Sefer Hachinuch: Recent Episodes
Rabbi Eli Mansour
The final of the 613 Misvot, as listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch, is the command to write a Sefer Torah. This Misva is introduced in Parashat Vayelech (Debarim 30:19), where Hashem commands, “Ve’ata Kitbu Lachem Et Ha’shira Ha’zot” (“And now, write for yourselves this song”). The Gemara teaches that it is “praiseworthy” to write a Sefer Torah oneself, if he can, and that one who does is considered as though he stood at Mount Sinai and received the Torah. If, however, one is not capable of writing his own Sefer Torah, then he may hire a Sofer (scribe) to write one for him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded writing for oneself a Sefer Torah for the simple reason that this ensures access to a Sefer Torah from which to study. Since everyone is commanded to write a Sefer Torah, everyone will have a Sefer Torah to learn from, without having to go borrow one, and this will help ensure that a person spends time learning. The more accessible something is, the more likely one is to use it, and so the Torah wanted that we all have access to a Sefer Torah, as this will helps guarantee that we learn Torah. Halacha requires one to write his own Sefer Torah even if he inherited one from his father, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this provision serves to ensure a plethora of Sifreh Torah. Not everybody can afford a Sefer Torah, and so the Torah wanted everyone – even those who already have a Sefer Torah – to write one, such that there would be Sifreh Torah available for those who do not have one. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, Sifreh Torah gradually wear out, and the ink fades, and so the Torah wanted people to write their own Sifreh Torah, in order for the Torah scrolls to be new and in good condition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although the Biblical command refers specifically to the writing of a Sefer Torah, there is certainly value also in having other works of Torah literature written. Even if one received such books from his predecessors, it is a Misva to have more Torah books produced. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it was customary among righteous people to allocate a room in their home where scribes, whom they hired, would write Torah books. (Of course, the Sefer Ha’hinuch lived before the invention of the printing press, and thus all books had to be handwritten.) In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch presents a number of Halachot relevant to the way a Sefer Torah should be written. He writes that a space the size of the letter Yod must be left in between each pair of adjacent words, and an empty space the size of a line of text must be left in between the lines. Each line should consist of thirty letters. The allusion given for this practice is the word “Le’mishpehotechem” (“according to your families”) written three times. This word consists of ten letters, and so three times this word teaches us the total of number of letters that should be written on each line of the Sefer Torah. The Rabbis of the Mussar movement taught that this allusion expresses the notion that if a person, his son and grandson all learn Torah, then he is guaranteed that Torah will remain in his family for all time. The Sages inferred this concept from the verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (59:21), “And these words, which I have placed in your mouth, shall not be removed from your mouth, from the mouth of your offspring, or from the mouth of your offspring’s offspring…from now and forever” – indicating that once Torah is studied by three generations, it remains in that family for eternity. The three instances of “Le’mishpehotechem” hint to this concept, that after three generations of Torah study, the family is assured of having the Torah remain with it forever. A line in the Sefer Torah should not consist of fewer than thirty letters, as this would resemble an “Iggeret” (formal letter), and the Sefer Torah is to be a book. A line should not consist of more than thirty letters, as it would then be difficult to find the next line, since the beginning and end of the lines would be very far apart. If a word at the end of the line has five letters, but there’s room for only three letters, then the extra two letters may be written outside the column. If there is room for only two letters, then those two spaces should be left empty, and the word should be written on the next line. Although two letters may be written outside the column in the case described above, a two-letter word should not be written outside the column. Tradition requires writing certain letters larger or smaller than the rest of the text. Also, certain letters are written with specific numbers of “Tagin” (“crowns”) above the letters. These laws apply only “Le’chatehila” (optimally). If the “Tagin” were not placed correctly, or if the lines were too close or too far from one another, or too lengthy or too short, the Sefer Torah is nevertheless valid, as long as the letters were written properly. This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that this Misva is binding only upon men, because this obligation is linked to the obligation to study Torah – as discussed above – and women are exempt from the Misva of Torah study. One who was able to write a Sefer Torah but failed to do so has neglected this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that such a person is deserving of harsh punishment, as fulfilling this Misva is necessary for learning Torah. Conversely, one who fulfills this Misva is rewarded with blessing and will be enriched by the ability to study. Many Rabbis addressed the question of why most people do not write a Sefer Torah, or even hire somebody to write a Sefer Torah for them. If, as we have seen, writing a Sefer Torah constitutes a Biblical obligation, then why do otherwise G-d-fearing people not write Torah scrolls for themselves? A famous answer to this question is given by the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327). He notes that whereas in earlier generations, people would use Sifreh Torah as their texts of Torah study, nowadays, we study from other books. Sifreh Torah are used only for the public reading in the synagogue, and we learn from printed Humashim and other Torah texts. Therefore, the Rosh writes, nowadays, we fulfill this Misva by obtaining texts of Torah literature to learn. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, as mentioned earlier, commented that having such books fulfills the spirit of the Misva of writing a Sefer Torah, but according to the Rosh, this is how we fulfill the actual Misva, since these texts are what we use for learning. According to the Rosh, then, we all fulfill this Misva by having works of Torah literature in our homes. We find among later Poskim different opinions as to how to understand the Rosh’s position. The Perisha (commentary to the Tur by Rav Yehoshua Falk, Poland, 1555-1614) maintained that according to the Rosh, one who writes a Sefer Torah nowadays, but does not acquire other texts, does not fulfill the Biblical obligation. Since we do not use Sifreh Torah for learning, one cannot satisfy his obligation through the writing of a Sefer Torah, and he must acquire texts from which to study. The Perisha went even further, stating that having only a Sefer Torah is an insult to the Torah. Since we no longer have the tradition of how to interpret the “Tagin” and other features of the Torah text, one who has only a Torah scroll, and no works of Torah literature, is bound to misunderstand the Torah. The Bet Yosef (commentary to the Tur by Maran Rav Yosef Karo, Spain-Israel, 1488-1575), however, disagreed. In his view, the Rosh concedes that the primary Misva is to write a Sefer Torah, but he also allows fulfilling the Misva by acquiring works of Torah literature. The Sha’agat Aryeh (Rav Aryeh Leib Ginzburg, c. 1695-1785) offers an entirely different reason for why it is not customary for everyone to write a Sefer Torah. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (30) states that some minor elements of the tradition for writing a Sefer Torah have been lost. We cannot definitively ascertain the precise spelling of a small number of words, whether they should be written with or without the letter “Vav.” Therefore, the Sha’agat Aryeh writes, we cannot fulfill the Torah obligation of writing a Sefer Torah, since we lack the knowledge necessary to ensure that the text is written correctly. The Torah reading in the synagogue is not a Biblical obligation, but rather a practice enacted by the prophets, and so we can observe this practice even if the text of the Sefer Torah is not precisely accurate. But writing a Sefer Torah constitutes a Biblical obligation, and it thus cannot be fulfilled, due to our lack of knowledge regarding the precise spelling of all the words. For this reason, the Sha’agat Aryeh avers, it is not customary for everyone to write a Sefer Torah. Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Iggerot Moshe, disputes this line of reasoning. A famous Halachic principle establishes that “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” – when it comes to Torah obligations, we must act stringently in situations of uncertainty. Therefore, Rav Moshe argues, we should be required to write a Sefer Torah despite the uncertainties that we have regarding certain words, because of the possibility that we write them correctly. As long as there is a chance that we can fulfill the Torah obligation by writing a Sefer Torah, we should be required to do so, in accordance with the rule of “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra.” Rav Moshe therefore suggests a different reason for why people do not write a Sefer Torah, explaining that Halacha does not require incurring an exceedingly large expense for the fulfillment of a Misva. Although one must be willing to spend all the money he has if necessary to avoid transgressing a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibition), one is not required to spend more than one-fifth of his assets to fulfill a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). For the vast majority of people, commissioning the writing of a Sefer Torah would require spending more than one-fifth of their assets, and so they are exempt. Rav Moshe then goes even further, showing that in fact one is not required to spend more than one-tenth of his assets for this Misva, as this would undermine his ability to fulfill other Misvot. Indeed, as Rav Moshe notes, the Tur (Rav Yaakob Ben Asher, Spain, 1269-1340) writes that everyone “Asher Yado Maseget” – “who can afford it” – is required to write a Sefer Torah. Now this condition, that one can afford to fulfill the Misva, applies to all affirmative commands, as mentioned. And yet, the Tur mentions this point specifically in the context of the Misva of writing a Sefer Torah. Apparently, the Tur felt that this Misva in particular is contingent upon one’s financial abilities, and one should not commission the writing of a Sefer Torah if this would compromise his fiscal ability to fulfill other Misvot. Another explanation is that some views allow fulfilling this Misva jointly with other people. Therefore, by participating in the cost of writing a Sefer Torah (such as by “purchasing” a letter, which is customary in many communities), one satisfies his obligation according to this opinion. If a person does have the privilege of commissioning a Sefer Torah, and he wants to give it to a synagogue, he should lend it, rather than giving it as a gift. Writing a Sefer Torah does not suffice for fulfilling the Misva; he must own the Torah after it is written. Therefore, one should retain ownership over his Sefer Torah, and give it to a synagogue on loan. Indeed, it is customary to write contracts to this effect when a Sefer Torah is donated, stipulating that the Sefer Torah is being lent, and not given, to the synagogue. Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that if one has a respectable place in his home where he can keep a Sefer Torah, he should do so, and he should make a point of reading some of the weekly Torah portion from the scroll each week. This way, he fulfills the Misva according to all opinions, as he writes a Sefer Torah which he occasionally uses for study.
The Torah in Parashat Vayelech (Debarim 31:12) commands that the entire nation – men, women and children – must assemble in Jerusalem for a special ceremony, called “Hakhel” (“assemble”), every seven years. This ceremony, which featured the public reading of certain sections of the Torah by the king, would take place after the conclusion of the Shemita year, on the first day of Hol Ha’moed Sukkot. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (34) comments that as Hakhel constitutes a Misvat Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama – an affirmative command which applies at a particular time – it should, in principle, apply only to men. As a general rule, women are exempt from these kinds of Misvot. However, Hakhel marks an exception to this rule, as the Torah explicitly commands assembling the men, women and children. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the entire essence of the Jewish Nation lies in the Torah. It is the Torah that distinguishes us from all other peoples. Other nations perform acts of kindness, and have houses of prayer, but the Torah is unique to Am Yisrael. And, it is the Torah that enables us to earn eternal life and the unprecedented delights of the next world. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, it is worthwhile for the nation to come together at certain times in order to reaffirm its identity, to be reminded that the core essence of Am Yisrael is our commitment to the Torah. Once in seven years, a major assembly is held, and everybody will know that this assembly is being held for the purpose of conducting a public Torah reading. This will leave a profound impression on the people, reminding them of the primary importance of Torah in our lives. This awareness will arouse within the people a fierce desire to learn the Torah, and as a result of this desire, they will commit to learn the Torah intensively, thus becoming worthy of Hashem’s blessings. The king would read the Torah at Hakhel in the Ezrat Nashim section of the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash. He was permitted to read the Torah while sitting, though he was deemed praiseworthy if he stood for the reading. He would read from the beginning of the Book of Debarim through the first paragraph of Shema, in Parashat Va’et’hanan, and then skip to the second paragraph of Shema, in Parashat Ekeb. He would then read from the section of “Aser Te’aser” in Parashat Re’eh through the end of the sections of the blessings and curses. Trumpets would be sounded throughout the city of Jerusalem announcing the event of Hakhel, and a large wooden stage would be erected in the middle of the Ezrat Nashim. The king would step up onto the stage, where he would be visible to the entire crowd, and everyone would assemble around the stage. The Sefer Torah would be passed around the nation’s leaders (from the “Hazan Ha’kenesset,” to the “Rosh Ha’kenesset,” to the deputy Kohen Gadol, and then to the Kohen Gadol), until it was finally handed to the king. This was done as an expression of honor for the king. The king opens the Sefer Torah, recites the Berachot, and reads the aforementioned sections. After the reading, he recites seven additional Berachot. A man or woman who was able to attend Hakhel and failed to do so, or a king who refuses to read the Torah at Hakhel, transgresses this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that those who neglect this Misva are liable to grave punishment, because Hakhel constitutes a “strong pillar” that upholds our religion, and thus failing to fulfill this Misva threatens the perpetuation of our faith. The Misva of Hakhel, as mentioned, is linked to the Misva of Shemita, as it is conducted during Sukkot after the conclusion of the Shemita year. As such, it applies only when the Misva of Shemita applies, meaning, when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel. A number of writers raised the question of why the Sages did not enact any commemoration of the Misva of Hakhel. Many other laws that apply during times of the Bet Ha’mikdash are required even nowadays, at least in some form, in commemoration of the Misva that was observed in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Hakhel is an exception, as the Sages did not require any form of ceremony for us to conduct to commemorate this Misva. The Aderet (Rav Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim, 1845-1905) suggested that the Rabbis instituted commemorations for Misvot that applied during the times of both the first and second Bateh Mikdash. The Misva of Hakhel, however, requires a king, and thus it was not observed in the latter part of the Second Commonwealth, after the Jews lost sovereignty and they did not have a king. Therefore, the Sages did not enact a commemoration of Hakhel. Another explanation is that the custom observed in some communities to remain awake on the last night of Sukkot (Hoshana Rabba) reading the Book of Debarim commemorates Hakhel, the king’s reading of Debarim during Sukkot. Yet a third theory is that the custom of “Hatan Torah,” calling a distinguished member of the congregation for the reading of the final section of the Torah on Simhat Torah, commemorates Hakhel. We might add that in a certain sense, the concept of Hakhel is commemorated each and every Shabbat, when Jews congregate in the synagogue and hear the Torah reading and the Rabbi’s speech. Like during Hakhel, a large assembly gathers for the purpose of hearing and learning Torah, which reinforces our appreciation of the importance of Torah, and its centrality in our lives. The children see the tumult and excitement, as everyone has come together in the synagogue, and they understand that all this is done for the purpose of learning the Torah. They thus grow up recognizing and appreciating the singular significance of Torah, which is the core essence of Jewish identity.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 28:9) commands, “Ve’halachta Bi’drachav” – “You shall walk in his ways.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this verse introduces the obligation to follow G-d’s example, to conduct ourselves in accordance with the qualities that He models for us. The Gemara, in several places (including Sota 14), teaches that just as G-d is merciful, kind and compassionate, we must be merciful, kind and compassionate in our interactions and dealings with other people. Although we human beings are limited and imperfect, and are thus incapable of attaining G-d’s pristine perfection, this verse commands us to strive to follow His example. This includes performing acts of kindness for other people, just as G-d provided Adam and Hava with clothing, visited Abraham Abinu when he was ill, comforted Yishak when his father passed away, and buried Moshe Rabbenu after his death. We are to follow G-d’s example and perform these and other acts of kindness. The reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is obvious, as we are to constantly strive to improve our character, by working to follow the example set for us by G-d Himself. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva affects everything we do, governing the way we eat, conduct our financial affairs, our interactions with other people, and our prayers and Torah study. Everything we do should be done in accordance with the character traits modeled for us by the Almighty. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, the Rambam taught that this Misva includes the obligation to follow the “middle way,” meaning, to avoid extremes, and conduct ourselves reasonably and moderately. We must be neither stingy nor overly generous. We need to find the “happy medium” with regard to our character traits. This Misva requires us to constantly scrutinize our conduct, and evaluate ourselves, to determine whether we behave with proper Middot (character traits). The Sages inferred this concept from the verse (Tehillim 50:23), “Ve’sam Derech,” which could be read as “Ve’sham Derech” – “and assessing the way,” alluding to the requirement to introspect and evaluate one’s behavior. One who lives this way, the Sages teach, will earn a portion in the world to come, and will have the privilege of beholding the Shechina. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One transgresses this command by failing to work to improve his character and to suppress his Yeser Ha’ra (evil inclination) so that he faithfully abides by the Misvot. Rav Moshe Cordovero (Safed, 1522-1570) wrote a famous work, Tomer Debora, which presents a detailed, step-by-step guide for how to follow G-d’s thirteen attributes of mercy which He pronounced to Moshe (Shemot 34:6-7). In the context of the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of this Misva, he addresses an important philosophical question relevant to the attribution of human character traits to G-d. Although we find that G-d is described in the Torah and by the prophets as having various qualities, we must not make the mistake of attributing to Him human properties. For example, one of the thirteen attributes of mercy is “Erech Apayim” (patience, being slow to anger), which seems to imply that G-d experiences anger which He then restrains. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is preposterous to think of G-d as actually experiencing anger. After all, one feels anger because of frustration, His inability to control the situation in the way He wants. G-d, of course, has unlimited power over the universe, and can do anything He wishes. He thus never has any reason to feel angry. And, anger is a sign of a faulty character, whereas G-d, quite obviously, is perfect. Necessarily, then, the descriptions of G-d’s anger must be understood allegorically. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since there is a great deal of evil in the world, and many people worship other deities, the world deserves annihilation. G-d’s allowing the world to continue existing is depicted as His restraining His anger, in that He refrains from punishing the world the way it deserves to be punished. The Gemara (Berachot 7a) comments that G-d is angry for one moment each day (“Ve’Kel Zo’em Be’chol Yom”), and the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this as a reference to the moment each day when the world’s sins “tip the scales,” exceeding its merits. At that moment, G-d is “angry” in the sense that the world deserves to be annihilated. G-d Himself, as explained, does not actually become angry, but the world becomes deserving of G-d’s anger, and this is the meaning of those passages which depict G-d as angry. The Misva of “Ve’halachta Bi’drachav” is the 611 th Misva, and 611 is the Gematria of the word “Torah.” This alludes to the singular importance of this Misva, as it is all-encompassing, calling upon us to conduct all our affairs, throughout the entire day, in accordance with the values and character traits taught to us by G-d. A beautiful example of the significance of this Misva is a story told of a wealthy woman who was passing by a department store, and she noticed several children peering into the store window. She discovered that these were underprivileged orphans, who longingly stared at all the beautiful clothing for sale in the store, which they could never purchase. The woman brought them inside the store and purchased for them complete outfits, from head to toe. As they were leaving, one of the children turned to her and asked, “Who are you? Are you G-d?” “No,” the woman replied, “I am one of His children.” “That makes sense,” the children said. “You are related to Him, so you act like Him.” The Jewish People are called G-d’s children. When we act kindly and compassionately, we show the world that G-d, our Father, is kind and compassionate, and we thus bring honor and glory to not only ourselves, but also to Hashem.
In the Vidui Ma’aser proclamation that a farmer was required to make every several years, avowing compliance with the various tithing obligations, he declares, “Ve’lo Natati Mimenu Le’met” (Debarim 26:14) – that he did not use the Ma’aser (tithe) for the needs of a dead body. This refers to the misuse of the money of Ma’aser Sheni, meaning, the funds onto which one had transferred the sanctity of Ma’aser Sheni, the tithe of one’s produce which is to be eaten in Jerusalem. This money must be brought to Jerusalem and used to purchase food and beverages, which are then to be eaten there in Jerusalem. This verse – “Ve’lo Natati Mimenu Le’met” – establishes a Biblical prohibition against using Ma’aser Sheni money for any other purpose. The Torah speaks of using the money for a “dead body,” referring to any purpose that does not sustain life, meaning, anything other than food or beverage. Thus, one may not use the money for utensils or jewelry. One may, however, use the money for skin ointments. This Halacha forms the basis of the general rule that applying ointment onto one’s skin is considered in a certain sense like eating. It is forbidden to use Ma’aser Sheni money even for Misva purposes, such as for a coffin or shrouds for a dead body. One who violated this prohibition, and used Ma’aser Sheni money for something other than food or drink, must take that sum of money and purchase food or drinks, which he must then consume in Jerusalem. This prohibition thus falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which one can rectify by paying money, and for which one is therefore not liable to Malkut. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the obligation of Ma’aser Sheni applies.
After the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, a farmer is required to make a proclamation avowing his compliance with the various tithing obligations, as dictated by the Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:13-15). In this declaration, the farmer specifies several laws that he obeyed, including, “Ve’lo Bi’arti Mimenu Be’tameh” (26:14), which means that he did not eat his Ma’aser Sheni in a state of Tum’a (impurity). The Ma’aser Sheni tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, and the Torah here informs us that it is forbidden to partake of this produce in a state of Tum’a. The fact that the farmer declares that he did not eat the produce while Tameh (impure), and that he concludes, “I have done in accordance with all that You commanded me,” shows that this is prohibited. This verse thus establishes a Biblical prohibition against eating Ma’aser Sheni produce while impure. This command forbids both eating Ma’aser Sheni while one is himself Tameh, and eating Ma’aser Sheni which has become Tameh, even though he is not Tameh. The Torah prohibition refers only to eating Ma’aser Sheni in Jerusalem, where it is to be consumed. If, for whatever, one ate Ma’aser Sheni outside Jerusalem, while he or the produce was Tameh, he does not transgress this Torah prohibition. Nevertheless, this is forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment. One who eats Ma’aser Sheni in a state of Tum’a is liable to Malkut; if he does so outside Jerusalem, then he receives Malkut for violating the Rabbis’ edict. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when tithing produce is required on the level of Torah law.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo presents the text of the “Vidui Ma’aser” proclamation which a farmer must make every three years, avowing his compliance with the various tithing obligations. This text includes the pronouncement, “Lo Achalti Ve’oni Mimenu” (Debarim 26:14) – that the farmer did not partake of the hallowed Ma’aser Sheni produce in a state of Aninut, meaning, immediately after a family member’s death, before the burial. The Ma’aser Sheni tithe, which is brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, has Halachic sanctity, and the Torah here establishes that, due to its sanctity, an Onen (person in a state of Aninut) is forbidden from eating it. An Onen is forbidden also from eating other hallowed foods, meaning, the meat of Korbanot (sacrifices). This is deduced from the story told in Parashat Shemini (10) of the events that transpired on the first day when Aharon and his sons served as Kohanim in the Mishkan. Two of Aharon’s sons tragically died that day, and Aharon and his remaining sons refrained from eating the meat of a sacrifice which would normally be eaten. Moshe asked why they did not eat the meat, and Aharon explained that as he was in a state of Aninut, he was not permitted to partake of the sacrifice. Aharon said, “Ve’achalti Hatat Hayom, Hayitab Be’eneh Hashem” (“If I would eat a sin-offering today, what this be pleasing in G-d’s eyes?” – Vayikra 10:19). The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two explanations for why the Torah forbade an Onen from eating hallowed food. First, he writes, a person eating sacrificial food of Ma’aser Sheni is considered as though he eats “from the table of G-d,” as G-d’s guest, and it is disrespectful to sit at a king’s table in a state of sorrow and anguish. As we read in Megilat Ester (4:2), “En La’bo El Sha’ar Ha’melech Bi’lbush Sak” – it was not allowed to appear in the area in front of King Ahashverosh’s palace wearing sackcloth, the garments worn by mourners. In the king’s presence, one must appear happy and cheerful. If this was true of King Ahashverosh, then it is certainly true – and much more so – of Hashem, the King of the universe. Therefore, the Torah commanded that a person who just suffered the loss of a family member is not permitted to eat “at the King’s table,” meaning, to eat sacred food. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Gemara teaches that “Kohanim Ochelim U’be’alim Mitkaperim” – a person bringing a sacrifice achieves atonement through the Kohanim’s consumption of the sacrifice. Therefore, when the Kohanim partook of sacrifices, they needed to have certain intentions so that their consumption of the sacrifice would have the desired effect. A person in a state of Aninut is distraught, and thus unable to concentrate and have the proper focus when he eats. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch suggests, the Torah forbade an Onen from eating sacrifices. On the level of Torah law, a person is considered an Onen on the day of a family member’s passing and burial. The night after that day, he is considered an Onen by force of Rabbinic enactment, and must therefore continue refraining from hallowed food. The status of Aninut remains throughout the period from the family member’s passing, until the burial. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices were brought, and when Ma’aser Sheni and other tithes were required on the level of Torah law. One who eats a Ke’zayit of Ma’aser Sheni or sacrificial food on the day of a family member’s passing is liable to Malkut. On the night after the death and burial, when Aninut is extended by force of Rabbinic enactment, one who transgresses receives Malkut for violating the law imposed by the Sages.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:12-15) commands one to make a verbal declaration after “the third year,” avowing his compliance with his various tithing obligations. Each year, a farmer must give a portion of his produce – Teruma – to a Kohen, as well as one-tenth – Ma’aser Rishon – to a Levi. In addition, on the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, he must take another tenth – Ma’aser Sheni – to Jerusalem and eat it there. On the third and sixth years, this tithe is substituted with Ma’aser Ani – a tithe for the poor. (During the Shemita year, all the produce is declared ownerless, and thus no tithing obligations apply.) The Torah here commands that after each year of Ma’aser Ani – meaning, after the third and sixth years – one must make a proclamation avowing his having satisfied these requirements. This verbal proclamation is commonly known as “Vidui Ma’aser” – “the tithing confession.” Normally, the term “Vidui” (“confession”) refers to the confession of sin; in this instance, it denotes avowing having done the right thing. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that what distinguishes the human being from all other creatures is the faculty of speech. Even animals have some degree of intelligence, but none of them have the power of verbal communication. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, many people are especially careful about how they speak, even more careful than they are about how they act. Keenly aware of the special importance of this defining human characteristic, they exercise particular caution in regard to their speech. Therefore, the Torah commanded a farmer to verbally affirm his meeting his Terumot and Ma’aserot obligations, as this will ensure his compliance with these laws. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that giving Terumot and Ma’aserot is an especially important responsibility, as these donations support those who serve Hashem in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Thus, in order to help enforce these obligations, the Torah requires farmers to make the Vidui Ma’aser proclamation. One who knows he will have to verbally affirm compliance with these requirements will likely comply with them, in order not to compromise his speech through a false declaration. The Misva of Vidui Ma’aser thus helps ensure that one meets his obligations. One must declare Vidui Ma’aser specifically during the day. It is done in the Bet Ha’mikdash, as the Torah commands making this declaration “Lifneh Hashem Elokecha” – “before Hashem your G-d” (26:13). Nevertheless, the Rambam rules that one who declared Vidui Ma’aser somewhere else, outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, has fulfilled his obligation. As mentioned, one must declare Vidui Ma’aser after the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle. Specifically, it is done on the final day of Pesach the following year, meaning, in the fourth year, and in the Shemita year. This Misva is binding only upon men, and only during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Aderet (Rav Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim, 1843-1905), who served as the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, maintained that the Vidui Ma’aser proclamation should be made even nowadays, when there is no Bet Ha’mikdash. This position was disputed by the Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953).
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:5) introduces the Misva known as “Mikra Bikkurim,” which requires a farmer to make a special proclamation upon bringing his Bikkurim – first ripened fruits – to the Bet Ha’mikdash. In this proclamation, the farmer recalls the story of Beneh Yisrael’s enslavement in Egypt and the miracles of the Exodus. He then expresses his gratitude for the land which G-d has given him, from which he produced quality fruit. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah requires the farmer to not only bring his first fruits, but also to make this proclamation, because verbally expressing one’s feelings has a stronger impact than the feelings themselves. By pronouncing with one’s mouth G-d’s kindnesses, and his feelings of gratitude, those feelings become even stronger. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d wants the farmer to feel deep appreciation for the fruits themselves, and for the ability he was given to bring these fruits to Jerusalem, the good health and strength that G-d has granted him. And once he is expressing his gratitude for these blessings, he expresses gratitude also for what G-d has done for the Jewish People, miraculously redeeming them from Egyptian bondage, and bringing them to the Land of Israel. Through these expressions of gratitude, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the farmer becomes worthy of continued blessing. It is because G-d wants us to earn His abundant blessings that He gives us this Misva, though which we become worthy of His kindness and grace. In the Mikra Bikkurim proclamation, the farmer expresses gratitude for the fruits he produced from “Ha’adama Asher Natata Li Hashem” – “the land which You, Hashem, have given me” (26:10). Therefore, this proclamation is made only by those who are given a portion of the land. Women, who do not receive a portion, do not recite Mikra Bikkurim, even though they are required to bring Bikkurim if they have agricultural land and produce fruit. Likewise, a Tumtum and Adroginus – people whose gender cannot be ascertained – do not recite Mikra Bikkurim. Additionally, an Apotropus – administrator of an estate on behalf of the deceased’s orphans – does not recite Mikra Bikkurim when he brings Bikkurim on the orphans’ behalf from the land left by their father. Since this land does not belong to him, he cannot recite, “Ha’adama Asher Natata Li Hashem,” and so he does not recite Mikra Bikkurim. An interesting exception to this rule is a convert, who recites Mikra Bikkurim despite the fact that he does not receive a portion of Eretz Yisrael. The reason is that Eretz Yisrael was given to the descendants of Abraham Abinu, who is called an “Ab Hamon Goyim” – “the father of a multitude of nations” (Bereshit 17:5). Abraham is considered the “father” of not only his biological descendants, but also members of other nations who join Am Yisrael. Therefore, a convert is able to refer to the Land of Israel as “Ha’adama Asher Natata Li Hashem,” because he is regarded as an heir of Abraham Abinu, to whom G-d promised the land. The Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question of why a woman is excluded from the Misva of Mikra Bikkurim simply because there is one phrase in the proclamation which is not relevant to her. Wouldn’t we assume that it is worth making this proclamation, given that the vast majority of the text is applicable to a woman no less than to a man? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that this Halacha shows the importance of precision when we pray and speak to Hashem. We must ensure never to say to G-d anything which is not perfectly accurate. Indeed, if even one phrase in a proclamation is inaccurate, then the proclamation should not be made, because when we speak to G-d, we must adhere to the strictest standards of precision. This Misva, of course, applies only when the Misva of Bikkurim applies – meaning, only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It applies specifically in the Land of Israel, and, by force of Rabbinic enactment, in the areas of Syria which King David conquered and annexed into his kingdom. One who brings his Bikkurim and fails to recite this declaration has transgressed this affirmative command.
In the final verses of Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:17-19), the Torah introduces three Misvot relevant to the evil nation of Amalek. The first is the command to always remember Amalek’s attack on Beneh Yisrael soon after the Exodus from Egypt. The significance of Amalek’s attack can be understood in light of a verse in Parashat Balak (Bamidbar 24:20), in which Bilam proclaims, “Reshit Goyim Amalek” – that Amalek was “the first among the nations.” Targum Onkelos explains this to mean that Amalek was the first nation to wage war with Beneh Yisrael after they left Egypt. The Sages compare Amalek’s attack to somebody who jumps into a bath of scalding water, into which nobody else had dared to enter. This fellow was badly burned, but he had the effect of cooling the water somewhat, so that others could enter. Similarly, after the miracles of the Exodus and the splitting of the sea, all the nations of the world feared Beneh Yisrael, and did not dare initiate hostilities against them. Amalek was defeated after attacking Beneh Yisrael, but the attack had the effect of exposing Beneh Yisrael’s vulnerability, “cooling” the fear that the rest of the world had felt, thus paving the way for future offensives by other peoples. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that Amalek launched this unprovoked attack due to its “evil heart and evil nature.” The Torah wants us to remember this event, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, so that we realize that anybody who causes to harm to Am Yisrael is despised by G-d. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the downfall of the enemy nations is commensurate with the extent of their efforts to cause us harm and destroy us. The harder they try to fight against us, the greater the devastation that they will suffer as a result. This notion is relevant to our time, as well, when we have enemies who are expending an enormous amount of effort to wage war against the Jewish People. The Kabbalists teach that the concept underlying this Misva refers not only to the actual nation of Amalek, but to all those who follow Amalek’s evil example, and fight viciously against Am Yisrael. We must firmly believe that the modern-day “Amalekites” are despised by Hashem, and He will bring retribution for the pain and harm that they cause to the Jewish Nation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Torah did not specify when or how often we are to fulfill this Misva to remember Amalek’s attack. As opposed to the Misva to remember the Exodus from Egypt, which, as the Sages inferred from the text of the Torah, requires mentioning the Exodus each day and night, the Misva to remember Amalek’s assault is not given any time-frame. However, the accepted custom is to fulfill this Misva once a year, on the Shabbat before Purim, by reading these verses from the Torah in the synagogue. This is done because on Purim, we read the Megilla, which tells of the destruction of Haman and his sons, who belonged to the nation of Amalek. In advance of the reading of the destruction of Amalek, then, we fulfill the Misva to remember what Amalek did to us. Later, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one transgresses this affirmative command by going his entire life without ever verbally remembering Amalek’s attack. It appears that in his view, the Torah obligation requires verbally recalling Amalek’s attack just once at some point in one’s life. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command applies in all places and in all time-periods, and is binding only upon men. He explains that since women do not generally go out to war, they are exempt from the obligation to remember Amalek’s attack, which is linked to the Misva of waging war to annihilate Amalek. Later scholars raised the question of how to reconcile the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s comments with the Gemara’s teaching that in the case of a Milhemet Misva (a war which there is a Misva to wage), everyone must participate, including brides and grooms. The Gemara clearly assumes that when it comes to obligatory wars, the responsibility falls upon even women. The answer given is that women fulfill non-combat roles, such as preparing and delivering food and other supplies for the soldiers. They do not, however, participate in the actual fighting, and therefore, in the view of the Sefer Ha’hinuch, they are not included in the Misva to remember Amalek’s attack, since they do not fight against Amalek. In the next verse, the Torah introduces the command, “Timheh Et Zecher Amalek Mi’tahat Ha’shamayim” – to eradicate Amalek from the face of the earth. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Batra relates that King David’s general, Yoab, waged war against Amalek, and killed only the males. When he returned, David asked him why he did not kill also the women, and Yoab replied by citing the phrase “Timheh Et Zecher Amalek.” His schoolteacher, Yoab recalled, taught him that the word “Zecher” in this verse should be pronounced, “Zechar” – “the males of,” such that the obligation is to kill only the men. This is a mistake, as the correct pronunciation is “Zecher,” which means “memory of,” and the Misva requires killing even the women. According to some views, this schoolteacher was tracked down and punished for the grave mistake that was made when teaching this command. The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin teaches that upon entering the Land of Israel, Beneh Yisrael became obligated in three Misvot: appointing a king, building the Bet Ha’mikdash, and annihilating the nation of Amalek. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command is binding upon all those who have the practical ability to kill Amalekites. Fundamentally, this Misva applies in all times and places. In practice, of course, we are unable to identify anybody as a member of the nation of Amalek. The Assyrian emperor Sanhedrib captured much of the ancient world and transferred entire populations from their lands, such that residents of a country cannot be assumed to be the descendants of the original nations who lived there. Hence, nobody can be identified as a member of the nation of Amalek, and we are thus unable to fulfill this Misva. The final words of Parashat Ki-Teseh are “Lo Tishkah” – “Do not forget,” introducing a third command, forbidding us from forgetting what Amalek did to our ancestors. In addition to the affirmative command to remember Amalek’s attack, we are also prohibited from doing anything that would cause us to forget what they did. The Gemara understood that the affirmative command requires verbally recalling Amalek’s attack, whereas the prohibition forbids us from forgetting it in our minds.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:13-16) forbids having in one’s possession inaccurate weights and measures, meaning, instruments which give incorrect readings of weight, volume or size, and could thus cheat either the seller or the buyer. Using such instruments, the Torah states, is considered “To’abat Hashem” – “an abomination to G-d.” The Torah here forbids having inaccurate weights and measures in one’s possession even if they are not being used. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that possessing such instruments is forbidden “Pen Yiheyeh Le’mokesh” – “lest it becomes a trap,” meaning, because it might lead to sinful conduct. The Rambam writes that other people, who do not realize that the instrument is not accurate, might innocently use it, and will unknowingly end up stealing, by overcharging or underpaying for merchandise. From the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation, however, it appears that he understood the concern to be for the person himself. Even though he knows that the instrument is imprecise, he might nevertheless be tempted to use it in order to steal. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Batra (89) establishes that this prohibition applies even if it can be assumed that the instrument will never be used. For example, if the instrument had been used as a bedpan, for urine, such that we cannot conceive of people using it later to measure food or beverages, nevertheless, one may not keep it in his home. The Torah speaks of the various instruments in this context with repetitive phrases – “Eben Va’aben”; “Efa Ve’efa.” The Rambam writes that although the Torah repeats these phrases, this command is to be listed as a single Biblical prohibition, and not as two prohibitions. One might have assumed that the extra words imply additional commands, such that one who transgresses this prohibition is actually guilty of multiple violations. The Rambam writes that this is not the case, as the Torah occasionally repeats itself for emphasis, and thus one violates only a single prohibition by having inaccurate weights or measures in his possession. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who keeps a faulty scale or measuring device in his home violates this command, but is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives two reasons why one is not liable to Malkut for this violation. Firstly, and more obviously, this falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which one transgresses passively, without performing a forbidden act. One violates this command simply by keeping the forbidden instrument in his home, and failing to bring it out of his home. As no action is performed, the violator is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then adds a second reason, explaining that this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which one can rectify by paying money. If one uses an inaccurate instrument to weigh or measure merchandise, and thereby steals, he corrects his misconduct by repaying the person from whom he stole. Malkut are not administered for a violation that can be rectified, and so one is not subject to Malkut for violating the prohibition against faulty weights and measures. Later writers raised the question of how the Sefer Ha’hinuch could apply the rule of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” to the prohibition against possessing faulty weights or measures. As explained earlier, this command forbids not only using these instruments, but even just having them in one’s home. This violation thus does not entail any theft, and, as such, it cannot be rectified through payment. How, then, does the Sefer Ha’hinuch classify this prohibition under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin”? The Minhat Hinuch (Rav Yosef Babad, 1801-1874) and the Or Same’ah (Rav Meir Simcha Ha’kohen of Dvinsk, 1843-1926) answer this question based on the aforementioned explanation of the command not to even possess faulty weights and measures. As we saw, the Torah issued this command in order to prevent the use of these instruments, which entails theft. Now if somebody actually uses inaccurate weights and measures, to the detriment of the other party to the transaction, then he is not liable to Malkut, because he repays the amount that he stole from his fellow. It stands to reason that if this violation is not punishable by Malkut, then the possession of faulty weights and measures, which is forbidden only as a safeguard against the actual use of such devices, cannot be punishable by Malkut. The prohibition enacted as a safeguard against theft cannot be treated more seriously than theft itself. Therefore, since one does not receive Malkut for using inaccurate instruments, one does not receive Malkut for having them in his possession, either. This prohibition should remind us of the importance of exercising caution with regard to what we allow into our possession. If the Torah forbids keeping in storage an old, broken scale, as it may possibly lead to forbidden activity, then certainly we must ensure not to allow in our homes things that people use and which could lead to misconduct. We must be careful with regard to the literature that enters our home, and also not allow unfiltered internet access, which poses far greater spiritual danger than an old scale in the basement. The Torah’s command teaches us of the diligence required when building and maintaining a Torah home, that we must not keep in the home anything which could cause people to stumble and act improperly.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:10-11) addresses the case of an argument that erupts between two men, and the wife of one of the men violently attacks the other, reaching for his private area. Since she endangered the man fighting with her husband, the Torah commands, “Ve’kasota Et Kapah” – “You shall cut off her hand.” This command is understood as a general obligation to rescue somebody who is pursued or has come under assault, by attacking the person who threatens him. The verse continues, “Lo Tahos Enecha,” adding a prohibition against having compassion for the attacker. The Torah thus introduces both an affirmative command to rescue the pursued, and a prohibition against turning away and allowing the pursuer to continue. If one can stop the pursuer by inflicting an injury – as in the case described by the Torah, where the woman’s hand could be severed – then this should be done. If the only way to stop the pursuer is by killing him, then he must be killed. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d wants us to maintain law and order in society, and so the Torah commands us not to allow the strong to take advantage of the weak. Moreover, the weak and vulnerable tend to be humbler and more devoted to G-d, and the Torah thus wants us to protect them against the violent elements of society who have no regard for Torah values. This Misva applies even if the Rodef (pursuer) is an adult who pursues a young child. The child’s life must be protected by stopping the adult pursuer. If one was able to rescue the pursued by injuring the Rodef, but nevertheless killed him, he is considered a murderer, as he killed unnecessarily. It is only if the pursuer cannot be stopped without being killed that one is allowed – and thus required – to kill the pursuer. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 49a) applies this rule to the story told in the Book of Shemuel II (chapter 2) of Abner, who killed Asah’el, who was chasing after him. Abner was considered guilty of murder because he could have protected himself by injuring Asah’el, and he did not need to kill him. If a woman is in labor, and, due to complications, she becomes dangerously ill, the doctor may kill the fetus in order to save the woman, as the fetus is considered to be “pursuing” the mother, in that it threatens the mother’s life. However, once the baby’s head has exited the mother’s body, then this situation is treated as the natural process of childbirth, and the infant may not be killed, even if the mother’s condition is life-threatening. The obligation to rescue somebody who is pursued applies also in the case of a man pursuing a woman with whom relations are forbidden, with the intent to violate her. This man, too, is considered a Rodef, and must be stopped, even if this necessitates killing him. This applies also if a man pursues another man for the purpose of committing a homosexual act with him. If somebody makes his way to commit a different capital offense, however, one may not kill or injure the fellow to stop him from committing the violation. Instead, Bet Din is assigned the task of trying the sinner after the fact. These two Misvot – the affirmative command to the rescue the pursued, and the prohibition against refraining from doing so – apply in all times and places, and are binding upon both men and women. One who is able to rescue the pursued but fails to do so transgresses these two commands as well as the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” (Vayikra 19:16), which forbids sitting idly instead of rescuing somebody whose life is in danger.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:7-10) commands that if someone’s married brother died without children, and he chooses not to marry the widow in fulfillment of the Misva of Yibum, then he must perform a special ceremony called Halisa. Once a married man dies without children, the widow is bound to the deceased’s brother (a relationship called “Zika”), such that she is not permitted to marry anybody else. The deceased’s brother bears an obligation to perform Halisa to release the widow from this bond if he does not want to marry her. The Halisa ceremony involves the brother wearing a special shoe which the widow unties and removes from his foot, after which she spits in front of him. The concept underlying the Halisa ceremony is that the widow demonstrates to the brother her willingness to be subservient to him, as represented by her removing his shoe, an act which a servant would perform for a master. She was prepared to serve him if he would marry her in order to perpetuate her deceased husband’s legacy. But since he has refused to marry her, she no longer gives him respect, to the extent that she now spits in his presence. This obligation applies only if the brother was born before the husband passed away. If the husband died and his parents then begot a child, the widow is not bound to this brother, since the brothers were not alive at the same time. The Misva applies only to paternal brothers, meaning, brothers who share the same father. If the deceased had only a brother from the same mother, but not a brother from the same father, then there is no Misva of Yibum in such a case. The Torah writes that Yibum or Halisa is required if a husband dies without a “son” (“U’ben En Lo”), but this refers to either a son or a daughter. If the deceased has a son or a daughter, then there is no obligation of Yibum or Halisa. If the deceased had a son or daughter who has since passed away, and has a grandchild from that son or daughter, then there is no obligation of Yibum or Halisa, since the deceased has living offspring. When Halisa is to be performed, three judges are chosen to oversee the process, which involves certain texts which both the widow and her brother-in-law must recite. In order to publicize the Halisa, an additional five Rabbis are brought to observe. Before the Halisa, the Rabbis instruct the widow and brother-in-law, “Go to such-and-such place,” as the location of the Halisa must be designated in advance. The Rabbis then ask the brother-in-law a series of questions, ascertaining that he is at least thirteen years of age, and that this woman is indeed his deceased brother’s widow. The judges also ask the widow if she had eaten that day, as she should not eat anything on the day of the Halisa before the ceremony. The reason is that the woman is required to spit her own saliva, and not fluid from anything she had eaten. The shoe used for Halisa must be made from leather, and optimally should be placed on the brother’s right foot. This special shoe has laces and straps tied up the brother’s leg. He must wear the shoe directly on his foot, without socks, as nothing may come in between the shoe and his foot. The widow unties the shoe and removes it. The brother must keep his foot on the ground throughout the process, and may not assist at all in the untying or removal of the shoe. She then spits in front of the brother, enough for the Rabbis to see. The Rabbis of the Bet Din then announce three times, “Halutz Ha’na’al,” and write her a “Get Halisa,” a text that pronounces her release from the bond to the brother-in-law. The widow is then permitted to marry anyone she wishes. Torah law permits a woman to marry a Kohen after Halisa, as she is not considered a Gerusha (divorcee), who is forbidden from marrying a Kohen. However, the Sages enacted that a woman who has performed Halisa may not then marry a Kohen, as though she had been divorced. If the deceased’s brother does not wish to marry the widow, and he refuses to perform Halisa, then he has violated this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that he is considered a “Ro’a Leb” – an “evil-hearted person,” as he keeps his widowed sister-in-law trapped and unable to marry.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh that if a married, childless man dies, and he has a brother, then the brother must perform “Yibum,” meaning, he must marry the widow. If he does not wish to marry her, then he performs a ceremony called Halisa, which is listed as a separate Misva. In explaining the reason behind the Misva of Yibum, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that when a couple marries, they are considered a single unit. This idea is rooted in the very first married couple – Adam and Hava – in that Hava was created from a part of Adam’s body. This shows that a wife is, in a sense, regarded as part of the husband. Now when a husband dies without leaving behind a spiritual legacy in the form of children who inherit his devotion to serving G-d, the Torah creates a method by which the deceased husband can be considered to beget children, such that he leaves a legacy. His brother marries the widow – who is considered part of the deceased – and their children will be considered the children of the deceased. The Misvot they perform will be partially credited to the deceased, thus elevating his soul. Of course, the biological father – the deceased’s brother – also shares in these merits, as he is the one who actually produces and raises the children. But in this way, the deceased can be considered to partially leave behind a spiritual legacy, and this is why the Torah introduced the concept of Yibum. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains on this basis the story of Onan, Yehuda’s second son, who married the widow of his older brother, Er, in fulfillment of the Misva of Yibum. However, although Onan married the widow, the Torah (Bereshit 38:9) tells that Onan refused to impregnate her, because he knew “Ki Lo Lo Yiheyeh Ha’zara” – “that the offspring would not be his.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch interprets this to mean that the child he would produce would not be attributed entirely to him, as he would be “sharing” this child with his deceased brother. Onan was not interested in only a partial share of the child, and so he refused to produce children with the widow. In any event, according to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, the concept underlying the Misva of Yibum is that it enables the deceased to leave a spiritual legacy here in the world through his brother’s marriage to his wife. The Misva of Yibum applies regardless of whether the husband died after he married his wife, or he died after Erusin (betrothal), before the completion of the marriage. Only a paternal brother is required to perform Yibum; a brother who shares only a mother with the deceased, and not a father, is not required to marry the widow. If the deceased was married to several wives, and had no children with any of them, then one of his brothers performs Yibum or Halisa to any of the deceased’s wives. The oldest surviving brother has first rights to perform Yibum, before the younger brothers. Once a brother performs Halisa, the widow may then not marry him. If the deceased also had other wives, they are also forbidden for marriage to the brother who performed Halisa, and also to all the other brothers, by force of Rabbinic enactment. Yibum should not be performed immediately after the husband’s death. The brother must wait ninety days – including the day of death and the day of the Yibum – as it must first be ascertained that the widow is not pregnant with the deceased’s child. If she is, then there is no Misva of Yibum, and thus the brother-in-law may not marry her. Therefore, a waiting period is required to ensure she is not pregnant before the deceased’s brother marries her. If a husband died while his wife was pregnant with his only child, but she miscarried, then she requires Yibum, because the deceased did not leave any children. The deceased’s brother fulfills this Misva by having relations with the widow. He fulfills the Misva even if he did not have intention at the time of the relations to fulfill the obligation. However, the Sages enacted that the brother should formally betroth the widow before having relations. This special betrothal before Yibum is referred to as a “Ma’amar.” The Misva of Yibum applies in all times and places. Even today, the brother of a childless husband who dies is required to perform Yibum, but it is customary to instead perform Halisa. If the brother performed neither Yibum nor Halisa, then he is in violation of this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Seseh (Debarim 25:5) commands that when a married man dies without children, the widow may not have relations with another man until Yibum or Halisa. The term Yibum refers to the marriage of the deceased’s brother to the widow, and Halisa is a ceremony which the brother and widow perform if the brother does not wish to marry her. The Torah here commands that until Yibum or Halisa is performed, the widow may not have relations with any man, as the “Zika” (Halachic link) to her brother-in-law forbids her for all other men. If the widow does have relations with another man before Yibum or Halisa, then both she and the man violate this prohibition, and are liable to Malkut. The Rambam implies that this prohibition is violated only if the widow marries another man. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, writes that this command forbids relations with the widow even outside the context of marriage. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains the reason for this command in his discussion of the next Misva, the obligation upon the deceased’s brother to perform Yibum.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:4), “Lo Tahsom Shor Be’disho” – “You shall not muzzle an ox as it threshes.” This establishes a prohibition against preventing an animal from eating as it works outside in the field. The Torah gives the example of an ox on the threshing floor, but this command applies to all animals. It applies even to non-kosher animals, as the animal’s status vis-à-vis human consumption is of no relevance to this prohibition. It also applies to any form of work outside in the field, and not only to threshing. Anytime a person has an animal perform work in the field, he may not prevent the animal from eating. It makes no difference whether the animal wishes to eat produce that is still attached to the ground, or produce that has already been harvested. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah introduced this prohibition in order to engender within a person a kind, compassionate, sensitive character. Although G-d created animals to serve human beings, He commanded us to show sensitivity to the animals who work for us so that we accustom ourselves to show sensitivity to the people who work for us, pay them fairly, and care for their needs and for their wellbeing. This command refers only to animals; the laws regarding the rights of human workers is addressed in other contexts. One violates this prohibition even if he muzzled the animal before it started working and then kept the muzzle on as the animal worked. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who muzzled an animal while it was working in the field has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. Even if one did not muzzle the animal, but he shouted at the animal when it tried to eat, thus preventing it from eating, he is liable to Malkut. With respect to this prohibition, moving one’s lips to shout qualifies as an “action” such that the violator is regarded as having transgressed by committing a forbidden act, and is thus liable to Malkut. If somebody leased his fellow’s animal and muzzled it while it worked in the field, then in addition to receiving Malkut, the violator must compensate the owner for failing to feed the animal. One who leases someone’s animal accepts responsibility to feed it, and thus if he prevents the animal from eating, he owes the owner money for failing to meet this obligation. Normally, if a person commits an act for which he is liable to both Malkut and payment, he receives the Malkut and does not need to pay (“En Adam Lokeh U’meshalem”). In this instance, however, the violator must compensate the animal’s owner, because the financial obligation is incurred not by the forbidden act of muzzling the animal, but rather by the failure to feed the animal as required.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh that when somebody is found guilty of a violation, he must be given Makut (lashes). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command is actually intended for the benefit of the transgressor. The afflictions that sinners endure in this world have the effect of cleansing their record, such that they can be worthy of the eternal rewards in the next world. In G-d’s great love for Am Yisrael, whom He treats as His precious children, He prescribed a system of punishment in this world so that violators can have the opportunity to receive great rewards in the world to come. Before the Malkut were administered, the violator would have his hands tied to a pole. The court official would tear the violator’s shirt until his chest was exposed, and stand on a stone behind him. The whip was made from the hide of a calf. One-third of the prescribed lashes were directed to the front of the violator’s body, and the other two-thirds struck his back. This command applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and only when there are courts consisting of judges who had received the official Semicha (ordination) that originated with Moshe Rabbenu. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a court failed to administer Malkut when this was required, they were deserving of severe punishment, because it is the threat of punishment that deters prospective sinners and thereby ensures compliance with the Torah’s laws. In this same verse, the Torah introduces a prohibition against lashing the convicted sinner more than the prescribed number of lashes. The Sages understood this command as establishing a general prohibition against striking a fellow Jew. This is inferred from the repetitious phrase in this verse – “Lo Yosif, Pen Tosif” – which implies that this prohibition is directed not only to the court official administering Malkut, but to all of us, forbidding striking our fellow. The Torah here states that a violator is given forty Malkut, but tradition explains this to mean thirty-nine. The Rambam writes that in truth, the verse should be understood literally, as referring to forty lashes, but tradition lowered the number to thirty-nine as a safeguard, to ensure that the court official does not exceed forty lashes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch questions why the Rambam advanced this novel theory, when the Gemara explicitly states that the word “Arba’im” (“forty”) in this verse means “one less than forty.” In any event, these thirty-nine lashes are the maximum amount the violation would receive. An assessment would be made by physicians beforehand to determine how many lashes the sinner could endure, based on his age and physical condition. If he could not tolerate even three lashes, then he would not receive any. The number of lashes needed to be a multiple of 3. Thus, for example, if the doctors determined that the violator could handle twenty lashes, then he would receive eighteen lashes. If, as the sinner is whipped, he lost control of his bodily functions, then he was not whipped anymore. If the whip was torn at some point after the court official began administering the Malkut, then he was required stop, without giving more lashes. If, however, the whip broke before the official began lashing the sinner, then he would repair the whip and proceed. If the sinner’s hands were not tied well to the pole, and he was able to escape, then he was not given lashes thereafter. It is forbidden not only to strike one’s fellow, but even to merely lift one’s hand and threaten to strike him. This Halacha is inferred from the story told in Parashat Shemot (2:13) of Moshe approaching two men whom he saw fighting. He turned to the “wicked one” and asked why he was striking his fellow. The Sages understood that Moshe saw this man lift his hand to strike the other, and so this person is called “the wicked one,” as it is forbidden even to lift one’s hand to strike somebody. This second aspect of the prohibition, which forbids striking one’s fellow, applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. The first aspect of this command, of course, applies only in the Land of Israel, during times when courts are authorized to administer punishment. One who strikes his fellow must make a series of payments to compensate him for the harm inflicted. As such, the violator is not liable to Malkut, as one is not liable to Malkut if he incurred a financial obligation by committing the transgression. If, however, one struck his fellow and the harm inflicted was worth less than a “Peruta” (the smallest unit of currency), then since there is no obligation to pay, he is liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:19) that if one forgets sheaves of grain during the harvest, they must be left for the poor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah required leaving these sheaves for the poor because when the underprivileged see the landowners harvesting their produce, they say to themselves, “These folks have such an abundance of a grain! If only we could have just several sheaves!” Out of compassion for the impoverished, G-d granted their request by giving them rights to the sheaves of grain that are forgotten during the harvest. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, leaving these sheaves for the poor will help the owner engender within himself the qualities of compassion and sensitivity, as a result of which he will be worthy of Hashem’s blessings. This requirement applies only to small sheaves of grain, specifically, sheaves amounting to one Se’a or less. If larger sheaves are forgotten, one may go back to retrieve them. Furthermore, the sheaves must be left for the poor only if they are forgotten by everybody. If the owner forgot about them but the workers did not, or vice-versa, then they may be retrieved. Even if some stranger saw that these sheaves were forgotten and informed the workers or owner, the sheaves may be retrieved. This Misva applies only in areas where the Teruma obligation applies – meaning, in Eretz Yisrael, and in regions near Eretz Yisrael. It is binding upon both men and women alike. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who violates this command by retrieving forgotten sheaves shows that he has a bad character, as he withholds that which ought to be given to the needy. In this same verse, the Torah adds a prohibition against going back to retrieve forgotten sheaves (“Lo Tashub Le’lekahto”). Thus, one is bound by both an affirmative command to leave the sheaves for the poor, and a prohibition forbidding him from taking it. One who transgresses this prohibition by retrieving forgotten sheaves is not liable to Malkut, because he can rectify his violation by bringing it back and leaving it for the poor, and one is not liable to Malkut for a violation which can be rectified (“Lav Ha’nitak”). According to some opinions, however, one would be liable to Malkut if, after unlawfully retrieving forgotten sheaves, the sheaves are lost and destroyed. Since he can no longer rectify his transgression by returning them, he is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:17), “Ve’lo Tahabol Beged Almana” – that one who lends money to a widow may not take something from her as collateral in lieu of payment. This applies regardless of whether the widow is needy or wealthy. Even if she is rich, it is forbidden for a lender to take one of her possessions as collateral. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this prohibition in order to accustom us to act mercifully and compassionately. Widows are generally downtrodden and vulnerable, and taking collateral from a widow would make her feel taken advantage of. The Torah wants us to show particular compassion and sensitivity to widows, and so a creditor may not seize collateral from her. It is forbidden for a lender to take collateral from a widow even if she agrees to give one. This prohibition applies at all times and in all places, and is binding upon both men and women. One violates this command by taking collateral from a widow once the debt is due and she has not paid. It is permissible to take collateral from a widow as security at the time the loan is given. If a lender took collateral from a widow in violation of this command, he must return it. For this reason, he is not liable to Malkut, because Malkut are not administered when one committed a violation which he can rectify through payment. However, the Rambam maintains that if the lender took collateral and it was subsequently lost or destroyed, then he is liable to Malkut, since he can no longer rectify the violation by returning the object. The Sefer Ha’hinuch questions this ruling, noting that the value of the lost collateral will be deducted from the sum of the debt owed by the widow. Hence, the creditor is considered to have repaid for what he unlawfully took, and should therefore not be liable to Malkut even if the original object is lost or destroyed.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:17), “Lo Tateh Mishpat Ger Yatom” – forbidding judges from “swaying” a trial involving a litigant who is either a foreigner or an orphan. A judge might tilt the decision in one of two opposite directions in a such a case. First, since foreigners and orphans are, generally, weaker and more vulnerable, the judge might not take their arguments seriously, and might have a natural bias in favor of the other litigant, who is likely wealthier and more well-known. Conversely, the judge might tilt the decision in favor of the foreigner or orphan, out of pity for this litigant’s disadvantaged condition. The Torah commands that a judge must be honest and impartial when handling such cases, without showing bias toward the foreigner or orphan, or to the opposing litigant. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a litigant is both a foreigner and an orphan, then the judge who sways the decision in either direction violates this prohibition twice – as he sways the judgment of both a foreigner and an orphan. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, the judge violates the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta’asu Avel Ba’mishpat” (Vayikra 19:15), which forbids judges from ruling unjustly. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although this command is generally applicable to men – as only men serve as judges – it can, in some instances, be relevant even to women. If the litigants agree to bring their dispute to a female judge, and have her try the case, then she becomes bound by this prohibition, and would thus transgress this command if she sways the judgment against or in favor of a foreigner or orphan.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 2416), “Lo Yumtu Abot Al Banim, U’banim Lo Yumtu Al Abot” – “Fathers shall not be killed because of their sons, and sons shall not be killed because of their fathers.” This verse is understood to mean that a court is not permitted to put a defendant to death based on the testimony of his parent or child. Although the Torah speaks here specifically of testimony regarding a capital crime, this command in truth includes all court cases, even cases involving financial disputes. A Bet Din is forbidden by force of this command from acting upon testimony given by a witness about a family member. The Torah gives the example of a capital case because one might have assumed that a person would not testify untruthfully about his family member’s capital offense, which would lead to his or her execution. Since we would have thought to accept testimony incriminating one’s family member of a capital crime, the Torah introduced this command specifically in the context of an offense incurring the death penalty. Likewise, although the Torah speaks here of a parent testifying about a child, and a child testifying about a parent, this prohibition actually applies to testimony about any family member. The example of a parent and child is given because of the strong feelings of love and affection that exist between parents and children. We might have thought to accept incriminating testimony about one’s parent or child, because it is difficult to imagine that one would falsely testify against one’s parent or child. The Torah therefore gave this particular example, but the prohibition applies also to other family members. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade accepting testimony about family members in order to help ensure the veracity of testimony accepted in courts of law. A stable society requires a functioning judicial system, and so it is imperative that courts act upon testimony which cannot be questioned. Therefore, the Torah forbade accepting testimony on behalf of family members, as family members might lie in order to help one another. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah extended this prohibition to include also incriminating testimony against family members as a safeguard against accepting testimony given on behalf of family members. If the Torah allowed accepting incriminating testimony, courts might then begin accepting even testimony on behalf of family members, and so the Torah disqualified all testimony about the witness’ family members. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, family members generally live with one another, which frequently gives rise to tensions and fighting. When friction arises, a person might decide to come to court and falsely testify about his family member towards whom he feels resentment. He will then later regret having brought the false accusation, once his anger subsides. The Torah therefore commanded that testimony about family members must not be accepted. On the level of Torah law, this disqualification applies only to paternal relatives – father and son, grandfather and grandson, paternal brothers, the sons of brothers, and a man with his brother’s son. The Rabbis extended this prohibition to include also family members related maternally, or through marriage. According to some opinions, however, even these relationships are included in the Biblical prohibition. Regardless, it is clear that brothers and first cousins may not testify about one another. Second cousins, however, may testify about one another. A second cousin may testify about his second cousin’s parent, and vice-versa. According to some opinions, although one may not testify about a grandparent or grandson, one may testify about a great-grandparent or great-grandson. Others, however, maintain that when it comes to a family’s direct line, testimony is invalid even about somebody three or more generations removed. Anytime a person is ineligible to testify about a woman due to a familial relationship, he is also ineligible to testify about her husband. Likewise, if someone cannot testify about a man due to their familial relationship, he may not testify about his wife. Thus, for example, just as one cannot testify about his wife’s sister, he may not testify about her husband. However, one may testify about that husband’s family members. If a man betrothed a woman (Erusin), they may not testify about one another, even before they marry. At my wedding, two Rabbis served as witnesses – Rabbi Max Maslaton and Rabbi David Ozeri. It was later determined that since Rabbi Maslaton and Rabbi Ozeri’s wife are first cousins, they are considered relatives, and are thus disqualified to serve as witnesses together. As such, the betrothal ceremony needed to be repeated with different witnesses. This is an example of the Halacha mentioned above, that a disqualifying familial connection with a woman is applied also to her husband. This prohibition applies even today, when witnesses are brought before a Bet Din in cases involving financial disputes. It applies to the judges of the Bet Din, forbidding them from accepting the testimony of a litigant’s family member. Of course, they are not liable to Malkut for this transgression, as it is committed without performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”).
