on how they influenced the Jews' study of Torah there. Also, more on the discussion of who can bring a Korban Pesach on behalf of someone else, in particular the woman who is a wife and daughter. Here, on children and slaves, as well. Also, more on the case of one who is half a slave and half a freed man. Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai on this person's marriage prospects. Plus, "tikkun olam" in the Talmud. Also, a king and queen who regularly turn to Rabban Gamliel the Elder, with some telling questions.
When a married woman eats from her husband's Korban Pesach, and when from her father's Korban Pesach. Likewise, how an orphan eats from a guardian's Korban Pesach, and a jointly-owned slave, or a partially-freed slave. [Who's Who/What's What: Hoshea and Trei Asar] Recounting Hoshea's narrative, and his repentance, and God's rebuke to him... and the promise of redemption. Also, the experience of the Babylonian Exile, and the comparison to Rome (with another exile to Babylonia!). Including the value of dispersal. Plus, why Babylonia was better for Bnei Yisrael, as a place of exile. And how the language brings us back to Hoshea and the mishnah.
We're the rooftops in Jerusalem, or even the Beit HaMikdash, considered holy? With implications for where one can eat the Korban Pesach. The discussion raises the question of how the Beit HaMikdash is a building. Also, a new mishnah on the actual group meal of the Korban Pesach, when two different groups are crowded in one room, where they'd face away from each other. A waiter traveled between the groups, being part of only one, so he too would turn his face away. So too a bride would turn her face away in shyness. Plus: R. Huna's etiquette, when offered honor as a distinguished guest. Here too, he's expected to turn his head. And he explains his breaches of etiquette as the appropriate conduct. Likewise, R. Yishmael, who related to the portions and expectations differently from R. Huna.
A new factor in the permissibility of th Korban Pesach: What happens if the meat is taken out of the boundaries where it's supposed to be? Is that rendered impure by rabbinic decree? Plus, what does moving it out entail? How much is parallel to the laws of carrying on Shabbat? Also, what happens if a limb leaves the boundary... where you then can't break the bone? As compared to other korbanot, where you could break the bones. And in having the boundary - outside the door jamb, possibly. Plus, a description of the courtyard vs. gates of Jerusalem, which hones which boundary. But wouldn't the gateways of Jerusalem be pure themselves?! Those with tzaraat would make their way to the Temple courtyard via Nikanor's Gate, to become pure.
Even those parts of a young ox that are edible because of its immaturity, which are not edible in an adult ox, are not permitted. The question is whether you can or cannot register to eat one of those parts of the Korban Pesach. That's a dispute of R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish -- which is revisited by the subsequent Amoraim, and Ravin and R. Abahu finish off the machloket (in favor of Resh Lakish). Also, if you break a bone of the Korban Pesach while it's still pure, that gets lashes, but not if the korban is notar and impure. Why are these cases different, though? 8 different explanations, with each flowing from the previous.
What do you do with the bones of the Korban Pesach? The mishnah says to burn them on the day after the day of eating the Korban Pesach, with any "notar" (leftover) - the question is why they are being burned, when only that which is edible is supposed to be burned. Also, that burning is shifted to the 17th of Nisan if the 16th is Shabbat (in which Anne and Yardaena think this deferral is sensible or puzzling, respectively). What about other korbanot that are burned on Shabbat? The biblical verses limit what's done when, including proofs from other arenas (like brit milah).
If the Korban Pesach is rendered impure, on part of all, how is it than burned? And how different personalities or economic standings have impact on who brings the wood to burn it. Plus, what in human nature we protect and protect against, and the potential to misappropriate public funds, even though we're talking about the holy Beit HaMikdash. Also, if the Korban Pesach or a portion thereof was taken out of Jerusalem - that too has to be burned. [What's What: Kodshim Kodashim/Kodshim Kalim] Plus, learning korban practice from the biblical offerings on the day of establishing the Mishkan, when Nadav and Avihu died and Aharon doesn't eat from the sin-offering that he brought that day (and the ensuing complicated rebuke and defense between Moshe and Aharon). And the implications of notar (leftover korban) and pigul (wrong intent). Note that the daf does not tell the story of Nadav and Avihu, but without knowing it, understanding Aharon's behavior is that much more puzzling.
More on Tumat ha-Tehom. First, the Gemara establishes a kal va-chomer (a fortiori) regarding the unknown impurity as derived from known purity. And then the Gemara knocks down that logic as illegitimate reasoning in this case. Rather, the particulars of Tumat ha-Tehom emerge from a whole slew of biblical verses, right? In fact, not quite, as the Gemara recasts those verses as "asmachta be-alma," a way to connect the halakhah to the text, but really the case of Tumat ha-Tehom is "halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai." Also, how all this comes to pass in practice - for example, how one might inadvertently, unknowingly come in contact with a dead body. And that body must be complete, in contrast to the usual tiny measure for Tumat Meit.
What happens if different elements of Bnei Yisrael are impure, and in different kinds of impurity? Those divisions might even be as per the biblical tribes... Would that push the whole tribe to Pesach Sheni? That's difficult, given the unifying role of the Korban Pesach. Also, the case of the korban itself being discovered to have been impure - the meat or the blood, not the person sacrificing - the tzitz of the kohen gadol will ease the way of that offering. It doesn't work for the person making the offering. Plus: Tumat ha-tehom - if one inadvertently comes in contact with the impurity of a dead body, without knowing it until afterwards, when it's too late to avoid... the situation is especially fraught for a nazir, who has essentially taken an oath to not come in contact with a dead body. For this case too, the tzitz will appease for the inadvertent impurity.
What happens if/when most or all of the population is impure? What happens if/when a minority of the community is impure? (Think Pesach Sheni). What if the people are pure, but the kohanim impure, or vice versa, or the vessels are impure? The offering stands. What is the knife is impure? With tumah that will render the person who wields it impure? Or tumah that will only render that which it cuts impure? Also: What if the population is exactly 50% pure and 50% impure? Are the both the majority? Or neither? (2 versions) And how do the cases line up with the sages' views? Plus, what about the women and their status of purity or impurity? How did their status contribute to the sum total of the people as a whole?
Does the mishnah line up with R. Yosi? What is the role of the tzitiz? Also, what is part of your korban becomes impure? Specifically, the meat that you would eat are impure, and the parts that would be burned on the altar are fine - no sprinkling of blood, because the eating is the most important part for the Korban Pesach. The reverse would require sprinkling. But the Korban Pesach itself doesn't have to be eaten, as long as that sprinkling takes place. Which lines up with Rabbi Natan's opinion. Also on tap, an attempt to understand the sprinkling of the blood.
5 different offerings from the mishnah on daf 76 that can be offered by those who are impure, though it's not eaten by those who are impure. As compared to other sacrifices, which cannot be eaten or offered in impurity. And as compared to the Korban Pesach. Plus, why identify this list as specifically "5"? What is excluded and why? Also, is the principle that allows for the korban one of "d'chuya" (pushing off) or "hutra" (actually permitted)? And what does the "tzitz" - from the garments of the kohen gadol that permits it, perhaps in the metaphysics of the mitzvot here. Also, the dispute between R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua, to what extent does the tzitz affect the acceptance of the korban?
What happens if the Korban Pesach comes in contact with something that might cook any amount of the sacrifice through direct contact? The question brings us to a discussion of basic kashrut principles, and how foods absorb (or don't) the taste(s) of other foods. Specifically, the role of temperature, and the placement of the respective foods. Similarly, the braita that presents the basics of temperature and absorption, with a solution (when rinsing off the foods in contact is sufficient). What about salted foods? What about pickled foods? What about the quintessentially dairy kutach? R. Chinena bar Rava of Pashronya is learned enough to be able to be lenient in the case of kutach. Plus: The mixing of flavors during cooking, even from 2 different Korban Pesach offerings. Bonus: A pig was cooked in the house of the resh galuta.
The need for fire in roasting, and the Gemara's reread of the mishnah with an emended text (chisurei mechsera) that turns the mishnah's discussion of a grill on its head, and Rabban Gamliel's instruction to his servant Tavi no longer contradicting the primary position of the mishnah. The Gemara also beings an example of fire that is fueled by that which is prohibited (in this case, orlah) - can the heat from that fire be used to bake bread? It is an attempt to determine whether the Korban Pesach can be roasted via residual heat from fire (spoiler: not so much). Also, the case of the betrothed daughter of a kohen who commits adultery, whose death sentence may have implications for the fire of the Korban Pesach. Plus, the new mishnah: on the fire-roasted Korban Pesach. [What's What: Ma'aser Sheni]
Chapter 7! Cooking the Korban Pesach... The mishnah says to roast the animal on a skewer of pomegranate wood, and of course the question is why pomegranate wood? Why not a metal spit? The positioning of the animal's limbs and entrails, while roasting, is a matter of dispute as well. Plus, a lot of detail of handling the blood of the animal. Also, Who's Who on R. Acha and Ravina.
Who's Who: Rabbi Tarfon, and his unusual take on terumah. Also, one who violates Shabbat without that action including some constructive aspect, that violation is not complete, for the sake of "melekhet machshevet." According to those who say that one who injures another, the injury is incomplete in this way (and the perpetrator is exempt from a korban chatat), whyever would a Korban Pesach that is brought in ways that disqualify it on Shabbat incur a korban chatat? Indeed, the Gemara goes on to look for constructive aspects to each case of a disqualified Korban Pesach to account of the chatat. Plus: what happens to the disqualified Korban Pesach? Can it be redirected to be a korban shelamim? And if so, does it require a conscious uprooting (akira) to shift its identity? And if it does, what are the implications for the korban?
The Gemara raises one model of a case, following on the positions of the mishnah,that then is applied to several different halakhic cases. Our case study of this? A case of 2 babies who need brit milah on Shabbat and the day after Shabbat, respectively. Or Friday and Shabbat, in turn. What happens when the wrong baby is circumcised on Shabbat? The outcome is different in those two scenarios, in terms of whether the mohel would be obligated in a korban chatat (and whether the baby is considered circumcised). Along with several other mistaken application of the act he means to do (one being a mistaken sexual encounter, where the intent and the error can result in needing to bring a chatat). Is this boundary-pushing or practical in its acknowledging where people can err? Also: R. Meir's opinion on a non-consecrated animal used for a Korban Pesach - in contrast to a blemished animal, which should be obviously unacceptable for sacrifice, that which is not consecrated is not demonstrably problematic.
Does a korban brought in rejoicing (shlamei simcha) have to be at the time of the holiday? Of course, it's a machloket, with a key implication with regard to what should happen on Shabbat. Also, how the chagigah differs when offered on Erev Pesach. And: another very long mishnah... this time, the halakhic discussion on the lack of intent or purpose for the Korban Pesach when it is slaughtered on Shabbat (as compared to previous such discussions, which were about the korban itself, and whether it qualified as a Korban Pesach). The implications for violating Shabbat in slaughtering various cases that don't go the distance as the Korban Pesach.
More on the Korban Pesach and the korban chagigah that is offered with it - Ben Teima's opinion whether the chagigah has to be roasted becomes essential [What's What: Yehuda ben Teima]. The 5th question of the 4 Questions is also telling. Also: What if everyone were impure - how would they bring the Korban Pesach? And also, however would there ever be a case of everyone being impure?! Plus: The story of Ben Dortai, who traveled far enough away so as not to be obligated to bring the Korban Pesach, because he disagreed with the psak about the chagigah.
More on R. Eliezer, R. Yehoshua, and R. Akiva, and their dispute from the mishnah - in terms of what, if anything, can be done on Shabbat, if it could have been done in advance. Also, a new mishnah, on when the korban hagigah comes together with the Korban Pesach, and when you don't. Plus: Acknowledging a pitfall of the podcast and our focus on the discussion along the way.
A departure from the regularly scheduled topics. First, some intricacy in explicating biblical verses, specifically to make a comment on the righteous and the resurrection of the dead - with a real dive into the esoteric, philosophical material. Also, revisiting Shmuel's comment on what will change (and what won't) in the time of the messiah, and God's role in life and death - and resurrection. Plus: On the essence of the day if yom tov, and heat we should do with the day. Also, the sages' appreciation for their own ability to learn Torah, and how Torah sustains the world.
An introduction to the challenges of this daf. A comment on the "isolation" of the metzora. And on the combination of a positive and negative commandment. Plus, on the range of impurities, and the implications of those degrees for what camp one could enter. And - what it may mean to learn these details at some remove from the experience of the Beit HaMikdash.
Chapter 6! We open with a long mishnah on the conflict between what needs to be done on Erev Pesach and what is prohibited on Shabbat. Also: Hillel on this same conflict. [Who's Who: Bnei Beteirah] Among other points, he notes that the Korban Pesach isn't the only korban to conflict with Shabbat - there are sacrifices every week! Plus: How our emotions, or character traits, can get the better of us, whether anger or arrogance, and result in our forgetting Torah because of it, or losing prophecy.
Finishing the 5th chapter: On the third group of the Korban Pesach, which was called the "lazy group" (but doesn't the Gemara stipulate that there are 3 groups? How is it fair to knock the third one??). The world is built to contain the range of professions, both males and females, and more, but some of those are praised and others denigrated (cough, female, cough). Namely, the third group had to exist, but that doesn't make it ideal. Also: A mixture of the blood on the floor would be collected and sprinkled on the altar. But, asks the Gemara, isn't there a halakhic issue with not collecting blood immediately upon shechitah? Apparently, the kohanim were again vigilant, and in their eagerness, managed to spill, apparently regularly. And isn't that blood a halakhic barrier, blocking the feet of the kohanim from the floor? (Not as wet). The service of God via animal sacrifice is a bit foreign, but perhaps no less profound because of it.
A very long mishnah, describing the offering of the Korban Pesach, as presented by 3 separate groups. Also, can we, should we rely on miracles, even in the Beit HaMikdash? Abaye and Rava disagree. Who's Who: Akavya ben Mehalalel. Plus: Two notable Pesachs, as recalled by the Gemara.
When it comes to the shechitah of the Korban Pesach, is it one full action, or are the many component parts considered separate parts? For example, the intent in the kohen's mind vs. what he says about uncircumcised, who cannot participate. Do a person's mouth and heart have to be in agreement?How can this even be a question?! But people misspeak all the time, and they should be protected from those goofs. The question is when does "pigul" (for the wrong intent) kick in? Also, what happens if that shechitah takes place when you still have chametz in your possession (you should have gotten rid of it hours ago!)? How big a problem that will be depends on your intent for the Korban Pesach - from disqualifying it (as a contradiction in terms) and invalidating for any use to simply not counting as the Korban Pesach. Plus: More on the group responsibility for the Korban Pesach.
What can impurity teach about the uncircumcised, who cannot eat from the Korban Pesach? Also, the Book of Yuchasin, lineage, spurs the question: Where are you from? Which grants a window into the travels of Chazal, from Lod to Nehardeah. And the put-downs of Chazal, too. On the one hand, Beruriah is held up as an example of her exceptional learning; on the other, the insult of being obviously upstaged by a woman may be worse than if she'd been male. Which takes the Gemara back to the intent question when it comes to the Korban Pesach, and its uniqueness.
Offering the Korban Pesach with intent for those who are not registered to eat it, or who are not eligible to eat it would disqualify the sacrifice. Unless some of the people who are part of that intent can eat, at least or the mishnah. The question of a mixed crowd - valid and not valid to eat the Korban Pesach - complicates matters, but salvages the karbanot. Also: The Gemara cites a passage from the Tosefta of a parallel case to the mishnah, wherein the kohen's intent was for the wrong group. As well as bringing the biblical verses that recognize the expanding groups that are possible for the Korban Pesach. What if those who are not eligible to eat from the Korban Pesach were included by intending them to do "zerikat ha-dam" - the sprinkling of the blood on the altar? Well, that's a fine machloket between Rabbah and R. Hisda. Perhaps it is not resolved (at least thus far) because it remains theoretical.
Improper intention invalidates the Korban Pesach. Note 4 essential component parts of the sacrifice. The degree of intent here is specific - and yet the case this daf considers is one where correct intent is there together with mistaken intent. Namely, that one could intend for the sacrifice before him to be the Korban Pesach, and also have intent for it to be a korban shelamim... How do those different intents affect the korban? What about a Korban Pesach that is slaughtered with correct intent, but on the wrong day? This seems an extreme, boundary-testing case. Plus: How does one show intent?
The order of the ritual on Erev Pesach: daily offering, Korban Pesach, incense, lighting menorah. Why so? Including, a specific detail about the menorah that makes the difference. Also: What happens when something runs interference to the completion of a sacrifice? Who gets the residual effects? Plus: On acclimating to korbanot.
Turning to the 5th chapter of Pesachim, and embarking on the many details of the Korban Pesach. Which means we must first consider the other korbanot that are offered on that same day, namely the Tamid shel Shacharit and the Tamid shel Bein HaArba'im on the 14th of Nisan. The afternoon offering that takes place every day must be completed before the Korban Pesach (plus a What's What run-down of the possible korbanot). Also: How do we know that the Korban Pesach should be slaughtered at the 8.5th hour? When do the "shadows begin to lengthen"? Does it really need to be a specific time, or just get it done in the afternoon? To make matters more complicated, the discussion here crosses the generations of Chazal. Plus: The order of the day - when Erev Pesach falls out on Erev Shabbat.
NOTE: Tomorrow, we start a new chapter, for those who want to start dad yomi - or start again! || More on how peah isn't relevant for vegetables. Also, the negative history of the kohanim, after corruption crept in. Several examples, including the way they became a disappointment, and worse. Plus, the archeology that backs the Gemara up. Also: 4 times that the Temple courtyard cried out... with a focus on specific stories of where the kohanim went wrong, as well as some comment on how other kohanim were good leaders. And the chapter ends with a backhanded plug for rabbinic authority, and the importance of learning Torah.
Establishing practices as authoritative, by whom, and how? For example: Grafting palm trees on Erev Pesach. Bundling Shema. Trimming hekdesh. Setting aside peah for fields of vegetables. Also: 6 things that Hezkiyahu did, including his famous water tunnel. Plus: A focus on the "bundling of Shema," the famous story on the placement of "Baruch Shem kavod malchuto le-olam va-ed," and whether it should be said out loud or under one's breath. Plus, more on peah, beyond the usual field.
More on talmidei chachamim, and whether everyone should try to practice as per the approach for them. [What's What: Yuhara] With regard to the bridegroom on his wedding night, as well as the previous case of not working on Tisha B'Av in a place where people do work. Also, an abundance of mishnayot, on what was allowed as per different people's practice on Erev Pesach, etc., including calling in a craftsperson then or on chol hamoed.
The blessing on fire comes through Havdalah, which was reportedly created after Shabbat. Which brings us to a list of 10+ things that were created Erev Shabbat, on twilight. Why these things? Why at that time? Also, 7 things created before the world was created. Plus, the creation of tongs - for which you need tongs. Also: That which was created in partnership with man. Fire... and the mule! Also: Things that are kept from people, including the day of consolation. And things that had to be created for the world to function - including the smell of rot. Plus: The local practice of whether people did work on Tisha B'Av - and the contrast with Yom Kippur.
Defining Israel's topography based on what grows where. Also, more on different practices in different places. Beginning with commerce between Jews and non-Jews, in the context of animals - more taboo than we might have thought. And back to Pesach practice - whether you intentionally eat roasted meat on seder night, or intentionally do not. Plus: Making sure not to specify that your meat is for Pesach, lest it seem like designating consecrated meat for Pesach. Also: Theodosius of Rome, and his practice of designating roasted meat for seder night. The sages rebuke him, saying - were he not himself, they would excommunicate him for (appearing to be making) offerings outside of the Temple. So who was he (Who's Who) - in terms of his character (which the Gemara answers, somewhat implicitly) and the historical backdrop (which is less clear). Plus: Lighting candles for Yom Kippur night, or intentionally not lighting candles.
More on practices that change from place to place. Including travel on the second day of yom tov. [What's What: Makat mordot] And transporting shemitah produce. Also: Consistency in following rabbinic authority, rather than taking on only leniencies. Plus: When is a fruit not (yet) a fruit.
Following the practice in the place that you're in: 3 examples, including a certain kind of wide shoes. As discovered by those who violate those norms, and how they conduct themselves afterwards. Also: Another such example, specifically a difference between the Land of Israel and Babylonia, as per Rabbah bar bar Chanah's experience - and how he conducts himself (another few examples). [Who's Who: The Kutim/ Samaritans.] With some observations about the cases the Gemara discusses.
A side conversation that explicates a verse from Zachariah, on light and dark and priorities. Plus: The Gemara's presentation of a near-death experience. Also: Minhag in Halakhah, and "the chumrahs of both places." Plus: 4 jobs that are not blessed. Including scribes and scholars, to ensure that they keep working.
A long daf with much to discuss. When Erev Pesach falls out on Shabbat - do you get rid of chametz before Shabbat or on Shabbat? It may depend if your chametz is terumah or not. [Who's Who: R. Tzadok] Also: Nullifying chametz in your heart (mind), by saying out loud that you negate its existence - various cases when involvement in mitzvot or trouble necessitates this approach. What about consecrated food items (that aren't supposed to leave Jerusalem)? What amount of this kind of food (chametz or hekdesh) would be a violation? Also: Talmidei chachamim should not participate in feasts that are not mitzvah celebrations. Including a side point about a marital pairing that should not happen, and what happens if it would happen (and when it did happen). Also: The havoc wrought by talmidei chachamim attending non-mitzvah feast, or one who eats too much, or focuses too much on the food. Plus: How far one should go to marry the daughter of a talmid chacham. Or to marry one's daughter to a talmid chacham. And if that population is not available to you, the Gemara lists a hierarchy of preference of what kind of profession to go for - as long as you avoid the "amei ha-aretz"/ ignoramuses, with very colorful language describing how bad that would be. Plus the parable of grapes on the vine, when like marries like. The language is so harsh... It makes R. Akiva's presentation of the harsh language all the more valuable.
More on "ho'il" - how the Gemara line up the rabbis in trying to understand how far this logic can apply. Working through the tannaitic sources to figure out the rationale. Also: How do you bake bread (or matzah) with regard to the mitzvah of challah? One family separates its dough in small amounts that don't require challah to be taken - but also speed up the process, and sidesteps the worry of chametz. But what happens to the mitzvah of taking challah? A discussion of whether the portions can combine together to form the amount that requires the taking of challah. Perhaps that combining only works if the rolls of bread themselves touch while baking - what about long rolls that don't touch? What about them being baked together? Well, the Gemara has a new case of women baking their matzot in turns (or are they an assembly line?). How many different variables will have impact on those loaves? Differences in psak between R. Eliezer and R. Akiva, given life experiences. Also: At what point does leavening happen? In physical symptoms, not on a clock (which they didn't have, anyway). The mishnah presents descriptions of the progress in baking to chametz, and when the punishment of karet kicks in.
Lechem Ha-Panim, the "shewbread," and the restrictions on when it can be eaten. And when it can be baked in preparation for when it will be eaten. With an attempted comparison to the Shavuot bread offering of "Shtei ha-Lechem." Also: More on the "ho'il" rationale, and a discussion of how far it can be used. Plus: Muktzah - could it be a Torah-level requirement?!
"Deaf dough" - the halakhah that pertains to it, and why it's called "deaf." Plus, the origins of the 18-minute time frame for rising in a walk along the Sea if Galilee. Also: Separating challah from dough that is already impure - can you take it after the dough is baked? Can you slow down leavening with cold water? Do you even need to worry about this dough becoming chametz? Also: "Tovat hana'ah" and more on the reasoning of "since" ("ho'il"), with its implications, in this case, that allow for preparation of food on yom tov (or not, if you don't accept this principle). Plus: Why we have an eruv tavshilin.
Marking a (solar) year of daf yomi. || When dough gets into the cracks of your mixing bowl. Is it a kezayit's worth? Does it have value for the bowl itself? Also: When 2 half-kezayits do not make a whole kezayit - specifically in the kneading bowl. But this seems counterintuitive - and indeed the case is left unresolved (teiku). Plus - food that is not fit for human consumption, but a dog would eat it.
First, "mayim shelanu"! Now, the time component of eating. Plus the quantity component of eating. And the fact that terumah and non-kodshim do not combine to make that volume. Also, the combination of bread soaked in wine. How does this compare to meat and milk? Or rather, why isn't meat/milk the example that is brought to begin with? [What's What: Ta'am ke-Ikar] Note the rule against extrapolating from an innovation. So instead of meat and milk, the Gemara moves to kilayim, as a prohibited food. And then the requirement to get rid of the vessels of the non-Jews, or purifying them before use.
A general rule about grains that become leavened violates the mitzvah of not having chametz on Pesach. And then, on top of the rule, specific examples are listed. Which leads to the importance of knowing the basic terms of many dishes. Also: another example of an apparent general rule that should apply across the board, followed by specifics, in this case, women and their obligations regarding both chametz and matzah.
Finishing chapter 2... An interpretation of a very common phrase in the Torah. Also: kneading dough with water that must be "rested" water. And making sure that the dough (and the water used to do so) does not warm up, and risk leavening faster. Noting that not all cases are the same, and parameters for one case do not necessarily apply to another. Is the default permitted unless there's a prohibition, or is it prohibited unless permitted? Plus a list of foods that are simply prohibited on Pesach, from the first mishnah in the new chapter.
