jihadica: Recent Episodes
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Since Hamas’s “Operation al-Aqsa Flood” attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the global jihadi movement has been divided over how to respond. While the Islamic State has reiterated its unequivocal stand against Hamas, al-Qaida has staked out a position of nearly unlimited support and sympathy. The contrast could not be starker.
Al-Qaida, however, has a problem in taking this pro-Hamas stand. This is that some of the key jihadi ideologues who have long supported al-Qaida, and who command a certain following within al-Qaida’s global network, are deeply uncomfortable with it. The most noteworthy of these is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), the Palestinian-Jordanian scholar whose many books, essays, and fatwas have profoundly shaped the ideological complexion of the jihadi movement, or “the jihadi current” (al-tayyar al-jihadi) as it is most commonly known in Arabic, going back to the 1980s. Al-Maqdisi has long served as something of the jihadi movement’s ideological standard-bearer, ensuring conformity with Salafi doctrinal principles that emphasize strict monotheism (tawhid) and condemnation and denunciation of all that goes again it, from supplicating saints at tombs to democracy and nationalism and failure to rule by God’s law.
Unlike in previous years when al-Maqdisi used social media accounts and wrote frequently online, over the past year or so his social media usage and his writing have been restricted by the Jordanian authorities. Even so, a number of his messages have appeared online since October 7, and for the most part these have comprised severe criticism of al-Qaida. While al-Maqdisi is not as categorically anti-Hamas as the Islamic State, he has no tolerance for what he sees as al-Qaida’s unprincipled stand of all-out support for the Palestinian militant group, a stand that he sees as representing al-Qaida’s ongoing ideological evolution toward a more generic kind of Islamism. These concerns of al-Maqdisi go to the heart of what al-Qaida is trying to become in the present moment as it repositions itself as the more “moderate” alternative to the Islamic State—and the challenge that this intended makeover entails.
Hamas between al-Qaida and al-Maqdisi
The Islamic State, to reiterate, has nothing positive to say about Hamas whatsoever. Back in January, the Islamic State’s official spokesman urged Hamas to “correct your path,” arguing that its “recent battle in Gaza” was not about “achieving the unity of God and making His word supreme” but rather about “the dirt and the land.” He went on to fault Hamas for failing to implement the Sharia in Gaza and for allying itself with Shiite Iran’s “axis of resistance,” noting that the “expansionary designs” of the “Rejectionists” (i.e., the Shia) are no less a threat to the Muslims than “the conspiracies and enmities of the Jews and the Crusaders.” The only way for Hamas to be worthy of the Islamic State’s support, in other words, was for it to abandon the resistance axis and transform itself into an extension of the Islamic State.
Al-Qaida has also in the past condemned Hamas, but never so severely and never to the point of outright excommunication (takfir). In 2006 al-Qaida’s approach turned negative when Hamas pivoted from being principally a terrorist militia to being a political group as well. That year Hamas participated in the Palestinian legislative elections, and al-Qaida responded by condemning it for participating in these “polytheistic assemblies” and effectively recognizing the Oslo Accords. In 2007 Osama bin Laden famously stated that Hamas had “forsaken their religion.”
Al-Maqdisi was even more critical of Hamas in this period, writing extensively about its perceived transgressions from its embrace of the “polytheistic” religion of democracy to its failure to implement the Sharia in Gaza (after Hamas’s takeover there in 2007) and the nationalism underlying its jihad, among other things. More broadly he critiqued Hamas for not adhering to the correct path or methodology (manhaj), meaning the ideological path associated with the jihadi movement, or Jihadi Salafism, with its emphasis on tawhid and its commitment to overthrowing the “apostate” rulers of the Islamic world.
It was in this context that al-Maqdisi came into conflict with the al-Qaida commander Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (d. 2010), who in a 2009 interview casually stated that “we and Hamas share the same thinking and the same manhaj.” Al-Maqdisi responded with a 20-page rebuttal setting out all the ways in which Hamas did not adhere to “the manhaj of the Jihadi Salafi current” (manhaj al-tayyar al-salafi al-jihadi). Abu al-Yazid duly issued a correction, explaining that he had misspoken (“the phrase was not precise”) and clarifying that al-Qaida’s position is one of distinguishing between the political wing of Hamas, which is deeply flawed, and Hamas’s military wing (i.e., the al-Qassam Brigades), which merits support as mujahidin fighting a shared enemy. Al-Maqdisi has sometimes indicated his agreement with this distinction between the political and the military wings of Hamas, though he has never been entirely comfortable with it. In any event, the episode with Abu al-Yazid demonstrated the kind of ideological authority that al-Maqdisi wielded within al-Qaida circles at this time. In recent years, however, this has changed, with al-Maqdisi finding himself critiquing what he sees as al-Qaida’s ideological drift and al-Qaida only drifting further.
In 2021, for instance, during an earlier round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, al-Maqdisi rebuked al-Qaida’s official media agency, al-Sahab, for its statement mourning the death of a Hamas senior military commander. He framed his criticism as though reflecting the concerns of a great many erstwhile supporters of al-Qaida. “Many mujahid brothers, shaykhs, and preachers,” he wrote,
were displeased by the al-Sahab statement’s exaltation of the al-Qassam leader who was killed in the recent war in Gaza, and they wondered astonishedly: “Are our brothers not aware of the deviation of Hamas and its leadership from the path of tawhid in favor of the path of democracy, and of their alignment with Hizb al-Lat [i.e., Hizbullah] and Bashar [al-Asad] and Iran?” … Has the manhaj changed?! Have the ranks of al-Qaida been penetrated by those who pay no heed to the purity of the manhaj?”
This was a major escalation in al-Maqdisi’s occasional criticism of al-Qaida, which had earlier included reprimanding the group for mourning the late President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt. For the first time, al-Maqdisi had accused al-Qaida of turning its back on the jihadi manhaj that he and others had worked so hard to construct. Al-Qaida was from his perspective trying to remake itself into a more pan-Islamist group that could appeal to the global Muslim community, or umma, more broadly, and this meant dispensing with the jihadi manhaj and all its ideological strictures. Since October 7, al-Maqdisi’s concerns about al-Qaida have only grown greater.
Early reactions
Al-Qaida would waste little time in publishing a statement of support for the Hamas operation. On October 13, the al-Qaida senior leadership, or “general command,” issued a statement titled “But Surely God’s Help is Nigh” (Q. 2:214) in which it hailed the October 7 attack as “one of the most courageous of heroic acts in Islam in this modern time,” and “one of the most important Islamic strides that will lead to the liberation of all the land of Palestine.” Addressing “the knights of Palestine,” the statement declared that “your brothers in al-Qaida, and all the righteous mujahidin worldwide, stand together with you in a single column, in the same trench of battle.” It further called on Muslims around the world to wage jihad against the Jews and their allies, announcing that “we are upon a great transformation in the path of global jihad.”
The October 13 statement was followed at the month’s end by the first essay in a series by Sayf al-‘Adl, al-Qaida’s presumptive leader since the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri in summer 2022. Writing under the pseudonym Salim al-Sharif, al-‘Adl heaped similar praise on the October 7 operation, portraying it as a strategic marvel that heralded the beginning of the end for the Jewish state. Despite the pain and destruction now being visited upon the people of Gaza, he wrote, the operation was nonetheless necessary in order to achieve the ultimate objective of driving the Jews from Palestine. It would further have the effect of lifting the morale of the umma and of the Muslims of the Middle East in particular, leading them “to revolt against their kings and emirs and presidents” who had done nothing over the years to restore Muslim rule in Palestine. With these two statements, al-Qaida was practically claiming October 7 as its own, portraying the attack as both a part of and in furtherance of al-Qaida’s jihad against the standing regimes of the Middle East.
Al-Maqdisi’s initial reaction was somewhat out of character. Rather than polemicizing against Hamas, he counseled restraint in condemning it at this sensitive time. In a comment relayed via Telegram on October 12, he expressed exasperation at receiving numerous inquiries about his earlier writings concerning Hamas. “I have been troubled by the brothers’ repeated questioning concerning our previous well-known statements about Hamas at this time,” he wrote, suggesting that this was not the moment for dredging up this material. At the present time, he continued, “it is obligatory to work to support Gaza and its people by any means possible, by the hand and by the tongue and by beseeching God to support the people of Gaza over the nations of unbelief who have rallied against them,” and it is further obligatory “to avoid all that might be seen as forsaking [the people of Gaza] at this time.” This moratorium on Hamas-bashing was bound to be brief.
Al-Maqdisi’s next comments on Hamas came in an issue of the jihadi magazine al-Mahajja, which appeared on November 6. In his article, titled “Proud Gaza and the al-Aqsa Flood: Studies and Lessons,” he began by praising October 7, saying that “there is no believer of true faith in this world who did not feel joy at the al-Aqsa Flood operation.” Yet this praise soon was shown to be backhanded, as in the very same paragraph al-Maqdisi described Hamas’s jihad as “marked by corruption” as he pondered “what would be the case were it a jihad in the path of God and in the path of applying His law on earth, as our Lord wishes and desires?” From here he proceeded to reaffirm his earlier criticisms “of the deviations of Hamas and its government,” saying that no military operation, no matter how great, can erase these transgressions. “The crime of neglecting the Sharia,” he wrote,
is not erased but by applying it; the sin of democracy is not erased but by dissociating from it; the veneration and adulation of the worst Rejectionist criminals and the showing of loyalty to the murderers of the Sunnis such as [Qasim] Sulaymani and his state and their satanic ayatollahs are not erased but by dissociating from them; and the praising and burnishing of Bashar [al-Asad], murderer of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, rapist of women, and destroyer of lands and persons, are not erased but by dissociating from him and his criminal regime.
