Philosophy of Consciousness: Recent Episodes
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As a primary task it should not be difficult to promote the thesis that understanding how and why consciousness emerged entails understanding the evolution of a hierarchy of systems-constructs. Why? If not irrefutable, it is at least commonly held that: … Continue reading →
William Lycan‘s (2008) introductory statement on intentionality for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins as follows: Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, properties and states of affairs” (Representational Theories of Consciousness, … Continue reading →
John Searle’s book entitled ‘Intentionality’ could otherwise be entitled ‘The principles and conditional characteristics of conceptual representation’. I say this because his irreducible stance on Intentionality is tightly restricted to and fixated on conceptually confined modes of analysis of mental … Continue reading →
Through impartial analysis of Daniel Dennett’s ‘The Intentional Stance’ (1987), I identify several inconsistencies in his position on intentionality. Then, I reveal a fatal flaw in the stance, but rather than throw the baby out with the bath water, make … Continue reading →
Michael Tye is of the view that the problem as to whether fish have feelings or not, is best addressed epistemically than metaphysically. At his lecture at King’s College London yesterday entitled ‘Do fish have feelings?’, he compiled and appraised … Continue reading →
There is an aspect to aesthetics that takes it beyond the bounds of coherent conceptual analysis. It shares this characteristic with consciousness itself. There is something about aesthetic experience that evades objective study and yet it is immediately accessible and … Continue reading →
Section 1 of 4 – Ali the particle physicist: “covering-laws” and the hermeneutic approach Consider Ali, the particle physicist. Unlike a physicist in the real world, he has no concept of the contained entity we call “the atom”. Imagine that … Continue reading →
- Intro – Incomplete Nature is Deacon’s Hierarchical Systems Model Although not explicitly expressed as such, Terrence Deacon’s ‘Incomplete Nature’ is a hierarchical model for explaining, through emergent process, how mind arises from matter. Deacon states, Our ultimate scientific challenge … Continue reading →
What is knowledge? Knowledge can be defined as a type of information construct that has evolved from a reflective discourse with the environment such that it enables the extension of that construct’s temporal existence through its functions and actions. Consequently, … Continue reading →
Abstract: Hierarchical Systems Theory dictates a particular theory of moral philosophy. This hierarchical moral philosophy provides a link with the evolution of efferent information processing. In other words, the key to this theory of moral philosophy is in the proposition … Continue reading →
ABSTRACT: Through the utilization of a descriptive illustration and detailed referencing of Carruthers (2000 – Phenomenal Consciousness), a comparison of Hierarchical Construct theory (2007 – On the Origins of Life, Consciousness, and Personal Identity) with Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory of … Continue reading →
If there is Phenomenon of conscious experience, what could Noumenal Consciousness be? ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness – … Continue reading →
ABSTRACT: This philosophy article provides a reductive explanation of ‘phenomenal experience’ and in doing so, provides an explanation for the emergence and evolution of human consciousness. The explanation demonstrates compliance with philosophical criteria. It does this by describing and explaining … Continue reading →
Alexander, S. (1920). Space, Time, and Deity. London: Macmillan. Armstrong, D. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge. Armstrong, D. (1984). Consciousness and causality. In D. Armstrong & N. Malcolm (Eds.), Consciousness and Causality (pp. 103-191). Oxford: Blackwell. … Continue reading →