The concern of non-chametz food items coming in contact with something that will become chametz. For example, water used by a baker can easily contribute to leavening. Which connects to methods of cooking and what is acceptable as roasting. What about the hot springs of Tiberias? When cooking isn't quite cooking, roasting over a fire is quite specific. Also, what happens if the korban Pesach is not cooked fully? If one eats it anyway? The Gemara lists the sets of lashes that one would incur in various scenarios.
Additional concerns about foods becoming chametz - specifically, soaking barley or wheat kernals, and the moment at which that soaking becomes a problem, even if you did it inadvertently. But isn't all of this prohibited? The Gemara hazards a distinction between those who look to be more stringent and everybody else. The Gemara establishes several viewpoints, leaving us to ask: So is it prohibited, possible, or required to soak that wheat or barely?? Also: from when does one protect the wheat or its flour from water - and the implications of that requirement, including whether one can purchase wheat from a non-Jew, or use wheat that has become wet... Which leads the Gemara into a discussion of shaatnez... And what happens to anything a Jew might sell and then it might be sold back to a Jew - including, say, a blanket for a donkey's back, that could be used by the Jew down the road (though not shrouds). Would flour be sold back to a Jew if it were sold first to a non-Jew?
Maror! 5 vegetables that are listed as effective to fulfilling one's obligation of maror. And what kind of preparation (or lack thereof) leaves them still fit for the obligation. And what kind of status is permitted. What ARE these 5 vegetables? And why horseradish, since it's not on the list and the Gemara is very clear on details about this list that make it clear that it doesn't include horseradish (including Rabbi Dr. Ari Zivotovsky's article on the same question). Also: Why lettuce? And why doesn't the Gemara discuss bitterness?! Including some of the rabbinic interplay in seeking out the best maror. Plus: A new mishnah on some additional possibilities of chametz (is this out of order?) for non-edibles (animal fodder, a shower scrub, a poultice).
Matzah that is made from ma'aser sheni produce, an etrog that is ma'aser sheni produce... doesn't work (following the opinion of R. Meir). Albeit for different rationales for each. Plus, the logic of the formulation of "since" (ho'il) in the Gemara. Also: The Nazir and the matzah of his offering. And the dynamic between R. Ilai and R. Eliezer, as evident in the discussion on these "rekikei nazir" and their knowledge of Halakhah, when some of these details are not explicit in the Torah.
How do we ensure that when we bake our bread, we don't end up with chametz? Firstly, no "thick bread." But how thick is thick? Do you need to be an expert to make sure you know what you're doing at all? And be sure to use dry wood (would wet wood really make chametz)? What about the difference between a metal oven and a clay oven? How much can we apply these elements of baking the lechem ha-panim to baking matzah? So perhaps "thick matzah" really means extra... and not to overcook. Also: The pitfall of making shapes in matzah, and whether it takes expertise to do so in a way that doesn't risk chametz or whether the experts might actually take longer (and too long), out of professional precision or pride. Plus: The story of a rabbinic family in the Gemara that indeed had matzah in shapes. And another plus: What about actual cake? Sponge, honey, spice, fried dough....
"Lechem oni" - what does it mean? Why is it used for matzah? (Several different possible explanations) Followed, of course, but what it means to enrich matzah in ways that may make it prohibited on Pesach, in part because additions can make the dough leaven more quickly that water alone does (excepting warm water). Also, why are the kohanim considered more likely to prevent the dough from leavening? Consideration of the diet of the kohanim.
Stringencies with regard to kodshim - specifically, as they emerge from the biblical text. Also, what can matzah be made from - to fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzah on the first night of Pesach. And also what can you not use for matzah (beyond the obvious chametz, which is not under discussion here). Including the different options that kohanim have, which the rest of the people cannot partake of. The gemara articulates the names of the mishnah's list of grains - in the vernacular. Which leads into a discussion of rice and millet, and why they cannot be used for matzah. What's the difference in the way they do or don't become leavened - and a consideration of the phrase, "close to leavening" (does it almost become leavened, or does it become leavened quickly). Plus - other plants that are not grains, and what happens if you grind them and use them as flour, essentially. The debates arise over less obvious plants that are like the 5 grains that do leaven, recognizing that, today, we have far more ways of getting to flour... Note the transition from getting rid of chametz to diving into matzah.
Who's Who: Abba Shaul. Also, terumah that becomes impure - what happens if you replant that terumah? The Gemara focused on the issue of "hesach ha-da'at" - a break in paying attention to the terumah (or what had been terumah), and the implications of that shift of focus. Plus: The judging of the sages of Babylonia by... the sages of Israel, and their harsh language. And also: the water of the water libations of Sukkot, and the question of impurity in this regard.
Why can't that which has no value be designated as terumah? Why must terumah have a value - to the recipient? Also - when it comes to squeezing grapes, for example, is their juice considered an integral part of the fruit, or separate. And most importantly, specifically, what are the implications of that difference of perspective once it comes to tumah? Also, implications of what happens with the juice of the fruit when it comes to mulberries, etc., and the impurity of it.
Chametz that is also terumah (or terumah that is also chametz) - what happens when it is misused? Which is to say, violating a prohibition and also incurring damages. Which will be a different value if the terumah is pure or impure. Also: One who is not a kohen who eats a k'zayit's amount of terumah has to pay back the amount and then a fifth of the total value on top of that. Though Abba Shaul disagrees, and the question is what is the crux of the disagreement.
The Gemara's extensive probing of any which place that chametz could be in play. Beginning with chametz being used as collateral in a loan. And ending (this daf) with chametz being buried under a landslide. How far we go to make sure we don't use chametz on Pesach! Also: Destroying chametz and nullifying the rest of it, in case there is any more. Plus: Who owns the collateral?! And what is the role of the creditor with regard to it, especially in the context of a chametz collateral?
More on "ta'am," conveying flavor. Now in the context of a ceramic pot, and chametz after Pesach - use it with food of a different type! Ah, but what if you used it for the same type of food? Rav and Shmuel dispute the matter. Plus: A strategy to prevent price gauging - relying on R. Shimon's opinion that one can benefit from chametz after Pesach. Also: An oven smeared with grease - now, what if you bake dairy in there? Or bread, which is pareve, and then you have to take exceedingly great care to not eat with dairy. How do we ensure that the flavors won't mix in prohibited ways? Beginning with no meat or dairy bread. And how does chametz fit in? And if flavor is transferred via heat, then what does that imply regarding cold utensils and the lack of transfer of flavor and the ability to make "mixtures."
More comparisons between chametz and hekdesh - including the phenomenon of the prohibition of food, and including chametz that is hekdesh on Pesach. Plus: Another example of two prohibitions coming together - in the case of having to pay damage from an action that itself violated Shabbat or Yom Kippur. Also - mixtures of prohibited food together with permitted food. Verging into the concepts that are most relevant in Hilkhot Kashrut... For example, what it takes for a food to be nullified in a larger amount of food... and when chametz can't be nullified at all.
Rejecting R. Yehudah's conclusion based on his own rationale, in the sharpest of terms. Also: Crumbling chametz and throwing it into the wind or the sea - does the crumbling apply to that which would thrown into the sea, or only into the wind, and throwing into the sea could be whole? A real grammatical conundrum. The parallel is grinding idols and scattering to the wind... or the sea, which just might be the Dead Sea. What is retrievable, and what is destroyed? Also: When Halakhah is affected by history - specifically, the original Pesach and how it was practiced. And what made the day of the 14th special? And how do we ensure Pesach in a post-Temple era, when there's no Korban Pesach, and the focus is on matzah and no chametz.
Intermingling of that wish is permitted with that which is forbidden - in complex ways. For example, baking bread with wood from an orlah tree. Or hekdesh. Which leads to issues of both me'ilah and the item losing its hekdesh status. But is burning different? The implications for the ashes that remain are telling. The prohibitions with regard to hekdesh go beyond the usual food prohibition. Also - more on the Gemara's logic and the kal va-chomer. Namely, a kal va-chomer doesn't work if the end results end up being lenient. And this is used to knock down R. Yehudah's position that chametz must be burned (as compared to other means of destruction), but at the end of the day, this position that sounds more stringent could leave you with chametz in your house over Pesach.
Getting benefit from something, unintentionally. Abaye's example is a story of R. Yochanan ben Zakkai enjoying shade from the wall of the Beit HaMikdash, as he taught. Other examples from cleaning the Beit HaMikdash - how they actually did their work. Also: sights and sounds and smells - and the benefits or enjoyment that they bring - are more abstract, and less tangible... with smell being more definite. How and to what extent is this applied? Note that the halakhah expects people to get enjoyment or benefit from their senses. Plus: A garment merchant who wears his wares, including shaatnez garments. And plus: Not using chametz to fuel a fire, even as it's being destroyed. Or orlah. Etc. A harsh psak - taking the issues seriously.
Milk and meat, as prohibited foods - where does the prohibition against benefit for in, or does it? The comparison to orlah, and why they are different, may be most significant. Also - "for medicinal purposes" will excuse and allow a lot of prohibited-for-benefit items. But not the Asherah. Which brings us to the Big 3 - mitzvot for which one should martyr oneself rather than transgress. Plus: What if you get benefit from something prohibited for benefit - against your will?!
Our learning today is in honor of Deborah Spector on her birthday dedicated by her chevruta, Cindy Barnard. || More What's What on "kal va-chomer." Also - when it comes to removing chametz, if you don't do it, you've violated two negative commandments. A variety of biblical verses come together to prohibit the eating of various creatures, as a sample of many verses coming together to round out the prohibition. The explication of text thereby elaborates on the negative commandments without actually increasing the number of negative commandments. Plus: The requirement that the violation include doing it in the normal, standard, usual manner of doing it, or of getting benefit - if one is to be given lashes for the violation.
More on the prohibitions against eating that counter R. Abahu's claim that a prohibition against benefit comes with the eating prohibition. Hizkiyah chimes in as well. And then the Gemara goes in to limit R. Abahu's claim extensively.
On R. Abahu's position that every prohibition against eating that is in the Torah carries with it a prohibition against getting benefit from that same food. How does this pan with out with the Gid HaNasheh (the sciatic nerve)? Moreover, does the gid ha-neshesh contribute to the flavor of the food? Also, what about the prohibition against non-Jews eating from the limb of a live animal. Note the introduction of the extension of responsibility to protect another from transgression. Plus: The significance (or lack thereof) of the Hebrew word "et."
Anytime that you are allowed to eat chametz, you're also allowed to get benefit from it in a variety of ways (or all ways). What happens in that in-between time of the 5th hour, as per the debate when you must stop eating chametz (4th or 5th hour)? Also, what is this formulation of "permitted to eat" and "to feed"? Also, selling chametz to a non-Jew during that same time that you can still eat chametz (which is getting benefit from it, if course). Which leads us to a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel that has far-reaching implications, or would if we paskened like Beit Shammai (we don't).
The case of the needle in the cow. Which brings us to imposing limitations on the case, and establishing the principles of what is susceptible to tumah (hibat ha-kodesh - the belovedness of the consecrated). Also - a discussion on the difference of oil vs wine, with regard to either of them as terumah, on the first day of Chanukah, no less. How either of these can be used in ways that go beyond their usual use (as food and drink).
What levels of tumah for which kinds of foods (consecrated, terumah, chullin)? And what happens to kadosh (consecrated) items that come in content with impurity? The combination and contamination within one vessel. Plus the non-food impurity rendered by a t'vol yom. Also - the scenario of a needle in a cow, which is metal... What is pure, what is impure? Doesn't it matter where the needle is found? What's What: "Tumat Yadayim." One of the many rabbinic decrees that establish Impurity. Which brings us back to R. Hanina S'gan ha-Kohanim. Also, the question of "safek" - when there's a question about the status of something that is found, and the determining factors relate to environmental, surrounding norms. For example, utensils found on the path to or from the mikveh.
More on the 7 Machshirim - mnemonics. Now, the biblical verses on this Impurity, which support the discussion of the daf. And to what extent are the details of the impurity of liquid learned from the verses and to what extent inferred via kal va-chomer logic. How does R. Akiva read the verse? Where is the impurity being transferred to? Also, R. Yossi's disagreement with R. Akiva. What's What: Muchsar Kippurim. Which leads to a refinement between terumah and kodshim. Plus:The implications for 3rd-degree and 4th degree impurity.
What's What: The 7 (!) Liquids of Machshirim. More on impurity.... Continuing the discussion of whether the liquids in the slaughter house in the Beit HaMikdash can become impure - including wine and oil, not just the blood and water. Also, trying to line up the sages and their opinions - Levi, Rav, and more. Plus: R. Pappa on the question of tumah d'Orayta, and his position that the purity here is Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. Which has its own rules. Also, the location of the liquid is a game-changer, whether in vessels or on the ground, in terms of when impurity kicks in (or doesn't). Plus - what happens to all that impure liquid, when it leaves the Beit HaMikdash?! And what if they left while pure? The liquids' origins - where it achieves its status of pure or impure - makes the difference.
Impurity, now in the context of liquid. All of which, in the slaughtering part of the Beit HaMikdash, were pure. But is that because they couldn't be impure or for other reasons? Also, liquid as a perquisite to food items that can become impure becoming impure. Plus - supporting Rav's interpretation (trying to) that blood can be impure from a d'Orayta level.
One of the less practical elements of the Talmud, in lining up opinions that have already been authorized... Specifically R. Meir, in this case. Also, a recommendation for Point by Point Daf (dafyomi.co.il) - for outlines. What's What: Pigul. Notar. Also, moldy food and its relation to the tumah status (which can't be applied to something that is so far gone it's not food). The role of the dog in determining what counts as food is reminiscent of how we determine what is food with regard to chametz too. Also: A barrel of wine that is consecrated as terumah, which is pure, in a wine press, above the unconsecrated impure wine. What is the upper spills into the lower and they mingle?! The discussion reminds us that there's no value judgement for the status of tumah - it's not better than tahor, it just is. Another quick What's What: The measurement, Log.
The sugya of R. Hanina S'gan ha-Kohanim. Basic principles of tumah and taharah - purity/impurity. Who's Who: Hanina S'gan ha-Kohanim. And, almost a What's What: The levels or degrees of tumah. Also - the mishnah itself, regarding the kohanim and impurity and Erev Pesach, including a t'vul yom (one awaiting the time for dunking). Plus the rabbinic decrees on mixing levels of tumah - including food transferring to food (derabbanan). Another plus: the tumah capacity of metal.
Trying to make sense of the halakhah, and how it lines up with the disputants' positions. Which brings us to a discussion of terumah (and kodshim) and how to dispose of it on Erev Shabbat, when the first day of Pesach is Saturday night, and you can't burn on the 14th, because it's Shabbat. It's an open question for a time, which in turn raises the concern that Eliyahu might show up on Shabbat to adjudicate... Also - more on this question, and including the challenge of the Korban Todah and the accompanying bread. How current do the Sages treat this discussion, when they are, in fact, hundreds of years removed.
People do not confuse night and day, even when they don't know what time it is. Similarly, when the time of day is close to dawn or dusk, you know... The investigation into this question delves into witness checking - to confirm testimony, to validate their reliability - with time as one of the means of checking accuracy. How much leeway do we need to establish a specific hour (in the absence of clocks)? Also - How much discrepancy is acceptable between witnesses? And what about chametz times? Why isn't there the same leeway. Plus, the Gemara notes how different are the component parts of this comparison, including the fuzziness of our experience of time.
The previous daf focuses on the time for Bedikat Chametz. On this daf, we delve into some of the rationale underlying the timing, with an eye to making sure that the rabbis' views are consistent across topics. Which, itself, is an interesting premise. Also - the discussion of what hour in the day (sha'ot zemaniot) to finish eating and then burning chametz. With an unidentified (thus far) hour between the two end times. Plus: A new dispute between R. Yehudah and R. Meir. Namely, when two witnesses essentially corroborate their respective stories, but with key details in error - is that testimony upheld? How much leeway do we allow when it comes to errors in time?
The question of a majority and certainty, and how it has impact on the assumptions that determine whether and how one needs to check for chametz. But what if you see a mouse bring chametz into one of two houses? What's the certainty? And what do you have to do? The Gemara notes that mice don't leave crumbs, as compared to a child who might have done the same thing - and leaving crumbs. Plus other mouse cases, when you can't be sure that the mouse and/or the chametz is the same that you saw going in. Also - a new mishnah: if you miss the correct time for checking for chametz, do it afterwards. It's still relevant!
NOTE: This daf deals with infant loss in a graphic way. From the mishnah, if, after you've done Bedikat Chametz, there's a weasel that brings the food from place to place, despite your search, you don't need to worry about that final transfer. This, once you've checked, you've checked, or the search would literally be never-ending. The Gemara's underlying discussion about things that are certain as compared to things that are possible veers into the discussion of miscarriage, and it's a heavy discussion that we address, and also sidestep. Also - Going back to the mishnah - as long as the weasel tracked the chametz through the house on the 13th of Nisan, and not after the bedikah on the 14th, there should be no issue. But how can that be a certainty? Note that the weasel represents any way that chametz may move in your home without your knowledge.
Pesachim 8 - How and where to check for chametz during the official check. Does a wine cellar need to be searched? Oil storage? Liquor (or beer)? Fish? Salt? Candles? Wood? Dates? Shouldn't there be just a rule of thumb for storehouses! Also: Those on their way to do mitzvot are not harmed. But sometimes they do! Commonplace danger seems to be left to the responsible activity of the mitzvah-doer. What about after you've done the mitzvah and need to return home? Plus: Isn't Jerusalem the most special of all, in all ways? Perhaps not. Also, full-circle back to the discussion of checking the storage places.
Pesachim 7 - When on Passover Eve does the prohibition against owning chametz kick in? And what if you use the items that you would have sold during the time after that time - will it work? What changes with that moment of prohibition. Also, what should the language be for the blessing upon burning chametz? The discussion relies on biblical verses as possible ways of formulation - and the application here is unusual in unexpected ways (when the verses aren't being used to derive halakhah nor as an asmakhta/support). Plus: Light from candles vs. sun. vs. anything else. Candlelight is special... Or maybe not. Do we need to use a torch?
Pesachim 6: More interplay between Jews and non-Jews, and ownership of chametz (by a non-Jew) in a Jew's space. Note the historical acknowledgement that Jews could not always, or usually, rent to a non-Jew (Syria being the counter example). Also, the significance of the requirements to check for chametz kicking in (or not) for those who are not home from 30 days before Pesach. Also: Thr concept of Ein Mukdam u-Meuchar ba-Torah -- no chronological order in the Torah -- and that of "kelal u-prat u-kelal" are employed.
Pesachim 5: Delving into Midrash Halakhah - on the verses that address the prohibition of chametz being found in one's home on Pesach, together with the prohibition against eating chametz. And then the mitzvah of eating matzah. Which brings us to a discussion of the word "rishon." And the challenge of handling Midrash Halakhah, as compared to Halakhah. Similarly, there are differences of opinion with regard to what source is used, and so on. Buy none regarding the basic practice. They certainly get engaged in their different derivations, however. Plus: The non-Jew who lives in your courtyard vs. the non-Jew whom you haven't yet conquered, which is a surprising appellation, to say the least.
Pesachim 4: Who's Who - Rabbi Hiya. Another example of using euphemism for more refined speech. Also, everyone agrees that "Or le-14" means the evening, but why the evening? Possibly because we have zeal to do mitzvot at the first possible moment. But that principle usually means the morning. But people are at home at night. And you get that pinpoint light in the dark. Also - how reliable are the people who claim a house has been checked for chametz? What if that person is a woman? A slave? A minor? Depending on your presumption of the right thing having been done, you can surely rely on them! But what if there's no presumption that the house has been checked, and we need to rely on their statement?
Pesachim 3: The Gemara finally asks - why didn't the mishnah just say "night"?? Using the positive version of negative words (tahor (pure) and eino tahor (not pure), instead of tameh (impure - admittedly, this distinction is less strong in English). The agenda, though, is clearly to speak always in a refined manner. So what then IS refined speech, especially given how the bar moves in society... But then the Gemara also prioritizes brevity. So refined language can trip you up, and the Gemara is aware of that. Rav lived up to the refined language concern, however, when he refused to speak to students whose speech was rough. But maybe Rav was in a different class.... Plus: The concern that we don't look into the lineage of the priests to check if they are legitimate is countered by a powerful story where checking into the background of a particular schemer would have been better (don't worry, R. Yehudah ben Beteirah saved the day). But note that the lineage concerns of kohanim goes back a long time... (See Editor too).
Why the plural, "pesachim"? There are several components to Pesach, including the time before Pesach that is necessary for preparation. And so we start with the biblical verses that establish those rules of no leaven in one's home on Pesach. And the analysis of these pages on the opening mishnah is dramatically different from what we've spent real time with before. Namely, word play on how the discussion of checking the home for chametz (leavening) pre-Pesach begins. [What's What: Midrash Halakhah] The Gemara wants to know why this tractate begins with the word that means light, though here, it seems to mean night, or evening, especially given that everyone knows when we do Bedikat Chametz. Of course, the midrash halakhah of this daf explores the verses and tannaitic literature that allows for this word to mean evening.
Wrapping up! Impure creepy-crawlies in the Beit HaMikdash - what's a kohen to do? How is one to remove it? Raising questions on how space is allocated within the Temple itself. Note also R. Kahane's prioritizing kohanim for service in the Temple, even if that priest has some kind of blemish that should invalidate him from doing the service. Plus, the final stretch: if one is outside of techum Shabbat, and Shabbat starts, can one enter the techum? R. Shimon is lenient, and maintains that that leniency is the ideal - that the flexibility is built in, in the relationship between the rabbinic regulations and the Torah laws. This is then connected to the broken harp string. Which brings us to the importance of the loopholes of eruvin, which gets out of carrying, and also prevents carrying!
Scatter salt on the ramp in the Beit HaMikdash, to make sure that the priests don't slip. Also, several places to draw water on Shabbat. There's a beraita that suggests this was a Temple-only list, but the Gemara says that you can put straw down on a muddy road that's hard to pass. Anywhere that is, not just the Mikdash. How is the straw case different from the salt case, that the latter is Temple only and the former is everywhere? Also - the story of Ulla visiting on Shabbat, when someone comes and knocks on the door - which Ulla finds to be a desecration of Shabbat. But isn't this a case of infinite regress - so many things make a sound - from games to incidental everything. Perhaps knocking on a door to be heard is different, because the aim IS to make a sound. Alternatively, as long as it's not to create music... you're probably good. Plus - on drawing water on Shabbat - in the Temple. Is that because doing so makes a sound?? But are these wells specific wells or kinds of wells? And either way, the greater concern seems to be watering one's garden. Except not in Mehoza, where there was no chance of using the water wheel there to water one's garden... Until they started using the water...
The instruments in the Beit HaMikdash on Shabbat did sometimes need repair. Was that allowed? If so, when and how? How integral was the music to the service? When can a knot be used? When must the string be tied in. A bow? Would that even work, in terms of the sound? Also: Wart removal in the Beit HaMikdash. Yes, ick. But only in certain ways, and only in the Temple. Which brings us to a discussion of the korban Pesach, and how it was prepared to the Beit HaMikdash outside of the Mikdash itself - in the way that seems to have been prohibited. Which bring us to a sweeping discussion of the handling of the korban Pesach, outside of the Mikdash. Which brings us to another interchange between Abaye and R. Yosef. And this time, the rebbe has some words of wisdom.
Bolts - how they need to attached, and how the requirements for them differ in the Temple as compared to everywhere else. Also, the significance of Mehoza [What's What - where's where??], together with Rava... Also, the framing of this daf (and several) with regards to distinctions of practice, especially in the Beit HaMikdash, as compared to the rest of the country - when it comes to rabbinic enactments (shevut). Plus - moving on to a discussion of tents - establishing a tent on Shabbat being problematic. Construction on a boat... and what about a hat with a large stiff brim? Or a cloak?
Dedicated in memory of Lester Osband, Eliezer ben Avraham Nechemiah, Yardaena's grandfather a"h, whose yahrzheit is 2 Kislev. || A series of mishnayot checking the boundaries of what's allowed on Shabbat, ostensibly about carrying, but, it turns out, not only. To wit, a back door that is relatively makeshift, where opening the door fundamentally seems problematic in term of "building." Note how the Gemara elaborates beyond the mishnah here. Also: The story between R. Yehoshua and a heretic, and the puzzling, intriguing discussion of thorns, on literal and perhaps metaphorical levels. And - another mishnah: opening your door into a public domain, to enter or exit a private domain (or vice versa). R. Meir recommends a vestibule to convert public domain to karmelit, at least. The case specifically of poultry shops (or perhaps wool shops) in the Jerusalem marketplace. And the Gemara then notes just how unusual the Jerusalem marketplace was, perhaps, from some other cities. (See the book of Nechemiah, if you get a chance)
When a tree reaches low to the ground, if as low as 3 tefachim from the ground, you can carry under them. If you actually can. Plus: Halakhic mention of "shev ve-al ta'aseh" and "bal taschit" (and "bal tigra"). Now: No spousal rape. Unequivocally. Moreover, the relationship between husband and wife has bearing on their children - with negative ramifications for those from the union of a man who did go ahead and force his wife after all, and very positive ramifications for the couple when the wife initiates intimacy. This is followed by the 10 curses to Eve - primarily carrying and bearing children, though also, perhaps disturbingly, she is said to cursed to keep quiet rather than standing up for herself. Alternatively - we now have the opportunity to redeem these curses and fix Eve's wrong-doing that led to the curses... Plus: Learning superior behavior from the animals - modesty, honesty, fidelity... Is there an ethic independent of Halakhah?!