Al-Maqdisi went on to note that it was the Hamas government that had instituted a “truce” with Israel in the first place, stifling the efforts of the smaller militant groups in Gaza, including the “Jihadi Salafi” ones, from making war on the Jewish state.
Here was al-Maqdisi returning to form. Whatever reservations he had about criticizing Hamas in the immediate aftermath of October 7 were gone. As al-Maqdisi announced of himself:
I am not one who is deceived by that which is not real, who goes out beating the drum for Hamas and dressing it up and beautifying it, with all its vices and faults, because of a raid it successfully carried out. In this way are people misled and their creed diluted. A great many shaykhs and groups have ridden the wave of this flood such that they have nearly drowned their followers in the misconceptions of innovative groups and ensnared them in contradictions! As if all the grave offenses that the Hamas government has committed and continues to commit are excused so long as it is fighting Jews! As if fighting Jews has become an impediment to condemnation and to takfir!
The criticism of certain unspecified “shaykhs” and “groups” here no doubt encompassed al-Qaida with its statement of unqualified pro-Hamas sentiment.
Al-Maqdisi’s frustration with al-Qaida became even clearer in his next public remarks concerning Hamas. In this brief commentary, relayed via Telegram on November 15, he argued that there was a major difference between calling on God to support a flawed Islamic group such as Hamas and “misleading the umma” by endorsing it and exaggerating its merits. The former was perfectly in accordance with the Sharia, but the latter was not. Indeed, to take the latter course was “to destroy all that we have built before of doctrinal fortresses examining the deviation of those who fight in the path of democracy and rule by manmade laws.” “What the jihadi organizations and shaykhs are doing today,” he continued, naming al-Qaida, “is precisely this destruction and annihilation of the edifice that they had previously erected,” a structure that was built to show “the falsity of democracy and the blameworthiness of governments that refuse to apply the Sharia.” Al-Qaida and certain unnamed scholars, al-Maqdisi was thus saying, were “misleading the umma” and “destroying” the ideological edifice of Jihadi Salafism. This was heavy criticism indeed.
“Don’t ride a wave that isn’t yours”
It was not till early January 2024 that al-Maqdisi’s next words concerning al-Qaida and Hamas appeared online. What seems to have prompted him to write at this stage was the release by al-Qaida the previous month of a short video featuring footage of Hamas fighters squaring off against Israeli forces. The video, based on an earlier newsletter from November, urged Muslims to join the battle alongside “the heroes” of October 7 by waging jihad against the “Zionist” Arab regimes of the Middle East, in particular “Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon.” Once again, al-Qaida was presenting Hamas’s war on Israel and the regional agenda of al-Qaida as part of the same general jihad. Another al-Qaida media product from December did even more to portray Hamas and al-Qaida as being in perfect alignment. This was a newsletter released at the end of the month presenting the “the blessed al-Aqsa Flood operation” as the successor to 9/11, and predicting that this “the second September 11” would inevitably lead to “the third September 11.” Notably, the newsletter suggested that the perpetrators of this third 9/11 might even be “non-Muslims,” given how widespread the anger at America in the West had become.
These attempts by al-Qaida to blur the distinction between Hamas’s and al-Qaida’s strategic agendas did not sit well with al-Maqdisi. In an essay published on Justpaste.it on January 8 and shared by followers on X and Telegram, he warned al-Qaida against trying to insert itself into a war it had no business being a part of. Hamas, he explained, “adheres to a Muslim Brotherhood, Islamo-democratic manhaj, it rules according to manmade laws, and it does not fight to establish God’s law!” Implicitly addressing al-Qaida, only later identified by name, he wrote, “You are simply not a part of its [Hamas’s] direction … [and] you haven’t the least participation or say in its vital decisions.” Indeed, Hamas could end this war at any time on the orders of its foreign patrons and without consulting you. The Hamas leadership “disagrees with you in the foundations of belief (usul), not just in the branches (furu‘). You and they are not aligned either in direction or in means or in objectives.” The “Rejectionists” of Iran and Hezbollah are the more natural allies of them. “Therefore,” he concluded, “your enthusiasm for them [Hamas], and your words and your statements about them, as though you are speaking on their behalf, is to be considered fake wailing. Truly, your drumbeating for them without concern for their methodology is a mixture of stupidity and naiveté and foolishness.”
It was at this point that al-Maqdisi finally mentioned al-Qaida by name, noting the fact that it
has begun to draw in its videos from the videos of Hamas’s fighters in order to talk about the global jihad that the Hamas of the Resistance dissociates from, and indeed considers to be terrorism, or to incite through the clips of the al-Qassam fighters against idolatrous rulers and regimes that Hamas is loyal to in the first place! … So long as you have wasted the milk in the summer and have not prepared for this day in terms of men and capabilities and damaging targets, then don’t ride a wave that isn’t yours, and don’t beat the drum and dance to songs that don’t suit you.
Not only was al-Maqdisi calling out al-Qaida’s “stupidity and naiveté and foolishness” in showering praise on Hamas and misrepresenting its loyalties and strategic aims, but he was also calling out al-Qaida’s irrelevance on the Palestinian scene, as an actor that had not mobilized and prepared for battle there. Simply put, this attempt at annexing Hamas’s war with Israel to al-Qaida’s global jihad was disingenuous nonsense.
This was not to say that the only appropriate course of action was for al-Qaida, or other jihadis, to sit the war in Gaza out. But to the extent that one participated, al-Maqdisi counseled, one ought to have a clear-eyed view of what Hamas is and where one fits within the Hamas-dominated battle. “In the event that you must participate,” he wrote, “then participate as one who has become involved in a battle over which one exercises no control, but in which one sees a benefit for the Muslims and through which one aspires to an awakening of the umma and an igniting of the burning coal of jihad.” In other words, participation in Hamas’s jihad against Israel was allowed, but only participation in a supporting role aimed at “an awakening of the umma.”
This was not the only comment by al-Maqdisi to appear on January 8. A second essay, titled “The Spittle of the Stricken One,” also circulated on Telegram that day, though initially without attribution to al-Maqdisi—indeed with a deliberate attempt to mislead as to his authorship by referring to him in the third person. The writing, however, was unmistakably al-Maqdisi’s, and the attribution was soon clarified when reposted by a follower days later. Here al-Maqdisi presented the current controversy surrounding Hamas as the third “tribulation” (fitna) to afflict the jihadi movement in a series of fitnas beginning with that of the Islamic State (too extreme) and that of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (too lax). He reminded readers of what Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had said about Hamas’s deviations and pointed to his own older statements as well, asserting that Hamas is still Hamas—“a deviant and innovative nationalist group.” “We can take pleasure in their fighting the Jews,” he wrote, “just as we take pleasure in any innovative group’s fighting the Jews, but without endorsing it and deceiving and misleading people concerning its manhaj.” Rehashing many of the criticisms in the previous essay from the same day, al-Maqdisi concluded with the following admonition: “Do not mislead the umma, do not forsake your principles, and do not turn away from your manhaj or corrupt your compass!” These words, one can safely assume, were directed first and foremost at al-Qaida.
Dr. Tariq and al-Qaida’s “end”
Since January, no new writings by al-Maqdisi have appeared online, even as al-Qaida has continued to release statements and essays supportive of Hamas. Al-Maqdisi’s criticisms of al-Qaida, however, continue to circulate and reverberate on jihadi Telegram, and other ideologues of his ilk have made similar al-Qaida-critical comments. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is the Canadian-based Egyptian jihadi ideologue Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim (b. 1948).
In April, Tariq, who holds a Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Birmingham, called attentiom to a statement issued by al-Qaida on April 22 offering condolences for Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau in Qatar, on the death of several of his children and grandchildren in an Israeli strike in Gaza. This statement seemed to be a departure from al-Qaida’s previous stance of distinguishing between Hamas’s political and military wings, as here it was saluting Hamas’s political leader as “the honorable shaykh”—twice.
On April 24, Tariq re-published al-Maqdisi’s essay “The Spittle of the Stricken One” on his Telegram channel, preceded by the words “The statement of the Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” as if to suggest that this was a response to al-Qaida. Minutes later, Tariq offered some critical commentary of his own, lamenting al-Qaida’s descent into ideological disorder and organizational impotence. “There is no doubt that al-Qaida,” he wrote, “following the martyrdom of its two pioneers,” meaning Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, “has passed into a state of manifest instability, confusion, and waywardness, as is perhaps apparent in its recent statement concerning the family members of Ismail Haniyeh who were assassinated by the hand of Zionist treachery.” Without elaborating, he attributed this “drumbeating” by al-Qaida for Hamas to Sayf al-‘Adl’s father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, whom he described as carrying on close relations with Iran (where he and al-‘Adl both reside) and as the one in control of the al-Sahab media agency. As for al-Qaida’s health as an organization with real-world influence, Tariq offered a grim prognosis: “Perhaps the organization’s role on the ground has come to an end with the demise of its two pioneers.”