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:15) commands, “Be’yomo Titen Secharo” – requiring an employer to promptly pay his worker the wages due to him, without any delay. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command because generally, people depend on their wages for their basic sustenance. Ensuring to pay workers on time so that they can pay for their necessities helps engender compassion and sensitivity for other people. The Torah wants us to be merciful and compassionate, because when we act toward people with mercy and compassion, we earn Hashem’s mercy and compassion, and He showers us with His blessings. This Misva includes both wages for work that one performed, as well as payment for leasing. Thus, if a person leases his fellow’s animal or utensil, he is required by force of this command to promptly pay the owner the rental fee. If an employee works during the day, then the employer must pay the wages that night, until morning. If the employee works at night, then the employer must pay the wages the next day, until dark. If the arrangement is for the employee to work for a week, a month or a year, then the time his wages are due depends on when his term of employment ends. If it ends during the day, then he must be paid by the end of the day, and if it ends during the night, then the payment must be given during that night. If somebody brings an artisan a utensil or some other item to repair, then the owner is not required to pay the artisan until he returns the repaired item. Once he returns it, the payment must be made immediately. This requirement applies only if the worker claims his wages; the employer does not violate this command as long as the employee has not yet asked for his money. Furthermore, this prohibition does not apply if the employer does not have the money owed to the worker. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is certainly proper not to hire a worker before ensuring that he will be able to pay his wages. This command applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:13) that a lender who took collateral from the borrower must return it to the borrower when he needs it. Previously, the Torah introduced a prohibition forbidding the lender from keeping the item with him when the borrower needs it; in this verse, the Torah adds an affirmative command to return the object. Thus, for example, if the lender seized a tool which the borrower requires for his livelihood, then the lender must return it in the morning, when the borrower needs to work, and the borrower then brings it back to the lender at the end of the day. If the lender took a blanket which the borrower needs to keep him warm at night, then the lender must return it in the evening, and the borrower then brings it back to the lender in the morning. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah introduced this command in order for us to train ourselves to act kindly and compassionately. By treating others with mercy and sensitivity, we become worthy of Hashem’s mercy and abundant blessings. This command applies only with regard to collateral taken in lieu of payment once the debt was due and the borrower did not repay. In such a case, the lender must return the object to the borrower when the borrower needs it. But if the loan was given from the outset on collateral, then the lender may keep the collateral with him at all times, because this was the condition on which the loan was given. The Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question as to what purpose there would be in taking collateral in lieu of payment if it must be returned to the borrower whenever he needs it. If the concept of taking collateral is to apply pressure upon the borrower to repay the loan, then why does the Torah require returning the item to the borrower whenever he needs it? Does this not undermine the entire purpose of collateral? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that, firstly, the collateral assures that the debt will not be cancelled at the end of the Shemita year. Normally, debts are cancelled at the end of Shemita, but when the lender took collateral in lieu of payment, the debt remains even after Shemita. Secondly, collateral allows the lender to collect the debt from the borrower’s inheritors if he dies before repaying the loan. Normally, after a debtor passes away, the creditor cannot collect the moveable possessions in the estate as payment. If, however, he had taken collateral in lieu of payment, then he may. If the item taken as collateral is a luxury item, which the borrower does not need for any practical purpose, then the lender does not need to return it at all. He may hold onto it for thirty days, and then, after thirty days, he may sell it under the auspices of Bet Din, and then keep the money as payment for the loan. A lender who refuses to return an item taken as collateral when the borrower needs it is in violation of both this affirmative command, and the prohibition mentioned earlier.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:10) that when a creditor is owed money, “Lo Tabo El Beto La’abot Aboto” – he may not enter the debtor’s home to forcefully seize his property in lieu of payment. The lender is not permitted to take the law into his own hands by forcefully seizing collateral, and must rather wait for the court to require the borrower to give him something as collateral. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command in the interest of maintaining law and order in society, to ensure that people do not resort to violent tactics to obtain what they want. If a person would be allowed to forcefully seize what is owed to him, society would be overrun by chaos, and the strong would always overpower the weak. The Torah therefore requires that a lender take collateral in lieu of payment only with the authorization of a Bet Din. This command applies also to court officials, forbidding them from entering the borrower’s home without his permission. They must instead wait outside the borrower’s home, and have him bring them possessions to be given to the lender. The court official may, however, forcefully grab the collateral from the borrower’s hand outside his home. The lender is not permitted to forcefully grab the collateral, even outside the borrower’s home. This command applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. If someone seized collateral from his debtor without permission from the Bet Din, he transgresses this prohibition. He is not liable to Malkut, however, because he can rectify his transgression by simply returning that which he unlawfully took, and one is not liable to Malkut for a violation which can be rectified (“Lav Ha’nitak”). The Rambam writes, though, that if the lender seized the collateral, and it was subsequently lost or destroyed, then the lender is indeed liable to Malkut, because he can no longer return it and thus rectify his violation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch questions this ruling, noting that even in this case, although the lender can no longer return the actual collateral, he can pay its value to the borrower, and thereby rectify the transgression. Seemingly, then, even if the unlawfully seized collateral is lost or destroyed, the lender should not be liable to Malkut. Two verses later (24:12), the Torah commands, “Lo Tishkab Ba’aboto,” introducing a prohibition forbidding a lender from keeping with him the collateral when the borrower needs it. If, for example, the borrower gave as collateral a blanket which he needs to keep him warm at night, the lender must return it at night. If the borrower gave a cooking utensil, it must be returned when the borrower needs to prepare food. If the lender keeps the collateral with him even when the borrower needs it, he is in violation of this command. He is not liable to Malkut, because this command is transgressed through inaction (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”), and Malkut are administered only for violations committed through an action.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:8) commands, “Hishamer Be’nega Ha’sara’at” – that we must “exercise care” with regard to Sara’at infections. This is understood as a prohibition against removing a Sara’at infection from one’s skin, garment or home. If a Sara’at discoloration is seen, one is required to follow the procedure outlined elsewhere by the Torah, and it is forbidden for him to simply remove it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that Sara’at is intended to serve as a sign of spiritual ills which a person must correct. It is meant to lead the person to prayer and repentance, so that he improves himself. If a person responds instead by just removing the infection, this constitutes a form of rebellion against G-d, as he rejects G-d’s “wakeup call” to repentance, “turning off the alarm” instead of answering the call and working to improve his behavior. This command forbids removing even a portion of the infection, and it applies both before the Kohen inspects the discoloration, and after the Kohen has determined that it qualifies as Sara’at. One who violates this prohibition is liable to Malkut once he removes enough of the infection that the portion which remains amounts to less than the minimum size to qualify as a Sara’at infection. If he removes some of the infection, and the amount which remains is sufficient to qualify as Sara’at, then he is liable to Malkut Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). If a Sara’at skin infection appears on the skin of an uncircumcised male, on the portion which is to be removed for the Berit Mila, the circumcision is performed even though this involves removing the Sara’at infection. The rule of “Aseh Doheh Lo Ta’aseh” establishes that, in most instances, an affirmative command is to be performed even if this entails violating a prohibition. Therefore, the affirmative command of Berit Mila overrides the prohibition against removing a Sara’at infection. This command applies whenever the laws of Sara’at apply, and is binding in all places, upon both men and women. As mentioned, one who removes a Sara’at infection from his body, clothing or home is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:6), “Lo Yahabol Rehayim Va’recheb” – forbidding a lender from seizing as collateral the borrower’s millstones, with which he grinds wheat for the preparation of bread. Although the Torah certainly entitles creditors to take collateral, a creditor may not take something which the borrower needs for preparing food. The Torah gives the specific example of “Rehayim Va’racheb” – the two stones of the mill – but this applies also to utensils needed to knead or cook, and to knives for slaughtering animals. A lender who takes such items as collateral is guilty of a separate violation for each one which he seizes. For example, if the lender took the borrower’s Shehita (slaughtering) knife, millstone, and pot, then he has committed three separate transgressions. The two millstones are considered separate utensils in this respect, and thus the creditor would be guilty of two violations for seizing the millstones, even though the borrower cannot use one without the other. If the lender did unlawfully take such an item as collateral, Bet Din has the authority to forcefully remove it from his possession and return it to the borrower. This prohibition applies only when the payment is due, and the borrower is unable to pay. In such a situation, the lender is not permitted to seize against the borrower’s will property which the borrower needs for food preparation. However, at the time the loan is given, the lender is allowed to take such utensils as collateral if the borrower agrees. Just as one is certainly allowed to purchase any item which the owner agrees to sell, one is allowed to demand any collateral that the borrower is willing to give in exchange for the loan. If the lender violated this prohibition, and the utensils he seized were burned or lost, then he is liable to Malkut, because he is no longer able to return the collateral in lieu of Malkut. He is liable to a separate set of Malkut for each utensil which he unlawfully seized. This command applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 20:10-15) that when Beneh Yisrael plan to wage war against an enemy nation, they must offer the nation peace. If the nation agrees to serve Beneh Yisrael and pay them a tax, then Beneh Yisrael must deal with them peacefully, and may not wage war against them. If the nation refuses, then Beneh Yisrael are to fight and kill all the men. The Sages understood that these verses refer to a situation of “Milhemet Reshut” (“optional war”), meaning, a war which is not obligatory according to Torah law. When it comes to a “Milhemet Misva” – a war which Beneh Yisrael are obligated to wage – the rules are different. Examples of a “Milhemet Misva” are the battles against the seven nations of Canaan, and the battle against the evil nation of Amalek. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even with regard to these nations, Beneh Yisrael must first offer peace, and if the nation accepts, then Beneh Yisrael must not fight against them. If the nation refuses, however, then Beneh Yisrael must kill the entire nation, including the women and children. This is one difference between a “Milhemet Reshut” and a “Milhemet Misva” – that in the former case, the women and children are spared, whereas in the latter case, there aren’t. Another difference between these two kinds of wars is that during a “Milhemet Reshut,” the soldiers may not surround the enemy army on all four sides; they must allow them an escape route. During a “Milhemet Misva,” by contrast, there is no such requirement, and Beneh Yisrael’s army surrounds the enemy troops on all four sides. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commands offering peace before going to war because of the great importance of the quality of Rahamanut – mercy and compassion toward others. We, G-d’s sacred nation, are expected to conduct ourselves mercifully in all our dealings with other people, even when waging war against pagan nations. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, waging war unnecessarily, even against evil nations, gives the appearance of cruelty, and, moreover, denies Beneh Yisrael the benefit of these nations’ service and tax money. During both a “Milhemet Reshut” and a “Milhemet Misva,” if the soldiers do not have access to kosher food, they are permitted to eat even non-kosher food. This Misva applies only when the Jewish Nation resides in its land, and it is binding upon the king or other leaders who have the power to enforce these laws. If the king did not first offer peace before initiating a “Milhemet Misva,” he has violated this affirmative command.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 20:5-7) that when Beneh Yisrael go out to war, a specially designated Kohen must accompany them and address them before battle. The Kohen – called the “Kohen Mashu’ah Milhama” – would deliver words of encouragement, urging the soldiers to place their faith in Hashem, and would also announce a number of exemptions. Specifically, anyone who had planted a vineyard but didn’t yet partake of its fruit, built a house but didn’t yet move into it, or betrothed a woman but didn’t yet marry her, is sent home from the battlefield. These soldiers are excused from war, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, because their minds are preoccupied with their vineyard, home or wife, and will thus not be able to properly focus on the war effort. Additionally, the Torah teaches, soldiers who are guilty of certain transgressions would be sent home, as they and the other soldiers might perish in battle on account of their wrongdoing. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that it was important to have a person of distinction who commands the respect of the soldiers to announce these exemptions. These exemptions are given only to soldiers fighting a Milhemet Reshut – optional war. But in a Milhemet Misva – obligatory war – even newly-married brides and grooms must leave to join the war effort. (Although women do not fight in battle, they help the war effort in other ways, such as by preparing food and tending to the wounded, and thus even brides are expected to participate in a Milhemet Misva.) Other officials also joined the soldiers in battle, and they were authorized to physically block soldiers from fleeing. The Sages explain, “Tehilat Nefila Nisa” – flight is the first step toward defeat. Therefore, officials were stationed to beat soldiers who tried to escape the battlefield, in order to force them to remain and fight. This Misva is assigned to the entire nation collectively. Those leading figures who are in a position to appoint a “Kohen Mashu’ah Milhama” are required to do so. Somebody in a position to appoint a “Kohen Mashu’ah Milhama” who fails to fulfill this responsibility violates this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 20:1) commands that when Beneh Yisrael go out to war, and they see the large, imposing enemy army, they must nevertheless not feel frightened – “Lo Tira Me’hem” (“Do not fear them”). They must instead place their trust in Hashem, and remember that He assists them in battle against their foes. This command appears also in other contexts (“Lo Tira’um” – Debarim 3:22; “Lo Ta’arotz Mi’penehem” – 7:21). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the soldier is expected to fully trust Hashem, and to concern himself not with his physical wellbeing, but solely with bringing honor and glory to Hashem and to His people. The soldier should not think at all about his family or his property, and should instead focus his attention entirely on the battle that he wages. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the soldier should recognize that the lives of all Am Yisrael depend on him. If he feels frightened and runs away from the battlefield, then other soldiers will follow suit, and the war effort will thus be lost. He will then be held accountable for the defeat and the lost lives. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites in this context the verse in the Book of Yirmiyahu (48:10), “Arur Mone’ah Harbo Mi’dam” – condemning one who “holds his sword back from blood,” meaning, who refrains from waging a war that must be fought against enemy nations. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch brings the teaching of the Sages that a soldier who fights with all his heart, and his intention is purely to bring glory to the Name of G-d, is guaranteed not to suffer any harm, and earns eternal rewards for himself and his offspring. This command is binding upon only males, as only males are obligated to fight in wars. A soldier who is frightened during battle violates the prohibition.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (19:19) that witnesses who falsely testified that somebody committed a crime must be given the punishment that would have been given to the accused defendant. The court is instructed, “Va’asitem Lo Ka’asher Zamam La’asot Le’ahib, U’bi’arta Ha’ra Mi’kirbecha” – “You shall do to him what he had plotted to do to his brother, and you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.” The Oral Tradition explains that the Torah refers to a case where two or more witnesses testify that somebody committed a crime, and then two or more other witnesses testify that they were with the first witnesses in a different location at the time they claimed the incident occurred. The Torah here instructs the court to accept the testimony of the second set of witnesses, that the first witnesses testified falsely, and to then give the first witnesses the punishment that would have been given to the defendant. Normally, when two sets of witnesses give conflicting testimony, Bet Din does not accept the testimony of either group. In this instance, however, the Torah makes an exception, instructing the court to believe the second set of witnesses who claimed that the first set of witnesses were not in a position to see the alleged incident at the time they claimed it transpired. Even if one hundred witnesses testified about the incident, and then only two witnesses testified that all one hundred witnesses were somewhere else at the time they claimed the incident took place, the two witnesses are believed, and the one hundred witnesses are punished. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah commands punishing convicted false witnesses in order to deter people from testifying falsely, a phenomenon which, quite obviously, could disrupt the entire social order, as innocent people will be wrongly convicted of crimes they did not commit. Many Rabbis addressed the question of why the Torah makes an exception in this case, and commands the court to accept the testimony of the second set of witnesses. What rationale is there to believe the second witnesses’ claim, that the first witnesses did not see the event about which they testify, and to not believe the first witnesses? The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the second witnesses are believed because the Torah does not accept testimony about oneself. If people are accused of a crime, they cannot testify in their own defense, because they are not objective; they are the subject of the case, and so their testimony cannot be given credibility. Similarly, after a second set of witnesses testify that the first witnesses were not in a location where they could have seen the alleged incident, the first witnesses are not believed with respect to this matter, since they are not impartial. Once the first witnesses become the defendants, their testimony cannot be accepted. Bet Din must therefore accept the second set of witnesses, and convict the first set. Witnesses do not become “Edim Zomemin” (witnesses who have been found to have falsely testified) unless the entire group was discredited. Meaning, the second witnesses must testify that all the witnesses in the first group were not present at the time of the alleged incident. If they testify about only several members of the group, then even those about whom they testified are not declared “Edim Zomemin” and are not punished. The Torah commands the court to do to the false witnesses “Ka’asher Zamam La’asot Le’ahib” – what they had schemed to do to the defendant. The Rabbis inferred from this verse that the law of “Edim Zomemin” applies only if the false witnesses’ scheme did not materialize, meaning, if they were disclosed as false witnesses before Bet Din punished the defendant for the crime wrongly attributed to him. Ironically, if the second witnesses arrive and discredit the first witnesses only after Bet Din acted upon the false testimony, then the false witnesses are not given the punishment that the defendant had received. Intuitively, of course, we would have assumed that if the false witnesses deserve punishment for an unsuccessful attempt to have an innocent person punished, then certainly they should be punished if their efforts were successful. But the Torah indicates that the law of “Eidim Zomemin” applies only if the second witnesses came and discredited the first witnesses before the Bet Din acted upon their false testimony. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if the Bet Din already punished the defendant – such as if they killed someone accused of a capital offense – this must mean that Hashem determined that he deserved to be killed. G-d arranged that false witnesses would testify against him because he was guilty of some offense for which he deserved punishment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch draws a comparison to the case of somebody who killed a Terefa – a person suffering a fatal condition from which he is certain to die within a year. The killer is not liable to punishment in such a case, because the victim would have died anyway. By the same token, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, if Bet Din punishes a defendant on the basis of false testimony, that person must have been deserving of this fate, and so the witnesses are not punished. This command applies in the Land of Israel, in the times when courts were comprised of “Semuchin” – Rabbis with the original ordination that began with Moshe Rabbenu, who were thus authorized to punish violators. If a court with such authority failed to punish “Edim Zomemin,” they have violated this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that this is an especially grievous violation, as it undermines the justice system, and encourages witnesses to falsely testify about innocent people.
The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 19:15) commands that a court may not reach a decision about a case on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. At least two witnesses must testify about the act or event in question for Bet Din to reach a decision. This verse forbids a court from punishing a defendant or awarding money to a plaintiff based on a lone witness’ testimony. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that even an outstanding and honest person could be tempted to falsely testify about somebody because of a tinge of hostility or animosity that he feels toward the defendant. No matter how righteous and trustworthy somebody is, he is not free from feelings of resentment, and so even a generally honest person might speak dishonestly to cause harm to somebody towards whom he harbors feelings of bitterness. When two upstanding witnesses are cross examined and testify to the same event, it can be assumed that they speak the truth. This cannot necessarily be assumed, however, when just a lone witness testifies. Although a court may not punish or extract money based on a single witness’ testimony, it will demand an oath from the litigant against whom a lone witness testifies. Furthermore, a single witness is believed in matters of “Issur Ve’heter” (where a status of permissible or forbidden must be determined), such as to testify that a piece of food is permissible for consumption. Another instance where a lone witness’ testimony is accepted is in the case of a Sota, where a husband warned his wife not to go into seclusion with a certain man, and she violated the warning. If even a single witness testifies that she and the man in question committed adultery, he is believed, and the woman does not then drink the special waters to determine her guilt or innocence. Likewise, in a case where a murder victim is discovered, and it is unknown who committed the crime, if even a single witness testifies about who murdered the victim, the Egla Arufa ceremony is not performed. The Sages enacted a provision that a woman may remarry based on the testimony of a lone witness who claims to have seen her husband die. In order to avoid a situation of an Aguna (“chained” woman), a lone witness’ testimony is accepted in such a case. This prohibition applies in all times and in all places, and is binding upon judges of a Bet Din. A judge who ordered a defendant to pay money based on the testimony of a single witness has violated this command. He is not liable to Malkut, because the wrongdoing can be rectified through the return of the money in question, and Malkut are not administered in the case of a violation that can be corrected.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 19:14), “Lo Tasig Gebul Re’acha…Be’nahalatecha Asher Tinhal” – “Do not move your fellow’s border…in your portion which you will inherit…” This verse establishes a Biblical prohibition against encroaching on somebody’s property, such as by moving the boundary onto his land, or performing an act displaying ownership (such as agricultural work) on his property, in the Land of Israel. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the general prohibition of theft forbids encroaching on somebody’s property anywhere, even outside the Land of Israel. (If one moves the border in broad daylight, openly, then he violates the prohibition of “Gezela,” and if he does so clandestinely, then he transgresses the command of “Geneba.”) If somebody does this in Eretz Yisrael, then he transgresses the prohibition of theft as well as the additional prohibition of “Lo Tasig.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that encroaching even a “Melo Esba” – a finger’s width – on somebody’s property is forbidden. Therefore, people who build homes must exercise extreme care and ensure not to extend beyond the boundary of their property into a neighboring property. Even if the neighbor is unaware of the encroachment, it violates a Biblical command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that there is no need to explain the reason behind this prohibition, as it is obvious that a functioning, civilized society cannot allow people to seize their neighbors’ property. This prohibition applies in all times, and is binding upon both men and women. One who extends onto somebody else’s property violates this prohibition but is not liable to Malkut, as this command falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation that can be corrected through payment. One who unlawfully seizes someone’s property must return it – or leave the property – and thereby rectify the wrongdoing, and Malkut are not administered for violations which can be rectified. The prohibition of “Hasagat Gebul” (encroaching on a person’s property) includes also a different type of encroachment – going into the same business as somebody, thereby ruining his livelihood. When a person wishes to start a business that will compete with an already existing business, he must seek Halachic guidance to determine whether or not this is permissible. While Halacha certainly allows competition in the marketplace, in some circumstances opening a competing enterprise will be forbidden on the grounds of “Hasagat Gebul.” This prohibition applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside the land. A famous example of this prohibition is a story involving the Maharam Padua (Rav Meir Katzenellenbogen, Germany-Italy, d. 1565), who, together with a non-Jewish partner, invested a great deal of money into printing of a new edition of the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah. A rival – a wealthy businessman who also owned a printing press – became jealous, and so he printed his own version of the Mishneh Torah, and proceeded to sell it for a far lower price, which the Maharam Padua could not afford to charge. The Maharam Padua lost his enormous investment. He wrote a letter to the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530- 1572), asking whether the competitor was allowed to do what he did. The Rama responded that the competitor’s actions were forbidden, as they clearly violated accepted business practices, and were undertaken for the purpose of putting the first enterprise out of business. Accordingly, the Rama issued a ban on the competitor’s edition of the Rambam, and the people purchased the Maharam Padua’s edition, rescuing him from financial ruin. People must be aware that whereas competition in the marketplace is, in and of itself, legitimate, some practices that harm a preexisting enterprise are forbidden, and a competent Halachic authority must be consulted for guidance.
The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 19:21) commands, “Ve’lo Tahos Enecha” – forbidding judges from compassionately excusing those liable for murder or damage from the punishment they deserve. A judge might, for a variety of reasons, pity a murderer or someone who caused his fellow damage, and decide that he should not be punished. The Torah here introduces a prohibition forbidding a judge from harboring such feelings of compassion for those who are liable to punishment for killing or harming somebody. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command because if people know that they can kill or damage without repercussions, then crime will be rampant, and “Ish Et Re’ehu Haim Bela’o” – people will “devour each other alive.” This prohibition is binding upon judges, and applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when courts had the authority to punish violators. A judge who fails to sentence a guilty party to the appropriate punishment has transgressed this prohibition. Of course, he is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is not violated through an action. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, the judge will be severely punished, because failing to sentence those guilty of murder or damage can lead to the destruction of civilized society. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the concept underlying this command is relevant even nowadays. Although courts today are not authorized to impose punishments, they do have the authority to resolve civil disputes so aggrieved parties can reclaim what they are owed. Judges are obligated to fulfill their duties so that people are not able to get away with criminal activity.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 19:3) commands designating six cities as “Areh Miklat” – cities of refuge where people who accidentally kill would find protection from the victim’s vengeful relatives. This Misva requires not only setting aside six such cities, but also “Tachin Lecha Ha’derech” – preparing the roads and removing any obstacles to ensure easy access to these cities. Three of the six Areh Miklat were set aside by Moshe in the territory east of the Jordan River, which was settled by a number of the tribes. The other three were set aside later, after Beneh Yisrael crossed the Jordan River into the Land of Israel. The three cities which Moshe designated did not begin functioning as Areh Miklat until the other three cities were established west of the Jordan River. The Gemara explains that Moshe nevertheless set aside the three cities east of the river during his lifetime, despite the fact that they would not be functional until later, in order to seize this Misva opportunity. This teaches us about the importance of vigilantly seizing every opportunity we are given to perform a Misva, without delay. In the times of Mashiah, three additional Areh Miklat will be added, in the territory which the Jewish Nation will possess at that time beyond the narrow borders of Eretz Yisrael. G-d promised Abraham that his descendants would possess the territory of ten nations (Bereshit 15:19-21), but when Beneh Yisrael captured the land, they took the territory of only seven of these ten peoples. The land of the other three nations – the Keni, the Kenizi, and the Kadmoni – will be taken in the future, when Mashiah comes, and three cities of refuge will be required in this territory. (This teaching of the Sages would seem to support the position that the only difference between our times and the Messianic Era is “Shibud Malchuyot” – that in the future, we will be freed from subjugation to foreign rule, and we will have more time for Torah learning and the service of G-d. If Areh Miklat will be necessary in the times of Mashiah, then, we must assume, the world will not be perfectly peaceful and secure, as accidental murders will still occur.) Although six special cities were designated as Areh Miklat, all forty-eight cities populated by the Leviyim provided protection for an accidental murderer. If the murderer went to any of these cities, the blood avenger was forbidden from killing him there. The difference between the six special Areh Miklat and the other forty-two cities of the Leviyim is that a killer was granted protection in the six cities even if he did not go there intending to seek refuge. In the other forty-two cities, a killer was protected from the Go’el Ha’dam (blood avenger) only if this was his intention when he went to the city. In the six primary cities of refuge, by contrast, he was granted protection regardless of whether or not he had gone there with this in mind. Additionally, an accidental murderer who sought refuge in one of the six special Areh Miklat did not need to pay rent, whereas in the other forty-two cities, he was required to pay rent for the home where he resided. Hacham Baruch Ben-Haim would teach that learning Torah serves as a “city of refuge,” protecting us from the Yeser Ha’ra (evil inclination), which tries to spiritually “murder” us. He noted the Gemara’s teaching that if a person feels vulnerable to the Yeser Ha’ra, he should recite the Shema. The first verse of Shema – “Shema Yisrael, Hashem Elokenu Hashem Ehad” – consists of six words, alluding to the six primary cities of refuge. The first paragraph of Shema (“Ve’ahabta”) consists of forty-words, alluding to the other forty-two cities which provided protection, teaching that the reading and study of Shema helps protect us from the Yeser Ha’ra. This Misva applies when the Jewish People reside permanently in their land. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this is a collective Misva, assigned to the nation as a whole. Hence, the obligation rests upon those figures who have the ability to designate cities of refuge, such as the king and other leaders who are responsible for public works and the like. Those who have the ability to arrange for the designation of Areh Miklat, but fail to do so, are in violation of this affirmative command.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:20) that if somebody delivers a prophecy “in the name of other gods,” he must be put to death. This introduces the Biblical prohibition against falsely prophesying that an Aboda Zara (false deity) commanded that it be served a certain way, promising reward for those who perform the service, while warning that those who do not will be punished. This also includes a prohibition against falsely prophesying that G-d commanded worshipping a foreign deity. One violates this prohibition even if he claims that the false god commanded doing something which the Torah considers a Misva. Although the action is itself virtuous, nevertheless, instructing people to perform the action in the name of a false deity transgresses this prohibition. One who prophesies in the name of a false god is liable to capital punishment. This prohibition applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women. Two verses later (18:22), the Torah commands that in the case of a false prophet, “Lo Tagur Mimenu” – “Do not be afraid of him.” This introduces a Biblical command that forbids refraining from administering capital punishment to someone found guilty of falsely prophesying. The court might feel frightened because of the false prophet’s warnings of what might happen to those who disobey or oppose him, and so the Torah prohibits such fear, and requires administering capital punishment. This Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the courts had the authority to administer capital punishment. The execution of a false prophet was conducted specifically by the seventy-one-member Sanhedrin.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:20) commands that if somebody delivers a message which he falsely claims was communicated to him prophetically by G-d, he must be put to death. The Gemara interprets this warning as introducing a prohibition against not only speaking false prophecy, but also relaying a true prophetic message, delivered by a prophet, as though one heard it directly from G-d. Meaning, if a person heard a prophet deliver a prophetic message, and this person then speaks those words to others claiming that they were prophetically communicated to him, then he is in violation of this Biblical command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this prohibition because of the special importance of prophecy, which constitutes one of the important foundations of our faith – that G-d communicates His messages to prophets. If imposters falsely claim to have received prophecy, and their predictions are not fulfilled, people will lose respect for the institution of prophecy, and will question the validity of even authentic prophets. And if a person relays a prophet’s words as though they had been spoken to Him, people will regard him as a prophet and spiritual guide. They will then treat all his words as binding and follow his example, when in truth he might not be worthy of such esteem and emulation. As a result, the people will be led astray by following the directives and example of somebody who should not be looked to as a mentor. This command applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who conveys a message which he falsely claims to have received through prophecy is put to death. There is a general rule that whenever the Torah assigns the death penalty for a violation, without specifying which form of execution should be administered, it refers to Henek (strangulation). Hence, the punishment for delivering false prophecy is Henek. The contemporary application of this prohibition is that those who speak or publish words of Torah must exercise extreme care to share only what is true. Nowadays, we do not have prophets, but we instead have teachers of Torah who deliver the word of G-d as expressed in the Torah, and they must ensure to relay the Torah accurately, without distortions that could mislead the people.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:15) commands that once a prophet establishes a reputation as an authentic prophet, “Elav Tishme’un” – we are obliged to obey all his instructions. This requirement applies even if a prophet instructs doing something that contravenes Torah law, as long as he does not intend to permanently uproot the law. If he instructs suspending a rule of the Torah as a temporary measure, then we must obey him, because he has already established himself as an authentic prophet. The only exception is if he instructs worshipping a foreign deity; in such a case, we must disobey the prophet. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that we are commanded to obey the words of a prophet because a person achieves prophecy only after he reaches outstanding spiritual heights, to the point where he can be described as having “his feet on the ground but his head reaches the heavens.” A person who has attained such a level can be trusted to understand things on a much deeper level than the rest of us. Challenging a prophet, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is a “Ta’ut Gamur” – “complete mistake,” and so the Torah commands obeying the prophet’s words. This Misva applies during the times when there are prophets, and is binding upon both men and women. One who disobeys a confirmed prophet transgresses this prohibition and is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hands of G-d, as opposed to execution by the court). This applies even to the prophet himself – if he disobeys the prophetic message he received, then he is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim. A prophet is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim also in a case of “Kobesh Nebu’ato” – if he “withholds” his prophecy, refraining from communicating it to the people as G-d had commanded. In light of this rule, the Rabbis address the question of how the prophet Yona ran away after receiving a prophecy to be conveyed to the people of the city of Nineveh. How could Yona, a righteous prophet, violate this grave Biblical prohibition by refusing to deliver the prophecy he received? The Radbaz (Rav David Ben Zimra, Egypt, 1479-1573), in one of his responsa (2:842), suggests answering this question based on a careful reading of the story of Yona. When G-d first speaks to Yona, He instructs him to go to Nineveh and to “call out to it” (Yona 1:2), without specifying any particular message. Since Yona did not receive a command to convey a specific prophecy, he felt that this did not fall under the prohibition of “Kobesh Nebu’ato.” The second time G-d speaks to Yona, however, He instructs him to convey to Nineveh “Ha’keri’a Asher Anochi Dober Elecha” – the message that G-d would communicate to him. Here, Yona was commanded to deliver a specific prophetic message, and so he was required to journey to Nineveh and convey the prophecy he received. The Radbaz also advances a second theory, suggesting that the prohibition of “Kobesh Nebu’ato” applies only once the prophet accepts the role as prophet. At that point, a prophet who withholds his prophecy violates the prohibition. But if he did not accept the job, then he is not required to convey the prophecy. The Radbaz notes that this answers the question of how Moshe Rabbenu initially refused to return to Egypt and deliver G-d’s message, as G-d had commanded at the burning bush. Seemingly, by refusing to speak to Pharaoh and to Beneh Yisrael, Moshe was in violation of the prohibition of “Kobesh Nebu’ato.” According to this theory, however, Moshe was not bound by this law before accepting the job of prophet. He initially declined, until finally G-d persuaded him to accept the mission, at which point he conveyed the prophetic message which he was instructed to convey.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family One of the forms of magic and sorcery which the Torah forbids in Parashat Shoftim is “Doresh El Ha’metim” (Debarim 18:11) – consulting with the dead. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that sorcerers would starve themselves and go to the cemetery to sleep, and during the night, the spirits of the deceased would allegedly appear to them in a dream and reveal information about the future. Some who practiced this form of witchcraft would offer incense, and some would wear special types of clothing, in order to receive communication from the dead. The prohibition against performing such practices applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who violates this command is liable to Malkut, as this violation is committed by performing certain actions. In light of this prohibition, the Poskim address the question as to the validity of the practice of praying at the graves of Sadikim. One of the Rishonim – Rav Haim Paltiel (France, 13 th century) – maintained that this practice falls under the category of “Doresh El Ha’metim,” and is thus forbidden. Others, however, disagree, noting the Gemara’s famous account in Masechet Sota (34) of Kaleb’s visit to the gravesite of the patriarchs in Hebron to pray for assistance. Some refuted this proof, contending that Kaleb, an outstanding Sadik, knew the right way to pray at a gravesite, but this example should not be followed by the masses. By contrast, some Poskim argued that this account indeed sets a precedent from which we can and should learn. We find three different explanations as to why praying at a gravesite does not constitute a violation of “Doresh El Ha’metim.” One approach is that the gravesite of a Sadik has sanctity, and this is why it became customary to pray at such sites. There is no communication whatsoever between the one who prays and the deceased; one simply prays to Hashem at the site because of its special sanctity, which increases the chances of the prayer’s acceptance. Others explain that it is acceptable to ask the spirit of the deceased to serve as a Melitz Yosher (advocate) and pray to Hashem on his behalf. Such a request is not considered “Doresh El Ha’metim” because one is not consulting with the dead, or asking for their direct assistance, but rather requesting that they pray to Hashem on his behalf. Others claim that when praying at a gravesite one asks that Hashem should accept his pleas and grant him the assistance he needs in the merit of the deceased. Accordingly, the Bah (“Bayit Hadash” by Rav Yoel Sirkis, Poland, 1561-1640) writes that the practice of praying at gravesites should not be discontinued, though he advises instructing the masses not to pray directly to the deceased. This ruling is brought by the Mishna Berura (581:27), and this is, of course, the widespread custom. In conclusion, then, it is certainly a worthwhile practice to pray at the graves of Sadikim, though one must ensure to speak only to G-d, and not to the deceased, or, at most, turn to the deceased and ask that he intercede on his behalf, without praying to him directly, which could transgress a Biblical command.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:11) forbids engaging in various forms of witchcraft, including “Ob,” a practice that is also called “Pitum,” and which involves supposed communication with the dead. The practitioner would claim to bring the spirit of a deceased person into the world, and the spirit would speak from the practitioner’s underarm. People would consult with these sorcerers in order to ask the deceased person questions and receive answers. The Torah forbids both practicing this form of witchcraft, and consulting with somebody who does. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who practices this form of witchcraft is liable to execution by “Sekila” (stoning). Those who consult with such a person transgress this prohibition but are not liable to punishment by the courts, because this violation is committed only through speech, by posing a question, without performing an action. In this same verse, the Torah introduces the related prohibition, forbidding a practice called “Yid’oni.” This practitioner would take a bone from an animal called a “Yid’oni” – known also as “Yadu’a” – and place it in his mouth. The bone would then, allegedly, begin speaking and predicting the future or revealing other hidden information. Both practicing this form of witchcraft and consulting with somebody who does are forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the “Yadu’a” is a very peculiar creature, featuring a cord – like an umbilical cord – that extends from the center of its body and is attached to the ground, limiting its range of movement. This creature resembles a human being, with a face, body, arms and legs. It is especially vicious, devouring any creature that comes within the territory in which it can move about. This animal must be killed from afar, by firing arrows at the cord to sever it. Once this creature is no longer attached to the ground, it perishes. Some commentators suggested that this creature is alluded to in the Torah’s description of Arob, the plague of wild beasts which Hashem brought upon the Egypt. The Torah (Shemot 8:17) tells of Hashem’s warning that the Egyptian homes would be filled with Arob, adding, “Ve’gam Ha’adama Asher Hem Aleha” – “and also the ground that they are on.” The plain meaning of this verse is that the animals would fill the land. However, some commentators explain this to mean that even the “Yadu’a,” the creature that lives attached to the ground, was brought to Egypt as part of this plague, and therefore “also the ground that they are on” – meaning, even the ground underneath these creatures – were miraculously brought with them to terrorize the Egyptians who had enslaved Beneh Yisrael. Someone who practices this form of witchcraft is liable to “Sekila,” whereas one who consults such a sorcerer violates this prohibition but is not liable to punishment by the court, because he did not transgress this command by performing an action. Different views exist among the Rishonim as to whether all forms of sorcery and witchcraft are forbidden by the Torah, or only the particular practices specified in these verses. According to all opinions, however, engaging in such practices violates the command of “Tamim Tiheyeh Im Hashem Elokecha” (Debarim 18:13), which requires us to place our trust completely in Hashem such that we have no need to learn about the future, because we rely solely on Hashem’s assistance and protection.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:10) forbids being a “Mechashef,” or sorcerer. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this refers to the power that some had in the ancient world to tap into the spiritual dimension of an object, and thereby change its nature. Every physical entity, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, has a spiritual component, and the ancient sorcerers were able to access this component in order to perform magic, overriding the rules of nature. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here disputes the position of the Rambam, who, in Hilchot Abodat Kochavim (11:16), writes explicitly that the “Kishuf” (“sorcery”) mentioned by the Torah is nothing more than “Ahizat Enayim” – illusions. In the Rambam’s view, these powers were all imaginary, and the practitioners of “Kishuf” simply knew how to deceive people into thinking that they could override nature. In any event, engaging in such practices is clearly forbidden by the Torah. Interestingly, all judges were required to have proficiency in the area of “Kishuf.” As they would need to preside over cases of suspected violations of this command, it was necessary for them to understand the many different forms of sorcery in order to determine whether a violation had indeed been committed. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. In the next verse (18:11), the Torah introduces the prohibition of “Hober Haber,” which refers to reciting certain words – like incantations – to produce some kind of magical effect. Magicians would say certain formulas claiming that they had the power to cure a person’s illness or wound, or protect someone from harm. Included in this prohibition is the practice of assembling snakes or scorpions using certain sounds to perform magic. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who transgresses this command by using words to bring healing and the like is liable to Malkut. It seems that the Sefer Ha’hinuch speaks of a process that involves not only speech, but also some sort of action, as otherwise the violator would not be liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites in this context the Gemara’s comment in Masechet Shabuot (15) regarding the 91 st chapter of Tehillim, which is called “Shir Ha’pega’im” (literally, “the song of afflictions”). The Gemara teaches that reading this chapter protects a person from harm, giving rise to the question of why this would not violate the prohibition of “Hober Haber.” If it is forbidden to say words for healing or protection, then why is it permissible to recite this chapter for protection? For that matter, on what basis do we allow, and even encourage, reciting Tehillim on behalf of ill patients, or during times of crisis? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers this question by drawing a critically important distinction between believing that the words themselves have the power to heal or protect, and earning merits. When we recite Tehillim, the reading is to inspire us and change us, enhancing our fear of Hashem, our faith in divine providence, and our desire to serve G-d properly. This inspiration and growth that result from the reading can then render us worthy of Hashem’s help and protection. This is quite different than incantations which one believes possess magical powers to bring healing. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains on this basis the Gemara’s ensuing discussion about the benefits of reading “Shir Ha’pega’im.” The Gemara tells that Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi would read this chapter of Tehillim for protection – and yet, he himself ruled that it is forbidden to try to cure oneself by reading words of Torah. The explanation, the Gemara states, is that “Le’hagen Shani” – reading for protection is different. The Sefer Ha’hinuch understands this to mean that reading words of Torah in order to gain knowledge and inspiration, and thus accrue merit through which to earn a cure or assistance, is allowed. We may not use words of Torah themselves for healing or protection, but we may and should use the words of Torah to grow and elevate ourselves, in the hope that we will then be deemed deserving of Hashem’s help. Therefore, when we read Tehillim, we should try to understand the words we recite, and we must intend not that the words themselves have magical powers, but rather that the growth we experience through the reading will accrue merit on behalf of the person in need of assistance.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:10) commands that there may not be a “Kosem Kesamim” among Beneh Yisrael. This refers to somebody who connects to various spiritual forces through which he can predict the future. This was done in ancient times by isolating oneself and focusing on certain things which enabled one to see future events. The Rambam, in Sefer Ha’misvot, writes that he saw these kinds of “Kosemim,” sorcerers who foretold the future. Some would throw a belt onto the ground and then make predictions based on the shape the belt formed when it landed. Others would place stones in bags, throw the bags on the ground, and then make predictions based on the arrangement of the stones inside the bag. There were also those would hit a stick on the ground and focus on it in order to see future events. (These forms of sorcery enabled people to predict the near future; only true prophets were empowered to foresee events in the distant future.) All these practices are strictly forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade these practices because they can have the effect of undermining a person’s Emuna (faith in Hashem). One who accustoms himself to these practices will likely start believing that the spiritual forces are independently powerful, beyond the control of G-d, Heaven forbid. We are to believe that “En Od Mi’lebado” – there is absolutely no force or power in existence that restrains G-d in any way; He exerts absolute, unlimited control over everything in the universe, and there is nothing that can limit or restrain Him. We also believe that “En Mazal Le’Yisrael” – the Jewish Nation is not subject to any sort of mystical force, and we are controlled exclusively and directly by Hashem. If a person utilizes means of foreseeing the future, he will assume that the predicted outcome is certain to occur, without believing that G-d can bring a different outcome. In order for us to retain our firm Emuna, the Torah forbade us from predicting the future through sorcery. This prohibition applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women. One who performs an action to determine the future transgresses this command and is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah here forbids performing these acts. Consulting with a sorcerer about future events is not included under this prohibition, though, in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, doing so is “Meguneh Me’od” – especially repulsive. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds in this context an analysis of the word “Yisrael” by which our nation is known. This name, of course, was given to Yaakob, the third of the three patriarchs, and it is thus commonly assumed that we are called “Yisrael” because we descend from Yaakob who received this name. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch posits that in truth, even Abraham and Yishak bore this name. The verse in the Book of Shemot (12:40) tells that Beneh Yisrael resided in Egypt for 430 years – despite the fact that G-d had informed Abraham that his descendants would spend just 400 years in a foreign land (Bereshit 15:13). The commentators explain that the 400-year period began with the birth of Yishak, and the extra thirty years are the interim years between the time Abraham received this prophecy, and Yishak’s birth. It thus emerges, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, that during the first thirty of the 430 years which Beneh Yisrael are said to have spent under foreign rule, only Abraham Abinu was affected. The fact that the Torah says that “Beneh Yisrael” spent 430 years in exile thus proves that Abraham himself was called “Yisrael.” As for Yishak Abinu, the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the opening verse of the Book of Shemot – “These are the names of the children of Israel who came to Egypt.” The first person named after this introduction is Yaakob, proving that Yaakob is included in “the children of Israel.” Necessarily, then, Yishak – Yaakob’s father – is also referred to as “Yisrael.” The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is that the word “Yisrael” means “Sar El,” which refers to dominion over the angelic forces in the heavens. All three of the patriarchs – and their offspring, for all time – transcend these forces, and are not under their control. We are called “Yisrael” precisely for this reason – because we exert control over the “Sarim,” the angels in heaven, through our Misvot. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives several examples of great Sadikim who overturned the laws of nature, such as when Yehoshua made the sun stop in the sky to lengthen the day. This and other similar instances demonstrate the concept of “Yisrael,” the unique power that we all have as descendants of Abraham, Yishak and Yaakob. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this is why sorcery and witchcraft are considered such grievous offenses. One who seeks to access these forces essentially denies the belief in the special power of Am Yisrael, our ability to subdue these forces through our good deeds.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:6-8) discusses the arrangement for the service of the Kohanim and Leviyim in the Bet Ha’mikdash. It first speaks of a Kohen or Levi who comes to the Bet Ha’mikdash wishing to serve, and command that he must be allowed to do so. But the Torah then commands abiding by “Mimkarav Al Ha’abot” – the “sales” made by the earlier generations. The Sages explain that this refers to the system that was later devised by the prophet Shemuel and King David, as we read in the Book of Dibreh Ha’yamim I (9:22-26), dividing the Kohanim and Leviyim into twenty-four “Mishmarot,” or shifts. Each shift would work for one week at a time, such that every shift would serve at least twice over the course of the year. This is considered a “sale” because each group of Kohanim “sold” its privileges to the other groups in exchange for its turn to serve. It thus seems that the Torah here first allows a Kohen to serve whenever he wishes, but then commands abiding by the rotation system that would be established. The Gemara explains that the first verse, which allows a Kohen to serve whenever he wishes, refers to the Regalim (the holidays of Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot), when all the Kohanim were given an equal opportunity to serve. On these three holidays, it was “all hands on deck,” so-to-speak, as all the Kohanim had the opportunity to participate in the Aboda (service) in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The rest of the time, however, only the Kohanim assigned to each week’s shift would serve during that week. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah required following this system in order to ensure that the various responsibilities would be properly fulfilled. If a job is assigned to a large group of people, then they might likely all assume that the job will be done by others, and it will thus be left undone. Or, they might argue with one another over who tends to which aspects of the task. If, however, a job is assigned to a small group, they will likely work effectively, cooperating with one another. The Torah therefore commanded dividing the Kohanim into small groups to ensure that the various functions of the Bet Ha’mikdash will be tended to in an efficient and peaceful manner. Each of the twenty-four Mishmarot had a leader, who was called the “Rosh Ha’mishmar,” who divided the shift into seven groups, each of which served one day of the week assigned to that Mishmar. Each of these seven groups was called a “Bet Ab,” and the head of the “Bet Ab” would divide the day’s responsibilities among the Kohanim in that group. The Mishmarot changed on Shabbat. The prophets also instituted the “Ma’amadot” – twenty-four groups of Yisraelim corresponding to the twenty-four shifts of Kohanim. The members of each “Ma’amad” (“Ansheh Ma’amad”) would represent the Jewish People in Jerusalem for the week of their shift. As the sacrifices were offered on behalf of the entire nation, it was only appropriate for members of the nation to be present in Jerusalem when the sacrifices were being offered. The “Ansheh Ma’amad” would fast each day from Monday through Thursday, and recite special prayers in a synagogue in Jerusalem. A Kohen who needed to bring a personal sacrifice was allowed, if he so wished, to perform the service for his sacrifice, even if that week was not his turn to serve in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one violates this prohibition by not allowing a Kohen to go to the Bet Ha’mikdash on one of the Regalim, when all Kohanim are allowed to participate in the Aboda. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch does not write that a Kohen violates this prohibition by failing to go to serve on the week of his Mishmar. The reason, perhaps, is that the Sefer Ha’hinuch felt that the obligation is to arrange the system, and so once the system was arranged and put into place, the Misva cannot then be violated. It is only the other aspect of this Misva that can be violated – granting permission to all Kohanim to serve on the Regalim. This part of the Misva is transgressed by denying a Kohen this opportunity.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:4), “Ve’reshit Gez Sonecha Titen Lo” – that we must give a Kohen the first wool sheared from a sheep. This obligation applies when one shears at least five sheep – whether male or female, and whether young or old. Even if a sheep had been sheared many times previously, nevertheless, each time one shears new wool, he must give a portion to a Kohen. On the level of Torah law, there is no minimum amount that one must give to fulfill this Misva. However, the Gemara in Masechet Hulin (137) teaches that the Sages enacted a requirement to give at least one-sixtieth of the wool. The reason for this Misva is that the Torah wants us to support the Kohanim so they can devote their time and attention to serving G-d. Just as the Torah requires giving the Kohanim certain portions of food – such as percentages from agricultural produce, and portions of animals which are slaughtered – it likewise requires giving them wool so they can make garments for themselves. This helps ensure that the Kohanim are free to perform their service without having to worry about their material needs. One who shears wool must give each Kohen at least the amount of wool weighing five Sela’im, which suffices to make a small sweater. If one does not have twice this amount of wool to give, then he must give to only one Kohen, and may not divide the wool he gives among multiple Kohanim. This obligation applies only when one shears wool which is soft and thus suitable for making garments. If the wool is coarse and unsuitable for making garments, then there is no obligation to give a portion to a Kohen. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, to Yisraelim and Leviyim, but it applies only in the Land of Israel. There is considerable discussion as to whether or not this Misva applies nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this obligation applies even when there is no Bet Ha’mikdash, though from the Rambam it appears that in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, this Misva is binding only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Some Poskim, such as the Hatam Sofer (Rav Moshe Sofer, Pressburg, 1762-1839), suggested that this Misva might not be applicable nowadays, because it is linked to the fact that the Kohanim did not receive a portion in the Land of Israel. Nowadays, technically, no tribes have a portion in the land, and so there is no longer an obligation to support the Kohanim. Others claim that since Kohanim nowadays cannot verify their lineage, people are not obligated to give them a portion of their wool, as it is uncertain whether they are truly Kohanim and thus deserve these gifts. (See Peri Hadash, Yoreh De’a, 61; and Birkeh Yosef, Yoreh De’a 333:2.) Regardless, the concept underlying this Misva is relevant nowadays in that we are obligated to support Torah scholars. They are, in a sense, today’s “Kohanim,” as they devote themselves to the service of G-d, and they must therefore be supported so they are relieved of the burden of supporting themselves and their families.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:4) that we must give the first portion of our grain, grapes and olives to a Kohen, an obligation known as “Teruma Gedola.” On the level of Torah law, there is no minimum required amount for fulfilling this obligation. In the Talmud’s words, “Afilu Hita Ahat Poteret Et Ha’keri” – even a single stalk of grain suffices to permit an entire heap of produce. The Sages, however, enacted that the average person should designate one-fiftieth – or 2 percent – of the produce as Teruma. Some suggest that this percentage is alluded to by the word “Teruma,” which may be read as “Tereh Me’a” – “two one-hundredths,” or one-fiftieth. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah introduced this Misva because grain, wine and oil are the primary staple foods. In order for us to remember that everything in the world belongs to G-d, and all our blessings have been given to us by Him, the Torah required giving a portion of these basic staples to His servants, the Kohanim who work in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Before we enjoy the produce, we first designate a portion for the ministers in the Mikdash, so we are mindful of the fact that everything we have has been graciously given to us by Hashem. This is why Torah law requires giving even just a single stalk – because the objective is the reminder that everything belongs to G-d, and not giving a specific quantity. Nevertheless, the Sages enacted that a larger portion be given in order for this Misva to make a stronger impression upon us. Although the Torah obligation of Teruma applies only to grain, grapes and olives, the Sages expanded the obligation to include all agricultural products, as long as it did not grow as Hefker (ownerless). The Gemara (Gittin 31) states that one separates Teruma through making an estimation; one does not need to take a precise measurement. Since, as mentioned, Torah law does not require any particular quantity for Teruma, one may estimate the one-fiftieth that he designates as Teruma. It is acceptable to separate Teruma “She’lo Min Ha’mukaf” – meaning, for produce which is in a different place. One may designate a portion of one’s produce as Teruma even though the rest of the produce is not with him at that time. One may appoint an agent to separate Teruma from his produce on his behalf, as long as the agent is Jewish. Teruma may be eaten only by Kohanim. Both adult Kohanim and young Kohanim may partake of Teruma. A Kohen may share his Teruma with his wife and with his Abadim Kena’anim (gentile servants). He can also feed Teruma to his animals. According to the Rambam, the Torah obligation of Teruma applies only in the Land of Israel when the Jewish People reside in the land. The Ra’abad disagrees, and maintains that even nowadays, the Teruma obligation applies in the Land of Israel on the level of Torah law, and not merely Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). The Sages expanded the Teruma obligation to certain other countries near Eretz Yisrael, such as Babylonia, the lands of Amon and Moab, and Egypt. This Misva does not apply at all, not even Mi’de’rabbanan, in other places. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that one who transgresses this affirmative command, and fails to separate Teruma from his produce, is deserving of harsh punishment.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:3) that when a person slaughters an ox or sheep, he must give certain portions of the animal to a Kohen: the Zero’a (forearm), the Lehayayim (cheeks), and the Keba (stomach). The Midrash explains that these portions are given to the Kohanim as an eternal reward for the courageous zealotry of one of the first Kohanim – Pinhas, Aharon’s grandson. During the sin of Ba’al Pe’or, the head of the tribe of Shimon – Zimri – publicly committed an illicit act with a Midyanite woman, named Kozbi. Pinchas killed them, bringing honor to G-d, and thereby ending the deadly plague that had killed thousands among Beneh Yisrael. Pinhas held the dagger with his hand, and thus Kohanim receive an animal’s forearm. After killing the violators, Pinhas prayed on behalf of the people, and so Kohanim receive the cheeks, commemorating Pinhas’ praying with his mouth. Finally, Pinhas stabbed the two violators in their stomachs, and so Kohanim receive the animal’s stomach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites this Midrashic teaching, and adds that this shows us the great reward for Kiddush Shem Shamayim – bringing glory to Hashem. One who performs a Kiddush Shem Shamayim, as Pinhas did, receives eternal reward both in this world and the next. The Zero’a of the animal which must be given to a Kohen includes the entire forearm, from the elbow to the palm of the hand. The obligation to give a Kohen the cheeks includes also the tongue. When giving the animal’s stomach to a Kohen, one is, technically, required to include the Heleb (fat) of that area, which, while forbidden for consumption, is permissible for other forms of benefit. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Kohanim adopted the practice of allowing the animals’ owners to keep the Heleb around the stomach. As mentioned, the Torah requires giving these portions when slaughtering an ox or sheep. On this basis, the Sages established that this Misva applies only to Behemot – kosher domesticated animals – but not to Hayot – kosher non-domesticated animals. The Sages understood that the word “Shor” (ox) in this verse indicates that this Misva applies even to a “Koi” – an animal whose status is unclear, as it is unknown whether it is classified as a “Behema” or a “Haya.” The word “Seh” (sheep), the Sages teach, indicates that these gifts are required even from animals produced by crossbreeding. The owner is allowed to partake of the animal’s meat even before giving the required portions to a Kohen. This Misva differs from the obligation of Teruma, which requires giving a portion of agricultural produce to a Kohen, in that one’s produce is forbidden for consumption until the Teruma is separated. Since the Teruma portion needs to be designated, it is considered mixed with the rest of the produce, thus rendering the produce forbidden. The required gifts from an animal, by contrast, are already specified by the Torah, and thus the rest of the animal is permissible for consumption even before these portions are given to a Kohen. Furthermore, unlike Teruma, which is considered hallowed and thus may not be eaten by non-Kohanim, the gifts from an animal may be shared with non-Kohanim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if there are no Kohanim in the area to whom to give the required portions, and the meat will likely spoil by the time a Kohen is found, then the individual may put money on the side for a Kohen and then eat this meat. He should keep the money and give it to a Kohen when he finds one, in lieu of these portions of the animal, thereby saving the Kohanim from a financial loss. These portions may be given even to the daughter of a Kohen. This Misva applies only to ordinary animals; one is not required to give these portions from a consecrated animal. This Misva is binding upon men and women, but not upon Kohanim; a Kohen is not required to give these portions of his animal to another Kohen. One who neglects to give these portions from an animal transgresses this affirmative command. The Rif and the Rambam maintain that this obligation applies even nowadays, and even in the Diaspora. This is the view taken by the Sefer Ha’hinuch, who laments the fact that in his time, the Rabbis were unable to compel the butchers to give these required portions to a Kohen in fulfillment of the Misva. He then cites the verse, “Ve’koyeh Hashem Yahalifu Koah” (“And those who place their hope in G-d shall have renewed strength” – Yeshayahu 40:31), as a prayer that the Rabbis should be given the strength to enforce compliance with this Misva. The Shulhan Aruch (Yoreh De’a 61) brings this opinion, as well, and then adds that some Poskim disagree, and maintain that this Misva is not binding nowadays.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:1) that the tribe of Levi must not be given a portion of the agricultural lands in the Land of Israel, or of spoils of war taken by the soldiers of Beneh Yisrael. The verse states that the Leviyim may not receive a “Helek” (“portion”) or “Nahala” (“estate”) with the rest of Beneh Yisrael, and the oral tradition explains that these terms refer to a share in agricultural lands (“Nahala”) and a share in spoils of war (“Helek”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists these prohibitions as the 504 th and 505 th commands in the Torah. Explaining the prohibition against the Leviyim receiving agricultural lands, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Leviyim are denied a portion of land so they can fully devote their time and attention to the service of Hashem. The Leviyim are to remain free from the burdens of tilling the land to earn a livelihood, and so they are supported by the other tribes, allowing them to involve themselves in sacred, sublime pursuits – learning and teaching Torah, and serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash. This Misva applies specifically to the Leviyim, and only when the Jewish People reside in the Land of Israel. The Rambam, in Hilchot Shemita (chapter 13), writes that this command is limited to the territory that Hashem promised to Abraham, Yishak and Yaakob. If a king expands the territory of Eretz Yisrael beyond its original borders, then this prohibition would not apply to the expanded area, and the Leviyim may receive a portion of agricultural land in that additional territory. The Rambam adds, however, that this command is applicable to the lands of the Keni, Kenizi and Kadmoni tribes, whose territory Beneh Yisrael never seized. In the Messianic Era, these areas will be annexed and made part of Eretz Yisrael, and when that happens, the Rambam writes, it will be forbidden for the Leviyim to receive agricultural land in these regions. The Rambam adds that the concept underlying this Misva is relevant for all times, even nowadays. If a person decides to relieve himself of the burden of pursuing a livelihood, in order to fully devote himself to the genuine service of Hashem, then he becomes “Kodesh Kodashim” – “the holiest of the holy,” and should be encouraged and assisted. The rest of the nation should provide him with a livelihood to enable him to pursue his lofty spiritual ambitions, and study and teach Torah. The notion of the community supporting Rabbis and Torah scholars is not a modern-day idea; it is as old as the Torah itself. As for the prohibition against Leviyim receiving spoils of war, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that as they are G-d’s servants, it would be inappropriate for them to receive and benefit from such property. Although this property was not stolen, and was legitimately seized during warfare, nevertheless, it is unbecoming for the people of Levi to benefit from people’s unwanted loss of their possessions. Due to the Leviyim’s special spiritual stature, they should receive only property given to them in a peaceful manner, and not property which was taken during warfare, causing anguish to the owners, even if this war was fought rightfully and the spoils were taken lawfully. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is, of course, binding specifically upon the tribe of Levi. He adds that a Levi who takes the spoils of war transgresses this command, but is not liable to Malkut. For one thing, this transgression falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’hishabon” – a violation which can be rectified through the payment of money, for which one is not liable to Malkut. The Levi can simply return the spoils that he unlawfully seized, and so he is not liable to Malkut. Secondly, it is possible to violate this prohibition without performing an action – if somebody places spoils of war in a Levi’s property, and the Levi has the intention to acquire them. In such a case, he violates the prohibition because he received spoils of war, but he did not perform an action. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that if a Biblical prohibition can be violated without an action, then one is not liable to Malkut even if he transgresses that prohibition by performing an action. For this reason, too, a Levi who seizes spoils of war in violation of this command is not liable to Malkut.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:18) commands that the Jewish king must write a Sefer Torah and keep it with him at all times, wherever he goes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a king is especially prone to sinning, because he enjoys absolute power, such that nobody criticizes him, instructs him, or corrects his behavior. Moreover, as he has complete authority over the people, to the point where he has the right to order a citizen’s execution, he can easily become arrogant, and consider himself above the law. Therefore, it is critically important for him to constantly review the laws and messages of the Torah, to be reminded of His subservience to G-d and His obligation to observe all the Torah’s laws. This is necessary for him to resist the Yeser Ha’ra (sinful inclination), remain humble, and submit to the Torah’s authority. The king is obligated to keep the Torah with him at all times, except when he uses the restroom or when he bathes. The king’s Torah scroll was copied from the “Sefer Ha’azara” – the original Sefer Torah written by Moshe Rabbenu. This scroll was kept in the Azara (courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash) and read by the king during the Hakhel ceremony, held every seven years. This was the most authentic copy of the Sefer Torah, as it was the original text written by Moshe himself, and this scroll was copied from when writing the king’s Sefer