One who urinates or spits from the private domain to the public domain seems to need to bring a sacrifice. But how does this act of transfer include both uprooting from the one place and coming to rest in a new place? Perhaps the person's thinking compensates for the lack of a defined space. Specifically, leaving and landing in a space of 4 tefachim, or that one's aim indicates that the 4 tefachim are not critical. [What's What: Truly, again?] Also - Resh Lakish on public spitting. Also - Thr wine press's that's near the junction of public and private domains. How formal is your drinking in this locale? What makes it formal, as compared to incidental? And how does this lead into the next mishnayot? Regarding a gutter, a cistern, an embankment for garbage.
3 mishnayot - 1. One reading from a book (a scroll), and the book unfurls because of an incline, he can pull it back, because he's still holding onto it. But what if it rolls off the roof? Isn't it on the ground? That can't be okay. Which leads to the tension between taking care to protect Shabbat by not carrying and taking care to protect the words of the holy the texts. 2. Limiting the details of the next mishnah. What can you put in the public domain? Fragile ones only? What if there are two ledges, like a windowsill? Perhaps an example of the Amoraim bring more strict than the Tannaim... 3. Moving an object at the border between domains, within 4 amot - as long as you don't transfer domains. Including urine and spit. Though let's not take that too far, either.
What happens when you have found tefillin - a machloket between R. Meir and R. Yehudah, specifically regarding new tefillin. How you know you have old tefillin vs. new becomes significant. Also, the significance of checking old tefillin... Also: The case of saving children - from out in the public domain to remove to somewhere more sheltered. What about carrying a barrel - do you really have to carry a barrel? Water becomes the case study. Narrowing the case to facilitate the logic...
On whether Shabbat is a time for tefillin - and how the need for intent (or lack thereof) has impact on the question of how or whether you bring in the found tefillin on Shabbat. Likewise, how the concert of bal tosif has impact on this question (which is connected to the question of intent, to be sure). Also: What about women doing positive time-bound mitzvot - women may not have to do them, but can they? What about women and tefillin? The cases of Michal, daughter of King Saul, the wife of Yonah, and the laying of hands on an animal sacrifice. "Nashim somchot reshut!" Plus: A comment on tekhelet and tzitzit, and what looks like the mitzvah even though it isn't really the mitzvah. Which has ramifications for new tefillin that might not be tefillin, but amulets. Maybe.
Yes, it's a long one. The daf itself closes off the "eruvin" part of Masekhet Eruvin, and moves into the final stretch, which includes other concerns about carrying - specifically when there's no eruv. First, the end of the 9th chapter: Was R. Yosi trying to permit carrying for all future shabbatot or prohibit it? How does R. Yehudah fit in here? Also: More on mechitzot, partitions - including when you build a second story over two homes. And the precision of language in the mishnah... Plus: Chapter 10: Exploring cases about carrying on Shabbat. First, found tefillin - you find them on Shabbat, what do you do? Put them on - or maybe more then one set at a time... What if you're not sure if they're tefillin? There are different solutions, with implications for other cases as well (the key example being the baby born in the fields). And finally, a discussion of whether tefillin are to be worn on Shabbat or not. And where do you wear them, when you do?
What happens when Rav and Shmuel get together, and disagree about a real-life situation in their midst? Also - 2 mishnayot that appear to be speaking broadly, where the Gemara narrows the cases. Specifically with regard to some basics about the spaces defined for eruvin. For example, if there's a large breach... Well, that's a basic case that we already know, so this must really be talking about something else. And also - a debate about how one week's status for an eruv and that particular Shabbat may (or may not) last for other weeks. For example, damage done to the corner of a house... And more from Rav and Shmuel.
When partitions delimit the space and make it more difficult to establish eruvin in that specific space. These kinds of mechitzot do not make one's life easier. Also, when you have 3 enclosures (karpef) - when is it okay to carry in them, and when are we supposed to be careful, lest one infer that one could carry in a karmelit, for example. And what about an upper embankment next to a lower embankment? When the gap is 5 tefachim, instead of the usual 10 -- do two five-handbreadth partitions combine to be 10? Establishing minimums... Also: What if new residents arrive on the courtyard on Shabbat itself - does their presence invalidate the eruv? R. Hisda and Rabbah offer caveats, the first to recast the case, the second to accept its terms - noting that the terms of how Shabbat begins should carry through.
More on R. Shimon and his opinion. Property with no owner that's near your own... Which discussion is fundamentally an answer to R. Shimon's opinion from the previous daf. Also: A large roof adjacent to a small roof, or a large courtyard adjacent to a small courtyard.... The larger one takes over. Which leads to practical implications for divorce, prayer, minyan, and hygiene.
More on the situations that don't have eruvin - for example, the rooftops that are one domain do not join with other areas that don't have an eruv. Though you can carry within the courtyard - things that were already in the courtyard. Plus - R. Yehudah HaNasi was learning Torah with R. Shimon, they'd carry oil and a towel with them, for their shabbat trip to the spring. Plus - in the time of "danger" - decrees against the Jewish people - ends up being the kind of time that can't be used for precedent. Also - R. Shimon's view seems to be that the entire great outdoors is one domain. Which seems to undermine or disagree with the premise of needing an eruv chatzerot. Which is flabbergasting. And not how we do "eruv" today.
Who's Who: Rami bar Hama. In the context of the case of carrying from what amounts to a private domain to a karmelit. Which is a pretty basic case, yet Rami bar Hama gets taken to task for being sloppy, despite being incisive otherwise. Also: carrying on boats... Pay attention to how Rav and Shmuel interact here. And what about an upside-down boat?
A new chapter - no-eruv eruvin. All the roofs of the city - one domain, or many? (R. Meir vs. Rabbanan) Certainly, the home itself is not the same domain as the rooftop (or the courtyard or an enclosure). But the idea of rooftops being their own domain makes sense in the way that people may use them. The Gemara notes that the same rooftops that may be lumped together as one domain are separate domains on the ground level, where each is one home, and therefore they should be treated as such (as each by itself) at the rooftop level too. Abaye now joins the discussion - to elaborate on R. Meir's opinion. Specifically, when a pillar is in a courtyard - which is treated as separate domain to train "best practices," and avoid transferring into the public domain - which would violate a Torah-level prohibition. The balancing act of remembering the prohibition... and also being able to function with an eruv on Shabbat. Also: Another R. Yosef and Abaye story. Still about the roofs and the domain...
Regarding the leniency to use a towel on Shabbat - leave it to dry over a windowsill. The main concern is for wringing it out - and that isn't such a concern. Also - Stealing applies to Shabbat. Though of course the conclusion is that you don't get to claim stolen property on Shabbat. Plus - How to treat waste water, given the eruv permutations, on Shabbat. Dumping waste water via the hole in the floor of a balcony over water? Dumping into a pit in the yard? Dumping into a pit outside your private property? A drainage ditch? What about seasonal differences? But if you can't pour directly into a ditch - you still can use a roof and let the waste water slide right off.
Who's Who: Hananya ben Akavya. What's What: Avel and Tzipori (towns). The case of a water channel that crosses one's property - do you need another partition? The example brought from the water channel from Tzipori to Avel. Note, though, that the size of the water channel matters. Plus: The case of a balcony over the water - specifically, over the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee). And even a balcony over the balcony that is over the water. Plus: 3 permissions allowed to the people of Tiberias by Hananya ben Akavya (only one being the hole in the floor of the balcony).
Make way for the wealthy! Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi (and R. Akiva) each showed respect to those who were wealthy. And also thought they should toe the line of a standards of dress. But Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi was wealthy himself! Why all the homage to wealth? Also - the case of someone who goes away for Shabbat (or the weekend, if not Jewish) - what happens to the courtyard they left behind without participating in the eruv? Can the other carry or does the one person's absence mess with the cooperative rights to carry? Plus - the case of a cistern that crosses into two people's courtyards... What kind of separation will allow each to draw water from the respective sides of the cistern?
The case of 2 homes that separated by 3 ruins. Each can dump things into the ruin closest to them, respectively, but they are prohibited from using the middle one. (Though halakhah says they can both use the middle). R. Elazar hears this and goes to confront Rav (as we last saw him go confront Shmuel - never mind that Rav and Shmuel lived in different places!). But didn't Rav himself say that the up-people and the down-people run into trouble. But Rav has a quick retort - that the configuration of these homes and ruins are more complicated than R. Elazar was assuming. Also - The case of eruv chatzerot for a gatehouse - it's not quite a house, it's a passageway. But if someone lives there, can that person use the eruv? Host the eruv? What about making an eruv chatzerot from the food that's part of a Friday meal? What do you need for a shituf mavoi. And we circle back through the cases and issues.
When the Gemara not only interprets, but reinterprets the Mishnah. Specifically, the two-story homes, and those who live in the upstairs homes. "To the courtyard" - both residents really do have access! The mishnah is contradictory, to what we know from everywhere else - so the Gemara's reinterpretation seems necessary. Also, the case of two-story homes, where the top story balcony hangs out over water. Namely, another "reality" for eruvin. Yet another very real architectural set-up for Hazal.
Standardized measurements are not yet in place in the time of the Talmud. So what size is a se'ah? There's a range presented on the daf, in a bit of a whirlwind. Also - Residents of two-story homes that open to the courtyard who forgot to make an eruv - and what it means to be upstairs when it comes to exiting to the courtyard, or downstairs and sharing space with the upstairs people.
Whenever there's a mishnaic statement that includes R. Yehudah's opinion, and it I closed the wording of "aimatai," he's clarifying not arguing -- when does that apply? The Gemara's case is the populations that are disqualified from giving testimony - all gambling categories, and people who mess around with other people's money, which suggest the person is not trustworthy. The Gemara qualifies that though - if the person is gambling for fun, and not as his or her income, then there's room to say such a person is kosher to testify. But is this a clarification or a dispute? Alternatively, the handling of the money may be less problematic than the initial sense of gambling. Note the formula information as to how mishnayot work - including using parallel cases. Also: 8th perek - from the mishnah: How do people join together for an eruv techumin? A barrel of food, stipulated for use by all - as long as they too sign on (with intent) during the day. Which brings us to the case of a 6-year-old who needs his mother, who is included in his mother's eruv. But what does it mean to need or not need one's mother?! And why the age of 6? A comparable case from the mitzvah of sukkah... The case can be turned around to focus on the one who does not need his or her mother (parents) - which is the more exceptional case, as compared to the age per se. In the end, the Gemara refines the case to have far more complicated parameters, as to why the child would be included in the mother's eruv. Plus: How much food for the eruv, and what kind of food? Note that the Gemara acknowledges the dessert of Shabbat.
What foods work to make an eruv? Not salt and water, and possibly a whole loaf of bread. Why pieces of bread would not be sufficient - because of enmity, no less - seems to be perfectly in line with the cooperative efforts of eruv. Plus: bread that's not fit for a dog, and how today it just might be gourmet. Also: Giving a coin to a shopkeeper to enlist him as proprietor of an eruv becomes a complicated proposition. At least, with regard to eruv techumin. Ownership, taking possession, requires more than handing over money. And then the whole discussion lines up with "zakin le-adam shelo be-fanav" - for the regular homeowners, who are not a shopkeeper. Which answers our questions yesterday... Also, who can be counted for the eruv techumin as "homeowners," rather than a shopkeeper. But even a "kli," a vessel or utensil, would work with a shopkeeper too. Similarly, one who said "make me an eruv" would work with the shopkeeper too. ie - the original case is a problem and wouldn't work without a formal act of acquisition, but there are modifications to the original case that make it effective in establishing an eruv.
First, mention of eruv tavshilin. Then: A disagreement between Rav and Shmuel whether one needs to take possession of the eruv. And then that comes to a head in a real case, in which a mother-in-law prepared food for the daughter-in-law's eruv, but the daughter-in-law was not involved. The case is then explored by many, thinking to be more leniently, and, at the end of the day, the conclusion appears to have been unanimous. Which leaves us with some questions, as it happens. Also: A non-Jewish superintendent in R. Zeira's neighborhood declined to rent out his space for the sake of making an eruv. They decide they should ask his wife, to see if maybe she'll sign on in his place - and the question is whether her authority will work, for this purpose (recognizing that he won't know). The case is then brought a second time, with R. Yehudah bar Oshaya in place of R. Zeira. With the same outcome. Which is confirmed by Shmuel. Which, in turn, contradicts a beraita - how could Shmuel have contradicted the beraita? Indeed, the Gemara has a nice solution in terms of how the cars are different. Though why halakhah about Jews is being applied to a non-Jew is a conundrum.
3 mishnayot on things that can come between courtyards and change the need for eruvin: 1. A ditch between two courtyards. The Gemara delves into the authority behind the mishnah's psak, and also attempts a comparison and then rejects it. 2. A haystack that is between 2 courtyards that is 10 tefachim high functions as a partition, until the livestock from either/both courtyards reduce it to lower than 10 tefachim high. 3. Establishing an eruv in an alleyway that runs by courtyards - how to do it? Use a barrel full of food and make it "everyone's." That gives them the common interest cooperative. But how do all those people accept the food in the barrel if they aren't there at that moment? "Zakin le-adam shelo be-fanav." A formal act of acquisition on behalf of someone else, which itself can only be performed by some people, but not all. Including making an eruv for a city. Plus: Pompedita.
A ladder that is dug out if the wall - handholds - must cover the whole height of the ladder. Which leads into the next case, that isn't quite a ladder: namely, a tree. Note that you wouldn't otherwise be able to climb the tree on Shabbat, but what about in its function as a means to ascend the wall? What about the tree as a place to put your eruv? It seems that at the end of the day, Shabbat overrides the possibility of using that tree as a passageway, which would be permanent over Shabbat (so it's not, and can't be used on Shabbat). Plus the case of the Asherah - is that not overkill? Or are they exploring all parameters, as we often expect?
The case of a wall between courtyards, and that wall changes - whether because the ground changes or the wall changes. For example, if you have a basin right next to the wall - which the Gemara develops and refines, when the original case doesn't hold up to scrutiny - from adding dirt, a rim, a trowel, and a comparison to turnips. Alternatively, bringing a ladder to the wall - whether an Egyptian ladder or one from Tzur.... The ladder here seems more permanent than we think of the usual ladder. So the ladder becomes a passageway, depending on its size, and diminishes the height of the wall.
When you have an outer house and an inner house, is the outer house a gatehouse, which would have implications for eruvin - in some ways, a study on how different spaces function differently with regard to different people. Chapter 7: A wndow in the wall that separates two courtyards - at a specific point in the wall - does that interfere with the partition function? Are the two courtyards one, or davka two? For the first time (we think), we see the possibility of an option to join, simply because you want to. (Too small, and the window would be lavud - the kind of gap that is considered negligible.) Also - The case of a round window - of 24 tefachim. Measurements include squaring the circle. But the measurements seem to be inexact. And R. Yochanan is taken to task for it. Note also that round windows are not all the common - they're that much harder to make! Plus: A wall between two courtyards - you need two eruvin, one for each side. If there were fruit on top of the wall, and both sides can access the fruit, either side can climb up to eat up there. A breach in the wall, however, can nullify that requirement for two eruvin, depending on the measurements.
The case of a courtyard inside a courtyard - what happens if the inner people established an eruv, but the outer people did not? Or the reverse? Or if they made an eruv for each separate courtyard, but not together? And all the other permutations. Note that the principle here precludes individuals from establishing eruvin. Also, R. Yosef on the case of inner/outer courtyards - in which he incorrectly states the halakhah, and the person who had taught the halakhah. R. Yosef's illness on display - and he explains his own mistake.
In the context of the alleyway cooperative and the courtyard cooperative, and the minimum requirements for the number of people participating: is one house on one courtyard on one alleyway really enough to merit an eruv? Shmuel seems to have said yes (he confirms that he said as much!). And R. Eliezer can't believe it. But when he confronts Shmuel, Shmuel is silent, in response. Which leaves us guessing what he meant. A proof case seems to have been found in the form of Ivut bar Ihi and his housing. Though an alternative explanation is found, instead.
How do eruvin reflect the relationships of the people joining together in the eruv? For example, students who eat out and about (literally, in the fields), and then would sleep at the rebbe's house. Does the eating place or the sleeping place determine the starting point to measure an eruv techumin? The Gemara testifies to the phenomenon of the different cases - placing the eruv where one sleeps, and likewise where one eats - suggesting that the students could have eaten in that same house, but for whatever reason didn't (suggesting that the eruv follows where you eat, even though it's a case of following where one sleeps). Which brings us to the relationship dynamic among these principle parties - does the group of people get treated as a collective, or as a bunch of individuals. To what extent is a rebbe-son relationship the same as father-son relationship? Also: The case of 5 cases - a man with 5 wives, 5 servants, and 5 courtyards that connect, and also each connect to an alleyway. Can they participate in the eruv for the courtyards and not in the one for the alleyway? Or vice versa? And what if one forgot to join the eruv? Did people need both? Was there ever a case where one needed the courtyard and didn't need the alleyway? Plus, how cycling through the topics rounds out the topics, in process, as it were.
A dad of two mishnayot. 1. The case of several groups in a large hall... A dispute whether every group would need to contribute to an eruv in that space or not. When are physical dividers among the groups considered sufficient partitions to divide among the people, and when are they low enough to simply divide the space, but not line up halakhic areas for eruv. Which leads us to speculate about the role of residence, or the absence thereof. 2. The case of brothers who sleep in their homes, and convene at their father's home for meals - do they need an eruv for their entire area, or not? And if they don't, then why is this case here to begin with? The notion that preserving halakhah for cases that are not then at hand is an ongoing orientation by Chazal. What about one who has multiple residences - where does he need to make eruvin?
If you have a partnership with those who live on the same courtyard - where everyone owns wine, for example - that precludes the need for an eruv. But what if one person owns oil instead? Also, some returning concepts in terms of joint ownership and "yesh Bereirah." Also, if your oil is terumah and your wine is not, and they don't mix, is that enough separation?? Plus - a shituf mavoi AND an eruv hatzerot - one requires bread, one requires wine... but why do you need both, ever? Once the properties have been joined cooperatively, that should be sufficient. The implications for our generation of why we do both boils down to the rabbinic identity of eruv, and the way we prize heritage.
The case of 5 homes on a courtyard, where one forgot to join in the eruv, and he therefore renounces his rights to the courtyard, so that everyone else can carry - does he have to do so before each one of the other 4 who live there? It ends up being a dispute between Abaye and Rabbah. Also: Can an heir to one who dies on Shabbat do that renouncing on Shabbat, and thereby allow an eruv for the neighbors on the courtyard? What is the status of the beneficiary - an extension of the person who died, or a different status altogether? A general principle - that goes beyond the case if the heir: something prohibited before Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat, and something that was permitted before Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat, with the exception of renouncing rights to the courtyard. What if one does give up those residential rights on Shabbat? Whether an heir or not. How does this inheritance case relate (if at all) to cases of shelichut - where one takes the place of another?
A person who goes out with a coral ring and hides it from the eyes of R. Yehudah HaNasi on Shabbat, so as not to be obviously carrying on Shabbat -- that kind of respect for Shabbat allows that same person to renounce his ownership rights within a courtyard, and enabling others to carry. [What's What: Mumar.] Brazen desecration of Shabbat becomes the measuring stick for the sinner - based on whether that violation indicates a willingness to transgress everything else, or whether each sin is its own. But if the one sin is idolatry, then there's no longer a dispute, because it fundamentally nullifies everything else. Granted, these days, we relate to this kind of transgression and those who transgress differently. Also - back to renouncing one's rights: one who forgot to participate in the courtyard's eruv - what are the parameters of where you aren't allowed to carry? Or if people gave away their rights to enable the person who forgot as well, then that person would be allowed to carry, and they would not. But if two residents forgot to participate, they each nix the carrying of the other. When does the eruv need to be made (or discovered to have been forgotten)? Is the issue close to Shabbat, or earlier on Friday? Also, how does the renouncing of your rights make your own house off-limits?! Renouncing the rights to the courtyard only is the better (and more obvious) approach. What about a guest and the eruv... we don't make the guest buy into the eruv. So the person who renounces fundamentally becomes the first of the others on the courtyard. Which speaks to the apostate and the reclusion from the cooperative.
The case of the need for warm water for a baby to be circumcised, in the absence of an eruv. Abaye explains why neither he nor Rava were up on the home's eruvin, including his own inability to contribute bread. Note that the food of the eruv is not symbolic! Other similar cases - if the mother needs hot water on Shabbat, a non-Jew can heat it for her. But only if she seems incapable of managing otherwise! Though inference from another's physical appearance may not be the best course of action. Renouncing ones rights may (or may not) help the people who need an eruv for the baby who needs warm water. How urgent was that eruv need? Also: Rabban Gamliel and the Sadducee on his alleyway, who naturally doesn't buy into the program. [What's What: Hisurei Mehsera]. How far do we go to say that a Sadducee is or is not akin to a non-Jew?! It seems that there's a race to take possession, as it were, of the court. [What's What: Boethusians] This story of Rabban Gamliel and the alleyway has a few versions, including one where R. Gamliel comes down harsh on the "heretic"...yet not to treat him like a non-Jew.
When there's a non-Jew who lives on the same courtyard or alleyway as Jews, and the non-Jew has another exit from his house, out to a valley... which door gets the primary use? Notably, because of that second door, he doesn't negate the Jews' ability to make an eruv chatzerot. Why is his exit to the valley considered his primary used exit? Because it's uniquely his. But what if it opens to a small karpef, enclosure? That doesn't provide the same privacy or exclusivity. [What's What: MiShmei de-Ulpana] The key value of tradition in the context o eruvin, again! How large does that karpef need to be? Or can it be? And what if the karpef-owner is Jewish? Plus the colorful case of the rock that juts out into the sea. And also a defense of R. Yochanan. Also: Needing warm water at a brit milah, without an eruv to bring some.over from the neighbor - and Rava seems ignorant of the fact that they hadn't set up an eruv. And then it boils down to the Torah law vs. rabbinic law.
What it means to negate other people's ability to carry within an eruv chatzerot - how that happens, when one potential participant in the cooperative doesn't join, whether out of spite or simply not being Jewish, for example, and the range in between. Note that these cases are indeed practical - "real world halakhah," more so than the theoretical expansion of policy. The goal becomes circumventing the person who is inherently present in the cooperative, but can't actually participate in it, and therefore nullifies everyone's ability to make an eruv and carry. Some practical cases, which also being to the fire the teacher/student relationship between R. Yosef and Abaye (again). Also, a person can negate or nullify his own property rights for carrying, which can make all the difference in these cases - where the possibility of establishing an eruv exists. Similarly, if you could prohibit others from using the property... that's where the ability to negate your ownership rights kick in.
R. Sheshet says he can exempt the entire world from responsibility for any sin that anyone may have done - because of the verse that equates mourning for the Temple with drunkenness. But transactions made while drunk are upheld when sober. Rather - don't pray when drunk. Especially if you're really intoxicated. Though if you're truly as drunk as can be (as drunk as Lot!), you won't be held accountable. Really to what extent can a person focus...? If you are distressed, you should not be praying or learning or paskening. Or if the weather is getting to you. Or if you have a to-do list preying on your mind. Or if you are physically uncomfortable, because of lice. Even the littlest thing can be distracting! Also, how are you supposed to spend your night hours - in that the "moon was created for Torah study." R. Hisda's daughter rebuked her father for not getting enough sleep; he retorts that try days are long, but short when it comes to being dedicated to Torah study. "Sleep fast, because there's so much to do tomorrow." Note - these cautions about focus and the elements that can distract us are very practical! Also: the very famous statement that you know a person's character - in how one is with regard to liquor, to finances, and to anger. And also in one's laughter. Back to halakhah: and back to Jew-non-Jew eruv coordination, and the lack of trust of Chazal for non-Jews as a general population. The calculations presumed for a non-Jew who lives in the inner or outer courtyard, with Jews in the outer or the inner courtyard.... challenge our modern sensibilities, or what our modern sensibilities have been.
What can you do when a non-Jew lives on your courtyard and doesn't want to contribute to an eruv? Among the solutions suggested are establishing better terms with the non-Jew, including monetarily (rather than getting rid of eruv!). We think this is a lovely solution, and R. Nachman agrees, calling the halakhah an excellent one! Which is unusual - that Chazal assess the halakhot. More: When the Gemara says not to pasken inebriated, R. Nachman says he can't function well without that same amount of wine! And then Rava takes issue with R. Nachman's assessing the halakhot... and R. Nachman accepts the rebuke. And to resolve R. Nachman's preference for wine, the Gemara acknowledges the difference between a little tipsiness and intoxication. That is, the Gemara takes a strong stand against drunkenness, especially in light of R. Nachman's apparent flippancy. Also: Rabban Gamliel and his student R. Ilai were traveling on the road, and then Rabban Gamliel's conduct (salvaging loaves of bread, giving it to a non-Jew) suggests prophecy on his part. And we learn 3 lessons from the story. And yet another Rabban Gamliel story teaches many lessons... including details that bring us back to the wine. And then the Gemara suggests each detail could have gone differently.