Surely al-‘Adl and his colleagues in the al-Qaida leadership see things differently. For them it is the exclusivist ideology promoted by the likes of Tariq and al-Maqdisi that has run its course, not al-Qaida. In the present global environment, which is witnessing an unprecedented spike in anti-American sentiment driven by Washington’s continued support for Israel, the optimal course is to put exclusivist ideology aside and to unite the umma around al-Qaida’s strategy of attacking the United States as the source of the Islamic world’s ills.
Whether al-Qaida is wisely repositioning itself for future success, or whether its self-transformation reflects profound confusion and impotence, is a question that can only be answered in time. The U.S. intelligence community has been adamant that al-Qaida, at least in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is at its weakest point in decades and is unlikely to see a revival. That assessment would seem to support Tariq’s view that al-Qaida central may well have reached its end point as a force on the ground.
In any event, what is clear beyond doubt is that al-Qaida’s pan-Islamic turn has grown increasingly visible since October 7, alienating some of the organization’s big-name scholarly proponents as never before. The controversy over Hamas and al-Qaida points to a crisis of identity on the non-Islamic State side of the global jihadi movement.
In the first article in this series, we saw how in 2004 al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” Abu al-Faraj al-Libi engineered an alliance with Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s Iraq-based group. Acting on behalf of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Libi met with al-Zarqawi’s emissary Abu Ja‘far al-Iraqi in mid-2004 to discuss the “reality of the situation” in Iraq and negotiate a merger. It was during this meeting that the deal was sealed between the two organizations: al-Libi told Abu Ja‘far that “the subject of the allegiance, God willing, has been completed”, leaving only technicalities to be worked out. After several months of subsequent secret messages between Pakistan and Iraq, a public communiqué released on October 17, 2004 announced that al-Zarqawi’s group was now operating under al-Qa‘ida’s umbrella. Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq was born.
During these months of negotiations, al-Libi had been in charge of carrying out the talks with al-Zarqawi and his group on behalf of al-Qa‘ida. Yet, al-Libi still had to report and answer to his two bosses, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Given that Bin Ladin was particularly difficult to contact at this time, al-Libi turned to al-Zawahiri for guidance during the process, even as he chose to ignore some of al-Zawahiri’s concerns, including the latter’s disapproval of al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda. However, the Libyan would eventually brief Bin Ladin about all the details of the negotiation, including the correspondence with al-Zarqawi’s group, in a message written a day after the merger was proclaimed.
Al-Libi’s letter to Bin Ladin, the most detailed account of the negotiation process that we have, was discussed in the first installment of this series. What remains to be addressed here is the subsequent reactions of the top two al-Qa‘ida leaders, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, to the merger. Once again, the Abbottabad files offer insights. On October 20, 2004, al-Zawahiri penned a missive to Bin Ladin—saved as “Risala li-l-Hizbar” (Letter to the Lion) in Bin Ladin’s archives—in which he provided his account of the merger and outlined the internal divisions al-Qa‘ida was facing as it came to terms with al-Zarqawi. Nearly two months later, on December 9, 2004, Bin Ladin responded to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s letters in a message to which he attached several other documents.
Al-Qa‘ida’s Internal Squabbles
In his message to Bin Ladin, Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was clearly concerned by the upcoming dispatch of al-Qa‘ida’s senior military leader, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, to al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. Al-Libi portrayed al-Iraqi as a divisive figure at the heart of “the problems” al-Qa‘ida was going through at the time, noting that some within the Waziristan-based jihadi milieu pointed to al-Iraqi to justify not allying with Bin Ladin’s men. According to al-Libi, these internal tensions had “significantly decreased” with the Egyptian Khalid al-Habib taking over al-Qa‘ida’s military affairs portfolio from al-Iraqi and the popular field commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi joining forces with the organization in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
Al-Zawahiri’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin substantiates al-Libi’s account about the organization’s internal squabbles, admitting that “some problems” were persisting within its senior ranks, including with al-Iraqi. “The affairs of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] have been in a state of struggle, as he has admitted to me”, al-Zawahiri writes, pointing to the “problems” and “conflict” between the Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id al-Misri (“al-Qari”), a founding member of al-Qa‘ida who would later become its general manager. “Each of them is complaining to me, but I am far away and all I can do is send letters at infrequent intervals”, al-Zawahiri laments. As is apparent from the letter, al-Iraqi was also quarreling with Hamza al-Jawfi, a senior Egyptian explosives trainer and weapons supplier whose strained relations with al-Iraqi had led him to stop working with al-Qa‘ida. Al-Jawfi, al-Zawahiri explained, “claimed that the problem was with ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] and that he was waiting for his departure” before going back to the fold. With al-Iraqi’s demotion, al-Jawfi expressed “his commitment” to resuming his cooperation with al-Qa‘ida.
For al-Zawahiri, however, it was al-Libi, not al-Iraqi, who was the primary troublemaker in al-Qa‘ida’s hierarchy. “Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] has been reckless and has exposed himself to hazards repeatedly”, al-Zawahiri wrote to Bin Ladin, adding that al-Libi had “caused a large problem with his continued absence that is nearly constant” as the Libyan “moves about frequently”. Over the past year, al-Libi had been mainly based in Abbottabad inside Pakistan while al-Iraqi and the bulk of al-Qa‘ida’s leaders operated from South Waziristan in Pakistan’s tribal areas. “I emphasized to Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] that he must stick close to the location of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi]”, al-Zawahiri stated, “because his leaving is dangerous and could lead to numerous problems”. Yet, “neither giving advice nor giving direct orders has diverted him from his path”, he complained. The Libyan’s “continued absence” ended up leaving “affairs and responsibilities unclear” and “things proceeding in an undisciplined manner” inside al-Qa’ida, notably causing the “conflict” between al-Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id. “I have exhausted all avenues with Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi]”, al-Zawahiri lamented, urging Bin Ladin to “issue a clear order to him [i.e., al-Libi] that he keep to a reliable location, such as the locations of ‘Abd al-Hadi, and leave the cities”, as staying inside urban Pakistani areas was deemed too dangerous.
Mindful of his lieutenants’ grievances, Bin Ladin authored a seven-page document saved as “al-Shura” (Consultation), which he attached to his December 2004 letter. An updated version of a missive written “a long time ago”, the “al-Shura” document aimed at resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal turmoil by charting a framework regulating command-and-control and duties within the organization. In setting all this out, Bin Ladin firmly stood by his decision to appoint al-Libi as al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” and reaffirmed his confidence in his young Libyan commander. “I consider you apt to manage the work under these circumstances”,Bin Ladin assured al-Libi, adding that the latter should not be “embarrassed because of the other brothers who had previous experience in the jihad or are older than he is”. Well-aware of the criticism around al-Libi’s leadership, Bin Ladin wanted to make very clear to the “senior brothers” in the Af-Pak region that “the author of these lines [i.e., Bin Ladin] is the one who appointed Tawfiq [i.e., al-Libi] as the overall head for all the al-Qa‘ida brothers”, thereby making al-Libi “the most senior official in the [Af-Pak] area”.
On the other hand, Bin Ladin took al-Zawahiri’s admonishment of al-Libi’s operational security recklessness very seriously. Consequently, the leader of al-Qa‘ida, in one of the attachments to his main letter, directed al-Libi to undertake his activities “using letters and very few couriers” and to “refrain from moving around unless there is a dire need [to do so]”, underlining that this was “an obligatory order and is not subject to discussion”. Further, in his “al-Shura” document, Bin Ladin reminded his Libyan lieutenant that his critics were not nobodies, advising him to “always remember that the respected brothers whose names were mentioned have good past experiences in the jihad”. The al-Qa‘ida leader went on to praise al-Zawahiri as “the cream of the crop of what was left from the mujahidin during these past decades” and instructed al-Libi to “increase your consultation with him and take his opinion, in addition to the fact that he is the deputy of the overall emir”. As for the “virtuous” Shaykh Sa‘id, another player in the group’s discord, Bin Ladin suggested that, “if possible”, al-Libi should “make friends with him, without him trespassing your privileges”. In sum, Bin Ladin wanted al-Libi to play ball for the organization’s sake by getting along with the other leaders. At the same time, Bin Ladin instructed him, “go forward and do not look back and do not hesitate, even if some people would talk [negatively] about you”.
With regard to the contentious case of al al-Iraqi, Bin Ladin weighed in in favor of his detractors, headed by al-Libi, whose complaints had been voiced in the Libyan’s October 2004 letter. First, Bin Ladin validated al-Libi’s decision to demote al-Iraqi as al-Qa‘ida’s military leader. He initially considered replacing the Iraqi with Abu ‘Ubayda al-Misri, a veteran military figure who was then leading al-Qa‘ida’s operations in Kunar, as he was “proven [in our eyes]”, while Khalid al-Habib would become “a trainer or an administrator, assuring the preparations of the brothers”. Eventually though, “we learned you had appointed brother Khalid al-Habib [as] the military emir”, Bin Ladin wrote to al-Libi, essentially endorsing the Libyan’s choice by confirming al-Habib as the new military leader “for a period of a year from his being given the assignment”.
Also, Bin Ladin sided with al-Libi regarding al-Iraqi’s relocation to Iraq. As we saw in the first article in this series, the leader of al-Qa‘ida initially favored dispatching al-Iraqi to Iraq. Yet, he changed his mind after learning that this move was causing concerns and was opposed by numerous top al-Qa‘ida figures, including al-Libi and al-Habib. As a result, Bin Ladin recommended in his December 2004 letter that al-Iraqi “delay his travel at this stage”. Instead, the Iraqi commander should “be assigned the file of al-Tanbul [the short] if that is possible, or whatever you see fit”. “Al-Tanbul” possibly refers to al-Zarqawi, especially given that al-Iraqi continued to work as a liaison to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq after 2004 (more on this in the next installment in this series).