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim commands that a king is not permitted to have a large amount of silver or gold – “Ve’chesef Ve’zahab Lo Yarbeh Lo Me’od” (Debarim 17:17). The king is permitted to collect as much money as needed for the nation, such as to maintain an army and for other matters of public concern. This Biblical command forbids the king from bringing money into his personal coffers for his own luxury and enjoyment, beyond that which he legitimately needs. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that a king who transgresses this command will be severely punished, though the he does not mention that the king is liable to Malkut. The Rambam, by contrast, maintains that a king would be liable to Malkut for accumulating extra wealth, as this violation is committed by performing an action. The commentators explain that the Sefer Ha’hinuch likely felt that Malkut cannot be administered for this violation because the witnesses cannot know the king’s intent when he amasses the extra wealth. Anytime the king collects money, it is unknown whether he does so for the needs of the people, or for his own luxury. Therefore, the witnesses cannot definitively testify to the violation of this prohibition, and for this reason, perhaps, the Sefer Ha’hinuch felt that the king does not receive Malkut for transgressing this command.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:17) says about the Jewish king, “Lo Yarbeh Lo Nashim” – he may not have a large number of wives. The oral tradition understood that a king is forbidden from taking more than eighteen wives. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a wife could potentially lure her husband toward improper conduct, and the more wives one has, the greater the risk of his being lured astray by one of his wives. The Torah therefore imposed a limit on the number of wives a king may have, in order to help ensure that he remains loyal to the Torah and is not led to wrongful conduct. A king who marries a 19 th wife transgresses this prohibition, and is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch formulates this Halacha by speaking of a case of “Hosif Li’kah” – where a king “took” more wives than are allowed. The word “Li’kah” in the context of marriage generally refers specifically to Kiddushin (betrothal), and it thus appears from the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation that the king transgresses this command when he betroths the 19 th wife. The Rambam, however, implies that the king does not transgress this prohibition until he consummates the marriage with the 19 th wife through intercourse. The Minhat Hinuch adds that according to all opinions, the king transgresses this prohibition anew each time has intercourse with the 19 th wife, and so he would be liable to a separate set of Malkut for each marital relationship.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 18:1) that the tribe of Levi must not be given a portion of the agricultural lands in the Land of Israel, or of spoils of war taken by the soldiers of Beneh Yisrael. The verse states that the Leviyim may not receive a “Helek” (“portion”) or “Nahala” (“estate”) with the rest of Beneh Yisrael, and the oral tradition explains that these terms refer to a share in agricultural lands (“Nahala”) and a share in spoils of war (“Helek”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists these prohibitions as the 504 th and 505 th commands in the Torah. Explaining the prohibition against the Leviyim receiving agricultural lands, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Leviyim are denied a portion of land so they can fully devote their time and attention to the service of Hashem. The Leviyim are to remain free from the burdens of tilling the land to earn a livelihood, and so they are supported by the other tribes, allowing them to involve themselves in sacred, sublime pursuits – learning and teaching Torah, and serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash. This Misva applies specifically to the Leviyim, and only when the Jewish People reside in the Land of Israel. The Rambam, in Hilchot Shemita (chapter 13), writes that this command is limited to the territory that Hashem promised to Abraham, Yishak and Yaakob. If a king expands the territory of Eretz Yisrael beyond its original borders, then this prohibition would not apply to the expanded area, and the Leviyim may receive a portion of agricultural land in that additional territory. The Rambam adds, however, that this command is applicable to the lands of the Keni, Kenizi and Kadmoni tribes, whose territory Beneh Yisrael never seized. In the Messianic Era, these areas will be annexed and made part of Eretz Yisrael, and when that happens, the Rambam writes, it will be forbidden for the Leviyim to receive agricultural land in these regions. The Rambam adds that the concept underlying this Misva is relevant for all times, even nowadays. If a person decides to relieve himself of the burden of pursuing a livelihood, in order to fully devote himself to the genuine service of Hashem, then he becomes “Kodesh Kodashim” – “the holiest of the holy,” and should be encouraged and assisted. The rest of the nation should provide him with a livelihood to enable him to pursue his lofty spiritual ambitions, and study and teach Torah. The notion of the community supporting Rabbis and Torah scholars is not a modern-day idea; it is as old as the Torah itself. As for the prohibition against Leviyim receiving spoils of war, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that as they are G-d’s servants, it would be inappropriate for them to receive and benefit from such property. Although this property was not stolen, and was legitimately seized during warfare, nevertheless, it is unbecoming for the people of Levi to benefit from people’s unwanted loss of their possessions. Due to the Leviyim’s special spiritual stature, they should receive only property given to them in a peaceful manner, and not property which was taken during warfare, causing anguish to the owners, even if this war was fought rightfully and the spoils were taken lawfully. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is, of course, binding specifically upon the tribe of Levi. He adds that a Levi who takes the spoils of war transgresses this command, but is not liable to Malkut. For one thing, this transgression falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’hishabon” – a violation which can be rectified through the payment of money, for which one is not liable to Malkut. The Levi can simply return the spoils that he unlawfully seized, and so he is not liable to Malkut. Secondly, it is possible to violate this prohibition without performing an action – if somebody places spoils of war in a Levi’s property, and the Levi has the intention to acquire them. In such a case, he violates the prohibition because he received spoils of war, but he did not perform an action. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that if a Biblical prohibition can be violated without an action, then one is not liable to Malkut even if he transgresses that prohibition by performing an action. For this reason, too, a Levi who seizes spoils of war in violation of this command is not liable to Malkut.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family In presenting the laws relevant to a Jewish king, the Torah in Parashat Shoftim (17:16) commands that the king may not have extra horses, as this might result in his sending men to reside in Egypt to breed horses. The Torah in this context mentions that it is forbidden to return to Egypt, a prohibition which the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as one of the 613 Biblical commands. This prohibition appears already earlier, in Parashat Beshalah (Shemot 14:13), and later, in Parashat Ki-Tabo (28:68). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command refers to permanently residing in Egypt. The Torah forbids permanent residence in Egypt, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, because ancient Egypt was an especially immoral society, and Hashem specifically took us away from Egypt so that we will not adopt its people’s conduct, and we will thereby be worthy of His blessings. He therefore forbade us from returning to Egypt, so that we do not embrace their beliefs or practices. This command applies in all times, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who transgresses this prohibition by residing in Egypt is not liable to Malkut. Although going to Egypt obviously involves a concrete action, nevertheless, the violation is committed not by going to Egypt, but rather through the decision to permanently reside there. Therefore, this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – prohibitions that are violated without a concrete action, which are not punishable by Malkut. The Rambam writes in Hilchot Melachim that if a Jewish king conquers Egypt and annexes the territory, making it part of Eretz Yisrael, then it would become permissible to live there. Since the territory of Egypt would then be considered part of the Land of Israel, the prohibition would not apply. Many writers raised the question of why many pious Jews lived in Egypt throughout the ages. Thriving, Torah-committed Jewish communities existed in Cairo, Alexandria and other Egyptian cities, despite this Biblical prohibition. In fact, the Rambam, who discusses this command in his writings, lived in Egypt. One answer given is that, as the Sages mentioned in various contexts, the Assyrian emperor Sanherib conquered the entire region and moved the populations from one country to another. Therefore, the people living in Egypt since the Assyrian conquest were not the ancient Egyptians spoken of by the Torah. If we assume that the prohibition against living in Egypt is linked not to the geographical territory of Egypt, but rather to its people, then the prohibition perhaps no longer applied after Sanherib conquered Egypt and forced its people into exile. This approach, however, seems difficult to accept, as the Torah says that one may not live in Egypt, without making any mention of the people of Egypt. Others note that the Torah formulates this command as a prohibition against returning to Egypt the way our ancestors left. It appears from the text that the Torah forbids not living in Egypt per se, but rather returning there from the Land of Israel. Therefore, going to live there via some other route would be permissible. Yet another theory is that this prohibition applies only when Am Yisrael lives in its homeland, but not during exile. Therefore, it was permissible for Jews to live in Egypt during the centuries of our nation’s exile. By contrast, there are those who maintain that it is indeed forbidden to live in Egypt at any time, and regardless of the route taken to arrive there, but the Rambam was compelled to live in Egypt. He served as the personal physician of the Sultan in Egypt, and thus had no choice but to remain in the country. Additionally, the Rambam went to Egypt to lead the Jewish community there, to help them and guide them spiritually, and this important Misva may perhaps override the prohibition against residing in Egypt. Interestingly, it is said that the Rambam signed some of his letters with his name and the addition, “who transgresses three prohibitions each day,” referring to three times the Torah forbids living in Egypt. It seems likely that if there was no justification for living there, the Rambam would not have remained. Quite obviously, a man as righteous as the Rambam would not knowingly transgress a Biblical command. It seems that the Rambam felt compelled by circumstance to remain in Egypt, as discussed, and he made this note to lament the fact that he needed to live there, and to express his longing to live in Eretz Yisrael.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:16), “Lo Yarbeh Lo Susim” – that a Jewish king may not acquire extra horses. The Rabbis explain that the king may acquire as many horses as are needed for the military, and, of course, he may have a horse on which to ride. However, he may not acquire even a single additional horse for himself. Although the Torah here forbids acquiring extra “Susim” – “horses,” in the plural form – the Torah later in this verse makes reference to just a single horse (“Lema’an Harbot Sus”), indicating that acquiring even just one unnecessary horse is forbidden. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, the Torah itself provides the reason for this prohibition, explaining “Ve’lo Yashib Et Ha’am Misrayema” – that acquiring excess horses might lead to a return to Egypt. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if the king begins expanding his cavalry, he might send servants to permanently reside in Egypt, where quality horses were available, in order to purchase and breed horses. The Torah forbids permanently residing in Egypt (as will be discussed in Misva #500), and so the Torah commanded that a king should not acquire extra horses, to prevent against permanent residence in Egypt. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, acquiring excess horses – which have an impressive appearance and gallop quickly and gracefully – could lead the king to arrogance and conceit. For this reason, too, the Torah forbids kings from acquiring unneeded horses. This command applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and, of course, only to the Jewish king. A king who acquires even a single horse unnecessarily transgresses this prohibition, and is liable to Malkut.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:15) commands appointing a king, and then warns, “Lo Tuchal La’tet Alecha Ish Nochri Asher Lo Ahicha Hu” – “You cannot place over yourself a foreigner, who is not your brother.” This verse introduces a Biblical prohibition against naming a non-Jew to the kingship. More generally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah here teaches us that we must appoint to important positions of leadership only qualified individuals. We must not appoint unqualified or evil individuals to leadership positions out of nepotism, fear, or to flatter rich or powerful people. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that if somebody does appoint an evil person to a position of leadership, “Lo Tasur Ra’a Mi’beto” – “evil will never leave his household”; meaning, he will be severely punished. Conversely, those who fearlessly do the right thing, and appoint qualified leaders, motivated purely by genuine concern for the public’s benefit, will be rewarded. This Misva is binding when Beneh Yisrael reside in their land and appoint a king. It is directed not toward any particular individual or group of individuals, but toward the entire nation collectively. The Mishna in Masechet Sota (41a) tells that Agripas, one of the kings of Judea during the time of the Second Temple, read this verse, which forbids appointing a foreigner as king, and began weeping. He was a descendant of Hordus (Herod), a non-Jew who worked as a servant for the royal Hashmonai family, and later killed all the Hashmonaim and seized the throne. Agripas, his descendant, realized upon reading this verse that he was not worthy of the throne, and so he began crying. The people assured him, “Al Tira, Ahinu Ata” – “Do not be afraid; you are our brother.” The Gemara comments that the people committed the grave sin of false flattery by wrongly comforting Agripas, assuring him that he was eligible to be king, when, in fact, he was not. They responded this way in order to ingratiate themselves to the king, a grievous misdeed for which they were punished. The Rishonim debate the question as to the precise nature of Agripas’ disqualification. Rashi maintains that Agripas’ mother was Jewish, and thus he was, in fact, eligible to serve as king. However, since his father descended from Hordus, a servant, Agripas’ appointment as king denigrated the kingship. According to Rashi, it seems, Torah law permitted Agripas to serve as king, and he was disqualified only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment), out of concern for the dignity and respect of the monarchy. Tosafot disagree with Rashi’s understanding, contending that the people would not be deserving of severe punishment for approving of Agripas’ appointment if it were allowed on the level of Torah law. Therefore, Tosafot advance a different view – that only somebody with both a Jewish mother and a Jewish father may be appointed king. Hence, Agripas was disqualified from the kingship on the level of Torah law, and the people were thus guilty of false flattery by falsely assuring him that he was eligible for the Jewish monarchy. (Yet a third view is advanced by Tosafot in Masechet Yebamot (45), stating that neither of Agripas’ parents were Jewish.) Even though we do not have a monarchy nowadays, nevertheless, as mentioned, this Misva is relevant in our time, requiring us to appoint to leadership positions only people who are truly qualified, and not to appoint leaders out of nepotism or in the interest of pleasing wealthy, powerful individuals.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:25) states, “Som Tasim Alecha Melech” – that the Jewish Nation is to appoint a king to lead them. According to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, this verse introduces a command to appoint a king. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded appointing a king because a nation cannot be run peacefully without a single authority figure who makes decisions and governs the people. The situation of a country run by a group of people, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is a “curse.” Indeed, the verse in Mishleh (28:2) states, “Be’fesha Eretz Rabim Sareha” – because of population’s iniquity, they are punished with a large number of rulers, which results in instability, strife and infighting. The Torah therefore commands appointing a single ruler to govern the nation, thus ensuring stability and peace. The Jewish king is appointed either by the Sanhedrin, or by a prophet. Thus, for example, Moshe, as a prophet, appointed Yehoshua as his successor as leader of the people, and the prophet Shmuel appointed Shaul and then David as kings. The Torah commands appointing a “Melech” (king), which the Sages understood as requiring the appointment of a king, and not a queen (“Malka”). After a king is named, he is formally anointed with the “Shemen Ha’mish’ha” – the special anointing oil. The kingship is passed through inheritance; when a king dies, the position is given to his son. If the son is young, then he becomes king when he grows up and reaches the age at which he can govern. An example is the king Yehoash, who was orphaned at a young age, and was cared for by the Kohen Gadol, Yehoyada, until he became old enough to rule. The order of precedence for inheriting the kingship is the same as that of ordinary inheritance. Whichever relative takes precedence for inheriting a deceased’s estate takes precedence for inheriting the kingship after a king’s passing. Just as the kingship is passed through inheritance, so are all positions of leadership passed to one’s offspring, provided that the inheritor is qualified for the position and G-d-fearing. A king has the right to kill a “Mored Ba’malchut” – one who rebels against or challenges his authority. An example of this law is Uriya Ha’Hiti, the first husband of Batsheba, who referred to the general, Yoab, as “Adoni Yoab” – “My master, Yoab.” This was an affront to King David’s rule, and so David was entitled to have Uriya killed as a “Mored Ba’malchut.” A king also has the right of eminent domain, and may break through fences to travel through somebody’s private property if he so wishes. Furthermore, a king has the authority to judge according to his intuition, even without the testimony of witnesses. Nobody is allowed to use a king’s property, even after he dies. In fact, after a king’s passing, all his possessions are burned. Nobody may marry his widow, or take his animals. Even if a king agrees to waive the special honor owed to him, “En Kebodo Mahul” – he may not do so, and the people remain bound by all the laws regarding respect for a king. The Misva applies only in the times when Am Yisrael resides in its land, and is assigned to the public collectively. A number of scholars addressed the question of why, according to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, the prophet Shmuel – and G-d – reacted angrily when the people requested that a king be appointed. If, as the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch maintain, there is a Misva to appoint a king, then why were G-d and Shmuel displeased by the people’s petition? The Rambam, in Hilchot Melachim, explains that G-d and Shmuel were angry at the people not because they asked for a king, but because of the manner in which they asked. Rather than express their desire to fulfill the Misva of appointing the king, they approached Shmuel “Be’tir’omet” – with complaints, demanding a king because they did not like Shmuel. The Ramban explains somewhat similarly, that the people belittled Shmuel’s honor in presenting their request. The Meiri (France, 1249-1315) suggests that the people acted wrongly by asking for a king before there was a suitable candidate for the kingship from the tribe of Yehuda. The king is to be a member of the tribe of Yehuda, and the people should have thus waited until there was somebody from that tribe eligible to serve as king. According to this approach, the people were reprimanded because the request was made prematurely. Another question that arises is why the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch list this Misva as one of the Torah’s 613 commands, given that it does not, seemingly, apply forever. Once David was named king and founder of the eternal Jewish dynasty, it would appear that there is no longer a Misva to appoint a king. One of the Rambam’s principles when listing the Misvot is that only those commands which are applicable for all time are worthy of inclusion in this list, and yet, he includes the Misva of appointing a king. The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that this Misva indeed applies eternally because the laws relevant to the kingship – such as those mentioned earlier – will be relevant to the king once Mashiah comes and the kingship will be restored. Since the rules regarding the kingship will be applicable in the future, this Misva is to be counted among the 613 Biblical commands.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family In Parashat Shoftim (17:1), after commanding that we must obey the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the Torah introduces a prohibition against disobeying their rulings: “Lo Tasur Min Ha’dabar Asher Yagidu Lecha Yamin U’smol” – “Do not turn away from what they tell you, right or left.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if everybody follows his own understanding of Torah, rather than accepting the rulings of the central body of Torah authority, there would be countless disagreements and ongoing divisiveness. It would appear as though we have many different Torahs followed by many different people, rather than a single Torah to which we are all devoted. The Torah therefore commanded that we abide by the rulings of the Sages of the Sanhedrin, who invested a great deal of time and effort, applying themselves assiduously day and night to arrive at the truth of Torah law. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah requires abiding by the Sanhedrin’s rulings even if one is certain that the ruling is incorrect. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is “Tob Li’sbol Ta’ut Ahat Ve’yiheyu Ha’kol Mesurim Tahat Da’atam” – “It is better to tolerate one mistake and have everyone subject to their authority.” Although the Sanhedrin might, on rare occasions, issue a mistaken ruling, it is preferable for everyone to accept all their rulings, even their mistaken decisions, rather than allow people to disregard their opinion and thus disrespect their authority. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if people do not obey the court’s ruling, this would lead to “Hurban Ha’dat” – “the destruction of the religion.” Thus, accepting the rare incorrect decision is a small price to pay to maintain the stability of the Jewish religion by respecting the Sanhedrin’s authority. The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this context discusses the famous story told in Masechet Baba Mesia (59) about the question regarding “Tanur Shel Achnai” – a certain type of oven, whose Halachic status came under dispute. Rabbi Eliezer maintained that this oven is not susceptible to Tum’a (impurity), whereas all the other Rabbis disagreed, and ruled that this oven can become Halachically impure. In an effort to prove his position, Rabbi Eliezer said that if he was correct, certain supernatural phenomena should occur, and they did. He then said that if he was correct, a Heavenly voice should make an announcement to this effect, and, sure enough, a voice came forth proclaiming that his view was correct. The Rabbis nevertheless refused to accept his opinion, as the Torah commanded following the majority view. Another Heavenly voice then came forth, announcing, “Nisehuni Banai, Nisehuni” – “My children have defeated Me!” It seems that Rabbi Eliezer’s view indeed reflected the true Halacha, but G-d was “defeated” by the Sages. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that G-d was, quite obviously, not “defeated.” It goes without saying that G-d can never be defeated by anybody. Rather, G-d was expressing that although Rabbi Eliezer was correct, the other Sages were nevertheless correct in dismissing his view, following the principle of “Ahareh Rabim Le’hatot.” G-d commanded in the Torah that we must follow the majority view, and so He granted His approval to the majority decision, even though it was incorrect. For the sake of maintaining the authority of the majority of the Sages, their view is to be accepted even in the rare situation where it can be determined to be incorrect. The Rambam maintained that this prohibition of “Lo Tasur” includes disobeying any law established by the Sages. Whether the law was determined through logical deduction, or by applying the thirteen “Middot She’ha’Torah Nidreshet Bahen” (methods by which Halachot are extracted from the text of the Humash), violating the law transgresses the command of “Lo Tasur.” The Rambam adds that this applies also if one transgressed a law enacted by the Sages as a safeguard against violations of Torah law. The Ramban strongly disputes the Rambam’s opinion, noting that the Rambam in essence transforms every violation of Rabbinic law into a violation of Torah law. If so, the Ramban asks, then how did the Sages draw Halachic distinctions between these two categories of laws? As we know, Halacha establishes that “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” – we must act stringently in situations of doubt where a Torah law is at stake, whereas “Safek De’Rabbanan Le’kula” – we may act leniently in situations of doubt where a Rabbinic law is at stake. According to the Rambam, however, this rule seems meaningless, for every Rabbinic law is, essentially, a Torah law, as violating a Rabbinic law constitutes a violation of the Torah command of “Lo Tasur.” The Ramban therefore maintains that the prohibition of “Lo Tasur” applies only to the Sages’ interpretation of Torah law, and not to the laws which they enacted. Later writers explained that in the Rambam’s view, the Sages enacted their laws with certain “built-in” leniencies. Meaning, from the outset, the Sages intended their enactments to apply only in situations of certainty, and not in situations of doubt. The rule of “Safek De’Rabbanan Le’kula” stems from the fact that the Sages did not require us to observe their enactments when there is some uncertainty. This rule, then, does not disprove the Rambam’s theory that violating a Rabbinic enactment constitutes a violation of the Torah command of “Lo Tasur.” Some Aharonim added that the command of “Lo Tasur” applies only to knowingly disregarding the Sages’ authority. If a person violates a Rabbinic law due to temptation, or out of simple laziness, but without any intention to undermine the Rabbis’ authority, then he is not in violation of “Lo Tasur.” The Rambam, according to this understanding, refers only to one who violates a Rabbinic law out of disregard for the authority of the Sages. The prohibition of “Lo Tasur” falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’azharat Bet Din” – a prohibition that, in certain circumstances, is punishable by court execution. There is a situation of “Zekan Mamreh,” where a Torah scholar refuses to accept a ruling of the Sanhedrin regarding certain categories of Torah law, and is thus liable to capital punishment. One who violates a “Lav Ha’nitan Le’azharat Bet Din” under circumstances that do not warrant capital punishment is not liable to Malkut. Therefore, one who violates the command of “Lo Tasur” by disobeying the ruling of the Sanhedrin, despite committing a grievous transgression, is not liable to Malkut.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:10) that after the Bet Din Ha’gadol – the highest Rabbinic court – issues a ruling, “Ve’asita Al Pi Ha’dabar Asher Yagidu Lecha” – one is required to abide by the ruling. This verse introduces an affirmative command to obey the rulings of the Sanhedrin. This Misva applies regardless of whether the scholars arrived at their ruling based on deductive reasoning, or by applying the thirteen “Middot She’ha’Torah Nidreshet Bahen” (methods by which Halachot are extracted from the text of the Humash). Likewise, if the judges on the court unanimously agreed on a certain matter for reasons which are not known, everyone is obliged to abide by the decision. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that nowadays, in the absence of the Sanhedrin, we have certain guidelines for how to act when the leading scholars disagree on a Halachic issue. If the Rabbis are equal in their level of scholarship, then we should follow the stringent position when matters of Torah law are concerned, whereas regarding matters involving laws enacted by the Sages, we may rely on the lenient view. The Sefer Ha’hinuch also addresses in this context the question of whether a court can reverse decisions made by a court in an earlier generation. He writes that a court may not reverse an earlier court’s decision that has gained widespread acceptance among the Jewish People, even if they have determined that the previous court’s ruling was erroneous. They may reverse an earlier court’s decision only if they are greater than that earlier court both in “Hochma” (scholarship) and “Minyan” (numbers). And even then, they may reverse only a Halachic ruling; they may not repeal an edict issued by an earlier court for the purpose of safeguarding a Torah law. The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this instance does not follow the view presented by the Rambam in the second chapter of Hilchot Mamrim. The Rambam there writes that a court’s rulings are authoritative for that generation even if it reverses the ruling of the court in an earlier generation. This command applies whenever there is a Sanhedrin, and is binding upon both men and women alike. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes by noting that even nowadays, when we do not have a Sanhedrin, we are to obey the “Hacham Ha’gadol Asher Yiheyeh Bi’zmanenu” – the leading scholar of our generation. His rulings are to be seen as binding and authoritative, and must be obeyed. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, although one who transgresses this command is not liable to punishment by the court (as the court does not punish for violations of affirmative commands), nevertheless, violators of this command will be severely punished. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva is “the strong pillar upon which the Torah leans,” and one who disobeys the Sanhedrin is thus considered to undermine the very foundations of Judaism. Therefore, he is deserving of harsh punishment.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 17:1), “Lo Tizbah L’Hashem Elokecha Shor or Seh Asher Yiheyeh Bo Mum” – that we may not offer a blemished animal as a sacrifice to G-d. The Sifri interprets this verse as emphasizing that even if an animal has a temporary blemish, which can be expected to be cured, it may not be offered as a sacrifice while the blemish is present. The Gemara gives the examples of certain kinds of mild skin boils, and a tearing eye which blurs the animal’s vision, conditions which are temporary. It is forbidden to offer as a sacrifice an animal suffering from one of these ailments. This prohibition applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and it is binding upon not only Kohanim, but also Yisraelim, and both men and women. The slaughtering of a sacrifice does not require a Kohen; it may be performed even by a non-Kohen, and by both men and women. Therefore, this prohibition, which forbids slaughtering a blemished animal as a sacrifice, is binding upon both men and women. One who transgresses this prohibition and slaughters a blemished animal as a sacrifice is liable to Malkut.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 16:22), “Ve’lo Takim Lecha Maseba Asher Saneh Hashem Elokecha” – “You shall not erect for yourself a monument which Hashem your G-d despises.” This verse introduces the prohibition against erecting a monument, such as from stone or earth, the way idolaters would build structures for their pagan worship. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even if one’s intention in building the monument is for the service of Hashem, it is nevertheless forbidden, because the Torah seeks to distance us as much as possible from anything that even resembles idol worship. This prohibition applies in all places and in all times, and is binding upon both men and women. One who erects a monument in violation of this command is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch implies that this command forbids only erecting a monument for religious purposes. Indeed, a number of Poskim, including Rav Yishak Weiss (1902-1989), in Minhat Yishak (1:29), ruled that it is permissible to erect a monument to commemorate an event, such as a military victory, or to honor a distinguished person. They maintained that this prohibition refers specifically to monuments erected for religious worship, and not those built solely for commemorative purposes. It should be noted that Rav Bension Meir Hai Uziel (1880-1953), in Mishpeteh Uziel, writes that it is far preferable to honor somebody by donating to a yeshiva and supporting Torah scholars, rather than erect a monument commemorating his achievements. Although such a monument is not forbidden, nevertheless, the money would be better spent facilitating Torah study.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 16:21) commands, “You shall not plant an Ashera or any tree next to the altar of Hashem your G-d, which you will make for yourself.” This establishes a prohibition against planting a tree in the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Rambam explains that the idolaters would adorn their temples with trees, and therefore, in order to distance us as much as possible from idolatrous practices, the Torah forbids us from planting trees in our Temple. The Torah wants us to avoid any possible connection or association with idol worship, and so it forbids practices which resemble pagan customs, including the planting of trees in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Although the verse speaks specifically of planting a tree next to the altar, the Sages understood that the Torah forbids planting a tree anywhere in the Azara (courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash). This prohibition includes all kinds of trees – both fruit-bearing trees, and tree which do not produce fruit. The Sages enacted a prohibition against constructing wooden balconies in the Azara, as wood is made from trees, and thus building these structures in the Azara might lead to planting trees there. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women. Even nowadays, one who plants a tree in the area where the Azara was situated transgresses this Biblical command. There is some discussion among the Poskim regarding the permissibility of adorning the synagogue with trees. There is a well-known custom to adorn the synagogue with greenery on Shabuot, to commemorate the greenery with which G-d adorned Mount Sinai at the time of Matan Torah. But the Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, Poland, 1633-1683) mentions that some had the custom to bring trees into the synagogue for Shabuot, to commemorate the Bikkurim – first fruits – which were brought to the Bet Ha’mikdash on this day. The Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797) opposed this practice, as it resembled the custom to bring trees into churches. Hacham Ovadia Yosef, by contrast, defended this practice, explaining that this is allowed because it is done for a clear reason – to commemorate the Bikkurim. Imitating a gentile custom is forbidden when there is no other reason for the practice. In this instance, however, the trees are brought into the synagogue for a reasonable religious purpose, and so it is permissible.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The opening verse of Parashat Shoftim (Debarim 16:18) commands, “Shoftim Ve’shoterim Titen Lecha Be’chol She’arecha” – that we must appoint judges and law enforcers in every Jewish community, to ensure compliance with Torah law. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command includes the establishment three different types of courts. The highest court – the Sanhedrin – consisted of seventy Rabbis, led by the Nasi (“prince”), and it convened in Jerusalem. Secondly, every city had a “Sanhedri Ketana” (“mini Sanhedrin”), consisting of twenty-three Rabbis, which had the authority to try capital cases. Smaller communities have a Bet Din of three scholars to preside over monetary disputes. In addition to the judges (“Shoftim”), the Torah requires appointing enforcers (“Shoterim”) who circulate among the people to ensure that they are following the Torah’s laws. The reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that people are influenced by their habits and routines. When people are coerced to observe the Misvot, they develop good habits, accustoming themselves to abide by the Torah. The objective is that the people will obey the Torah “Me’ahaba” – out of a love for Hashem. The fear and deterrence are necessary to accustom people to observe the Misvot, so that they will then fulfill them out of love. The Rabbis of the Sanhedrin would sit in order of their stature, with the Nasi, the leader, sitting in the most prominent position, and the leader under him, the Ab Bet Din, sitting beneath him. The other judges were seated in order of their scholarly achievements. If they were on the same level of scholarship, then they were seated according to age. The judges sat in a semicircle, so that they could all see one another. All judges appointed to the Sanhedrin, or to the “Sanhedri Ketana,” needed to have achieved proficiency not only in Torah, but also in medicine, mathematics and astronomy, and must also have been familiar with witchcraft in order to be able to try cases involving alleged sorcerers. The judges must also be “Meyuhasim” – meaning, descend from established pedigree, such that their daughters are eligible to marry Kohanim. The judges appointed to the Sanhedrin or the “Sanhedri Ketana” must be “Semuchim,” having received ordination from the original chain of Semicha (ordination) that began with Moshe Rabbenu. Moshe conferred Semicha upon his disciple, Yehoshua, and then upon seventy elders, and they were then authorized to confer Semicha upon their students, who then in turn conferred it upon theirs, and so on. This Semicha can be conferred only in the Land of Israel. The chain of Semicha continued for many generations, until soon after the destruction of the Second Temple. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although the chain of formal Semicha has been disrupted, nevertheless, Rabbis who have determined that a scholar has attained proficiency in Torah such that he is suitable to judge should ordain the student so he can serve as a judge. Today, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, we have only courts of three judges with the authority to preside over financial disputes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even today, every community should appoint qualified and respectable figures to reach decisions, resolve disputes, and ensure that the people observe the Torah. Several centuries ago, a major controversy arose in Eretz Yisrael concerning the prospect of reinstating the original Semicha. The notion of reinstating Semicha is based on the Rambam’s comments in Hilchot Sanhedrin (chapter 4), where he writes that if all the Torah scholars in the Land of Israel agree to reintroduce Semicha, and confer Semicha upon qualified judges, they may do so. The judges upon whom Semicha is conferred then have the authority of judges of the Sanhedrin. The reason why this hasn’t been done, the Rambam explains, is that a consensus could not be reached, due to the Jews’ dispersion. In principle, however, the Semicha could be reinstated if all the Sages in the Land of Israel agree. In 1538, the leading Rabbi of the city of Sefat, Rav Yaakob Berab (1474-1546), decided to reinstate the original Semicha on the basis of the Rambam’s ruling. A group of Rabbis formally ordained Rav Yaakob, and he then prepared to confer Semicha upon four other sages, one of whom was Maran, the Bet Yosef, author of the Shulhan Aruch (Rav Yosef Karo, 1488-1575). The plan was to then reestablish the Sanhedrin. When the news of this development reached Jerusalem, the city’s Rabbi, the Maharlbach (Rav Levi Ben Habib), vehemently opposed to idea. He wrote a strongly-worded letter arguing against the reinstating of Semicha, igniting a major controversy. A number of other leading Rabbis got involved, including the Radbaz (Rav David Ben Zimra, Egypt, 1479-1573), who sided with the Maharlbach. Those who opposed the reintroduction of Semicha noted that not all Poskim agreed with the Rambam, and it thus could not be assumed that Rabbis can reinstate the Semicha before the Messianic Era. Moreover, even the Rambam concludes his discussion of the subject by writing, “Ha’davar Sarich Hechre’a” – that the matter requires further study and analysis, expressing his uncertainty about his ruling. Additionally, the Rambam explicitly requires the agreement of all the Rabbis in the Land of Israel, which Rav Yaakob Berab did not have. It was also noted that the new Sanhedrin would declare new months based on the sighting of the new moon. Those who did not accept the new Sanhedrin would continue following the fixed calendar system, resulting in a schism within the Jewish People. The controversy became heated, and even personal, with Rav Yaakob Berab making mention of the time when the Maharlbach lived in Portugal and was coerced to accept Christianity for a period of time. Ultimately, the Rabbis of Jerusalem prevailed, and the reinstated Semicha did not continue. The Rabbis teach that when Eliyahu Ha’nabi returns to announce the advent of the Messianic Era, he will reinstate Semicha. Eliyahu received the original Semicha (either because he was Pinhas, and thus received Semicha directly from Moshe, or because, as the Rambam writes, he was part of the chain of the Mesora that began with Moshe Rabbenu), and so he is authorized to confer Semicha upon qualified scholars. This is how, please G-d, the original Semicha will be reinstated in the future.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 16:16) that every male among Beneh Yisrael must “be seen by G-d” on the three Regalim (pilgrimage festivals) – Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot. This obligation includes the offering of an Ola sacrifice (meaning, a sacrifice which is burnt entirely on the altar), known as “Olat Re’iya.” The first Mishna in Masechet Pe’a (which we customarily recite each morning after Birkat Ha’Torah) lists this sacrifice (“Re’ayon”) among the Misvot which have no “Shiur” – meaning, no minimum amount. One can even purchase a small, inexpensive bird as his Olat Re’iya; there is no minimum amount which is required for this obligation. The reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is for us to make a proclamation that we are G-d’s servants. G-d invites only us into His “home,” so-to-speak, because we are His faithful servants. When we arrive with a sacrifice, we declare and reflect upon this special status. This experience will enhance our awareness of our obligations to Hashem, such that we will become worthy of His blessings. This Misva is directed specifically to men, as the Torah explicitly states – “Ye’ra’eh Kol Zechurcha” (“All your males shall be seen”) – because they are the heads of the household. The “Olat Re’iya” sacrifice may be offered on Yom Tob, despite the fact that private sacrifices are generally not brought on Yom Tob, but may not be offered on Shabbat. The Torah adds a separate Misva forbidding arriving in the Bet Ha’mikdash on the Regalim “empty-handed” – “Ve’lo Yera’u Fanai Rekam” (Shemot 23:15). Even if one makes the pilgrimage to the Bet Ha’mikdash, he transgresses this prohibition if he does not bring the required “Olat Re’iya.” This command is binding only upon men, who are bound by the Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) of Aliya Le’regel (the festival pilgrimage to the Bet Ha’mikdash). Even though women would accompany their husbands to the Bet Ha’mikdash during the festivals, they are not bound by the prohibition of “Ve’lo Yera’u Fanai Rekam,” and are not responsible for offering a sacrifice. The Gemara in Masechet Hagiga (3a) cites the verse in Shir Hashirim (7:2), “Ma Yafu Fe’amayich Ba’ne’alim Bat Nadib,” and explains it to mean that the “steps” of Beneh Yisrael are “beautiful” as they make the Aliya Le’regel pilgrimage on the festivals. The Rabbis of the Mussar movement raise the question of why the Gemara focuses specifically on the “steps” of the people as they make their way to Jerusalem. Of course, the people fulfill the Misva by walking, journeying from their homes to the Bet Ha’mikdash. But why is it specifically the steps that are “beautiful” as the people journey to Jerusalem for Aliya Le’regel? One answer is that as a person makes his journey to the Bet Ha’mikdash for Aliya Le’regel, he feels anxious. After all, the Torah describes Aliya Le’regel as “being seen” by G-d. The person knows that as he stands before G-d, his conduct will be scrutinized. G-d will “see” Him, will look at all his actions and even his thoughts. Therefore, the person prepares himself throughout the trip to Jerusalem by introspecting and repenting, committing to improve himself. With every step taken toward the Bet Ha’mikdash, he advances further, working on himself and moving closer to Hashem. This is why the Gemara describes the people’s “steps” as beautiful – because the journey is spent in Teshuba, as the people make a sincere effort to improve, and there is nothing more beautiful than working to make ourselves better.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 16:14), “Ve’samahta Be’hagecha” – that we must rejoice on the Yamim Tobim (festivals). The primary form of rejoicing to which the Torah refers in this context is the offering of Shelamim sacrifices in the Bet Ha’mikdash and partaking of their meat, together with wine. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this Misva is fulfilled also in other ways – such as by wearing new, fine clothing, and by giving family members treats. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that music, too, is a form of enjoyment through which this Misva is fulfilled. Of course, playing music is forbidden on Yom Tob, but it is allowed on Yom Tob in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes, one cannot fully experience Simha (rejoicing) on Yom Tob without assisting the poor, the downtrodden, and all those in need of help and support. Explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that joy and festivity are among the basic needs of human beings. In addition to the need to eat and sleep, we also have a need to experience enjoyment, to indulge in delights on occasion. However, enjoyment and indulgence have a tendency to lead a person to improper, sinful behavior. Therefore, Hashem commanded us to celebrate special occasions, and enjoy festivity, in the context of a Misva, as part of a religious observance. This allows us to fill our need for enjoyment and festivity while helping to ensure that we conduct ourselves properly. This Misva applies in all places and in all time eriods, and is binding upon both men and women. Of course, we cannot fulfill this obligation nowadays through the offering of sacrifices, but we observe this Misva through the consumption of regular meat, drinking wine, and other means of enjoyment. Somebody who fails to rejoice on Yom Tob has neglected this Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion of this Misva by citing the famous Rabbinic dictum, “Ve’chol Ma’asecha Yiheyu Le’shem Shamayim” – “All your actions shall be done for the sake of Heaven.” When we feast and rejoice on Yom Tob, we must direct our thoughts and attention to Hashem, and enjoy the holiday for His sake, and not purely for the sake of vain pleasure.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 16:5) commands that one may not sacrifice the Korban Pesach “Be’ahad She’arecha” – “in one of your gates.” Meaning, the Korban Pesach must be sacrificed only in the central location – the Mishkan, and then the Bet Ha’mikdash – and may not be sacrificed on a private altar. Even during the periods when it was permissible to offer other sacrifices on private altars, the Torah prohibits offering the Korban Pesach on a private altar. Before the construction of the Mishkan, Beneh Yisrael were permitted to offer sacrifices wherever they wished, but once the Mishkan was built, it became forbidden to offer any sacrifice anywhere other than the Mishkan. Later, when Beneh Yisrael crossed the Jordan River into the Land of Israel, the Mishkan was stationed in Gilgal, where it remained during the fourteen years when Beneh Yisrael captured and distributed the land. Throughout these fourteen years, it was permissible to offer sacrifices on private altars. Upon the conclusion of this period, the Mishkan was moved to the town of Shilo, whereupon it once again became forbidden to offer sacrifices anywhere besides the Mishkan. The Mishkan remained in Shilo for 369 years. It then moved to the towns of Nob and Gibon, where it remained for fifty-seven years, during which time Beneh Yisrael were allowed to offer sacrifices wherever they wished. Finally, the Bet Ha’mikdash was built, and from that point on, for all time, it is forbidden to sacrifice anywhere other than the Bet Ha’mikdash. The prohibition introduced in this verse in Parashat Re’eh forbids offering the Korban Pesach anywhere other than the Mishkan (or Bet Ha’mikdash) even during those periods when other sacrifices could be offered anywhere, such as when the Mishkan was in Gilgal, Nob and Gibon. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this prohibition as an expression of the unique importance and significance of the Korban Pesach, which commemorates the miracle of Yesiat Misrayim (the Exodus from Egypt). This miracle demonstrated G-d’s unlimited control over nature, proving that He Created and governs the world. In order to impress upon us the great importance of the Korban Pesach and what it teaches us, the Torah required that it be offered only in the Bet Ha’mikdash, even when other sacrifices are allowed to be offered elsewhere. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and it applies even nowadays – if somebody would consecrate an animal as a Korban Pesach, sacrificing it on an altar would violate the command forbidding sacrificing the Korban Pesach outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. This Misva marks an unusual instance where the Sefer Ha’hinuch does not follow the Rambam’s counting of the Misvot. Whereas the Sefer Ha’hinuch generally adheres to the list of 613 Misvot compiled by the Rambam, in this case he disagrees with the Rambam, as the Rambam does not include this prohibition in his listing of the Misvot. The Rambam felt that this Misva does not apply for all time, and was limited to those several periods in Jewish history when other sacrifices were allowed to be offered on private altars. Once the Bet Ha’mikdash was built, the Rambam held, this prohibition is no longer relevant, since all sacrifices are forbidden outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. As the Rambam listed only those commands which are eternally relevant, this command was not included in his list. Various theories have been advanced to explain why the Sefer Ha’hinuch deviated from the Rambam’s view in this instance. One intriguing possibility arises from an exchange of letters between a Rabbi named Rabbi Daniel Ha’babli (Syria, late 12 th - early 13 th century) and the Rambam’s son, Rabbi Abraham (1186-1237). Rabbi Daniel Ha’babli asked Rabbi Abraham why his father included in his list of Misvot the prohibition against offering the Korban Pesach on a private altar, being that this command was relevant only temporarily. Rabbi Abraham replied that the Rambam did not, in fact, include this command in his list of Misvot, and that there must be a faulty text of the Rambam’s work that led people to think that he did. Conceivably, the Sefer Ha’hinuch may have seen that text and thus assumed that the Rambam included this prohibition in his list of the 613 Misvot, and he therefore followed this opinion. Regardless, according to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, even after the Bet Ha’mikdash was destroyed, and even today, offering the Korban Pesach on a private altar transgresses this prohibition.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 16:4), “Ve’lo Yalin Min Ha’basar Asher Tizbah Ba’ereb Ba’yom Ha’rishon La’boker” – forbidding leaving over meat from a sacrifice until morning. This verse refers to a specific sacrifice – the Hagiga offering that would be brought together with the Korban Pesach on the 14 th of Nissan. The meat of the Hagiga offering is eaten that night, together with the meat of the Korban Pesach, and may be eaten also afterward, throughout the following day and the next night, until the morning of the 16 th of Nissan. The Torah here forbids leaving over any of the meat of this sacrifice until the morning of the 16 th of Nissan. This sacrifice should not be confused with the standard Hagiga sacrifice which must be offered every Yom Tob. We deal here with a special sacrifice that would be offered together with the Korban Pesach on the afternoon of Ereb Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this sacrifice is required because of the unique importance of the Korban Pesach. The Korban Pesach celebrates the miracle of Yesiat Misrayim, an event which confirms the fundamental belief that G-d created the world and exerts absolute control over it, and therefore, this sacrifice has special significance. As such, the Torah commanded eating the Korban Pesach as part of a festive event, and for this reason, an additional sacrifice is offered and eaten at the same time, in order to enhance the joy and festivity surrounding the Korban Pesach. This sacrifice accompanying the Korban Pesach falls under the category of Shalmeh Simha – sacrifices offered for the sake of providing meat and thereby enhancing the festivity on Yom Tob. Therefore, this offering could be sacrificed even earlier, before the 14 th of Nissan, as long as the meat can still be eaten at the Seder with the Korban Pesach. Moreover, if one had vowed to offer a Shelamim sacrifice, he may use that sacrifice as the Hagiga accompanying the Korban Pesach. This is in contrast to the standard Hagiga required every Yom Tob, which must stand alone and must be offered on the holiday. This Misva, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that this requirement is binding even upon women, because women are included in the Yom Tob obligations. Others disagree, and contend that women are exempt from the obligation to offer the Hagiga on the 14 th of Nissan. Somebody who left over meat from this sacrifice until the morning of the 16 th of Nissan has violated this prohibition, and is required to burn the leftover meat. The violator is not liable to Malkut, because he did not perform an action. Additionally, this violation can be corrected by burning the leftover meat, and no Malkut are incurred when violating a prohibition that can be corrected (“Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh”).
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah says about the Korban Pesach sacrifice, which was offered on the 14 th of Nissan, “Lo Tochal Alav Hametz” (Debarim 16:3) – “Do not eat leaven in conjunction with it.” This verse introduces a prohibition against eating Hametz throughout the time when the Korban Pesach may be offered, meaning, during the afternoon of the 14 th of Nissan, Ereb Pesach. The Biblical prohibition takes effect at midday, which is the time when the Korban Pesach could be offered, but the Sages enacted a safeguard, forbidding Hametz already during the sixth hour. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah introduced this prohibition due to the unique severity of the prohibition against eating Hametz during Pesach. This prohibition is treated with special stringency, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, because it commemorates the event of the Exodus – when Beneh Yisrael left hastily, and their dough did not have time to rise. The miracle of the Exodus is especially important as it confirms the belief that G-d created the universe and exerts absolute control over the world, and so all Misvot associated with the commemoration of this event is treated very stringently. Accordingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah made a safeguard for its own prohibition, forbidding the consumption of Hametz already during the afternoon of Ereb Pesach, before the onset of the Yom Tob. Due to the especially stringent nature of the Hametz prohibition, the Torah added a safeguard, extending the prohibition by six hours, such that we must refrain from Hametz already at midday on Ereb Pesach. In addition to the prohibition against eating Hametz on the afternoon of Ereb Pesach, which the Torah commands in this verse (“Lo Tochal”), the Torah also forbids owning Hametz during this time. This law is derived from a different verse: “Ach Ba’yom Ha’rishon Tashbitu Se’or Mi’batechem” – “But on the first day, you shall eliminate leaven from your home” (Shemot 12:15). While we might initially assume that this refers to the first day of Pesach, in truth, it cannot refer to this day, because the Torah already forbids having Hametz in one’s possession throughout the seven days of Pesach. Therefore, the Sages understood that the word “Rishon” (“first”) refers to the day before Pesach, as this word can sometimes mean “preceding.” The implication of this command is that one may have Hametz in his possession during part of the day of Ereb Pesach, and then at some point one must eliminate all Hametz. The Torah does not specify when during this day one is required to eliminate Hametz from his possession. Quite reasonably, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Sages understood that half the day one is allowed to have Hametz, and during the second half this is prohibited. Thus, this verse establishes the prohibition against having Hametz in one’s possession during the afternoon of Ereb Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that there were those who understood differently, claiming that the Sages inferred this Halacha from the word “Ach” (“But,” or “Only”) at the beginning of this phrase. There is a system of letter substitution called “Ahas Bata,” according to which the letter “Alef” is substituted with a “Het,” and “Chaf” is substituted with “Sadi,” such that “Ach” may be read as “Hetz,” which means “split in half.” These unnamed Rabbis thought that this is how the Sages derived from this verse the requirement to eliminate Hametz from one’s possession in the middle of the day on Ereb Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch strongly denounces this far-fetched explanation, saying that those who advanced such a theory did not properly understand the words of Hazal. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies in all places and in all time periods. One who eats a Ke’zayit of Hametz after midday on Ereb Pesach is in violation of this command and thus liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that his discussion follows the view of the Rambam, but the Ramban disagrees, and understands the command “Lo Tochal Alav Hametz” differently. In his view, there is only an affirmative command to eliminate Hametz from one’s possession at midday of Ereb Pesach, but one who eats Hametz on the afternoon of Ereb Pesach is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes by emphasizing that different scholars have different understandings of Torah law, and “Elu Ve’elu Dibreh Elokim Haim” – they are all the words of Hashem’s Torah and worthy of our study and analysis.
Today's Lesson is Sponsored in loving memory of Yona bat Ester A"H by Friends and Family The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:19) introduces two prohibitions relevant to an animal that is consecrated as a sacrifice, forbidding using such an animal for work (such as plowing with a consecrated ox), and shearing a consecrated sheep’s wool. This verse specifies the particular case of a Bechor – a firstborn animal, which is consecrated automatically at birth – but the oral tradition teaches that these prohibitions in fact apply to all consecrated animals. It is thus forbidden to have a consecrated animal perform work, or to shear the wool of a consecrated animal. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that as these animals have been declared sacred, and designated as sacrifices to Hashem, we are to treat them with reverence. For this reason, the Torah forbids us from using such animals for our personal benefit. These prohibitions apply to both kinds of animal sacrifices – Kodasheh Kodashim (the higher-level sacrifices), and Kodasheh Kalim (the lower-level sacrifices). Once the blood of the sacrifice has been sprinkled on the altar, such that the meat becomes permissible for consumption, it is no longer subject to this prohibition. Certain sacrifices are permissible for consumption by Kohanim after the sprinkling of the blood (such as Hatat, Asham, and the two loaves of bread brought on Shabuot together with two sheep). Although non-Kohanim many not eat this meat, nevertheless, if they do, then they violate a separate prohibition, and not this command of Me’ila (misusing consecrated property). One who mistakenly derives personal benefit from consecrated property must pay the Temple treasury the value of the benefit he received, plus an additional one-fifth. He must also bring an atonement sacrifice called Asham Me’ilot. The money that he must pay – even the additional one-fifth – is considered consecrated, and thus once it has been designated as payment, it is subject to the Me’ila prohibition. If an animal was consecrated as a sacrifice and then developed a Mum (disqualifying physical blemish), it remains subject to these laws. However, after it is slaughtered, its wool may be sheared and used. An animal’s wool may be removed if necessary for the purpose of inspecting it for blemishes, as this does not qualify as “shearing.” These prohibitions are binding upon both men and women, and apply in all places and in all times. Although we do not consecrate animals nowadays, if one did consecrate an animal, it is subject to these prohibitions, and may not be used for personal benefit. One who performs work with a consecrated animal, or shears the wool of a consecrated animal, is in violation of a Biblical command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands the master of an Ebed Ibri (Jewish servant) to release the servant after seven years of work, and it then adds that the master may not send the servant “emptyhanded” (Debarim 15:13). This verse introduces a Torah prohibition against releasing a servant without providing him with gifts. In the next verse, the Torah adds a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) to give the servant gifts when he is released – “Ha’anek Ta’anik Lo.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists these two commands as the 481 st and 482 nd Misvot in the Torah. The reason for this requirement, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is to engender proper Middot (character traits), so that we are worthy of receiving G-d’s blessings. G-d wishes to bestow His kindness upon us, and so He commands us to deal kindly with others, in the merit of which He will deal kindly with us. As such, after a servant spent a number of years working for and helping his master, the master should express his gratitude and grant him gifts. This expression of Hakarat Ha’tob (gratitude) is part of the way the Torah seeks to develop within us a kind, generous spirit. This obligation applies whether the servant is released after six years of service, or upon the onset of the Yobel (jubilee) before six years have passed. These gifts are required even if the servant leaves because the master has passed away. If, however, the servant comes up with the money to buy his freedom, then the Misva of Ha’anaka (gifts) does not apply. The Torah commands giving the servant gifts only when releasing him; if the servant is able to buy his own freedom, then the master isn’t releasing him, and so he does not bear the obligation to provide Ha’anaka. The Torah commands giving the servant sheep, grain and wine. The Gemara notes that the common denominator between these products is that they grow and reproduce. Therefore, the Sages inferred that the master may not fulfill this obligation by giving items such as money or clothing; he must give animals or produce. In formulating this command, the Torah requires the master to give from “that with which Hashem your G-d has blessed you.” At first glance, one might assume that the Ha’anaka obligation applies only if the servant’s work brought blessing and prosperity. However, the oral tradition teaches that this is not the case, and the master is required to give the servant gifts even if his work did not result in the success that the master had hoped for. The Ha’anaka must be given to the servant. If the servant owes somebody money, the creditor cannot claim the debt from the master. Normally, the Halacha known as “Shibuda De’Rabbi Natan” states that if a person (A) owes somebody (B) money, and the creditor himself owes a third person (C) money, then that third person can collect his debt from the first debtor (meaning, C can claim his debt from A). In the case of Ha’anaka, however, the master’s obligation is limited to the servant himself, such that the servant’s creditor cannot claim his debt from the master. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and applies when the laws of Jewish servants apply, meaning, during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although this Misva technically does not apply nowadays, the concept remains very relevant to this day. He writes that if somebody worked for his fellow, even for a short period of time, it is proper for the employer to give him a gift when he finishes working beyond the wages that he owes. Although this is not obligatory, we must apply the spirit of the Misva of Ha’anaka, and show our gratitude to those who have worked for us by granting them a gift when they finish working. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch teaches, being kind and generous to others makes us worthy of G-d kindness and blessing.
After introducing the requirement to remit outstanding loans upon the conclusion of the Shemita year, the Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:9) commands that one may not refuse to extend a loan as Shemita approaches. A prospective lender might, understandably, be reluctant to grant loans shortly before the Shemita year, given the possibility that the borrower might not repay before the end of the Shemita year, and will then not be required to repay the loan. The Torah forbids those in a position to lend from withholding loans from people in need due to this concern. Despite the possibility that the loan will be cancelled and the money will thus be lost, one is required to lend to those in need of a loan, even shortly before Shemita. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command in order to strengthen our quality of “Nedibut” – generosity – and to distance us from stinginess. There is no greater form of generosity, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, than agreeing to extend a loan to a person in need, knowing that there is a likelihood that the money will never be repaid. This command, then, helps reinforce our generous character. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that one who is generous with his money, selflessly giving to help other people, earns G-d’s blessing and thus ends up earning even more. Conversely, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, stinginess acts as an “iron wall” between a person and G-d’s blessing, preventing it from coming into his life. This command is directed to both men and women alike, and it applies in all places and in all times. Although the law of Shemitat Kesafim – the remission of debts at the end of Shemita – applies nowadays only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment), the Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that even nowadays, one is bound by the Torah command not to refuse a loan out of concern of the Rabbinically-mandated remission of debts. Somebody who refuses to grant a loan to a person in need because of his fear that the debt will be cancelled after Shemita is in violation of this Torah prohibition. Since this prohibition is transgressed passively, through inaction, violators are not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question of why a person would fear extending a loan as Shemita approaches, given the possibility of circumventing this prohibition. For example, a lender may grant a loan on condition that the debt will not be cancelled by the Shemita year; such a condition is Halachically binding. Likewise, a lender can give his contract to the Bet Din, which then has the authority to collect the debt on his behalf after Shemita. If the law of Shemitat Kesafim can be circumvented, then why did the Torah need to command prospective lenders not to refuse to grant loans before Shemita? After all, a prospective lender who is afraid that the debt might be cancelled can simply utilize one of the available Halachic methods of avoiding the remission of debts. The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that the Torah nevertheless introduced this prohibition in order to teach us the underlying concepts of this command, the importance of generosity, and so on. While in practice this prohibition might not be so relevant, the Torah issued this command so that we learn the principles that it expresses. Seemingly, we can also suggest a different answer – that the person in need of a loan might not accept the loan unless the possibility of its remission remains open. In such a case, the Torah forbids the prospective lender from refusing the loan request, and he must lend the money despite the likelihood that the money will not be returned.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:8) commands that when there is a fellow Jew in financial straits, “Pato’ah Tiftah Ed Yadecha Lo” – we must generously “open our hands” and give him what he needs. The highest standard of performing this Misva is to give charity indirectly. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, this is done by giving money to the collector, the administrator of the fund, who distributes the money that he collects. This way, the recipient does not know the donor, and the donor does not know the recipient, thus avoiding embarrassment, unpleasantness and discomfort. Indeed, the Rambam observes (in Hilchot Matenot Aniyim 9:3) that all Jewish communities in his time that had at least ten Jews would establish a charity fund for the needy members of the community. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch dispels the common misconception that Sedaka means only giving money to the poor. This Misva requires giving even to a wealthy person when he is in need, such as if his assets are inaccessible for whatever reason. This could be because of investments, because of an illness which prevents him from obtaining his money, or because he is far from home without cash or other means of spending his money. Whenever somebody currently needs financial help, regardless of his general financial situation, there is a Misva to assist him. Likewise, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, there is a Misva to give not only money, but anything that a person needs, such as a practical favor, or words of encouragement and comfort. These are also included in the Misva of Sedaka. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who gives charity will receive great reward – “Secharo Harbeh Me’od.” If a person in need refuses to accept charity because of his pride, one may offer him money as a loan and then never claim it. Such deception is allowed in this case for the sake of helping a needy individual. If a person has money but does not want to spend it, and, as a result, he lacks his basic necessities, there is no Misva to give him charity. Since he has money which he could use, one is not obligated to give him money. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that we have been assured that nobody will ever become poor as a result of giving charity. To the contrary, the verse in Yeshayahu (32:17) states, “Ve’haya Ma’aseh Ha’sedaka Shalom” – giving charity brings blessing and peace. Earlier in Yeshayahu (1:27), we read, “Sion Be’mishpat Tipadeh Ve’shabeha Bi’sdaka” – that our redemption will arrive, and Jerusalem will be rebuilt, in the merit of the Misva of Sedaka. This Misva applies in all times and in all places, and is binding upon both men and women. If a person is solicited to give charity to somebody in need, or knows of somebody in need, and he refuses to give, then he transgresses this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:7) warns that we must not respond stingily and indifferently to our fellow Jew in need: “Lo Te’ametz Et Lebabecha Ve’lo Tikpotz Et Yadecha Me’ahicha Ha’ebyon” – “Do not harden your heart and do not clench your first toward your brother the pauper.” We are to extend kindness and generosity to our fellow in need of financial help, rather than withhold charity from him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah wants to distance us from the character trait of “Kilut” – miserliness – and “Sarut Ayin” – stinginess. The Torah urges us to engender the qualities of kindness and compassion, and so it forbids us from reacting apathetically to the plight of a pauper, and refusing to lend him the assistance he needs. Several verses later (15:10), the Torah assures a person that he will be blessed by G-d for generously assisting the needy. A person should not be concerned about the financial sacrifice entailed in giving charity, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, because we have been promised that charity is rewarded by G-d with financial blessing. G-d’s blessing, the Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes, is worth far more than any treasures a person can own, and so we should not hesitate to give charity, because this brings G-d’s blessing, which is more precious and valuable than anything in the world.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:3) that at the conclusion of the Shemita year, “Va’asher Yiheyeh Lecha Et Ahicha Tashmet Yadecha” – one must cancel debts owed by Jewish borrowers. In the previous verse, the Torah introduced a prohibition against claiming debts after Shemita, and now the Torah adds an affirmative command to cancel outstanding debts. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah commands cancelling debts after Shemita in order for us to develop proper Middot (character traits), and to strengthen our faith in Hashem. Cancelling debts every seven years engenders within us a generous character, training us to be willing to forego on money which is rightfully owed to us. When we act generously, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, G-d treats us with kindness and generosity, and the Torah therefore gives us commands which help us develop a generous character, so that we become worthy of G-d’s blessings. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, this Misva helps us avoid the destructive quality of “Hemda” – lust for money and material assets. When a person foregoes on money which is rightfully owed to him, money which he had lent to somebody and now does not demand be returned, he will certainly refrain from trying to obtain money which does not belong to him and to which he is not entitled. Thus, by requiring us to forego on money which we have a right to claim, the Torah protects us from an unhealthy lust for money. A debt is cancelled after the Shemita year even if a contract was written, such that the lender has right to seize the borrower’s property if he does not pay on time. The exception to this rule is where a specific piece of property was designated for the lender to seize if the loan is not repaid. In this case, since a piece of property has been designated, the loan is considered in a sense to have already been repaid, and thus the lender can claim the debt after Shemita. Similarly, if the borrower gave the lender a collateral, the debt is not cancelled. If one had purchased goods at a store on credit, this debt is not cancelled after Shemita, because the law of Shemitat Kesafim (the remission of debts) applies only to loans. Likewise, money owed to employees may be claimed even after Shemita. If a couple divorced and the woman did not receive her Ketuba payment by the end of the Shemita year, the husband must pay, as this debt is not cancelled. The Torah forbids an individual from claiming debts after Shemita, but a Bet Din is permitted to collect a person’s debts on his behalf if he had authorized them to do so. Therefore, one can circumvent the law of Shemitat Kesafim by assigning Bet Din as one’s agent to collect his debts, in which case they can collect even after Shemita. If a person lends money to a borrower with the explicit stipulation that the debt would not be cancelled by the Shemita year, then the condition is binding, and the debt is not cancelled. Normally, Halacha does not allow making a condition that runs in opposition to Torah law, and such a condition is null and void. In regard to financial matters, however, such conditions are valid and binding, and therefore one can stipulate when lending money that the debt should not be cancelled by the Shemita year, and he may then collect the debt after Shemita. This command applies in all places. The Torah obligation of Shemitat Kesafim applies only in times when the laws of Yobel are binding; nowadays, the obligation of Shemitat Kesafim applies Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). The Sages enacted that debts should be cancelled even nowadays so that this obligation would not be forgotten. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this enactment, addresses the question of how the Sages could annul the borrower’s obligation to the lender. If, according to Torah law, the borrower owes the lender money, and the lender thus has a lien on the borrower’s property, how can the Sages come along and break this obligation? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers by noting the famous rule of “Hefker Bet Din Hefker,” which empowers the Sages to seize private property when they see fit. Similar to the concept of eminent domain, whereby the government has the authority to seize property, the Sages are authorized by the Torah to enact laws even if they entail taking away people’s property. Thus, the Sages had the authority to extend the law of Shemitat Kesafim nowadays, denying lenders the right to claim their debts after the Shemita year. Nowadays, we circumvent this Halacha by signing a Pruzbul document before the end of the Shemita year, whereby we hand our debts over to Bet Din. This allows us to collect our debts after Shemita by the authority of Bet Din.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:3) commands, “Et Ha’nochri Tigos,” which the Sefer Ha’hinuch, based on the Rambam, understands as requiring a creditor to claim debts owed by a gentile idolater. The creditor is not permitted to waive the debt out of grace and compassion for the debtor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command to safeguard against close relationships between Jews and idol-worshippers, so that we do not learn from or begin imitating their sinful conduct. If we act toward them with too much kindness and generosity, we might end up forging close friendships with them, to the point where we come under their pagan influence. The Torah therefore forbade waiving debts owed by idolaters. One may, however, waive a debt for pragmatic reasons, such as if he is afraid of confronting the gentile, or if he feels that waiving the debt will work to his advantage in the future. The prohibition applies only to waving the debt out of grace and compassion. According to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, one who forgives a debt to an idolater out of compassion transgresses this affirmative command. The Ramban disagrees with this view, and maintains that this verse does not introduce a command requiring a creditor to claim debts from gentile debtors. According to the Ramban, this verse means that whereas one is permitted to claim debts from a gentile after the end of the Shemita year, it is forbidden to claim a debt from a Jew after the end of the Shemita. This verse should be read as a “Lav Ha’ba Michlal Aseh” – a prohibition deduced from an affirmative command. The Torah allows claiming debts from a gentile, implying that it is forbidden to claim debts from a fellow Jew. In the Ramban’s view, then, one does not violate any Torah command by forgiving a debt to an idolater.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 15:2) forbids claiming a debt after the Shemita year – “Lo Yigos Et Re’ehu” (“One shall not claim his fellow”). The Shemita year features a number of special laws, such as the prohibition against agricultural activity, and it also cancels outstanding debts. Whether a person had lent his fellow money before the Shemita year or during the Shemita year, he is not permitted to claim the debt after the final day of the Shemita year (29 Elul). He may claim the debt at any point during the Shemita year, but not after the Shemita year ends. A person who claims a debt after the conclusion of the Shemita year has transgressed this prohibition. He is not, however, liable to Malkut, since this prohibition is transgressed verbally, by asking for the money, without performing an action. Although it is possible to violate this prohibition through an action – such as by trying to forcefully seize the money from the borrower – nevertheless, the violator is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that if a Torah prohibition can be transgressed without an action, then it is not punishable by Malkut even if one transgresses it by performing an action. Therefore, even if one tries to forcefully seize a debt after Shemita, he is not liable to Makut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies on the level of Torah law only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nowadays, this prohibition applies M’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment).