Regarding the prohibition of answering halakhah in the presence of one's teacher: R. Eliezer tells his wife, Imma Shalom, that he doubts the one who taught halakhah in his presence would make it through the year. Which comes to pass. Which is plenty eerie - and he credits his prediction on this tradition that one is not allowed to teach halakhah before his teachers. Plus: The case of Yehoshua ben Nun, who indeed answered in the presence of Moshe... Or alternatively, his punishment ends up being "midah k'neged midah" - in that he prevents people from fulfilling "be fruitful and multiply," and he did not father children. And he's accused of not devoting enough time to learn Torah. Interestingly, the verse that teaches how all-consuming the study of Torah should be is from the Book of Yehoshua.
A new perek (#6), a new mishnah... What happens when there's no possibility of carrying, even given the hope of an eruv hatzerot. One who lives on the same courtyard as a non-Jew (or a Samaritan or a Sadducee), none of whom accept the rabbinic authority that establishes eruv, cannot be active sharers of space when it comes to eruv. Alternatively, the problem isn't the one Jew among other non-Jews, but when there are more than on Jews among the non-Jews. Plus a race to declare "ownership" over that area - between the Jews and the non-Jews. The presence of the non-Jews is a definite wrinkle. Is the residence of a non-Jew considered a halakhic residence? [Who's Who: Abaye bar Avin, not to be confused with Abaye.] A clear concern about establishing norms of a high level of comfort between Jews and non-Jews. Some of the phrasing here is less than pleasant for modern ears, for which the mix of Jews and non-Jews is so accepted. [What's What: The 7 Mitzvot of the Noahides; also: Megilat Taanit] What are we doing when we set up an eruv? Also: Can a student issue a halakhic decision that differs from that of his teacher? We know we're going to pasken according to R. Eliezer ben Yaakov, but Abaye's question is whether one can do so, even if we usually would not - specifically when it comes to this situation of Jews and non-Jews living in proximity, and the way it has impact on eruv. Which means the question of how each generation will function in the absence of the previous one, and the key elements of understanding halakhah as case by case, perhaps nowhere more exemplified than in Hilkhot Eruvin.
Discussion of the tension regarding the establishment of eruv techumin - where measuring precisely can turn out to be to your disadvantage. Also, the case of a city on the bank of a river - what is needed to make the eruv when you have a steep drop, and why a partition of 4 amot becomes necessary. Indeed, the drop to the river is significant enough to need more than a symbolic demarcation. Also, the case of the cities of Hamtan and Geder, and why Geder residents could get to Hamtan, but not the reverse. And the several opinions that explain their different techumei Shabbat. Also: The observation that Shabbat is a relaxed time at meals, and the less than complimentary observation that it was a time of drunkenness.
Establishing eruvin for smaller cities and towns - a story of one town (Kankunya) that seeks expertise in calling in someone who knows eruvin. And even so, the expert (Abaye in this case) needs to make sure that the eruv will hold up to the scrutiny of naysayers. I deed, he keeps second-guessing himself. For example, do the homes abutting the river need windows, or really not? Is Mehoza, another city that shifted status from a more public to a more private city, a good parallel, or not really? The process of creating the actual eruv is indeed a challenge! Plus: Abaye then probes whether a given position finds its source in logic or in some tradition -- he is looking for there to be logic. We're seeing the Amoraim work through the cases to the practicality of psak halakhah. Also: A new Mishnah brings us back to techum Shabbat, and determining where the eruv techumin can be set up. Where does the eruv actually need to be placed? Note - Another push for logic.
Assess the terrain to determine techum Shabbat precisely - using a professional surveyor. If he makes a mistake, we correct the error to have the most expanded techum Shabbat - a lenient position. Note that even non-Jewish servants are eligible to testify as to the location of techum Shabbat. Also: A private city becomes a public city - you can establish an eruv for the entire town. But if a public city was adjusted to be private, you still can't make one large eruv for the whole city. There needs to be a small area outside of eruv. Plus a story at the home of the Resh Galuta, establishing the case of a private estate. Also: a discussion of how to divide up a public city, to avoid the public thoroughfare, and establish eruvin on the different sides of the city. Plus, the role of the public thoroughfare.
Measure the techum Shabbat with a rope that was 50 amot long, precisely, as held at the surveyor's heart. And if there's terrain "in the way," the surveyor holds the rope over the area that is not flat as if it's flat... as long as they don't leave the techum to do so, lest their trek mislead spectators. Alternatively, they could "pierce" the hills to draw a flat line, as it were. Note that the rope should be made from a material that won't give it shrink in the weather or after usage - as long as it is actually rope. Note also that for the cases of surveying for the eglah arufah or for the cities of refuge could not be done through the piercing method, because the measurements have to be accurate, as per the Torah.
A new mishnah - on adding a karpef (the extra space of 70 amot), but when? Depending on the space between two cities, or between three, for that matter... Now, about these three villages, the ability to go far is apparent, but why they needed to is not. The three villages don't have to be in a line! But were you to slide them into position of a line, then you'd have this distance between them (the amount of techum plus two karpefs).
Cities that have ascents and descents within it take a toll on their residents. And: The rest of the day is as challenging as we've seen. That is, one way of measuring the location of your city's edges to determine the city limits is by using the constellations... And the daf addresses how to do so. Also: Adding the extra space to make the city shapes smooth is a lot of extra space. Note that the cities of the leviim - which were also cities of refuge - included extra space, even beyond the add-on to make a smooth shape.
A final piece of aggadah before going back to the halakhic details of eruvin: the idea that the Torah is not in the heavens - it's right here for the taking, or, alternatively, it's not going to be accessible for one who is too haughty and refuses to approach Torah with humility. Moreover, don't rely on merchants and traders who may not have the time to study sufficiently. Back to halakhah: how do we determine the boundaries of a city. Filling in bumps and crevices to make smooth shapes for the city from which techum will be measured. We're always increasing the space, with an eye to being lenient for eruv. Also, different types of structures on the outskirts of a town - do they count as houses or not? The question boils down to what is used for residence. Plus: Those who live in huts... (yoshvei tzerifin) - their lives are not lives. The insulting statements here seems to be a comment on the morality of this population - given that the men travel, and maybe the wives were loose or subject to attack in the husbands' absence. And lastly: Torah scholars may not live in cities that don't have vegetables - if you've seen a radish, you've seen the elixir of life.
Back to the story of Beruriah. Note that she is in (brief) conversation with a Galilean, and she is presumably a Judean, which shifts the focus of the "women" discussion wholly. Besides which, she goes on to kick a student in the next line - if you were worried that she was promoting hypermodesty. Also, on the "248 limbs of the body." And if you don't feel well - in your head, your throat, your stomach, etc. - you'll find your healing in learning Torah. Which is a comment on experience and values, of course, and not on medicine. Plus: The process if learning Torah, from Moshe to Aharon, Elazar and Itamar, the elders, and everyone after them. And everyone ends up reviewing the material 4 times. This and other pedagogical nuggets of wisdom further the Torah learner, and recognize the system of transmission by many to many. And the famous story of a student who needed the teacher's repetition 400x, this time, with an explanation for why so much repetition was needed, and what kind of patience and focus by the instructor.
How do you "me'abrin" - extend the city for the sake of its eruv? If you were to draw a straight line around your city, and the actual footprint is a bit more jagged, the idea is to smooth out that line, filling it in, as if it were square, with its added area as compared to a circle. But is "me'abrin" spelled with an aleph or an ayin? The meaning is different, the practical halakhic difference at this point, not so much. Which leads to a discussion of Machpelah (the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hevron), and what the doubling implicit in "Machpelah" refers to (kefel meaning double). Also: a broad meta-discussion by the sages about themselves, and they're placement among each other, and even in history. For example, each generation's Torah acumen diminishes, which leads to the need to write down the Oral Law. And with it and approach to better education. [Who's Who: R. Yochanan] The differences in approach between the people in there Galilee as compared to the Judeans carried real implications for their respective educations and status within Torah, as well as their care in preserving the Oral Law. Plus: The three who bested R. Yehoshua Ben Hanina include a woman and a young girl, beans and a well-trodden path through a field. Which leads into a very famous interaction with Beruriah, in context (which usually doesn't get enough attention).
A person who sets out of the place where he's establishing his eruv, and he's somehow detained or delayed, he can still continue to that place, but nobody else can rely on that eruv. This seems to be the diminishment of eruv techumin - meaning, all you need to do is set out on your way, and not even get there, to establish residence. And then just one step seems to be enough... Though this is more demonstration of intent than many other mitzvot require. Now, if you've set foot out of techum, without an eruv, you may have an amah of wiggle room, but beyond that machloket, you can't go back in. Plus: The third mishnah on the daf (of four), and the shortest piece of Gemara on a mishnah that we have ever seen. Specifically, on how inexact the surveyors who demarcate the location of techum Shabbat set that line, to allow a traveller who makes it close to the city, but not to the gates, can still get there and not spend Shabbat outside of the city. A fair application of how generous the setting of limits can be.
Rava and R. Yosef needed to set up an eruv, so Rava plans to set up a residence under a specific tree. R. Yosef doesn't know which tree, but Rava assures him that his familiarity is enough. And he credits R. Yosi as the tannaitic authority upon whom he relies for this. It's not clear, however, whether R. Yosi had anything to do with this view. Plus: The source for 2,000 amot for eruv techumin, and many-verse chain of links to get there.
Rav's statement that one who tries to establish his residence under a tree, with an aim to 4,000 amot, hasn't said anything. Namely, the statement is too vague. And not actualizable. The language and the place's identity needed to be more clearly defined. Plus, the tree itself was massive, which makes the location all the more vague. "Underneath the tree" should be clear for a smaller tree, for example. Also, a beraita wherein one who made an eruv in two directions -- becomes problematic. But maybe this stands against Rav's position, in which case, how could Rav counter the beraita (which is from the Tannaim)?! Because he was a Tanna, as it were (Who's Who). Namely, first gen Amora, and a student of R. Yehudah HaNasi. So he's allowed to disagree with that beraita. Now, interspersed in the discussion of Rav's position is a discussion of events that take simultaneously, as compared to sequentially. Whether that's 4 amot of residence, or doubling your tithes, or tithing animals...
The traits of Sodom. And other ways that eruvin may or may not take hold, but aren't really in the spirit of eruvin: one who doesn't allow others to eat from the eruv he has set aside. Or one who divides the content of the eruv. Both flout the essence of eruv, which is to bring people together, joining, sharing, into a unity. The Gemara also fleshes out why we need both of these cases. Also: Does the essence of eruv work because of the collective kinyan (formal act of acquisition) or because of residence taking hold? The owners of the house where the eruv is located don't have to contribute food themselves - either hosting counts as his contribution, or the others establish their residence in that home, as it were, via their eruv contributions. But then why do we make eruvin out of food and not money? Often enough, people don't have cash on hand on Friday afternoon. Also, the nature of the participation changes, based on those food contributions. What's the difference in the approach? One practical difference is how much the food itself has to be worth... Likewise, the involvement of a child. The approaches to eruvin on this daf undermine the mindset that eruv is entirely a loophole, and establish the value of eruv for community.
Some inner workings of the beit midrash: Amoraim on tannaitic statements - a need to separate a residential area and a water-cooled ditch. And then R. Yosi bar R. Hanina laughed at the manner of separation... leaving the Gemara to figure out why he was laughing. Also: Among the discussion of how far one has to carry, the Gemara address the basis for "4 amot" - 3 amot for a person's space and an extra amah to bend and maneuver as needed. But are those amot objective distances or specific to each person's own measurements? There are advantages either way, but R. Papa notes how time-consuming it would be to determine objective measurements all the day long. The subjective measurements are, of course, relevant to the maneuvering a person needs with regard to techum and 4 amot. Plus: If you have 2 outer courtyards and one in the middle, the external ones can't carry to the middle one. But that flies in the face of what the eruv is supposed to be doing! So what case would fulfill the details so that it would make sense? To what extent do the participants consider the whole space one joint space? If the eruv itself is divided among the homes, that's not considered joint. Or does being in the same official domain make it a joint eruv?
The halakhah discussion that is framed by the methodology question of rules of thumb of whose p'sak holds away. Cases pertain to women who were required to wait 3 months before getting married, lest she be pregnant from a previous marriage. This delay assures sure knowledge (presumably) of paternity. Also: One who buys from non-Jews, when in the Land of Israel, redeems all kinds of things. A kohen can leave the Land of Israel and make himself impure if he needs to legislate something in a court. And he can likewise go to a cemetery. (Wait, what?!) There are places that are rabbinically impure, and not the standard. Likewise, he can leave the Land of Israel to find a wife, to learn Torah. The implication for the status of kohanim is significant, of course. And bringing us back to eruvin - do the objects of a non-Jew establish residence (with regard to techum on yom tov)?
How did the Amoraim view the Tannaim, and the process of halakhic development? Transmission from the previous generations, or inference? The Halakhah is lenient when it comes to eruvin. And that has to be a specific uttered statement, not inference - because it's too easy to think that the opinion of the "many" would prevail against the opinion of the one (R. Yochanan ben Nuri) - but it doesn't. Eruvin is rabbinic in any case! The daf continues to explore these principles of how the sages established Halakhah. A case study, as it were, if the one vs. the many - in the context of hearing that one of the 7 close relatives has died, in a "near" or "distant" report (ie: within the first 30 days of when the person has died, or after those 30 days). It's R. Akiva vs. the sages, in this case (whether one sits shiva if the news arrives more than 30 days after the day of the death). All of this (one vs. many) is when the solitary view is the lenient position, and the many take the stringent view. But the halakhah follows R. Akiva! Breaking this rule! In this case, it's a matter of the topic, and not the process.
Dedicated in memory of Chava bat Eliezer v’Sarah, Rabbanit Chava Schindler Oles on 5 Tishrei. || Who's Who: Rabban Gamliel the Elder. Regarding those whose activities legitimately take them out of techum Shabbat (emergency workers, protectors, and so on) can go home afterwards. One time, there was a melee with the enemies that they were trying to protect against... and they ended up killing more of each other instead of the actual enemy, in the chaos. Which leads to a discussion of when you can take out your weapons on Shabbat, and it depends on the intent of the marauders (theft? no; murder? definitely). Even when that desecration of Shabbat is warranted and permitted, it still may diminish Shabbat. Also: A traveler who falls asleep on the road and doesn't realize when it becomes Shabbat can walk either 2,000 amot or 4 or 2, depending on whom you ask. What about 2 travelers? What about 3? With overlapping 4 amot? Can they join together to share their meals, etc? R. Yochanan ben Nuri says you establish residence even if you're asleep - which may be why he says the travelers can walk 2,000 amot from the spot where they wake up. The discussion begins and has implications for objects that take up residence, as it were, on terms of carrying... on yom tov. And the question becomes how far can you go, carrying, not whether you can carry at all. What's What: Kinyan Shevitah.
Can you use living creatures as a partition? What if those creatures are human beings? Can a person become part of a wall of the sukkah? What if the person doesn't know about it? Shabbat and sukkah appear to be different in this regard. Plus: If a person set off to leave the techum, and it is allowed! - and along the way, he get word that he's not needed, where does he go now? Is he allowed to return home? We can't penalize people (by not allowing them to return home) for sticking their necks out in a way that is desirable (being willing to go to begin with). The mishnah explicitly doesn't want to restrict the movement too far and inhibit people's volunteerism. Plus: A cave with 2 entrances and techum extending from each of them.
Does the concept of techum apply to a space that's over 10 tefachim? Again the overlap with eruv chatzerot, and so on. Seven teachings were taught twice, first in Sura, and then in Pompedita. How could that happen - at that distance? Eliyahu HaNavi! He could fly and bring the information. Alternatively, a demon. Pertaining to the vow of a Nazir. And the eruv and 10 tefachim. But can the messiah come, if he has to travel out of techum? Eliyahu has to travel and also the messiah to come the following day... And each day that Eliyahu doesn't come, the one who takes an oath that he'll be a Nazir as soon as the messiah arrives can drink that day. And then everyone will celebrate Shabbat and the non-Jews will help the Jews keep Shabbat. How hard would it be for everyone if the messiah came when everyone is preparing for Shabbat or yom tov. Also: again, on the ship - can they disembark on Shabbat? Rabban Gamliel says they had entered the techum before Shabbat, so they can depart the ship. He had a device that enabled him to scope out the shore from 2,000 amot away, using geometry to calculate the distance (astrolabe). Likewise, geometry was used to determine the height of a date palm, by measuring and comparing the lengths of shadows.
THIS IS SUNDAY'S DAF. Eruv techumin vs. Eruv chatzerot - note that they're really different (which means that there's no carrying for the distance of eruv techumin). What if you don't know exactly how far the 2,000 amot of the techum takes you? What if your extended techum runs into a non-Jewish private domain? What if you need an eruv chatzerot to be able to carry where you're going? Plus: Another discussion of the partitions on a ship. If the walls are broken... But how does a boat function? ie does the movement of the boat through the water change how your own movement through the space is assessed?
THIS EPISODE IS SATURDAY'S DAF. What happens when Tisha B'Av falls out on Friday (which cannot happen in the era of a fixed calendar)? Namely, nobody should enter Shabbat in a state of affliction. But how can one eat on a fast day?! Note also that we do not have public fast days on Rosh Chodesh or Chanukah or Purim, with exceptions that don't establish a fast on one of the happy days. And then some rabbinic intrigue in terms of whose p'sak to follow - when Rabban Gamliel was alive, but does his p'sak stand when he's no longer alive? R. Yehoshua is willing to say no (granted, their disputes are well-known). Rigging the calendar made all of these difficult-to-navigate scenarios moot. Plus: In the new perek, the new mishnah, and when people went out of the Shabbat boundary, perhaps at the hands of non-Jews or one who forgot himself. When the sages ended up in a ship that was traveling on Shabbat, the ship went beyond techum, but the question was how much walking could they therefore do on the ship outside of the techum? Some walked the length of the ship and some stuck to 4 amot. Note that these cases might have been helped with an eruv.
On R. Dosa's statement that the person who davens on behalf of the congregation should pray conditionally, depending on the true date. The sages had gathered and were deliberating whether to mention Rosh Chodesh in the Rosh Hashanah liturgy. They disagree, of course, but the dispute us over the conditional factor, not the Rosh Chodesh factor (R. Dosa always favored the conditional approach!). Plus: An investigation into Shehechyanu, which can be an especially poignant blessing at the time of the holidays. The time of saying it may be less precise than any one moment. And the observation that the pilgrimage festivals are different from Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur.
The establishment of Rosh Chodesh, based on witness testimony, and the implications of that for Rosh Hashanah, which, by definition, falls out on Rosh Chodesh, as it were. The Gemara says, set up two eruvin as possible for each day that might be the day of the new moon, vs. the day that retroactively will have been determined to be a regular day. But the sages reject this approach of dividing the holiness of Rosh Hashanah into two. With implications to separating terumot and maaserot as a conditional statement. Likewise, the question of an egg that was laid on the first day. Plus: when the shaliach tzibur goes up to daven on behalf of the community, he would also make the davening a conditional statement. But the sages did not accept the conditional approach to Rosh Hashanah. Also, more "real life with the Tannaim and Amoraim": when a deer was captured by a non-Jew on the first day of Rosh Hashanah, and slaughtered on the second day, is that venison permitted? Machloket. And the sages acted in accord with their respective positions. With many elements to unpack. Plus: when the non-Jews wised up to this two-day conditional day, and how they would purchase fresh produce, etc. Note that Rav Sheshet's more stringent approach isn't a matter of strife.
When yom tov is next to Shabbat... Making one eruv going to the west, and another one going to the east. From there, he follows the procedure for two days of eruv. When can he leave the eruv in the direction he's walking? And what if he ate the eruv on the first day? He won't have an eruv on the second day, because it's been eaten! Does that have implications for the holiness of the day? The significance of whether the two different days have one blended holiness, or are they separate? This discussion takes on a life of its own, as it were, in exploring the opinions of "the four sages" - who certainly appear to conclude that there are two holinesses between Shabbat and yom tov. Until the Gemara raises a question, swaps their opinions, and then raises a more intense question on those switched opinions. Including a question on whether the sages were presenting views, in the abstract as possible opinions, or what they themselves actually believed (what a can of worms that could open). R. Hisda tries to figure out Rav's view on the holinesses, alas without R. Huna to consult. Should there be other sources to answer this question directly, rather than sussing out the logic?
Terminology/What's What: Bereirah. Can an eruv techumin kick in retroactively, as determined by whether it is used? This kind of planning and thinking ahead, with a verbal declaration that designates a change at another time may be uniquely human, certainly far-ranging. Plus: A complete reversal of the sages' opinions, apparently after the fact - a "Fokh." A fluidity in the text itself that is no longer in evidence.
How accessible does the food in the eruv need to be? What if you're a kohen, and you know that some of your food is terumah, and some is terumah that has been rendered impure? What can you eat? What happens if the status of your food is about to change (the next day, for example)? Is it sufficient to be available before Shabbat? What about the case of "tivul yom" (What's What)? It seems that the pre-Shabbat timing is critical for determining the accessibility of the eruv itself. Plus: The new Mishnah, with a rationale for eruvei techumin. Moreover, based on what's happening, the person making the eruv may set one up in different directions outside of the city. And that's true whether your reason to head out of the city is negative (to avoid people) or positive (to seek out those who are outside if the city to begin with). The Gemara establishes apparent contradictions, and then resolves them. Including reasons why you would want to get out of town.
A detour: When someone becomes a "zav" and is impure, that impurity can be transferred to an item simply by moving the item. But only if it's a kli, utensil, not if it's a tent that moves. And depending on what makes it move. Back to Eruvin: What happens if your eruv techumin is no longer available to be an eruv - if it rolls outside of the techum, if it's been destroyed, or rendered impure... Plus: The eruv meal - symbolic or your main food?
Do you really need to bring the eruv techumin to the place where you want to set up the eruv? (In the case where Shabbat follows yom tov) Perhaps the concept of the eruv is sufficient, without having a physical eruv set up. But the case of when yom tov falls after Shabbat is exactly one that poses a difficulty for that theoretical eruv approach - the theoretical has to be possible! Also, if you put an eruv deep in the ground, that makes sense if it's a private domain, which goes up to the sky, and deep into the earth. But what if the pit is in the public domain - where, then, is the temporary residence supposed to be? Above the pit - in which case the eruv is in the private domain of the pit? Or in the private domain deep in the pit - that's certainly the same domain. So the question hinges on a pit that's located in a karmelit, and where you want the residence to be above the pit. Plus: A case where the eruv is in a cupboard, and the key is lost... Is that eruv still valid? Is there another way to access the eruv?
If you put your eruv good low in a tree, note that if it within 3 tefachim of the ground, it's as if it were on the ground itself. What if you put the eruv food in a basket that hangs from the tree? Will that hanging make a difference? Will it be valid? Can you move the food? Perhaps the eruv first must be in a makom patur, in its own defined domain. Also, how Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi uses the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Plus, when yom tov falls out on Friday, and you want an eruv techumin that will work for both for yom tov and Shabbat (since it's not an issue of cooking or carrying).
Following from the discussion of shlichut, sending an emissary - when can you trust that the system will function the way you've set it up to run? When you appoint a shaliach, can you act thereafter as if the shaliach has done his (or her) job? Or so you need to check in before you take the next step? For example, a woman who has given birth and offers a korban before she can dunk in the mikveh to purify. Namely, her dunking presumes that the kohen did his assignment. Plus the case of the "chaver" (one who is learned, knowledgeable) vs. the "am ha-aretz" (one who is ignorant). With the example of Demai - food that isn't clear whether it has had terumot/maaserot taken from it. Making the case for who is more reliable in both directions, perhaps with a little focus to the chaver. Also, a new mishnah! What if you put your meal establishing your eruv techumin up in a tree? Or deep in the ground? The same distance up is not acceptable, while the same distance down counts as a legitimate establishment of your residence, to count as a residence.
The case of an eruv for a kohen who can eat the terumah (which is pure), and he himself is pure, but the location for the eruv is on a grave (which is impure). Ah, but the terumah has to be prepared or readied to be eligible to be rendered impure. The Gemara gets into a number of details pertaining to the care the kohen must take - an example of the far-reaching permutations for the case, the kind that we have seen fewer of in Eruvin. Also, the Gemara makes the point that we do not do mitzvot for the sake of our personal benefit, but for the sake of doing a mitzvah. Note that this gets complicated implications for prohibited items... Also, an entirely new area of discussion -- using a shaliach, or emissary, to do the mitzvah on your behalf. But what about someone who doesn't accept that the mitzvah is a mitzvah? Or that any mitzvot are binding? What if your shaliach were a monkey or an elephant - will that work? With differences here between the erev chatzerot vs. the eruv techumin.