The Al-Rabi‘a-Al-Zarqawi Nexus
Besides backing al-Libi on the al-Iraqi issue, Bin Ladin also rallied behind the Libyan’s proposal concerning al-Qa‘ida’s external operations. Earlier, al-Libi had recommended to Bin Ladin that the group “transfer the external work department to Iraq” by sending there Hamza al-Rabi‘a, the external wing’s head, or Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, al-Qa‘ida’s best bombmaker, “or both of them”. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin sanctioned the “transfer” of al-Rabi‘a to Iraq. He noted that “it is fine for him to travel alone”, hence implying that he did not see the presence of al-Muhajir as necessary.
Bin Ladin further advised that before traveling al-Rabi‘a should first reach out to and coordinate with al-Zarqawi to obtain “reassurance regarding the security of the road” between Pakistan and Iraq. The leader of al-Qa‘ida also wanted al-Rabi‘a to explain to al-Zarqawi the purpose of the mission at hand, namely to “form an independent apparatus to carry out external operations” from Iraq so as to capitalize on the numerous foreign fighters there who could easily travel abroad to mount these attacks. Al-Rabi‘a was also told that before setting off he ought to brief al-Zarqawi on external operations by sending the latter a message “comprising [information on] our previous experiences in this work”, with a focus on the “conditions necessary to be met” for would-be operatives. In doing so, Bin Ladin reasoned, al-Rabi‘a would not be starting from scratch if he managed to get to Iraq as al-Zarqawi would already be working on global attacks; on the other hand, if al-Rabi‘a were unable to travel, then external plotting would still continue from Iraq.
Bin Ladin attached a document to his December 2004 letter specifying the joint mission on which al-Rabi‘a and al-Zarqawi ought to cooperate. In it, the leader of al-Qa‘ida stipulated that, among their top priorities, the two should focus on planning attacks in the U.S., especially in “the states which elected [George W.] Bush, starting with Florida and Ohio and Texas”. Indeed, Bin Ladin seemed inclined to spare the states that did not vote for Bush, stipulating that there should be “some kind of security [guarantee] for them” and that al-Qa’ida should “issue a special message clarifying their status”. This echoes the conclusion of a public video by Bin Ladin released earlier in October 2004 in which he stated that “every [American] state that doesn’t play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own security”.
Another Abbottabad file indicates that Bin Ladin’s instructions were then communicated to al-Zarqawi. In a draft of a statement entitled “The America Speech”, Bin Ladin refuted the notion that al-Qa‘ida’s international attacks had waned and gloated that the war in Iraq had even strengthened the organization’s “military wing responsible for operations against America”. To further his point, he announced that “we have asked our brother … Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to establish another wing there [i.e., in Iraq], for recruiting those energies qualified to operate against America and its allies”. He went on to threaten that “the best witness of the success of this wing will be the operations undertaken in the capitals of Europe”, mentioning the 7/7 London bombings as the wing’s latest success. Lastly, while Bin Ladin acknowledged that “no operations have occurred in America recently”, he claimed that it was not because of the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts but the “result of some mistakes committed by some of the brothers in Pakistan [who] were discovered by … the apostate Pervez [Musharraf]”. The al-Qa‘ida leader nonetheless warned the U.S.: “what will come to you all is the most bitter thing you will have tasted … And the results will come … when the preparations are completed”.
It is worth noting that Bin Ladin’s December 2004 letter, the attached document threatening the states that voted for Bush and “The America Speech” all corroborate claims by U.S. intelligence back in 2007 that the leader of al-Qa‘ida had asked al-Rabi‘a “to send Zarqawi a briefing on al Qaeda’s external operations, including information about operations against the American homeland”. The same intelligence sources reported that Bin Ladin had also “tasked [al-Zarqawi] with forming a cell to conduct terrorist attacks outside of Iraq” and that he had “emphasized that America should be Zarqawi’s number one priority in terms of foreign attacks”. It is most likely that al-Libi was the one who transmitted Bin Ladin’s directives to al-Zarqawi, as the Libyan is reported to have called on al-Zarqawi “to target U.S. interests outside of Iraq”. The same U.S. intelligence sources added that al-Zarqawi had “welcomed this direction and claimed he had already come up with some good proposals”.
On January 19, 2006, al-Jazira broadcasted a new audio statement from Bin Ladin, who had not been heard in the media for a year. Entitled “A Message to the American People: The Way to End the War”, this message was a heavily edited version of “The America Speech” in which the leader of al-Qa‘ida was far less candid about his group’s planning for international attacks. The public address made no mention of the “external wing” or the nexus with al-Zarqawi in Iraq and instead remarked that “Iraq has become a point of attraction and recruitment for qualified forces”. Bin Ladin also chose not to evoke the “mistakes … of the brothers in Pakistan” to explain al-Qa‘ida’s failure to strike inside the U.S., rephrasing the passage as follows: “As for the delay in the occurrence of similar operations in America, it is not because of the impossibility of penetrating your security arrangements, but rather, operations are in preparation and you shall see them on your own soil when they are completed”. Finally, Bin Ladin did not issue threats against Europe, contenting himself to celebrate the achievements of “the mujahidin … as evidenced by what you have seen in terms of bombings in the capitals of the most important European States”, referring to the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005.
Al-Zawahiri’s “Glad Tidings”
In his October 2004 letter, al-Zawahiri recounted to Bin Ladin that two days earlier, he had heard “the glad tidings” in the media: al-Zarqawi had declared his allegiance to Bin Ladin and “urged the umma to unite against the Crusaders and the Jews”. The news had been reported by newspapers such as al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Quds and Radio America (in Pashto) but was “completely ignored” by the BBC, despite the latter “filling its bulletins with a lot of rubbish!!”, al-Zawahiri fumed.
Al-Zawahiri went on to narrate the negotiation process between al-Qa‘ida and al-Zarqawi’s group, citing details that largely match those of al-Libi’s version. Before the merger, al-Zawahiri wrote, al-Libi had “sent [me] a message about the conditions of Iraq”. The main points of this message were that the “mujahidin” were thriving as they “controlled large areas” of Iraq, were well-resourced and had “hundreds” of recruits coming “from the neighboring countries”; that they were “about to form a unified group” that would include “most of those working on behalf of the jihad”; that they were planning “large-scale operations in neighboring countries”; that they had begun targeting the Shi‘a only after the Badr Corps started attacking “the Sunnis and their scholars”; and that after they had asked to swear allegiance to Bin Ladin, al-Libi told them to go ahead with the oath of allegiance, saying he would reach out to al-Zawahiri “to speed up the matter”. Al-Libi then “requested the approval of Abu Fatima [i.e., al-Zawahiri] with brief directives”, which would be followed by more detailed guidance at a later time.
It is worth noting here that al-Zawahiri’s letter helps to clarify al-Zarqawi’s rationale for joining al-Qa’ida, something which was missing in al-Libi’s letter. In discussing al-Zarqawi’s eagerness to pledge allegiance, al-Zawahiri specified that the Jordanian’s group initially showed “some hesitancy as concerns [Bin Ladin’s] forbearing from fighting the client rulers” but that Bin Ladin’s most recent message had “reassured” them. Although not more explicit, this passage echoes the account of a member of al-Zarqawi’s group who related that al-Zarqawi used to see al-Qa‘ida as “soft” on “the apostate rulers – especially the Saudis – and their armies” and had thus refused to join al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, Bin Ladin “explicitly declared the obligation to fight [the Saudi regime] in some of his addresses” and “the obstacles preventing the unification … were thereby removed”. It thus appears that it was the post-911 takfiri friendly agenda embraced by al-Qa‘ida that “reassured” al-Zarqawi and prompted him to join forces with an organization he saw as previously not adhering to the “correct” methodology.
Based on his understanding of Bin Ladin’s policy, al-Zawahiri sent a response to al-Libi urging al-Zarqawi’s group to “prepare immediately to announce the bay‘a”. He added that the oath “should not be in the name of a person”, namely al-Zarqawi, but rather on behalf “of the collectivity of the mujahidin in Iraq”. Al-Zawahiri’s message also addressed the scope of jihad for al-Zarqawi’s group: the Jordanian’s men should “stop working against the Shi‘a” and “postpone activity against the client rulers at the present time, so that their efforts are not scattered across two fronts given that we are now in the stage of mobilizing the umma for jihad”. Nonetheless, he added, “confronting the client rulers will eventually come, God willing, and victory will not be achieved without it”. As mentioned earlier, al-Libi withheld some of these instructions from al-Zarqawi’s group. While al-Libi notified Bin Ladin about this, none of the files I’ve reviewed indicates that al-Zawahiri was informed about this.