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 14:28) commands that every three years, one must separate one-tenth of his agricultural produce and give this tithe to the poor. This means that on the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, the Ma’aser Sheni tithe is replaced by Ma’aser Ani – a tithe for the poor. During the other years (first, second, fourth and fifth), after one gives one-tenth of his produce to the Leviyim, he must take a second tithe, bring it to Jerusalem, and eat it there. On the third and sixth year, instead of taking a tithe to Jerusalem, one gives a tithe to the poor. When a poor person comes to a person’s field to receive Ma’aser Ani, the owner is to give him “Kedeh Sob’o” – an amount that satiates the recipient. The Sefer H’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, specifies the precise amount that must be given for each species of produce. If a large number of poor people come requesting Ma’aser Ani, and the individual does not have enough for them all, then he places the tithe in front of them, and they take for themselves. If a needy man and a needy woman come requesting Ma’aser Ani, then the woman takes precedence, as it is preferable for a woman not to have to go about collecting charity. A person is not permitted to choose a poor person whom he likes and give him his Ma’aser Ani. He is not granted the “Tobat Hana’a” – the right to select somebody for whom he wishes to do a favor and give him the Ma’aser Ani, and must instead make it available for all those in need. On the level of Torah law, this Misva applies only when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in the Land of Israel.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 14:22) commands tithing one’s produce and bringing the tithe to Jerusalem, where he must then eat it. This tithe, called Ma’aser Sheni (“the second tithe”), is taken on the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle. (The mnemonic representing these years is “Abeda” (literally, “lost object”), which is spelled “Alef,” “Bet,” “Dalet, “Heh,” alluding to the first, second, fourth and fifth years.) We refer to this tithe by the name “Ma’aser Sheni” because it is taken after the initial tithe, which is given to the Leviyim. Unlike the first tithe, Ma’aser Sheni is not given away, but is rather brought to Jerusalem and eaten there by the owner. If the owner finds it too difficult to bring all this produce to Jerusalem, then he has the option of transferring the produce’s sanctity onto money. He then brings the money to Jerusalem and uses it there to purchase food, which he eats in the city. When he transfers the sanctity of the Ma’aser Sheni onto money, he must add a Homesh (one-fifth) to the value of the produce. The reason for this Misva, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explained at length in an earlier context, is that the Torah wants people to spend time in the city of Jerusalem, which was the center of Torah scholarship. In order to connect people to Jerusalem, and thereby connect them with righteous, learned scholars, the Torah introduced several obligations that require a person to go to Jerusalem. As a result, people are likely to purchase homes in Jerusalem, or to send children or relatives to live there, so they have a place to stay. This has the effect of strengthening a person’s connection to the holy city of Yerushalayim, and, by extension, to the Torah scholars who live there. The Misva of Ma’aser Sheni requires taking a tenth of that year’s produce; one cannot set aside produce as Ma’aser Sheni for a different year’s produce. The “fiscal year” with respect to Ma’aser Sheni as far as fruit trees are concerned is Tu Bi’Shbat. If a tree reached a certain point of development by Tu Bi’Shbat of the second year of the Shemita cycle, then one-tenth of its produce is designated as Ma’aser Sheni. If, however, the tree reached this point after Tu Bi’Shbat, then the fruit is considered the produce of the third year of the Shemita cycle. The produce of the third and sixth years is subject to a different tithe – Ma’aser Ani, which is given to the poor, instead of Ma’aser Sheni. The Torah obligation of Ma’aser applies only to Dagan (the five principal grains), Tirosh (wine) and Yis’har (oil). Other produce requires tithing Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Furthermore, the Torah obligation applies only when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel. Nowadays, tithing is required for Israeli produce Mi’de’rabbanan. A person who has produce separates Ma’aser Sheni, and then, since we are all Teme’im (impure) and thus forbidden from eating Ma’aser Sheni, he transfers the sanctity onto a special coin. After transferring several times, the coin is either thrown into the ocean or destroyed. Due to the special laws that apply to Israeli produce, one who purchases produce in Israel, or Israeli produce outside Israel, must ensure that it is under supervision by a reliable Kashrut agency.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 14:21), “Lo Tochelu Kol Nebela” – that we may not eat a Nebela. The term “Nebela” refers to the carcass of an animal, even of a kosher species, that died in any way other than valid Shehita. If the animal died on its own, was killed without slaughtering, or was slaughtered in a manner that is not Halachically acceptable, then the carcass is considered a Nebela and forbidden for consumption. The reason for this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is the same as the reason for the Torah’s other dietary restrictions, namely, that the Torah forbade foods which adversely affect a person’s mind and cloud his judgment. After prohibiting the consumption of a Nebela, the Torah adds that a Nebela may be fed to a non-Jew. The Sages inferred from this addition that this prohibition applies only to a Nebela which is worthy of consumption. As the Torah speaks of feeding a Nebela to a gentile, we may conclude that only a Nebela which a gentile would want to eat is forbidden for a Jew. But if the meat had already spoiled, and has a putrid taste, such that nobody would eat it, then it does not fall under the prohibition of Nebela. This is the source of the well-known Halacha known as “Noten Ta’am Li’fgam,” which establishes that a foul taste of forbidden food is not forbidden. As we know, if prohibited food was cooked in a utensil, then the utensil has absorbed its taste, and it would thus be forbidden to eat food that is cooked in the utensil subsequently, as this food will have absorbed the taste of the forbidden food from the utensil. However, the Sages determined that once twenty-four hours have passed since the food was absorbed into the utensil, the taste becomes foul, and thus it is no longer forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to explain how this principle applies to Hag’ala – immersing a utensil in hot water in order to expunge the taste of forbidden food, and thereby make the utensil permissible for use. At first glance, this immersion should be ineffective, because the taste is released into the water and then immediately back into the utensil. Often, the quantity of water is not sixty times larger than the volume of the utensil such that the forbidden taste can be nullified by the water. Seemingly, then, Hag’ala should not be effective in making the utensil permissible, unless the amount of water is sixty times larger than the amount of taste expunged into the water. However, if the immersion takes place at least twenty-four hours after the utensil had absorbed the taste, then the taste is foul, and thus loses its prohibited status. At that point, then, the immersion is effective. Relevant to the topic of Hag’ala, the Poskim address the question of why we do not recite a Misva before performing Hag’ala on a utensil that has become forbidden. Seemingly, just as we recite a Beracha when immersing utensils obtained from a gentile to make them permissible for use (“Al Tebilat Keli/Kelim”), we should likewise recite a Beracha when performing Hag’ala to expunge the forbidden taste from a utensil. One answer given is that Hag’ala is not a Misva, but rather the means of avoiding a transgression. Hag’ala is performed so that food cooked subsequently in the utensil would be permissible for consumption; it is not performed in the fulfillment of an obligation. It is comparable in this respect to Nikur – the removal of the Gid Ha’nasheh (sciatic nerve) and its surrounding area from an animal – upon which no Beracha is recited. Nikur is required not as a Halachic obligation, but rather to avoid violating the prohibition against eating the Gid Ha’nasheh, and thus it does not warrant a Beracha. By the same token, some argue, no Beracha is recited over Hag’ala, a procedure done for the purpose of avoiding the consumption of forbidden food. Others challenge this answer, drawing a distinction between Hag’ala and Nikur. Whereas the Torah never mentions Nikur, it speaks clearly about the procedure of Hag’ala to purge utensils that had been used with forbidden food (Bamidbar, chapter 31). Hence, as the Torah explicitly mentions Hag’ala, we must find a different reason for why a Beracha is not recited over Hag’ala. These Rabbis explain that a Beracha isn’t recited because it is not necessary to purge the utensil of the taste of forbidden food. One can use a different utensil, or purchase a new utensil, rather than perform Hag’ala on the pot that had been used with non-kosher food. Since Hag’ala is not necessary, it is not considered significant enough to warrant a Beracha. Others question the first approach by noting the example of a Nidda, who recites a Beracha over her immersion. In this case, too, no Halachic obligation is being fulfilled, and the act is performed only to avoid a violation (in this case, intimate relations with a Nidda). The answer given is that in the case of a Nidda, the woman’s status is being transformed from forbidden to permissible; the immersion has the effect of making her permissible. By contrast, when one performs Hag’ala, nothing is being transformed. The forbidden taste is being removed from the utensil so it will not affect the food which will later be prepared in the utensil, but nothing is having its status transformed from forbidden to permissible, as a Nidda’s status is changed. (This is true also of Nikur, which involves the removal of the forbidden part of the animal, and not its transformation into permissible food.) Therefore, a Nidda’s immersion warrants a Beracha, whereas Hag’ala does not. The Nebela prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who eats a Ke’zayit of meat of a Nebela is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 14:11) commands, “Kol Sipor Tehora Tochelu” – “You shall eat every pure species of bird.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the Rambam, understands this verse as introducing the command to determine the kosher status of birds. As discussed in the context of an earlier Misva (153), the Torah lists twenty-four species of birds which are forbidden for consumption, and all other birds in the world may be eaten. In theory, then, one who knows the identity of these twenty-four species can eat any species of bird which he has determined to not belong to any of these species. The Sages taught that a bird can be confirmed kosher it has all of the following four properties: it does not attack other creatures with its claws; it has an extra toe; it features a crop; and it has a gizzard that can be peeled. The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam, and does not consider it a Misva to inspect birds to determine their kosher status. In his view, this verse adds a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) to the Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition) against eating non-kosher species of birds, such that one who partakes of a such a bird transgresses both a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh and a Misvat Aseh. After listing the twenty-four non-kosher species of birds, the Torah commands that one may not eat “Sheretz Ha’of” (14:19), referring to small flying insects, such as bees and hornets. The reason behind these commands is the same as the reason underlying the restrictions on the consumption of other creatures, which the Sefer Ha’hinuch explained in a separate context, namely, that the species which the Torah designated as forbidden damage the body. The body serves the vital function of containing the soul, and thus if we compromise the body’s wellbeing, this adversely affects the soul. Partaking of non-kosher species impairs the body, and thus, by extension, it impairs the soul. This idea is expressed in a letter which the Rambam had his student, Ibn Tibbon, write to a certain community that had contacted him asking for guidance. The people in this town were struggling with certain matters involving Jewish faith, as the people were finding it difficult to accept and embrace certain principles of Emuna (such as the belief in the future resurrection). The Rambam told his student to respond, and the student wrote a letter advising the people to check to ensure that the food they were eating was permissible. He explained that when a person eats, the digestive system processes the food, expelling the waste and distilling what it is kept in the body. The finest components of the food are sent to the brain, so it can function at optimum level. Therefore, if one consumes non-kosher food, the brain receives low-quality nourishment, and this compromises its functionality, impeding its ability to properly perceive and understand. Therefore, Ibn Tibbon urged the townspeople to determine whether perhaps they were eating non-kosher food, and this was hampering their ability to accept the core principles of Jewish faith. For this same reason, when Abraham Abinu set out to teach and guide people toward monotheism, he offered hospitality, inviting guests and giving them food. At first glance, we might think that this was simply a tactic, a way to bring people under his influence. But it has been explained that Abraham wanted them to ingest kosher food in order that their minds would then be receptive to the concepts of Emuna which he sought to teach them. Likewise, the Zohar comments that Beneh Yisrael needed to eat Masa at the time of Yesiat Misrayim in order for them to be able to achieve Emuna. The Zohar draws an analogy to a doctor who instructs a parent not to give the ill child normal food until he finishes the prescribed medication, because only once the malady is cured will the child’s body have the ability to properly process food. By the same token, Beneh Yisrael were spiritually ill, deficient in Emuna, and they required “medication” to cure them of this malady. Masa, the Zohar teaches, is “the food of faith,” with the power to bring spiritual healing, and Beneh Yisrael could not eat Hametz until they first ate Masa for seven days to cure themselves of their spiritual illness and achieve firm belief in Hashem. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), in Yoreh De’a, writes that a woman who eats non-kosher food should not nurse an infant, because the child would then ingest milk produced from non-kosher food, which would have a deleterious spiritual effect. The commentaries (Shach and Taz) explain that the Rama refers to a case where a woman needs to eat certain non-kosher food for medical reasons due to a life-threatening condition. This is a situation where the mother is allowed – and even required – to eat non-kosher food, and nevertheless, the milk she produces could contaminate the child because of the non-kosher food she ingests. If this is the effect of non-kosher food consumed permissibly, then certainly, non-kosher which one eats in violation of the Torah causes severe spiritual harm. These commands, of course, apply in all times and places, and are binding upon both men and women. If a person eats a Ke’zayit from a forbidden species, or an entire forbidden creature (“Birya”) regardless of its size, is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 14:3), “Lo Tochal Kol To’eba” – that we may not eat food which is “abominable.” The oral tradition teaches that this refers to an animal which had been consecrated as a sacrifice, but was then disqualified. Specifically, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah speaks here of two cases: where a person blemished the animal in a manner that invalidates it (an act which itself constitutes a Halachic violation), and where the sacrifice became invalidated for any reason after the animal was slaughtered. Eating the meat of the animal in either of these two cases is forbidden by force of this Biblical command, as the sacrifice is considered “abominable.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade partaking of such sacrifices in order to maintain our esteem and reverence for the sacrifices. It is vitally important that we treat and regard the sacrifices with great respect so that the experience of offering a sacrifice will have the desired emotional impact, leading us to repent and devote our hearts to G-d. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies in all places and at all times, even nowadays. If somebody were to consecrate an animal and then inflict a disqualifying blemish, the animal would be forbidden for consumption. One who eats a Ke’zayit of meat from such an animal is in violation of this command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 14:1), “Lo Titgodedu,” forbidding making gashes in one’s skin, which the ancient pagans would do as an expression of grief upon the death of a loved one. This verse forbids following this practice; we are prohibited from performing acts of self-mutilation to mimic the custom of the ancient pagan, or as an expression of mourning. The Sefer Ha’hinuch presents two explanations for this command. First, he writes, it is meant to distance us from idol worship; the Torah forbids us from doing anything which bears resemblance to pagan practices as part of the effort to keep us away from idolatrous influences. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it is unfitting for Am Yisrael, G-d’s treasured nation, to act in such a foolish way, excessively grieving over personal loss. We must remember that everything that happens is caused by Hashem, and we are thus forbidden to express anguish beyond the limits set by the Torah. If a person mutilates his body in response to a loved one’s death, this displays a lack of faith in Hashem. Indeed, the Ramban, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites, points to this command as the source for the Talmud’s statement that it is forbidden to excessively mourn the death of a loved one. Halacha acknowledges the human need to mourn, and even commands a person to mourn a family member’s death, but it is forbidden to extend beyond that which the Torah prescribes. A person who gashes his skin is liable for each gash he makes; if he is warned before each gash, then he receives a separate set of Malkut for each act of self-mutilation. Interestingly enough, a person who gashes his skin once as an expression of mourning for five people who passed away is liable to five sets of Malkut. Although he committed only one forbidden act, nevertheless, since this act was performed to express grief over five deaths, the violator is guilty of five separate violations, and is thus liable to five sets of Malkut. This prohibition marks an exceptional situation where a person can be liable to multiple punishments for a single act. The Rabbis also taught an additional understanding of the command of “Lo Titgodedu.” As the Rambam discusses in Hilchot Aboda Zara (12:14), this verse commands, “Lo Ta’asu Agudot Agudot” – that we may not create different groups. If two courts are situated in the same city, they may not reach different views, as this will create strife and conflict. The Sefer Ha’hinuch qualifies this rule, clarifying that two equally competent courts in the same city may hold different opinions, and it is only within a single institution that Halacha requires groups that disagree to reconcile their differences and reach a unanimous decision in order to avoid quarreling and unrest. The prohibition of “Lo Titgodedu” applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who mutilated his or her body to imitate pagan practice, or as an expression of mourning, is in violation of this command, and, as discussed, is liable to Malkut. In this same verse, the Torah adds a related command – “Ve’lo Tasimu Korha Ben Enechem La’met,” forbidding pulling out one’s hair, as this, too, was a pagan expression of grief and mourning. If one pulls out his hair to mimic pagan ritual, or to express grief, he violates this command. As in regard to violations of “Lo Titgodedu,” one can be liable to five sets of Malkut through a single act, if he removes his hair in mourning for five different deaths. Likewise, if a person removed hair five times over a single death, then if he received a warning before each act, he is liable to five sets of Malkut. One violates this command by removing his hair with his hand, or even with a depilatory. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a person dips five fingers into a depilatory, and then places his hand on his head, causing the removal of hair in five places on his head, he is liable to five sets of Malkut. Even though he performed just a single action, Halacha in this case considers the violator guilty of five separate violations, for each of which he is liable to punishment. As discussed in the context of “Lo Titgodedu,” the Torah forbids grieving excessively over personal loss, as we are to temper our pain and anguish with Emuna, firmly believing that everything that happens is Hashem’s will, and He is always caring for us and doing what is ultimately best for us, even when we cannot understand how.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh discusses the case of an Ir Ha’nidahat – a city whose inhabitants were led to worship foreign gods – and it commands that the entire city must be burned, together with all its property (Debarim 13:17). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah treats this situation with greater severity than an ordinary case of individuals who worship foreign deities, because it is far more grievous when a city’s population worships other gods all together, collectively. Therefore, the entire city must be burned. For a city to be formally condemned as an “Ir Ha’nidahat,” at least two people from the city, who belong to the same tribe, must succeed in convincing the majority of the city’s population to worship a foreign deity. Those lured to foreign worship must number at least 100 people, but they must not comprise the majority of one of the tribes. If the majority of a tribe was led to foreign worship, then they are judged not as an “Ir Ha’nidahat,” but rather as individuals. They are executed by Sekila (stoning), and their property is not burned, but rather given to their inheritors. This command is assigned to the Sanhedrin, who bears the obligation to carry out this punishment against the city. Of course, this Misva applies only in times when there is a Sanhedrin. If the judges are delinquent in this regard, and fail to carry out their responsibilities vis-à-vis an “Ir Ha’nidahat,” then they transgress this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that they will be severely punished, because by failing to properly respond to the city’s worship of foreign gods, they cause a proliferation of idol worship in the Land of Israel. In this same verse, the Torah issues an additional command, forbidding rebuilding an “Ir Ha’nidahat” after it is burned – “Lo Tibaneh Od.” It is permissible to plant gardens and orchards on the site of the city, but it may not be made into a residential area like it had been previously. This Misva, naturally, applies only in the times of the Sanhedrin, when the obligation to burn an “Ir Ha’nidahat” applies. This command is binding upon both men and women. The Torah then commands in the next verse, “Ve’lo Yidbak Be’yadecha Me’uma Min Ha’herem” – that nothing from the property of the “Ir Ha’nidahat” may “stick to your hand.” The Sages explained this to mean that it is forbidden to derive any sort of benefit from this property. Beyond the obligation to burn the city’s possessions, it is also forbidden to derive any benefit from them.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 13:15) introduces the command that Bet Din must thoroughly interrogate witnesses who have come to testify about somebody in court: “Ve’drashta Ve’hakarta Ve’sha’alta Heteb” – “You shall inquire, investigate and thoroughly ask.” The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin explains that the court must ask the witnesses two sets of questions, called “Hakirot” and “Bedikot.” The seven Hakirot are: 1) During which seven-year Shemita cycle did the event take place? 2) During which year of that cycle did the event take place? 3) During which month of that year did the event take place? 4) On what day of that month did the event take place? 5) On which day of the week did the event take place? (Curiously, the Sefer Ha’hinuch formulates this question as, “On which of the six days of the week did the event take place?” – implying that the witnesses would not testify about an event that they witnessed on Shabbat. Clearly, however, this is not correct, as witnesses would certainly testify about events witnessed on Shabbat. Apparently, this is a copyist’s error, and the text should read “seven days.”) 6) On which hour of that day did the event take place? 7) Where did the event take place? The judges also pose more detailed questions about the alleged incident. If, for example, the witnesses testify about an act of Shabbat desecration, they are asked to identify the specific Melacha (category of forbidden activity) that they saw. If they testify about somebody who ate on Yom Kippur, they are asked to identify the type of food that was eaten and the quantity. The “Bedikot” consist of secondary questions, such as about the clothing worn by the defendant and the victim, if the witnesses testify about a murder. They are also asked about the color of the ground upon which the murder allegedly took place. If either of the witnesses is unable to answer any of the seven “Hakirot,” then the testimony is voided. When it comes to the “Bedikot,” however, a witness’ inability to answer a question does not invalidate the testimony, but if the responses of the two witnesses contradict each other, then the testimony is dismissed. The Rabbis enacted that when it comes to Dineh Mamonot – civil cases, involving monetary disputes – the witnesses are not questioned this thoroughly. The reason is that if people know that they would be rigorously interrogated when testifying about a civil case, they would be reluctant to serve as witnesses to loans. Prospective lenders will then refuse to lend money to those in need of loans, as they would be unable to procure witnesses to ensure that they are repaid. Therefore, the Sages relaxed the standards of interrogation for Dineh Mamonot. This Misva applies even nowadays, when courts preside over monetary cases. Of course, capital cases are no longer tried. This command applies only to men, as only men serve as judges on a Bet Din. A court that failed to properly interrogate witnesses as required has violated this affirmative command, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that the judges are deserving of harsh punishment, because this leads to a perversion of justice. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (1:18) teaches that the world is sustained by three things, one of which is “Din” – an effective justice system. If a court fails to follow the procedures required to ensure a fair trial, then they compromise one of three “pillars” of the world, and are thus deserving of severe punishment.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh discusses the procedure to be followed in the case of a Mesit – a person who attempts to convince his fellow to worship a foreign deity. It concludes by commanding, “Ve’lo Yosifu La’asot Ka’dabar Ha’ra Ha’zeh Mi’kirbecha” – “And they shall not again perpetrate this evil in your midst” (Debarim 13:12). This verse introduces the prohibition against being a Mesit – meaning, trying to persuade a fellow Jew to worship a foreign deity. This includes suggesting to a fellow Jew that they pray, bring incense, pour a wine libation, or bow to a foreign god. This transgression is violated even if the Mesit speaks in the singular form, saying, “I will go worship the deity,” subtly inviting his fellow to join him. Even if neither the Mesit nor the other person end up worshipping the foreign deity, the Mesit is guilty of violating this command through the attempt to persuade his fellow to serve a false god. Halacha treats the Mesit with exceptional stringency, suspending some of the standard rules that normally apply with respect to trying and convicting suspected violators. For example, if a person tries to lure two people to worship an idol, those two people can then testify in court. Normally, only the testimony of objective third-party witnesses is accepted in Bet Din, but here, the two people whom the Mesit tried to lure may testify against him, and the Bet Din will convict and execute the Mesit on the basis of their testimony. If the Mesit tries to lures just one person to worship an idol, then that person – who cannot testify alone, because Bet Din needs at least two witnesses to convict – has a Torah obligation to arrange for more witnesses. He does this by telling the Mesit that he has a friend who might be interested in idolatry, and then bringing his friend to the Mesit. After the Mesit seeks to lure both of them, the first person and his friend go to Bet Din and jointly testify against the Mesit. Or, if the Mesit does not wish to lure more than a single person, the person he approached must frame him by having two people hide and hear the Mesit attempt to lure him to foreign worship. They can then testify against him in court. One who is found guilty of trying to lure someone to foreign worship is put to death. It is a Misva for the person whom he had tried to lure to participate in the execution. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that it is due to the unique severity of this offense – missionizing, trying to lure Jews to foreign worship – that the Torah suspends the normal rules in order to ensure that the violator is convicted and punished. This command applies in all places, at times when there is a court authorized to administer capital punishment, and to both men and women. The Gemara teaches that causing a fellow Jew to sin is considered worse than killing him, as killing affects the body, whereas causing someone to sin affects his soul. For this reason, the Torah treats the Mesit – who seeks to lead his fellow away from the service of G-d, to foreign worship – with exceptional severity, in order to ensure that he receives his due punishment.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 13:9) issues a series of five commands relevant to a situation of a “Mesit” – somebody who tries to lure others to engage in the worship of foreign deities. If a person is found to be involved in such efforts, the Torah demands that he be treated very harshly, and it issues five distinct prohibitions that apply in such a case. The first is “Lo Tobeh Lo,” which is understood to mean that we must not show the “Mesit” any sort of fondness or affection; he must be looked upon with sheer contempt, and not be made to feel good about himself. Secondly, the Torah commands, “Ve’lo Tishma Elav” (“Do not listen to him”), which means that we must not try to remove from our hearts our feelings of contempt for this individual. Elsewhere (Shemot 23:5), the Torah commands that if somebody whom we have legitimate reasons to dislike requires our assistance, “Azob Ta’azob Imo” – we must help the individual despite our negative feelings toward him. Targum Onkelos translates this phrase to mean that we must abandon our feelings of hostility toward that person and extend to him the help he needs. In the case of a “Mesit,” however, the Torah specifically commands us to retain our hostile feelings toward this person, and forbids us from trying to change our outlook and overcome our contempt for him. Thirdly, the Torah commands in this verse, “Ve’lo Tahos Alav” (“Do not show him pity”), which means that we must not rescue the “Mesit” from situations of danger. Normally, of course, we are forbidden to remain idle when a fellow Jew faces danger, and we must do what we can to save him (“Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” – Vayikra 19:16). The exception to this rule is the “Mesit,” whom the Torah forbids us from rescuing, due to the unique severity of his actions, seeking to lure other Jews to worship idols. The next command in this verse, “Ve’lo Tahmol” (“Have no compassion”), applies in the courtroom setting, forbidding bringing arguments in favor of the “Mesit.” In all other situations of a defendant who stands trial, every effort must be made to argue in his favor, to find reasons for an acquittal. In the case of a “Mesit,” however, the Torah commands that to the contrary, no argument may be brought on behalf of the “Mesit” for the purpose of avoiding a conviction. Finally, the Torah in this verse commands, “Ve’lo Techaseh Alav” (literally, “Do not cover for him”), which forbids withholding information or arguments which could lead to the conviction of an accused “Mesit.” One who has an argument for convicting the defendant must speak up, and may not remain silent. The Sefer Ha’hinich explains that the Torah’s exceptionally harsh treatment of the “Mesit” is due to the exceptionally egregious nature of his sin. As he actively works to lead Jews away from the belief in, and worship of, the true G-d, and toward the worship of idols, he is not entitled to mercy or compassion. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that this applies also to other exceptionally wicked individuals – people “who have no hope,” meaning, they’ve deteriorated to a level of evil from which they cannot be realistically expected to recover. Specifically, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, he refers to those who ridicule the Hachamim and seek to harm them. Such people must be treated harshly, like a “Mesit.” The Midrash famously cites the teaching of Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi, “Whoever is compassionate to the cruel person, becomes cruel toward the compassionate one.” If we “mix the wires” in one direction, showing love and compassion to a truly evil person who is undeserving of love and compassion, then we are likely to then “mix the wires” in the opposite direction, as well, and show cruelty to those who deserve compassion. Thus, while normally, of course, the Torah demands that we treat people lovingly, kindly, sensitively and mercifully, there are exceptional circumstances of especially wicked people who must be treated harshly, such as the “Mesit,” missionaries who make a concentrated effort to lure Jews away from their faith.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh addresses the situation of somebody who claims to speak prophecy on behalf of an Aboda Zara (foreign god), and it commands, “Lo Tishma El Dibreh Ha’nabi Ha’hu” – “Do not listen to the words of that prophet” (Debarim 13:4). When an alleged prophet claims to speak in the Name of G-d, there is a vetting process which must be followed. The prophet is asked questions and told to provide proof to verify his claims. However, the Torah here commands that once a prophet claims to speak in the name of an Aboda Zara, we are forbidden from paying any attention to him, or engaging him in any way. We are not allowed to ask him any questions, or give him any credence or any opportunity to substantiate his claims. His prophecy must be immediately and outright rejected. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids engaging in any sort of dialogue with such a person because one who speaks with him might be misled to accept his claims. Even if ultimately the individual who speaks with the false prophet dismisses his claims, nevertheless, he might, over the course of the conversation, momentarily consider the possibility that he is a true prophet, Heaven forbid. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d does not want us to question the truth about G-d, or entertain doubts, for even a fleeting moment. He therefore forbids speaking with a prophet who claims to have received prophecy from a foreign deity, as such engagement might lead to a temporary legitimization of his claims, which we must avoid. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (2:14) instructs, “Da Ma She’tashib La’apikoros” – that we must know how to respond to a heretic, to someone who embraces foreign beliefs and ideologies. Significantly, the Mishna does not instruct us to speak to such a person, but rather to know for ourselves how we respond to the heretics’ challenges to our faith. We should not be approaching people who reject our beliefs to discuss these matters with them, because over the course of discussion, we might end up conceding some points, or even temporarily considering the legitimacy of their arguments. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch here teaches us, we must not be open even momentarily to hear the arguments of foreign ideologies, and we must therefore avoid such conversations. This command applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women. As this prohibition is violated verbally, by expressing interest, asking questions, and so on, one is not liable to Malkut for transgressing this Misva, as Malkut are administered only when violating a command through an action.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 13:1), “Lo Tosef Alav” – that we may not add onto Misvot. The Rishonim disagree in defining this prohibition. The Rambam, in Hilchot Mamrim (2:9), maintains that this command is violated by considering a law one of the Torah’s laws when in fact it isn’t. For example, the Rambam writes, if a Rabbi or court rules that eating chicken with milk is forbidden by force of Torah law, then the Rabbi or Rabbis have violated this Torah prohibition. The Torah command forbidding mixing meat with milk applies only to the meat of animals; the Sages extended this Biblical prohibition to include also poultry. Therefore, according to the Rambam, if one rules that mixing poultry with milk transgresses a Torah command, he is guilty of “Bal Tosif” – the prohibition against adding onto the Misvot – because he has sought to add a Misva to the Torah. Most Rishonim, however, dispute the Rambam’s position, and maintain that “Bol Tosif” forbids adding to one of the Torah’s Misvot Aseh (affirmative commands), such as by wearing two pairs of Tefillin simultaneously instead of just one, or by making the Tefillin Shel Rosh with five compartments instead of four. Other examples include taking a second Lulab when fulfilling the Misva of the four species on Sukkot, or residing in the Sukka after Sukkot with the intention of fulfilling the Misva of Sukka. According to these Rishonim, the prohibition of “Bal Tosif” forbids not considering something a Biblical command, but rather adding to the performance of one of the Torah’s affirmative commands. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in explaining this view, clarifies that one does not violate “Bal Tosif” by repeating the performance of the Misvat Aseh multiple times within the time in which it applies. For example, it is entirely permissible to take the four species even one hundred times each day of Sukkot, or blow the Shofar one hundred times on Rosh Hashanah. The later commentators explain that “Bal Tosif” forbids not repeating a Misva, but changing the essence of a Misva. The Torah allows repeating a Misva act multiple times, but forbids changing the Misva, such as by wearing a second pair of Tefillin, adding a second Lulab, or residing in the Sukka beyond the seven days of Sukkot. Moreover, the commentators explain, from the outset, the Torah never imposed a limit on the number of times a person can fulfill a Misva. When it commanded to take the Lulab on Sukkot, for example, the intent is that the Lulab must be taken at least once; the Torah did not set a maximum limit on the number of times a person can take the Lulab. And the same is true of other Misvot. Therefore, as long as a person is still within the Misva’s time-frame, he may fulfill the Misva multiple times, and this does not violate the command of “Bal Tosif,” because the Torah never placed a limit on the number of times a Misva act may be performed. After the time for the Misva has passed, however, performing the Misva act with the intention of fulfilling a Misva constitutes an addition to the Misva, and is thus prohibited. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, interestingly enough, that adding a fifth species when taking the Arba Minim (four species) on Sukkot does not transgress the command of “Bal Tosif.” At first glance, this would certainly appear as a classic example of adding onto the performance of a Misva, no different than wearing two pairs of Tefillin, or wearing Tefillin Shel Rosh with five compartments instead of four. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in the case of the Arba Minim, the fifth species can be seen as disconnected from the four species. Halacha does not require binding the four species together when fulfilling the Misva (“Lulab En Sarich Eged”), and thus we do not regard the four species as comprising a single entity. As such, even if one did bind the four species together with a fifth species, he has not added onto the Misva, because we can disregard the fifth species; it is not considered to be included as part of the Misva act. This case thus differs from that of Tefillin with five compartments, as this constitutes a change to the entity of the Tefillin, and thus violates the prohibition of “Bal Tosif.” The reason for this command is that Hashem’s commands are perfect the way they were given, and adding onto a Misva gives the impression that one feels the Misvot require modification. Just as one would never add to the dose of medicine prescribed by a doctor, as this could cause harm, we are likewise forbidden from adding to the Misvot which G-d “prescribed” for us. We must accept precisely what Hashem has commanded us to do, without seeking to add onto or modify His commands in any way. This Misva applies at all times and in all places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who violates this command by adding onto a Misvat Aseh is liable to Malkut (according to the opinion of most Rishonim, as discussed). The Torah in this verse introduces also the converse command – “Bal Tigra,” forbidding diminishing from a Misva. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives the example of “Matan Damim” – the placement of sacrificial blood on the Mizbe’ah (altar). He references the debate among the Tannaim concerning the case of blood of two sacrifices that was mixed. Specifically, the blood of a Bechor (firstborn animal, that is offered as a sacrifice), which requires a single sprinkling on the altar, was mixed with the blood of an Ola (burnt-offering), which must be sprinkled four times. The question arises as to what should be done with this blood. Rabbi Yehoshua ruled that the blood should be sprinkled only once, because if it would be sprinkled four times, the Kohen would be in violation of “Bal Tosif,” by sprinkling the blood of the Bechor more than required. Rabbi Eliezer felt that to the contrary, the blood should be sprinkled four times, because if it is sprinkled only once, this would be violation of “Bal Tigra,” sprinkling the blood of the Ola less than required. Rabbi Yehoshua explained that it is preferable to violate “Bal Tigra” passively, by sprinkling the blood of an Ola fewer times than required, rather to violate “Bal Tosif” actively, by sprinkling the blood of the Bechor more times than required. In any event, the Sefer Ha’hinuch brings this discussion as an example of the violation of “Bal Tigra” – diminishing from a Misva. The Abneh Miluim (Rav Aryeh Leib Heller, Galicia, d. 1812) raises the question of why the Sefer Ha’hinuch chose this specific example of “Bal Tigra.” Seemingly, there are numerous different ways in which one can detract from the performance of a Misva. Why did the Sefer Ha’hinuch resort to this example? The Abneh Miluim answers that the Sefer Ha’hinuch selected this particular Halacha because sprinkling the blood of an Ola only once actually fulfills the Misva, only not the way the Misva is optimally to be fulfilled. If one diminishes from a Misva in a manner that does not satisfy the obligation, then this does not violate “Bal Tigra,” because the individual performed a Halachically meaningless act. If, for example, a person wears Tefillin Shel Rosh that consists of only three compartments, then he does not wear Tefillin, and thus this act has no significance whatsoever. As such, it does not transgress “Bal Tigra.” This prohibition is violated only when one chooses to diminish from a Misva in a manner that fulfills the obligation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch therefore gave the example of sprinkling the blood of the Ola just once, which fulfills the Misva but in a diminished manner. The reason for this Misva, of course, is that one may not assume the right to diminish from what Hashem has told us to do. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that if the Torah forbade adding onto Misvot – which one might intuitively have thought is virtuous, an attempt to serve G-d even more than required – then certainly, it is forbidden to diminish from the Misvot, and do less than Hashem commanded us to do.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:26) commands, “Rak Kodoshecha Asher Yiheyu Lecha U’ndarecha, Tisa U’bata El Ha’makom Asher Yibhar Hashem” – “But your consecrated items which you have, and your pledges, you must carry and bring to the site which G-d shall choose.” This has been understood as referring to animals which were consecrated in Hutz La’aretz, outside the Land of Israel, and the Torah commands bringing them to the Bet Ha’mikdash in Jerusalem and offering them there as sacrifices. Although the Torah had already issued a general command to bring all sacrifices to the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Torah here adds a special command relevant to animals which had been consecrated outside the Land of Israel. Since bringing the animal to Jerusalem entails a great deal of time and effort, the Torah issued an additional command in order to motivate a person who consecrated an animal abroad to bring the animal to the Bet Ha’mikdash despite the trouble involved. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here follows the Rambam’s view, that the Torah adds a second command to bring animals consecrated in the Diaspora to the Bet Ha’mikdash, beyond the general command to offer all sacrifices specifically in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam, and maintains that there is only a single Misva requiring bringing consecrated animals to be offered in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and this Misva includes animals consecrated in Eretz Yisrael and those consecrated outside the land. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch, based on the Rambam, mentions that it applies to all animals that were consecrated as any type of sacrifice – whether as a Hatat, an Asham, an Ola, or a Shelamim. Rav Yosef Karo (author of the Shulhan Aruch, 1488-1575), in his Kessef Mishneh commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah (in Hilchot Ma’aseh Ha’korbanot, chapter 18), raises the question of why the Rambam does not mention also bird sacrifices. Birds can be brought as a Hatat and an Ola, and thus, seemingly, they should be included in this Misva. Some explain that indeed, the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch do not exclude birds from this command, but they did not mention birds in this context because, very simply, people would not, as a practical matter, consecrate birds as sacrifices outside the Land of Israel. Even in Eretz Yisrael, people did not consecrate birds and then bring them as sacrifices. They would instead consecrate money for this purpose, and the money was then used to purchase birds in Jerusalem to be offered as sacrifices. Certainly, then, it was not common for people outside the land to consecrate birds which they would then need to bring to Jerusalem. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah states in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:21), “Ve’zabahta Mi’berakrecha U’mi’sonecha…Ka’asher Siviticha” – “You shall slaughter from your cattle and your sheep…as I commanded you.” This verse indicates that G-d had previously presented the commands for how to slaughter animals. However, no such commands appear anywhere in the Humash. The Sages explain that these laws were transmitted orally to Moshe (“Halacha Le’Moshe Mi’Sinai”), and were then conveyed to us. G-d taught Moshe the rule that in order for the meat of a kosher species of animal to be permissible for consumption, the animal must be slaughtered with a perfectly smooth knife, that severs at least the majority of the animal’s “Kaneh” (windpipe) and “Veshet” (esophagus). This requirement applies to kosher species of domesticated and non-domesticated animals, and birds. Fish, however, do not require Shehita (slaughtering). A verse in the Book of Bamidbar (11:22) speaks of fish being “collected” for food (“Im Et Kol Degeh Ha’yam Ye’asef Lahem”), implying that fish may be eaten without Shehita, even if they were already dead when they were drawn from the water. This applies to grasshoppers, as well. A verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (33:4) speaks of grasshoppers being “collected” (“Osef He’hasil”), indicating that grasshoppers, like fish, can be eaten regardless of how they died, even without slaughtering. In explaining the reason behind the requirement to slaughter animals before eating their meat, the Sefer Ha’hinuch points to the severity of the prohibition against consuming an animal’s blood. He writes that consuming such blood has the effect of bringing the animal’s nature into our beings. Therefore, in order to ensure that we avoid the consumption of blood when partaking of animal meat, the Torah required killing the animal in the manner that drains the blood the swiftest – slaughtering the neck. The knife must be perfectly smooth and bereft of any nicks, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, in order to minimize the pain inflicted on the animal during the act of slaughtering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah does not want us to cause pain to the animal “Yoter Mi’dai” – excessively, or “Hinam” – for no reason, and so the knife must be smooth. There are four ways in which a Shohet (slaughterer) can render the Shehita invalid. The first is through Shehiya – a pause during the process of slaughtering. If, for example, the Shohet began slaughtering the esophagus, but before completely severing it, he stopped, and then went back to complete the process, the Shehita is invalid, and the animal is considered a Nebela – an animal that died without Shehita. If, however, the knife was dull, and the Shohet thus needed to move the knife back and forth for an extended period of time in order to sever the windpipe and the esophagus, the Shehita is valid, because no pause was made. The second disqualifying method of Shehita is “Hadrasa,” which means pressing the knife downward. The severing must be achieved by moving the knife back and forth, and not by applying pressure against the two pipes as though one cuts vegetables. If the Shohet pushes the knife downward to sever the two pipes, the Shehita is invalid. The third disqualification is “Halada” – concealing the knife during the act of slaughtering. The blade must be exposed and visible at the time of the severing of the windpipe and esophagus. The fourth disqualifying factor, “Hagrama,” involves the spot where the incision is made. The Shehita must be performed at a specific area of the neck, and if it is done higher or lower, then the Shehita is invalid. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Shohet must ensure when slaughtering that the windpipe and esophagus are intact. If they are “Akur” (“uprooted”), not in place, when the slaughtering took place, then the animal is considered to have died without slaughtering, and it is thus forbidden for consumption. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that a slaughterer who is not aware of this crucial law is guilty of feeding his fellow Jews forbidden meat. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, it is forbidden to eat the meat of an animal slaughtered by somebody who is not proficient in the laws relevant to these five disqualifications. As mentioned earlier, the knife used to slaughter the animal must be perfectly smooth, without any nicks. Therefore, a Shohet is required to carefully inspect the knife before slaughtering. The Gemara outlines the procedure that must be followed for this inspection. These laws apply in all times and places, and to both men and women. Halacha allows a woman who is proficient in the relevant laws to perform Shehita. Strictly speaking, a minor who is proficient in these laws may perform Shehita, as long as an adult supervises him. However, the Rabbis discourage having minors perform Shehita, because they frequently err, resulting in forbidden meat and thus causing a considerable financial loss. If somebody partook of meat of an animal that did not undergo Halachically valid slaughtering, then besides transgressing the prohibition against eating a Nebela, he also transgresses this affirmative command to eat only meat from a properly-slaughtered animal. If he ate a Ke’zayit of such meat, he is liable to Malkut for violating the command not to eat a Nebela. We must be very careful when purchasing meat to ensure that it was prepared through proper Shehita. In earlier generations, this was somewhat easier, because people generally knew the Shohet, whom they trusted as knowledgeable and G-d-fearing. This is not the case today, when meat is prepared industrially, on a large scale, and when companies have an interest in sidestepping halachic restrictions in order to maximize profits. We must therefore exercise caution and purchase meat only if it has reliable certification. The unique importance of this law can be seen in the Gemara’s comment in Masechet Megilla (12a) that the Jews at the time of the Purim story were deserving of annihilation because they took part in Ahashverosh’s feast. It seems that this violation, indulging in non-kosher food, is so severe that it is punishable by death. Although Bet Din punishes this violation with Malkut, it seems that G-d treats it as a capital offense, to the point where He nearly annihilated the Jewish People in response to their participation in Ahashverosh’s feast. This explains the Gemara’s otherwise perplexing discussion in Masechet Hulin (139b), where it raises the question of “Haman Min Ha’Torah Minayin” – where we might find an allusion to Haman in the Humash. The Gemara answers by citing G-d’s response to Adam after he and Havah partook of the forbidden fruit – “Ha’min Ha’etz Asher Siviticha Le’bilti Achol Mimenu Achalta” (“Did you eat from the tree from which I commanded you not to eat?! – Bereshit 3:11). The word “Ha’min” can be punctuated differently to read “Haman,” and this verse, then, alludes to Haman. The question naturally arises as to why the Gemara found it necessary to find such an allusion in the Humash, and how the story of Adam’s sin in Gan Eden relates to Haman and the Purim story. The answer might be that the Torah was wondering where in the Torah we find an indication that the sin of partaking of forbidden food constitutes a capital offense, punishable by death. It wanted to know why Haman – the threat of annihilation – was a punishment for the Jews’ participation in Ahashverosh’s feast. The Gemara found the answer to this question in the story of Adam’s sin, which brought death to the world. Adam and Hava were severely punished for eating forbidden fruit, to the extent that G-d decreed death in response to this misdeed. This shows us the unique gravity of the sin of eating forbidden food. Indeed, the Gemara noted that great Sages were capable of making occasional mistakes, but they would never eat forbidden food. It is more likely that a Tanna (Rabbi from the period of the Mishna) would accidentally violate Shabbat than he would eat non-kosher food. The reason for this unique severity, perhaps, is that the food we eat becomes part of us. Other sins are simply forbidden actions, which one can regret and repent for. Forbidden food, however, becomes part of the body, and cannot simply be eliminated. It adversely affects the person, compromising his judgment and his ability to properly understand Torah. The Rambam once wrote a letter to a community that was struggling with philosophical questions relevant to Jewish faith, and he urged them to check the butcher to make sure their meat is kosher. The consumption of non-kosher meat has the effect of undermining a person’s faith and religious devotion. We must therefore exercise caution in this regard and ensure to eat meat with reliable certification.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:23), “Ve’lo Tochal Ha’nefesh Im Ha’basar” – “You shall not eat the soul with the flesh.” This verse is understood as introducing the prohibition known as “Eber Min Ha’hai” – eating a limb which was severed from a live animal. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids eating “Eber Min Ha’hai” because it seeks to distance us from cruelty, and nothing can be crueler than removing a part of a live animal’s body. Hashem treats people “Mida Ke’neged Mida” (“measure for measure”), in accordance with the way they conduct themselves. Therefore, although He is benevolent and wishes to bestow His kindness upon us, He can do so only if we act kindly. For this reason, He commands us Misvot that accustom us to be kind and generous, so that we will be worthy of His kindness and beneficence. This prohibition applies to all kosher species of domesticated and non-domesticated animals, and all kosher species of birds. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes a distinction drawn in this regard between different body parts. When it comes to an animal’s organs that have no bones, such as the tongue or the spleen, one violates the command of “Eber Min Ha’hai” even if he removes and eats only part of the organ. A body with a bone, however, such as a hand, must be entirely severed from the animal’s body for the prohibition of “Eber Min Ha’hai” to apply. One who eats a Ke’zayit of “Eber Min Ha’hai” is liable to Malkut. All parts of the animal that one eats – such as veins, sinews, and so on, and not just the meat – combine to complete the quantity of Ke’zayit. Even if the meat one consumed constituted a small percentage of what he ate, he is nevertheless liable to Malkut if he ate a total of a Ke’zayit of “Eber Min Ha’hai.” If a person removed one of an animal’s internal organs from its place, and left it inside the animal’s body, and the animal was then properly slaughtered, then the animal’s meat is permissible for consumption, but that organ is forbidden, as it is considered “Eber Min Ha’hai.” However, if dislodging this organ renders the animal a “Terefa” (mortally wounded), then the animal’s meat is forbidden by force of the prohibition against eating a “Terefa.” The prohibition of “Eber Min Ha’hai” is included among the “Sheba Misvot Beneh Noah” – the seven Noachide laws which are binding upon all mankind. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, several differences exist between this prohibition as it applies to the Jewish Nation and its application to gentiles. First, for Jews, this prohibition pertains only to kosher animals, as mentioned above, whereas for gentiles, eating a limb from a live animal of any species transgresses this command. Secondly, a Jew who violates this prohibition is liable to Malkut, whereas a gentile’s violation of any of the seven Noachide laws is punishable by death. (Since non-Jews are given only seven commands to observe, their violations of these commands are treated with greater severity.) Additionally, whereas a Jew is not punished if he comes forward and confesses his offense, gentiles are punished for violations of the Noachide laws even on the basis of their confession. Another distinction relates to the minimum quantity that must be consumed for the person to be liable to punishment. A Jew, as mentioned earlier, is liable if he eats a Ke’zayit of “Eber Min Ha’hai,” whereas a gentile is liable for eating even a minimal quantity (“Mashehu”). The Torah’s commands forbidding cruelty to animals draws our attention to the need to cultivate within ourselves a kind, sensitive, compassionate nature. If the Torah demands that we avoid cruelty to animals, then certainly, in our dealings with people, who are endowed with the divine image, we must be especially kind and ensure not to cause them any sort of pain or discomfort.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:19), “Be careful not to abandon the Levi, all your days on your land.” The expression “Hishamer Lecha” denotes a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibition), and thus this verse establishes a prohibition against neglecting to properly care for the Levi. Specifically, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, this means that one may not delay giving the Leviyim the tithes to which they are entitled, or refrain from supporting them on the Regalim (pilgrimage festivals) so they can celebrate the holiday festively. The Leviyim were not given a share in the land, and so they were unable to support themselves. They relied on the support of the rest of the nation, and the Torah here forbids neglecting the Leviyim and failing to give them what they need. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d wants the Jewish People to be an “Am Hacham Ve’nabon” – a learned and wise nation, and a blessed nation, worthy of His special blessings. He wants the entire world to recognize Am Yisrael as a special people, a nation that is distinguished through its knowledge, wisdom and refined conduct, so it can set an example for the rest of the world to follow. To that end, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, G-d designated one tribe that would devote itself to Torah scholarship, spending their days and night immersed in Torah learning. This tribe would serve as the scholars and guides for the rest of the nation, and, by extension, for the rest of the world. As the verse says in reference to the tribe of Levi, “Yoru Mishpatecha Le’Yaakob, Ve’Toratecha Le’Yisrael” – “They shall teach Your laws to Yaakob, and Your Torah to Yisrael” (Debarim 33:10). They are selected to be the scholars who teach the rest of the nation. In order to spare the Leviyim the need to take out time to secure a livelihood, G-d commanded the other tribes to support them. The Torah emphasizes that we must not neglect the Leviyim “Al Admatecha” – “on your land.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that people who own land might look upon the tribe of Levi condescendingly, because they do not have a portion of land. The Torah here forbids having such an attitude, because, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, “Hu Ha’gebir” – to the contrary, the Levi must be seen as special and distinguished, as he devotes himself to Torah learning and is an accomplished scholar. People of means should not feel superior to learned scholars who do not have money, but should instead look at them with admiration and respect, and support them generously. And so the Torah emphasizes that we must not neglect the Leviyim “on your land” – meaning, even though we have land and they do not, we must not look down at them, and should instead care for all their needs. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah emphasizes “on your land” because people who own land generally can afford high quality meat and other products. The Torah here requires those who enjoy financial comforts to share their blessings with the Leviyim, the tribe that is set apart so it could devote itself to studying and teaching. This command applies when Beneh Yisrael live in their land. One who fails to give a Levi that which he owes him, or who does not assist a Levi in need during a holiday, is in violation of this command. He is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition is transgressed through inaction. At the conclusion of his discussion of this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates on the practical relevance of this Misva nowadays. Although technically this Misva does not apply, as the tribe of Levi is no longer designated for learning and teaching, the message of this Misva is that we must support those who choose to devote themselves to Torah scholarship. The Torah scholars are the ones who sustain our religion and ensure its successful transmission to the next generation, and it is therefore our responsibility to support them, and allow them to immerse themselves in their studies and to teach, without having to make time to earn a livelihood. The Sefer Ha’hinuch assures us that those who support the Torah scholars will earn Hashem’s grace in this world, and, moreover, will receive an equal share of the rewards given to the scholars in the next world.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:17) forbids the consumption of various kinds of sacred food without complying with certain restrictions that apply to these foods. The final prohibition in this verse relates to the consumption of “Terumat Yadecha,” which the Sages understood as a reference to Bikkurim – the first ripened fruits, which a farmer is required to bring to the Bet Ha’mikdash, and give to a Kohen. The Kohen is permitted to eat the Bikkurim, but the Torah here forbids the Kohen from eating the Bikkurim before they are placed in the Azara (courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash). A non-Kohen is never allowed to eat Bikkurim, and if he does, he is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death by the hand of G-d). A Kohen is forbidden from eating Bikkurim before it is brought to the Azara, and if he does, he is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that just as a person is permitted to eat his Ma’aser Sheni tithe in Jerusalem, but is not permitted to eat it outside Jerusalem, similarly, a Kohen is permitted to eat Bikkurim once the fruits reach the Azara, but not prior to this point. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women. A Kohen’s wife, who is permitted to partake of her husband’s Bikkurim, is not permitted to eat the Bikkurim before they are brought to the Azara.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:17) issues a command forbidding the consumption of a number of different hallowed items without following the relevant restrictions. Included in this verse are a number of prohibitions relevant to the consumption of sacrifices, which the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 445 th , 446 th , 447 th and 448 th Biblical commands. The first relates to “Bechorot Bekarecha Ve’sonecha” – the male firstborn animals of kosher species, which are to be given to a Kohen. The Torah here forbids Kohanim from eating a Bechor (firstborn) outside the city of Jerusalem. As long as the animal is Tamim (unblemished), it must be slaughtered as a sacrifice, and then eaten within the walls of Jerusalem. This command includes a prohibition forbidding non-Kohanim from eating the meat of a Bechor anywhere, even in Jerusalem. A Kohen who eats a Ke’zayit of meat of a Bechor outside Jerusalem, or a non-Kohen who eats this quantity of meat of a Bechor anywhere, has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The next command which the Sefer Ha’hinuch infers from this verse is the prohibition against consuming the meat of sin-offerings (Hatat and Asham) outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the reason for this command stems from the Gemara’s comment that the person who brings a sin-offering attains atonement through the Kohanim’s consumption of the sacrificial meat (“Kohanim Ochelim U’be’alim Mitkaperim”). This is a special type of eating, and it must therefore be conducted in a special way, with concentration and intention, and so the Torah requires the Kohanim to partake of this meat specifically in the sacred territory of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and forbids eating the meat anywhere else. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command includes a prohibition against the consumption of Kodashim Kalim – sacrifices which may be eaten even by non-Kohanim – outside the walls of Jerusalem. This prohibition applies in all places, and in all time periods. Even nowadays, if somebody consecrated an animal as a sacrifice, and then proceeded to slaughter it and partake of its meat, then in addition to violating the prohibition against benefitting from sacred property, he also transgresses this prohibition. One who eats a Ke’zayit of a sacrifice outside is designated location (sin-offerings outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, and Kodashim Kalim outside Jerusalem) is liable to Malkut. This verse also forbids the consumption of “Nedarecha Asher Tidor” – sacrifices brought in fulfillment of a pledge, which the Sages understood as referring specifically to a Korban Ola (burnt offering). The Ola is to be burned entirely on the altar, and the Torah in this verse forbids eating the meat of an Ola anytime and anywhere. Regardless of when or where one eats the meat of an Ola, he is in violation of this Biblical command. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies in all places and in all time periods, even today. One who intentionally eats a Ke’zayit of an Ola is liable to Malkut; if this is done mistakenly, then the violator must offer a special sacrifice – Korban Me’ila – to atone for his having accidentally benefitted from hallowed food. Finally, this verse forbids partaking of “Nidbotecha” – voluntary offerings. The Sages interpreted this term as a reference to the consumption of the meat of Kodashim Kalim sacrifices before the blood has been sprinkled. The meat of Kodashim Kalim is permissible for consumption, even by non-Kohanim, but the meat becomes permissible for consumption only once the blood of the sacrifice has been sprinkled on the altar. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command to teach us that we must prioritize our spiritual obligations over our physical gratification. We are allowed to enjoy worldly delights, but only after we have met our responsibilities to Hashem. This is symbolized by the prohibition against enjoying the meat of a sacrifice before the altar received its share of the sacrifice. One who eats a Ke’zayit of such a sacrifice before the blood was sprinkled has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. This command applies in all places and in all time periods. Even today, if somebody would consecrate an animal as a Shelamim or Toda, and would then proceed to slaughter it and partake of its meat, he would be in violation of this command, because, quite obviously, the blood cannot be sprinkled on the altar nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:17-18) introduces a command forbidding eating “the tithe of your grain, your wine or your oil in one of your gates,” instead of eating it in Jerusalem. This refers to Ma’aser Sheni, the only of the three tithes which can be considered “yours,” as it is eaten by the owner of the produce. Ma’aser Rishon must be given to a Levi, and Ma’aser Ani must be given to the poor, but Ma’aser Sheni is brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. The Torah here commands that the tithe must be eaten “Lifneh Hashem” – “before G-d,” referring to the city of Jerusalem, and it is forbidden to eat it outside the city. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, lists this prohibition as three separate commands – one forbidding consuming Ma’aser Sheni of grain (“Dagan”) outside Jerusalem, a second forbidding consuming Ma’aser Sheni of wine (“Tirosh”) outside Jerusalem, and a third forbidding consuming Ma’aser Sheni of oil (“Yis’har”) outside Jerusalem. One is liable to Malkut for eating Ma’aser Sheni produce outside Jerusalem only if the produce had been brought to Jerusalem and was then brought outside the city. Furthermore, this prohibition is transgressed only if the produce had not been redeemed. The Torah allows transferring the sanctity of Ma’aser Sheni from the produce onto money and then bringing the money to Jerusalem, instead of bringing the produce to Jerusalem. Once the sanctity is exchanged onto money, the produce loses its special status, and may be eaten anywhere one wishes. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women. In discussing the third in this series of prohibitions – the prohibition concerning oil of Ma’aser Sheni – the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one transgresses this command by consuming a Ke’zayit of oil. Normally, the volume of Ke’zayit is used in reference to the consumption of solid foods, and not in the context of drinking beverages. It thus seems strange, at first glance, that the Sefer Ha’hinuch rules that this prohibition – eating oil of Ma’aser Sheni outside Jerusalem – is violated through the consumption of a Ke’zayit of oil. The Sefer Ha’hinuch addresses this question, and explains that people do not use oil as a beverage; oil is consumed like food, and not drunk like a beverage. Although, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, some Arab populations indeed drink oil like a beverage, they are a small minority of people. Therefore, the volume of oil of Ma’aser Sheni that one must consume outside Jerusalem to transgress this command is a Ke’zayit, as it is treated like a solid food with respect to consumption.