When the eruv meal is made on food that the person using the eruv cannot eat (a Nazir and wine, a Yisrael and terumah). That's acceptable to Beit Hillel, but not to Beit Shammai. And then, for a change, Beit Hillel actively attempts to convince Beit Shammai, making a logical argument about an eruv for an adult on Yom Kippur. But Beit Shammai has an answer why they agree with Beit Hillel for the Yom Kippur case, and not for the Nazir/Yisrael scenarios. Also, Beit Shammai insists that if you are extending your Shabbat residence, with an eruv techumin, you can't do so with a small meal, but move your residence there - as in: move your bed! Their reluctance to accept the figurative symbolism of an eruv is appealing for its straight-shooting, but would make living on Shabbat much more challenging. Another challenging loophole: beit ha-pras, where the kohen cannot walk easily - and yet a kohen can make an eruv in the cemetery, as long as he's in a container or a carriage. Plus, crossing into the Diaspora from the Land of Israel in a carriage - will that protect you from the impure land of the air outside of Israel? Noting that the distinction between Israel and the Diaspora in this way is not comfortable for modern sensibilities...
How much of certain foods do you need for them to be part of the meal upon which an eruv is established? 2 meals worth of the given food, now jointly owned (for eruv chatzerot), or left in the place of extending your distance (even if you don't eat it). We focus on the beverages this time. First, wine. Depending on the wine, you might need more or less of it. For beer, the discussion revolves around how beer is not water (it was drunk as though it was). How much beverage do you need to make an eruv? Half a log of beer. As compared to a quarter of a log of wine (in 3/4 water). There has to be value to the meal in the beverage.
More on the food that is not just food, when it comes to establish an eruv. Greens, herbs, however they are identified by the Gemara's names (which Anne stumbles over): cress and sweet clover and more. Unused (for people) parts of wheat and unripe dates are not eligible for the eruv meal. But what about that sweet clover? It's not good for everyone, so how can it be eligible for this meal? The Gemara limits the statement to those who can eat it. Or maybe the clover is a different clover.... How would this food-that-isn't-food be translated into today's terms, when it comes to foods that aren't good for most people or for some people (allergies)? Similarly, should "hearts of palm," which in the Gemara is not considered food for an eruv meal, but today are eaten straight from the can... would we have other foods to add to the list of acceptable? (We know there are people who pasken these issues, and may well speak to them and circle back to this question).
The 3rd perek of Eruvin - beginning with a mishnah that ranges many topics. A joined meal to establish an eruv, also for Eruv Techumin (to extend one's city environs by another 2,000 amot). What about a meal made on maaser sheni?! You sell that produce, and use that money down the road (I'm Jerusalem). [What's What: They cycle of maaser sheni and maaser ani in the shemittah cycle]. What about someone who swore off food? That oath doesn't include water or salt, by definition. Note that establishing an eruv can made over wine, even if the person to use the eruv is a Nazir, who can't have wine (that's fine), or a Yisrael over terumah (machloket). And extending the techum through a "beit ha-pras" (when you don't know where the bodies are buried) - a kohen can go through to eat the eruv meal, in between the graves... The Gemara on the textual formula of the mishnah, instead of its content: Don't take the text too literally, when it comes to a statement of "all" - even when it gets more precise, to make exceptions. The example here is positive time-bound commandments from which women are exempt (except for when they're not) - and the inverse as well (the positive non-time-bound commandments from which women are also exempt). But the notion that the Gemara would treat the language of the mishnah as less than precise is very surprising. Perhaps the question really is what counts for food for the seudah that makes an eruv. What about brine (which is neither salt, nor water, but both, and more of a good than either alone). The Gemara gives us the key manner of deriving interpretation: mi'ut ribui mi'ut. Amplification and specific restrictions... And amplification again. Likewise, klal u-prat u-klal. The logic may not be intuitive (or second nature!), but as long as you're relying on one of the accepted methodologies, you're set.
Terminology: Karpef! (finally). Also, the case if the karpef near the home of the Resh Galuta. Who, in the end, has harsh words for the sages Andrew their figuring and configuring of the eruv. We see some of the tension between the political power, as compared to the sages themselves, in Babylonia, specifically. Plus: Comparing the verse used to criticize the sages to its meaning in its original context (Jeremiah). Also: When the group of people in homes on a courtyard join together to make an eruv on that area, and one person/family does not participate in the eruv - how can that person carry in the courtyard? By relinquishing ownership over the courtyard, which allows the rest of the cooperative (for this purpose specifically) to host that person/family as a guest. And a second comparable version of the case, used to flesh out R. Eliezer's view that one relinquishes ownership of the home as well. We see creativity in the loopholes, and the practicality of them.
More on the karpef. What if you demarcate the space with another partition, in addition to the original partition that demarcates it. Also, the inheritance rules for the convert (ger), or acquiring the property from the ger, are a little unexpected. To take possession, one would have to actively improve the land. Plus, the case of a woman who doesn't improve the land to take possession in the accepted way - so the halakhah didn't accept her claim. The challenging additional factor is that one may not know what one does as a mourner until this case is a done deal. Also: moving beyond the karpef, to an orchard that is adjacent to a mansion, when a wall of the mansion falls down. But it was also the wall that helped enclose the orchard - now what? Plus: A cryptic insult by R. Papi to R. Bavei, for speaking cryptically. And one more case that sets up a Shabbat gathering in a pavilion, through the orchard, from the mansion. Plus: Doing more than is required just might make it required.
"New faces": More on the courtyard garden area - set up to be part of one's residence, where people may we'll need to carry. What if you take one amah at a time and fence it off? What if you broach the fence and seal it off, to the size of a pomegranate - will that be sufficiently redone, such that it's fundamentally a new item (as per the impure and its repair vs. reconfiguration to a new sandal, a case from Masekhet Shabbat, if you recall). Also: What happens if a residential courtyard has been flooded - does that water function like planted trees or does it make it uninhabitable, and then not a place where it would be permitted to carry? Abaye and Rava have different solutions to re-establish the area as a place to carry.
The focus on the cisterns and wells. Plus, the new mishnah - including 3 unusual statements that are not the halakhah, but are in the mishnah, giving us a window into the crafting of the Mishnah. Also: In determining measurements of the area of an eruv, the daf takes us back to the dimensions of the Mishkan, with all the implications of that comparison.
One who makes himself cruel for the sake of Torah, or Torah study... isn't doing the right thing, which of course should be obvious, but the fact that self-sacrifice for the sake of Torah can go wrong is a worthy point. Now, back to Eruvin topics - what happens when you have an apparent public domain passageway through what would otherwise be a private domain? Do you have to divert the path? Note that the topography of a given area can make a difference, how you block off private domains. Note that the "physicality" of an eruv is somehow acknowledged as less than the actual lay of the land, or physical boards, and so on.
Extending the private domain via the boards around the well, which fundamentally come to include it - and the limitations on this extension. There's a need for access to water - for animals, for people on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, etc. And on this daf, that measure of specificity comes into play. Also: Those limitations become even clearer in the context of "burganim," watchman's towers, and whether they were allowed outside of the Land of Israel... And whether those well extensions were permitted in an area that did not have yeshivas, to justify their use by those in pursuit of a mitzvah (learning Torah). Also: the rabbinic enactments get a big push on this daf, using verses to present how important they are. But if that's the case, shouldn't the rabbinic enactments be part of the Written Torah?! Yet, the Oral Torah has infinite expansive possibilities that go beyond the written word. Plus: Who's Who: The self-sacrifice of Rabbi Akiva for the sake observing rabbinic enactments (specifically, washing his hands before eating), and how he represents exactly the importance of rabbinic interpretation and application.
Note: Apologies for the interference from Yardaena's outdoor setting to record. Setting an enclosure around a well from before Shabbat - what if it dries up over the course of Shabbat? Or dries up and then is filled again by rain, both over the course of Shabbat? Namely, the status over Shabbat has shifted from what it was at the beginning of Shabbat. Does that change the standing of the enclosure? Is the eruv legitimate, insofar as permitting carrying? The need for access to water clearly made the enclosure necessary, but that only makes sense when the water is in the well. Another question - how close to the well can those boards be? Maintain your presence in the private domain even if you take a swig from a public domain. But is that the same concern for an animal who is partially in the public domain, and partially in the private? Will the animal wander away? Will the animal bring its trough to the other domain? In a nutshell, what do you do when variables that can't be controlled come into play? Once they permit some measure of this eruv, they work to limit how far the leniency goes.
More aggadot. The gold on the gold-plated altar did not melt in all the years of sacrifices. So too the nature of the Jewish people, who may sin, but have enough mitzvot to their individual credit that the sin has no power over them. Also: 3 entrances to Gehinom - the wilderness (Korach), the sea (Yonah), and Jerusalem. Plus 7 names for Gehinom. How do you get there? By means of mistaken actions or sin, that still does not resemble the grim Christian conception of punishment, at least not from this daf. Also: Gan Eden! Where is heaven on earth? And to finish up, back to Eruvin topics - The number of boards contributing to an enclosure - as long as the gaps between them is within the measurement required. Plus: What's What: Mnemonics (and the orality and precision of the Oral Law). Note the scholarship of William A. Graham (Beyond the Written Word) and Rabbi Dr. Yaakov Elman z"l (Authenticity and Tradition).
A small portion of a long mishnah: the case of arranging boards as an enclosure around a well, where 4 boards look like 8, or 8 that look like 12. The key being the "dyumadim" - double-boards. Then the daf moves on to aggadot connected to that "dyu" (two). Specifically, Adam and Eve, who were also two, but one. Also an observation on Eve as a receptacle for a baby. And the image of God as Adam's "best man," accompanying him at his wedding, putting God into the equation for both of them. Plus: A man should not walk behind a woman, for reasons of modesty... Which several biblical men seem to defy. Manoach (father of Samson) is singled out as an ignoramus. And finally, a hierarchy of following behind a lion, a woman, and idolatry.
What happens if the terms by which you established your eruv change over that Shabbat? Also: The mishnah that closes the chapter - 4 exemptions for those involved in military encampments, including, of course, eruv. Plus: burial of a soldier in the place where he fell. Is he considered a "met mitzvah"? Or does that particular mitzvah only kick in when there's nobody to do the burial? Certainly, in this case, you don't dig up the seat to bury him there. Do the least amount of damage to the surroundings. And: An exemption from ritual handwashing before food. But ritual handwashing after the meal is... obligatory? What is "melach s'domit" (Sodomite salt) anyway? And what about the exemption from setting up an eruv?!
Terminology: Parutz, breach. The case of "Parutz ke-omed," when the breached part and the wall part are equal - as disputed by R. Papa and R. Huna. Where the sources and the bottom line don't quite line up. Also, the new mishnah, that follows the previous mishnah. Setting up an eruv out of ropes, when you're on the go, and you need to make camp for Shabbat. Note the debate of horizontal vs. vertical elements of the enclosure. Is the caravan case (on the go) an example because it happened often or because it's the parameter? Plus trying to suss out how large an enclosure an individual could make in a personal camp.
What if the lechi was there, in the right spot, with the necessary dimensions, naturally? What if that naturally occurring architecture element can be used as part of your sukkah? And, what if your naturally occurring architectural element is actually alive - not a tree, but an animal? The mishnah indicates that that would be fine, but R. Meir says otherwise. That said, writing a get (a bill of divorcement) on a live animal would be fine (R. Yosi HaGelili disagrees). Which leads to a list of other circumstances for which a live animal is not acceptable. Plus a shout-out to Ne'ot Kedumim. Also, a basic run-down of the details of how we arrive at the need for a written get. Plus the case of a caravan of people camping out who make their enclosure from the stuff they have with them. What if they can't quite finish the enclosure? A certain amount of a gap is acceptable, but no more. Bottom line: The length of wall must exceed the gap - because Hashem taught Moshe that detail (in contrast to "halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai," for example). What does this really mean?!
Parameters needed for a koreh and lechi, and a round koreh, with its circumference and diameter... leads to a tangent... King Solomon's pool that was 10 amot across, and 30 amot in circumference (an approximation of our knowledge of πd, or, if you prefer, 2πr). This Yam shel Shlomo answers a question about the brim of a koreh. And what about the volume? As compared to mikvaot (at 40 seah!). Also, the next mishnah, defining the lechi: 10 tefachim by amount (or 3 tefachim, according to R. Yosi). How does this align with the requirement for one or two lechis? Plus, a definition of "any amount" for the width/depth of the lechi.
Who's Who: R. Meir. Including the differences of interpretive approach by R. Yishmael and R. Akiva, and we we don't always pasken halakhah according to R. Meir. Also: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel - long-term disagreements between them, where both sides are treated as legitimate views, and the halakhah is according to Beit Hillel (who actually taught the Torah of Beit Shammai before presenting their own view). Lo and behold, that humility is essential to one in the midst of machloket. Indeed, one who seeks greatness, it will elude that person, and the one who flees from greatness will be pursued by it. Likewise, one who learns patience in the present moment will find the moment to be most effective. Plus: The debate whether it is better or not that God created humanity, and what we can do with our time, once we're here.
Eruvin 12:
Terminology: Pas/pasim. R. Eliezer visits his student, R. Yosi ben Preida, and the topic of conversation is the student's need for a second lechi on his alleyway. But how big of a need is it? Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai debate the need for lechi and koreh (is that both or either?!). And their debate answers R. Yosi ben Pereira. Now, another case - with only one board (pas) in a courtyard that has a breach, in this case, by the sea, and the need is to close it up. Do you need 2 pasim? Plus: A new case on the shape of the alleyway or courtyard. How wide do those pasim need to be? Length vs. width? How really are the different from a lechi?
Terminology: Tzurat ha-petach. Pitachei shima'ei. Avkata. The need to visualize, and how that plays out, runs throughout the daf. So, what type of space does "tzurat ha-petach" permit? What does it have to look like? How like a door must it be? 2 lechis and a koreh do, fundamentally, create a doorway... Also, the case of an arch, as part of tzurat ha-petach. And: a strange story about R. Nachman, R. Sheshet, R. Gadda, and the Resh Galuta. What is the nature of your arch, on terms of determining its need for a greater distance across (as on this example). Plus: More on the basic case of what needs to be done to turn an alleyway where you can carry (from the new mishnah? Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree, and the discussion moves from the rabbinic space to the Torah concerns of carrying in the public domain.
A sidepost that is visible from the outside, as from within, and R. Yosef says he never heard that halakhah. Who's Who: R. Yosef. Now, the case of a sidepost that ends beyond the wall of the alleyway... works as a lechi, within a certain measurement. If longer, the alleyway is treated as not having any lechi. The next case: A 20-amot-wide alleyway... a couple of suggestions how to divide it and make it usable for an eruv. Also: Another example of R. Dimi's comments, having come from Israel to Babylonia (also Ravin's similar travels), where the discussion of establishing measurements for what amounts to be a toilet, with regard to tumah/taharah, provides an important example of the challenge of "interhalakhicality."
Topics recurring with more development on each pass, like a spiral passing through again, but at a distance reflecting that development (as an observation of organization). With a focus on Lavud, today - the extension of the material to cover a gap before the wall. As long as that gap is less than 3 tefachim (or 4), you don't need to add an additional koreh (crossbeam). What about a fully suspended beam, with gaps on both sides? In that case, it seems too much to expect lavud to work. Though the Gemara seems to indicate that it would after all. Who's Who: Rabbi Zakkai. The case? For a "makom patur," carrying under the beam, but not between two sideposts. But there are different opinions here. How many sideposts are necessary to establish the area underneath the koreh and between the two lechis?! And what about only one lechi? Isn't that area akin to the public domain? The Gemara answers, No! And uses biblical allusion to do so. The karmelit essence extends itself, type going after type, as it were. Basically, extending rabbinic jurisdiction.
Some thoughts on learning Eruvin. Plus: What happens when a backyard is owned by more than one person... Or when the alleyway runs between sites that are nobody's property, but also not a public domain. For example, the sea. For example, a garbage heap. Even R. Yehudah HaNasi didn't have an easy answer -- which leads into the question of how the alleyway itself was going to be treated, and whether it will be set off by a partition or just demarcation. Also: A centipede alleyway. And: An alleyway with different lengths of bordering walls, so should the koreh (crossbeam) be placed diagonally across the alleyway, from the shorter one to the longer one...? In doing so, the conspicuous marker that identifies the transformed space as being rendered a private domain. But that's a matter of dispute. Until the case of a diagonal that is longer than 10 amot... Also, can you use the space under the koreh? Is it whether the koreh is a demarcation? Or an actual partition? The daf traces these positions to their logical implications. Note too that the rabbinic nature of this question (by definition) of partition vs. recognition, or an identification of both together.
What do you do when you want to follow the stringencies of two opinions, and they contradict?! Bottom line principle: Follow Beit Hillel! What if you like Beit Shammai's position better? Sure, go ahead. What you should not do is follow only the leniencies of both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. Nor only the stringencies of both. Example: Is the new year for the trees on the first or the fifteenth of Shevat? There are practical differences... and Rabbi Akiva kept the stringencies of both dates. Also: The intertextuality of this Gemara - going back to the principle that the ruling is always in accord with Beit Hillel, as told by a bat kol. But that position only works as long as you accept the notion that a bat kol is authoritative - which R. Eliezer does not. Our daf presumes knowledge or the background... And is thereby engaging in a nuanced discussion about the multiplicity of approaches within halakhah.
Terminology: (Mavoi) Mefulash. Also Mavoi Akum. We start with the premise that the in-between status of alleyways as a karmelit will be next to a public domain, and expand the private domain into the karmelit. But this daf suggests that an eruv could be made in a public domain. Could that be done with a lechi (sidepost)? Perhaps you need actual doors at every exit point? Jerusalem becomes a counterpoint - where the doors (gates) were locked at night. Similarly, Mehoza (another city). Those locks seem to make all the difference. But that what happens with alleyways that open into the public domain? That needs a "tzurat ha-petach," lechi, and koreh. Challenge case of Manhattan - a very complicated place to make an eruv, if you can at all. Note that Eruvin is a lot of real-life cases, perhaps less exploratory for the sake of the parameters of halakhah.
Terminology: Gode, Lavud, Lechi, Koreh. And: The crossbeam is there to demarcate the space, distinguishing between the alleyway and the public domain... Or is it a partition? Recognizing that the space within and outside of an eruv is different. Plus: A lechi that protrudes 4 amot into an alleyway - when is that sufficient? Also: Safek d'Rabbanan lehakel - leniencies for rabbinic requirements, when in doubt.
More on the phrasing of tefachim and amot: they're happy and sad! Also: All those measurements are "halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai." Or are they from the Torah itself? Or are the Torah sources an asmakhta? The verse of the seven species has implicit in it the measurements that each of those species represents, from the amount of time before which a house of tzaraat would render a visitor's clothes impure... to the smallest amount of food that is prohibited on Yom Kippur. Are the seven species convenient, as the produce of the Land of Israel, or are they some kind of prototype for the measurements? Plus: chatzitzah - barriers in the mikveh, and the potential subjectivity of what defines something as a barrier.
Terminology: Amaltra - cornice. Amah - cubit. The implication of having amaltrot, even as high as 20 amot, in your alleyway (in contrast to a sukkah). The subjectivity of the measurements (how many tefachim in an amah, without expressed concern for whose tefach, but a concern for expanded vs. contracted amot). The implication of a larger amah in the context of kilayim (hybrid growth). Also, the implication of a minimum amount for a space to be considered an alleyway. Plus: kila'ei ha-kerem, the distance of seeds from the vineyard, and how to plant without this problem. And: How shared responsibility can mean nothing gets done.
Some words of introduction to the tractate. The phenomenon of this loophole that allows us to carry - on the one hand, feels very permissive, and on the other hand, was limiting for the sake of keeping Shabbat. Also some technique and recommendation for managing the new tractate and its more extensive halakhic (rabbinic) discussion. Note that eruvin bring the community together. Plus: explaining the term, in the context of the several kinds of eruvin. And the different domains, in brief. Now, to the daf, with its opening mishnah: When an alley has 3 homes, that are united somehow, and open out to a public alley - you can't carry there, unless you add a crossbeam to essentially join those homes together. How high can that crossbeam be? The Gemara jumps in to compare the case and thereby find some answers, among comparable architectural areas of halakhah.
More on muktzah! "Machmat mi'us" -- you can't handle because it has no purpose, because it's disgusting. When you have debris from your meal on your table, how can move it? Also: Lining up the halakhot of Shabbat with R. Shimon's approach. With an old oil lamp being the prime example of something that has no purpose on Shabbat, and would be unpleasant to handle. Plus: The last mishnah in Masekhet Shabbat - annulling vows on Shabbat, which is less than ideal, but under certain circumstances, can be done. Also: measuring the space/water of a mikveh to make sure it's large enough to be a mikveh. And - shuttering a window to prevent transfer of tumah. A couple of detail-intensive scenarios to finish off the tractate. Plus a story of measuring water in a tub in just this way, though not for the purpose of a mitzvah, just to occupy himself. Hadran alakh - please God, we will return to Masekhet Shabbat.
Astrology, and whether the celestial bodies impact our lives. Namely, depending on which day of the week you were born, your traits and/or success will follow the events of the days of creation. Alternatively, the determining factors in our fates were the hours of the day. And yet, the very strong statement that "ein mazal le-Yisrael" - that astrological sign does not hold sway over Israel. Or perhaps - Israel has the means to overcome the astrology that was otherwise accepted to be governing lives.
First, in memoriam: Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, z"l. Then: how far can you to prepare food (for animals) on Shabbat? You cannot overfeed or force-feed animals on Shabbat (especially camels, and excepting chickens). Watering those birds that can't fly to get its own water is also acceptable. Tension between real world application of these laws vs. the true practices and concerns re forcefeeding. Plus: Feeding dogs. How long a food remains in a dog's stomach - but why? Could metaphors be afoot? (audio issues in the middle of this issue sort themselves out, and hopefully we have passed them fully, at least for the foreseeable future).
(Again with audio issues - it's all here, but you'll hear the separate recordings we did...) Who's Who: Rav Mari bar Rahel. How one can be not obligated to bring a korban chatat for a case of shogeg, and yet be obligated s'kilah (stoning) when intentional? And how does intent with regard to idolatry teach about intent with regard to the rest of Torah? Plus: A prime example of Gemara logic to explain why the s'kilah doesn't take place in the end. And why lashes aren't exacted either. Also: The donkey of Rabban Gamliel - where he didn't want to unload the animal until motzash, but then the donkey died! Why did he delay, when this daf explicitly teaches the halakhah that he could have?! What about "tza'ar ba'alei chayim," treating animals humanely? Two rabbinic precepts come into conflict - which is to take precedence?
Apologies for audio issues - it turns out that we missed ~20 seconds of Anne, but all the key content from the daf is here || If you do teshuvah every day, you'll always be ready to meet your Maker. The value of this approach is illustrated by a parable of servants invited to a feast by the king. The Gemara offers a couple of different ways of ending the parable. Plus: Last chapter of Masekhet Shabbat! Carrying money into Shabbat... An important discussion of why asking a non-Jew to carry money is acceptable, even in the context of asking for melakhah to be done on a Jew's behalf, which is, of course, prohibited.
A request from the Roman Caesar that R. Yehoshua Ben Chananiah show up at the House of Avidan. Plus: Riddles! Fundamentally, on aging. (Addendum: the Queen of Sheba's riddles for King Solomon, as part of the culture of riddles). Note the challenge of this kind of reminder of our own mortality. So: biblical interpretation where a person's soul mourns over him. From there, an inference that the soul mourns for 7 days, as we keep 7 days of shiva. Also: R. Yehuda made sure to bring a minyan to a home of someone who died with no mourners. And he is given comfort that he did the right thing in providing this comfort. Plus: The purity of the soul and the challenge of living up to giving back your soul in purity.
A difficult daf: When someone dies on Shabbat, don't close their eyes; when someone dies on a weekday, don't risk hastening their death. Note that once a person has died, the body is muktzah. Also, a comparison: break Shabbat to save a newborn, but don't handle any dead body on Shabbat, not even that of King David. Plus: A lion does not pounce upon two people, except when it does. Also: Do mitzvot when you can. And wealth can be lost in an instant... Nobody's material success is inherently permanent. And we learn to treat everyone with compassion. "There but for the grace of God go I."
The mishnah reflects two issues: what can we talk about and think about on Shabbat, and what can we plan to do after Shabbat? Tchum Shabbat - how far can one go on Shabbat in preparation to hire workers after Shabbat? The Gemara then applies the mishnah, to determine its specific case, including explanations why it can't mean the more general case. Also: when you cannot say something on Shabbat, but you can hint to it. And: Some of the things that appear on this daf as permitted are surprising - apparently, for the sake of Heaven, but still surprising. Plus: Waiting to bring harvest in right after Shabbat, and discovering a hole in the fence... Which he can't fix on Shabbat, so a bush grows to fill in the gap. To some extent, that kind of miracle involves paying attention. Note: And the Gemara asks this question: what about Havdalah? Namely, if you're sitting waiting for Shabbat to end to take care of hiring workers, etc., you need to make Havdalah! Apparently, this point at the edge of tchum Shabbat was near a winepress... Alternatively, say "Hamavdil"!
Today, a halakhah section and an aggadah section. First, halakhah: no written lists for that which will appear at the table, lest one erase items off the list as they happen -- or lest one start dealing with business documents. The Gemara tracks through the different views, and the rationale and implications of each. Fundamentally, what it means to explore the "nafka minah," the practical difference between the two views. Also: being involved in punishing another person distances one from God. Plus: strange aggadot re Nebuchadnezzar.