Bin Ladin’s Guidelines
In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin rejoiced over the news of al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a, saying that it pleased him greatly and describing it as “great and promising”. The leader of al-Qa‘ida urged al-Zawahiri and al-Libi to “pay close attention to this event” as it was “a major step toward unifying the efforts of the mujahidin … not only in Iraq, but in the whole region”. In view of the fact that unity among Muslims is “one of the most obligatory of legal duties”, Bin Ladin wanted his two lieutenants “to ask the brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to urge the other mujahid groups in Iraq and its environs to unite their efforts with him”, adding that al-Zawahiri and Abu al-Layth al-Libi should issue public messages calling for unity among the elements of the Iraqi insurgency. Bin Ladin also suggested publicizing the additions to al-Zarqawi’s group, even the “small” ones, as doing so would “raise the morale of Muslims and increase their interest and support for the mujahidin”. Bin Ladin commented on the rest of the Iraqi insurgency by stating that the Islamic Party and Ansar al-Sunna “should be encouraged and supported” in their operations.
As explained in the first installment in this series, al-Zarqawi and al-Libi wanted Bin Ladin to deliver a public pronouncement endorsing the Jordanian’s group, inciting the militants in Iraq and the Levant to rally behind it and “encourag[ing] the youth there” as they were in the midst of heavy military pressure from the U.S. in Fallujah. Following al-Libi’s and al-Zarqawi’s advice, Bin Ladin recorded an audio addressed to “the Muslim brothers in Iraq in particular and the umma in general” in which he lauded “the free people in the land of al-Anbar, particularly the residents of the heroic city of al-Fallujah” who were giving “an example of steadfastness for others in the face of U.S. barbarism”.
More importantly, the statement formally sanctioned the bay‘a of “the dignified brother” al-Zarqawi and his group. “We, in the al-Qa‘ida organization, warmly welcome their union with us”, Bin Ladin said, emphasizing that “this is a great step toward rendering successful the efforts of the mujahidin to establish [an Islamic state]”. He further stressed that “it should be known that the mujahid brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi is the emir of al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Two Rivers [i.e., al-Qa‘ida in Iraq]” and that “the brothers in the group there should heed his orders and obey him”. Bin Ladin also encouraged others in the jihadi landscape in Iraq to come together under al-Zarqawi’s leadership, stating that “the mujahid groups [there] ought to coordinate amongst themselves in order to unite their ranks under one banner”.
Bin Ladin’s audio advocated broad mobilization for fighting in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world where “the Crusader-Zionist coalition” was seeking to subjugate the umma, including Afghanistan and Palestine. “The most important and serious issue today,” he explained, “is this Third World War”. In these circumstances, jihad was an “individual duty” (fard ‘ayn) on every member of the Muslim umma, who “are required to devote of their resources, sons and wealth what is sufficient for fighting the unbelievers and driving them out of their lands”. Adopting a more takfiri rhetoric more in tune with al-Zarqawi’s thinking, Bin Ladin also touched on “a number of the most important and serious legal judgments” concerning those who refrain from supporting this jihad. The first pertained to “those who support the unbelievers against the Muslims”. According to Bin Ladin, “giving support to America or [Ayad] Allawi’s apostate government … in any way whatsoever … is greater unbelief that expels one from the community”. This included “the owners of companies and the workers who transport fuel, ammunition, food supplies and any other needs”. All these “have apostatized from the religion and it is necessary to fight them”. In the same vein, he stated that “those Iraqis … who belong to Allawi’s apostate government, such as members of the Army, the security agencies and the National Guard … their blood is licit”. The second issue was about “participation in the upcoming elections” in Iraq. Given that the Iraqi constitution was “a constitution of unbelief” and that the elections “will be held upon America’s orders”, Bin Ladin maintained that “if anyone participates in [these elections] knowingly and willingly, he will have rejected God”.
In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin had advised that al-Zarqawi’s men “focus [their] operations against the Americans, their allies and the apostate government of Allawi”, arguing that “undoubtedly, they have the right to defend themselves and their brothers against any force wanting to harm them”. Similarly, the audio praised al-Zarqawi’s jihad in Iraq, highlighting the “daring operations against the Americans and Allawi’s apostate government”. Yet, the leader of al-Qa‘ida also argued that the “mujahidin” should “beware the shedding of innocent blood, except for what the law permits, such as in the case of people being used as shields (tatarrus), without going to excess”, a likely reference to the numerous Iraqi civilians killed in jihadi bombings in Iraq. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin also recommended that al-Zarqawi’s group “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”, which is almost certainly a reference to delaying an all-out war against the Shi‘a in Iraq.
Epilogue
In addition to the one on Iraq, Bin Ladin would record an additional audio statement in late 2004 focusing on the Arabian Peninsula. These two files as well as the other documents cited in this article, including Bin Ladin’s operational security directives to al-Libi, were all supposed to be sent together as a response to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages from October 2004. But as another document from the Abbottabad files suggests, Bin Ladin’s effort to reach out to his two deputies failed, at least initially.
This document is a letter addressed to al-Libi (“Wakil Sahib”) signed by a certain “Jaragh al-Din”. Clues from this missive and from al-Libi’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin indicate that Jaragh al-Din was part of Bin Ladin’s inner circle, living with or in close proximity to the leader of al-Qa‘ida in Haripur and transmitting the latter’s messages to his aides. In his October 2004 letter, al-Libi asked Bin Ladin “to permit brother Ahmad … to meet with us” so that “we can introduce him to at least one or two new brothers … so that you might benefit from us regarding sending communications”. Al-Libi also told Bin Ladin that “we can take advantage of the meeting to teach the brother some of the new means of encryption that we have”. In his letter to al-Libi, Jaragh al-Din wrote: “as for your request to meet with me, I would love to see you … but the Professor [i.e., Bin Ladin] would like us to arrange the meeting at a later time and also would like the study of encryption … to take place via correspondence”. These excerpts show that Jaragh al-Din and Ahmad were one and the same and that he was part of Bin Ladin’s courier network. Given his profile, it is possible that “Ahmad” is just short for the infamous Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who would end up being killed along with “the Professor” during the Abbottabad raid.
In any event, Jaragh al-Din’s letter to al-Libi reveals that the files Bin Ladin produced in late 2004, from the “al-Shura” document to the audio statements on Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, “were lost with Salih”. Together with a certain “Hassan”, Salih was one of “the two current lines” in al-Qa‘ida’s courier network on the receiving end of the correspondence from Bin Ladin at the time. Although the circumstances of the losses were not explained, in his letter to Bin Ladin al-Libi had warned that “the two current lines” were “overstretched” and “not safe on account of the extent of the demand on them” inside the organization.
Eventually though, Bin Ladin’s files reached their intended recipients. In his December 2004 letter, he notified al-Libi that he wanted the audio about the Arabian Peninsula to be released first, either on December 14 or 15, as there was an unspecified “interest related to this date”. If that was not possible, he continued, then the Iraq audio should be released before the Arabian Peninsula speech. Jaragh al-Din instructed al-Libi to “find a secure path” for “the two audio messages” to be released on “the internet” as “we do not think they will be published in their entirety in the media”. He asked the Libyan to “give a copy of them to al-Zarqawi’s representative if he visits you” so that the “important legal judgments” contained in these “messages” could be disseminated in Iraq.
On December 16, Bin Ladin’s Arabian Peninsula audio address was released on jihadi forums, the same day that anti-monarchy protests were planned in Riyadh and Jeddah at the initiative of the Saudi Islamist Sa‘d al-Faqih. Eleven days later, on December 27, the Iraq audio was released.
Reflections
When al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a to Bin Ladin was announced on October 17, 2004, the communiqué noted that “our most generous brothers in al-Qa‘ida came to understand the strategy of [our group], and their hearts warmed to its methodology”. Here, al-Zarqawi was signaling that, while nominally under Bin Ladin’s leadership, it was his “strategy” and “methodology” that Bin Ladin was agreeing to sign up for, and not the other way around.
The Abbottabad files studied in this series lend credence to the communiqué’s claim. As noted earlier, al-Zarqawi’s willingness to come under Bin Ladin’s leadership appears to have been facilitated, at least in part, by the more avowedly anti-regime stance adopted by al-Qa‘ida in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, it was only when al-Qa‘ida moved away from its “attack the West only” program to include a local component closer to al-Zarqawi’s line of thinking that he agreed to join forces. He likely reasoned that if he were to subordinate himself to al-Qa‘ida, he would not be encumbered by what was before 9/11 al-Qa‘ida’s exclusive focus on the far enemy.
Besides the positive signals in the form of Bin Ladin’s more takfiri statements, al-Zarqawi must have felt even more vindicated when, behind the scenes, al-Libi commended his strategy in Iraq, telling the Jordanian’s envoy that “what al-Zarqawi is doing, i.e., striking the Americans in Iraq and all the apostates who help them” while using “the Iraqi theater to make preparations for neighboring countries in terms of training and arrangements”, was “absolutely correct”. After the meeting where al-Zarqawi’s emissary outlined his group’s vision for Iraq and the region to al-Libi, the latter sent a message to his counterpart in Iraq announcing that al-Zawahiri had accepted the bay‘a and asking al-Zarqawi to present the bay‘a in public.
With all this in mind, it is easy to see why al-Zarqawi would think he had succeeded in bringing al-Qa‘ida on board with his strategic vision. However, the Abbottabad files also show that, despite the positive signals, al-Qa‘ida’s top leaders were not in full agreement with the Jordanian when his bay‘a was first accepted by al-Libi. Bin Ladin was originally keen on keeping al-Zarqawi in check by dispatching a senior figure, al-Iraqi, to Iraq in order to uphold al-Qa‘ida’s true agenda there, namely “the escalation in the resistance to the occupying forces” and “the prevention of the opening of other secondary fronts, such as [against] the Shi’ites”. Al-Zawahiri, for his part, wanted al-Zarqawi’s group to “stop working against the Shi‘a” and to “postpone activity against the client rulers”, which was to form a later stage of jihad. Likewise, al-Libi had notified al-Zarqawi’s emissary that Bin Ladin considered jihad against the Arab regimes “an advanced stage” and that the current priority was “the stage of fighting the greater unbelief (the Americans)”.The Libyan also appeared concerned by the mass-casualty attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a community.