The Torah states in Parashat Re’eh (12:15) that we may eat meat “with all your heart’s desire,” without any restrictions, even in a state of impurity, just as we may eat the meat of wild animals such as deer. The oral tradition explains that this verse speaks of the case of an animal that was consecrated as a sacrifice, but then developed a physical blemish that renders it unfit as a sacrifice. The animal in this case must be “redeemed” – meaning, its sanctity is transferred onto money, whereupon the animal is no longer considered sacred. The Torah here commands eating the meat of this animal, treating it like the meat of a deer – an animal which cannot be consecrated as a sacrifice. The blemished animal that has undergone Pidyon (“redemption”) no longer retains any sanctity, to the point where it may be compared to animals such as deer which have no possibility of ever being consecrated. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah commanded us to partake of the meat of this animal as a measure of kindness. We might have assumed that once an animal had been consecrated, it is permanently out of our control, and can never be returned. But G-d, in His infinite kindness, established that once the animal becomes disqualified for use as a sacrifice, it may be redeemed and used like an ordinary animal, as though it had never been consecrated. The Torah went so far as to require – and not just allow – eating this animal, because otherwise, a person might feel that even though this meat is technically permitted, it is proper to be stringent, and refrain from the meat, since the animal had been consecrated. In order to dispel this misconception, and to make it clear that this animal is entirely permissible, the Torah commanded that we eat the meat of this animal which had been consecrated and was then redeemed. If a consecrated animal died after it developed a disqualifying blemish, before it could be redeemed, then it cannot then be redeemed so it’s carcass could become permissible for use. The carcass must instead be buried. If the consecrated animal was pregnant, and it gave birth after developing a blemish but before it could be redeemed, the infant is considered consecrated, and must therefore be offered as a sacrifice. If the animal conceived after being consecrated, and is redeemed before giving birth, then before the redemption, the fetus is formally declared consecrated for the same sacrifice for which the mother had been consecrated. When a consecrated animal becomes unfit for sacrificing, and requires Pidyon, it may be brought to the meat market to be slaughtered, and the meat may be weighed and sold there. Although this might seem disrespectful to a consecrated animal, this is nevertheless allowed, because the meat will likely be sold for a higher price in the market, thus benefitting the treasury of the Bet Ha’midkash. The exceptions to this rule are a Bechor (firstborn animal) and Ma’aser (animal tithe) which developed a blemish. These blemished sacrifices are eaten by the owners themselves, and there is thus no benefit to the Bet Ha’mikdash by selling them in the market. As such, the meat may not be sold in the market, since this would be disrespectful, and there is no offsetting factor of benefit to the Bet Ha’mikdash in such a case. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nowadays, of course, when we do not consecrate animals, the laws of Pidyon do not apply.
The Torah warns in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:13), “Guard yourself, lest you sacrifice your burnt-offering anywhere…” This verse establishes the Biblical prohibition against offering sacrifices outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. In the next verse, the Torah commands, “Only in the site which Hashem will choose…there shall you sacrifice your burnt-offerings” – adding an affirmative command to offer sacrifices exclusively in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The reason for these commands is that Hashem wished for us to have a single location where sacrifices are offered and where we come to experience G-d’s presence, so that this site will be sacred and a place where G-d bestows His blessing. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, such a site will have an emotional impact upon the people, inspiring them to regret their wrongdoing, repent, and commit to improving. If it was permissible to offer sacrifices anywhere, people would not be impacted the way they are by a site which is the exclusive location for sacrificing to the Almighty. These commands are binding upon both men and women, and apply in all places, wherever a person offers a sacrifice. They are applicable even nowadays, when we do not have a Bet Ha’mikdash; if a person today offers a sacrifice somewhere besides the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash, he transgresses these commands.
The Torah commands in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:5-6), “You shall come there, and you shall bring there your burnt-offerings…and your pledges…” These verses establish an obligation to fulfill one’s pledges to the Bet Ha’mikdash by the first Regel (pilgrimage festival) that is celebrated after making the pledge. If a person commits to offer a voluntary sacrifice, or to make a donation to Bedek Ha’bayit (the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash), he has until the soonest Regel to fulfill this pledge. This Halacha is inferred from the word “Shama” (“there”), which implies that the sacrifice or donation must be brought immediately when you arrive “there” in the Bet Ha’mikdash, meaning, the first holiday requiring a pilgrimage to the Bet Ha’mikdash, when one comes to the holy site. At that first opportunity, he must fulfill his pledge. The reason for this Misva, of course, is that one should not be lazy or apathetic toward his commitments to the Bet Ha’mikdash. Just as people are careful to fulfill their civic duties in timely fashion, we must similarly ensure to fulfill our obligations to the Bet Ha’mikdash without delay. Nevertheless, the Torah does not require one to fulfill his pledges immediately, as this would pose an unreasonably difficult burden, and would discourage people from pledging to offer sacrifices and to donate to the Temple treasury. In addition to this affirmative command, there is a separate prohibition – known as “Bal Te’aher” – which forbids delaying the fulfillment of one’s pledges to the Bet Ha’mikdash. That prohibition is not violated until three Regalim pass before one fulfills his pledge. As mentioned, the affirmative command to fulfill one’s pledge requires bringing the sacrifice or donation before the end of the first Regel that is observed after one makes the pledge. This Misva applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nowadays, when, unfortunately, we do not have a Bet Ha’mikdash and are thus unable to bring sacrifices, one who pledges to offer a sacrifice clearly is not bound by this Misva.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh commands us to destroy objects of pagan worship, and then warns, “Lo Ta’asun Ken L’Hashem Elokechem” – “Do not do such to Hashem your G-d” (Debarim 12:4). This establishes a Biblical command forbidding any sort of destruction of sacred property. That which is required to be done to objects of idol worship may not be done to sacred property such as the written Name of Hashem, synagogues, the Bet Ha’mikdash, the altar, or any other sacred object. The reason behind this command, quite obviously, is that we are to treat matters of sanctity with awe and reverence, and so we are not allowed to destroy them in any way. The Sages identified seven Names of Hashem that this Biblical command forbids erasing. These are: Havaya (spelled Yod, Heh, Vav, and Heh); Adanut (spelled Alef, Dalet, Nun, and Yod); Kel (spelled Alef and Lamed); Elo-ah (spelled Alef, Lamed, Vav, and Heh); Elokim (spelled Alef, Lamed, Vav, Heh, Yod, and Mem Sofit); Sha-ddai (spelled Shin, Dalet, and Yod); and Seva-ot (spelled Sadi, Bet, Alef, Vav, and Tav). If one of these Names is written with a prefix, such as “L’Hashem” (“for Hashem”), then the prefix is not endowed with sanctity, and may be erased. Since it was written before the Name, it is not considered sacred. Thus, the Lamed in the word “L’Hashem” may be erased. If, however, the Name has a suffix, such as in the word “Elokechem” (“Your G-d”), the additional letters may not be erased. Since they are added to the Name after the Name is already written, they are endowed with sanctity and thus forbidden to be erased just like the Name itself. This applies also to the word “Elokecha” (“your G-d”); the Chaf Sofit at the end of the word may not be erased, because it was added to a Name of G-d. If a person began writing Hashem’s Name, but has not completed the writing, he may erase the letters that he has written. Thus, for example, if a person intended to write the Name “Sha-ddai,” but after writing the letters Shin and Dalet, before writing the Yod, he changed his mind, he may erase the Shin and Dalet. This prohibition does not include descriptive references to G-d, such as “Rahum” (Merciful One”), “Hanun” (“Gracious One”), “Gadol” (“Great One”), “Gibor” (“Mighty One”), and “Nora” (“Awesome One”). Although they refer to Hashem, these Names may be erased if there is a need. If a heretic, who does not accept the authority of the Torah She’be’al Peh (oral Halachic tradition), writes a Name of G-d, this Name is not subject to the prohibition of “Lo Ta’asun Ken.” In fact, it is a Misva to burn the paper upon which the Name was written in order to demonstrate that the Name written by such a person has no sanctity. If a gentile writes G-d’s Name, however, the paper must be placed in Geniza (meaning, it must be buried with other sacred materials). This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who erases any of the aforementioned seven Names of G-d has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that in the case of Names with a suffix, such as “Elokecha,” one who erases the additional letters written after the Name receives Malkut Mi’de’rabbanan (for violating a Rabbinic edict). This prohibition also includes removing a stone from the altar in the Bet Ha’mikdash. A practical lesson for us to learn from this Biblical command is the reverence and respect with which we must treat our synagogues. We must ensure not to cause any damage to the structure of the synagogue or any of its furniture, and to conduct ourselves in a respectful, dignified manner in the synagogue, as befitting a sacred site. Although acting disrespectfully in a synagogue might not be included in the technical parameters of this Misva, it certainly undermines the message that this Misva is meant to convey to us.
The Torah in Parashat Re’eh (Debarim 12:2) commands, “Abed Te’abedun Et Kol Ha’mekomot Asher Abedu Sham Ha’goyim” – obligating us to destroy all objects of foreign worship, as well as anything used to serve a foreign deity. G-d wants to keep us distant from foreign worship, and therefore, He commanded that we eradicate it. This Misva is binding upon both men and women. It applies in all times when we have the power and authority to destroy articles of foreign worship. Nowadays, of course, we do not have this ability, and so this obligation does not apply as a practical matter in our times. It applies in all places, but in Eretz Yisrael, there is an additional obligation to not only destroy objects of Aboda Zara (foreign worship) that we are aware of, but also search for such articles in order to cleanse the Holy Land of the impurity of idolatry. Somebody who had the opportunity to destroy an object of Aboda Zara but failed to do so has violated this affirmative command.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 10:20), “U’bi’shmo Tishabe’a” – “In His Name shall you swear.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch understands this verse as introducing a command to swear with Hashem’s Name when it becomes necessary to take an oath. He explains that when a person invokes Hashem’s Name when swearing, and realizes that he must not violate his word because he swore with Hashem’s Name, his faith in Hashem is reinforced. He attains a higher level of awareness of Hashem’s existence through the recognition of the authority that the mention of G-d’s Name lends the oath. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who refuses to swear by Hashem’s Name when he must take an oath has transgressed this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of this Misva follows the view of the Rambam. The Ramban, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, disagrees, and maintains that there is never a Misva to take an oath.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 10:20), “U’bo Tidbak” – “To Him shall you cling,” requiring us to “cling” to G-d. The Gemara (Ketubot 111b) comments that, quite obviously, it is not possible to physically cling to G-d, but this verse obligates us to attach ourselves to Torah scholars and their disciples. By spending time in the company of Torah scholars, we are considered as though we “cling” to Hashem. The Gemara teaches that one who marries a Torah scholar, or who has his daughter marry a Torah scholar, can be said to attach himself to the Shechina. The reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because we learn how Hashem wants us to live by spending time with scholars with thorough knowledge of the Torah. We must place ourselves in the company of Torah scholars so that we learn how to conduct our lives according to the laws and values of the Torah. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (1:4) instructs, “Ve’haveh Mit’abek Ba’afar Raglehem” – that we must draw so close to Torah scholars that the dust of their feet collects on us. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one transgresses this command by squandering an opportunity to attach oneself to a Torah scholar. One who violates this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, will be severely punished, because the perpetuation of the Torah depends on our associating with Torah scholars, as those who accustom themselves to be in the company of scholars are not likely to sin. The Ramban interprets the command of “U’bo Tidbak” differently, as referring to invoking G-d’s Name when taking an oath to motivate oneself to observe a Misva. This verse concludes, “U’bi’shmo Tishabe’a” – “You shall swear in His Name,” which is understood as referring to an oath to fulfill a Misva, which one may take in order to motivate himself. The phrase “U’bo Tidbak,” according to the Ramban, instructs that when taking such an oath, one should invoke G-d’s Name. In any event, the Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the Rambam’s understanding, that this verse introduces a Misva to attach oneself to Torah scholars.
In a number of contexts in Parashat Ekeb, the Torah instructs that we must serve G-d with all our heart (e.g. “U’l’obdo Be’chol Lebabchem” – Debarim 11:13). The Rambam maintains that this refers to the Biblical obligation of prayer. As the Gemara explains in Masechet Ta’anit, the way we serve G-d with our hearts is by turning to G-d in prayer. Explaining the reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that prayer is the key to accessing G-d’s blessings. By turning to G-d, who has the unlimited capability to provide us with all our needs, and requesting those needs, we are able to obtain them, because Hashem responds to all those who call to Him with sincerity. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, Tefila (prayer) enhances our awareness that Hashem is the master over the universe, the only Being who knows what we need, and who has unlimited ability to provide us with what we need, with nothing whatsoever that can ever prevent Him from giving us what He wishes to give us. This is a second purpose of prayer – to reinforce this belief in, and awareness of, G-d’s boundless control over the world. The Rambam writes that the Biblical obligation of prayer requires praying just once every day; the requirement to pray three times a day at specific times was enacted by the Sages. The Ramban challenges the Rambam’s position, questioning how the Rambam determined that the Biblical obligation requires praying each day. After all, since the Torah did not specify any particular time for prayer, we have no basis on which to determine whether the obligation is to pray once a day, once a week, once a month, once a year, or even once a lifetime. The Ramban therefore advances a different position, claiming that there is no Biblical obligation to pray each day. In the Ramban’s view, the Torah obligation requires praying only during an “Et Sara” – a time of crisis, when a person faces danger and needs help. Under such circumstances, one must pray on the level of Torah obligation, but otherwise, according to the Ramban, there is no Biblical requirement to pray. As mentioned, the Rambam concedes that the requirement to pray three times a day at specific times was enacted by the Sages; the Torah obligation requires praying only once at any point during the day. This is why the Sages formulated a brief prayer for one to recite when he finds himself in dangerous situation which does not allow him to recite the complete Amida prayer, as the Gemara discusses in Masechet Berachot. Since the fixed prayer is required only by force of Rabbinic enactment, the Rabbis suspended this requirement in situations of danger, and instituted a briefer prayer for the person to recite. The Talmud teaches that the three daily prayers – Shaharit, Minha and Arbit – correspond to the sacrifices offered each day in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The morning Shaharit prayer corresponds to the morning Tamid sacrifice; the afternoon Minha prayer corresponds to the afternoon Tamid sacrifice; and the evening Arbit prayer corresponds to the offering of the portions of sacrifices which were unable to be placed on the altar during the day, and were thus placed on the altar during the night. Since it was not always necessary to place these portions on the altar at night, the Arbit prayer, fundamentally, is optional, and not obligatory like the other two prayers. Practically speaking, the Jewish nation has accepted upon itself the Arbit prayer as an obligatory prayer, such that it is now obligatory like Shaharit and Arbit. On Shabbat, holidays and Rosh Hodesh, when a Musaf sacrifice would be offered in the Bet Ha’mikdash, we recite Musaf to commemorate that sacrifice. And on Yom Kippur we add a fifth prayer – Ne’ila. The text of our prayer service was composed by Ezra and his court. The first three Berachot express Shebah – praise to Hashem – whereas the next thirteen Berachot of the weekday Amida contain the requests that we present to G-d. The final three Berachot express Hoda’a – gratitude. The Gemara in Masechet Megilla relates that the Ansheh Kenesset Ha’gedola (Men of the Great Assembly) arranged the Berachot of the Amida in a particular sequence, but this sequence was later forgotten (likely because back then, printed Siddurim were not available). A Rabbi named Shimon Ha’pakuli then came along and arranged the blessings anew in the proper order. Although one should pray the entire Amida with concentration, one who did not have concentration when he prayed nevertheless fulfills his obligation, as long as he recited the first Beracha with concentration. This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods, and is binding upon both men and women, though there is some discussion as to how many times a day women are required to pray. Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Israel, 1924-1998) ruled that women should pray Shaharit and Minha, and may recite Arbit if they wish. If somebody went an entire day without praying at all, then, according to the Rambam, he has transgressed this Biblical command. According to the Ramban, one transgresses this Biblical command only if he failed to pray during a period of crisis. Although one is not liable to Malkut for violating this affirmative command, nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that one who fails to pray will be severely punished. Besides losing access to G-d’s assistance and blessing, one who fails to pray also in effect denies G-d’s providence, and he is thus deserving of harsh punishment.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 10:20), “Et Hashem Elokecha Tira” – “You shall fear Hashem your G-d,” establishing a Biblical obligation to have fear of Hashem. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that at all times, we are to feel a degree of fear, recognizing the repercussions of wrongdoing. The Torah issued this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, because the most effective deterrent against sin is fear of the consequences. Recognizing that G-d is aware of all our actions and punishes wrongdoing serves to discourage us from acting incorrectly and motivates us to conduct ourselves the way Hashem wants and expects us to. This Misva applies is all places and in all time periods, and is binding upon both men and women. It is one of the six “Misvot Temidiyot” – Misvot which apply constantly, throughout the day, each and every day. At any time, we can fulfill this Misva by contemplating that G-d watches our behavior and holds us accountable. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, a person fulfills this Misva anytime he experiences a desire to act wrongly but he desists because of fear of Hashem. But if one did not reflect at that moment on the repercussions of sin, and he commits the wrongful act, then he not only violates that prohibition, but also transgresses the affirmative command of Yir’at Hashem (fear of G-d), because he failed to have fear of Hashem. The Talmud teaches, “Ha’kol Bi’ydeh Shamayim Hutz Mi’yir’at Shamayim” – everything is in G-d’s hands, except fear of G-d. Hashem exercises complete control over the world, but He left one area in our control, and that is our Yir’at Hashem. He does not interfere with our free will, and so it is entirely up to us whether we live with the fear of Hashem in our consciousness, or whether we ignore Hashem and do not reflect upon our accountability for our actions. Nobody should think that he is “pre-programmed,” that he is not able to live with religious commitment. We have the freedom and independence to choose our behavior, to restrain our sinful impulses, and to live the way Hashem wants us to live. People who live in submission to their natural drives and instincts in essence relinquish control over the one area of life over which they are able to have control. But when we live with Yir’at Hashem, we exercise control over ourselves, and have the freedom to live the way we are supposed to live.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 10:9), “Va’ahabtem Et Ha’ger Ki Gerim Heyitem Be’eretz Misrayim” – “You shall love the foreigner, for you were foreigners in the land of Egypt.” This verse establishes the Biblical command to show love and respect to converts. The Torah already earlier commanded showing love and respect for all members of the Jewish Nation, in the famous verse, “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha” (“You shall love your fellow as yourself” – Vayikra 19:18). The word “Re’acha” (“your fellow”) clearly includes converts, as indicated in Parashat Yitro, where the Torah refers to Yitro, a convert, with the term “Re’ehu” (“Va’yish’alu Ish Le’re’ehu Le’shalom” – Shemot 18:7). Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah added a separate command to love converts, requiring us to go out of our way to show them a special degree of love, affection and respect. Similarly, the Torah issues a separate command not to cheat a convert in commerce (“Ve’ger Lo Toneh” – Shemot 22:20), even though there is already a general prohibition against cheating any fellow Jew. A separate command was introduced in order to impress upon us the need to exercise particular care when dealing with converts, who are especially vulnerable. Explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that as G-d has chosen us to be a special, sacred nation, we are expected to conduct ourselves in an especially sensitive and compassionate manner, such that people are impressed and uplifted by our behavior. Therefore, we are to show special love and kindness to those who decided to leave their families, their communities and their backgrounds to join our nation and bask in the presence of the Shechina. When other nations see us giving special respect to foreigners who chose to join Am Yisrael, they will have esteem for the Jewish Nation. Moreover, by extending warmth and kindness to foreigners, we become worthy of Hashem’s blessings, because, in the words of the Sefer Ha’hinuch, “Ha’toba Mitpashetet Be’tobim” – “Goodness spreads to the good.” Included in this command is a prohibition against reminding a convert about his past as a pagan. The Torah formulates this command similarly to the command to love G-d – “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha” – impressing upon us the importance of this Misva and the extent to which we are required to show converts love and respect. The Rambam, in one of his published responsa, goes so far as to say that the obligation to respect converts is, in a sense, greater than the obligation to respect one’s parents. He notes that although the Torah commands us to respect and have reverence for our parents, it never commands loving our parents, whereas the Torah does require us to love converts. This suggests that, at least in some sense, we have a greater obligation toward converts than we have toward our parents. This Misva applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who inflicts any sort of harm upon a convert – whether it’s physical harm, emotional harm, or financial harm – is in violation of this Biblical command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this law is relevant not only in its narrow application, as requiring showing love to converts, but also more broadly, requiring us to give special attention and show special concern to all foreigners. When people arrive from other communities and other places, and they naturally feel uncomfortable, we are obligated to try to make them feel at ease, and we must certainly avoid exacerbating their feelings of discomfort. This is included in the obligation to love converts. As cited earlier, the Torah commands loving the convert “for you were foreigners in the land of Egypt.” Our nation is familiar with the experience of being foreigners suffering mistreatment and oppression, and, as such, we are expected to be especially sensitive to the plight of vulnerable foreigners. When we encounter a newcomer, or a visitor from a different region, we are to do what we can to make that person feel comfortable and show him respect and consideration.
The Torah in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 8:8) commands, “Ve’achalta Ve’sabata U’berachta Et Hashem Elokecha” – “You shall eat, you shall be satiated, and you shall bless Hashem your G-d.” This verse establishes the well-known Misva of Birkat Ha’mazon – to recite a special blessing after eating a satiating quantity of bread made from one of the five principal grains (wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats), to thank G-d for the blessing of food. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates on the meaning of the phrase “Baruch At Hashem” (literally, “You are blessed”), teaching us the fundamental concept underlying the recitation of Berachot. He explains that when we say, “Baruch Ata Hashem,” we are acknowledging that G-d is the source of all blessing. Hashem has given the human being dominion over the natural world, and He wants us to be worthy of enjoying the benefits that the world has to offer. When we recite “Baruch” and acknowledge that Hashem is the source of blessing, from whom all blessings originate, and that only He controls the world and bestows blessing upon people, we become worthy of His blessings. Reciting a Beracha is, in a sense, the key to accessing G-d’s blessings, as it is through the recognition of Hashem as the source of all blessings that we earn them. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in the Amida prayer, after requesting what we need – such as wisdom, forgiveness, and health – we recite a concluding Beracha to express gratitude. Otherwise, we would resemble a servant who received a gift from his master and then left without expressing appreciation, which would, of course, be disrespectful. The Sefer Ha’hinuch also discusses in this context the word “Yitbarach” (“He shall be blessed”), which we recite in Kaddish. He understands this word as a prayer asking that Hashem inspire all His creatures to recognize that He is the source of all blessing and goodness. We hope and pray that just as we acknowledge Hashem’s exclusive control over the universe, that He is “Baruch” – the source of blessing – the rest of mankind should similarly arrive at this belief and awareness. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains on this basis the teaching of the Sages that Hashem “desires” the prayers of the righteous. The righteous bring blessing to the world through their recognition of Hashem as the source of all blessings, and therefore, Hashem, who desires that mankind should be deserving of blessing, cherishes the prayers of the righteous. This should be our intention whenever we recite a Beracha – that we acknowledge Hashem as the source of all blessings in the world, through which we earn access to His infinite blessings. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes this part of his discussion by noting that there are deeper, Kabbalistic understandings of the word “Baruch,” but in this work, which he composed for his son, he limited himself to the straightforward, easily understood concepts behind the recitation of Berachot. Birkat Ha’mazon is unique, in that it is the only, or one of the only, Berachot which are required Mi’de’Orayta – on the level of Torah obligation. The rest of the Berachot – including the Berachot recited before eating, and the Beracha Aharona blessings recited after consuming products other than bread – were instituted by the Sages. The Gemara explains that the Rabbis established the requirement of Beracha Rishona – reciting a Beracha before eating or drinking – because it is improper to derive enjoyment from this world before acknowledging Hashem as the provider of this enjoyment. Moreover, the Gemara comments, if the Torah requires reciting a Beracha after experiencing the enjoyment of eating, then Kal Va’homer (all the more so) one should recite a blessing when he experiences hunger and prepares to eat. It emerges, then, that each time we recite a Beracha before eating, we follow a Halacha established via a Kal Va’homer line of reasoning. The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) taught that when we observe a law established through a Kal Va’homer, we arouse Hashem’s kindness and compassion. Every morning, we recite the Berayta of Rabbi Yishmael which lists the thirteen rules through which Halachot are extracted from the text of the Torah, the first of which is Kal Va’homer. The Ben Ish Hai writes that these thirteen rules correspond to G-d’s thirteen attributes of mercy. Specifically, the rule of Kal Va’homer corresponds to the attribute of “Kel,” which signifies the pinnacle of divine kindness, as indicated by the verse, “Hesed Kel Kol Ha’yom” (“The kindness of G-d is all day” – Tehillim 52:3). Thus, whenever we observe a law deduced through a Kal Va’homer, we bring upon ourselves G-d’s abundant kindness. It follows, then, that each time we recite a Beracha before eating, we activate G-d’s kindness, since the requirement to recite a Beracha before eating is established on the basis of a Kal Va’homer. According to the Sefer Ha’hinuch and a number of other Rishonim, there is also another Beracha which is required on the level of Biblical obligation – Birkat Ha’Torah, the blessing we recite each morning over Torah study. The Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question of why the Beracha over Torah learning is recited before we begin learning, but the Beracha over food (which is required by the Torah) is recited only after we eat. If the Torah commanded reciting blessings over food and over Torah, why did it draw this distinction, requiring one Beracha before enjoying the blessing and the other Beracha after experiencing the blessing? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that there is a basic difference between physical enjoyment and spiritual enjoyment. Physical enjoyment is not appreciated until it is experienced, and so the Torah requires reciting a Beracha after eating and receiving enjoyment from food. The intellectual and spiritual benefits of learning Torah, however, can be recognized and appreciated even before the experience, and so the Beracha over Torah study is recited before we begin learning. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his lengthy discussion of the Misva of Birkat Ha’mazon with what has become one of the most famous passages in the entire work. He writes (listen to audio recording for precise citation): “Such have I received from my rabbis, may the Almighty protect them – that whoever is careful with regard to Birkat Ha’mazon, his sustenance is made available to him with dignity throughout his life.” Ensuring to fulfill this Misva properly brings a person financial blessing. The Mishna Berura adds that those who are especially meticulous in their Halachic observance make a point of reciting Birkat Ha’mazon from a Siddur. A number of Rabbis taught that Birkat Ha’mazon should be recited sitting, as alluded to in the phrase, “Ve’sabata U’berachta,” which could be read as, “Ve’sheb Et U’berachta” – “And sit at the time when you bless.” Furthermore, the Arizal (Rav Yishak Luria, Safed, 1534-1572) writes that the Sadikim would wear their overcoat and hat for the recitation of Birkat Ha’mazon. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women, though the Gemara comments that it is uncertain whether women are required to recite Birkat Ha’mazon on the level of Torah obligation. One who neglected to recite Birkat Ha’mazon after eating a satiating quantity of bread has transgressed this
The Torah commands in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 7:26), “Ve’lo Tabi To’eba El Betecha” – “You shall not bring an abomination into your home.” This refers to Aboda Zara – objects of pagan worship, and this verse establishes a prohibition against bringing such an article into one’s possession with the intention of deriving benefit from it. For example, if a person cuts down an Ashera tree – a type of tree that was worshipped by ancient pagans – and brings the logs into his home for use as firewood, he transgresses this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch makes a remarkable comment about this prohibition, asserting that the word “To’eba” (“abomination”) refers also to ill-begotten gains, money which one earned through theft, deception, dishonesty, or any other forbidden means. Just as it is forbidden to bring an object of idol worship into one’s home, because such an article is considered “abominable,” it is likewise forbidden to bring into one’s home money obtained in ways that the Torah prohibited. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Yeser Ha’ra (evil inclination) is referred to as an “Aboda Zara,” and thus by bringing into one’s home assets acquired as a result of the Yeser Ha’ra, one is considered as though he brings objects of idol worship into his home. The Gemara, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites, teaches that one does not enjoy blessings from money earned through forbidden means, and, in fact, “Peruta Shel Ribit Mechaleh Kama Oserot Shel Mammon” – a single coin of forbidden interest that one receives has the effect of destroying entire treasure houses of money which was gained permissibly. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who brings an object of pagan worship into his home to derive benefit from it transgresses this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. As we will see in a later installment in this series, there is a separate prohibition – “Ve’lo Yidbak Be’yadecha Me’uma Min Ha’herem” (Debarim 13:18) – against deriving benefit from objects of idol worship. Therefore, one who brings an object of worship into his home and derives benefit from it is liable to two sets of Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 7:25), “Lo Tahmod Kesef Ve’zahab Alehem Ve’lakahta Lach” – “Do not desire the silver and gold which is upon them [objects of pagan worship] and take them for yourselves.” This verse establishes a prohibition against benefitting from the plating on an object of pagan worship. If something is worshipped, then not only does that object become forbidden for benefit, but also the decorative plating becomes forbidden. This prohibition applies even to the plating on an object of worship which itself cannot become forbidden. If a pagan worships something which is connected to the ground – such as a mountain or a tree – the object of worship is not forbidden for benefit. However, if a pagan plates the tree he worships with gold, with example, then although the tree cannot become forbidden for benefit, the gold plating is forbidden. The reason behind this prohibition, quite obviously, is to distance people from idol worship. The Torah forbids deriving benefit even from materials used to adorn idols in order to ensure that we keep away from any form of foreign worship. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who derives even a small amount of benefit from the plating of an idol has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 6:3), “Ve’lo Tit’haten Bam,” forbidding marrying a non-Jew. It is prohibited to have one’s son marry a non-Jewish woman, or have one’s daughter marry a non-Jewish man, and it is likewise prohibited to marry a non-Jewish spouse. Halacha draws a distinction with respect to this prohibition between the seven Canaanite nations, which populated Eretz Yisrael at the time when Beneh Yisrael entered the land, and other gentiles. It is forbidden to marry somebody from one of the seven nations even if they convert and become Halachically Jewish, whereas members of other nations are permissible for marriage after conversion, and it is only before they convert that one may not marry them. The Biblical prohibition of “Lo Tit’haten Bam” forbids only marriage with a non-Jew; a relationship with a non-Jew out of wedlock is forbidden only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). However, it is clear that this is the most severe of all prohibitions enacted by the Rabbis. An exception to this rule is the case of a relationship with a non-Jewish woman in public. One who commits such an act may be killed by a genuine zealot – “Kanna’in Pog’in Bo” – as in the famous case of Zimri, who committed a public act with Kozbi, a woman from the nation of Midyan, and they were killed by Pinhas. If no zealot kills the violator, he is brought to Bet Din, who are to administer Malkut. If he is neither killed by a zealot nor punished with Malkut, he receives Karet for his grave misdeed. Torah law forbids relationships with four types of women, known by the acrostic “Nashgaz.” This refers to a Nidda (menstruating woman), a Shifha (gentile maidservant), a Goya (gentile woman whom one marries), and a Zona (Jewish harlot). The Sages forbade relationships with a gentile Zona as a safeguard against violations of the Biblical prohibition against relationships with a Jewish Zona. Regardless of these distinctions, the Zohar establishes that any relationship with a non-Jewish woman constitutes an especially grievous misdeed. The reason why the Torah forbade intermarriage, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is because people are naturally influenced by their spouse. If a man marries a non-Jewish woman, he will likely be influenced to follow her idolatrous beliefs and practices. Moreover, children born to a non-Jewish woman are not Jewish, and thus marrying a non-Jewish woman has the effect of begetting non-Jewish children, who will most likely grow to become idolaters like their mother. And in the case of a Jewish woman who marries a non-Jewish man, too, she runs the risk of falling under his pagan influence, and her children, despite being Jewish, might likely follow the father’s beliefs and practices. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women alike. If a person marries a woman from the seven Canaanite nations, even after she underwent conversion, or a woman from a different gentile nation who did not convert, he is liable to Malkut. If one gave a child to a gentile for marriage, he has violated this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, because this violation did not involve an action.
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 7:2), “Lo Tehanem,” which the Sages interpreted to mean that we may not give idolaters “Hen” (“favor”). That is to say, it is forbidden to compliment or praise an idolater, such as by speaking about his impressive appearance or talents. The reason for this command, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because expressing admiration for idol worshippers can easily lead to idol worship. Once a person speaks highly of idolaters, and regards them as praiseworthy, he might end up following their example and embracing their pagan beliefs and practices. As part of the effort to distance ourselves from idolatry, the Torah commanded us to refrain from praising and giving compliments to idol worshippers. This command also forbids giving idolaters gifts. This prohibition only to idol worshippers. There is no prohibition against praising or giving gifts to other gentiles, who do not worship idols, as long as they accept the seven Noachide laws. To the contrary, we are to support and encourage such gentiles. There is considerable discussion concerning the status of Moslems with respect to this prohibition. As they believe in one G-d who created and governs the universe, it is likely that they are not included in this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is permissible to give praise to an idol worshipper if the intent is to bring praise to a Jew. The commentators give the example of the Philistine general Golyat, whom the Tanach praises for his exceptional strength and military might. This praise is allowed because it introduced the story of David’s victory over Golyat, and was thus expressed in order to highlight David’s remarkable achievement. One who expresses praise for an idolater has violated this command. He is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is transgressed without an action, but the violator will nevertheless be severely punished, as his words of praise could lead to idol worship. The Gemara also brings additional interpretations of the command “Lo Tehanem,” explaining that it forbids giving an idolater a “Matenat Hinam” (free gift), and granting him “Haniya Be’karka” – a portion of the Land of Israel. Rabbenu Bahya (Spain, 1255-1340) notes that these three readings of the word “Tehanem” are based on different Nekudot (vowels). Meaning, by adding different Nekudot to the letters of this word, we arrive at different readings. Rabbenu Bahya writes that this is why the Torah scroll is not written with Nekudot, and if Nekudot are added, then the scroll is invalid. Adding Nekudot has the effect of limiting a word to a single meaning, and the words of the Torah are specifically meant to be understood in different ways and on different levels. The different implications of “Lo Tehanem” exemplify the reason why Nekudot do not appear in the Torah scroll – in order to allow for the various meanings intended by the text.
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (7:2), “Haharem Taharimem” – that Beneh Yisrael must eradicate the seven nations that populated the Land of Israel at the time Beneh Yisrael entered the land: the Kena’ani, the Emori, the Hitti, the Girgashi, the Perizi, the Hivi, and the Yebusi. These nations were responsible for entrenching idol worship in the Land of Israel, and so G-d commanded Beneh Yisrael to annihilate them in order to prevent the proliferation of idolatry, and so that there would be no one in the land from whom to learn pagan beliefs and practices. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, Beneh Yisrael were commanded to eradicate these nations in order to learn the severity of foreign worship, so that they would be deterred from serving false deities. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to pose the philosophical question of why G-d created these seven nations if He would then command that they be eradicated. For what purpose were they created, only to be annihilated? The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers five answers to this question. First, he writes, every person has the free will to choose whether to act righteously or sinfully. The seven nations were not destined to be sinful; they had the free will to act properly, but they chose not to. G-d does not interfere with the human being’s free will, and so He created the seven nations despite knowing that they would choose the path of sin. Secondly, it is entirely possible that at some point, these nations performed some goodness, and it was thus worth creating them for that benefit which they provided to the world. Additionally, there were members of these nations who converted and joined the Jewish Nation, and thus these peoples were created for the sake of those converts. Yet another answer is that these seven nations planted fields and constructed buildings which Beneh Yisrael were able to use after vanquishing the Canaanite peoples. Finally, the fate of these nations showed other peoples that they should refrain from worshipping idols and serve the one, true G-d. The war to eradicate the seven Canaanites nations has the status of a “Milhemet Misva” – a mandatory war. As such, the Jewish king can initiate this military campaign without permission from the Sanhedrin, whereas non-mandatory wars may not be fought without the Sanhedrin’s authorization. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and it applies in all places. In principle, it applies in all time periods, as well. The Rambam explains that in our times, we do not, practically speaking, have the ability to fulfill this Misva, because we are unable to identify the members of these seven nations. Fundamentally, though, the command applies even nowadays; in theory, if we would know for certain that somebody belongs to one of these nations, it would be a Misva to kill that person. One who was in a position to kill a member of one of these nations and failed to do so has transgressed this affirmative command. Additionally, he violates a separate prohibition – “Lo Tehayeh” – which forbids allowing these nations to live.
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (6:26), “Lo Tenasu Et Hashem Elokechem” – “Do not test Hashem your G-d.” The Sages understood this as referring to excessively testing a prophet whose authenticity has already been confirmed. If a prophet had already proven to be a real prophet by making two or three correct predictions, it is forbidden to test him further by demanding that he make additional predictions or perform certain miracles. Since he had already established himself as a true prophet, it is forbidden to demand additional verification. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade excessively testing a prophet because this could undermine his stature in the people’s eyes, leading them to question his words and to ignore his calls for repentance. This command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, also forbids testing G-d by performing a Misva in order to see if He will give a reward. The ultimate rewards for Misva observance are received not in this world, but in the next world. Therefore, we must perform Misvot without any expectation of seeing their rewards here in our lifetime, and we may not test G-d by performing a Misva with the specific intention of seeing whether or not we receive reward for it. For example, one cannot decide to observe Shabbat in order to see if G-d would compensate him for the money he forfeits for the sake of Shabbat observance. We are to observe Shabbat and our other religious requirements out of subservience to G-d, and not with the expectation of reward. Some Rishonim raised the question of how to reconcile this prohibition with the Gemara’s comment that if one gives charity with the specific intention that his child should recover from his illness, he is considered “perfectly righteous.” Even though he performs this Misva for the sake of receiving reward, nevertheless, he is regarded as pious because he performs a Misva. Seemingly, giving charity with this specific intention transgresses the prohibition against “testing” G-d, and should thus be forbidden. The Rishonim answer that the Gemara speaks of a person whose child did not live after he gave charity, but he nevertheless did not regret his Misva, and for this reason, he is considered righteous. The fact that he did not regret giving charity despite not receiving what he wished for proves that he gave out of sincere motives, and so he is called “entirely righteous.” The lone exception to this law is the Misva of Ma’aser – tithes – which may be given with the expectation of receiving reward. The prophet Malachi (3:10) conveys G-d’s announcement regarding the Misva of Ma’aser, “U’vhanuni Na Ba’zot” – that we are invited to “test” Him by giving charity to determine whether we will be rewarded with material blessing. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that as Ma’aser is given to G-d’s servants in the Bet Ha’mikdash – the Leviyim – He is automatically dutybound, as it were, to repay the person. When we take care of Hashem’s servants, it’s practically automatic that He will generously repay us. Since there is no question that this will happen – as this is almost a natural consequence of Ma’aser – there is no prohibition against testing to see whether or not G-d will repay for giving Ma’aser. This compensation will be given irrespective of the person’s behavior – even if he is guilty of wrongdoing – because the process is automatic. Returning to the case of a prophet, if a prophet warns of some calamity, which in the end did not occur, this does not disprove his authenticity. G-d is compassionate and rescinds harsh decrees in response to sincere repentance, and therefore if a predicted catastrophe never takes place, this could be explained as the revocation of G-d’s decree. A well-known example of this phenomenon is the story of Yona, who warned that the city of Nineveh would be destroyed, but in the end, the city was spared, because of the townspeople’s repentance. Another example is King Hizkiyahu, who fell ill and was warned by the prophet Yeshayahu that he would die. The king responded by sincerely repenting, and he recovered. The survival of Nineveh and of Hizkiyahu clearly did not call into question the stature of Yona or Yeshayahu; rather, these events reflected G-d’s compassion and loving acceptance of Teshuba. Conversely, however, if a prophet predicts some blessing, and the blessing does not arrive, then the prophet is to be regarded as a false prophet. G-d’s promises of blessing and prosperity are never overturned, and so a favorable prediction which does not come true proves an alleged prophet’s inauthenticity. One who tests an established prophet when this was not warranted, or who tested Hashem by performing a Misva with the expectation of reward, transgresses this command. He is not liable to Malkut, however, as this prohibition is violated without performing a concrete action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”).
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 6:9), “U’chtabtam Al Mezuzot Betecha U’bi’sh’arecha” – “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your home and upon your gates.” This command is repeated later, in Parashat Ekeb (Debarim 11:20), introducing an obligation to write these two sections of Biblical text upon parchment and affix the parchment to one’s doorpost. This Misva, of course, is known to us as the Misva of “Mezuza.” The two sections which must be affixed to the doorpost are the first two paragraphs of Shema (Debarim 6:4-9, 11:13-21). The reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is to provide a frequent reminder of our belief in Hashem and our obligations to Him. Each time we leave or enter the house, we see the Mezuza on the doorpost and are reminded of our subservience to the Almighty. Even a single missing letter, or improperly written letter, disqualifies the Mezuza. The Mezuza is to be placed on the right side when entering the home. The Gemara interprets the command of Mezuza as requiring placing the Mezuza “Derech Bi’atcha” – the way one enters the home, and thus, as one generally enters with the right foot first, the Mezuza should be placed on the right doorpost. All rooms in the house used for “Dira Shel Kabod,” respectable dwelling, require a Mezuza. This is to the exclusion of restrooms and bathing rooms, which do not require a Mezuza. The Torah requires placing Mezuzot “on the doorposts of your home,” and the Sages understood that this refers specifically to ordinary homes, as opposed to buildings endowed with halachic sanctity. Thus, Mezuzot are not required in the Bet Ha’mikdash, or in synagogues. Mezuzot should be checked twice every seven years to ensure they are kosher. Seven letters require special “crowns” in the scroll of the Mezuza – “Shin,” “Ayin,” “Tet,” “Nun, “Zayin,” “Gimal” and “Sadi.” If a person rents a house outside the Land of Israel, then he must affix Mezuzot within thirty days of moving into the home. In the Land of Israel, however, one is considered to establish permanent residence as soon as he moves into the home, and he must therefore affix Mezuzot immediately. One who rents a house bears the obligation to affix Mezuzot, and when he moves out of the residence, he must leave the Mezuzot behind, unless a non-Jew will be moving into the residence, in which case he should take the Mezuzot with him. Mezuzot are required on all doors in a home, though a number of conditions apply. First, a room requires a Mezuza only if its area is at least four square Amot, and it has doorposts and a lintel above them. Additionally, the room must be roofed. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, maintains that only doorways with a door require a Mezuza. The majority of Rishonim, however, disagree, and maintain that a Mezuza is required on a doorpost regardless of whether or not there is a door. The doorway must be at least ten Tefahim (handbreadths) high. As mentioned, only rooms used for “respectable” purposes require a Mezuza, as opposed to restrooms and bathing rooms, which do not. Buildings designated for animals – such as barns and stables – do not require Mezuzot. A Mezuza is required only in a permanent residence; a Sukka, which is a temporary, seven-day residence, does not require a Mezuza. This obligation applies in all places and in all times periods, and is binding upon both men and women. One who failed to affix a Mezuza to a doorway that requires a Mezuza has violated this command, and must immediately affix a Mezuza. It is noteworthy that in discussing the Misva of Mezuza, the Sefer Ha’hinuch makes no mention of the common notion of a Mezuza providing protection to the home. This omission is likely due to the fact that the Rambam, in Hilchot Mezuza (5:4), strongly condemns those who regard the Mezuza as a sort of amulet that magically brings protection. Interestingly, however, there is one passage in the Gemara which implies that one indeed earns protection in the merit of the Misva of Mezuza. The Kessef Mishneh commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah (by Maran Rav Yosef Karo, 1488-1575) explains the Rambam’s position by drawing a very important distinction between a reward for a Misva, and inherent, magical powers. One who properly fulfills the Misva of Mezuza is rewarded by G-d for his compliance, and receives protection as his reward. The Rambam criticizes those who believed that the Mezuza had intrinsic mystical powers that brought protection; this does not negate the notion of earning Hashem’s protection in reward for faithfully complying with the command of Mezuza. In any event, it is likely that the Sefer Ha’hinuch makes no mention of protection in the context of the Mezuza because he followed the Rambam’s view, opposing the notion that affixing a Mezuza brings protection.
The Torah in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 6:8) presents the command to wear Tefillin: “U’kshartam Le’ot Al Yadecha, Ve’hayu Le’totafot Ben Enecha.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, lists the Tefllin Shel Rosh and the Tefillin Shel Yad as two separate commands. Like the Tefillin Shel Yad, the Tefillin Shel Rosh contains within it four portions of Biblical text: “Kadesh Li Kol Bechor” (Shemot 13:1-10); “Ve’haya Ki Yebi’acha” (Shemot 13:11-16); “Shema” (Debarim 6:4-9); and “Ve’haya Im Shamo’a” (Shemot 11:13-21). However, unlike in the Tefillin Shel Yad, in the Tefillin Shel Rosh these portions of text appear on four separate pieces of parchment, and each piece of parchment is inserted into a separate compartment in the box of the Tefillin. These four sections are chosen because they put forth some of the most basic, fundamental principles of Judaism: Kabbalat Ol Malchut Shamayim (submitting to G-d’s authority); the belief in the Oneness of Hashem; remembering the miraculous Exodus from Egypt, which demonstrates G-d’s unlimited control over the universe, His ability to overturn the laws of nature, thus proving that He created the world; and the belief in divine providence. Due to the importance of these fundamental tenets, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we are to wear these texts on our arms and heads – near our minds and heart – throughout the day. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here clearly indicates that ideally, Tefillin should be worn throughout the day, and indeed, this was the practice long ago. However, the Hafetz Haim, in Bi’ur Halacha (Orah Haim 37), cites the Peri Megadim (Rav Yosef Teomim, 1727-1792) as commenting that strictly speaking, one fulfills the Misva of Tefillin by wearing Tefillin even for just a single moment each day. And nowadays, of course, we do not wear Tefillin throughout the day, as it is difficult to maintain all day the level of concentration and focus, and the standard of bodily cleanliness, that are required while wearing Tefillin. The letter “Shin” is to appear on both sides of the box of the Tefillin Shel Rosh. On the right side, the “Shin” is formed with three legs, and on the left side, the “Shin” is formed with four legs. The straps of the Tefillin Shel Rosh pass through an area at the back of the box called the “Ma’abarta.” The straps are tied together in the back of the head, in a knot in the form of the letter “Dalet.” The Gemara in Masechet Hulin (9) comments that one of the things that every Torah scholar must know is how to tie the Tefillin straps in a knot the shape of the letter “Dalet.” The Torah commands placing the Tefillin Shel Rosh “Ben Enecha” – “in between the eyes,” but the Sages understood that this refers not to top of the nose, which is actually between the eyes, but rather on the head, with the Tefillin centered such that it is parallel to the area between the eyes. Specifically, the Tefillin Shel Rosh should be placed on the spot on the head which is soft on a newborn infant’s head (an area known as the cranium). As mentioned, the Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, lists the Tefillin Shel Yad and Tefillin Shel Rosh as two separate Misvot. This is in contrast to the view of the Ramban, who maintained that wearing Tefillin comprises but a single Misva, albeit one with two components. The Rogatchover Gaon (Rav Yosef Rosen of Dvinsk, 1858-1936) offered an insightful explanation for why the Rambam felt that these two obligations should be counted as distinct Misvot. The Torah formulates the requirements of the Tefillin Shel Yad and Tefillin Shel Rosh differently, commanding, “U’kshartam Le’ot Al Yadecha” – that we must “tie” the Tefillin Shel Yad upon our arms – “Ve’hayu Le’totafot Ben Enecha” – and that the Tefillin Shel Rosh must “be” upon our heads. When it comes to the Tefillin Shel Yad, we are commanded to perform the act of tying the Tefillin around our warms. But with regard to the Tefillin Shel Rosh, the Torah commands that the Tefillin should be upon our heads. The Rogatchover Gaon notes that these are two entirely different commands – one to perform an act of tying, and one to ensure that the Tefillin is in position upon our heads. Therefore, the Rambam counts these two obligations as separate affirmative commands. The practical difference between “tying” the Shel Yad on our arms and “having” the Shel Rosh on our heads, the Rogatchover Gaon explains, arises in a case where one was already wearing Tefillin before the earliest time in the morning when the Misva can be fulfilled. In light of the distinction discussed above between the Tefillin Shel Yad and Tefillin Shel Rosh, it would appear that the person in this case would have to remove his Shel Yad and put it back on, but may leave his Shel Rosh. Since the Misva of Tefillin Shel Yad requires the act of tying, the individual must remove the Shel Yad so he can tie it on his arm during the time when the Misva is to be performed. The Misva of Tefillin Shel Rosh, however, requires simply having the Tefillin Shel Rosh on the head, and thus it can be fulfilled even if the person was already wearing the Tefillin Shel Rosh when the obligation took effect in the morning. (It should be noted that as far as practical Halacha is concerned, this is not necessarily the ruling that we follow.) This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods. It is binding only upon males, because it falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands that apply only in certain times, from which women are generally exempt. Tefillin is worn only during the day, and is not worn on Shabbat or holidays, and thus women are exempt from this obligation. One who fails to wear Tefillin an entire day is considered to have neglected eight Biblical commands, as the Misva is mentioned four times, in each of the portions contained in the Tefillin Shel Yad and Tefillin Shel Rosh, for a total of eight commands.
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 6:8), “U’kshartam Le’ot Al Yadecha, Ve’hayu Le’totafot Ben Enecha” – requiring that one bind on his arm and on his head certain sections of the Torah. This is, of course, what we refer to as Tefillin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the obligation to wear Tefillin as two separate Misvot – one Misva to wear the Tefillin Shel Yad upon the arm, and a second Misva to wear the Tefillin Shel Rosh upon the head. These two Misvot are not interdependent, and thus one who has only one and not the other should wear the one he has. The specified four sections of the Torah are written on a single piece of parchment which is then rolled like a Sefer Torah, from the end to the beginning, and placed inside the box of the Tefillin Shel Yad. This box is tied to the arm with Resu’ot (straps). These four sections are: “Kadesh Li Kol Bechor” (Shemot 13:1-10); “Ve’haya Ki Yebi’acha” (Shemot 13:11-16); “Shema” (Debarim 6:4-9); and “Ve’haya Im Shamo’a” (Shemot 11:13-21). The box of the Tefillin Shel Yad is worn on the upper left arm, near the heart. To explain the reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch reiterates a point he had made earlier, that the human soul lives in a spiritually hostile environment, so-to-speak. It originates from the pure, pristine domain of the heavens, but then descends into a physical body, which is beset by various drives, impulses, desires and lures. This is analogous to somebody who comes to a dangerous neighborhood, and needs guards to protect him from the hostile people who live there. Our “guards,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, are the various Misvot which serve to remind us of our obligations to Hashem. We are commanded to affix Sisit strings to our garments, place Mezuzot on our doors, and wear Tefillin on our arms and heads, to remind us of our devotion to G-d, and they help protect us from the lures of the Yeser Ha’ra (evil inclination). Of course, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, even with all these reminders, we are still prone to sin, and people occasionally act wrongly. But without these reminders, we would be even more vulnerable, and more easily lured to sin, and so these Misvot help us in our lifelong struggle to maintain our commitment to G-d. Many of the Halachot relevant to the Misva of Tefillin have been handed down to us as a “Halacha Le’Moshe Mi’Sinai” – tradition taught to Moshe at Mount Sinai. For example, the Kesisa – the Tefillin box – must be perfectly square, as must the Titura – the base underneath the box. The stitching around the base of the Tefillin must also be square. The Tefillin Shel Rosh must have a symbol of the letter “Shin” on either side. The parchment must be wrapped in material – called a “Matlit” – before being inserted into the Tefillin box. A thread made from the hair of a kosher animal is used to wrap the outside of the parchment. The Tefillin box is similarly stitched together with sinews from a kosher animal. The base of the box of the Tefillin Shel Yad has an extension called the “Ma’abarta” through which the strap passes. The strap of the Tefillin Shel Rosh is tied in back in the shape of the letter “Dalet.” The Tefllin straps must be black. Tefillin should be prepared only by Jews. The strap of the Tefillin Shel Yad must be long enough to pass through the “Ma’abarta,” be tied in a shape resembling the letter “Yod” alongside the box, and then wrap around the arm and reach the middle finger, around which the strap is wrapped three times. The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the opinion that one recites only one Beracha when putting on Tefillin – the Beracha of “Le’hani’ah Tefillin.” If one made an interruption in between the placing of the Tefillin Shel Yad and the placing of the Tefillin Shel Rosh, then he recites a second Beracha – “Al Misvat Tefillin” – when putting on the Tefillin Shel Rosh. Likewise, if, for whatever reason, one puts on the Tefillin Shel Rosh without the Tefillin Shel Yad, then he recites the Beracha of “Al Misvat Tefillin.” The Tefillin Shel Yad is placed on the bicept of the upper arm, the portion of the area between the elbow and the shoulder that is elevated. It should be positioned such that when one’s arm is at his side, the Tefillin rests near the heart. The earliest time for putting on Tefillin is the point of “Mi’she’yakir” – the time in the morning when there is enough light to recognize one’s friend from four cubits away. Tefillin must be worn anytime from this point until sunset. We do not wear Tefillin on Shabbat, Yom Tob or Hol Ha’mo’ed, because these occasions are considered an “Ot” (“sign” of our relationship with Hashem), and so there is no need for Tefillin, which themselves serve as an “Ot.” One wears Tefillin only if he is able to maintain a “Guf Naki” – physical cleanliness and hygiene. Thus, someone suffering from an upset stomach, who must frequently pass air, does not wear Tefillin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that this requirement of “Guf Naki” refers specifically to bodily cleanliness, and not to spiritual “cleanliness.” A person should not excuse himself from the Misva of Tefillin because he is guilty of sinful conduct; to the contrary, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, involving oneself in the Misva of Tefillin could have the effect of improving his conduct, as the Sages teach, “Misva Goreret Misva” – one Misva leads to another (Abot 4:2). The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions in this context that there was in his time a group of Jews who taught that only the pristinely righteous, who avoid all wrongdoing, are worthy of wearing Tefillin, and everybody else should specifically not wear Tefillin, because they are soiled by sin. This group tried drawing proof to this ruling from a story told in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Berachot, chapter 2) of somebody who gave his fellow a silver utensil to watch, and when he went to retrieve it, the watchmen falsely denied receiving it. The utensil’s owner remarked that he had decided to trust the fellow because he wore Tefillin, which he presumed indicated that he was honest and trustworthy. Some understood from this story that one should wear Tefillin only if he is perfectly righteous, and one who does not adhere to the strictest standards creates a Hillul Hashem (defamation of G-d’s Name) if he wears Tefillin. (It should be noted that long ago, people wore Tefillin the entire day, and this might have contributed to the feeling that wearing Tefillin indicates a high spiritual standard, which most people did not maintain.) The Sefer Ha’hinuch strongly objects to this theory, citing the famous verse in Kohelet (7:20), “Ki Adam En Sadik Ba’aretz Asher Ya’aseh Tob Ve’lo Yeheta” – there is no perfectly righteous person in the world who never acts wrongly. It is human to occasionally err and sin. Thus, it is inconceivable that a person could excuse himself from a Misva because he is guilty of sin. And, as mentioned, performing Misvot is what helps steer a person along the right path, toward proper conduct. The reward for one Misva is another Misva. Therefore, if a person is a sinner, then to the contrary – this is even more of a reason for him to fulfill the Misva of Tefillin, as this Misva will likely lead him to additional Misvot. We read in Tehillim (34:15), “Sur Me’ra Va’aseh Tob” – “Turn away from evil, and do goodness.” One explanation of this verse is that before we perform goodness, we must ensure to refrain from wrongdoing. However, some Rabbis explain that to the contrary, the way we “turn away from wrongdoing” is by involving ourselves in goodness, by performing Misvot, which will have an impact upon us and help us improve our conduct. There is a famous debate among the Rishonim as to the sequence in which the four sections are to be written on the parchment in the Tefillin. Rashi, the Rambam and Rav Hai Gaon maintained that the sections should be written in the sequence in which they appear in the Torah – “Kadesh Li,” “Ve’haya Ki Yebi’acha,” “Shema,” and “Ve’haya Im Shamo’a.” This manner of preparing Tefillin is commonly known as “Tefillin Rashi.” However, Rashi’s grandson, Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171), disagreed. In his view, the two paragraphs which begin with “Ve’haya” should be adjacent to one another, as the middle two paragraphs. According to Rabbenu Tam, the proper sequence is “Kadesh Li,” “Ve’haya Ki Yebi’acha,” “Ve’haya Im Shamo’a,” and “Shema.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows Rashi’s opinion. However, the Arizal (Rav Yishak Luria, Safed, 1534-1572) taught that “Elu Ve’elu Dibreh Elokim Hayim” – both opinions are correct, and both types of Tefillin have a place according to Kabbalistic teaching. Moreover, there is room on the head for two pairs of Tefillin, and the Arizal maintained that both types of Tefillin should be worn. In fact, the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) writes that Moshe Rabbenu wore both kinds of Tefillin. This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods. It is binding only upon males, as it falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – Misvot which apply at certain times, from which women are, as a general rule, exempt. The Misva of Tefillin applies only at night, and not on Shabbat or festivals, and is thus considered a “Misvat Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama.” The Gemara in Masechet Erubin (96) tells that Michal, the daughter of King Shaul, wore Tefillin. There is a debate as to whether the Rabbis of the time approved or disapproved of this practice. In any event, the accepted practice is that women specifically should not wear Tefillin. Some suggested that this is because of the difficulty women have in maintaining a “Guf Naki” due to menstruation. Regardless, it is accepted that women do not wear Tefillin. If somebody did not wear the Tefillin Shel Yad, or the Tefillin Shel Rosh, at any point during the day, he has transgressed an affirmative command. If a person wore neither the Tefillin Shel Yad nor the Tefillin Shel Rosh, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, then he is considered to have neglected eight affirmative commands – as the command appears in each of the four sections of the Torah in the Tefillin, and since he wore neither the Shel Yad nor the Shel Rosh, he neglected eight commands. Conversely, by complying with this Misva, and wearing Tefillin, one is credited with the fulfillment of eight separate Misvot.