Financial dealings on Shabbat - or at least goods: borrowing without saying "borrow." If Erev Pesach (in Jerusalem in the time of the Temple) fells out on Shabbat, certain negotiations could be done for the sake of the korban pesach. Also: Several cases based on the mishnah's concern re the specific language of the loan, which leads to the difference between a larger, longer-term loan vs. spotting someone for a short time. But isn't the shorter-term loan at risk of getting written down? During the week, the language is less significant, but on Shabbat, the language matters. Plus other cases between Rava bar Rav Chanan and Abaye, whether one must use a shinui (difference in practice) for certain practices, and when one is not required. And: we avoid certain practices to guard against coming to fix an instrument, but people do those practices! And people don't correct them! Better that people do what they're going to do anyway and not be rebuked so that they're not violating the halakhah intentionally. But why prohibit it if people aren't going to keep it?! Alternatively, there's a paternalistic assumption that they're not going to do the right thing, why not give people more of a chance. Also: The principle that halakhah follows the anonymous voice of the Mishnah. And: Don't write down your guest list or your meal's menu; keep track in your mind. Likewise, people can draw lots for some aspects of who gets what at a meal, but not the size of the portion.
If you shake crumbs or dust, etc., off your tallit, or garment, that's akin to laundering, and incurs a korban chatat, at least for a new garment. And yet, this was not a universal approach - as some people were not concerned about it, and for them, shaking off the dust, crumbs, etc. did not matter, and therefore did not incur a korban chatat. Ulla, the key personality here, does seem to like to get involved, as he fears that those who were not particular about their garments in this way were violating Shabbat! They reassure him. Also: R. Yehudah HaNasi wore his tallit piled on his shoulders - wouldn't Rabbi Meir (son-in-law of R. Chananyah Ben Tradyon) obligate him in a korban? Or was it R. Akiva's son-in-law, citing R. Akiva? It seems that R. Yehudah HaNasi has an open ear to other's comments. Also, a new mishnah: If you bathe (or go swimming on Shabbat) in the waters of the hot springs of Tiberias, the case of one person drying off with 10 towels vs. 10 people drying off with one towel, and veering into the prohibition of squeezing on Shabbat. And other interesting tidbits here, including the notion that making yourself throw up is a problem of bal taschit. Note: The halakhot on this daf seem to contradict our current practices. Plus: an indictment of wine and bathhouses as a path to forgetting Torah, and the claim that such pleasures are how we (ahistorically) lost the 10 Tribes. The sages were clearly concerned with assimilation and the harm it was causing the Jewish people - how modern of them.
(Recorded in advance of Tisha B'Av) The Gemara claims that non-Jews were considered contaminated - why? They never had the contamination from the Garden of Eden serpent removed, as Bnei Yisrael did. It's a difficult presumption in a world where we generally claim that people are born good, or at least innocent (which would mean not contaminated!). And what about converts? The implication is that they were always going to be part of the Jewish people. Also: Making a hole in a cask of dates - depending on how it's done, either you're strengthening the cask or your preserving it. Likewise, opening up a house... depending on your actions, impurity will or will not be removed... again, the difference between strengthening and preserving. Which also brings us back to intention, but in these cases, the physical manifestation of the action reveals the intent more than any verbalized statement. Plus: a cloth that can be a blanket or a cloak - depending on the fabric, you can wear it (or not) on Shabbat. The Gemara provides the rationale for the dispute here, including when one is lenient.
More on squeezing fruit on Shabbat, specifically over food, and not over an empty bowl - salad dressing! Also, hearsay testimony (one witness) is accepted only for allowing women to remarry, instead of leaving them agunot. Is there no other arena of halakhah where one witness's testimony would be sufficient? There is - when one claims that an animal is a first-born animal, and not available for the food of the kohanim. Plus: Certain unsavory foods that we're not considered tasty, yet some still go for it: tarnagolta of R. Abba and kutach. And: A competitive chat praising the Babylonian experience over experiences in the Land of Israel, and the take-down in response, eg: the talmidei chachamim in Babylonia were not bnei Torah (and then R. Yochanan rebukes them and tempers the discussion).
That ongoing discussion about liquid that unintentionally comes out from fruit on Shabbat... Blood is also one of the liquids that can grant the food it comes in contact with (!) the capacity to become impure. R. Akiva is more stringent for the milk, over the blood. What do intentional and unintentional mean, in this context? What about other fruit (berries and pomegranates, for example)? And how do our expectations of what the fruit will be used for (to be squeezed for juice or not, for example) affect the bottom line psak? Again, the categories here are more than they appear to be, with more sub-descriptions and distinction. Note the focus on R. Menashye ben Menachem - is that too much emphasis on the practice of an individual, or is the halakhah that individualized? An example from the thorns in the fields - kilayim or not (well, are you in Arabia or not). The tension here is about a difference of opinion, a difference of practice, and an individual vs. the larger population. Plus: the statistics of it - and what point does the standard of practice change?
More on moving muktzah. Removing bones and husks from the table - or removing the board of the table altogether. Crumbs and left over pods are less problematic, as they can be eaten by animals, and thereby have a purpose on Shabbat. Also, using a sponge on Shabbat is tricky in that it may entail automatic squeezing, unless it has a strap as a handle. Note the implications for cleaning our own Shabbat tables are not necessarily clear from this. Plus: A barrel that breaks on Shabbat - taking the food from it for the 3 meals for Shabbat, and invite others to take for themselves (reminiscent of examples we've seen before). Also: that which has become wet from one of the "mashkim" then has the capacity to be rendered impure - what about the fruit juice that ekes out of the fruit, or honey squeezing out of its honeycomb... your goal for the fruit makes a difference (are they for juicing or for eating?). Olives and grapes may have a more lenient treatment, but that's a matter of machloket. Now, regarding that juice that ekes out of its own accord is to be explained via a nursing mother's milk that can be expressed intentionally or unintentionally - either way will give that which it comes in contact with the capacity to be rendered impure. R. Akiva recasts the case, based on the logic of a kal vachomer. And the fruit that has been rendered impure has no purpose on Shabbat... Stay tuned for pushback against R. Akiva, tomorrow.
More on moving muktzah, for the sake of needing its place or the item itself. Specifically, terumah, where some is pure and some is impure, in the same basket. Also, coins on a pillow. Notably, the Gemara's careful and close reading of the Mishnah. A side comment on "Gemara logic," and its associative nature, as compared to the linear approach of Greek logic, which underpins much of modern thinking. And: some more cases of moving muktzah: a stone at the mouth of the barrel. And more on the coins on the pillow. With a question on what item needs moving, as the muktzah item. Plus: Moving something valuable that was left in a public place, for example, a wallet - make it a carrier for something that is permissible to carry. Plus: Work-arounds, and whom Chazal suggest use them, and the subjectivity of what we need to move.
Moving muktzah - when and how can you manage that? When you need the space where the muktzah item is, or when you need the muktzah item for a non-muktzah use. Examples include straw and a press, depending on the rest of the circumstances. Also: Scraping mud off your shoes with a tool... as long as the shoes are new. Similarly, how one can use oil as a moisturizer without working the shoe leather, or the leather of a covering akin to tanning. Plus: Don't go out wearing shoes that are way too big, lest you come to taking them off and carrying them in the public domain. Likewise, a woman should not go out wearing a torn shoe, lest she remove them and carry in the public domain, to avoid disgrace. And: Don't go wearing new shoes on Shabbat - if you're a woman - lest they be uncomfortable, and you come to carry them in the public domain. But if you break them in before Shabbat, you remove the risk if taking them off and carrying in the public domain. Also: Starting Chapter 21 - the first mishnah sets us up for going forward: working around muktzah issues, plus some terumah.
A brief comment on the range of homegrown practices of amud alef. And then the wisdom of R. Hisda (Who's Who), including the general advice and then his personal experience, to Torah students: 1. Don't eat vegetables; 2. Don't share out your bread if you don't have enough; 3. Don't pass up barley bread or beer for wheat bread or wine, because of bal taschit (the Gemara recasts that). Plus his advice to his daughters: 1. Don't eat too much in front of your husband; 2. Don't have food/drink that results in stomach rumbling; 3. Don't relieve yourself where your husband does; 4. Speak to unknown visitors to your home in the feminine form; 5. Hiding something away can make it more valuable. That last one becomes an interesting lesson in translation, between Sefaria and Artscroll's English translation, on the original. His advice might not all be suited for nowadays, but his love for his daughters and his good cheer with regard to the students is evident.
Cause and effect: If there are troubles in your world, look to what's wrong with the judges of Israel. The rebuke here is explicit, even if we are less comfortable with ascribing blame that directly in this day and age. And so we ask, punishment, or a natural consequence of the messy messiness? Also: 3 questions asked if Levi: spreading a canopy on Shabbat, planting hops in a vineyard, and burial on yom tov. But another rav needed to answer: there were ways to pasken with leniency, but he didn't want to, because of who they were as people. And yet, another case of applying leniencies specifically because of who they are. Is that elitism? Plus: R. Mesharshya was careful to task a non-Jewish child when planting hops in his vineyard, to avoid miseducating a Jewish child and also the mar'it ayin of a non-Jewish adult. The themes of this daf are all of a piece, whether the approach is lenient and looking for loopholes, or restrictive - either way, the question is taking responsibility for effective leadership.
How straining wine for its sediment is a concern of making a tent. More, the range of opinions in the dispute about that wine is fodder for concern (on the daf) about how disparate they are (recall the Jerusalem of Gold ornament). Also: A promise, as it were, that the Torah will be forgotten by Israel (the people) in the future, with a prooftext from a verse in Amos. Which is, or course, of great concern. The daf tries to suss out what "word of God" will be forgotten, and the focus of that concern shifts to the details of the laws of ritual purity/impurity. And then, interestingly, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, never known to be a moderate, seems more confident that Torah won't be forgotten after all. Does this discussion itself protect against that Torah being forgotten? It certainly reflects their fear.
Finishing off this chapter on brit milah. What if you do a brit milah on Shabbat that wasn't supposed to happen until Sunday? Or Friday? Interestingly, the dispute here is rooted in a parallel of idolatry. And: Brit milah takes place on the 8th day of the baby's life, but it also can happen in the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th days, simply because of how the calendar works out. And of course the brit delayed for the sake of the health of the baby. Also: Precision on removing the foreskin. Plus: The blessings made for each person who might need a brit milah. Hadran alakh R. Eliezer de-Milah.
Warning: Infant mortality. In the world of the Talmud, a baby was viable if carried to term at 9 months, and also viable at 7 months, but not those delivered at 8 months. Also, 2 stories of rabbis who mourned their babies, even though they seemed to have died within the first 30 days after birth. Both sages insist that the child was born to term, and they each mourn, despite those who raise questions on their doing so. And: The question of yibum in a case where a father died, and then his baby dies before 30 days. Plus: The case of the "androgynous" - a hermaphrodite - is the brit milah done on Shabbat, or is it too great of a question? Noting the very modern sensibilities of Chazal in this case, with no hesitation in treating the complex case. What's What: Erkhin.
More on brit milah... When a child is born circumcised, what to do? You can take a drop of blood. Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai seem to disagree. R. Adda bar Ahava fathered a son who was born circumcised, and took that drop of blood, to his detriment. Also: If a baby is born to a woman who does not become impure in childbirth, what day should the brit milah be? Plus: Who's Who/What's What: Eved Kna'ani.
Dedicated by Lisa Droski, in memory of her parents Bertrand and Florence Sandweiss. || A story about Rabbi Meir not keeping the halakhah he himself had paskened - an object lesson of not doing something just because you can. Also, medical lessons taught to Abaye by his mother, specifically about newborns. Notable is the level of care, given the times of the Talmud, without molecular knowledge. And: Two stories of women whose infants had died and whose next babies, one for each of them, were saved by the medical advice by R. Natan, science being within the scope of the talmid chacham.
[With apologies for the audio issues at the beginning. They do diminish pretty quickly.] The Gemara asks why verses are needed when logic should be enough, in that the unintentional act is permitted. Rava and Abaye explain that the verses are necessary to make the point here to R. Yehuda and R. Shimon - as, when it comes to intent, they each take the less popular position. More on brit milah: You can do anything pertaining to the brit on Shabbat, including all ways of caring for the injury. Plus the factor of beautifying the mitzvah. And...the controversy of Metzitzah BaPeh - part of the post-brit milah care for the child. Including Anne's report back from a conversation with mohel Dr. Daniel Kaszovits.
More brit milah on Shabbat - everyone accepts that milah overrides Shabbat: it's Halakhah! From brit milah, we infer that saving a life also overrides Shabbat. What's What: Kal va-chomer. In the context of different approaches of rabbinic interpretation. Plus: The Rock Paper Scissors of what overrides Shabbat - meaning, when there's a conflict between mitzvot that compete for the time (namely, on Shabbat), which takes precedence: brit milah, the Temple service, tzara'at.
Gezerah shavah again. The Omer sacrifice and the Shtei HaLechem sacrifice - both of which involve grinding of flour to prepare. Not all gezerah shavahs are created equal. Also: Not all mitzvot override Shabbat, but the following do: lulav, sukkah, matzah, shofar, brit milah. These inferences do not arrive at modern day halakhah, because the overriding sometimes applied only in the Temple. And a brief reflection on the challenges of this kind of daf.
A mohel who needs to perform a circumcision on Shabbat should make sure his tools are at the site of the brit from before Shabbat. If he has to bring the tools with him on Shabbat, he makes sure they're visible, so everyone know what he's carrying. But why visible? And what if the era involves oppression of Jews, where "visible" is not a good idea? Rabbi Akiva's rule: that which can be done before Shabbat cannot be done on Shabbat. Also: Eating poultry with milk. Including peacock. R. Yehudah HaNasi explains why that practice was tolerated there. Note the value of the "da'at yachid," the solitary opinion. Also: Keeping the mitzvot with joy, despite the given that there will be some conflict (as per marriage). And: More on those brit milah tools, and a look at the arena through which why were to be carried.
To be stringent or lenient when it comes to not quite a case of pikuach nefesh? Note that lenient with regard to Shabbat in this context means being stringent with regard to health - and that is the psak. Also: Bloodletting - seems to have been done frequently, for the sake of basic health, and even nourishment. Look at the extent to which Chazal were focused on health, even if their bloodletting approach does not align with current medical practice. Namely, a fully rounded sage is well-versed in this practice. Plus: A post-partum woman who is no longer at risk to her life, but still within 30 days of having given birth - turn to a non-Jew to do the necessary actions to accomplish what she needs. Note this key distinction between "no danger to life" vs. "a question whether there's danger to life." And: what about the baby? What are you allowed to do for the baby upon a Shabbat birth? Answer: everything necessary, which is aligned with an otherwise metaphorical passage from Ezekiel.
Food for ravens - muktzah or no? Food for deer? For doves? What about food for ostriches? Or elephants? Who knew?! Plus: All of Israel are the children of kings. Namely, even exotic pets area reasonable. Note the application to a debtor collecting from one of our princes. Back to the animals - chicks, chickens, calves, foals... and toddlers: help them to walk. How do we navigate the muktzah aspect of animals with the need to care for them too? What if the animal is stuck in the water? What if the animal needs help giving birth? Lehavdil, what about a women giving birth? (Spoiler alert: women and animals are not in the same category, halakhically)
Muktzah does appear! R. Yehudah HaNasi cleared the baskets, but not actually himself - an example of what it meant to be the Nasi. Also: That passage about moving the baskets for the sake of the guests rolls into a discussion about hachnasat orchim - hospitality. Which rolls into the beraita that lists the mitzvot for which we real the real rewards in the World to Come, though they seem to focus on the here-and-now. As well as the interplay between bein adam la-chaveiro (human-focused mitzvot) and those that, underlying all the humanity, are a matter of giving honor to God, our partnership in keeping mitzvot. Plus: Another list, of the comparable, mitzvot. Leading into judging our fellow people favorably.... and the Talmud's stories on successful giving the benefit of the doubt. With the lesson of avoiding cynicism, and approaching others with positivity. Even if you're wrong, and are giving too much credit where it isn't even due. Note also the obligation to pay a day-laborer on time, that same day, and how judging favorably kicks in as part of the employer/employee dynamic.
The distinction on practice at the Temple vs. outside of it. In this case, door bolts that are not tied to the door - which is fundamentally the melakhah of building. So there's a work-around for places outside the Temple, but not within it. Also: window shutters, even if they aren't attached to the building.... are permitted. Note: What's What: Anonymous mishnayot are usually authoritative - but in this case, they supplement with knowledge of the practice, and that "ma'aseh rav" trumps. Also: Covers that have handles can be moved on Shabbat - distinguishing between utensils in the home vs. covers for pits in the ground...or is that about an oven? More What's What on how the Gemara works: "lishna acharina" - another version of the same text, with edits. The Gemara preserves both. Plus: Moving the baskets for the sake of guests. As long as the things that you're moving can have a purpose on Shabbat.
What do you do with the broken shards of an item that was (or wasn't) designated before Shabbat? The daf follows the process of argumentation that emerges on this discussion. Side-point: A paradigm of impurity. Also: A contraption that involves filling it up on Shabbat -- and introducing the "basis" category of muktzah, depending on your intent. But how can you tell what happened how?! And the daf offers the same structure of argumentation as above, and that familiarity helps us understand the less familiar cases. Plus: Did R. Yehudah HaNasi require an action to pull something out of muktzah status, or is designating alone sufficient? Recommended: Point by Point Daf.
The term "muktzah." Shabbat vs. yom tov - when it comes to items with a permissible purpose on yom tov that is prohibited on Shabbat. But shouldn't all details of Shabbat and yom tov be the same outside of food prep? And yet, that's not necessarily the case. Also: the shards of broken vessels can be treated like the vessels themselves would have been, as long as they serve a purpose.... more of less specifically. Depending on when the vessel broke, in terms of determining its Shabbat use. Note: Designating a purpose to every given vessel for use on Shabbat must take place before Shabbat. And again, the question of the permitted melakhot on yom tov that are more limited because of the details of Shabbat.
The mishnah on daf 122 explains that every item is permissible to move on Shabbat - and provides permitted activities to do that designate items that otherwise have a prohibited purpose on Shabbat for use on Shabbat. But what is this really all about? For that, we need today's daf. And the mishnah here says - you can move all items on Shabbat, except 2. But why? Again, what is this really all about? Which brings us to the decree against carrying anything, (except 3 small things for the table), and how it was rescinded over time. That decree came on the heels of Shivat Tzion, the return to Israel in the time of Nechemiah, when people simply were not keeping Shabbat. The decree was slowly rescinded, and the Gemara acknowledges that sequence of events in subsequent discussion - the recognition that the Oral Law changed. And indeed, the way Shabbat was kept changed too.
Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi - a man of great wealth, and why that matters. Even the non-Jews wouldn't think of starting up with him; such was his power and influence. Which segues nicely into a mishnah from generations earlier on the relationships between Jews and non-Jews. Namely, when a non-Jew does melakhah on his own behalf vs. on behalf of a Jew. For example, one candle lights the way for 100. And a story about Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai disembarking from a ship, where the halakhah explains the narrative, rather than the narrative illustrating the Gemara (though it technically does that too). Also: a city that has Jews and non-Jews living in it - how does that have impact on the public bathhouse, for specific example? When can the Jews piggyback on the non-Jews melakhah, and when is that not acceptable? Plus: A visit to Beit Avin Toren that leaves us wanting to know more.
A footnote to the Who's Who on Rabbi Yosi ben Halafta. And: Amira le-Akum, and how Jews are not responsible for non-Jewish activities on Shabbat. But Jews are responsible for the activities of Jewish children on Shabbat. Also-ran: When a miracle put out a fire on Shabbat, and that's not the focus of the story of putting out a fire on Shabbat. Also: a focus on determining Halakhah based on real-life stories. And: overturning a bowl to do actions indirectly on Shabbat - including to protect against scorpion bites, except that that seems to violate the melakhah of tzad (trapping). The Gemara lists 5 dangerous animals that you can always kill on Shabbat, and then expresses ambivalence re that plan. But isn't this a pre-pikuach nefesh situation? Would it be an exemption to break Shabbat, or an obligation in the fulfilment of keeping Shabbat, to the nth degree?
Getting the community in on rescuing foods from the fire, and calculating who owns whom what. But are pious people going to take payment for this helping out on Shabbat? (Answer: quite possibly). Also: Smothering a flame on Shabbat, one-step removed - when is this allowed? Note that this Gemara reads a little nonchalant, given the context of fire in the home. Though their homes may have been less flammable.
The source for Kabbalat Shabbat is here - going out to greet the Sabbath - and the implicit honor to the day. And a list of rabbis attests to what each of them did special in preparation for Shabbat. It's a real lesson to our efforts today too. Plus: One of the most famous stories about Shabbat - Yosef Moker Shabbat - is next, with a special guest. This telling includes a detail that we think is left out of many renditions for kids. Its message - getting back from Shabbat what he'd invested. How does this narrative play out a discussion of astrology? Also: Angels! Who accompany us in the way we already choose to go, in terms of Shabbat preparation. Lastly, the desecration of Shabbat, in the context of the destruction of the Temple - counterpoint to the stories we tell children, as their education was interrupted... Also problematic was the equivalencies made in that society, a critique that sounds difficult to our modern, democratic ears.
Eating the 3 meals of Shabbat protects you from 3 harsh periods of travail - inspirational fear, if you will. Also: What happens when people don't keep Shabbat? Even from the very beginning of the mitzvah of Shabbat! In some ways, this is disheartening; in others, the capacity for return is inspiring. Plus: A series of statements by Rabbi Yosi - and our Who's Who. And the story if his 5 sons, his reported yibum, and his apparent asceticism.
More rescuing from a fire on Shabbat - this time, food: for the 3 meals of Shabbat (or maybe all food), and enough to feed your animals. Also: An example of needing to save your bread from the fire - in the event of forgetting your bread in the communal bakery (what you can do to salvage your bread). Note how the day is designed to cultivate the "sparkles" of Shabbat in us. Plus: Prooftexts from the Torah for getting up early on Friday to prepare for Shabbat, for having lechem mishnah (2 loaves of challah for each meals), and having 3 meals on Shabbat. Also, cutting one large slice of challah to last the whole meal - which might be too gluttonous for every meal, but not when it's clearly an unusually Shabbat practice.
NOTE: Something went wonky with the audio for the first few minutes - then it clears up. Apologies! Now: What about breaking Shabbat to save blank folios that will become kitvei kodesh once they are written on? No dice. What about breaking Shabbat to save heretical scrolls from destruction? Even worse. Notable is the way this daf addresses the question of heresy head-on, here, from both the halakhic perspective and with a narrative recounting the activities of Chazal. Who's Who: Ima Shalom. Taking issue with Christianity, without naming it culprit, but otherwise direct critique (no elaborate code here). Recognizing that the Christian position is that its texts replace the Torah, and setting up a Christian philosopher to acknowledge that his stance was truly anti-Torah stance, and mock him for it.
A new chapter: If holy writings are threatened by a fire, save them on Shabbat, no matter what language they're written in. Also: A story to Rabban Gamliel about Rabban Gamliel, his grandfather, who hadn't allowed the same policy re texts - and then the accuracy of that story is disputed. And: The essential value of scrolls in translation. Plus: the parameters of the texts that are holy enough or texts enough to count as worthy of breaking Shabbat to save. Also: what's the shortest text worth saving? 85 characters or "Vayhi benso'a aron," which is a smaller unit, and sufficient, but the exception to prove the rule. And: what about those 85 letters? Do they have to be consecutive? That's a dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Hisda. An important aside: Owning scrolls in that era was a much bigger deal than our default of owning books.
Honoring the Torah scholar, the talmid chacham. In the context of defining "Derekh Eretz" - the Torah teaches us manners, etiquette, and how to be a mentsch. Changing clothes, not wearing patched shoes, oil-stained garments as matters of respect. Note the higher standard for the talmid chacham, presumably given what he represents. The significance of presentability goes beyond what we often recognize in our casual era. Also: Stains on a donkey's saddle - when is it a barrier? A comparable case is brought to answer the question - about those who have stained garments on both sides. Linguistically, the term "bana'in" needs explanation, and is linked to the Torah scholars who "build" the world. The expectation is that Torah scholars are so meticulous that even uneven stitching on a garment wouldn't be seen, and that same meticulousness is evident in his Torah knowledge as well. And distinguishing between talmidei chachamim who are leaders as compared to those who have a depth and breadth of knowledge, but don't undertake that role.
When there's no dispute... really. Also: A new topic: folding your garments and bedclothes in Shabbat, as long as you're not preparing for Saturday night. Including from Yom Kippur (before the calendar was set and rigged against that possibility). What is permitted to be folded depends on how many changes of clothes one has - to allow the treatment of Shabbat as special. That different treatment is sourced in Isaiah/the haftara for Yom Kippur, and applies to clothes, the way of going, what you say, in terms of manner and content. Note: The Gemara here moves past the 39 melakhot to get to our experience of Shabbat. Also, how we apply the principles today. Plus: A comment on the remnants of the Flood in Babylonia. And: The Book of Ruth and the midrashim on it - why the risque overtone, and why Chazal diminish it with their interpretations. Mini-Who's Who: The wealth of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi.