Nevertheless, al-Qa‘ida—or al-Qa‘ida central, as it would soon come to be known—was in no position to strong-arm al-Zarqawi into following its preferred path in Iraq. From the start, al-Zarqawi had made clear that it was up to al-Qa‘ida to embrace his program, telling Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri that “if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner”. In the aftermath of the first battle of Fallujah, the Jordanian had the upper hand in the negotiation as he had become the leading figure in the most important battleground for jihad. By contrast, letters from al-Libi and al-Zawahiri highlight that al-Qa‘ida was then enduring intense military and security pressure in Pakistan as well as internal rifts. The level of strain was such that the planning of external operations had “practically halted” and Bin Ladin had to write a guidance document (the “al-Shura” letter) focused entirely on bringing harmony to the ranks. In this precarious context, the prospect of a merger with al-Zarqawi appeared particularly attractive to al-Qa‘ida, which viewed Iraq as a new El Dorado which could reverse the organization’s fortunes, especially in terms of planning international attacks.
Hence, the concerns of al-Qa‘ida’s leadership, and its divergences, were transmitted in attenuated form or even hidden from al-Zarqawi altogether. The one “warning” to al-Zarqawi against “excess” contained in Bin Ladin’s audio about Iraq was only briefly expressed and came very late in what was otherwise a speech endorsing the Jordanian’s actions. Bin Ladin was not much more assertive in private. He eventually gave up on trying to rein in al-Zarqawi, instructing al-Iraqi to “delay” his journey to Iraq and, instead of confronting the Shi‘a elephant in the room head-on, merely shared his view in his letter to al-Libi and al-Zawahiri that al-Zarqawi’s group should “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”. Even then, he made sure to qualify his subtle criticism with the expression “the witness sees what the absent one does not see”, in deference to al-Zarqawi and his team. It is telling that while Bin Ladin devoted an entire missive to resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal disputes (the “al-Shura” letter), his strategic instructions to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq were limited to a six-line paragraph shorter than the one discussing wedding arrangements for his son Khalid”. This somewhat lax approach on the part of Bin Ladin would later be confirmed by al-Zawahiri, who stated in 2006 that while Bin Ladin had instructed the “brothers in Iraq” to “focus their efforts on the Americans and neutralize the rest of the powers as best as they could”, he had still given “them some freedom of movement, telling them that the witness sees what the absent one does not see.”
With regard to al-Zawahiri, although he was the bluntest in criticizing al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda internally, his disapproval was purposely concealed from the Jordanian by al-Qa‘ida’s general manager, al-Libi. From the Abbottabad files, the Libyan emerges as the most driven and ambitious of al-Qa‘ida’s top officials in brokering a deal in Iraq, as illustrated by his Iraq-focused October 2004 letter that provided detailed guidance on the topic. Bin Ladin’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages on the matter were rather laconic by contrast. It can be argued that al-Libi’s influence in forging the merger was more significant than either of his two bosses’. Besides his role in brokering the deal with al-Zarqawi’s group, he was also instrumental in convincing Bin Ladin to “delay” the dispatch of al-Iraqi, who was supposed to maintain al-Qa‘ida’s interests in Iraq. Furthermore, determined as he was to expedite the negotiation process and remove any remaining impediments, al-Libi, of his own initiative, accepted al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a on behalf of his bosses even as he withheld some of al-Zawahiri’s opinions from al-Zarqawi.
Although al-Libi’s resourcefulness likely facilitated the positive outcome of the negotiation, it also put al-Qa‘ida central in a precarious position in its relationship with its brand new subsidiary and helped to sow the seeds of the coming discord between the two sides. A union had been proclaimed, but strategic divergences had not been fully resolved—let alone conveyed to Zarqawi’s side. Before the announcement of the bay‘a, al-Libi had asked al-Zarqawi for a “detailed report on your situation”, which al-Libi intended to send to his bosses so that they could make well-informed decisions regarding the course of the Iraqi jihad. The files I have archived do not tell if this “report” was ever sent. In any case, the unresolved issues hidden by al-Libi and ignored by Bin Ladin would remain, proving an enduring source of tension as illustrated by al-Qa‘ida’s endless attempts over the years to “rectify” the policies of its affiliate behind the scenes.
Ultimately, al-Qa‘ida came to fully grasp the negative impact of the leeway granted to its Iraqi subsidiary from the outset. At least al-Zawahiri did. In a letter written to Bin Ladin in January 2011, the Egyptian was still arguing over issues that had been preoccupying him ever since the merger, including attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a and “opening new fronts, whether inside or outside Iraq”. Another issue was the arrival of a new leader named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose presence was further eroding the already strained relations between al-Qa‘ida central and the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq’s latest incarnation. Particularly vocal in his opposition to the Islamic State’s conduct, al-Zawahiri urged Bin Ladin to restrain al-Baghdadi’s men by sending them a message detailing the policies to follow in Iraq. In the past, al-Qa‘ida’s top leadership had postured diplomatically when questioning the actions of its troublesome affiliate, stating, in the case of Bin Ladin, “the witness sees what the absent one does not see,” and, in the case of al-Zawahiri, “I see the picture from afar, and … you see what we do not see”. Now, the same al-Zawahiri was telling Bin Ladin that “I hope that you do not conclude your message with sayings like … ‘the witness sees what the absent one does not see’, as these sayings nullify every directive preceding them”. As the coming divorce between the two groups later showed, al-Zawahiri’s plea for a more assertive approach was too little, too late—if it ever stood a chance in the first place.
One of the unifying themes of the Sunni jihadi movement as it has developed over the past half-century has been the view that Western-style democracy is an affront to Islam. Even worse, it is a religion fundamentally incompatible with the faith, a version of polytheism (shirk) in which authority is derived from the popular will as opposed to God’s will, and in which manmade laws are adopted and implemented as opposed to God’s law, the Shari‘a. Yet as the jihadi movement’s unity has frayed over the past decade with the rise of the Islamic State, so too has the united front against democracy. Last month’s elections in Turkey, which saw President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, head of the Islamist AKP, reelected to another five-year term in office, brought divisions over the matter into the sharpest relief yet, as ideologues debated the legitimacy not only of voting for the Turkish president but of advocating his reelection as well. For most jihadis, Erdoğan is an apostate unbeliever as he upholds a secular democratic system. But how to deal with this fact in the real world remains an issue of considerable contestation.
Background: jihadism confronts democracy
The Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-11, which saw autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt overthrown, paving the way for temporary democratic experiments in each, posed the initial test for the jihadi movement’s approach to democracy. In a series of message over 2011-13 directed to the people of Egypt, al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri reiterated his opposition to the electoral system, stressing that “democracy is in reality a religion that rests on the sanctification of the will of the majority” and that “we, as Muslims, must reject the political process and elections, except on a foundation of the sovereignty of the Shari‘a.” Nonetheless, he refrained from calling for jihad against Egypt’s elected Islamist president, Mohammed Morsi, stating in April 2013, “I have not called for revolution against Muhammad Morsi. Rather, I have called for the continuation of the blessed revolution that brought us Muhammad Morsi, until the desired change is achieved.” This position represented a tactical toleration of the democratic outcome in Egypt, a departure from the previous al-Qaida position of calling for the overthrow of all the region’s political leaders. A similar approach was taken by the Palestinian-Jordanian jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who from prison in 2013 wrote that it would be “politically stupid to open up battle fronts at this stage” with the newly elected rulers.
This stance was by no means an embrace of democracy, though some in the jihadi movement effectively did end up promoting democracy as a vehicle for change. The most notable example was the Syrian scholar Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who in November 2011 endorsed the Salafi candidate Hazim Salah Abu Isma‘il for president of Egypt, earning him a sharp rebuke from a member of al-Maqdisi’s Shari‘a council.
Al-Qaida’s position on Morsi may have been merely tactical and temporary, but for the ideological purists of the Islamic State it was the sort of wishy-washiness that they were no longer willing to tolerate. As the Islamic State distanced itself from al-Qaida in 2013-14, seeking to distinguish itself as the standard-bearer of a more puritanical version of Jihadi Salafism, it highlighted the issue of democracy, and of Morsi in particular, as a key area of divergence. In one of his more noteworthy audio statements, the Islamic State’s spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani cited al-Qaida’s soft position on Morsi and failure to urge jihad against him as evidence of the group’s deviation. Rejection of democracy tout court became a signature feature of the Islamic State’s messaging. As Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stated in his mid-2014 sermon following the announcement of the caliphate, “The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement to make that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and uncover its deviant nature.”
While the democratic winds have since subsided in the Arab world, the occasional controversy over democracy still flares with respect to Turkey, where President Erdoğan attracts a certain level of sympathy in jihadi circles. This is because Erdoğan, an Islamist, is seen as better than his political opponents in the more nationalist and secularist opposition. Most jihadis still consider him an apostate for his embrace of democracy and secularism, as well as for contributing forces to the anti-Taliban and anti-al-Shabaab missions in Afghanistan and Somalia, respectively. But they nonetheless tend to see him as preferable to the alternative.