The Torah in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 6:7) commands, “Ve’dibarta Bam” – “You shall speak them,” requiring us to recite the previous verses, specifically, the verse of “Shema Yisrael Hashem Elokenu Hashem Ehad.” The command of “Ve’dibarta Bam” thus introduces the Misva to read Shema each day. The Torah commands reading these words “Be’shachbecha U’b’kumecha” – “when you lie and when you rise,” which the Sages understood to mean that we must read Shema at night at the time when people go to sleep, and in the morning, at the time when people awaken. The Ramban was of the opinion that these two daily recitations are to be counted as two separate Biblical commands. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, counts them both as a single Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). The Gemara identified “Zeman Shechiba” (the time when people go to sleep) as the period from nightfall (Set Ha’kochavim) until daybreak (Alot Ha’shahar). And “Zeman Kima” (the time when people wake up), the Gemara explains, extends until the end of the third Halachic hour of the day. Although some people sleep later, the Gemara determined that most people arise by the end of the third Halachic hour, and thus one must recite the morning Shema by this time. The reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because we are physical beings, who are naturally drawn after forbidden pleasures and the vanities of this world, such that we need regular reminders of our obligations to G-d. When we recite Shema each morning and evening, we remind ourselves that we are subservient to Hashem, and we reaffirm our acceptance of “Ol Malchut Shamayim” – the “yoke of G-d’s kingship.” This acceptance is the most effective deterrent against sinful conduct. We need this protection each day, and so we recite Shema every morning and every evening, to safeguard ourselves against wrongdoing both during the day and at night. The Sages taught that we are to elongate the “Dalet” at the end of “Ehad,” the final word of the verse “Shema Yisrael…” While pronouncing this elongated “Dalet,” we are to have in mind that G-d is King over the four corners of the universe (as “Dalet” in Gematria equals 4), and over both heaven and earth. The Shulhan Aruch adds that when we recite “Ehad,” we should turn our heads to show that we acknowledge Hashem’s dominion over the entire earth. The Rishonim debate the question of what is included in the Torah obligation of Shema. The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the opinion that only the recitation of the verse “Shema Yisrael” is required on the level of Torah obligation; the rest is required by Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Other Rishonim, however, maintain that the entire first paragraph of Shema (the verse of “Shema Yisrael” followed by “Ve’ahabta”) must be recited to fulfill the Torah obligation. The first paragraph of Shema speaks of the oneness of G-d, the obligation to love G-d, and the obligation to study Torah. The second paragprah speaks of the observance of all the Misvot. The third speaks of the Misva of Sisit, which helps us remember our obligation to observe all the Misvot. The morning Shema is preceded by two Berachot – “Yoser Or” and “Ahabat Olam” – and followed by one Beracha – “Ga’al Yisrael.” The evening Shema is likewise preceded by two Berachot – “Ha’ma’arib Arabim” and “Ahabat Olam” – but is then followed by two Berachot – “Ga’al Yisrael” and “Hashkibenu.” These seven Berachot recited each day are alluded to in the verse in Tehillim (119:164), “Sheba Ba’yom Hilalticha” – “I have praised You seven times in the day,” referring to the seven blessings before and after the two daily recitations of Shema. Shema must be recited audibly, meaning, loudly enough that the person can hear what he says. Of course, he should recite it softly so that he does not disturb others, but he should recite it in a manner that allows him to hear what he recites. Nevertheless, if one did not recite the Shema loudly enough to hear the words, he has fulfilled his obligation, as long as he verbalized the words, and did not just read them with his eyes. The Gemara teaches that there are certain pairs of words in the text of Shema that require a slight pause in between the words, as otherwise, they might be read incorrectly. If the first letter of a word is the same letter as the final letter of the previous word, then one must make a slight pause in between the two words to ensure that they are not pronounced as a single word. For example, the pair of words “Al Lebabchem” could sound like a single word (“Alebabchem”) if a break is not made in between them. Another pair of words that requires a slight pause is “U’kshartem Otam,” as they might otherwise be pronounced, “Ukshartemotam,” which sounds like it refers to death (“Motam” means “their death”). If one did not make a pause between these pairs of letters, he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation, but optimally, these pauses must be made. When reciting the word “Tizkeru,” one must carefully pronounce the “Zayin,” so that he does not mistakenly say “Tiskeru,” which is a different word, and which would mean that we fulfill the Misvot only to receive reward. Nevertheless, the Gemara writes that “Lo Dikdek Be’otiyoteha” – if one was not precise and meticulous when pronouncing the words – he has fulfilled his requirement, as long he pronounced the words correctly. This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods, and is binding upon men. Women are exempt from the obligation of Shema, as it falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands that apply at specific times, from which, as a general rule, women are exempt. The morning Shema is required only in the morning, and the evening Shema is required only at night, and so women are not included in this obligation. Nevertheless, it is proper for women to recite Shema in order to accept upon themselves “Ol Malchut Shamayim” each day. A man who failed to recite Shema within the required time frame has violated this affirmative command. If he recites it after the final time for fulfilling the Misva, he is credited with a Misva for reading verses from the Torah, but he is not credited with the specific Misva of Shema. One must be especially vigilant to ensure to recite Shema in the proper time, and with concentration. The Gemara writes that one who recites Shema slowly, carefully and with concentration will have Gehinam “cooled” for him, meaning, his punishment in the afterlife will be diminished.
The Torah commands in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 6:7), “Ve’shinantam Le’banecha,” which literally means, “You shall teach them [the words of the Torah] to your children.” This verse is understood as introducing both the command to teach one’s children Torah, and to learn Torah oneself. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the obligation to learn Torah consists of two components. First, we need to learn for the practical purpose of knowing our religious obligations, what precisely the Torah requires us to do and forbids us from doing. In addition, we have a separate obligation to be proficient in all of Torah, even those portions of Torah which are not directly relevant to practical observance. The word “Ve’shinantam” is understood to mean not only “teach,” but also as a command to be “sharp” (“Shenunim”), such that if somebody poses to us a question in Torah, we will have the answer readily accessible. Thus, we are required to learn Torah so that we know how to observe it, and also for the separate purpose of attaining Torah knowledge. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah is the expression of Hashem’s wisdom and the way He wants us to live, and so we are required to study the Torah in order to acquire this knowledge and wisdom. The command of “Ve’shinantam Le’banecha” requires one to teach Torah generally, to anybody, as the word “Banecha” (“your children”) can mean “your students.” However, this verse also is to be understood plainly, as requiring a father to teach his actual children Torah. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that when a young child is first able to speak, at around the age of three, the father must teach him the verse “Torah Siva Lanu Moshe, Morasha Kehilat Yaakob” (Debarim 33:4), and the verse “Shema Yisrael, Hashem Elokenu Hashem Ehad” (Debarim 6:4). When the child reaches the age when he can begin schooling – normally around the age of six – the father must send the child to be taught by teachers. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that when a child is still young and fragile, he should not be educationally burdened, as Torah learning requires effort and can be draining. A young child lacks the physical strength to handle a heavy burden of learning, and so his parents and teachers should not demand too much of him in terms of Torah study. Once he becomes older and stronger, however, he should be taught to apply himself in order to attain a complete Torah education. If a father fails to fulfill his obligation to provide his son with a Torah education, then the child’s grandfather bears this responsibility, and should teach the child at least the written Torah (Humash and Nach). If neither the father nor the grandfather taught a child Torah, then when the child becomes an adult, he must assume responsibility for his own Torah education. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin instructs that if this person can afford to either enroll in a yeshiva, or enroll his son in yeshiva, then he takes precedence over his son, unless his son is exceptionally gifted, in which case the son should be sent to yeshiva instead of the father. One is obligated to learn Torah throughout his life, even when he is very old, and even on his deathbed. This is inferred from the verse in the Book of Bamidbar (19:14), “Zot Ha’Torah, Adam Ki Yamut Ba’ohel” (literally, “This is the law concerning [a case where] a person dies in a tent”). This verse can be read to mean, “This is the Torah – even when a person is dying in a tent,” implying that even as one is about to die, he must learn Torah to the best of his ability. One is required to learn Torah regardless of whether he is rich or poor, healthy or ill. Nobody has an excuse not to spend time learning Torah. The Gemara (Yoma 35b) tells that Hillel was impoverished, but he nevertheless went to the Bet Midrash each day to learn Torah. Another great sage, Rabbi Elazar Ben Harsom, was exceptionally wealthy, with enormous amounts of assets around the world which occupied his time, but he nevertheless made time for Torah learning. These two outstanding Rabbis prevent both the poor and the rich from excusing themselves from Torah learning on the basis of their circumstances. The Gemara adds that some people might think to excuse themselves from Torah learning because of their Yeser Ha’ra, because they are good-looking and thus lured toward vain, worldly pleasures. The example that refutes this claim is Yosef, who was exceptionally good-looking, and as a result faced temptation, but he resisted the lures and remained devoted to Torah. I once heard a Rabbi comment that this teaching of the Gemara is alluded to in the famous verse in Mishleh (19:21), “Rabot Mahashabot Be’leb Ish, Va’asat Hashem Hi Takum” – “There are many thoughts in the heart of a man, but it is G-d’s decision that will be sustained.” The word “Hi” in this verse is spelled “Heh,” “Yod,” “Alef,” alluding to “Hillel,” “Yosef,” and “Elazar Ben Harsom.” People have many “thoughts” of how to excuse themselves from learning Torah, but “Hi Takum” – the examples set by these righteous figures undermine all these excuses. Elsewhere in Mishleh (17:14), we read, “Poter Mayim Reshit Madon,” which can be understood to mean that a person’s punishment after he leaves this world will begin with the retribution for his laxity in the area of Torah learning. The first sin for which a person will be punished in the next world, Heaven forbid, is Bittul Torah – the failure to properly devote oneself to Torah study. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, based on the Gemara, that a person must divide his time, spending equal amounts of time on the study of Tanach, another third on the study of Mishna, and another third on the study of the discussions in the Gemara. Tosafot in Masechet Kiddushin write that nowadays, we learn the Talmud Babli, which combines (“Balul”) all three – the Tanach, the Mishnayot, and the deliberations explaining the Mishna. This is the ruling of the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), in his glosses to the Shulhan Aruch (Yoreh De’a 246). The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (2:4) exhorts that one should not say, “I will learn Torah when I have free time,” because he might never have free time. We must make time for Torah learning, instead of waiting until we have free time. The Gemara teaches that after one leaves this world, he will be asked “Kabata Itim La’Torah,” which is commonly understood to mean, “Did you set fixed times for Torah?” However, Rav David Abuhasera of Nahariya (contemporary) noted that the verb “K.B.A.” can mean “steal,” as in the verse in Mishleh (22:23) “Ve’kaba Et Kob’ehem Nafesh,” such that the question “Kabata Itim La’Torah” refers to “stealing” time for Torah. We cannot wait until we happen to have free time for learning, because the Yeser Ha’ra will make us continually “busy” so that we never have free time for learning. Instead, we need to “steal” time from our other activities and obligations for Torah study. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion by teaching that if one exerts effort to learn Torah even when this is difficult, then he receives Hashem’s assistance, and he will be relieved of his burdens so that he can properly devote his attention to learning. Such a person will enjoy great blessings both in this world and the next. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon males. Women are exempt from the Misva of Torah learning, and are thus likewise technically exempted from the obligation to teach their children Torah. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it is proper for women to train their children to study Torah. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that a father’s minimum obligation with regard to this Misva is to teach his son to read the Torah with the Te’amim (cantillation notes), and explain to him the plain meaning of the entire Humash. The Shulhan Aruch Ha’Rav (Rav Shneur Zalman of Liadi, first Rebbe of Lubavitch, 1745-1812) writes that nowadays, when printed Humashim are available, it suffices to teach one’s son how to read with the vowels and the Te’amim, and the son will then have the ability read the Torah on his own. The Mishna teaches, “Ve’talmud Torah Ke’negged Kulam” – that the Misva of Torah learning is equivalent to all other Misvot combined. It is clear that this is an especially important Misva, and a person is thus required to use his time for Torah learning, to the greatest extent possible.
The Torah commands in the Book of Debarim (6:5), “Ve’ahabta Et Hashem Elokecha” – “You shall love Hashem your G-d,” establishing an affirmative command to love G-d. The Sifri explains that the Torah in the very next verse tells us how this is done: “These words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart” – referring to engagement in Torah learning. Through learning the profound wisdom of the Torah, one achieves genuine Ahabat Hashem (love of G-d). We might draw an analogy to someone who studies an artist’s paintings, and thereby develops admiration and fondness for the artist; or reading a writer’s works, which leads to love and affection for the author. By seeing the genius and brilliance of a person’s work, we develop love for that person. Similarly, by seeing the depth, profundity and wisdom of the Torah, we develop a love for it’s “author,” Hashem. By encountering the vastness and brilliance of Torah, we experience Ahabat Hashem and thereby fulfill this Misva. The Rambam, in Hilchot Yesodeh Ha’Torah (2:1), adds that one can achieve “Ahabat Hashem” by pondering the wonders of the natural world, which demonstrate the limitless wisdom of the Creator. When one contemplates just how vast and intricate the universe is, the Rambam writes, he is immediately overcome by a burning desire to attain a greater understanding of Hashem, and experiences a deep love for Him. These are the two means by which one fulfills the Misva of Ahabat Hashem – Torah learning, and contemplating the complexity of the natural world. It is told that Rav Aharon Yehuda Leib Shteinman (1914-2017) was once in an airplane, and he of course spent the time engrossed in Torah learning. During the flight, people approached him and advised him to look out the window, as the plane was flying over Niagara Falls. “You can see the wonders of the Creator!” they told him. “I am already seeing the wonders of the Creator,” he replied. Learning Torah also shows us the unlimited brilliance and genius of Hashem, and thus brings us to love for Hashem just like seeing remarkable natural phenomena. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the reason why we are commanded to love Hashem is because the Misvot can be properly fulfilled only if we perform them out of love. If we love Hashem, then we will be motivated and driven to fulfill His commands meticulously and consistently. If a husband truly loves his wife, for example, then he will buy her beautiful, fresh flowers, whereas a husband who does not feel such love for his wife will buy simple flowers. Similarly, the more we love Hashem, the more committed we will be to perform the Misvot on the highest standards. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Misva of Ahabat Hashem requires us to try to ensure that our love for all the wonderful blessings in our lives should pale in comparison to our love for Hashem. We are to endeavor to love Hashem more than we love our material possessions, and even more than we love our spouse and children. It is told that the Hafetz Haim lost a child, and at the funeral, he commented that when his child was alive, he needed to divide his love between his child and Hashem. Now that his child had, tragically, left the world, he was able to devote all his love exclusively to Hashem. This is how far the Sadikim went in experiencing love for the Almighty. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Misva to love Hashem is a “Misva Temidit” – a Misva that applies at all times, and can thus be fulfilled at every moment of every day. He adds that we are to accustom ourselves to think about our love of G-d, to the point where there is not a moment of our day when our hearts are not filled with this love. This Misva, of course, applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one violates this command by pursuing material and physical pleasures for the sake of enjoyment, without channeling them toward the service of Hashem. If someone displays love for something other than Hashem, then he has transgressed this command, which requires loving Hashem more than anything else. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that one will be severely punished for this transgression, loving the vanities of this world more than Hashem. I recall that one of my Rabbis when I was young heard a boy talk about how he “loved” a certain baseball player. The Rabbi admonished the boy, informing him that he had just violated a Biblical command. If we say that we love Hashem, then we cannot also say that we love an athlete. We are to direct all of our love and our emotion to G-d. The Minhat Hinuch comments that the Misva of Ahabat Hashem is not binding upon gentiles. Even though they are required to believe in G-d, they are not obligated to love G-d. The reason might be that since Torah study is one of the methods through which one attains Ahabat Hashem, gentiles, who are not obligated to learn Torah, are likewise not included in the obligation to love Hashem.
In one of the most famous verses in the Torah (Debarim 6:4), Moshe proclaims, “Shema Yisrael, Hashem Elokenu Hashem Ehad” – “Listen, O Israel, Hashem our G-d, Hashem is one.” This is understood as a command requiring us to accept and acknowledge that the G-d of the Jewish Nation is the one, true G-d, and there is no other deity in existence. This tenet, of course, constitutes the core principle of our Emuna (faith), the foundation upon which the entire Torah and all of religious life stand. One who does not acknowledge the existence of a single G-d over the universe is a “Kofer Ba’ikar” – an apostate, who rejects Jewish faith, and is considered an idol-worshipper. A person is required to surrender his life for this belief if he is threatened to renounce this tenet at the threat of death. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both males and females. One who denies the Oneness of Hashem has transgressed this Misva, and, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, he essentially violates the entire Torah, because, as mentioned, all the Misvot are built upon the foundation of this basic tent. Such a person is considered to have defected from the Jewish religion, and forfeits his share in the next world. By contrast, the Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes, one who believes and places his trust in Hashem will earn His protection. This Misva is included among the “Misvot Temidiyot” – the “constant” Misvot, which apply at every moment of every day. Anytime a person thinks about G-d’s Oneness in his mind, he fulfills this Misva. This means that a person can fulfill this Misva hundreds of times a day. Even when one finds himself without anything to do, he can fulfill a Misva by reinforcing in his mind the belief that Hashem is the one, true G-d. Minimally, though, we fulfill this Misva twice a day, when we recite “Shema Yisrael.” Through this recitation, we fulfill not only the Biblical command to recite Shema, but also the Misva to believe in Hashem’s Oneness. The Maharam Shick (Hungary, 1807-1879) adds an insight into this Misva by noting the distinction between Jews and non-Jews with regard to the command to believe in G-d’s Oneness. Non-Jews are bound by the Misva to believe in the one, true G-d, but they can arrive at this faith in numerous different ways. Some will arrive at this belief through philosophical inquiry, and others will reach this conclusion by pondering the wonders of the natural world. There are additional ways of arriving at the belief in G-d, as well. Am Yisrael, however, have this belief ingrained within them because of our tradition which we have received from our forebears, who experienced a prophetic vision of Hashem. Our faith, therefore, is an “Emuna Meshutefet” – “a shared faith,” a faith which we all attained the same way, through its transmission from our ancestors. This is why the verse begins, “Shema Yisrael” – “Listen, O Israel.” Our faith is common and shared in all respects; we not only accept the same belief, but we all arrived at this belief the same way. And thus the Torah proclaims, “Shema Yisrael” – that we acknowledge this belief all together, as one, collectively.
As part of the Aseret Ha’diberot found in Parashat Va’et’hanan (Debarim 5:18), we find the command, “Ve’lo Tit’aveh Bet Re’echa,” which forbids desiring for oneself something owned by his fellow. This command is associated with the command of “Lo Tahmod” – “You shall not covet,” but the Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, maintains that these are two separate commands. “Lo Tahmod” refers to one who not only desired his fellow’s possession, but ultimately obtained it, either through theft or by pressuring the fellow to sell it. “Lo Tit’aveh,” by contrast, refers to the desire itself. Even if one never acts upon the desire, and does not obtain the coveted object, he transgresses the command of “Lo Tit’aveh.” In light of this definition of “Lo Tit’aveh,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch poses the question of how the Torah could forbid the experience of desire. How can the Torah demand that a person not desire something appealing and attractive which his fellow possesses and he does not? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers this question by dismissing out of hand the entire premise upon which the question is built. He writes that according to Torah belief, one can, in fact, control his desires and feelings. The Sefer Ha’hinuch derides the “fools” who maintain that human beings are preprogrammed by natural instincts and, like animals, cannot control what they feel and desire. A human being, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, “Libo Masur Be’yado” – has power over his heart. We control our hearts; our hearts do not control us. We are, indeed, empowered to steer our hearts in the proper direction, and the Torah thus commands us to avoid feelings of desire for other people’s possessions. The reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that desiring other people’s possessions is the first step toward theft. The Torah forbade coveting other people’s property as a safeguard against stealing. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this Misva is binding even upon gentiles. Although it is not included among the seven Noachide laws which are commanded to all mankind, nevertheless, it is a subsidiary of the prohibition of theft, which is one of the seven Noachide laws. The Sefer Ha’hinuch draws a comparison to another of the Noachide laws – the prohibition against Arayot (forbidden intimate relationships), which has numerous subsidiaries. By the same token, the prohibition against theft also includes the prohibition against desiring other people’s possessions. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that although gentiles are bound by the prohibition of coveting, they are liable to death only for violating the seven primary commands, and not their subsidiaries. He explains that G-d gave us 613 Misvot, all of which constitute separate commands, so that we can earn reward for observing the affirmative commands and for refraining from violating the prohibitions. Through each Misva act we perform, and each time we have an opportunity to sin but abstain, we acquire a “Praklit” (advocate”), and so Hashem gave us many Misvot through which to earn these merits. As the Mishna famously states, “The Almighty wanted to bring merit to Yisrael; therefore, He gave them much Torah and many Misvot.” The gentiles, however, are given only seven commands, and the subsidiary laws do not constitute independent Misvot. Quite obviously, one who violates this command, and desires something owned by his fellow, is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is not transgressed by committing an action. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, one who violates this prohibition will be severely punished. The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions in this context the disturbing story of King Ahab, who desired the vineyard owned by his neighbor, Nabot, but Nabot refused to sell him the property. The king’s desire led to false charges being brought against Nabot, and witnesses falsely testifying against him and falsely swearing in G-d’s Name, resulting in his unlawful execution. This incident shows the dangers of coveting other people’s belongings, how it could lead to other, exceedingly grievous, sins. Tradition teaches that each of the Ten Commandments is associated with the corresponding commandment on the other side of the stone tablets. There were five commandments on each side, and each corresponding pair of commandments are linked. According to this tradition, the prohibition of “Lo Tahmod” – the tenth of the Aseret Ha’diberot – is associated with the fifth command, the Misva to honor one’s parents. The commentators explain that a child might think to himself, “I wish I had so-and-so’s parents who are so much better than my parents, letting their children do whatever they want.” At the root of Kibbud Ab Va’em (honoring parents), then, is the need to avoid coveting what other people have. Just as it is forbidden to covet other people’s belongings, we must also exercise care not to arouse people’s jealousy and cause them to covet what we have. Today, unfortunately, many people publicly broadcast their blessings, successes and achievements on social media, thereby – albeit unknowingly – arousing people’s jealousy. It is possible that people who do so will be held responsible for the transgressions of “Lo Tit’aveh” which they cause by putting their good fortune on display. It is a Misva not to covet – and it is a Misva not to cause other people to covet. We must therefore be very careful not to put other people in a position where they would envy our blessings and good fortune.
The Torah in Parashat Debarim (1:17) commands judges, “Lo Taguru Mipeneh Ish” – “Do not be afraid of any man.” This verse introduces a prohibition forbidding a judge from refusing to issue a ruling on a case he tried out of fear. The Sifri explains that a judge might be afraid to rule against a litigant because this litigant might seek revenge, such as by killing the judge or one of his family members, or damaging his property. The Torah therefore commands, “Lo Taguru Mipeneh Ish,” prohibiting the judge from refraining from issuing what he thinks is the correct ruling out of fear of the losing party. This prohibition applies only after the judge heard the case and has decided which side is correct. At this point, the judge may not refuse to issue the correct ruling. However, a judge is allowed to recuse himself from hearing a case at the outset, if he is concerned for his safety. And even after he has heard the case, if he does not know which side is correct, he may recuse himself at that point. But once he has an idea of which side is correct, he may not desist out of fear of the repercussions of his ruling. If a student who is training to be a judge hears the proceedings and thinks that the judges should rule a certain way, he, too, must speak up, and may not desist out of fear of the guilty party. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon judges. A judge who, after hearing a case and determining in whose favor he should rule, refuses to issue a ruling because of his fear of the other party, transgresses this prohibition. He is not liable to Malkut, however, because this prohibition is violated without committing an action.
The Torah commands in Parashat Debarim (1:17), “Lo Takiru Panim Ba’mishpat” (literally, “Do not show favoritism in judgment”), which the Sages understood as a prohibition against appointing judges who lack the necessary credentials. Quite obviously, a judge who lacks proficiency in Torah law is prone to ruling incorrectly, and will at times acquit a guilty defendant and convict an innocent defendant. The Torah therefore forbids appointing as judge somebody who does not have the knowledge and expertise necessary to judge competently. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that those appointed as judges must also be men of fine character. Otherwise, the litigant whom a judge rules against will reject the legitimacy of the verdict, charging that the judge is himself guilty of crimes, and thus has no right to decide other people’s innocence or guilt. This requirement is inferred from Moshe’s instruction to select judges who were “Yedu’im Le’shibtechem” (1:13) – “known to your tribes,” referring to men with an upstanding reputation, who are known to have good character traits and are well-respected. Judges must also be “Ansheh Hayil” (Shemot 18:21) – “men of strength.” This refers to meticulousness in Misva observance, and the discipline to suppress one’s evil inclination, as the Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (4:1) famously teaches, “Who is strong? He who restrains his inclination.” Additionally, judges must have the courage to issue correct verdicts that will arouse anger and hostility, such as ruling in favor of the lowly and oppressed against the rich and powerful people who try to abuse them. An example of this strength and courage is Moshe Rabbenu, who fearlessly intervened to rescue Yitro’s daughters from the shepherds who tried taking advantage of them (“Va’yakam Moshe Va’yoshi’an” – Shemot 2:17). Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, judges must be men of genuine humility, just as Moshe was exceedingly humble. This prohibition applies in all times and places. If a person appoints a judge who is not qualified, such as if he was wealthy and influential, or out of nepotism, then he has transgressed this prohibition. The Rambam, in Hilchot Sanhedrin (19:4), implies that one who violates this command is not liable to Malkut. One reason is that it would be very difficult to prove one’s guilt in this regard, as he could always claim that he made an innocent mistake, wrongly assuming that the person he appointed was worthy of the position. Additionally, this prohibition is not transgressed by committing an action, and Malkut are administered only when one violates a Biblical prohibition by committing a forbidden act. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that the violator will be severely punished, because he bears responsibility for every erroneous ruling issued by the incompetent judge whom he had appointed. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that just as the Torah forbids appointing unqualified judges, we must ensure that all positions of public service are filled by competent, worthy individuals. A person named to any leadership post, such as synagogue president, board member, and the like, must be someone with an upstanding reputation, respected for his integrity and fine character, and strong enough to take correct positions even if they will be resented and opposed by powerful people.
The Torah in Parashat Maseh (Bamidbar 35:31) forbids accepting a “Kofer” (“ransom”) from a convicted murderer in lieu of capital punishment. This establishes a prohibition against receiving payment to absolve somebody who was convicted of a capital offense. Once a court ruled that the defendant is guilty of such an offense, money may not be accepted in lieu of execution. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if people were able to pay to escape punishment, there would be little deterrence against criminal behavior. Anybody with wealth, or with connections to wealthy people, would allow themselves to do what they pleased, even severe offenses, and the fabric of society would unravel. The Torah therefore forbids accepting money in lieu of punishment. This prohibition applies even if a murder victim’s close family members publicly forgive the killer and express their wish that he not be put to death. Even then, the court should not accept money to suspend the execution, and the convicted killer must be put to death. This prohibition applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the courts were authorized to administer capital punishment, and it is binding upon both men and women alike. Although only men serve as judges, nevertheless, this command is relevant to women, as well, forbidding an influential woman from accepting money from a convicted offender to use her influence and connections to suspend his punishment. One who accepts money for the sake of suspending a convicted offender’s execution is in violation of this command. This prohibition is not punishable by Malkut, because it falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – violations which can be reversed through payment. The violator who received the money can simply give it back, and therefore, he is not liable to Malkut. In the next verse (35:32), the Torah introduces a similar command – not to accept payment to excuse somebody from relocating in an Ir Miklat (city of refuge). A person who accidentally killed somebody is required to flee to one of the designated cities of refuge and remain there until the Kohen Gadol’s death. The Torah here forbids accepting payment from such a killer for the sake of allowing him to remain in his hometown without moving to a city of refuge. The reason, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because this “exile” serves as an incentive to exercise care and caution to avoid accidentally killing people. If people with wealth could excuse themselves from this exile, they would not have the same level of motivation to act cautiously in order to avoid fatal accidents. The Torah formulates this command by stating that money may not be accepted from an accidental killer “La’nus El Ir Miklato” – which seems to mean, “to flee to his city of refuge.” Syntactically, this verse seems difficult to understand. The Sefer Ha’hinich explains that the word “La’nus” in this verse means not “to flee,” but rather “for the one fleeing” (in other words, “Nus” is a noun, not a verb, referring to the individual who flees). Money may not be accepted from such a person who seeks to excuse himself through payment from the obligation to relocate in an Ir Miklat. As in regard to the previous Misva, this command applies in the times when the courts have the authority to administer capital punishment, and is binding upon both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Maseh (Bamidbar 35:30), “Ve’ed Ehad Lo Ya’aneh Be’nefesh La’mut” – “A single witness may not testify against a soul for death.” According to tradition, this verse establishes a prohibition forbidding a witness who testifies in a capital case from advancing an argument for the acquittal or conviction of the defendant. When dealing with a crime that is punishable by the death penalty, the witness is permitted only to provide testimony, to report what he saw, and is not allowed to voice arguments in favor of an acquittal or a conviction. Even if the witness is a Torah scholar who is well versed in the relevant laws, he is not permitted to give an opinion as to how the judges should rule. The reason behind this command is that the Torah treats human life with extreme care, and thus the death penalty may not be issued unless every precaution has been taken to ensure that the trial was fair and the ruling is correct. As such, the Torah does not allow the witnesses in such a case to say anything other than what they saw. Having witnessed the incident in question, they are, naturally, biased in one direction or another, and, as such, they are not entitled to voice an opinion. This applies only in cases involving a suspected capital offense. When it comes to monetary disputes, the witnesses are allowed to add their arguments in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. However, even in monetary disputes, there is a rule “En Ed Na’asa Dayan,” which does not allow witnesses to serve as judges. Although witnesses in monetary cases are permitted to voice an opinion, they may not serve as judges who decide the case. This prohibition applies only to men, as only men serve as witnesses. A witness who testifies in a capital case and voices his opinion regarding the defendant’s guilt transgresses this prohibition, but he is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition is transgressed without committing an action.
The Torah in Parashat Maseh (Bamidbar 35:25) commands that in the case of an accidental murder, the Bet Din is required to send the killer to an “Ir Miklat” – one of the designated “cities of refuge,” where he would be protected from the victim’s relatives who might seek revenge. Later (32:28), the Torah adds that the murderer must remain in the Ir Miklat until the death of the Kohen Gadol. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the reason behind this Misva relates to the unique severity of the crime of murder. One who intentionally kills, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is not spared from harsh punishment regardless of how otherwise righteous he might be. Therefore, when one kills mistakenly, the fact that he ended up committing such a grave sin, albeit without intention, necessitates atonement, and so the Torah requires him to go into exile. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that exile is a very harsh punishment, as a person leaves his loved ones and peers, as well as his homeland, and must live among strangers. The distress of exile brings atonement for the accidental crime of murder which was committed. Additionally, of course, this requirement serves to protect the killer, as in the Ir Miklat he finds refuge from the victim’s relatives looking to avenge their loved one’s death. Thirdly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah does not wish for the killer to live in the same community as the victim’s family members. This would, quite obviously, create a very uncomfortable situation, and cause a great deal of tension. Even if the victim’s family members are not seeking revenge, they are nevertheless embittered and resentful. As the Torah wishes to create a pleasant, comfortable atmosphere, it requires the killer to leave his town in order to avoid frequent interaction between him and the victim’s family. The killer must exile to an Ir Miklat only if the victim died immediately when the accident occurred. If the victim survived for some time and then passed away, the killer is exempt from the obligation to relocate in a city of refuge. If, Heaven forbid, someone accidentally killed his parent, or child, this obligation applies, and the killer must relocate in an Ir Miklat. If, however, a father accidentally killed his child while teaching the child Torah or a trade, such as if he struck the child to direct his attention to his studies, unintentionally killing the child, the parent does not go to an Ir Miklat. Since the tragedy occurred in the process of fulfilling a Misva – teaching one’s child Torah, or a profession – the obligation to go into exile does not apply. When a person is required to exile to a city of refuge, his Rabbi who teaches him Torah must go with him. This is inferred from the Torah’s command that the killer “flee to one of these cities, and live” (Debarim 4:42). The wisdom of Torah is crucial for life, and thus the word “Va’hai” (“and live”) in this verse implies that the person must be given the opportunity to continue learning Torah when he relocates in an Ir Miklat. If the killer died before reaching the city of refuge, his remains are brought there for burial. The Gemara discusses at length which types of accidental murder require one to exile to an Ir Miklat, and which do not. The basic rule is that if the accident occurred through negligence, such that the killer bears a degree of responsibility, then he must go to an Ir Miklat. If the situation resembles one of “Oness” – extenuating circumstances, where the killer cannot be said to have been criminally negligent, then he is not required to go into exile. The Gemara gives the example of one who kills while climbing a ladder, which is not likely to happen, and one who kills while coming down a ladder, when greater caution is expected. In the former case, the killer cannot be said to have been criminally negligent, and is thus not required to go to a city of refuge, whereas in the latter case, he bears responsibility, and must go into exile. If a Kohen Gadol mistakenly killed, he can go to the Bet Ha’mikdash and serve at the altar, where he is protected from the victim’s relatives as though he was in an Ir Miklat. After he finishes performing the service, he is escorted to an Ir Miklat. This Misva applies when the Jews are living in the Land of Israel, and there is a Sanhedrin. If a Bet Din failed to send an accidental killer to relocate in an Ir Miklat in a situation where this is required, they are in violation of this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that they are liable to severe punishment, as the failure to enforce these rules results in less care and caution in society, and thus leads to the loss of life.
Amidst its discussion of the procedure to be followed in cases of murder, the Torah in Parashat Maseh (Bamidbar 35:12) commands that a murderer may not be put to death before standing trial (“Ve’lo Yamut Ha’rose’ah Ad Omdo Lifneh Ha’eda La’mishpat”). Even if the members of the Sanhedrin personally witnessed a murder, nevertheless, they may not proceed right away to execute him. Rather, they must go through due process, convening a court and testifying. This introduces a general command forbidding administering the death penalty without a trial. The reason behind this command, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that the Torah treats human life with great care and concern, such that taking a life – even that of a criminal – must never be done flippantly, without first ascertaining beyond a shadow of a doubt that this is warranted. In fact, the Torah here in Parashat Maseh (35:25) commands, “Ve’hisilu Ha’eda” – that a court handling a capital case must do all they can within the confines of the law to acquit the defendant in order to save his life. Therefore, the Torah requires granting due process to everyone suspected of a capital offense, to the extent that even if the judges personally saw the crime, they may not execute the offender without a proper trial, so that the defendant could be given the opportunity for an acquittal. An exception to this rule is the situation of a “Rodef” – where somebody pursues his fellow to kill him, or pursues an engaged girl with the intention of violating her. In such a case, one should warn the pursuer, and if he persists, then he is put to death immediately, without a trial. The reason, quite obviously, is because he poses an immediate danger to the person he pursues, and thus in the interest in saving the threatened individual, the pursuer is to be killed immediately, without delay. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when courts were authorized to administer capital punishment for certain violations. If somebody violated this command, and killed an offender without a trial, then the person who killed him – even though he was indeed guilty of the crime for which he was killed – is himself liable to capital punishment. Since he killed the offender without a trial, he has committed a capital offense for which he is liable to death. The question arises as to which prohibition the violator is punished for in such a case. As the Minhat Hinuch discusses, there seem to be two different possible approaches. On the one hand, one might claim that the one who executed the offender is put to death for violating the standard prohibition of murder (“Lo Tirsah”). Since this execution was not authorized, it constitutes an act of murder, no different than any other murder, which is punishable by execution. Alternatively, one might argue that the violator is put to death for violating the prohibition against administering capital punishment without conducting a trial. This violation might in itself constitute a capital offense, for which the person who killed the offender is liable to execution. The practical difference between these two approaches relates to the “Hatra’a” – the formal warning that must be given before a forbidden act is committed, for the violator to be liable to punishment. The warning must inform the prospective violator of the particular prohibition that he would be transgressing by committing the act. Thus, in the case of an executioner who puts an offender to death without a trial, the question becomes whether he is warned that he would be violating the general prohibition against murder, or the prohibition against executing without a trial. The Minhat Hinuch posits that the prohibition for which the executioner in this case would be liable to the death penalty is the specific prohibition against putting someone to death without a trial. Therefore, this would be the prohibition that the witnesses would have to mention in their warning, in order for the violator to be liable to capital punishment.
The Torah in Parashat Maseh (Bamidbar 35:2) commands the allocation of cities for the residence of the Leviyim. Later, we read that forty-eight cities are to be set aside for the Leviyim. The Torah specifies that six of these cities were to be the “Areh Miklat” – the “cities of refuge” where accidental killers would flee and be protected from the victim’s relatives who sought revenge. The Gemara teaches that in truth, all forty-eight cities given to the Leviyim served as “Areh Miklat,” though the other forty-two did not function as cities of refuge in the same capacity as the six primary “Areh Miklat.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates in a different context (Misva 520) on the differences between the six primary cities and the other forty-two. One of these differences is that the six primary cities granted the killer protection even if he was within the city’s boundaries without realizing it. In the other forty-two cities, the killer was protected from the victim’s relatives only if he was aware that he resided in a city of refuge which granted him protection; otherwise, a vengeful relative of the victim would not be liable for murder if he killed the murderer there. But in the six primary cities, regardless of whether the murderer realized that he was in a city of refuge, he was protected from the victim’s relatives. In explaining this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the tribe of Levi was chosen to serve G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and they were therefore not given a portion of the Land of Israel as the other tribes were. They did not receive fields and orchards to till because they were set aside for the service of G-d. Hence, the rest of the nation bore the obligation to allocate territory for them to live in. The Leviyim’s cities were chosen to serve as the “Areh Miklat,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, because they lived on a higher spiritual standard, such that their cities would provide atonement for those who accidentally killed. Additionally, due to the Leviyim’s noble characters, they would likely treat accidental killers kindly. If the killers would be sent somewhere else, the townspeople would be hostile toward them, and might even kill them. The Leviyim, however, were especially refined and disciplined, devoted to G-d’s commands, and could therefore be trusted to deal kindly with those who accidentally killed and now seek refuge. This Misva applies when the Jewish Nation lives in the Land of Israel. The obligation to allocate cities for the Leviyim rests upon the entire nation collectively, but mainly on the leadership, who are in a position to ensure that the cities are set aside as required. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion of this Misva by stating that after we are privileged to return to the Land of Israel, we will instantly fulfill this Misva, and he offers a prayer that this should happen speedily and in our times.
The Torah commands in Parashat Matot (Bamidbar 30:3) that if a person takes a vow, obligating himself in regard to some matter, “Lo Yahel Debaro” – he may not violate his word. The Gemara interprets this phrase to mean, “Lo Ya’aseh Debarav Hulin” – one may not make his words “profane” by failing to fulfill his promise. This refers to any sort of pledge which one makes – such as pledging to offer an animal as a sacrifice, or to donate money to the Temple treasury or another charitable cause, such as to a synagogue. If a person makes a pledge of this nature, and he fails to fulfill his promise, then he is in violation of this command. If, however, a person tells his fellow that he will give him something, and he fails to do so, then he does not transgress this particular prohibition. Of course, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it is a deplorable practice to commit to do something and then fail to follow through, and this transgresses the command of “Mi’debar Sheker Tirhak” – “You shall distance yourself from falsehood” (Shemot 23:7). But the command of “Lo Tahel Debaro” refers specifically to pledges involving a Misva, such as sacrifices or charitable donations. The Sages understood this command as implying that although a person himself may not violate his word, others may violate it. This refers to the concept of “Hatarat Nedarim” – the annulment of vows by either three laymen or a scholar with expertise in the area of Nedarim (vows). A person can seek the annulment of his vow, whereby the people in a sense make his word “profane” by revoking his pledge. A person who declared something Hekdesh (consecrated to the Temple treasury) can seek the annulment of his consecration, and it is then voided, and the item is divested of its consecrated status. As long as the consecrated item had not yet been given to the Bet Ha’mikdash, the pledge may be revoked through Hatara (annulment). Similarly, one who designated a portion of his produce as Teruma, or a portion of his dough as Halla, can have his designation annulled, as long as the consecrated portion had yet to be given to a Kohen. This Misva applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who fails to fulfill a Neder (vow) has violated this command, but he is not liable to Malkut, because failing to fulfill a pledge does not involve an action, and one is liable to Malkut only when transgressing by committing a forbidden act. If, however, a person violates a Shebua – an oath taken invoking G-d’s Name, then he is liable to Malkut even if he violates his oath without committing an action. Violating a Shebua is one of three exceptional transgressions for which one receives Malkut despite not performing an action. The other exceptions are cursing one’s fellow with Hashem’s Name, and Temura – declaring the transfer of sanctity from a consecrated animal to a different animal.
The opening verses of Parashat Matot introduce the concept of the annulment of vows, whereby a vow which a person took can be voided such that he or she is no longer bound to it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, lists the procedure for the annulment of vows as one of the Torah’s 613 commands. This is in contrast to the view of the Ramban, who maintained that this Halacha should not be included in the list of the 613 Misvot. The Torah forbids violating one’s vow, and the absolution of vows is, according to the Ramban, merely a mechanism by which one can release himself from his vow so he can avoid this prohibition. This mechanism, the Ramban writes, should not be counted as a separate Misva, and should be viewed instead as an option given to a person to avoid violating the command to abide by one’s vows. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch references a number of Halachot relevant to vows which are discussed by the Gemara in Masechet Nedarim. He mentions, for example, the notion of “Kinuyeh Nedarim,” whereby one takes a vow using slang. As the first Mishna in Masechet Nedarim discusses, there are several words which are used in place of the word “Korban” (“sacrifice”), such as “Konam” and “Kunah.” If a person declares something forbidden like a Korban, using one of these slang expressions, the vow is valid and binding. There are four types of Nedarim which are not binding, and thus do not require annulment. The first is “Nidreh Zeruzim” – a vow taken only as a negotiating tactic, such as if a seller vows to a customer that he would not benefit from his money if he agrees to sell the item below a certain price. It is understood that this vow was made only as a tactic, to give the customer the impression that he would not lower the price any further. Therefore, since the vow was not meant seriously, it is not binding even if the seller ultimately agrees on a lower price. The second type of vow which does not require annulment is “Nidreh Habai” – a vow made as an exaggeration. If a person, for example, vows that he would never eat fruit “if I didn’t see a million people walking in the street,” it is clear that he is exaggerating, and was simply making a dramatic statement about how crowded the street was. Therefore, the vow is not binding. Thirdly, a vow is not binding if it was taken on error, for example, if a person declared something forbidden if he had eaten that day, and it turns out that he had eaten something but did not remember. Finally, if a person could not fulfill the stipulated condition due to circumstances beyond his control, then the vow is not binding. For example, if a person tells his fellow, “All fruits are forbidden for me if I do not come to you tomorrow,” and he got sick and could not go, then the vow is not binding. When a vow requires annulment, this can be done by finding a “Petah” – a development which the person did not anticipate at the time he made the vow, on the basis of which the vow can be dismissed. For example, if somebody takes a vow that he would move to Israel, but then his wife got pregnant, preventing him from moving, the vow can be annulled on the basis of this new development. A vow can also be annulled if the person regrets the vow, and explains that it was made due to a rush of anger or some other emotion, which he no longer experiences. A vow can be annulled by three ordinary people, or by an individual scholar who is an expert in the laws of Nedarim (vows). A father can, in some circumstances, annul his daughter’s vows, and a husband can annul his wife’s vows if they involve self-denial or affect their relationship. If a person takes a vow whose terms are vague, the stricter interpretation must be assumed, unless the individual explains his intent, in which case his explanation is accepted. A person cannot declare somebody else’s property forbidden. For example, Reuben cannot declare that Shimon’s property is forbidden for Shimon. If a person forbade himself from deriving benefit from his fellow, then, in ancient times, when Torah was taught for free, he was allowed to learn Torah from his fellow, because a Misva is not Halachically considered “benefit.” However, this applies only to Torah She’be’al Peh (the oral law). The written Torah was taught for pay, and thus learning the written Torah from somebody would save a person money, and it would therefore be forbidden to learn this from a teacher from whom benefit is forbidden. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding only upon men, as women are not authorized to annul vows. If a person attempted to annul a vow in a manner other than that prescribed by the Torah, he has transgressed this affirmative command. Although his attempt had no effect, as the vow remains binding, nevertheless, the attempt itself transgresses the Misva to follow the Torah’s procedures for annulling vows.
The Torah in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 29:1) commands that the occasion of Rosh Hashanah must be observed as a “Yom Teru’a,” a day when the Shofar is sounded. This verse introduces the Biblical command to sound the Shofar each year on Rosh Hashanah. The Torah does not specify the instrument with which the “Teru’a” (“blast”) is to be sounded, but the Sages understood that it refers specifically to a Shofar. This conclusion is reached on the basis of a verse in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:9) requiring the sounding of a “Teru’a” with a Shofar on Yom Kippur at the beginning of the Yobel (jubilee year). The Sages inferred from that command that on Rosh Hashanah, too, specifically a Shofar should be used to sound a “Teru’a.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded sounding a Shofar on Rosh Hashanah in order to motivate us to repent and pray on this day of judgment. Just as a Shofar sounded during wartime to motivate and energize the soldiers, similarly, on Rosh Hashanah, we blow the Shofar to awaken us and alert us to the urgent need to perform Teshuba and improve ourselves as we are now being judged for the coming year. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, the “Teru’a” is a “broken” sound, a rapid succession of very brief blasts, symbolizing the need to “break” our bad habits and negative impulses, so that we avoid sin. The Shofar must be long enough that it can be seen protruding from either side of one’s hand when he holds it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the word “Shofar” refers to a hollow animal horn, whereas “Keren” refers to a horn which is not hollow. Any hollow horn is suitable for the Misva, but horns which are not hollow are called a “Keren” and thus deemed unfit for the Misva. An exception is the horn of a cow or bull, which is hollow, but is nevertheless disqualified because it is referred to as a “Keren.” Any sound produced by the Shofar suffices to fulfill the Misva. Thus, if one removes the outer layers of the Shofar, it may be used to fulfill the Misva, even though this has the effect of altering the sound. According to Torah law, the Shofar is sounded on Rosh Hashanah even when it falls on Shabbat. However, the Sages enacted that the Shofar should not be blown on Shabbat, due to the concern that one might carry the Shofar through the public domain, and thus desecrate Shabbat. The Sages made an exception to this rule, allowing sounding the Shofar in the presence of a Bet Din. According to the Rambam, this refers only to a Bet Din of “Semuchin” – judges who received the formal ordination that dates back to Moshe Rabbenu, which has since been lost. By contrast, the Rif (Rav Yishak Alfasi, Algeria, 1013-1103) maintained that the Shofar is blown on Shabbat in any Bet Din whose members are recognized as the leading Rabbis of the generation. It is reported that the Rif himself had the Shofar blown on Shabbat in his yeshiva, where he had a Bet Din. However, even his own students did not follow this practice, and today, clearly, nobody blows the Shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat. The word “Teru’a” appears in the text three times, implying that the Misva requires sounding the Teru’a three times. As the Teru’a must be preceded and followed by a Teki’a sound, it turns out that the Biblical obligation of Shofar requires blowing nine sounds – three sets of the series Teki’a-Teru’a-Teki’a. In ancient times, this indeed was the practice, and everyone would choose which Teru’a sound to blow. The Teru’a sound is to resemble the sound of weeping, but there are different kinds of weeping. Some would blow a Teru’a as a series of rapid, brief blasts (what we today call “Teru’a”), whereas other blew three longer sounds (what we today call “Shebarim”). Others thought that crying is a combination of these two, and so they would blow both series of sounds (what we today call “Shebarim-Teru’a”). In the times of the Gemara, Rabbi Abahu instituted that all three practices should be observed. We therefore blow three series of each combination, for a total of thirty sounds. It was later instituted that we repeat the entire set of Shofar blasts a second time during Musaf, and additional blasts were then introduced such that in total we blow 100 sounds. This Misva applies in all places and in all historical periods, on Rosh Hashanah. As it falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” (time-bound affirmative commands), women are exempt from this Misva. One who does not hear at least the minimum required nine sounds on Rosh Hashanah has violated this command. One may fulfill the Misva by hearing the sounds over the course of an extended period, such as hearing one sound every hour. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this applies only if one did not hear invalid Shofar sounds in between the valid sounds.
The Torah in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 28:9) commands offering a special Musaf sacrifice each week on Shabbat, consisting of two sheep. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva is aimed at drawing our attention to the significance of Shabbat, as the day which commemorates, and actually testifies to, G-d’s creation of the world in six days. This Musaf offering, as mentioned, consists of just two sheep, making it the smallest of all the Musaf sacrifices. The Midrash explains that G-d commanded offering two sheep because of the theme of doubling which features prominently on Shabbat. Just as we have two loaves of bread at the table, we offer a sacrifice that is double the daily Tamid sacrifice, which consists of just one sheep. The next Misva listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch is the Musaf sacrifice offered each month on Rosh Hodesh. The Torah (Bamidbar 28:11-15) requires offering for this sacrifice two bulls, one ram, seven sheep, and a goat as a sin-offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a special sacrifice is required on Rosh Hodesh because the new moon – the advent of which is when Rosh Hodesh occurs – affects many aspects of nature. It is well known that the moon’s size affects the tides, and thus sailors would schedule their voyages around the lunar cycle. But in addition, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the lunar cycle affects the quality of trees, such that those who cut trees for wood would refrain from doing so around the time of the new moon. People also made a point not to perform bloodletting around this time. In fact, it was believed that soaking flax around the time of the new moon would cause the flax to spoil. In light of this effect on the natural world, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah requires offering a sacrifice on Rosh Hodesh to remind us that everything that happens in the world is directly governed and controlled by G-d, and nothing occurs on its own. If Rosh Hodesh falls on Shabbat, then both Musaf offerings are brought, but the Leviyim would sing the song for Rosh Hodesh, instead of the song for Shabbat, to publicize the observance of Rosh Hodesh. The 404 th Biblical command listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch is the Musaf sacrifice required on Shabuot (Bamidbar 28:27). A unique feature of this Musaf is the Torah’s formulation in commanding the offering of a goat as a sin-offering. Whenever the Torah commands offering a goat as a sin-offering, it makes a point of stating that the goat is brought as a “Hatat,” to atone for sin; in the context of Shabuot, however, the Torah simply states that we must offer a goat, without mentioning the word “Hatat.” The Talmud Yerushalmi (Masechet Rosh Hashanah) explains that Shabuot celebrates our receiving the Torah, and G-d tells us that if we wholeheartedly commit ourselves to the Torah, then we are considered to never have sinned in our lives. Our genuine devotion to Torah learning has the effect of purging our misdeeds, as though they never occurred, and so in the context of Shabuot, the day which celebrates our renewed commitment to Torah, the word “Hatat” is omitted, alluding to the erasure of our sins in the merit of our commitment to the Torah.
The Torah in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 28:1-4) commands that a sacrifice be offered each and every day in the Bet Ha’mikdash, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. This daily sacrifice is known as the “Korban Tamid” (literally, “the ‘constant’ sacrifice”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commands offering this sacrifice so that we see ourselves as G-d’s servants. Just as a servant cannot tend to his own needs without filling his master’s needs, similarly, we must serve G-d by bringing Him His “food,” so-to-speak, when we ourselves eat. People would usually eat two meals each day, one in the morning and one in the late afternoon, and so the Torah commanded offering sacrifices each day at those times. This will lead us to reflect on our obligations to our Master, which will, in turn, motivate us to scrupulously follow His laws, through which we will be deserving of blessing. The Torah speaks of this sacrifice as a “Re’ah Nihoah…L’Hashem” – “a pleasing fragrance…for G-d” (28:6). The Rabbis explained this to mean that G-d receives gratification from the fact that we have fulfilled His will. Quite obviously, He does not benefit from the fragrance of a sacrifice, and so this description must be understood metaphorically, as referring to the satisfaction we bring G-d by faithfully observing His commands. Recognizing this satisfaction will motivate us to fulfill all our other obligations, as well, such that we become worthy of G-d’s blessings. The earliest time for the slaughtering of the morning Tamid sacrifice is shortly after Olat Ha’shahar (daybreak). The afternoon Tamid may be brought from 6.5 Halachic hours after the beginning of the day, until sundown. Normally, the sacrifice was offered late in the afternoon, for the simple reason that no sacrifices may be offered on the altar once the afternoon Tamid has been offered. (This Halacha is known as “Aleh Hashlem Kol Ha’korbanot Kulam,” as we mention in the Korbanot section of the daily prayer service.) Only in exceptional circumstances was the afternoon Tamid brought earlier in the afternoon. The morning Tamid was slaughtered in the northwestern section of the area of the Temple courtyard where the sacrifices were prepared, whereas the afternoon Tamid was slaughtered in the northeastern section. The reason is that the slaughtering was to be done in the sunlight, and thus in the morning, it took place in the west, opposite the sunrise, and in the afternoon, it occurred in the east, opposite the sunset. This Misva, quite obviously, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although the sacrifice was offered by the Kohanim, it is, fundamentally, assigned to the entire nation. If the sacrifice was not offered, then those who were in a position to influence the Kohanim and ensure that the Misva was fulfilled, but failed to do so, are in violation of this affirmative command. Whereas the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the offering of the Tamid sacrifice as just a single Misva, the Ramban lists two separate Misvot – one to bring the morning Tamid, and another Misva to bring the afternoon Tamid. These two sacrifices are, of course, brought at different times, and, additionally, they are not dependent on one another – meaning, if one was not offered, the other can still be offered. Therefore, in the Ramban’s view, they should be listed as two separate Misvot. Nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, we are unable to offer Korbanot, but the prophet says, “U’neshalema Farim Sefatenu” (Hoshe’a 14:3) – our sincere, heartfelt prayers take the place of sacrifices, and it is through them that we find favor in Hashem’s eyes.
The Torah in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 27:8-11) establishes the principles of Yerusha – inheritance, specifically, who inherits a deceased individual’s estate, and in what order of precedence. The Sefer Ha’hinuch begins his discussion of this Misva by clarifying that the Torah does not require a person to hold onto all his property and not give any away so that his children will inherit all his wealth. While this is an ideal in other faiths, the Torah does not follow this approach. A person is entitled to use the money Hashem has given him as he pleases, and may allocate his wealth to whichever people or causes he chooses to, even though this will diminish from the inheritance he bequeaths to his children. A person does not have the right to circumvent the Torah’s laws of inheritance, such as by declaring after a fight with one of his sons that he should not receive a portion of the inheritance. However, during a person’s lifetime, he has every right to distribute his wealth as he wishes, as long as the gifts are given when he is still alive. Explaining the rationale behind the Torah’s system of inheritance, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that Hashem wishes for the blessings He grants us to remain with us permanently. Indeed, if not for Adam and Hava’s sin in Gan Eden, which brought death into the world, we would enjoy G-d’s blessings forever. Human mortality makes G-d’s blessings temporary, but the Torah sought to extend them permanently through the institution of Yerusha, whereby a person’s wealth remains with his offspring and within his family, thus, in a sense, staying with him for all eternity. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, in the case of a person who has no children to inherit his estate, it goes to his siblings or other relatives, because, generally speaking, they had played a role in his becoming the person who he was. All people are influenced by those in their close inner circle, and therefore an individual can be said to be a product of his family’s influence. In recognition of this impact that one’s family had upon a person, they inherit his estate if he has no children to inherit his assets. The basic law of Yerusha is that a person’s assets are given to his sons, or, if his son or sons had died, then to their offspring. If there are no sons or offspring of sons, then the estate goes to the deceased’s daughters, or, if the daughters had died, then to the daughters’ descendants. If there are no daughters or descendants of daughters, then the estate is given to the deceased’s paternal siblings, or to their offspring. If there are no paternal siblings or descendants of siblings, then the estate is given to the deceased’s father’s paternal siblings, or to their offspring. If there are no such relatives, then the estate goes to the closest relative. The only scenario in which a deceased has no relatives is the case of a convert who died without children. Everyone born a Jew has some relative who can inherit his estate. It is only a convert, whom Halacha considers no longer related to his family members after he converts, who can die without any inheritors. According to Torah law, a mother does not inherit her son’s estate if, Heaven forbid, he dies during her lifetime. A son inherits his father even if he is a Mamzer (the product of an incestuous or adulterous relationship), and even if he became an apostate, as inheritance rights do not depend on one’s level of religious observance. The Sages enacted a provision granting a husband rights to his wife’s estate if she passes away during his lifetime. A firstborn son receives a double portion. If the deceased left only two sons, then the estate is divided into three equal portions, and the firstborn receives two of the three portions. If the deceased left three sons, then the estate is divided into four equal portions, and the firstborn receives two portions; and so on. A Bechor (firstborn) receives a double portion only from the property which was in the father’s possession at the time of his passing. If the father was owed money at the time he died, the money paid to his estate after his passing is divided equally among the sons; the Bechor does not receive a double portion of this money. A father is trusted to identify one of his sons as his Bechor. He is also trusted to say that somebody is not his son, even if that person had been presumed to be his son. This Misva applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. If somebody instructed before his death that somebody due to receive a portion of inheritance should not receive his portion, then he has transgressed this command. Although his words have no effect, and the estate is divided according to Torah law, nevertheless, he is in violation of this command for attempting to distribute his assets in a manner that runs in opposition to the Torah’s laws of inheritance. As mentioned earlier, a person has the right to distribute his assets before his death, and he may even distribute all of his property, such that none of his possessions would be subject to the Torah’s laws of Yerusha. Nevertheless, stories are told of certain Sadikim who made a point of leaving some of their assets for themselves so that they could fulfill the Torah’s command of Yerusha with those leftover assets. Moreover, the Sages enacted certain provisions for the benefit of daughters, in order to ensure that they would be cared for, such as requiring the sons to allocate a portion of the inheritance for their sisters. In general, a person should ensure to plan wisely, so that his property will be distributed fairly after his passing. Unfortunately, there have been situations where a wealthy person who was not strictly Torah observant during his lifetime suddenly chose to be especially vigilant about fulfilling the Torah’s prescription for inheritance. This resulted in his sons enjoying his wealth, while his daughters were left struggling. Quite obviously, this caused an irreparable rupture in the family. A person should use common sense and ensure to assign assets to his daughters before his death, for their wellbeing and in the interest in keeping the family together.
The Torah in Parashat Hukat (Bamidbar 19:14) instructs that if a person dies in a tent, then all people and utensils in the tent together with the corpse attain the status of “Tum’at Met” – the status of impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 398 th Biblical command the obligation to abide by the laws that apply to this form of impurity, the impurity caused by being under the same roof as a dead body. Specifically, the person or article is Tameh (impure) for seven days, and is divested of this status only by being sprinkled with the purifying waters which are prepared with the ashes of the Para Aduma (red heifer). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 399 th Biblical command the obligation to follow the procedures for the sprinkling of the Para Aduma. The Torah (Bamidbar 19:19) refers to these waters as “Meh Nidda” (“Nidda waters”). It must be clarified that the word “Nidda” in this verse has nothing at all to do with the more common meaning of this word – a woman who has experienced menstrual bleeding. Rather, it denotes “throwing,” as in the verse in Megilat Echa (3:53), “Va’yadu Eben Bi” – “They cast a stone at me.” The purifying waters are called “Meh Nidda” because they are sprinkled upon the person or article requiring purification. The Torah writes in this context (19:21) that “he who sprinkles the Nidda waters shall launder his clothes,” which seems to mean that the Kohen who sprinkles the water onto an impure person or article becomes Tameh. In truth, however, the Sages interpreted this verse differently, as referring to somebody who carries the Para Aduma waters for the amount of time needed to sprinkle them. Such a person becomes Tameh, but actually sprinkling the waters does not render a person Tameh. The act of placing the ashes of the Para Aduma into the water is called “Kiddush Meh Hatat.” This act may be done by anybody, except a “Heresh” (deaf-mute”), “Shoteh” (mentally disabled individual) and “Katan” (minor). If somebody was involved with some other activity at the time he filled the utensil from a fountain, or when bringing the water for the ashes to be placed in it, then the water is disqualified for use as purifying waters. If a person accepts payment to place the ashes into the water, or to sprinkle the water, then the ashes and water become like ordinary ashes and water, and may not be used. One may, however, accept payment for the job of filling a utensil from the fountain. This Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and to both males and females, as both men and women can become Tameh through exposure to a corpse, and then require purification. Someone who had become Tameh and thus required sprinkling, but did not follow this procedure, has transgressed this affirmative command
In the beginning of Parashat Hukat (Bamidbar, chapter 19), the Torah introduces the Misva of the Para Aduma – the “red heifer” which was slaughtered and then burned in order to prepare purifying waters with its ashes. These waters were used to bring purity to people and objects that had become Tameh (impure) through contact with a human corpse. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, which the author wrote for his son, explaining the 613 Misvot and their underlying reasons, writes in the context of this Misva, “Rafu Yadai” – “My hands are weak,” meaning, he is powerless to offer a rational explanation for the Misva of Para Aduma. He says that he is afraid to say anything about the reasoning behind this Misva, which even King Shelomo said he could not understand. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the notion of an animal sacrifice bringing purity in itself is not difficult to understand. A precedent for this concept is the requirement for a Yoledet (woman after childbirth), a Zab and Zaba (people who experienced an unusual discharge) to offer certain sacrifices to fully regain their status of purity so they can enter the Bet Ha’mikdash. The difficulty in understanding the Para Aduma, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is the opposite effects that it has. Somebody who is impure regains his purity by having the Para Aduma waters sprinkled on him, but all those involved in the preparation of the Para Aduma waters become impure as a result of contact with the ashes. It turns out, then, that the same ashes which bring purity also bring impurity. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concedes that some herbal medications have opposite effects, such as cooling those who are overheated and warming those whose body temperature is low. Nevertheless, this feature of the Para Aduma remains an enigma, leading even King Shlomo, the wisest of all men, to acknowledge his inability to understand the reasoning behind this Misva, as mentioned earlier. Rav Yaakob Kamenetsky (1891-1986) noted that from the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion it appears that the Torah specifically intended for this law to be a “Hok” – a command whose reasoning eludes our comprehension. The Torah wanted that we would not have access to the reason behind this Misva so that we acknowledge that ultimately, we observe all Misvot purely out of a sense of subservience to Hashem, regardless of whether or not we understand why they were commanded. The cow chosen as the Para Aduma should be between 3 and 4 years of age. During a cow’s fifth year, it should not be used, but if was slaughtered and burned, then the ashes may be used for the purifying waters. If the cow was younger than 3 years of age, it may not be used, even after the fact, if it was slaughtered and burned. The Torah requires that the red heifer be “Temima” (“complete”), implying that it must be completely red. Even two white or black hairs disqualify the cow for use as a Para Aduma. The cow does not become disqualified if the hairs turn white at the tips. As long as the root of the hair is red, one can cut off the white tip, and the cow remains suitable as the Para Aduma. Another condition which the Torah requires is “Asher Lo Ala Aleha Ol” – that no “yoke” had been placed on the cow. The Sages understood that this refers to any sort of burden, light or heavy, placed on the cow’s back. Even if somebody placed his garment on the cow, the cow may not then be used as the Para Aduma. The cow for the Para Aduma was purchased from the money in the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash (“Terumat Ha’lishka”). The person who burns the cow becomes Tameh, as do the person who mixes the flesh in the fire, the person who places wood in the fire, and the one who stokes the coals. Extreme precautions were taken to ensure that the Para Aduma would remain pure. The Kohen who would prepare the ashes was taken out of his home seven days prior and kept guarded from sources of impurity. On each of those seven days, he would be sprinkled with preexisting purifying waters. All the utensils used for this process were made from stone, such that they were not susceptible to Tum’a (impurity), and the sprinkling was done by Kohanim who had never been exposed to a human corpse. Nine Parot Adumot were prepared from the time of Moshe through the destruction of the second Bet Ha’mikdash. The first was prepared in Moshe’s time, and the second was prepared in the time of Ezra, the religious leader who led the return from Babylonian exile to begin the Second Commonwealth. Seven Parot Adumot were prepared during the Second Commonwealth, for a total of nine. The tenth will be prepared at the time of Mashiah’s arrival, speedily and in our times. The Misva of Para Aduma is an especially important Misva, because many Misvot depend upon it, since we must be pure in order to visit the Bet Ha’mikdash and offer the sacrifices. Due to the special importance of the Para Aduma, we read this section of the Torah not only on Shabbat Parashat Hukat, but also on the Shabbat before the Shabbat of Parashat Ha’hodesh (the Shabbat preceding Rosh Hodesh Nissan), to remind us that in the future, we will need to purify ourselves with the Para Aduma waters to be able to offer the Korban Pesach.