Tying knots: professional, unprofessional, and knots that won't last. The Gemara says: well, obviously (!) a woman is permitted to knot her robe, and goes on to explain why it's a specified case. Especially because of knots that are not permanent, yet remain in place... permanently. Also: Halitzah. Plus: Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Yehudah, and Hizkiah on the impurity of vessels and how repairs change the original. A bit of Who's Who, including the generational shift from Tannaim to Amoraim, and the diminishment from one generation to the next. Which all provides the context for the story about the donkeys who wouldn't eat from untithed food.
Are people permitted to castrate themselves (with a potion)? What about indirect castration? What about drinking such a potion if you're already sterile? What if the person drinking the potion is an old woman? The mishnah seems to be a far broader statement than the cases that whittle down its meaning. Also: Vinegar for medicinal purposes vs. as a condiment at a meal. Or rose water. To what extent do economic advantages dictate what substances are limited to medicinal use? Rabbi Shimon's implicit answer: not at all.
Is the Gemara talking in code? For part of this daf, it seems so. Beginning with remedies to cure someone who was bitten by a snake - presented as an event that happened, even Abaye relates to the case as going beyond its physical example. Which leads into other cases including snakes like you've never seen before, including a woman and a sexually promiscuous snake (is it code? We explore this question with the help of Dr. Shai Secunda and his excellent treatise that includes discussion of this case). Plus: how far does the mishnah's statement that all foods are permitted to eat on Shabbat, even if they also are used for healing. Likewise, all drink. And, the Gemara notes, people do not ever drink urine. Also: A book on biblical and talmudic medicine turns up in Yardaena's house.
Talmudic medicinal treatments, on Shabbat - some of them sound quite in line with practices today. Also, the first-thing-in-the-body spirit that we wash out of ourselves every morning, and the different reasons (elsewhere) for this take. Also, using wine on Shabbat, when vinegar is the real cure (and a bigger issue on Shabbat, unless wine itself will cure). And: a story of Chazal's practice with regard to these substances... and when is the injury so bad that the need is for vinegar's healing properties. Plus: an "ika de-amrei" alternative text providing a more explicit explanation of the Shabbat violation (or lack thereof) in the case of serious injury. Also: when your food has medicinal properties - can you eat it on Shabbat? And the connection between now and then, in terms of our return to an awareness of the impact of various foods, both in diet and less-alternative medicine.
Shmuel and Karna, and Rav. Sniffing a keg to make sure it's doing well. The word of God should be "in your mouth," so kashrut. Similarly, fruit trees and orlah have a literal meaning and a symbolic one. All of which leads to drama between Rav and Karna. Rav's curse (of Shmuel) comes to pass... Do Chazal have powers? Also: A new mishnah, prohibiting making brine on Shabbat (vs. salt water, which seems to be a difference in quantity of product and/or salt). How much you can or cannot your food on Shabbat becomes an interesting subjective topic, which is a curious instruction on Shabbat. Plus: The Dead Sea - as a natural salty phenomenon, may it be used on Shabbat, in its healing capacity. Who's Who: Bitusim (Boethusians).
The 3 cases where "exempt" means not "no korban, but don't do it," but "no korban, and it's even allowed." Also: The new chapter of "8 crawling animals" - including discussion of what these creatures are, and the fact that wounding them leaves you exempt... Some significant disputes are these animals - what has separate skin? Plus: Killing a louse on Shabbat... How differently Chazal related to live, as compared to other animals, specifically with regard to their procreation (which we know today was not via spontaneous generation). Which, of course, raises questions of what to do when Chazal's halakhah is based on faulty science.
When a destructive act can actually constitute "melekhet machshevet," even though it's not constructive in the least. Also: Trapping, which can depend on the size of the place used to capture the animal. And a discussion about a free bird... that does not accept authority (!). Plus: Another animated discussion among Chazal. And: Deer! What happens if the deer you're trapping can't run away? Well, it depends why it can't run. And what about grasshoppers and hornets and so on?!
Abbreviations - in the Torah itself?! Apparently so, and with the claim that it's part and parcel of the Torah itself. Then: moving on to "sewing 2 stitches," and "tearing in order to sew 2 stitches." That is, constructive tearing for the purpose of sewing. Also, tearing keriyah - as a sign of mourning, in anguish. Or one who tears in anger. Mourning obligates tearing keriyah! One who is present at the moment that a person dies is also obligated to tear keriyah - according to this Gemara at least. When the deceased as a Torah scholar, tearing keriyah is incumbent on all - as if all were relatives. It's so raw... and constructive in one's grief... It can't incur a korban. Also: the anger... One who is caught in the throes of emotion - the halakhah recognizes that loss of control, and accommodates it, but truly encourages moderation instead.
From the melakhah of writing to the Hebrew alphabet. Discussion about the letters themselves, and letter-play, apparently in the hands of the young students. "At-Bash" and other midrashim about the letters. And: Back to the halakhot about writing... All kinds of inks and other substances that are visible and lasting if you write with them. And where you write is pretty flexible too, wherein the two letters don't necessarily have to be next to each other, if they are legible and combine to make words. All that to make you chayav. Followed, of course, by all kinds of ways of being exempt from the korban (the substance if the writing, the location of where you write the two letters, etc.). Plus: what happens if you write over writing that is already there? And what happens if you write just one letter, not two, but with that one letter, you finish the book?
A closing general note that emerges from the discussion on the previous daf. And: plowing, etc. In any amount incurs a korban -- because it is inevitable that all of these cases are beneficial to the the land and its growth potential. Which means it doesn't matter if you intend to enhance the land - you're doing it anyway. Inevitability removes the excuse of "unintentional" melakhah. [What's What: Psik Reisheih] And then what matters is how beneficial it is to you, how much do you care about the benefit? Also: Writing. Ever put together a sukkah and indicate what goes where with symbols? That was writing in the Mishkan. The typical writing was presumed to be right-handend. What about a lefty? The Gemara addresses this directly (also ambidextrous). And what about those marks vs. writing 2 letters?
Finishing off HaZorek, the chapter, and our (current) discussion of carrying on Shabbat. A reminder of the two-part requirement for "carrying" to take place, and what it means to be obligated to offer the korban. Namely, if you throw an object on Shabbat, to be required to bring a korban, you must have forgotten that it is Shabbat, or that the action is prohibition on Shabbat, for the entire time of transfer of domains, from when you throw it to when it lands. Thus, we are reminded of the complexity of the nature of this melakhah, including its effect on both time and space. Also, beginning the next chapter of the tractate, with its next complex melakhah: Boneh/building. Any amount of building will incur the requirement of bringing a korban. For something to constitute "building," it must be established in certain ways (not just placing a speck of dirt on top of another speck of dirt). And, of course, the connection to the Mishkan. Plus: there's no poverty in a place if wealth (aka, no half-measures... in the Mishkan, specifically).
Can walls extend into the empty space near them to establish a private domain? The answer lies in the little goats who can run around in that space. Also: Ships that are tied together - carrying from ship to ship. And a challenge regarding the language of the mishnah - can it mean carrying from a large ship to another large ship, with a small one attached between them? Can these ships join together to make an eruv? Love and behold, boats can combine for this purpose. But can you do so on Shabbat? Note what appears to be a practical angle to this exploration of the parameters of the halakhah.
Tannaitic halakhah... What happens when you throw an object 4 amot within the public domain? 4 different scenarios that fulfill this description.... When would you be obligated to bring a korban? When exempt? Plus: Now add bodies of water into the equations. Why is the water itself considered a karmelit, as compared to the public or private domain? Also, inconvenient passage vs. inconvenient usage. Plus: ships and boats, when you can carry from one to the next. How do we count the depth of the area around the boat? Where are the 10 tefachim?
More on the Mishkan, but more concrete: the colorful curtains, made of goat hair. Spinning goat hair required exceptional taken or skin, especially because they did the spinning on the animal. Especially when you consider the wayward, stubborn nature of sheep or goats... Also: back to private/public domains, when one throws above 10 tefachim (air space that isn't in the domain) to land on top of a 10 tefachim. But here, R. Moredechai has a complaint that Chazal do not address his question thoroughly enough - which speak to a culture of learning that includes challenging others' take. Plus: Changing the status of a karmelit (to reshut hayachid)...on Shabbat - can that change if status make you obligated (or exempt) in the korban chatat... a real conundrum. And: don't sit in a chair all shabbat, lest you incur an obligation for a korban; rather, live your life and learn the halakhah!
The Mishkan, in glorious description of its architecture - what it means to turn the inherently abstract words into a concrete physical structure. Constructing a visualization from the text - some people are exceptional at this, of course But what if you're not a visual person? There are different ways of thinking, of course. Plus: Making the attempt to "translate" the words of one section of the daf into more of a visual description.... How the curtains adorn the Mishkan. Part if what's tricky is being sure we know what each term means to begin it, of course. The visual then helps explain function, in this case, of the curtains. Also, consider the scope on the text and the capacity for interpretation that is expected of Bnei Yisrael, on building the Mishkan, as per God's description.
The suggestion that Rabbi Akiva's interpretation on Miriam and Aharon goes too far. Which leads into a discussion of "choshed be-kesherim" - speaking I'll of those who are blame-free, and the punishment is to the speaker's body... A la Miriam and Aharon. Moshe also is presented as one who failed to believe, even as Bnei Yisrael are represented as believers in God's promise of redemption. Moshe's lack of belief bring attributed to when he hit the rock, if course. Nobody wants to be spoken about with that lack of benefit of the doubt, but it's not so simple to keep ourselves from engaging in this kind of gossip or prelude to gossip. Also: recapping R. Yehudah HaNasi's position that there's a fixed number if melakhot (namely, 39). With implications for one who throws 4 amot into the public domain from the private domain... Does that incur a second korban (for the 4 amot themselves)? Not surprisingly, that's the crux of the dispute. Also, how this all relates to our conception of Shabbat - and the nature of a moment of sin, as compared to a time spectrum of ongoing capacity to sin.
The new chapter, HaZorek: Throwing an item between public and private domains; throwing an item from a private domain to another private domain, through a public domain; passing from private to privately domain, through public domain... The last there case there having been learned from the Levites practice in constructing the Mishkan (passing from wagon to wagon). Note: the Gemara explains the camp of the Levites and the "shabbat" completion of the Mishkan. Sanctifying time (Shabbat) and place (Mishkan!). Also: Bringing IN vs. Taking OUT. Which leads to avot and toladot, and incurring korban obligations, according to Rabbi Eliezer. What's What: "Nafka minah." Plus: Tzlophchad - a tzadik or deserving of the death sentence? How rabbinic midrash answers this question.
Wait, how is braiding your hair the same as building? The Gemara makes sense of exactly this. Plus: Slice of Talmudic Life - making cheese. homegrown insults, and beit midrash consultation (still about the melakhot). What happens when Chazal shop study halls? Also - A new member of Chazal? Plus - sprinkling water to tamp down the dust in your home on a hot and dusty day. Namely, ancient air conditioning.
Can a Jew lend a horse to a non-Jew for use on Shabbat? Ben Beteira says yes, even despite the strong requirement that the entire household rest on Shabbat. Why a horse? Note: The discussion here is matter-of-fact, without tension, on the topic of interaction between Jews/non-Jews. Also: transferring a piece of a corpse leads into a discussion of tzaraat. Wherein interfering with the skin ailment is prohibited (despite a possible human inclination to try to tweak what the kohen would see before diagnosing tzaraat or no). And: the prevalence of issues of tumah and taharah in a daily way, and in the context of Shabbat. Plus: A list of cosmetic routine actions that are prohibited on Shabbat, but don't incur a sacrifice if you do them. What's What: "Shevut." (A curious placement of this list that gets some unpacking).
When two people go carrying.... A case where one person was capable to carry and the other was not - who is obligated to bring a korban and why? Being nice may not always be the best course of action, if you aren't truly helping. So, what are the parameters? Basically, always check it out. Plus: Carrying less than the measure of food that would require a sacrifice in a container - the container doesn't count - after all, you can't carry soup in your bare hands. Similarly, carrying a live person on a bed, but that's not the case for carrying a dead body on a bed. What's What: a refresher of ikar/tafel.
Shifting focus from the object that is carried to the subject who is doing the carrying. Right hand, left hand, in your lap, on your shoulder. Alternatively, carrying in an alternative way - with a "shinui," not the normal way of carrying - that exempts the carrier from culpability for the act of carrying. What about carrying on your head?! Anshei Hotzel (or Hutzal) did regularly carry their baskets on their head. The Gemara emends this text itself... Also, a woman who wears a "sinar" (pants? pantaloons? a skirt over jeans?) - indusputed (!) halakha. Plus: When carrying must be divided among 2 people. Who's Who: Bnei Kehat.
Purpose and intent, when it comes to carrying tiny amounts. And how that differs across people, and across plans, which change. Plus: Lining up the opinions of the mishnah. Also: what happens when the act of carrying even this tiny amount is not completed? And what happens when one person completes the plan of another - can we really transfer intent? And if so, how far does that principle go? Finally, when changing your mind doesn't change your obligation.
Back to Shabbat topics, and minimums for carrying to be obligated in bringing a sin-offering - including a list of items that require an offering no matter how little of them you carry. In contrast: When it comes to metals, various substances were used to protect the Temple, to clean the lamps, etc. That is, when it comes to donations to the Temple, "any amount" is too little - rather, the amount has to be of actual use to the Beit HaMikdash. Plus: The "mekek," and the need to protect the scrolls in the Beit HaMikdash.
When the Satan went to God, asked for the Torah, searched the world for it, and finds it, as per God's instruction, with Moshe Rabbenu. What is this all about? Namely, what is "the Satan" in rabbinic literature? Again, what's going on here? What is this passage all about? Exploring the place of Torah and humanity in creation - and the need for people doing mitzvot. How could the perfect Torah be given to imperfect mankind?! Where's the sense in that?
Were Bnei Yisrael forced to keep the Torah? That seems inappropriate. But was there any other way for God to give the Torah? An encounter between humanity and the Divine seems to go beyond human experience. Also: the semblance of free choice, from former refuseniks to our post-Israel experiences, and the potential paradox of choice. So is that coercion per se, or helpful? That close encounter with God may not be all that comfy - just because we want it to be. Yet, Bnei Yisrael do accept the Torah freely in the time of the Purim story. Plus: the words of the Torah shatter into 70 languages, a message of accessibility, across nations and cultures.
When did the giving of the Torah actually take place? Figuring the precise date of the first year. Also: preperatory separation between husbands and wives. And his personal kal vachomer, to separate from his own wife,in perpetuity. Breaking the tablets. Moshe's own sense of the right thing to do. Also: an interplay between God, Moshe, Bnei Yisrael, in the context of getting the chronology of events right. Plus: the relay conversation from God to Moshe to Bnei Yisrael, and back again. What was the substance of that conversation? The mitzvah of setting boundaries, or the punishment and reward system of mitzvot (or the reward and punishment system, if you will).
The fourth of the four asmakhtah mishnayot, with four topics within the one mishnah: polatet shikhvat zera, bathing an infant who has undergone brit milah on Shabbat, separation of husband and wife, anointing on Yom Kippur. Which leads into a discussion of the separation between husbands and wives during the giving of the Torah. Via hints of non-legal verses from Tanakh. Also, how the Gemara delves into the first category at length, and why that feels prurient. Plus: separation between husbands and wives at Mount Sinai - when, exactly, did that begin? How, exactly, did they handle it? Also: the importance of careful reading of the entirety of Torah.
Asmakhtah, again. And a whole new discussion: kilayim, the prohibition against sowing seeds together. Mapping out the garden... And on to the salvation of the Jewish people at the end of days. Which leads into a question about rabbinic authority when it comes to agriculture, of all things. Yet the Torah itself, claims the Gemara, teaches a great deal about agriculture - for example, the inference possible from the concerns not to encroach on your neighbor's land. Which has implication for planting. And the all-encompassing nature of Torah and halakhah.
What's What: Midras tumah. When boxes are contaminated, as it were, with tumah - when they open from the side or from the top. Whereas a very large box is not rendered impure. Now, what about earthenware? That's not able to be rendered impure in this way. So, what about the ship? The difference between midras tumah and the handling of an object that renders it impure.
The importance of context, when the backdrop of idolatry shows up here. Also: What's What: Tumat Heset - the tumah that is transferred when moving an object of idolatry. Plus: A new mishnah, with another divergent, and somewhat cryptic topic, and the unpacking of it by the Gemara, about the impurity - or lack thereof - of a ship.
A nod of appreciation to the topic of witchcraft. Also: When a father tells his son that learning the basics is important. Plus: Those basics - some moral lessons about going to the bathroom when you need to. Also, some health lessons to assist one who is constipated -- so many recommend solutions. And: a new (unusual) chapter begins. Asmakhtot.
How heavy is the rock you throw at a bird? What's the amount that makes a rock a problem to carry on Shabbat? It can't be muktzah, because it has essential use. Namely, bathroom etiquette involved setting aside rocks and leaves and more as functional toilet paper in a world that didn't have indoor plumbing. Plus: Kavod ha-briot, in its essential form.
More on blue eye shadow: whoever shadows just one eye?! Modesty vs. hypermodesty - not just a tension of the modern era. Plus: Lime qua depilatory and emollient - as applied to R. Bivei's daughter, in contrast to R. Bivei's neighbor's daughter. Until R. Nachman shuts it down. Also: Maaseh Merkavah - with a stinging hornet, no less. With incorrect study (appropriately blamed on the instructor). And: Plaster mixed with straw in mourning the Temple.
When carrying becomes a topic of documents and of receipts or promissory notes, it's only logical that the discussion would veer to parchment and tefillin and mezuzot. Which leads us to ask, to what extent does the purpose of the act determine the nature of carrying. Plus: More on animal hides than we ever knew before. Also: A truncated quote on repurposing, and the going up in holiness. What's What: "Duchsustos." And practically speaking: go look up the cited texts!
The liquids that are beverages or food, and are also used for medicinal purposes - on which measure is used to determine how much one would need to carry to be obligated to bring a korban? It seems leniencies are bred into the system. Also: Blood - using blood to heal... a sty? A cataract? From a chicken? From a bat? Plus: Blue eyeshadow. And still more on the measurements for carrying all kinds of things.
Dedicated for the yarzheit of Dr. Michael E. Osband Melech Gershom Channa Ben Eliezer v’Chasya Hesha. Alef vs ayin - the Gemara is figuring out the Mishnah's spelling. Also: the purpose of every (annoying) thing in the world, including mosquitoes. Plus: Rabbi Zera pays a visit to his father-in-law.
Where what you value has impact on what is: namely, is the amount for which one is held accountable an objective measurement, or dependent on the individual's values? More specifically: when you're feeding a cow, that's different from feeding a camel. And how all of the above pertains to the phenomenon of carrying, in terms of violating Shabbat. The different component values do not usually combine. Plus: the measurements for violating carrying with various liquids - wine, milk, and more (or maybe those are objective measures too). Rabbi Shimon plays a role throughout.
Mazalot - divination vs. astronomy, that which at worst carries a death sentence for those who practice it vs that which is a mitzvah to undertake, as a means to appreciate the Divine. Also, the hilazon and the number of korbanot hatat one who uses it to make tekhelet... on Shabbat, if one would. Touching on bigger discussions for another time: "mitasek"; "psik reisheih." Plus: Another view (rejected) of avot and toladot that could entail a lot more korbanot. And the next mishnah, which brings us back to carrying.
Who's Who: Nachmani. Borer - what are the parameters of this melakhah? A tannaitic statement needs rereading by the Amoraim, to establish just that - 5 attempts, 4 refutations. Also, the halakhic upshot of borer. Plus: the melakhah of "ofeh," baking, and not "bishul" - language choice. Also: counting up melakhot in any creative endeavor.
First, Abaye vs Rava on throwing an object in reshut harabim -- if the resultant action alines with your own concerns, don't you have to bring a korban? Which brings us to the component parts of a complete action of melakhah: your act and your intent. Plus: The 39 prohibited creative labors of Shabbat - a list worthy of its own discussion. Including the groupings that help us remember the list better, as mnemonics.
The Gemara claims: Shabbat is a more stringent area of halakhah than other mitzvot - and where it is less so. And then the Gemara twists and turns to figure out exactly what this case is. Which bring us to different applications of "shogeg." And what makes a moment of sin? Which raises questions about the nature of sin itself, and the opportunity to atone for it.
R. Yochanan vs. Resh Lakish on the number of sin-offerings one brings upon eating "chelev," the prohibited fats. Delving in, the biblical verses and beyond. Can the sin multiply, if you discover it at different times? Or is one period of ignorance enough to make it one sin and one sin-offering? To what extent does the sacrifice's designation have impact?
How did we come by these 39 individual melakhot? The Gemara finds an answer in the biblical text on the severity of the punishment. Which, of course, distinguishes between mezid (intentional) violation and shogeg (unintentional) violation. How this teaches the severity of Shabbat! Also: Gematria! Plus: Isn't lighting a fire the quintessential violation if Shabbat? R. Yosi's position suggests otherwise. That kind of dispute is one of the times where we just pause to recognize the challenges in the Oral Torah, too.
Why do we need to know that there are 39 melakhot? After all, there's a list! It's all about what happens in a time period of forgetting (he'eleim). Defining "shogeg" with regard to Shabbat (again). Also: understanding the korban chatat. Plus: The case of the person who loses track of time and doesn't know what day is Shabbat. Do we resolve that in accord with God's count of 7 days or the human experience of Shabbat? Also, what does it mean to start keeping Shabbat again out there in the wilderness (if that's where you lost track of time)? The significance of Kiddush and Havdalah and the nature of Shabbat in our experience of the day (when keeping the melakhot is not the overwhelming experience of the day).
Back to basics: The categories (avot) of prohibited labor on Shabbat, their sub-categories (toladot), and the significance of having both avot and toladot. Now, if one forgot that it was shabbat or forgot that the given action violated shabbat... the avot and toladot lead to careful bookkeeping, which minimize the number of sin-offeringa that would be needed. Also, note that this is all the negative aspect of Shabbat (making sure not to violate Shabbat, "shamor"), but don't forget the positive side of things (as found in the mitzvah to remember Shabbat ("zakhor"). Also, a couple of cases where these rules apply, where one truly forgets that it is shabbat. Who's Who: Munbaz.
When folk remedies don't heal, and might be worse - superstitious nonsense or "darkei haEmori"? Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree. But Abaye and Rava agree: that which heals is not superstitious. But do the talismans listed in the gemara fit that bill? Plus: Painting a tree with red paint to spur prayers for mercy. And: when we need to reach out and ask for help, with no guilt or shame (and when we need to offer help to those who have reached out).
Is a prosthetic leg to be considered a shoe? What about going out on Shabbat with prosthetics? The Gemara's discussion does not address what we might think is the key concern. Plus: Some Who's Who: Abaye. Also: Healing practices that don't involve grinding medicine - including... superstition? Some folks remedies seem more medicinal than others (and some of which were allowed on Shabbat).
More things a woman might wear. Including strings in pierced ears, holding the place for future earrings. Medean garments. Etc. With all the implications for the masks we wear today... (eruv aside). Thus, the lasting strength of the Oral Law. Also: Shmuel's father, the girls in the household, and going to the river or mikveh. Sourcing rain water and mixing it with river water. This seems to be a stringency, and opens the question: what about the rest of Babylonian Jewry?
Different ornamental items - how internal and external pieces of jewelry might be treated differently in halakhah. Context matters, and individual sensitivities matter too, with the onus on the person doing the "looking." Also: Hair decor, including wigs, all presumably for beautification - and therefore needing adjudication as to whether that's carrying on Shabbat. Conclusion: appearance always has been, and always is going to be important to people. Rabbi Akiva: and so a person doesn't have to go out of her way to look unattractive.
The smell of cinnamon in Jerusalem. The time of the messiah - the perpetual question of how different it will really be after all. Plus: Never forget the plain sense (pshat) of the text. Namely, discovering the layers of meaning of the biblical text, and the possibility of misinterpretation of R. Kahana, without contextual reading. Also: 4 kinds of chavrutot, learning partnerships. And: the best way to give tzedakah - support a business (with all the ramifications for current events).
First, defining some terms of armor. Then, a new mishnah introduced several topics: starting with balsam oil, and the absence of a decree when there's no post-Temple joy in the item (how recent the destruction must have seemed). Plus: additional Torah prohibitions for women, in terms of wearing them on Shabbat... In contrast to what a man cannot wear. From shepherds to every man. Also: Are women a nation unto themselves? Plus: Tefillin as an example for what women do not wear....except that here they do! Why don't women wear tefillin after all? What's What: Chisurei Mechsera, when the text is lacking.
Going out on Shabbat with one shoe and an injured foot: why do we wear shoes? Plus: Amulets! (What is going on with them?? How are they okay? How do they heal? And reliably, no less? Nonetheless, they seem to have been used without critique.
Parallel structuring, on what a man cannot wear out on Shabbat. The hobnailed sandal and the reason it was prohibited get the focus of this daf. This decree follows tragic events, and finds a culprit in this shoe, with 3 versions of the narrative that led to the decree. The lessons go beyond the danger of the shoe, however. For starters, why would you ever wear something to injure people on Shabbat?! Yet the prominence seems clear, given the attention of this daf. Also, the specificity of Chazal's decrees. Plus: R. Hiya's concern for his reputation as a posek.