The Turkish presidential elections of 2018 because a source of controversy when Abu Qatada Filastini, a Palestinian-Jordanian jihadi scholar based in Jordan, expressed joy in Erdoğan’s successful election. As he wrote on his Telegram page at the time, in June 2018, “There is no doubt to one possessed of knowledge that [Erdoğan’s] victory is a mercy for the people in Turkey and that the alternatives to him are apostate unbelievers who hate the religion.” His own view, Abu Qatada clarified, was that “the man does not represent me, but I am fond of his triumph over his religion-hating enemies among the leftists, secularists, and nationalists.”
A year earlier, the Islamic State had condemned the idea that one may rejoice in victories for Erdoğan. As an editorial in the group’s weekly newsletter, al-Naba’, stated in July 2017, concerning the outcome of a pro-Erdoğan constitutional referendum, “Naïve people today are rejoicing in the victory of the idol-ruler (taghut) Erdoğan over some of his opponents.” This was a mistake, for rather than choosing one taghut over another, Muslims are required to reject and wage jihad against all of them. Another recent al-Naba’ editorial, from July 2020, reiterated the Islamic State’s opposition to Erdoğan and the folly of participating in the “polytheism of democracy.” The claim that voting for a democratic ruler might bring some benefit is invalid, it said, as the greatest benefit of all is God’s oneness (tawhid), which empowering an apostate like Erdoğan vitiates.
Al-Maqdisi’s “pure milk”
The latest Turkish elections have invited even more controversy than previously, in part because Turkey now plays a key role in sustaining the presence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former al-Qaida affiliated that rules in northwest Syria. Since late 2017, HTS has cooperated militarily with Turkey, first permitting Turkish troops to establish bases and observation posts in and around Idlib Governorate and then coordinating with them more extensively. The Turkish military presence in the northwest effectively serves to guarantee the HTS statelet’s continued existence. It is unclear whether Erdoğan’s political opponents would maintain this policy, and thus for HTS and its supporters, Erdoğan’s status as Turkey’s ruler is of paramount importance.
For its collaboration with Turkey and for many other perceived transgressions, HTS is viewed as heretical by the Islamic State. But there are also numerous jihadis not aligned with the Islamic State who view HTS unfavorably, accusing it of abandoning the jihadi methodology (manhaj) in making concession after concession to secure its rule. Most of these critical voices are aligned with al-Qaida. One of these is the jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.
In January 2022, after Erdoğan announced the upcoming elections in May, al-Maqdisi wasted no time in firing off a warning shot against participation. The next day, on January 23, he published an article on Telegram under the title “Concerning Elections: Leave the Froth and Take the Pure Milk.” The main argument was that God’s oneness (tawhid) requires the believer to disavow and reject all idols (tawaghit, sing. taghut) as God says in Q. 16:36, “Worship you God and eschew taghut.” The elected political leader today is a taghut, or idol-ruler,by virtue of the fact that he rules not by God’s law but by manmade laws and so arrogates to himself God’s divine prerogative regarding legislation. The polytheism (shirk)that he embodies is “the shirk of legislation and rule that assigns partners to God, who legislate for the people that which God did not permit.” While a taghut might exhibit some positive attributes, this does not make it permissible to vote for him. “It is only permissible, O monotheist, to call for dissociation from all forms of shirk and the rejection of all taghuts—for their rejection and not their election.”
Here as elsewhere, al-Maqdisi employed his favorite anti-democracy terms, Islamocrat (islamuqrati) and Islamo-secularist (‘ilmanislami), using these to portray his ideological foes as seeking to corrupt Islam with the polytheistic taint of democracy and secularism. Much of the article is devoted to countering the anticipated arguments of those termed “the shaykhs of Islamocracy and Islamo-secularism,” also described as “the cheerleaders of the taghuts.” The principal argument that he refuted relates to the victory of Byzantium over Persia in the seventh century, which the Qur’an mentions in Surat al-Rum, stating that “on that day the believers shall rejoice.” The argument that some democracy advocates use, al-Maqdisi explained, is that if the Qur’an can celebrate the victory of Christian Byzantium over Zoroastrian Persian, the former being seen as the closer to monotheism, then surely Muslims can cast a vote for the lesser of two evils in an Islamic context. For al-Maqdisi, however, this is wrong, for there is an important distinction to be drawn between rejoicing and supporting. While it is permissible, pursuant to the Qur’anic example, to rejoice in the victory of a more tolerable taghut over a more tyrannical one, it is not permissible to support any taghut’s empowerment by voting for him. “When we warn against participation in elections,” al-Maqdisi wrote, “we are warning against all of them. We are not aligning with a harsh and dictatorial taghut against a gentle and democratic taghut, nor against an Islamocrat like Morsi or Erdoğan.” Choosing between the lesser of two taghuts is not the business of the believer. It is believer’s business to worship God alone and “dissociate from all taghuts—all of them—for shirk and the following of taghuts are not made permissible by any of a taghut’s desirable attributes.”
Al-Mahdi and al-Dhahabi weigh in
Unsurprisingly, it was the supporters of HTS in the jihadosphere who would make the case for voting for Erdoğan. The most outspoken of these was the Syrian scholar and preacher ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi, a former member of HTS who would later resign his post, complaining about his inability to thwart HTS’s acts of “oppression.” Despite such criticism, he has remained broadly supportive of HTS and its governance project in the northwest, where he continues to reside, working as a teacher and popular writer. His fatwa channel on Telegram, where he responds to all manner of inquiries, has over 23,000 subscribers.
A recent inquiry, from late April 2023, put to al-Mahdi the following question: “What is the religious judgment (hukm) concerning participation in the elections that will take place in Turkey in the coming month? Is the one who participates in these elections charged with sin, or is there no fault in him?” Al-Mahdi’s response, or fatwa, came a week later in the form of a series of Telegram posts published between May 6 and 11. Al-Mahdi began by noting that Muslim scholars have articulated five positions on the issue of participating in elections, ranging from forbidden and excommunicable to permissible and even obligatory.
Before offering his own take on the matter, he stated that it is first necessary to establish some basic facts about Erdoğan’s challenger and what his victory would entail. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, he said, belongs to the Alawite sect and is a staunch secularist in thrall to “Kemalist ideas.” As the head of the Republican People’s Party founded by Ataturk, Kılıçdaroğlu “always stresses that he will preserve the teachings of Ataturk and his opposition to the Islamization of the state.” As president, he would likely launch a campaign against Islam and Muslims to include banning the hijab, persecuting clerics and preachers, and expelling or imprisoning those who fled the savagery of the Arab regimes. Furthermore, a president Kılıçdaroğlu would withdraw Turkey’s forces from Syria, handing power in the “liberated areas” over to the Asad regime.
Turning to the legal status of participating in elections, al-Mahdi quoted the judgments of the two most prominent Salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia of the late twentieth century, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz and Muhammad ibn ‘Uthaymin, who both approved of participating in elections in certain circumstances. “Most Muslim scholars,” al-Mahdi declared, have thus judged participation to be permissible, “so long as the objective is establishing the Shari‘a, even if as a distant prospect, or minimizing evils and securing benefits to Muslims in their religious or worldly affairs.” He further cited a recent statement signed by dozens of scholars worldwide supporting Erdoğan in the coming election, largely on the grounds of the “great benefit” that his presidency has brought to Muslims in Turkey, including the millions of refugees.
Al-Mahdi concluded by urging his readers not to “hesitate in electing Erdoğan and the members of AKP,” noting that whatever faults or insufficiencies Erdoğan may have when it comes to implementing the Shari‘a, these pale in comparison to what is on offer in his opponent. Implicitly addressing al-Maqdisi, he wrote, “Whosoever deems elections to be forbidden contradicts the great scholars of the Hijaz, Egypt, al-Sham, and the lands of the Arab west and the Islamic east; and he gives no consideration to the principles acknowledged by the consensus of Muslim scholars: ‘the lesser of two evils,’ or ‘the lesser of two harms,’ or ‘the accrual and enlargement of benefits and the aversion of evils.’”
Also adding his voice to the mix at this time was the more obscure figure of Hani Dahab, an Egyptian former associate of HTS who goes by the name “al-Dhahabi” online. In several posts on Telegram, al-Dhahabi likewise advocated the permissibility of participating in the Turkish elections and of voting for Erdoğan. For al-Dhahabi, the heart of the matter was the comparison between the two potential outcomes, and to his mind a Kılıçdaroğlu victory was a far worse scenario than an Erdoğan one. “If the Ataturkists prevail,” he wrote, “then Turkey will return to the era of forbidding the hijab, not to mention the expulsion of the Syrians and every oppositionist who has found in Turkey a place to live … Whosoever deems Erdoğan’s victory as equivalent to his opponent’s knows nothing about the situation in Turkey nor the files related to it, especially that of Syria and the liberated areas.”
Like al-Mahdi, al-Dhahabi defended participating in elections, though unlike the former he appealed to the authority not of mainstream Salafi scholars but of the more fiery ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Tarifi, a Saudi scholar whose views are closer to Jihadi Salafism. (Al-Tarifi was arrested in 2016, shortly after criticizing the Saudi move to disempower the religious police force, and has been imprisoned ever since.) On the matter of voting in elections, al-Tarifi was supportive in the event that some benefit was to be gained. In a Telegram post, al-Dhahabi embedded a video in which al-Tarifi can be heard saying, in response to a question about participating in elections, “If a person is securing a benefit or averting a harm, then this is a permitted matter in which there is no fault.” His approval was limited, however, only to such cases and not to those where the choice is between two equally corrupt options.