The Torah in Parashat Korah (18:26) commands that a Levi, who receives the Ma’aser Rishon tithe from farmers’ agricultural produce, is required to separate ten percent from the produce he receives, and to give it to a Kohen. This donation is called by the Torah “Ma’aser Min Ha’ma’aser” – “a tithe from the tithe,” and the Sages refer to it as “Terumat Ma’aser.” The Torah commands that the Levi donate to the Kohen “Mi’kol Helbo,” which means that he must give the choicest portion of the produce he receives to the Kohen as his Terumat Ma’aser. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah required the Leviyim to give a portion to the Kohen to remind them of the Kohanim’s special stature. Although the Leviyim themselves were appointed a special role to serve in the Bet Ha’mikdash, they must recognize the unique prominence of the Kohanim, who perform the service of offering sacrifices in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, if the Leviyim would not be required to donate a portion of the Ma’aser Rishon that they receive, Beneh Yisrael might look down on them, and say, “You received only grain; but we receive credit for a Misva.” G-d wanted the Leviyim to also have a Misva to fulfill with their produce, just as Beneh Yisrael have Misvot to perform with theirs, and so He commanded the Leviyim to donate a portion of the produce they receive to a Kohen. If a Levi took his Ma’aser Rishon from produce that was still in the form of stalks, before the stalks were processed into grain, then he is not permitted to give Terumat Ha’ma’aser before processing it himself. Rather than give a Kohen one-tenth of the stalks, he must process the produce and then donate one-tenth of the grain to a Kohen. In such a case, he gives only one-tenth of the actual grain, and not one-tenth from the straw that is separated over the course of processing. If, however, he separated one-tenth for Terumat Ma’aser before processing the produce, then after processing the stalks and producing grain he must give the Kohen the entire portion, even the straw, since it had all been designated as Terumat Ma’aser. If a Levi’s Terumat Ma’aser from a beverage he receives amounts to less than 1/64 th of a Log, then he does not have to go through the trouble of giving it to a Kohen, and instead burns it. The exception to this rule is Terumat Ma’aser of wine and oil, which must be given to a Kohen even in very small amounts, unless the liquid had become Tameh (impure), in which case the Levi can burn it instead of going through the trouble of finding a Kohen. This Misva, of course, applies only to Leviyim, and only when the laws of Terumot and Ma’aserot apply.
The Torah in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:24) commands, “For I have given to the Leviyim Beneh Yisrael’s tithe which they separate as a donation…” This verse establishes the Biblical command to donate one-tenth of one’s agricultural produce to the Leviyim, a tithe known as “Ma’aser Rishon” (literally, “the first tithe”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since Levi is the tribe chosen to serve G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, it is appropriate that the Leviyim receive their livelihood respectably, without having to take time away from what the Sefer Ha’hinuch calls “Abodat Ha’melech” – their “service to the King.” As there are twelve tribes, the Leviyim actually receive more agricultural produce than the other tribes, as each tribe receives just one-twelfth, and the Leviyim receive one-tenth. Moreover, the Leviyim receive their share without incurring expenses, such as purchasing the land, buying equipment, and hiring labor. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because the merit of supporting the tribe of Levi, G-d’s servants, brings material blessing. As the Sages teach, “Ma’aserot Seyag La’osher” – tithing one’s produce brings wealth. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes in this context the Rabbis’ teaching that it is permissible to “test” G-d in this regard, to give Ma’aser and then anticipate the reward of wealth. The command of “Lo Tenasu Et Hashem Elokechem” (Debarim 6:16) forbids testing Hashem, but the Rabbis teach that the Misva of Ma’aser marks an exception to this rule. One may not say, “I am going to observe Shabbat, and let’s see if Hashem makes me rich because of it,” but when it comes to Ma’aser, one may make such a “test.” Therefore, the Torah commands giving the Leviyim a full one-tenth of one’s produce, as one earns wealth in this merit. Unlike Teruma (the portion of produce that one must give to a Kohen), which is sacred and permissible for consumption only by Kohanim, Ma’aser Rishon does not have any status of Halachic sanctity. Once it is given to a Levi, and the Levi separates one-tenth to be given to a Kohen (“Terumat Ma’aser”), he may share the Ma’aser Rishon with anyone, even ordinary Yisraelim. The Torah obligation of Ma’aser Rishon applies only to “Dagan” – the five principal grains (wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats), “Tirosh” – wine, and “Yis’har” – oil. Ma’aser Rishon is required for other agricultural produce Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Torah law requires separating Ma’aser Rishon only from produce which one intends to eat; produce which one intends to sell does not require Ma’aser Rishon on the level of Torah obligation. Produce requires Ma’aser Rishon once it reaches the “Onat Ha’ma’aser” (literally, “the tithing season”), meaning, from the time when it reaches a certain point in its growth process. Generally, this is determined to be the point at which the product can be planted in the ground and reproduce. At this point, even though the product has not fully ripened, it requires Ma’aser Rishon. One may partake of the produce “Achilat Arai” (literally, “temporary eating”) – meaning, as a snack – before separating the required tithes, but he may not make a meal out of the produce at that point without first separating the obligatory portions. Once all the work required for this product has been completed, then even “Achilat Arai” is forbidden. An example is grain which is harvested and then made into a pile. This marks the completion of the work needed for this produce, and thus at this point, tithes must be taken even if one wishes to eat some only as a snack. If produce is brought into the home, then it requires tithing only if it is brought through the front door. If it is brought through the backdoor or a window, then it does not require tithing. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and even to Kohanim and Leviyim. If a Levi grows produce, he must give Ma’aser Rishon. This obligation applies only in the Land of Israel. Outside the Land of Israel, although the Misva of Ma’aser Rishon does not apply in its original form, the concept is still relevant, through the giving of charity. It has been proven countless times that giving a portion of one’s earnings to charity brings wealth no less than giving Ma’aser Rishon brings prosperity. By sharing our material blessings with those in need, we become worthy of G-d’s rewards and are repaid in full.
The Torah commands in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:23), “Ve’abad Ha’Levi Hu Et Abodat Ohel Mo’ed” – that the Leviyim must perform special tasks in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Specifically, the Leviyim served as the gatekeepers, and sang in the choir whose music accompanied the offering of certain sacrifices. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah commanded the Leviyim to serve these roles just as a mortal king has especially hired staff to perform various jobs in his palace. It would be disrespectful, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, to repeatedly hire different people for the various jobs that were needed in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and so the Torah designated the tribe of Levi as the “staff” assigned over the various jobs in G-d’s “palace.” If a Levi accepts upon himself the responsibilities of the Leviyim except for one certain task, he is not permitted to perform any of the jobs until he proclaims his willingness to do all the tasks assigned to the Leviyim. A Levi is allowed to perform his duties in the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of Aninut – meaning, after the death of an immediate family member, before the burial. The choir of Leviyim would sing during the offering of public Ola sacrifices – including the daily Tamid sacrifice – as well as during the pouring of the wine on the altar on Shabuot. No fewer than twelve Leviyim would sing in the choir. Although the role of singing is assigned exclusively to the Leviyim, the playing of musical instruments which accompanied the singing could be done even by Yisraelim. The orchestra that played the instruments consisted of at least nine violins and one set of cymbals (presumably, because the cymbals are very loud, and thus more than one set of cymbals would produce too much noise). On twelve occasions during the year, a flute was added – during the offering of the Korban Pesach on the 14 th of Nissan, on the first day of Pesach, during the offering of Pesach Sheni on the 14 th of Iyar, on Shabuot, and on each of the eight days of Sukkot. The flute is to be played even when these occasions fall on Shabbat. A Levi does not join the choir until he has undergone five years of training. The Sages infer from this Halacha that if a student does not succeed in his Torah learning after five years, then it can be presumed that he will not succeed thereafter. Whereas Kohanim become disqualified from performing their duties in the Bet Ha’mikdash if they develop a physical blemish, this is not true of Leviyim; a Levi with a physical blemish may perform his duties. A Levi likewise does not become disqualified when he reaches old age. Although the Torah says that a Levi serves only until the age of 50, this applied only to the Leviyim’s service in the Mishkan; in the Bet Ha’mikdash, Leviyim may serve even beyond the age of 50. A Levi becomes disqualified from serving in the choir once his voice is not strong enough to sing properly, at which point he leaves the choir and becomes a gatekeeper. In concluding his discussion of this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch – who wrote this book for his son – explains to his son that he elaborated on this Misva because the Bet Ha’mikdash will, hopefully, soon be rebuilt, whereupon “you will need” to know this information. Meaning, the author of the Sefer Ha’hinuch was a Levi, and thus expressed to his son the hope that they would soon have the privilege of fulfilling this Misva in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Likewise, in the introduction to this work, the author – who never says his name – identifies himself as “a Jewish man from the house of Levi, a Barcelonan,” clearly stating that he was a Levi. Indeed, some have suggested that the author was the Ra’a – Rav Aharon Ha’levi (13 th century), who was a Levi. A Levi who refuses to preform his duties in the Bet Ha’mikdash is in violation of this affirmative command, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that he is deserving of harsh punishment for giving the impression that he has no interest in serving G-d.
The Torah in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:18) commands that a person’s firstborn ox, sheep or goat is considered sacred, and must not be redeemed. Whereas a firstborn child is redeemed from a Kohen, a firstborn kosher animal may not be redeemed, and must be given to a Kohen. A firstborn kosher animal differs in this regard from a firstborn donkey, which may be redeemed, as the Torah discusses elsewhere. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes in a different context, the Torah commands us to give firstborn animals to a Kohen in order to heighten our awareness of the fact that everything we have has been given to us by Hashem. By giving the first animal to G-d, we are reminded that we do not actually own anything, as everything has been mercifully granted to us by G-d as a gift. If we would redeem the firstborn animal, then its sacred status would have less of an impact upon us, and so the Torah forbade redeeming the firstborn animal, requiring us to instead give it to a Kohen. After the Bechor (firstborn) is given to a Kohen, the Kohen must offer it as a sacrifice. However, once the animal develops a Mum (disqualifying blemish), the Kohen is permitted to eat or sell the animal. A blemished Bechor may be sold even to a gentile. Nowadays, when the Bechor cannot be offered as a sacrifice, the Kohen may sell it immediately, even before it develops a Mum. However, even nowadays, he cannot eat the Bechor unless it has become blemished. This Misva applies in the Land of Israel, and even nowadays. It is binding upon Kohanim, Leviyim and Yisraelim. If one attempts to redeem his Bechor by transferring its sanctity onto money, the redemption is ineffective, but he has nevertheless transgressed this Biblical prohibition. Even though he has not altered the animal’s status, the attempt to effect a Pidyon (redemption) itself violates this command. The person is not liable to Malkut, however, because the Pidyon is done verbally, without performing an action, and Malkut are administered only if one transgresses a Biblical command through an action.
The Torah commands in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:15), “Ach Pado Tifdeh Et Bechor Ha’adam” – that one must redeem his firstborn son. This refers to a case where a woman’s first child is a boy, regardless of whether or not this child is the father’s firstborn. The Torah speaks here of a “Peter Rehem” – “first issue of the womb,” and thus this obligation applies when a woman’s first child is a boy. This Misva, which is referred to as “Pidyon Ha’ben” – “the redemption of the son,” takes effect thirty days after the infant’s birth, when it has been ascertained that he is not a “Nefel” (child who dies soon after birth). The Torah requires performing the Pidyon from the time the child is thirty days old; it does not specify a time by which this obligation must be fulfilled. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Pidyon should be performed immediately after thirty days, without delay. This is, indeed, our practice – to perform the Misva immediately at the first opportunity, rather than delay it to a more convenient time like Sunday or a legal holiday. The obligation of Pidyon Ha’ben rests upon the father. The mother does not bear the obligation to redeem her son, because firstborn women do not require a Pidyon Ha’ben after birth. If the father fails to redeem his son, it becomes the child’s obligation when he reaches the age of Bar Misva, though even then, the father can still redeem the child. The redemption is done with an amount of money equivalent to five Sela’im, or with objects of value worth this amount. The Misva cannot be fulfilled by transferring real state, servants, or Shetarot (legal documents authorizing the collection of debts). This money may be divided among several Kohanim, such as by giving one Sela to five different Kohanim. As long as the tribe of Kohanim receives a total of five Sela’im, the obligation has been fulfilled. The money must be paid to a Kohen; the Misva is not fulfilled if the money is given to a Kohen’s daughter. The Kohen may return the money to the father after the Pidyon if he so wishes, as long as the father did not condition the payment from the outset on the Kohen’s returning it to him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here describes in detail the procedure for the Pidyon Ha’ben ceremony. He writes that a cup of wine and Hadasim are brought in honor of the event, and the Kohen recites the Berachot over the wine and over the fragrance of the Hadasim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then proceeds to present the text of a Beracha which was customary for the Kohen to recite before the Pidyon. This Beracha does not appear in the Gemara, and was, apparently, instituted during the period of Geonim. We no longer have the custom to recite this Beracha, but it is nevertheless significant in that it gives us a sense of the meaning of this Misva and its underlying concepts. This Beracha reads as follows (for the Hebrew text, listen to audio recording): Blessed are You, Hashem…who consecrated the fetus in his mother’s womb, and forty days [after conception] divided him into 248 limbs, and thereafter blew a soul within him, as it is written, “He blew within his nostrils” (Bereshit 2:7); He clothed him with skin and flesh, and covered him with bones and sinews, as it is written, “You clothe me in skin and flesh, and You cover me with bones and sinews” (Iyob 10:11); and He provided for him food and drink, honey and milk in which to delight, and appointed for him two ministering angels to guard him inside his mother’s womb, as it is written, “Life and kindness…” (Iyob 10:12). His mother says: This is my firstborn son, with whom the Almighty opened the doors of my belly. His father says: This is my firstborn son, and I am commanded to redeem him, as it says, “And every firstborn person among your children shall you redeem” (Shemot 13:13). May it be the will before You, Hashem my G-d, that just as You granted his father the privilege to redeem, so will You grant him the privilege [to raise him] to Torah, the wedding canopy, and good deeds. Blessed are You, who sanctifies the firstborn of Israel with regard to their redemption. The father then recites the Beracha, “Asher Kideshanu Be’misvotav Ve’sivanu Al Pidyon Ha’ben,” followed by the Beracha of “She’hehiyanu.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites a custom mentioned by the Ramban – which we follow today, as well – that the Kohen turns to the father and asks, “Which is dearer to you – your son, or these five Sela’im?” The father then responds, “My son is dearer to me.” (Of course, the father does not have a choice of whether or not to redeem his son; he bears a Torah obligation to perform the redemption.) The Kohen then takes the money from the father, places it over the father’s head, and proclaims, “This is in place of this; this is in exchange for this… This goes to the Kohen, and this child shall go to life, Torah, and fear of Heaven. May it be His will that just as he was brought to redemption, so shall he be brought to Torah, the wedding canopy, and good deeds; and let us say, ‘Amen’.” After the Pidyon Ha’ben, the Kohen blesses the child with Birkat Kohanim. This Misva applies in all places and at all times. As mentioned, it is binding only upon the father of a firstborn boy. This Misva does not apply if the father is a Kohen or a Levi, or if the mother is the daughter of a Kohen or a Levi. If a father failed to redeem his firstborn son, and he died without doing so, then he has neglected this affirmative command.
The Torah commands the Kohanim and Leviyim in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:5), “U’shmartem Et Mishmeret Ha’kodesh” (“You shall stand guard at the Sanctuary”), establishing a command to guard the Bet Ha’mikdash. Now this command has already been presented in the previous verse – “Ve’shameru Et Mishmeret Ohel Mo’ed” – and the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists that requirement as the 388 th Biblical command. This second verse is understood as introducing a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition), forbidding the Kohanim and Leviyim from neglecting their duties and failing to stand guard. As mentioned in our discussion of Misva #388, the Kohanim and Leviyim were to stand guard not to protect the Bet Ha’mikdash from thieves or marauders, but rather as a display of honor. Needless to say, G-d does not need human beings to protect His Sanctuary; the guards were present to lend an aura of respect and reverence for the sacred site, just as guards stand at palaces and other important places. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here addresses the question of why the earlier verse – “Ve’shameru Et Mishmeret Ohel Mo’ed” – is understood as introducing a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command), whereas this second verse is viewed as establishing a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. On what basis, he asks, did the Sages decide which verse introduces which command? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that Misvot Lo Ta’aseh are stricter than Misvot Aseh, in that one is liable to punishment for transgressing a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, but not for neglecting a Misvat Aseh (with several exceptions). Therefore, when it comes to the two commands to guard the Bet Ha’mikdash, the verse which is formulated in stricter terms is understood as referring to a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, and the verse which is formulated in milder terms refers to a Misvat Aseh. The second verse is written in the second person – “U’shmartem” (“You shall guard”) – which is a stronger, more direct formulation than the third person form used in the first verse – “Ve’shameru” (“They shall guard”). On this basis, the Sages understood that the first verse introduces a Misvat Aseh and the second verse introduces a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. In any event, if the Kohanim and Leviyim fail to guard the Bet Ha’mikdash as required, then they are guilty of transgressing both a Misvat Aseh and a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. They are not liable to Malkut, however, because this violation is committed passively, through inaction, by failing to perform a required act, and Malkut are administered only when one transgresses a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh by performing a forbidden action.
The Torah commands in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:4), “Ve’zar Lo Yikrab Alechem” – that a “foreigner,” a non-Kohen, is forbidden from performing certain Abodot (rituals in the Bet Ha’mikdash) which are assigned exclusively to the Kohanim. The Sages explained that these include all stages of offering a sacrifice beginning with the stage of “Kabbala” – receiving the blood when the animal is slaughtered. The Shehita (slaughtering) itself, however, is permissible for a Zar (non-Kohen), even Le’hatehila (optimally; meaning, not only is the sacrifice valid after the fact if it was slaughtered by a Zar, but this may be planned from the outset). Another Aboda which is permissible for a Zar is bringing the wood to the altar. According to the Rambam, a Zar is allowed also to kindle the Menorah. The cleaning and preparing of the lamps must be done by Kohanim, but, in the Rambam’s view, the lighting itself may be done by a Zar. The Rambam writes that a Kohen can bring the Menorah into the area where non-Kohanim are permitted, and have a non-Kohen kindle the Menorah there. The Kohen would then bring the Menorah to its place inside the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows this opinion. There are four Abodot for which a Zar is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hand of G-d, as opposed to execution by the court) for violating this prohibition. They are: 1) Zerikat Ha’dam – sprinkling the sacrificial blood on the altar; 2) Hakraba – placing the required portions of the animal, or of the grain offering, on the altar; 3) Haktarat Ha’ketoret – offering incense on the altar inside the Bet Ha’mikdash; 4) Nisuch – pouring the libations (either wine or water) on the altar. This prohibition applies to both males and females. In principle, it applies even nowadays, as the Rambam ruled that the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash retains its sanctity even after its destruction, such that, fundamentally, sacrifices can be offered at the site even today. (It goes without saying that for several practical reasons, this cannot be done.) Theoretically, then, a non-Kohen could violate this command even nowadays by performing the Kohanim’s service at the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah in Parashat Bamidbar (4:19) commands that the Leviyim should be assigned “Ish Ish Al Masa’o” – each person to a particular job. Later in the Book of Bamidbar (18:3), the Torah forbids the Leviyim from approaching the altar and other areas of the Mikdash to serve, a role assigned exclusively to the Kohanim (“Ach El Keleh Ha’kodesh Ve’el Ha’mizbe’ah Lo Yikrabu”). The Sages understood these verses as establishing a prohibition for a Kohen or a Levi to perform a task assigned to a different Kohen or Levi. The Gemara (Arachin 11b) tells the story of Rabbi Yehoshua Bar Hananya, a Levi, who volunteered to help his fellow Levi, Rabbi Yohanan Ben Gudgoda, with his job locking the gates of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Rabbi Yohanan admonished him to step back, as he would otherwise be liable to capital punishment for violating this Biblical command. This story demonstrates that it is forbidden not only for a Levi to perform a Kohen’s role, but also for a Levi to perform a fellow Levi’s role. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah introduced this prohibition because very often, when a job is assigned to two people, it ends up not getting done, as each assumes that the other will tend to it. Indeed, the Gemara (Baba Batra 24b) states, “A pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold” – meaning, if a pot of raw food is given to two chefs to cook, it remains uncooked. Therefore, in order to ensure that none of the duties in the Mikdash are neglected, the Torah commanded each Kohen and each Levi to tend to his assigned role, and not perform anybody else’s job. This way, each Kohen and Levi knows that he and only he is responsible for completing his assigned task. In all, fifteen areas of responsibility were assigned to the Kohanim and Leviyim: 1) An official was assigned to keep track of the time, and make sure that everything was done at its proper time. 2) An official was assigned to supervise the opening and locking of the gates. 3) An official oversaw the watchmen who were stationed at various posts inside and outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. 4) An official was in charge of the Meshorerim – the Leviyim who would sing and play music during the offering of sacrifices. 5) An official was assigned over the lottery which was held to determine which Kohen would perform the various rituals in the Bet Ha’mikdash that day. 6-7) A cashier was appointed to receive money from people who needed to purchase wine for the libations accompanying the sacrifices, and would give them a certificate with which to obtain wine. This certificate was then given to another official, who was in charge of giving wine to the customers. 8-9) Similarly, two officials were assigned to sell birds to those who needed to offer bird sacrifices, such as women after childbirth. One official would receive the money, and another would give the birds to the customers. 10) A physician was on call to care for Kohanim who fell ill. 11) Well-diggers were appointed to prepare wells and ensure a sufficient supply of fresh water for pilgrims coming to Jerusalem. 12) There was a family in charge of baking the Lehem Ha’panim, the special bread placed on the Shulhan (table) inside the Bet Ha’mikdash. 13) Another family was in charge of preparing the Ketoret, the incense offered on the altar inside the Bet Ha’mikdash. 14) There was also a family in charge of weaving the Parochet, the cloth partition that divided between the two areas inside the Bet Ha’mikdash. 15) Yet another family was in charge of preparing the special garments worn by the Kohanim. Once somebody was assigned to one of these jobs, he was not permitted to do a different job. This prohibition applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and to the Kohanim and Leviyim. A Levi who does a Kohen’s job, or a job assigned to other Leviyim but not to him, is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death by G-d’s hand, as opposed to execution by the court). A Kohen who does a job assigned to a Levi has transgressed this Biblical command, but is liable to Malkut, not to death. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, if a Kohen does a job assigned to a different Kohen, then he is indeed liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim.
The Torah commands in Parashat Korah (Bamidbar 18:4), “Ve’shameru Et Mishmeret Ohel Mo’ed” – that the Kohanim and Leviyim are required to guard the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commands guarding the Bet Ha’mikdash not for the purpose of protecting it from thieves and the like, but rather as a display of honor to the sacred site. It goes without saying that G-d is capable of protecting His “home” from burglars and other criminals. But having guards stationed around the Bet Ha’mikdash lends it an aura of grandeur and majesty, just as royal palaces have watchmen. The Torah requires guarding the Bet Ha’mikdash in order to raise its esteem in the eyes of the people, so that seeing the Bet Ha’mikdash would leave an impression upon them. There were twenty-four groups of watchmen who guarded the Bet Ha’mikdash each night. Three groups consisted of Kohanim, who stood guard at different locations inside the Bet Ha’mikdash, and the other twenty-one groups consisted of Leviyim, who stood guard at different areas outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. There was also an official in charge of the guarding, who was called “Ish Har Ha’bayit” (literally, “the man of the Temple Mount”). He would go around to all the different guard posts during the night, holding a torch. When he approached a guard post, the guards would greet him, saying, “Ish Har Ha’bayit, Shalom Alecha,” to indicate to him that they were awake. If they did not greet him, then he would know that they were asleep, and he would strike them to wake them up. He was even authorized to singe their garments with his torch in order to punish them for sleeping and deter them from sleeping while guarding in the future. This command is binding specifically upon the male Kohanim and the Leviyim, and it applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. If the Kohanim and Leviyim neglect this requirement, and fail to guard the Temple, they are in violation of this Misvat Aseh (affirmative command).
The Torah commands in Parashat Shelah (15:39) – in one of the sections that we read twice each day as part of the Shema recitation – “Ve’lo Taturu Ahareh Lebabchem Ve’ahareh Enechem,” forbidding “straying after your hearts and after your eyes.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Biblical command incorporates two prohibitions. First, it forbids engaging in thoughts that are contrary to Torah beliefs. Once a person begins pondering heretical ideas, he can easily be drawn to embrace them, and resort to heresy, and so the Torah forbade entertaining such thoughts. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this prohibition includes straying after our eyes, referring to the unbridled pursuit of worldly pleasures. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that this pursuit always leads a person to harmful behavior. He adds, “Bad thoughts are the origin and source of impurity” (“Abi Abot Ha’tum’a”). Engaging in thoughts of indulgence in physical pleasures leads a person to acting upon these thoughts, and thus falling into a pattern of sinful conduct. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives the example of those who become addicted to wine, and then find themselves pursuing other forms of pleasure, once drinking loses its excitement and appeal. Indeed, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch here cites, the Sages famously taught, “Abera Goreret Abera, U’misva Goreret Misva” – one sin leads to another sin, and one Misva leads to another Misva. Once a person pursues his lust, he is driven to pursue another. Those who grow accustomed to indulging in physical pleasures find themselves seeking additional pleasures, and thus fall into a pattern of addiction. The Sefer Ha’hinuch urges us to exercise restraint and discipline, to avoid this pitfall of the addictive, endless pursuit of pleasure. He adds that the more we restrain ourselves, the easier it becomes to continue exercising restraint and living the refined, disciplined life that the Torah wants us to live. Of course, it is permissible to enjoy worldly pleasures for valid reasons – such as eating, sleeping and relaxing in order to tend to the needs of one’s body and his emotional wellbeing. The Torah here forbids the unbridled pursuit of pleasure, for its own sake. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies in all places and at all times. One who engages in heretical thoughts, or in thoughts of the unbridled pursuit of pleasure, violates this prohibition. However, one is not liable to Malkut for transgressing this command, as it is generally violated through thought alone, without any action. Additionally, Malkut are administered only if the violator was warned of the punishment before he transgressed, which is, of course, not possible in the case of forbidden thoughts, as people cannot know that a person wishes to engage in a forbidden thought such that they could warn him in advance.
The Torah in Parashat Shelah (Bamidbar 15:38) introduces the command of Sisit, requiring that special strings be affixed to one’s four-cornered garment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah requires affixing Sisit to one’s garment in order for us to remember our obligations to G-d, that we are duty-bound to observe His commands. When a servant wears his master’s seal on his garment, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this is the most effective way of always remembering his obligations to his master. And so we, too, wear Sisit, the “seal” of our Master, reminding us that we must always be subservient to His will. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Sisit alludes to our obligation to fulfill the Misvot. The word “Sisit” in Gematria equals 600, and when we add the eight strings and five knots, we arrive at 613, the number of Misvot in the Torah. The Sefer Ha’himuch also adds a deeper insight into the symbolism of the Sisit, explaining that it represents the subservience of both the body and the soul to the Almighty. The Gemara in Masechet Nidda (25) teaches that when an infant is formed, the arms and legs resemble strings, and thus strings serve as a symbol of the human being. The Sisit strings include both white strings and strings colored blue with the Techelet dye, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch posits that these two kinds of strings symbolize the body and the soul. The human body was created from the ground, and according to tradition, the ground came into existence through a white substance resembling snow. Thus, the white Sisit strings represent the body, whereas the blue strings, which resemble the heavens, represent the soul, which originates from the heavens. The Techelet string is wrapped over the white string, to symbolize the superiority of the soul over the body. We wear both to demonstrate that both our body and our soul must be subservient to the Almighty. Different views exist as to how many wrappings are made with the Sisit – either seven or thirteen. The seven wrappings represent the seven layers of the heaven, and the Gemara in Masechet Hagiga teaches that there are spaces in between the seven heavens, such that there are in total thirteen layers. According to both views, then, the Sisit strings bring to mind the heavens, thus reminding us of our obligations to G-d. The Misva of Sisit requires affixing strings to each corner of a four-cornered garment. If a garment has more than four corners, then Sisit are required on the four furthest corners. If the Techelet dye is not available, the Misva of Sisit can nevertheless be fulfilled without it, with only white strings (and, conversely, if one only has Techelet strings, he can fulfill the Misva even without white strings). Indeed, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Jewish Nation for centuries has not had access to the Techelet dye, and thus fulfilled the Misva of Sisit with only white strings. Nowadays, there are indications that the authentic Techelet dye might have been rediscovered, perhaps signaling that as we reach the time of the final redemption, we are moving closer toward the fulfillment of the Misva of Sisit in the ideal manner, with the Techelet dye. The wool used for the Sisit strings must be spun “Li’shmah” – with the intention that the strings are being prepared for the sake of the Misva of Sisit. If the wool was spun by a gentile, the Misva of Sisit cannot be fulfilled with these strings. The Misva of Sisit applies only to garments that are being worn. If one has a four-cornered garment in his closet which he does not wear, he is not required to affix Sisit to that garment. In Halachic jargon, Sisit is a “Hobat Gabra” – an obligation that rests upon the person, as opposed to a “Hobat Mana” – an obligation applicable to the garment. It is only when the garment is worn by a person that it requires Sisit strings. The Torah obligation of Sisit applies only to garments made from wool or linen; garments made from other materials require Sisit Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Halacha follows the view of Bet Hillel, that the prohibition of Shaatnez (wearing a garment containing both wool and linen) does not apply to Sisit. The Torah in the Book of Debarim (22:11-12) juxtaposes the Shaatnez prohibition with the Misva of Sisit, indicating that the obligation of Sisit overrides the prohibition of Shaatnez. Therefore, according to Bet Hillel, a linen garment requires Sisit, even though the Techelet strings are always made from wool, as the color of the Techelet is properly absorbed only in wool. Since the prohibition of Shaatnez is not applicable to Sisit, the woolen Sisit strings must be affixed even to a linen garment. Nevertheless, Bet Hillel maintained, when one wears a linen garment, he may not affix woolen Techelet strings, as a safeguard enacted by the Sages. There was a relatively inexpensive dye called “Kala Ilan” that strongly resembled Techelet, and if somebody would dye his woolen Sisit with “Kala Ilan” instead of Techelet, and affix the strings to his linen garment, he would be in violation of the Shaatnez prohibition. Since these strings are not dyed with Techelet, they do not fulfill the Misva, and thus the prohibition of Shaatnez remains in force. To protect against this violation, it was enacted that when affixing Sisit to a linen garment, Techelet should not be worn. Fundamentally, the Misva of Sisit requires only affixing Sisit strings to a four-cornered garment which one decides to wear. Strictly speaking, there is no obligation to specifically wear a four-cornered garment in order to fulfill the Misva of Sisit. However, the Sages instructed that it is proper to make a point of wearing a four-cornered garment so we can fulfill this precious Misvas. In fact, the Gemara teaches that one who ensures to fulfill this Misva will be rewarded in the next world with having many servants tending to him. Specifically, the Gemara teaches, each of the seventy nations will supply ten servants for each of the four corners – for a total of 2800 servants. Certainly, then, it is worthwhile to make a point of wearing a four-cornered garment in order to be able to fulfill this Misva and earn its rewards. Moreover, the Gemara teaches that while generally Hashem does not punish a person for neglecting to perform a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command), a person can be subject to punishment for this neglect during an “Idan Rit’ha” (“period of wrath”), when the divine attribute of justice is in force. As we never know when an “Idan Rit’ha” might befall the world, we are well-advised to pursue every Misva opportunity, including the relatively easy Misva of wearing Sisit. Additionally, the Sages teach us that one who ensures to properly fulfill the Misvot of Tefillin, Sisit and Mezuza is guaranteed not to sin. This Misva applies in all places and times, and only to males. However, this Misva does not apply at night, and thus it falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” (affirmative commands that are limited to specific times), from which women are exempt. Nevertheless, in principle, a woman who wishes to fulfill this Misva may do so. And, some authorities maintained that a woman who volunteers to perform a time-bound Misva from which she is exempt recites a Beracha when performing the Misva, and thus, according to this view, a woman who chooses to wear Sisit would recite a Beracha. Clearly, however, it is not customary for women to wear Sisit. If one wears a four-cornered garment that is made from wool and linen, and which is the minimum size that requires Sisit, and he does not have Sisit on the garment, then he violates this affirmative command. If the garment is made from a different material, the individual has violated a Rabbinic enactment. It should be noted that the obligation of “Hiddur Misva” requires using aesthetically pleasing articles for the performance of Misvot. Accordingly, one must ensure that his Sisit, and his Tallit, are clean and neat. Unfortunately, there are many people who wear the same Tallit for many years, during which it becomes dirty and worn, and thus looks unbecoming. Just as one purchases a new suit every so often, it is proper to purchase new Sisit and a new Tallit every so often to ensure that the garment is befitting the fulfillment of the Misva.
The Torah in Parashat Shelah (Bamidbar 15:20) commands that when a person bakes, he must take a portion from the dough and give it to a Kohen. This portion is referred to as “Halla.” The Sages understood that as this command was given to Beneh Yisrael in the wilderness, where the “bread” they ate was the daily portion of manna which descended from the heavens, this portion constitutes the minimum quantity of dough that is subject to the Halla obligation. In order to determine this minimum quantity, then, we must calculate the volume of the daily portion of manna. The Torah says (Shemot 16:36) that the daily portion of manna equaled one-tenth an Efa, which consists of three Se’a, and a Se’a consists of six Kabin. Each Kab contains four Lugim, and each Log contains six Besim (meaning, six times the volume of an egg). It turns out, then, that an Efa constitutes 432 Besim, such that one-tenth an Efa is 43.2 Besim. This, then, is the amount of dough from which one is obligated to separate Halla on the level of Torah obligation. This is alluded to in the word “Halla,” which in Gematria equals 43, and which ends with the letter “Heh,” alluding to the additional one-fifth of a Besa (as the numerical value of “Heh” is five). The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) calculated the volume of 43.2 Besim to be roughly 5 lbs., whereas Hacham Ovadia Yosef maintained that 43.2 Besim equals 3.5 lbs. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah gave us the Misva of Halla because bread is the primary staple on which people depend for their sustenance. G-d, in His infinite mercy, wanted us to accrue merit through which to earn material blessing, and so He gave us a command which can be observed on a frequent basis, each time we bake bread. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this Misva enables the Kohanim, who devote their time entirely to the service of G-d, to receive their sustenance easily, without having to disrupt their service. It emerges, then, that the Torah gave us the Misva both for our benefit, and for the benefit of the Kohanim. The Halla obligation takes effect only after one adds water to the flour and mixes it to form dough. It applies to flour made from any of the five principal grains – Hita (wheat), Se’ora (barley), Shifon (rye), Shibolet Shu’al (oats) and Kusemet (spelt). One who neglected to separate Halla from the dough may fulfill the Misva later, by separating a portion from the bread after it is baked. If one baked an amount of dough that is less than the minimum required amount for the obligation to apply, and then bakes more bread and places the loaves together in the same basket, they are regarded as a single entity with respect to Halla. This means that if the two loaves together amount to the minimum quantity that requires Halla, then one must separate Halla from this bread. This Halacha applies only if the two loaves are placed together in a basket with a Bet Kibul (receptacle). If, however, they are placed together on a flat surface, they are not seen as being combined into a single entity, and Halla does not need to be taken. The Torah obligation of Halla requires giving any amount of dough; even a small piece separated from the batter and given to a Kohen fulfills the Misva. However, the Sages enacted donating no less than 1/24 th of the dough to a Kohen. For a baker, who earns a living from selling his baked products, the Sages lowered the required percentage to 1/48 th . If a Jew co-owns dough with a gentile, then if the Jew’s portion consists of the minimum quantity that requires separating Halla, he must donate a portion of his share of the dough to a Kohen. Dough that was prepared for animal consumption does not require separating Halla. However, if dough is prepared for both human and animal consumption, then it requires Halla. This Misva is binding upon both males and females. The Biblical obligation of Halla applies only in the Land of Israel, when the majority of the nation lives there. However, the Sages enacted that Halla must be separated even outside the Land of Israel, in order to preserve this Misva. Indeed, even today, Halla is separated from dough, and it is customary to burn the separated portion. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes the custom practiced in some communities to give Halla to a Kohen. Although Halla must be eaten in a state of Tahara (ritual purity), the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, these communities would give the Halla to a young Kohen, who has not yet experienced a bodily emission that brings impurity, or to a Kohen who immersed in a Mikveh to divest himself of Tum’a (impurity). And although these Kohanim still have Tum’at Met – the impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse – the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that according to this custom, Halla may be treated leniently in the Diaspora, where the obligation applies only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). In any event, as mentioned, the common practice is to burn the portion that was designated as Halla. As Halla is required only Mi’de’rabbanan, one may knowingly mix the Halla with other dough so it will be negated by the majority of the mixture. Normally, the principle of “En Mebatlin Issur Le’hatehila” forbids intentionally creating a mixture so that a prohibited food becomes permissible. Thus, for example, it is forbidden to knowingly mix a small amount of milk in a meat dish such that it will be negated due to its small proportion in the mixture. However, when dealing with food forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment, this is allowed. Therefore, one may mix Halla with permissible food so that it will become permissible by virtue of its comprising a minority of the mixture.
The Torah in Parashat Beha’alotecha (Bamidbar 10:9-10) introduces the command to blow special Hasoserot (trumpets) on certain occasions. Specifically, the Torah states, trumpets must be blown during times of war or some other crisis, and also on special occasions – holidays and Rosh Hodesh – while the sacrifices are being offered. However, while it appears from the text that the sounding of the Hasoserot is required only holidays and Rosh Hodesh, the Sages understood that they are sounded each day in the Bet Ha’mikdash during the offering of the day’s sacrifices. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the purpose of the sounding of trumpets on these occasions is to awaken the people so they have greater focus and concentration. The offering of sacrifices requires proper thoughts and intentions, and an improper thought while offering a sacrifice undermines its validity. During times of crisis, too, one must concentrate intently as he beseeches G-d for help. The Sefer Ha’hinuch posits that nothing arouses emotion more than “Niggun” (song), and the trumpet has a greater emotional impact than any other instrument. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah requires sounding trumpets during the offering of sacrifices and during times of crisis, as these are occasions when it is critical for a person to focus intently. This resembles the reason given for the sounding of the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah, which has the effect of “awakening” us from our spiritual “slumber” and drawing our attention to the need to repent. During the offering of sacrifices and in times of crisis, when an especially high level of concentration is needed, the Hasoserot are sounded so that people avoid distractions and remain focused on the sacrifices or their prayers for help. The Hasosrot must be made from silver; trumpets made from other materials are invalid. Each trumpet must be made from a single block of silver which is then banged out to form the instrument, rather than being assembled from several pieces of silver. The minimum number of trumpets blown in the Bet Ha’mikdash is two, and the maximum number is 120. This Misva applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is binding specifically upon the Kohanim. Whereas the other instruments played in the Bet Ha’mikdash were played by the Leviyim, the Torah commands that the Kohanim must blow the Hasoserot (10:8). The Rambam implies that it is only on the festivals when specifically the Kohanim must blow the Hasoserot, whereas on other occasions, they may be blown even by the Leviyim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, appears not to follow this opinion, indicating that whenever the Hasoserot are to be blown, this must be done by the Kohanim. If the Kohanim failed to sound the trumpets when this was required, they have transgressed this affirmative command. Rav Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986), in Iggerot Moshe (Orah Haim 1:169), addresses the question of why this Misva is not observed today during times of crisis. Although we obviously cannot fulfill the requirement to sound the Hasoserot during the offering of sacrifices, as we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash, there seems, at first glance, to be no reason for not fulfilling the other part of this Misva, to sound trumpets during times of crisis. We can make silver trumpets following the specifications discussed in the Talmud, and we have Kohanim who can sound them when, Heaven forbid, crisis strikes. There is no indication that the Kohanim must be Tehorim (ritually pure) to sound the Hasoserot. Why, then, is this Misva not fulfilled nowadays during times of war or other crises? Rav Feinstein answers this question by establishing that the two components of this Misva are intrinsically linked to one another. The reason why the Torah requires sounding the Hasoserot during times of crisis, he explains, is because these instruments accompany the offering of sacrifices. We are to blow the trumpets to invoke the merit of the sacrifices, on account of which G-d would then save us. In the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, then, there is no reason to sound the Hasoserot during times of crisis, because they are not blown in the Bet Ha’mikdash during the offering of sacrifices. Since the entire purpose of sounding the trumpets is to invoke the merit of the sacrificial offerings which are accompanied by these same trumpets, this Misva does not apply when we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash. However, although we do not blow Hasoserot nowadays in times of crisis, we nevertheless still have the great power of heartfelt Tefila which we can and must access whenever we face any sort of trouble.
The Torah in Parashat Behaalotecha issues several commands relevant to the consumption of the meat of Pesach Sheni – the sacrifice offered on the 14 th of Iyar by those who were unable to offer the Korban Pesach when it is meant to be brought, on the 14 th of Nissan. The first of these commands is “Al Masot U’mrorim Yocheluhu” (Bamidbar 9:11) – that the sacrifice must be eaten together with Masot and Maror, just like Pesch Rishon (the Korban Pesach offered at the proper time, on the 14 th of Nissan). As in the case of Pesach Rishon, the Masa eaten with Pesach Sheni must be “Masa Shemura” – Masa made from wheat which was guarded against contact with water from the time it was harvested. Likewise, as on Pesach Rishon, the Marror eaten with Pesach Sheni should preferably be what the Mishna calls “Hazeret,” also known as “Hasa.” One of the reasons why this vegetable is preferred, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is because the word “Hasa” alludes to the fact that the Almighty had pity (“Has”) on our ancestors and miraculously rescued them from bondage. This Misva, quite obviously, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices were offered. It is binding only upon men, as women who could not offer Pesach Rishon are not obligated to offer Pesach Sheni, though they have the option of doing so. A woman who could not offer Pesach Rishon and decides to voluntarily offer Pesach Sheni is not required to eat the meat with Masa and Maror. A man who is required to bring Pesach Sheni and eats the meat without Masa and Marror has transgressed this affirmative command. In the next verse (9:12), the Torah introduces the command not to leave over the meat of Pesach Sheni until the next morning. The animal is sacrificed on the 14 th of Iyar and then eaten that night – just as Pesach Rishon is slaughtered on the 14 th of Nissan and eaten that night – and one may not leave any meat over until the morning. In this same verse, the Torah commands that one may not break any bones of the Pesach Sheni sacrifice – just as it is forbidden to break a bone of Pesach Rishon. Although there are several differences between Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni, these three Misvot mark points of similarity between these two sacrifices.
The Torah in Parashat Behaalotecha (Bamidbar 9:11) states that a person who did not, for whatever reason, bring the Korban Pesach at its proper time – the 14 th of Nissan – is required to bring the sacrifice one month later, on the 14 th of Iyar. One brings the sacrifice on the 14 th of Iyar regardless of whether he failed to offer it in Nissan due to circumstances beyond his control, or intentionally. This “makeup” sacrifice, called “Pesach Sheni,” is a unique phenomenon, one which we do not find in regard to other Misvot. Normally, if a person fails to fulfill a Misva before its deadline, then he has squandered the opportunity. When it comes to the Pesach sacrifice, however, the Torah introduces an extraordinary provision allowing – and requiring – him to make up the missed Misva at a later time. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah required making up the missed sacrifice due to the particular importance of the goal of the Korban Pesach. This sacrifice, of course, commemorates the miracles of the Exodus, which reinforce the belief in G-d as the creator of the universe. When people witnessed or heard about the great miracles of Yesi’at Misrayim, and the splitting of the sea, they arrived at the belief that there must be a G-d who created the universe “Yesh Ma’ayin” – bringing matter into existence out of nothingness – as only a Being who created the universe could overturn the laws of nature and perform miracles. Moreover, G-d also brought Beneh Yisrael into the uninhabitable wilderness and miraculously sustained them for forty years – further proving that He created the universe. This belief, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, constitutes the central pillar of our faith, and one who denies it has no share in our Torah and no portion in the world to come. Due to the centrality of this belief, G-d established that those who failed to bring the Korban Pesach in the proper time should do so one month later – because this Misva, which serves to reinforce our belief in creation, is too important to squander. The Torah went so far as to require a convert who converted to Judaism in between Pesach Rishon (the first Pesach, in Nissan) and Pesach Sheni, and a boy who became a Bar-Misva during this period, to bring the sacrifice on Pesach Sheni. Even though they were not obligated to bring the sacrifice on Pesach Rishon, nevertheless, this sacrifice is so important, serving to reinforce our belief that all matter was created from nothingness, that they must bring the sacrifice on Pesach Sheni. Several differences exist between the observances of Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni. Firstly, on Pesach Rishon, it is forbidden to eat or own Hametz, whereas on Pesach Sheni, there is no prohibition of Hametz. Pesach Rishon is observed for seven days, while Pesach Sheni is observed for just one day. The first and seventh days of Pesach Rishon are observed as a Yom Tob, when Melacha is forbidden; Melacha is entirely permissible on Pesach Sheni. When the sacrifice is offered on Pesach Rishon, Hallel is recited twice – when the animal is slaughtered, and then again at the Seder, when the sacrificial meat is eaten. On Pesach Sheni, Hallel is recited only when the sacrifice is slaughtered. Both Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni override the Shabbat restrictions. This means that the Korban Pesach is offered on the 14 th of Nissan even when it falls on Shabbat, and those who must bring Pesach Sheni on the 14 th of Iyar do so even if this day falls on Shabbat. Both Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni are subject to the prohibition against leaving over the meat of the sacrifice, and to the prohibition against breaking any of the sacrifice’s bones. One of the examples of a person who brings Pesach Sheni is somebody who was Tameh (ritually impure) on the 14 th of Nissan, and was thus disqualified from participating in the Korban Pesach. This applies if the individual was Tameh as a result of a bodily emission, childbirth, or contact with a human corpse, which generates a prolonged status of impurity. One who came in contact with an animal carcass, however, immerses in the Mikveh that day, and then becomes pure at night; such a person, then, immerses on the 14 th of Nissan, and may then eat the meat of the Korban Pesach that night (since the meat of the Korban Pesach is in any event eaten only after nightfall). The other example of somebody who cannot bring the Korban Pesach is somebody who was distant from Jerusalem on the 14 th of Nissan. The Sages explained that this refers to a distance of 15 “Mil” from Jerusalem. The Misva of Pesach Sheni applies, of course, only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices were offered. It is binding upon men; a woman who did not offer the sacrifice on Pesach Rishon has the option of offering Pesach Sheni, but is not required to do so. As such, if Pesach Sheni falls on Shabbat, she is not permitted to bring the sacrifice, since it is not mandatory. If a man failed to bring the Korban Pesach in Nissan, and then did not bring Pesach Sheni on the 14 th of Iyar, he has transgressed the command of Korban Pesach and is liable to the severe punishment of Karet. According to some opinions, if the person was unable to bring the Korban Pesach on the 14 th of Nissan due to circumstances beyond his control, then he is not liable to Karet even if he intentionally fails to bring the sacrifice on Pesach Sheni. Korban Pesach is one of only two Misvot Aseh (affirmative commands) for which one is punished with Karet if he fails to observe them, the other being Berit Mila. This testifies to the unique importance of the Korban Pesach, which, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, reinforces our belief in the concept of creation “Yesh Me’ayin,” that G-d created the universe and everything it contains from nothingness.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 7:9) commands that the Leviyim assigned the coveted role of transporting the Aron (ark) must carry it on their shoulders, and not by carriage or other means – “Ba’katef Yisa’u.” The Rambam, controversially, writes that this Misva is actually assigned not to the entire tribe of Levi, but rather specifically to the Kohanim. Although the Kehat family of Leviyim transported the Aron through the wilderness, the Rambam writes that this was an exceptional, temporary provision, necessitated by the fact that there were very few Kohanim at that time. In the desert, the only Kohanim were Aharon and his sons, and so the entire Kehat family participated in the transportation of the ark. Later, however, when the Aron needed to be transported, this was done specifically by the Kohanim, because, according to the Rambam, this Misva is assigned only to them. The Ramban disagrees, writing about the Rambam’s theory, “Eno Emet” – “It is not true.” Heaven forfend, the Ramban writes, that this Misva changed from an obligation upon the tribe of Levi to a Misva assigned specifically to the Kohanim. In his view, this obligation continued to rest upon the tribe of Levi as a whole, just as it was in the wilderness. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concurs with the Ramban’s opinion. It should be noted that the Ramban agrees that the Kohanim are eligible to carry the Aron, as they, too, are called “Leviyim” (as in the verse in Yehezkel (44:15), “Ve’ha’kohanim Ha’leviyim Beneh Sadok”). He disagrees only with the Rambam’s assertion that the job of transporting the ark was assigned solely to the Kohanim. Explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah is our nation’s source of honor, and it is what distinguishes us from other peoples. Therefore, it is appropriate that the most prominent tribe – the tribe of Levi – should be assigned the task of carrying the Aron, which contained the Torah. This Misva applies only when Am Yisrael live in their land and have an Aron. The Sefer Ha’hinuch observes the custom that was practiced among communities in his time to remove the Torah scrolls from the ark and bring them to greet the gentile king when he visited the town, as a display of honor and respect. When this is done, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, there is no obligation whatsoever to have specifically Leviyim carry the Torah scrolls, as this Misva pertains only to the Aron in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nevertheless, he adds, if a congregation chooses to have Leviyim carrying the Torah scrolls in accordance with the spirit of this Misva, then this is a worthwhile practice.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 6:23) introduces the Misva of Birkat Kohanim – the special blessing with which the Kohanim are required to bless the rest of the nation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that as G-d wishes for Am Yisrael’s wellbeing, He commanded that the Kohanim, who minister in the Bet Ha’mikdash, should bless them. The Kohanim live on a higher level of spiritual consciousness, with Debekut (attachment to Hashem) and fear of G-d, and so in their merit, their blessings are fulfilled. Hashem therefore wanted them to bless the nation for the nation’s benefit. After presenting this explanation, the Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question of why G-d commanded that the blessing should go through the Kohanim, instead of just blessing the people directly. If, indeed, G-d wishes for the nation’s wellbeing, then why does He require the Kohanim to pronounce a blessing, instead of just showering them with His goodness even without Birkat Kohanim? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that Hashem wants us to earn His blessing, to perform actions through which we become worthy of being blessed. He therefore commands us Misvot through which we are considered deserving of Beracha. And thus He required that we receive the blessing of the Kohanim, to connect ourselves with His devoted ministers, through which we become worthy of His goodness. Birkat Kohanim is recited only in the presence of a Minyan. When the Hazzan reaches “Reseh” in the repetition of the Amida, the Kohanim begin moving towards the Duchan (platform in the front of the synagogue). They stand facing the Hechal (ark) until they begin reciting the introductory Beracha, at which point they turn around to face the congregation. They lift their hands and recite the introductory Beracha – “Baruch…Asher Kideshanu Bi’kdushato Shel Aharon Ve’sivanu Le’barech Et Amo Yisrael Be’ahaba.” The Hazzan dictates to the Kohanim the text of Birkat Kohanim one word at a time, and they repeat each word after him. After the Kohanim complete the recitation of the blessing, they turn back around toward the Hechal, and remain standing there until the Hazzan finishes reciting the final Beracha of the Amida, “Sim Shalom.” Six factors disqualify a Kohen from reciting Birkat Kohanim: 1) if he is unable to property enunciate the words; 2) certain physical blemishes; 3) if he had violated certain restrictions that apply to the Kohanim; 4) if he did not wash his hands; 5) if he is not the suitable age; 6) if he had drunk a certain quantity of wine. This Misva applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon the Kohanim. Birkat Kohanim is recited during the repetition of the Amida of Shaharit each day, during Musaf on days when Musaf is recited, and during Ne’ila on Yom Kippur. It is not recited during Minha, because the Kohanim may have drunk wine over the course of the day, in which case they are ineligible to recite the blessing. On a fast day, when Kohanim obviously cannot drink wine, they nevertheless do not recite Birkat Kohanim, as a safeguard against reciting it at Minha on other days. If, however, the congregation prays Minha late in the afternoon, within a half-hour of sundown, then, since this resembles the Ne’ila prayer on Yom Kippur, Birkat Kohanim is recited. The text of Birkat Kohanim consists of three verses, the first of which contains three words, the second, five words, and the final verse, seven words. The Rabbis explain that these numbers correspond to the number of Aliyot called to the Sefer Torah on different occasions – three men are called to the Torah on weekdays, five on Yom Tob, and seven on Shabbat. This alludes to the fact that listening to the Torah reading in the synagogue resembles Birkat Kohanim, in that it brings us great blessing. The Torah concludes its brief discussion of Birkat Kohanim by declaring, “Va’ani Abarechem” (Bamidbar 6:27), emphasizing that it is Hashem who blesses the nation. The Kohanim are merely the conduits of G-d’s Beracha, as He is the true source of all blessings in the world.
The Torah commands in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 6:13-20) that after a Nazir completes the observance of the period which he had vowed to observe, he must cut all the hair on his head, and offer a series of sacrifices. Specifically, he must bring a sheep as an Ola sacrifice, a female sheep as a sin-offering, and a ram as a Shelamim. The haircutting should be done in the Ezrat Nashim section of the Azara (courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash), in the special chamber designated for this purpose, called the “Lishkat Ha’nezirim.” The Nazir should not cut his hair until the door to the Azara has been opened in the morning, as implied by the verse which requires the Nazir to cut his hair “Petah Ohel Mo’ed” (“by the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” – 6:18). The meat of the Shelamim sacrifice is cooked in the same chamber, and while the meat is cooking, the Nazir places his hair into the fire. If the Nazir cut his hair somewhere else, even outside the city of Jerusalem, he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation. Quite obviously, the requirement for the Nazir to cut his hair does not apply if he is bald. The cutting must be done specifically with a razor; if the Nazir removed his hair through some other means, he has not fulfilled the requirement. The restrictions that apply to a Nazir are lifted at nightfall after he offers his sacrifices, even if he did not cut his hair. Failing to cut his hair violates this affirmative command, but does not prolong the restrictions against drinking wine and coming in contact with a corpse. This command applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices could be offered, and it is binding upon both males and females, as both are eligible to become a Nazir.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 6:7) commands that a Nazir – a person who took the Nazirite vow – may not expose himself to Tum’at Met, the impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse. Even if an immediately family member passes away, a Nazir is not permitted to tend to the body or attend the burial. Interestingly enough, a Nazir resembles in this regard a Kohen Gadol, who may not expose himself to Tum’at Met even in the case of a deceased family member. Ordinary Kohanim are prohibited from coming in contact with a human corpse, but are allowed to come in contact with the remains of immediate family members (father, mother, brother, sister who has yet to marry, spouse, son and daughter). A Kohen Gadol, however, is forbidden from exposing himself to Tum’at Met even in the case of a deceased family member. Surprisingly, the Torah imposes upon the Nazir the same level of restriction as that which applies to a Kohen Gadol, forbidding exposure to Tum’at Met even upon the death of an immediate family member. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a Kohen did not choose his special stature; he attained it naturally, simply by being born into the tribe of Kohanim. And, a Kohen generally lives a normal life, not that much different from the life of other members of the nation. A Kohen serves one week a year in the Bet Ha’mikdash, but otherwise, he lives with his family and his community like everybody else. Therefore, since a Kohen lives a normal family life, the passing of a family member affects the Kohen deeply, and so the Torah suspended the prohibition against exposure to Tum’at Met so that he can tend to his loved one’s burial and grieve. A Nazir, by contrast, made the conscious decision to live a more sacred life, subjecting himself to a degree of deprivation, withdrawing from wine, which means he cannot feast and celebrate with his family as most people do. As a Nazir has chosen to withdraw from the normal manner of living and strive for special closeness with Hashem, he resembles the Kohen Gadol, who essentially lives in the Bet Ha’mikdash, withdrawn from ordinary life. Therefore, like with regard to a Kohen Gadol, the special laws that apply to a Nazir are not suspended in the case of a deceased family member. Because of the Nazir’s decision to withdraw from worldly engagement and focus more intensely on his relationship with G-d, the loss of a family member has less of an emotional impact, and thus the Torah does not allow him to expose himself to Tum’at Met even in such a situation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then raises the question of how a Nazir can be held to a stricter standard than an ordinary Kohen, given that his special status is only temporary. Unless otherwise specified, a Nazir is bound to his Nazirite vow for only thirty days. How can this thirty-day period confer upon him a status that is treated more stringently than the status of Kohen, which lasts throughout a Kohen’s life? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that in truth, the effects of the observance of a period of Nezirut will remain with the Nazir for the rest of his life. After experiencing this exalted mode of living, withdrawing from worldly affairs and clinging to G-d, the Nazir is likely to either renew his vow afterward, or, at least, live at a higher level of spiritual focus and intensity henceforth. In this sense, a Nazir indeed resembles a Kohen, who lives on a higher spiritual plane throughout his life. If a Kohen comes in contact with a human corpse, then the period of Nezirut that he had observed is rendered invalid, and he must “reset” and begin his term of Nezirut anew. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the various cases to which this Halacha applies. He writes that a Nazir must begin his term of Nezirut anew if he comes in contact with any of the following: a Nefel (stillborn infant); a Ke’zayit of flesh from a human corpse, even if the flesh had already begun decaying (“Nesel”); the majority of a corpse’s limbs; the majority of the body’s frame, even if it contains only a minority of the limbs; a half a “Kab” of bones; the spinal cord; the skull; any complete limb; a limb separated from a living person if it contains a certain quantity of flesh; half a “Log” of blood from a corpse. Any of these invalidates the Nezirut if the Nazir touched the substance directly, lifted it without touching it, or was under the same roof as it. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women, as both can take the Nazirite vow. The Rambam writes that a Nazir who intentionally exposes himself to Tum’at Met transgresses not only this Biblical command, but also three other Torah prohibitions. Since he violated his vow to observe the restrictions of Nezirut, he transgresses the prohibition of “Lo Yahel Debaro” (Bamidbar 30:3), which forbids violating any vow which one took. The Nazir also violates the prohibition of “Lo Te’aher Le’shalemo” (Debarim 23:22), which forbids unnecessarily delaying the fulfillment of a pledge. Since the individual vowed to observe a period of Nezirut, intentionally exposing himself to Tum’at Met, which results in having to begin the period of Nezirut anew, has the effect of unnecessarily delaying the fulfillment of his vow. Finally, if the Nazir walked into a tent or a building knowing that a corpse was present, then he also violates the separate prohibition of “Al Nefesh Met Lo Yabo” (Bamidbar 6:6), which forbids a Nazir from going under the same roof as a corpse.