The city of gold, which is to say, more ornaments, to be worn (or not) in the public domain. Rabbi Akiva's gift to his wife, Rachel. But in this case, the korban hatat might be required, in contrast to the previous ornaments, this far. The difference that being a particularly distinguished woman makes. Plus, the discussion of the kelilah, that tiara-like adornment, and which of the sages are cited as permitting the item as one of clothing. Including: Levi, his identification, arrival in Babylon, and the transfer of rabbinic power in Jerusalem. Also, how the women react to hearing that this kelilah was permitted attire.
What's What: "Atarot Kallot." More on clothing that is decreed against wearing on Shabbat, lest one come to carry. Extending the discussion to focus on a bell - that is worn, that's a "kli," and the importance of the clapper. The value of adornment, including decorative elements in the home - which may not have "kli" status.
A new chapter! The decree against women wearing certain kinds of adornments on Shabbat - lest they take them off to show them off and forget to put them back on, and thereby carry. Plus how all that relates to tevilah, immersion in the mikveh. Also: Sussing out what an unfamiliar name is for one such clothing item, for which multiple halakhot apply.
On the practice of close reading of the biblical text, and the strong interpretive tradition of Chazal. Understanding biblical personalities via the reinterpretation of them. Focus on reinterpreting King David, as a non-sinner, despite the biblical text, and because of it. Who's Who: R. Shmuel bar Nachmani.
Selecting good people to be protected from the angels of destruction and wicked people to be identified for them. But Justice asks: how different are they really?! The Gemara goes on to explain the rebuke in place here. The discussion as to how and why the the tzaddikim were marked at all emerges from why it was done with the Hebrew letter Tav. Also, Zekhut Avot, and what it means to not rely on it. Plus: the story of Reuben and Bilhah in the biblical text as prep for tomorrow's daf, which elaborates on those who never sinned, despite all appearances to the contrary (including Reuven).
First, an addendum to the one-armed woman of yesterday. Next: limits on what animals can wear, as it were, on Shabbat -- and the implication of those limits on the animals' human owners. Plus: R. Elazar ben Azariah, and how he apparently let his cow go out on Shabbat wearing exactly the prohibited item - how can that be? A refresher as to who he was and the implications of this decision. Also: wishing you a happy Yom HaAtzmaut! Dedicated in memory of Anna Rutner Sara bat Yom Tov v’Rachel. (Some audio overlaps/cut-offs today; apologies - we'd get rid of them if we could!)
First, the distinction between medicine for a person as compared to an animal; next, no medicine on Shabbat at all. Plus: 2 very strange stories, one involving the miracle of a nursing man, and the other, a man's hypermodesty (are either of these things good? we discuss). Also: a meaningful Yom HaZikaron to you all - may Israel know no more pain.
Animals in the public domain - what can they wear, what counts as "carrying"? We focus on the parah adumah, the red heifer, and today what extent wearing some bridle, bit, reins, etc. would invalidate its status as a parah adumah (or what it doesn't). The means to control the animal does not "work" the animal, which would invalidate it. Also, questions of definition with regard to Shabbat, as compared to tumah and taharah - rings, and their function, their composition, etc. Plus: observing the range of the topic and pace and process of the journey of the daf.
Can you insulate to keep things cold? R. Yehudah HaNasi contradicts himself - until Abaye resolves the contradiction. Also, a lesson in rabbinic authority, and just how oral the Talmud was. Plus: Perek 5: What about your animals' melakhah on Shabbat?
Again, the overlap of hatmanah and muktzah, and again, the importance of intent, as we set items aside... for use on Shabbat. Also: Pursuing beauty, in celebration of God's world Dedicated in memory of Chaya Bayla bat Yeshayahu Yaakov v'Sarah Tziporah
More hatmanah/insulation. Elisha (not the prophet). Explaining why the dove. Plus: The important discussion of the 39 Melakhot and their ostensible source in the Mishkan, with its attendant machloket and absolute agreement.
The new perek! Insulating food on Shabbat, without cooking it. What substances protect the heat without increasing it and cooking. Plus, two stories that happened in the house of the Resh Galuta, specifically regarding violations of Shabbat (different practices, rightly and wrongly, seems to have been an age-old problem).
First, an unusual use of a biblical verse that we found delightful. Next: Carrying ashes on Shabbat - muktzah, no? Which leads into an important discussion about the value of clothing for the poor and the wealthy. Also, "mi'us" in the text! Plus: the final mishnah of the perek, with a new contraption to accompany the ancient candles that leads to concerns of muktzah (they get resolved, not to worry).
Stories of Hazal - how they kept the laws of Muktzah themselves, as per the Gemara's account. Sussing out halakhic positions from observed practice. Also: undoing vows on Shabbat, specifically those that a husband undoes for his wife, and the vow and its nullification relates to Shabbat, Plus: how sha'atnez connects to this discussion of Muktzah. Also: keep in mind the maximalist/minimalist divergence of approach.
More on Muktzah. Including the case in the title, and how it relates to bein hashmashot. Plus: R. Shimon's minority opinion on the dried figs and raisins that are on the category of "muktzah" (a minimalist approach) vs. R. Yehudah's majority opinion (a maximalist approach).
More Muktzah. Still no statement to that effect by the Gemara. That which is disgusting, that which is designated not for use before Shabbat, and that which serves as a "basis" for other things that cannot be moved.
Some overview, and some cases from this daf - of these things that are prohibited to carry on Shabbat. Also: Defining "nolad," which is, of course, muktzah too.
So many ways of not meaning to do melakhah. Partially defining "melekhet machshevet," and its requirements. Intent (davar she'eino mitkaven). And needing the physical outcome of the action (melakhah she'ainah tzerichah legufah) (as per the dispute between R. Shimon and R. Yehudah (and everyone less). Plus: Cooking spices indirectly, away from the heat source. That is, kli rishon, sheni, etc. And what happens when herbs cook very rapidly.
Who's Who: Rabbi Zera. Also: What the Gemara learns from Rabbi Yehuda's conduct in the bathhouse. Plus: Warming devices for heating on Shabbat.
The decree against full showers or baths on Shabbat, even when the water has been heated prior to Shabbat. Plus: the hierarchy of rabbinic authority, in which " Tannaim trump Amoraim. Two caveats from Anne: 1) when I said 3 days of yom tov in "America," I did not intend to exclude the rest of the Diaspora!; 2) in the discussion of long-haired bathing, yes, I'm well aware that there are women with short hair and men with long hair. Also: Who's Who: Rabbah.
Still more cooking - frying your egg on the sidewalk ( is the sun)? Acceptable or not? What about-face hot springs. Also: Drawing inferences vs. a tradition handed down -- and who gives in in matters of dispute?
More cooking! A decree that sheds light on halakhic cooking - and human nature. Defining terms: acting be-mezid, be-sho-geg, or forgetting. Also: Why intention matters, and how forgetting means you're not cooking anyway. How completing the prohibited action doesn't automatically mean the outcome (cooked food) is prohibited too - except it is. Plus: Ovens - the cooking apparatus, if you will - and how heat matters, as does an oven's structure.
Cooking! When more time on the fire is better or worse for the food. Also: Understanding the variables in cooking as a melakhah. Including how Yardaena likes her steak (just so you know) and why that matters.
Shofar, aravot, and the name of Babylonia - definitions in the absence of the Temple and losing the nuances of language. Also: Cooking! We begin the discussion of leaving food on fire on Shabbat, or returning it to fire on Shabbat.
Erev Shabbat preparation, beginning with the 6 shofar blasts announcing the coming day. And the 5 shofar blasts of the Babylonian diaspora - of some concern to those in Israel.
A brief mention of "hatmanah" and crock pots. More: The checklist going into Shabbat. Keeping tension in check, and welcoming Shabbat well. Also: Bein Hashmashot - between the suns - and different kinds of definitions for this amorphous time.
One of those dapim we were eager to get to - it's got drama and conflict and religious pathos; it's got spying and flighty women; it's got the ability to provoke a serious discussion about whether Judaism is ideally integrated into the world, or held apart from the world. Namely, the story of how Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and his son came to live in a cave for more than a dozen years. Plus the connection to Shabbat that makes the placement of this narrative in this tractate logical.
Three sins for which women die in childbirth - from "women's mitzvot," such as they are. Why these are so severe, and the cautionary mishnah. Also: Rabbi Yannai and not relying on miracles. Plus: Theodicy (again). And: Cause and effect between sins and negative outcomes for society.
Hillel and Shammai themselves, the famous stories. The dare to anger Hillel, who takes every question seriously, patiently. "Convert me while I stand on one foot." The ways Hillel and Shammai were so different, and yet also the same. Also: The value of Yirat Hashem.
Extinguishing a flame to prevent the flame from being seen vs doing so to save the candle... For example, saving a life... Or improving the sick person's situation. Also: King David's death and what God doesn't tell man, and how nobody outsmarts the Angel of Death, not really. Plus: The effort to keep Kohelet (Ecclesiastes) out of the canon of the Bible, and why it didn't work.
Repurposing a garment to be wicks - yea or nay? Plus: The prohibition of getting up an oil dispenser for candle from an egg shell (never mind the challenge in securing eggs in Israel right now), and it would be permitted. Also: The need for context in understanding halakhah and how psak works (including what happens on social media).
Still talking about ritual impurity... Including non-kosher animals. Holy endeavors must use a kosher animal, and the Gemara explains where this rational doesn't apply to tefillin, which are defined by Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai - and no argument. Plus: The "tachash" - an unknown animal (kosher? unkosher?) used in making this Mishkan.
The impurity of Tzara'at and the impurity of the creepy-crawlies -- can one be inferred from the other? Different ways one happens upon tumah - vs. the tumah and experience of Tzara'at. Also: Tzitzit. With Sha'atnez. Literally. Plus: Learning from verses in proximity to each other. And: Some musing on the surreality of the discussions of these mitzvot (and Yardaena's story of sha'atnez). Also: why the blind are obligated in Tzitzit.
The audio is a little wonky today - with gaps and overlaps - we don't know why (why tried to fix it) - we are sorry about that....... Back to the oils for Shabbat candle use (or not-use, as the case may be). And: a very strange drama that illustrates the volatility (flammability) of balsam oil and some family dynamics... What if you don't have olive oil? Because plenty of locales did not.
Some basic terms of what invalidates kodshim - the sanctified offerings - including immediate mourners who cannot partake. Also: welcoming Shabbat with nice candles, with washing in hot water. Preparing for Shabbat, with a focus on what matters. The complications of the current era and our changes under the coronavirus. Who's Who: R. Yehuda bar Ilai.
The influence of Chanukah: should it be mentioned in Birkat HaMazon? What about Musaf? How do we incorporate new-fangled holidays into the liturgy, without casting aspersions on the biblical holidays?
Blessing the "commandment" of Chanukah. Lighting at every entrance to prevent suspicions. Pe'ah - leaving gleanings the right way. Also: human nature. And concern for community norms and well-being. Plus triage for when you can't afford everything, and don't want to diminish the value of any mitzvah.
How do we treat ritual objects? Disgracing a mitzvah. Are the tools and byproducts of a mitzvah inherently holy? 3 debates between Rav and Shmuel, including R. Shimon's opinion on the physical outcome of melakhah.
Bad oil, bad wicks. Also: Chanukah! Embarking on everything you wanted to know about the holiday and its halakhot, at least from the texts of the Sages.
What does it mean for something to be cooked? How much must be cooked before Shabbat starts? The measurement of Ben Dorsai. Welcoming Shabbat - to exclude a whole host of possible candle materials (ch. 2). Plus a discussion of vocabulary.
All kinds of things come together: Jew/non-Jew interaction, Pesach, selling chametz... Kutach. Shabbat responsibility (when those who are not obligated in Shabbat do what would be violating Shabbat for Jews). Plus: Passive Shabbat "violation." And: When the talmudic text is absent and that changes psak. Also: Muktzah, and the limits of local authority (or: how halakhah is supposed to function).
A new mishnah, a new machloket between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai: beginning a process before shabbat that continues into shabbat, with no new involvement on your part. Namely letting your tools and vessels rest on shabbat. Plus: the concept of a "shabbos clock" (timer). And the concept of mar'it ayin (the appearance gives the wrong impression). Also, the beginning of the conversation of Jew/non-Jew interactions when it comes to shabbat.
Hillel and Shammai. Harvesting grapes in purity, sure, but what about olives? Preserving Hillel's honor in the face of Shammai's decree. Also: the passions riding high when it comes to figuring out the last of the 18 decrees, including using and avoiding non-Jews.
The oddity of the decree to make vessels made of metal impure. Breaking vessels to renew their pure status. What makes rain Waters become standing water, and the significance of intent. Plus: A very strange decree rendering the Kutim/Samaritans impure. Also: the impulse to protect the halakhah with stringent decrees.
Impure land - who said, and when? Six decrees out of Usha (Who's Who and What's What). What's the purpose of a rabbinic decree? Specifically: When terumah comes in contact with possibly impure ground, garments, vessels, spit, or urine.
The impurity of the Sefer Torah - what? Why?! Busy hands. With a note that pure/impure are not value judgements. Now, who decided what? What was ascribed to Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai was really Hillel and Shammai themselves - and those great men really got along.
R. Hananya ben Hizkiyah ben Garon, who saved the Book of Yezhekel (Ezekiel). Plus, Megillat Taanit. We're a product of our times, whenever that may be.
Tefillin on erev Shabbat, and the message of awareness of God at all time. Bikur Holim, and God's presence in the visit. Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha - and the prohibition against adjusting a candle on Shabbat (was he an "adam chashuv" or not?).
A powerful statement that encompasses the Talmud's action, in full. Then, small actions to avoid on erev Shabbat, lest you forget, into shabbat (the Mishnah picks up where the last one left off). Who's Who (what): Matos Mechasya. What's What: Seyag - a fence for the Torah.
Rav Kahana's exceptional approach to prayer - and the fact that we can turn to God in different frames of mind. Plus: The potential conflict between prayer and learning Torah - coming down heavily on the side of the eternal life earned in talmud Torah (with an aside for the proper mentality for prayer).
Examining the essence of the threshold - inside, outside, fluctuating? Establishing space before time... And now on to time: What activities to avoid before Mincha, until after you have davened. What's What: Sha'ot Zmaniot, Minchah Gedolah, Minchah Ketanah.
The definitions and oddities of these four domains, from a large barrel to a basket -- objects vs. domains. Also some reflections on our definitions of space in this challenging time of redefining space, inside and outside of quarantine, closing of public spaces, and ongoing community.
The Karmalit - defining what it is and what it is not, in relation to reshut ha-rabim and reshut ha-yachid. Plus: Exploring the outer parameters of the karmalit, including why the Gemara cares about throwing that juicy cake of figs. And why we care about the karmalit.
Defining the 4 domains (well, two of them). Paying attention to the differences in our space. Carrying in and carrying out, including from an "exempt place" (mekom patur).
Answering Rabbi Akiva (from Shabbat 4). The importance of one's hands in completing the act of Hotza'ah. Probing what counts as a resting place to constitute completed "hanachah." What's What: Teiku
The Gemara tries to figure out why the poor person in the first mishnah of the masekhet would be in violation of Hotza'ah on Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva has an interesting take.
Each tractate is a unit unto itself. Levels of violation of Shabbat. Who's Who: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rav, Rav Hiya. What's What (Shabbat edition): Mezid, Shogeg, Patur aval asur. Melakhah definition: Hotza'ah
Recognizing the terms and definitions we need for this tractate: "av" melakhah, "toladah," and the two main domains from and to which one is not permitted to carry. Note: An unedited version made its way to Apple (at least) - we have no idea how, and this extra text is an attempt to see how and when it updates. Apologies to the 76 of you who listened to the original (hopefully correct!) version - when we previewed it, we only heard the edited version. Thank you for bearing with us while we figure out what went wrong (esp. if it didn't affect you)
In this episode, and in a departure from our usual mandate, we learn through the entirety of the very short daf. Basically, tune in for some wise statements from a few rabbis, including the peace that Torah learning brings to the world. Plus the Hadran itself - please God, we will return to Masekhet Berakhot.
Some wise moral one-liners (no, they're not funny, but they're good). The surge to maintain religious authority from Israel over Babylon. And... the primacy of learning Torah, what else? Also: apologies for audio issues today (we're not sure why it's spotty today)
When one rabbi spies on another -- learning bathroom practices and sexual practices by observation. The true meaning of tzniut (modesty). Also: The theological challenge of King David's punishment.
The yetzer hara and male/female norms of social interaction. And: Rabbi Akiva, his refusal to stop teaching Torah, his capture by the Romans, and his "deathbed" recitation of Shema - and what all that means to us, philosophically and religiously.
The prayers to say when you traverse a city of criminals. The prayers to say when you enter a Roman bathhouse. Plus: Taking a positive stand re any news - framing our experiences, framing our days - anchoring ourselves with prayer.
The cycle of time and how it gives rise to the requirement for new blessings over our experience of the natural world. And "Ha-tov ve-ha-Metiv," redux
A large gathering of Jewish people gets a bracha too. Also: Rav Sheshet and the power of a steely blind gaze. Celebrating the power of the individual in the congregation as a whole.
Sightings in your dreams that indicate miracles coming your way. And the spin that renders dreams positive taken to the extreme. Also: Sixtieths.
Abaye and Rava dream the same dreams, which are consistently interpreted differently in the same way. How can that be? Plus: What it means when Yishmael shows up in your dream. Or when those elephants do.
Witnessing the supernatural. What shortens a person's life? God gives wisdom to the wise. Interpreting dreams, dreams, dreams. NOTE: THIS WAS FIRST RELEASED PRE-EDIT. IT IS FIXED NOW.
The glorious and different 9th chapter: When prayer is in vain. The radical prohibited requirement of greeting people with God's name. Miracles and their blessings. Larger than life, Moshe Rabbenu. Bentsching gomel.
Taking fire from a non-Jew for Havdalah (when is that okay?), and what that means about the dynamic between Jews and non-Jews (or the nature of talmudic exploration). Also: What if you forgot to bentsch?
Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai may have been more argumentative than was strictly necessary, but their disputes populate this daf, with a lot of food for thought. Also: The bat kol, a voice from on high, gets into the debate.
Yalta! Also: 3 things that you can do to prevent a visit from the Angel of Death. And: 10 things pertaining to the proper handling of wine at kiddush.
The Gemara borrows from a foreign field to understand the current topic, in this case: from the impure bed to zimun. Also: How wine becomes wine and stays wine.
Who's Who: The Resh Galuta (Exilarch). And: What is the difference between Birkat HaMazon and prayer?
More on zimun: when a child is eligible. When Yannai left nearly nobody left alive to lead the zimun. And: Finally, the basic texts and structure of Birkat HaMazon . Who's Who: Abaye and Rava (and Rabbah). Yannai and Shimon Ben Shetach. What's What: Kal VaChomer.
Etiquette, as dictated by Halakhah -- we'd still have manners without the Gemara, right? Also: The talmudic category of "am ha-aretz" and its halakhic applications, against the backdrop of our contemporary sensibilities.
Honoring your guests, honoring your betters - who breaks bread for the meal? The Persian banquet and its divans. "Ha-tov ve-ha-metiv" - in and out of context.
Ignorance is not bliss when you don't know the halakhah. Also: The honor of leading is truly an honor. Also: The holy congregation that is formed when 3 people sit down to eat together. What's What: The Meturgaman
A very sweet fruit, eaten in large quantities, and needing a salty fish accompaniment. The intoxicating beauty of the world. Also: Back to some basics, putting in place some building blocks of the past several dapim (Birkat HaMazon, 7 species, etc.).
The personal and the halakhic loss that happens with the death of Rav. Also: The naturalist blessings for all of us in God's perfect world. And: Don't disgrace others or yourself.
Pat HaBa BeKisnin: If you fill up on cakes and cookies and pretzels (snacks and desserts), you may not need to say Birkat HaMazon. You said you had HOW MUCH? You might have to daven as it is. If you fill up, you might need to bentsch after all. And a question a claim that IF this, THEN that -- immediately (what exactly does that entail? Perhaps you know.
The power of HaMotzi. The 7 species and their halakhic meaning in our land, including impurity because of Tzaraat. What's What: Asmakhta
Identifying the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge. Also, how flexible is the formula for blessings? And the very flexible Shehakol blessing. Note: Talking Talmud is now on Facebook.
Also, the story of how two students incurred Bar Kapara's wrath. And: how big an olive?
The careful wording of HaMotzi, and the transformative partnership we recognize from the blessing's allusion to the Exodus from Egypt. Also, Who's Who: Ulla.
What do we do when the a Gemara gets detailed in the different halakhic intricacies on one daf. Plus: Rice and Rabban Gamliel vs. Rabbi Akiva.
Promoting a deep appreciation for the world around us, from time to the land, and the food we eat. Applying the blessings over food. Also: Orlah, the one "land" mitzvah that applies outside of the Land of Israel.
[WE HAVE MUSIC! (Still fine-tuning, literally, but excited to include our theme here)]. Birkat HaNehenin. Plus: tending your fields vs. learning Torah - How should we spend our time in this world? The eternal challenge of finding a balance.
Prayer is not magic. The Messianic Era won't be magic either. Also: Some "chazzan" etiquette. And the powerful need and effect of praying on behalf of others.
Clear demarcations on the expected violence from various specious of wildlife, and the miraculous doings of R. Chanina Ben Dosa in withstanding all that nature. Also: Who's Who/What's What: Anshei Knesset HaGedolah and the institution of Havdalah.
How much are we masters of our own fate? If God influences our actions, do we have free will? To what degree must human beings overcome themselves to reach the Divine?
More on prayer (of course). Giving rebuke even when it turns out that you're wrong (and standing up for yourself!). Also, focus in prayer... And the unsung model of prayer: Daniel.
We begin with location, we continue to constituency, and close with context - the many factors that are designed to drive our focus and intent in prayer. Do they work for you?
The Amidah, its 19th blessing, its abridgement, and the Traveler's Prayer. Also: What's What: Sadducees
The daf we've all been waiting for, with the story Yardaena has been telling us about: Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar Ben Azariah.
Treating one's Torah teacher right.... Buy a watch and you'll know what time to daven!... And that critical evening service.
Our daf finishes the discussion of bodily fluids with some practical details for our day too. And then: Our Shacharit, Mincha, Maariv that replace the Temple sacrifices...or originate with the Patriarchs... Or both!
When the daf is all cases of urine and excrement, we found some important cases of nakedness. Special guest appearance by Maya, aged 4 (listen if you can spot her).
What does it mean that a woman's thigh, voice, and hair are "nakedness"? Is that for always, or is it about Shema? Also: How many people did sleep in the same bed? And: Elevating ourselves above the physical.
When you gotta go... and it gets in the way of your tefilah, not to mention everything else that can too. Also: Tefilin, and why a prostitute shows her face in the beit midrash.
And why are we talking about a ba'al keri anyway - that's not tzanua (modest)?! [Some odd audio issues we can't explain - apologies]
It's the human condition to make mistakes! Also, the renewal of prayer in the collective experience. What's What: Mitzvot in their ideal and "after the fact" (lekhathilah/bedieved). Also, gezarah shavah.
From the "imposter syndrome" of the Amoraim to the women who do positive time-bound commandments to the men who no longer sit outside the mikveh when women go to dunk. Let's just say, our norms shift. Whether they should is a different question.
Personal dignity vs. Halakhah -- which should win? What does halakhah have to say about that? Also some loose ends from daf 18, including an understanding of that difficult story from the graveyard.
Almost everyone who lives long enough experiences the death(s) of close relatives. The Gemara relates to this natural course of events with lessons for the modern era.
A collection of prayers and proverbs by Chazal makes us think about the meaning of each as well as the fact that they are collected, from across time and place, onto the page.
"Real world" halakhah for when you can't do more, and Rabban Gamliel, who always did more anyway.
Who says what in the mishnah on this daf, and why it matters to the Gemara. Also, deafness, then and now.
When you lie down and when you get up, Shema is to be your first and last event of the day. Can we manage that? Also, crafting the text of Shema. And, yes, women and tefilin.
Avram, Avraham! Also: Hello, chapter 2! Do mitzvot need performative intent (kavanah), and if so, which kind?
You misspoke your berakhah - now what? Also introducing our "Who's Who and What's What" segment.
Saying Shema lying down or sitting up, and when what you're learning counts as learning Torah.
It's about humility (always), whether you're avoiding judging people or reaching out to God. Plus Barkhi Nafshi.
Not everyone agreed with R. Shimon Ben Gamliel. The very fact that Halakhah is not a dictatorship is clear in multiple voices of psak. Plus some historical background. NOTE: Correction: Yerushalmi is attributed to R. Yochanan. The Tosefta is attributed to R. Hiyya (you'll hear when you get there)
In the absence of the Temple and its sacrificial ritual, how can we reach God? And can we do it as a group?
When God's traits seem exceedingly human (including how He handles anger), what does it mean to draw near to Him To hold ourselves back?
How many people need to gather for God to grace a group who turn to Him with His Presence? And where?
When bad things happen to good people, is it a punishment? A sign of God's love? A reason to learn Torah? Ah, the incomprehensibility of it all.
Being a leader means you never - always! - having to say you're sorry. Also: redeeming prayer.