Al-Maqdisi would respond to both of these critics in a series of tweets. First, he emphasized the point that the choice in Turkey was not between a candidate who would implement the Shari‘a and one who would not, but rather between one taghut and another. “As for your democratic elections,” he wrote, “they are marked by unbelief, as the choice therein is limited to rulers all of whom will refrain from applying God’s law.” “Be not deceived by the deceptions of the Islamocrats,” he added later, stating that “democracy” in the present case is “patent unbelief and flagrant polytheism.” Erdoğan, he continued, has promised to draft a new “civil constitution,” and “will not those voting for him bear responsibility for this constitution? … We are not partisans of the democratic game. Rather, we draw near to God by dissociating from it and from all those who rule by manmade laws. We are among the followers of the religion of Abraham (millat Ibrahim), which rejects shirk and its adherents and which unifies God in His worship and His sovereignty.” In another comment, al-Maqdisi described his opponents as “the Islamocrat scholars and the jihadi Murji’ites [i.e., those unduly tolerant in creedal matters],” claiming that they “wish to portray the struggle between the gentle secularist Erdoğan and his harsher secularist opponent as a struggle between Islam and unbelief, and in this they have deceived Muslims … If they had [merely] wished for Erdoğan’s victory without distorting facts and deceiving Muslims, I would not have criticized them. No one who is knowledgeable wishes for the victory of the more wicked.”
Evidently, al-Maqdisi himself saw an Erdoğan victory as preferable, even if he was unwilling to say so explicitly. In a reply, al-Dhahabi sought to make al-Maqdisi’s position clearer, writing that “anyone who indicates to you his lack of interest in the Turkish elections … writing for you at length about the judgment concerning elections and God’s sovereignty, [matters] about which there is no dispute … is in reality, between himself, wishing for his victory.” For al-Dhahabi, al-Maqdisi’s position was self-contradictory. Like his opponents, al-Maqdisi was hoping for an Erdoğan victory, but he simultaneously opposed any act that might help to bring that victory about.
Abu Qatada’s intervention
Al-Maqdisi’s attacks on al-Mahdi and al-Dhahabi soon elicited a response from Abu Qatada al-Filastini, al-Maqdisi’s rival in Jordan’s jihadi milieu, in the form of a Telegraph post on May 18. In recent years, Abu Qatada has split with al-Maqdisi on a range of issues, advocating a more pan-Islamist vision of jihadism that includes support for HTS. He would continue in that spirit here, implicitly criticizing al-Maqdisi (never mentioned by name) for too severely condemning his opponents and for questioning their adherence to monotheism (tawhid). Abu Qatada’s main point was that al-Maqdisi was wrong to make the dispute over elections a creedal matter as opposed to a legal one admitting of more than one acceptable view. As he wrote, “The dispute between two Muslims over the issue of legislative and presidential elections is not a dispute over the oneness of God’s lordship (tawhid al-uluhiyya),over the fact that God is the All-Ruling who possesses the right of deeming what is permissible and what is forbidden, the right of legislation.” Anyone who rejects this, in part or in full, stated Abu Qatada, is not a Muslim. However, a Muslim jurist seeking to derive a judgment on the matter of elections should be able to do so without having his tawhid thrown into question. “This is his ijtihad, and he might judge rightly and he might err,” meaning that if he errs he will still be rewarded for his sincere effort. To make the matter about tawhid, which is a creedal issue,is to put forth “a false conception of the dispute” that will inevitably lead to pronouncements of takfir.
The next day al-Maqdisi responded on Twitter, defending himself and accusing Abu Qatada (though not by name) of “seeking to sugarcoat the wicked fatwas that permit” participation in elections. The election of a person such as Erdoğan, who “embraces secularism” and has pledged to rule in accordance with “a liberal constitution,” is undoubtedly “a matter connected to tawhid al-uluhiyya.” A person can believe that God has the sole right of legislation, but that does not absolve him of stripping God of that right by issuing a fatwa permitting a vote for him. This is a “violation of tawhid.” “Whosoever issues a fatwa on behalf of electing an unbelieving, secularist ruler who refrains from ruling by the Shari‘a, who shows loyalty to unbelieving apostates, and who gives support to them against the Muslims in Somalia and elsewhere, on the grounds that in doing so he is averting the greater evil by tolerating the lesser evil, is not in reality calling for the toleration of the lesser evil; rather, he is calling for its election … And thus the fatwa is connected to tawhid even if they deny it.”
Following the exchange, one of al-Maqdisi’s allies, the Canada-based Egyptian scholar Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim, chimed in on Telegram, ridiculing Abu Qatada for making an argument so patently at odds with the basic principle of Jihadi Salafi thought. “The matter of electing someone who will rule by other than what God has revealed,” he wrote, “is not a jurisprudential matter over which jurists debate and in which creed has no place! It is a creedal matter that the right of legislation belongs to God alone, and whosoever grants it to other than God, in part or in full, has disbelieved as a matter of consensus.” ‘Abd al-Halim followed up in another post by quoting from an old essay of Abu Qatada’s condemning democracy as polytheism, asking how the methodology (madhhab) on display there can be reconciled with what he is displaying today.
This sentiment al-Maqdisi seemed to approve of, though he would also seek to defend Abu Qatada against accusations that took the criticism too far. On June 1, a certain jihadi tweeted a montage showing Abu Qatada together with a group of “Islamocrat” scholars, to which al-Maqdisi responded by saying: “It is unjust to place Shaykh Abu Qatada together with the Islamocrats. Fear you God. However much we might disagree with people it is still obligatory to be just with them. Were you to say that Abu Qatada defends some of the Islamocrat shaykhs and excuses them,” that would be acceptable, but depicting him together with such people is “wrong and we condemn it.”
Rejoicing in Erdoğan’s victory
For all the contretemps between al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, their reactions to Erdoğan’s victory on May 28 would be quite similar. This was to express delight in Erdoğan’s triumph in light of the perceived benefits that it would bring for the Muslims of Turkey and beyond. Abu Qatada’s Twitter account reposted his reaction to Erdoğan’s win from five years earlier, in which he had written, “There is no doubt to one possessed of knowledge that [Erdoğan’s] victory is a mercy for the people in Turkey and that the alternatives to him are apostate unbelievers who hate the religion.” This included, however, the qualifying statement that “the man does not represent me.” In a similar vein, al-Maqdisi responded to the outcome by stating, “Praise be to God who averted from our brothers in Turkey the worse and more severe in enmity to Islam and Muslims.” Yet he also made sure to reiterate his negative view of Erdoğan and democracy, adding, “And we ask God to provide [the Turks] with someone who will rule by God’s law and annul secularism and positive laws. And we congratulate our brothers, the proponents of tawhid who did not participate in the 2023 Turkish elections, on their resolve in adhering to truth and not succumbing to the fatwas of the Islamocrat shaykhs.”
The response to Erdoğan’s victory from those labeled the “Islamocrats” was naturally more enthusiastic. Al-Mahdi wrote on Telegram, “We congratulate the Turkish people on the victory of President Recep Tayyib Erdoğan … And we ask God to grant success to President Erdoğan in what will bring benefit to the land and to the Muslims.” Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, one of the top leaders in HTS, likewise congratulated the Turkish people in a Tweet, imploring God to “grant President Erdoğan success and to distance him from the Alawite criminal [i.e., Bashar al-Asad] who has killed the Sunni Muslims of al-Sham.” His colleague in HTS, the cleric Mazhar al-Ways, also conveyed his congratulations to the Turkish people, as did HTS itself in a statement released by its Department of Political Affairs. Notably, these statements were not qualified by the reservations expressed by al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada.
A range of views
What this dispute over the Turkish elections shows is that the jihadi movement today admits of a range of views on the issue of democracy in Turkey. The most extreme position is that held by the Islamic State, which considers Turkey’s democracy to be shirk, rejects the validity of any opinion permitting participation, and opposes the idea that Muslims may rejoice in Erdoğan’s victory. The next most extreme is that held by al-Maqdisi, who considers Turkey’s democracy to be shirk and rejects the validity of any opinion permitting participation but accepts that Muslims may rejoice in Erdoğan’s victory. Next down the line is the position held by Abu Qatada, who considers Turkey’s democracy to be shirk but accepts the validity an opinion permitting participation and accepts that Muslims can rejoice in Erdoğan’s victory. After this is the position of the so-called “Islamocrats,” such al-Mahdi and the followers of HTS, who consider Turkey’s democracy to be shirk (at least in theory) but who themselves permit participation and even in some cases call for it. These are four distinct, if overlapping, opinions, and one could surely identify further distinctions and nuances by looking more closely.
The ideological confusion in the jihadis’ approach to this issue is further evidence of the movement’s fractured state at the present time. While the main division in the movement runs through the Islamic State and al-Qaida, there is a broader spectrum of opinion than the two-camp picture suggests. Religious authority in the movement is increasingly diffuse. While many subscribe to the Islamic State’s every word, those in the al-Qaida camp tend to revere al-Maqdisi’s views or Abu Qatada’s or those of another scholar or leader. As time goes on, it becomes harder and harder to locate the ideological center of gravity that gives this movement coherence and a sense of common purpose and identity.
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