In discussing the laws relevant to a Nazir (a person who took the nazirite vow), the Torah commands, “Al Nafshot Met Lo Yabo” (Bamidbar 6:6) – a Nazir may not enter a tent or a building where a human corpse is present. The Gemara understands the formulation “Lo Yabo” (literally, “he shall not come”) as referring to “Bi’at Kulo,” a complete entry into the building. If the Nazir merely puts his nose, or his toes, into a building where a corpse is present, but not the rest of his body, then although he becomes Tameh (impure), he has not violated this command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, addresses the intriguing case of a Nazir who placed himself inside a closed box or container, and is then brought in the container into a building where a corpse is present. Since the container is closed, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Nazir is not considered to have entered the building, and so he has not violated the command. If, however, he then instructs somebody to open the top of the container, or if he expresses his consent to have the top removed, then at the moment the top is removed, he is considered to have entered the building, and thus violates this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Nazir also violates the separate command forbidding a Nazir from becoming Tameh through contact with a human corpse even without entering a building where a corpse is present. If a Nazir entered such a building, or a cemetery, mistakenly, not realizing that he had entered a place where a corpse is present, then he must immediately leave, as quickly as he can, to avoid transgressing this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if the person unnecessarily lingers for the amount of time it takes to bow in the Bet Ha’mikdash, then he has violated this Biblical command. The likely reason why the Sefer Ha’hinuch mentioned specifically bowing in the Bet Ha’mikash is because of the resemblance between this case and the case of someone who mistakenly entered the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of Tum’a (impurity). Halacha in that case requires the person to immediately leave, and forbids lingering for the amount of time needed to bow. It seems that the Sefer Ha’hinuch here borrows the expression “Hishtahavaya Ba’Mikdash” (“bowing in the Mikdash”) from the context of the discussion of a person who entered the Temple in a state of impurity. (After all, it takes no more or less time to bow in the Bet Ha’mikdash than to bow anywhere else.) This prohibition applies in all places and all times – even nowadays, if somebody would declare himself a Nazir – and to both men and women, as both are able to become a Nazir. One who enters a tent or building where a corpse is present has violated this command and is liable to Malkut for violating a Torah prohibition through an action. In the case described above, where a person is brought into the building in a closed container and then has the top opened, it seems that he would be liable to Malkut if he performed an action, such as by gesturing to the person to open the top of the container (assuming the container was made from transparent glass or a similar material). Even this kind of action would likely suffice for the violator to be liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 6:5) commands that one who takes a vow to be a Nazir must allow his hair to grow throughout the period of Nezirut to which he committed (“Gadel Pera Se’ar Rosho”). In discussing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates on the concept of Nezirut and the purpose of this observance. He explains that the human being is comprised of two components – the spirit, which is the primary element of our beings, and the body, which the Sefer Ha’hinuch compares to a “house.” The body’s purpose is subordinate to that of the spirit, and serves only to facilitate our involvement in spirituality. Our challenge, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is to focus the bulk of our attention on the spirit, but without neglecting our body, the “house” of the spirit. As G-d wanted us to fulfill our spiritual purpose through the medium of our physical components, we are to maintain the body and tend to our physical needs in order that it will function property and serve as the vehicle that it is meant to serve for spiritual pursuits. The Nazir is thus considered special, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, because he seeks to limit his physical engagement without neglecting his physical needs entirely. He abstains from wine, which is not a necessity for his physical wellbeing, and he refrains from haircutting, which shows a disregard for his appearance, thereby signifying a diminished focus on the body and the physical elements of his being. This has the effect of subduing the Yeser Ha’ra (evil inclination), and thus puts the Nazir in a better position to fulfill the purpose for which G-d created him. The Torah requires a Nazir to remove all his hair at the conclusion of his period of Nezirut, because this, too, displays a disregard for his appearance, and thus shows a preoccupation with the spirit instead of a preoccupation with the body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch references in this context the story told in Masechet Nedarim (9) of Shimon Ha’sadik, who met a young, nice-looking man with beautiful hair, who took upon himself the nazirite vow. Shimon Ha’sadik asked the young man why he undertook such a measure, and the man explained that he made this decision in order to ensure that he would not fall prey to his Yeser Ha’ra. This response made an impression on Shimon Ha’sadik, who praised the young man and expressed his wish that there should be many more people like him. The question arises, however, as to why, after the completion of the Nazir’s period of refraining from wine and haircutting, he is required to offer a sin-offering for atonement. If he is considered special and sacred for undertaking measures to heighten his focus on spirituality, and to subdue his evil inclination, then why does he require a sin-offering? The Gemara cites an opinion that the Nazir brings an atonement offering because “Si’er Asmo Min Ha’yayin” – he deprived himself of wine. This seems, at first glance, to contradict the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s analysis of the concept of Nezirut, viewing it as an admirable process of diminishing one’s preoccupation with physical enjoyment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers this question by explaining that all people are different and have different needs; that which is a noble measure of moderating physical engagement for one person is irresponsibly extreme for another person. it is thus possible that the Nazir may have extended too far in seeking to intensify his focus on spirituality, to the point where his term of Nezirut is deemed inappropriate. Therefore, in case the Nazir’s period of self-denial was excessive, he must bring a sin-offering to atone for depriving himself unreasonably. The Ramban advances an entirely different explanation for why the Nazir is required to bring a sin-offering after observing his period of Nezirut. He writes that to the contrary, the Nazir requires atonement for ending his observance of a higher standard of spiritual focus. After living on an especially high standard of Kedusha, he now resumes drinking wine and cutting his hair, instead of continuing his observance of Nezirut forever. For this reason, the Ramban writes, the Nazir must bring a sin-offering to earn atonement. If a Nazir cut his hair with a razor, even if he did so accidentally, or under duress, the term of Nezirut that he had observed is rendered invalid, and he must begin his term anew. However, this applies only if he cut the majority of his hair; if he cut less than the majority of his hair, then his observance is not disqualified. Exposure to Tum’at Met (the impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse) likewise invalidates the Nezirut and requires beginning the period anew, even if this happened accidentally, such as if the Nazir was with somebody who suddenly died. However, drinking wine does not invalidate the Nezirut. If a person declared himself a Nazir using a “Kinui” – a “slang” term that refers to Nezirut, his vow is binding. For example, if instead of declaring, “Hareni Nazir” (“I am hereby a Nazir”), one says, “Hareni Nazik,” “Hareni Naziach” or “Hareni Baziach,” he becomes a Nazir, because these terms refer to a Nazir. The same is true of “Yadayim” – meaning, incomplete declarations. For example, if a Nazir passes by a person, and he says, “Eheh” (“I shall be”), then he becomes a Nazir, even though he did not complete the sentence by saying, “Eheh Nazir.” A father is empowered to declare Nezirut upon his child if his child is a minor, before the age of Bar-Misva. Furthermore, a father is empowered to override his young daughter’s declaration of Nezirut, and also his wife’s declaration of Nezirut. This command applies to both men and women, as both can become a Nazir. It applies in all places and in all times, even nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and thus one who declares himself a Nazir nowadays may not cut his hair. However, since the term of Nezirut ends with the offering of special sacrifices, and we cannot offer sacrifices nowadays, one who declares Nezirut nowadays becomes a Nazir forever. He is forced to move to Israel and live there until either he dies or the Bet Ha’mikdash is rebuilt and he can offer the required sacrifices.
One who takes the nazirite vow becomes subject to a number of restrictions, including “Ta’ar Lo Yabo Al Rosho” – literally, “a razor shall not pass over his head” (Bamidbar 6:5), meaning, he may not cut his hair. A Nazir may not remove a hair from his head with a razor, with scissors, or even by pulling them out with his hand. The Rambam writes that a Nazir violates this prohibition only if he removes the entirety of the hair, or most of the hair. If he cut the hair but left enough of the hair that it can be folded, he is not liable for a Torah violation. Applying chemicals that causes hair to fall does not violate this prohibition, but it does violate a separate affirmative command requiring a Nazir to allow his hair to grow (“Gadel Pera Se’ar Rosho” – Bamidbar 6:5). Therefore, a Nazir who removes hair in this fashion is not liable to Malkut, because he transgressed only an affirmative command, and not a prohibition. A Nazir violates a Torah command for every hair that he removes. Thus, if he is given a separate warning before removing each hair, then he is liable for a separate set of Malkut for each hair that he removes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that a Nazir is allowed to scratch his head, because this is not certain to cause hair to fall from the scalp. Combing the hair, however, is forbidden, because this will inevitably cause hair to fall. Although the Nazir does not intend to remove hair when he combs, nevertheless, since this is inevitable to occur, it is forbidden (a Halacha known as “Pesik Resheh”). This is the source of the Halacha that forbids combing one’s hair on Shabbat. Removing hair from the head is forbidden on Shabbat, and thus one may not comb his hair, as this will inevitably result in the removal of hair, irrespective of the fact that this occurs unintentionally. The Mishna Berura goes so far as to say that one who attends the synagogue with combed hair has the status of a “Mehalel Shabbat Be’farhesya” (public Shabbat violator), as he appears in public with his hair groomed in a way that must have entailed an act of Shabbat desecration. After the Nazir completes his period of Nezirut, he must remove all the hair on his head. The Sages understood that even if only two hairs remain, he has not fulfilled his obligation; he must remove all his hair until no more than a single hair remains. If a Nazir violates his vow by cutting his hair, then the days he had observed are considered void, and he must begin anew the period of Nezirut to which he had committed. However, this Halacha – called “Setira” – applies only if the Nazir cut the majority of his hair. Although he violates a Torah prohibition with the removal of each strand of hair, as mentioned above, nevertheless, the requirement to begin his period of Nezirut anew does not take effect unless he cuts the majority of his hair. This prohibition applies to both men and women – as both can take the nazirite oath – and in all times and places. Even nowadays, if a person declares himself a Nazir, he is bound by all the restrictions that apply to a Nazir, including the prohibition against haircutting.
The Nazir is somebody who takes a special vow to deprive himself of certain enjoyments for the purpose of drawing closer to G-d. One of the commands which the Torah introduces in its discussion of the Nazir is a prohibition against eating “Zag” – the peels of grapes (Bamidbar 6:4). The question arises as to why the Torah would go this far in imposing restrictions on the Nazir. It is understandable that a Nazir would be forbidden from drinking wine, which is intoxicating and can thus lead to sin. (Incidentally, the Torah (6:3) forbids a Nazir from drinking “Yayin” and “Shechar.” The Rambam understands that “Yayin” refers to plain wine, whereas “Shechar” refers to a mixture of beverages consisting mostly of wine. Targum Onkelos translates “Yayin” as newly-pressed wine, which has yet to become alcoholic, and “Shechar” as wine which has become alcoholic and is thus intoxicating.) We must wonder, however, why the Torah forbids the Nazir from partaking of grapes, which are not intoxicating and thus do not lead to sin. Intuitively, we might explain that the Torah forbade eating grapes as a safeguard against drinking wine. However, it seems somewhat far-fetched to say that the Torah would go so far as to forbid even the peels of grapes as a safeguard against drinking wine. The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers by positing that in truth, grapes do, in fact, have the effect of intensifying a person’s Yeser Ha’ra (sinful inclination). Even without intoxication, the properties of grapes themselves can strengthen our negative tendencies. Therefore, although the Torah permits eating grapes, in the case of a Nazir, who seeks to exercise particular care to avoid wrongdoing, the Torah forbids the consumption of wine and even grapes, as part of the Nazir’s effort to cling to the service of G-d. The Rambam summarizes the prohibitions related to a Nazir’s eating and drinking by listing five commands, forbidding wine, grapes, raisins, a grape’s pits, and a grape’s peel. The Gemara in Masechet Nazir comments that these constitute five separate Biblical prohibitions, such that one who consumed all five products, and was warned about all five prohibitions, is liable to five sets of Malkut. It should be noted that the prohibition against drinking wine includes drinking vinegar, meaning, wine that went sour. The Torah specifies both “Yayin” (“wine”) and “Hometz Yayin” (“wine vinegar”), but these are in truth two aspects of the same prohibition, forbidding wine, as wine does not lose its status as “wine” even once it becomes vinegar.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 6:3-4) issues a number of prohibitions that apply to a Nazir – a person who took the nazirite vow, to abstain from certain forms of enjoyment, which include wine. The first of these commands is the prohibition against drinking wine, including vinegar made from wine, and water in which grapes had been soaked. The second command is the prohibition against eating a grape, even the peels. The Gemara understands that this prohibition includes “Boser” – grapes that have yet to fully ripen. The third command is a prohibition against “dry grapes,” referring to raisins. One might have assumed that once a grape has been dried, it is no longer considered a grape, and it should thus be permissible for a Nazir, and so the Torah added a separate prohibition forbidding a Nazir from eating raisins. The final command in this group of prohibitions is that a Nazir may not eat the pits of grapes. These commands apply to both men and women, and in all times and places. If a person who took the Nazirite vow drank a Rebi’it of wine, or ate a Ke’zayit of grapes, then he has transgressed a Torah prohibition and is liable to Malkut. All parts of the grape – the fruit itself, the pits and the peels – combine to constitute a Ke’zayit. Thus, if a Nazir ate small amounts of different portions, which altogether amount to a Ke’zayit, he is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 5:15) discusses the special offering brought by a Sota – a suspected adulteress who is brought to the Bet Ha’mikdash to determine whether she had indeed betrayed her husband. The woman brings a Minha (flour offering) which differs in several respects from standard Minha sacrifices. One difference is that the Torah here forbids adding Lebona (frankincense) to the Sota’s offering. Whereas other Minha offerings specifically required Lebona, the Torah forbids including this spice in the Minha brought by a Sota. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that Lebona has the effect of enhancing the sacrificing, by emitting a pleasing fragrance. It is thereafter inappropriate in the context of the offering brought by a Sota; given the unpleasant circumstances that necessitate her sacrifice, it should not be made beautiful and fragrant. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, our saintly matriarchs – Sara, Ribka, Rachel and Leah – are compared to “Gib’at Ha’lebona” – “the hill of frankincense” (Shir Hashirim 4:6). The Sota acted inappropriately, veering far from the righteous example set by our matriarchs, and so Lebona is excluded from her offering to symbolize her having distanced herself from our tradition of modest, dignified behavior, which our matriarchs exemplified. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command is directed toward the Kohanim. A Kohen who adds frankincense to a Sota’s Minha offering has violated this command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (5:15) discusses the Minha (flour offering) brought by a Sota – the suspected adulteress who is brought to the Bet Ha’mikdash to determine whether or not she was indeed unfaithful to her husband. This offering, the Torah commands, must not include oil, which is added to other Minha offerings. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that oil is associated with light, as it fuels candles, which are used for illumination, and oil is therefore inappropriate in the context of the Sota, who committed her misdeed in darkness. More generally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it is fitting for this offering to be simple, crude and low-quality. Unlike most offerings, which should be honorable and impressive, this offering, which accompanies the unseemly process of determining the innocence or guilt of a woman who acted inappropriately and thus aroused suspicion, should be simple. The Sefer Ha’hinuch further notes that oil served as a symbol of royalty and prestige; thus, for example, kings and Kohanim Gedolim were consecrated with special oil, as were the utensils of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sota is to be treated in the exact opposite fashion, and so no oil is to be included in the procedure that is performed when she is brought to the Temple. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes in this context that whereas most Minha offerings consist of wheat flour, the Sota’s offering consists of barley flour. The Sages explain that barley was used primarily as animal fodder, and it is thus used for the offering of the Sota, whose conduct in a sense resembled that of an animal. The Ramban offers a different interpretation, noting that the word “Se’ora” (barley) is related to the Hebrew word for “storm,” and the woman’s offering thus signifies the “storm” which would strike her in punishment for her misdeed. Likewise, the Ramban writes, the special water given to the women was contained in an earthenware utensil – because earthenware vessels were usually broken after they were used, and thus earthenware symbolizes the harsh fate that awaited the infidel woman. And, earth from the ground was added to the water, which the Ramban explains as a warning that the woman would be returning to the ground. This Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only where there is a Sanhedrin. A Kohen who adds oil to the Sota’s offering has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 5:12-15) commands that in a situation where a woman becomes a “Sota,” her husband must bring her to the Bet Ha’mikdash, where she is given special water to drink. The case of a “Sota” is where a husband suspects his wife of having a relationship with another man, prompting him to warn her not to seclude herself with that man, but she is seen going into seclusion with him. In such a case, the husband and wife may not have relations until the wife is brought to the Bet Ha’mikdash and given the special water which tests whether or not she indeed had an adulterous relationship. If she did, then she would die after drinking the water, and thus if she survived, she has been determined to be innocent, and she and her husband may resume their marriage. The word “Sota” means “strayed,” referring to the fact that this woman had “strayed” from proper behavior. Even if she had not committed an act of adultery, she had nevertheless acted in an appropriately flirtatious manner that aroused her husband’s suspicion, and she then violated his warning by going into seclusion with another man. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah arranged a system whereby a suspicious husband’s concerns can be allayed, and he can be reassured that his wife had not been unfaithful. It is a source of praise for Am Yisrael, the Sefer Ha’hinuch comments, that we are given a mechanism whereby this concealed information – of whether or not the wife had an adulterous affair – can be disclosed. This information allows the husband and wife to resume their relationship with strong bonds of love and trust. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this miraculous system was discontinued “Mi’she’rabu Mena’afim Be’Yisrael” – when, unfortunately, infidelity became common among Am Yisrael, such that our nation became unworthy of this miracle. The husband’s warning to his wife must be given in the presence of witnesses, and she becomes a “Sota” if she is then seen secluding herself with that man for the period in which she could commit an adulterous act. The Gemara cites different views as to the precise length of this period, and the accepted position is that it is the period of time needed to roast an egg and then swallow it. As mentioned, if the woman is seen violating her husband’s warning, they may not have relations until she drinks the special water. When the special water cannot be prepared, such as nowadays, then the couple must divorce, and the wife does not receive the payment of her Ketuba. A woman does not drink the water for the same man more than once. Meaning, if she was seen secluding herself with a man against her husband’s warning, and she drank the water and survived, she does not go through this process again if the husband later warns her a second time not to seclude herself with that same man, and she did. If, however, the husband then warned her not to seclude herself with a different man, and she violated his warning, she must go through the process again. Even if the husband warns her repeatedly, regarding one hundred men, she must drink the water each time she violates his warning regarding a different man. If a woman refuses to drink, she is not forced to; she instead leaves her husband without receiving her Ketuba. This Misva is binding specifically upon men, as the husband is commanded to bring his wife to the Bet Ha’mikdash in the case of a “Sota.” The obligation applies only in times where there is a Sanhedrin. A husband who fails to bring his wife to the Bet Ha’mikdash if she is a “Sota” has transgressed this affirmative command. Although he is not liable to Malkut, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that he will be punished severely for failing to fulfill this Misva.
The Torah commands in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 5:6-7) that if somebody commits a transgression, he must verbally confess his wrongdoing – “Ve’hitvadu Et Avonam Asher Asu.” This verse introduces the affirmative command of “Vidui,” to verbally confess after sinning. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that after one commits a violation, he must verbally acknowledge that he had sinned before G-d (“Hatati, Aviti, U’pashati Lefanecha”), and he must specify the exact sin which he committed. One who committed a misdeed for which an atonement sacrifice is required must also confess; offering the sacrifice without confession does not bring atonement. One must verbally confess for sins committed against G-d (“Ben Adam La’Makom”), and also for interpersonal offenses (“Ben Adam La’habero”). In order to earn atonement for an interpersonal offense, one must ask the victim for forgiveness, and in the case of theft, he must return what he had stolen. Repenting without returning the stolen property is likened to “Tobel Ve’sheretz Be’yado” – immersing in a Mikveh while holding a rodent’s carcass, which, quite obviously, is ineffective in divesting the person of his status of impurity. Similarly, in order to cleanse oneself of his sin of theft, the thief must return what he stole. The reason underlying this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is that verbal confession serves as an incentive to desist from wrongdoing henceforth. Verbally confessing that one has acted wrongly reinforces the sinner’s belief that Hashem watches everything we do, and this awareness will help prevent him from sinning again. In addition to confession, the sinner must also resolve in his heart to never repeat the wrongful act. The Yom Kippur service in the Bet Ha’mikdash included a special goat called the “Sa’ir Ha’mishtale’ah,” which was sent out into the desert and killed there, symbolizing the eradication of Am Yisrael’s transgressions. This atoned for all the nation’s sins – both minor and severe, intentional and accidental, for sins that people were aware of and for those of which they were unaware. However, even this atonement was dependent upon Teshuba; the Sa’ir Ha’mishtale’ah was not effective in atoning for sins unless the people confessed and sincerely repented. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that Tesuhba atones for all sins, and even if a person was wicked his entire life, but he repented at the very end, just before his death, his sins are forgiven; all the evil he committed is erased. The Misva of Vidui applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if one did not confess his sins on Yom Kippur, the day designated for repentance and seeking forgiveness, then he has violated this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, “Woe unto a person who dies without confessing.” The Gemara in Masechet Shabbat (32) teaches that if, Heaven forbid, a person becomes gravely ill and lies on his deathbed, he should be told to recite Vidui. Masechet Semahot adds that the patient should be told that many who have confessed on their deathbed ended up recovering, and many who did not confess ended up passing away. The Ramban records a tradition he received from his Rabbis that a person lying on his deathbed should recite a prayer in which he confesses his sins, asks G-d to cure him, and then prays that if he dies, his death should serve as atonement for his misdeeds so that he earns life in the next world. Reciting Vidui when one is on his deathbed is a source of merit through which he will either recover or earn a portion in the next world after his passing.
After the Torah in Parashat Naso commands that Teme’im – people with Tum’a (impurity) – must be distanced from the site of the Mikdash, it then warns, “Ve’lo Yitam’u Et Mahanehem” – “They shall not defile their camp” (Bamidbar 5:3). The Gemara in Masechet Makkot (14) explains this phrase as introducing a separate command – a prohibition forbidding somebody who is Tameh (impure) from entering the site of the Temple. In addition to an affirmative command that such a person must avoid the site of the Temple, the Torah also establishes a prohibition against entering the site in a state of Tum’a (impurity). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command applies to anyone in a state of Tum’a that requires immersion in a Mikveh on the level of Torah law, or a person who came in contact with a human corpse and thus requires sprinkling with the purifying waters of the Para Aduma. It also applies to somebody who immersed in a Mikveh but remains impure until sundown (a state known as “Tebul Yom”); he may not enter the site of the Temple before sundown. If anyone in one of these states of impurity enters the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash, he has transgressed this prohibition, and is liable to the grave prohibition of Karet. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that there are some forms of Tum’a which are not included in this prohibition, and a person with one of these forms of Tum’a does not transgress a Biblical command if he enters the site of the Temple. These include forms of Tum’a that do not invalidate a Nazir’s observance of his vow (which entails, among other restrictions, abstaining from Tum’a associated with contact with human corpses). They also include a person who touched a utensil that had been touched by somebody who became Tameh through contact with a corpse. People with these forms of Tum’a are proscribed from entering the site of the Temple by force of Rabbinic enactment, and if they do, they receive Malkut. One who throws impure utensils into the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash is not liable to Karet, but does receive Malkut. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and is applicable even nowadays, despite the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash. In warning of the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash in the Book of Vayikra (26:31), Hashem says, “Va’hashimoti Et Mikdeshechem” – “I shall lay your Temples desolate,” implying that even in its state of desolation, the Temple still retains its status as a “Mikdash,” a sacred site. As such, the prohibition against entering the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of Tum’a applies even after the Temple’s destruction. Therefore, today, when we are all presumed to have impurity, we are not permitted to enter the area where the Bet Ha’mikdash stood. (Indeed, there are signs in Jerusalem warning observant Jews of where they may not proceed, in order to avoid transgressing this prohibition.) The Gemara in Masechet Erubin addresses the situation where the carcass of a Sheretz (rodent that emits Tum’a) is discovered in the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash. As the Torah forbids bringing impurity into the area of the Temple, the carcass must be taken out of the area. Rabbi Yohanan, as the Gemara cites, taught that the way this is done is by a Kohen wrapping the rodent’s carcass with his Abnet (belt), and then carrying the carcass outside the area of the Temple. This way, the Kohen does not become Tameh, and only the Abnet becomes Tameh. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question of why it should be permitted to actively defile the Abnet in the area of the Mikdash, causing it to become a Rishon Le’tum’a (something which came in contact with an original source of impurity). This will have the effect of bringing, in a sense, an impure article into the grounds of the Bet Ha’mikdash. We would have assumed, the Minhat Hinuch writes, that it is preferable to passively allow the carcass to remain in the area of the Mikdash, rather than actively bring an additional Tum’a to the Mikdash by defiling the Kohen’s garment. Evidently, the Minhat Hinuch answers, the Gemara understood that the Torah prohibition does not apply to a Rishon Le’tum’a. It is forbidden to bring an Ab Ha’tum’a (an original source of impurity, or a person or utensil that came in direct contact with a human corpse) into the area of the Temple, but not a Rishon Le’tum’a. Therefore, causing the Kohen’s garment to become a Rishon Tum’a is permissible on the level of Torah law, and this should be done for the sake of removing the carcass, which is an Ab Ha’tum’a. (The Kohen himself does not become impure by touching the garment, because a Rishon Le’tum’a brings impurity only to food and liquids, and not to people or utensils.)
Join our BIG campaign! Announcing the NEW APP from iTorah.com https://itorah.com/campaigns/ special The Torah in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 5:2) commands that all those who have a status of Tum’a (impurity) must be sent away from the area of the Mishkan. This verse establishes a command requiring one to distance himself from the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash when in a state of Tum’a. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Sages understood that Tum’a adversely affects the “Ko’ah Ha’nefesh Ha’sichlit” – the power of one’s mind, his intellectual capacity. It causes a degree of confusion, as though creating a “blockage” between him and what the Sefer Ha’hinuch calls “the fountains of the intellect.” The basis for this notion is the verse in the Book of Vayikra (11:43) which speaks of Tum’a with the word “Ve’nitmetem” (“you shall become defiled”). The Gemara notes that the word is spelled without the letter “Alef,” such that it may be read as referring to “Timtum” (“blockage”), thus alluding to the fact that impurity has the effect of “Timtum Ha’leb” – confusing one’s mind. The Torah therefore forbade a person in a state of impurity to enter the sacred area of the Bet Ha’mikdash, just as a person wearing unseemly clothing is not permitted to enter a royal palace. In Megilat Ester, for example, we read that it was forbidden to enter the area in front of the king’s palace while wearing sackcloth (“Ki En La’bo El Sha’ar Ha’melech Bi’lbush Sak” – 4:2). Tum’a is, in a sense, spiritual sackcloth, as it makes a person spiritually “unseemly,” and thus a person is barred from the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash when in a state of impurity. There are three different categories of Tum’a, and each category requires distancing oneself from a different region. A person who is declared a Mesora – impure as a result of a Sara’at skin infection – is barred from the entire city of Jerusalem. People who have become impure as a result of bodily emissions (Nida, Zab, Zaba), and women after childbirth, are barred from the Temple Mount, but may enter the rest of the city of Jerusalem. One is impure as a result of contact with a human corpse is permitted even on the Tempe Mount, but must avoid the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash. This command is binding upon both males and females, and at all times, even nowadays, as the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash retains its sacred status even after its destruction. As we are all considered Tameh (impure), it is forbidden even today to enter the area where the Bet Ha’mikdash stood. An impure individual who enters an area from which he is barred due to his state of Tum’a has transgressed this affirmative command, as well as a Biblical prohibition, which is listed as a separate Misva.
Join our BIG campaign! Announcing the NEW APP from iTorah.com https://itorah.com/campaigns/ special In its discussion of Ma’aser Behema – the annual tithe of one’s kosher animals – the Torah (Vayikra 27:33) commands, “Lo Yigael” (literally, “it shall not be redeemed”), introducing a prohibition against selling an animal designated as Ma’aser Behema. After one tithed his herds, marking every tenth animal as Ma’aser Behema, the marked animals may not be sold. They must be brought to the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash in Jerusalem and slaughtered. Blood of the sacrifices is sprinkled on the foundation of the altar, and certain fats and body parts are placed on the altar. The rest of the meat is eaten in Jerusalem either by the animals’ owner or anyone with whom the owner wishes to share it (as we recite each morning in the “Ezehu Mekoman” chapter of Mishnayot, “Ve’ha’ma’aser Le’chol Adam” – the meat of Ma’aser Behema may be eaten by anybody). The underlying reason behind this Misva (as we discussed in reference to Misva 360), the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is that the Torah sought to ensure people’s connection with the city of Jerusalem. The Torah requires bringing several different kinds of foods to Jerusalem, such that a person will find himself having to travel to the city several times during the year. As a result, people will likely purchase property in Jerusalem either for themselves or for family members, thus building a connection with the Torah scholars in the city. This bond with scholars will have a profound impact upon the family, and, ultimately, upon the Jewish Nation as a whole. If an animal designated as Ma’aser Behema developed a disqualifying blemish, then it loses its status of sanctity, and may be eaten anywhere. However, the Sages enacted that even after becoming blemished, the animal should not be sold. The Rabbis also enacted a prohibition forbidding placing meat of Ma’aser Behema on a scale. Thus, for example, if a family eats Ma’aser Behema together, and they want to ensure that the meat is divided evenly, they may not weigh the portions against one another. Placing meat on a scale gives the appearance of selling it, as butchers weigh meat when selling it, and so the Sages forbade weighing meat of Ma’aser Behema. Only the meat of the animal is forbidden to be sold. Other portions of the animal – such as the forbidden fats, the sinews and bones – may be sold. The Rambam maintained that if one did sell the meat of an animal designated as Ma’aser Behema, the transaction does not take effect, because the Torah forbade this sale. For this reason, the Rambam maintained that one is not liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition. Even though an action has been performed, Malkut are not administered because the action had no effect, and the command was thus violated purely through the intent to sell the meat. This command is binding upon Kohanim, Leviyim and Yisraelim, and upon both men and women. It applies at all times, even nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sages forbade designating animals as Ma’aser Behema nowadays, given the risk that one might slaughter such an animal, and thus violate the grave prohibition of “Shehuteh Hutz” (sacrificing animals outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nevertheless, if one did designate an animal as Ma’aser Behema nowadays, the animal then becomes forbidden to be sold.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:32) introduces the command of “Ma’aser Behema” – to tithe one’s herds of kosher animals each year. This means that once a year, one who owns kosher animals must assemble them in a pan that has a passageway with room for only one animal to walk through it, and have the animal pass through. (The mother is brought outside the pen so that the young animals will leave the pen to go to her.) The owner counts each animal, and he colors every tenth animal with a stripe, designating it as sacred. The marked animals must then be brought to Jerusalem where they are slaughtered as sacrifices and eaten in the city. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes that the Torah introduces numerous different obligations that require going to Jerusalem. In addition to Ma’aser Behema (the animal tithe), one must bring one-tenth of his agricultural produce to Jerusalem (Ma’aser Sheni), as well as the fruits of a tree’s fourth year (Neta Rivai) and the annual Bikkurim (first fruits). The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is because most people are generally drawn after their professions or commercial enterprises, and the Torah seeks to direct our focus towards Torah learning. It therefore arranged that a person would have to travel to Jerusalem, the center of Torah learning and scholarship, several times a year. A person will likely decide to purchase a property in Jerusalem, so he can spend time there, and he will then be regularly exposed to, and influenced by, the Rabbis and Kohanim. Or, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, one might have his son reside in Jerusalem and send him all the foods which the Torah requires eating there. The son will then likely devote himself to Torah and become a great scholar. The result will be that every family will have at least one Rabbi, and this will have a profound influence upon the nation. This Misva applies to both men and women, both in Israel and outside the land, and even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Fundamentally, then, even nowadays, a Jew who owns kosher animals is required to designate one-tenth of his cattle each year as Ma’aser Behema. However, the Sages enacted that one should not consecrate one-tenth of his animals nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, because it is forbidden to slaughter a consecrated animal outside the Bet Ha’mikdash until it develops a Mum (physical blemish that disqualifies it as a sacrifice). If one would consecrate animals as Ma’aser Behema, he or someone else might end up slaughtering it, in violation of the grave prohibition of Shehuteh Hutz – slaughtering animals outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sages therefore suspended the Misva of Ma’aser Behema nowadays, and one does not consecrate one-tenth of his animals in our times, when they would be unable to be offered as sacrifices.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:28) addresses the case of “Herem” – where a person declares a possession consecrated, but without specifying that it should be consecrated for the Bet Ha’mikdash. The object or property in question is given to the Kohanim serving that week in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Torah commands “Lo Yimacher” – that the owner is not permitted to sell the item, as it must be given to the Kohanim. Once the consecrated item is given to the Kohen, the Kohen may use it however he wishes; it is not considered sacred after the Kohen receives it. If it is land, and the Kohen sells it, the property returns to the Kohen on the Yobel (jubilee year). The Sefer Ha’hinuch makes no mention of Malkut being administered to a violator who transgresses this prohibition by selling property declared Herem. It appears that the Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the view taken by the Rambam, in Hilchot Bechorot (6:8), that one is not liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition. We might have assumed that a violator would be liable to Malkut, since this command is transgressed by performing an action – specifically, making a legal transaction, which normally entails some sort of action. Perhaps, the Rambam felt that this violation is not punishable by Malkut because the transaction does not take effect. Since the Torah forbade selling this property, the sale is not valid and is legally ineffectual. For this reason, perhaps, the act of transaction is not significant enough to warrant Malkut. The Torah in this verse also adds a second command – “Lo Yiga’el,” forbidding the redemption of property which one has declared Herem. Normally, when one consecrates his possession for Bedek Ha’bayit (the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash), he transfers its sanctity onto a sum of money equaling the value of the property in question, and then the money is given to Bedek Ha’bayit while the property becomes permissible for use. The Torah commands that in the case of “Herem,” this may not be done. Rather, the item must be given to the Kohanim. In regard to this Misva, too, the Sefer Ha’hinuch appears to maintain that one is not liable to Malkut, likely for the same reason discussed above – because the redemption is ineffective, and thus nothing has been done through the act of redeeming the property. The Rambam maintains that these prohibitions apply even nowadays in regard to land outside Israel (land in Israel can be declared Herem only when the laws of Yobel apply), and to moveable items in all locations. If someone were to declare such property Herem, even nowadays, it would be forbidden to sell or redeem the property.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:28) addresses the situation of one who consecrated something he owns without specifying the purpose it is consecrated, simply declaring it “Herem” (untouchable). Unlike property that one consecrates for the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash, which is then redeemed for its value, the Torah commands that “Herem” may not be redeemed, and must instead be given to the Kohanim. In explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d chose Beneh Yisrael to serve Him and publicize His Name throughout the world. Due to Am Yisrael’s distinctive stature, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, we are governed directly by G-d, without any intermediaries. Thus, for example, as we emphasize in the Haggadah on Pesach, G-d brought Beneh Yisrael out of Egypt directly, without sending an angel or other kind of messenger. This direct, close relationship between us and G-d requires us to be devoted to His Torah, through which we become deserving of great blessing, and of having the opposite of blessing befall our enemies. The word “Herem,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, means “curse.” Indeed, this term is used in reference to excommunication, and the Sages teach that when a Herem is pronounced upon a person, it is as though a curse spreads throughout his entire body (as alluded to by the word “Herem,” which in Gematria equals 248, the number of limbs in a person’s body). Thus, when a person declares his possession “Herem,” he is in effect pronouncing it “cursed,” saying that he wants to have nothing to do with it. However, everything given to us is a blessing from G-d, and, as such, it cannot be cursed. Therefore, the Torah commands that this property should remained blessed – so much so that it is given to G-d. Practically, it is given to the Kohanim, because they are G-d’s servants, and thus the property is considered to have been given to G-d, for everything acquired by a servant becomes the master’s possession (“Ma She’kana Ebed Kana Rabo”). As mentioned earlier, the Torah here commands that property declared Herem may not be redeemed. When one consecrates property to the Temple treasury, he pays its value to the treasury, and may then use the property normally. In the case of Herem, however, the property declared Herem becomes like Teruma – the portion of agricultural produce given to a Kohen. It is not redeemed, and is instead given to the Kohanim who are serving that week in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Land that is declared Herem remains with the Kohanim forever, and does not return to the owner on Yobel (the jubilee year) like other lands do. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and it applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, as nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, one should not consecrate property or declare property Herem. However, the Rambam writes in Hilchot Erchin (8:11) that if a person nowadays declares his property consecrated, without specifying the purpose for which it is consecrated, it is given to the local Kohanim. One who declared his property Herem and did not give it to the Kohanim transgresses this affirmative command. Although this violation is not punishable by Malkut (as this is an affirmative command, and not a prohibition), nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that one who fails to fulfill his pledges will be severely punished.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:26) says about a Bechor (male firstborn kosher animal), “Lo Yakdish Oto” – that one may not consecrate it. This animal is considered consecrated as a Bechor from the moment of birth, and the Torah here forbids consecrating it as a different kind of sacrifice. Thus, it would be forbidden to declare the animal consecrated as an Ola sacrifice or a Shelamim sacrifice, since it is already consecrated as a Bechor. Tradition teaches that this verse establishes a general prohibition against declaring a change in the status of any consecrated animal. Once an animal has been consecrated as a particular sacrifice, one may not then consecrate it as a different sacrifice. Thus, for example, one may not declare a Shelamim consecrated as an Asham, or an Asham as a Hatat, and so on. Likewise, if one consecrated money for the maintenance of the Hechal (the interior of the Bet Ha’mikdash), he may not then declare the money consecrated for the maintenance of the altar. If a female animal was pregnant at the time it was consecrated, the fetus is also consecrated for the same purpose. Therefore, it is forbidden to change the status of the fetus by consecrating it for a different purpose, just like it is forbidden to change the mother’s status. The exception to this rule is a Bechor, which does not become consecrated until birth. While a firstborn animal is in its mother’s womb, it is not yet sacred. Therefore, if the owner, for whatever reason, wants to deny the Kohanim rights to Bechor (as the meat of the Bechor is eaten by the Kohanim), he can consecrate the Bechor as a different sacrifice – for example, an Ola – when it is still a fetus. The fetus becomes an Ola at that point, and thus does not become a Bechor at birth. This declaration is permissible, because it does not change the animal from the designation as one kind of sacrifice to the designation as a different sacrifice. This prohibition applies to both men and women, in all places, and at all times, even nowadays. Although one should not consecrate animals (or anything) else nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, nevertheless, if one did, the consecration takes effect. It then becomes forbidden to consecrate the animal as a different kind of sacrifice. One who consecrates a consecrated animal as a different sacrifice transgresses this prohibition, but he is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition is transgressed without performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”).
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:16) addresses the situation of one who consecrated agricultural land, declaring it the property of “Bedek Ha’bayit” – the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The owner must pay the value of the field to the treasury, and may then enjoy full rights to the field. The Torah stipulates that regardless of the field’s quantity, the value is determined based on the field’s size. For every “Homer Se’orim,” the Torah commands, the owner must pay 50 shekels. “Homer Se’orim” is the size in which one can produce a “Homer” – or fifty “Se’a” – of barley. The Sages determined that this is an area of 75,000 Amot, or 273.86 square Amot. For each such area in the field, the owner must pay 50 Shekels. In the case of a “Sedeh Ahuza” – one ancestral holding, which has been in the family, as opposed to a purchased property – the owner must add one-fifth to the price. Moreover, the calculation is made based upon the number of years remaining until Yobel (the jubilee), when lands are returned to their original owners. If one consecrates his field during the Yobel year, then he must pay the full price. If one consecrates the field at some point after the Yobel year, then he reduces 1/49 th of the redemption sum for each year that has passed since Yobel. If the owner did not redeem the property before the onset of Yobel, then the field is given to the Kohanim. They pay the field’s value to the Bet Ha’mikdash, and the field becomes theirs, forever. This is how the Kohanim, who were not granted a share in the Land of Israel as the other tribes did, received land. This Misva applies when the laws of Yobel are binding, and it applies to both men and women. Nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, one should not consecrate property. If one does consecrate a field in the Land of Israel, he should follow the solution proposed by Shmuel, as cited by the Gemara in Masechet Erchin, and transfer the sanctity onto a coin and then discard the coin in the Dead Sea. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this is what should be done, even if one wishes to set aside the full redemption sum as stipulated by the Torah, and save it for the time of the final redemption, so that funds will be available to rebuilt the Bet Ha’mikdash. This should not be done, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, because this gives rise to the risk of somebody mistakenly using the money, which would constitute a grave violation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that we are assured that when the time comes to rebuild the Bet Ha’mikdash, there will be no shortage of funds, and thus one should not consecrate money nowadays and put it aside to be used for the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:14) addresses the case of a person who consecrates his house, declaring it sacred, and it then becomes the property of the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The property must be appraised by a Kohen, and the owner of the home must then redeem it by paying to the Temple treasury the value as determined by the Kohen, and adding a Homesh (one-fifth) to its value. This process is listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch as one of the Torah’s 248 affirmative commands. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded the owner to redeem the property by paying 120 percent of its value in order to arouse feelings of respect and reverence for the Bet Ha’mikdash and everything associated with it. The Torah grants the homeowner the opportunity to redeem his house so that he does not lose it, but he must add an additional 20 percent so that he has an appreciation for the importance and significance of the Bet Ha’mikdash and will not treat it lightly. This Misva applies not only to the case of a consecrated home, but to any situation involving an object whose owner decided to consecrate it. Nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, one should not consecrate property to the Bet Ha’mikdash, because he will then, quite obviously, be unable to donate it. If one did consecrate something, then he should transfer the sanctity onto a coin, and then cast the coin into the Dead Sea, where it is then ruined. The Sefer Ha’hinuch implies that before the sanctity is transferred onto a coin, the item must first be assessed and its value determined. It is difficult to understand why this is necessary, though, in light of the fact that the object is not redeemed, but is rather divested of its status by transferring its sanctity onto a coin. This verse, which speaks of a person consecrating “Beto” (“his home”), serves as the source for one of the important Halachic principles related to consecration. The Talmud states that just as one can consecrate only “Beto” – his home, which belongs to him and which he physically possesses, similarly, one can consecrate only property which he owns and which is in his physical possession. If a person owns something but does not have it in his possession, or has something in his possession which he does not own, then he cannot consecrate that item. One example is a Mashkon – an item which a borrower gave his lender as collateral for the loan. The Mashkon belongs to the borrower, but is in the physical possession of the lender. As such, neither can consecrate it – the borrower cannot consecrate it because it is not in his possession, and the lender cannot consecrate it because he does not own it. Another example is an item which was stolen, and which the thief must return to its original owner. The item still belongs to its original owner, but is in the physical possession of the thief; therefore, neither can consecrate the item. (This is true only of moveable items; land cannot, technically, be stolen, and thus it is always considered in the possession of the owner.) This Misva apples only during the times when the laws of Yobel (the jubilee year) apply. One who did not have his consecrated property appraised, or did not pay the required sum – or, nowadays, failed to transfer the sanctity onto a coin – has transgressed this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the individual also violates the prohibition of Me’ila – misusing sacred property, because he continues living in his house without redeeming it, thus deriving benefit from a home belonging to Hekdesh (the Temple treasury). Although this Misva does not apply nowadays, when we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash, the message underlying this command is relevant to the pledges that we make to synagogues or other charitable institutions. Such pledges must be treated with the utmost respect and seriousness, and paid in full in timely fashion.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:11) addresses the case of an animal that was consecrated as a sacrifice, but then became a “Ba’al Mum” – meaning, a disqualifying blemish surfaced on the animal’s body. In such a case, the Torah commands that the animal must be brought before a Kohen, who makes an assessment of the animal’s worth, and the owner must then purchase a new animal with that sum of money. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this procedure as one of the Torah’s 248 affirmative commands. This Misva applies to men and women – as both are capable of consecrating animals as sacrifices – and it applies, in a certain sense, only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nowadays, when we do not have a Bet Ha’mikdash and thus cannot offer sacrifices, one should not consecrate an animal, and so this Misva is not practically observed. However, the Gemara states in Masechet Erchin (29) that if one did consecrate an animal nowadays, the animal is allowed to die. Another option, which the Gemara cites in the name of Shmuel, is to transfer the animal’s sanctity onto a coin, and then throw the coin into the Dead Sea, where it becomes ruined. The Debar Abraham (Rav Avraham Dov Ber Kahana-Shapiro of Kovno, Lithuania, 1870-1943) raises a question based on the Halacha that applies in the case of a consecrated animal that remains unblemished, but dies before it could be offered as a sacrifice. Unlike in the case of a Ba’al Mum, the animal is not brought before a Kohen for an assessment, because the Torah requires “Ve’he’emid” – that the animal must be made to stand before the Kohen who then makes his assessment. The Sages understood that in the case of a dead animal, since the carcass cannot stand on its own, no assessment can be made, and it cannot be redeemed. The Debar Abraham notes that seemingly, this Halacha should apply also in the case of animal consecrated nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash. In this case, too, the animal cannot be brought before the Kohen for an assessment, and thus, we would assume, the sanctity cannot be transferred onto money, just like in the case of a consecrated animal that died. The Debar Abraham answered by distinguishing between the case of a dead animal, which is entirely unable to be made to stand before the Kohen, and the case of a consecrated animal nowadays, which is able to stand. It is only due to an external factor – the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash – that an assessment of the animal cannot be made, but in principle, the animal is capable of standing before the Kohen. Therefore, its sanctity can be transferred onto a coin. This Misva, and others like it, seem very remote and irrelevant to us, since, unfortunately, we do not have a Bet Ha’mikdash, and thus do not deal with consecrated animals. In ancient times, however, when the Bet Ha’mikdash stood, these situations were as common as, for example, somebody forgetting Ya’aleh Ve’yabo. It is important that we learn and familiarize ourselves with these Halachot, and in this merit, we will, please G-d, be worthy of the restoration of the Bet Ha’mikdash, speedily and in our times, Amen.
The Torah establishes in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:10) that if a person tries to transfer the sanctity of a consecrated animal onto a different animal, then both animals are consecrated. This means that if a person consecrated an animal as a sacrifice, and then declared the transfer of its sacred status onto a different animal, then the first animal retains its status of sanctity, and the second animal attains this status. This Halacha is known as “Temura” (“exchanging”). Earlier, the Torah forbade making such a proclamation, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch counted this prohibition as one of Misvot Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibitions). The Sefer Ha’hinuch additionally lists as a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) the obligation to treat both animals as sacred. To explain the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d wanted people to treat all sacred articles with the utmost reverence and respect. As such, the Torah did not want a person to change his mind after consecrating an animal, which would bespeak a disrespectfully flippant approach to the sacrifices. The Torah therefore established that if one tries to transfer sanctity from one animal to another, he will be required to treat both animals as sacred, thereby impressing upon us the significance of this status. This will help ensure that people do not take Kedusha lightly, and will give the sacrifices the respect and reverence that they deserve. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then proceeds to cite the Rambam as giving a different explanation for this Misva. The Rambam writes that after a person consecrated an animal, he might later regret his decision, once his excitement and enthusiasm wane, and he will therefore want to minimize his financial loss by substituting the animal with a less expensive animal. In order to prevent people from having this change of heart after consecrating an animal, the Torah stipulated that such an attempt will result in both animals being consecrated as sacrifices. The Rambam adds that the Torah extended this rule even to the reverse case – where one seeks to transfer the animal’s sanctity onto a more expensive animal – because if this were allowed, people would also transfer the sanctity onto a less expensive animal. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion of the reasons behind this command by expressing his admiration for and gratitude to the Rambam, who offered reasons for the Misvot. The Sefer Ha’hinuch humbly acknowledges that the Rambam’s explanations were exceedingly helpful to him as he set out to produce this work, going through the 613 Misvot and suggesting the reasons behind them. The law of Temura applies only if one declares the transfer of sanctity onto an animal which is fit to be offered as a sacrifice. If one declares the transfer of sanctity onto an animal that is Kil’ayim (a crossbreed), a Tefera (mortally wounded animal), a Yoset Dofen (animal born via Caesarean section), a Tumtum or Androgynus (animal whose gender cannot be verified), the proclamation has no effect. Since these animals cannot be offered as sacrifices, such a proclamation is ineffective, as this is akin to declaring the transfer of sanctity onto species such as donkeys or camels, which are not offered as sacrifices. A Temura proclamation is effective only if one declares the transfer of sanctity onto his own animal. One cannot make somebody else’s animal a Temura, unless that other person explicitly said that Temura would be effective with regard to his animals. If a person declares the transfer of a consecrated animal’s sanctity onto 100 animals, all 100 animals become consecrated, and the individual is liable to 100 sets of Malkut for these multiple violations of the Temura prohibition. Likewise, if one proclaimed the transfer of the animal’s sacred repeatedly, first onto one animal, and then another, and then another, even one thousand times, all the animals are consecrated, and he is liable to Malkut for each proclamation. An animal which was consecrated via Temura cannot then make another animal sacred via Temura; if one declares the transfer of sanctity from the Temura onto a different animal, this declaration has no effect. If a consecrated animal gives birth, the offspring is subject to the laws of Temura. Although non-Jews can consecrate animals as sacrifices, and animals which they consecrate are indeed sacred, non-Jews cannot, according to Torah law, consecrate an animal via Temura. This means that if a gentile declares the transfer of his consecrated animal’s sanctity onto a different animal, this declaration has no effect on the level of Torah law. However, the Sages enacted that the second animal should be regarded as consecrated. This law applies to both men and women, and in all times and places. One who proclaims the transfer of a consecrated animal’s sanctity onto a different animal transgresses a Torah prohibition, as we discussed in regard to the previous Misva, and he is then bound by a Misvat Aseh to treat both animals as sacred. If he fails to do so, then he transgresses this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:10) forbids declaring the transfer of the sanctity of a consecrated animal onto another animal. This means that if an animal had been consecrated as a sacrifice, it is forbidden to proclaim that its sanctity should be transferred onto a different animal. If one did make such a proclamation, he has violated this prohibition, and both animals are now sacred and must be offered as sacrifices. This prohibition – known as “Temura” – is unique in that it carries a punishment of Malkut despite the fact that no action is performed. Normally, one is not liable to Malkut for violating a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a Biblical prohibition which is transgressed without a physical act. In the case of Temura, however, one is liable to Malkut for violating this command even though it is violated through only a verbal pronouncement. Additionally, one is liable to Malkut for violating this command even though it can be rectified through the performance of a Misvat Aseh. Normally, when the Torah presents a Misva to be performed following the transgression of a prohibition (“Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh”), the violator is not liable to Malkut for committing the violation, because it can be rectified by performing the Misva. Here, however, although the violation of Temura is rectified by treating both animals as sacred, nevertheless, one is liable to Malkut for transgressing the Temura prohibition. The reason is because the Torah issued two commands forbidding Temura, and the rule of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” applies only in regard to a lone prohibition. If two prohibitions are violated, the associated Misvat Aseh rectifies only one, but not the other, and so the violator is still liable to Malkut. This prohibition applies to both men and women, in all places, and at all times, even nowadays. Of course, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, one should not consecrate an animal. But if an animal was consecrated, it would be forbidden to declare the transfer of its sanctity onto a different animal.
The Torah in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 27:2) introduces the law of “Erchin,” a type of pledge which a person makes to the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash (called “Bedek Ha’bayit”). If a person pledges “Erki” – “my value,” then he must pay to the Temple treasury the value stipulated by the Torah here in Parashat Behukotai. The Torah assigns different sums for different groups of people, depending on age and gender, and one who pledges his or her “Erech” must make the payment specified by the Torah for that person’s gender and age group. This case differs from the case of one who says “Dami Alai,” pledging his value as a servant. In the case of “Dami Alai,” one pays the sum for which he or she would be sold as a servant based on the current market value of people of his or her age, appearance and physical condition. In the case of “Erchin,” however, appearance and physical condition are of no relevance, as the price is set by the Torah based solely on age and gender. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the notion underlying this Misva, to fulfill one’s verbal commitments, is the unique importance of the faculty of speech. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes, verbal communication is what distinguishes human beings from all other creatures. The Torah in Parashat Bereshit (2:7) tells that when G-d created Adam, He placed within him a soul, and Adam became a “Nefesh Haya” (literally, “living spirit”). Targum Onkelos translates this phrase as “Ru’ah Memalela” – “a speaking spirit.” Speech is the defining quality of the human being, an expression of the soul which only we, and no other creature in the universe, possess. When we speak, we are, in essence, exercising the soul. For this reason, we must treat our speech with utmost respect, and this includes fulfilling all verbal commitments. The Torah requires fulfilling verbal commitments not only in regard to Misva matters, such as pledges to the Bet Ha’mikdash and to charity, but also in regard to mundane, everyday matters. The Sages warned, “Lo Yeshaneh Adam Be’diburo” – that a person must not deviate from what he says, and must instead follow through on all his pledges. If a person pledges money to the treasury but cannot afford to fulfill the pledge, Bet Din would seize his possessions. Fulfilling pledges is so important that Bet Din would even seize a Torah scholar’s books if this is necessary for him to pay the sum he had pledged. The only exception is the text of the Masechet which he currently studies, which is left for him to use. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this exception is made out of Kevod Ha’Torah (respect for Torah). Bet Din would sell the seized property and use the money for fulfilling the pledge. If they seize Metaltelin (moveable property), the items are sold right away, and in the person’s location. Bet Din does not delay selling them in the hope that their market value will go up, or bring them to a different region where they could be sold for a higher price; instead, they are sold immediately. In the case of real estate, however, Bet Din advertises the property for sixty days in order to get the best offer, and then the money is given to the treasury. This Misva applies to both men and women, and it applies at all times, even nowadays, when there is no Bet Ha’mikdash. Of course, nowadays one should not be making pledges to the Bet Ha’mikdash, but if one did, then he has an obligation to fulfill his pledge. If he consecrated food for Temple treasury, then he sets it aside and lets it spoil. Similarly. if he consecrated utensils, then he waits for them to break or otherwise be ruined. If he consecrated coins or metal, they should be discarded in the Dead Sea, where they will be ruined. If he consecrated an animal, then the animal is locked up until it perishes. Another opinion, that of Shemuel, maintains that one transfers the sanctity of the consecrated money or object onto a coin, and then this coin is cast into the Dead Sea. One who fails to fulfill his pledge to the Bet Ha’mikdash transgresses this affirmative command, and also transgresses a separate Biblical command (“Bal Te’aher”) which forbids delaying one’s pledges to the Temple for three Regalim (three pilgrimage festivals). The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that one who transgresses this command will be severely punished (“Onsho Gadol”). This command impresses upon us the importance of exercising caution in regard to speech, the care that must be taken to speak properly, and to follow through on all our promises and commitments. The Torah commands in the Book of Bamidbar (30:3) that when one makes a promise, “he shall not defile his word; he shall do in accordance with everything he said.” This verse has been understood to mean that if one ensures not to defile his speech, then “everything he said” – all his prayers and requests, will be granted. If we are careful with regard to our faculty of speech, then our mouths are pure, such that our prayers are recited in a state of pristine purity, making them exceptionally powerful. One way we ensure the acceptance of our prayers is by exercising caution with regard to speech, and following through on all our verbal commitments.
The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 26:1) that one may not place an “Eben Maskit” on the ground on which to bow. This refers to a stone with a design that was either drawn or engraved on the stone. The Torah forbids bowing on such a stone, even if one bows to express his submission to Hashem. The Rambam writes that the Torah forbade bowing on an “Eben Maskit” because this resembles the idolatrous practice of placing in front of an object of worship a decorative stone, and then bowing on the stone. In order to distance ourselves from pagan worship, the Torah forbade many practices which were common among idolaters, including bowing on a stone with a design. Therefore, it is forbidden to bow on such a stone, even if one bows to Hashem. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds a second reason for this prohibition, noting that bowing on a decorative stone gives the impression of bowing to the stone. The Torah does not forbid bowing on a garment or some other perishable item, but bowing on a stone, which is permanent, appears as a type of pagan worship, and is thus forbidden. This Torah prohibition applies only to “Pishut Yadayim Ve’raglayim” – bowing down on the floor with one’s hands and knees, as we do during the Aboda service on Yom Kippur. Bowing on an “Eben Maskit” without lowering oneself to the floor is prohibited only by force of Rabbinic enactment. It is permissible to cover an “Eben Maskit” with a cloth, such as a carpet, and then bow on it. This is why it is customary in synagogues that have stone floors without carpeting to place materials on the floor for the bowing during the Yom Kippur service. The Torah formulates this command as a prohibition against bowing on these stones “Be’arsechem” – “in your land.” The Sages understood that this prohibition actually applies even outside the Land of Israel, and the word “Be’arsechem” implies that bowing on an “Eben Maskit” is permitted in the Bet Ha’mikdash, which is not considered “our” land (as it is G-d’s domain). In the Bet Ha’mikdash, it is permissible to bow to Hashem directly on the stone floor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that according to the reason he offered for this prohibition – to avoid giving the impression of bowing to the stone – it is understandable that it does not apply in the Bet Ha’mikdash, where one could hardly be suspected of worshiping a stone. According to the Rambam’s understanding, however, that the Torah wanted to distance us from anything that resembles pagan practice, we might wonder why an exception would be made in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Some commentators suggest that since the Kohanim were known to be especially vigilant (“Kohanim Zerizim Hem”), the Torah was not concerned about bowing in the Mikdash in a manner resembling the pagans’ bowing. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who bowed on the ground on a stone with a design has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. It must be emphasized that this prohibition refers to somebody who bows to G-d, not to an idol or to the stone itself. If one bows to an object, then he is liable to capital punishment for transgressing the grave prohibition of idol-worship. The Torah speaks here of one who believes in G-d and seeks to worship Him; even in such a case, bowing on an “Eben Maskit” is prohibited.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:53) addresses the situation of a Jew who falls into financial straits, and decides to sell himself as a servant to a non-Jewish master. In such a situation, the Torah commands, “Lo Yirdenu Be’ferech Le’enecha” – the gentile master may not impose harsh labor upon the servant before our eyes. This means that if we learn of a fellow Jew whose gentile master imposes upon him “Abodat Perech” – harsh work, then we must rescue him from the master. The term “Abodat Perech,” as was discussed in the context of a different Misva, refers to not only physically harsh labor, but also tasks that cause emotional distress, such as open-ended jobs, and jobs which are not needed but are demanded simply to cause the servant to work. When we hear of a fellow Jew subjected to such conditions under a gentile master, we are required to do what we can to bring him to freedom. We may not decide that since this Jew made the mistake of selling himself into the gentile’s service, we have no responsibility to rescue him, and we can let him suffer the consequences of his poor decision. The Torah commands that although this Jew is to blame for the adverse situation in which he finds himself, we nevertheless bear the obligation to help him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that the prohibition is to allow the Jew to remain in servitude “Le’enecha” – before our eyes, implying that this applies only if we hear of a Jew in this situation. We are not obligated to search and investigate to find Jews who work as servants for gentiles; it is only when such a situation comes to our attention that we bear the obligation to rescue the servant and extricate him from his state of servitude. Some sources indicate that this command is directed to Bet Din, the nation’s religious leadership. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, understood that this command is directed to each and every Jew, both male and female, who is in a position to rescue the servant. He writes that this Misva applies only in times when the Jews have sovereignty and the authority to compel non-Jewish masters to release their servants. One who fails to extricate the Jewish servant in times when this Misva applies has transgressed this prohibition, though he is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition is transgressed without performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”). The Rambam, in Hilchot Matenot Aniyim (8:10), points to this command as a source for the Misva of Pidyon Shebuyim – rescuing Jewish captives. Anytime a Jew is taken captive, those who are in a position to rescue him have an obligation to do so. A number of commentators noted that whenever a Jew is in the service of a gentile master, there is a Misva to bring him out of this condition, even if the master is not imposing upon him harsh labor. Apparently, the Torah introduces an additional Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition) that applies to the specific circumstances of a Jewish servant who is bring mistreated by his gentile master. While the technical aspect of this Misva – rescuing a Jew who is in the service of a non-Jew – does not apply nowadays, the underlying principle most certainly does. This Misva shows us the responsibility we have to help our fellow Jews even when they are to blame for their situation. Even if somebody caused his own downfall, we are obligated to assist him if we can. Indeed, many of our fellow Jews have, unfortunately, given themselves over to “masters” who cause them great harm – such as alcohol, drugs, gambling, and other addictive behaviors. We do not have the right to say that since they are to blame for engaging in these addictive habits in the first place, we have no obligation to help them. The Torah here teaches of our responsibility to extricate our fellow Jews from subservience even if they had placed themselves in this position. And thus when we see or hear of, Heaven forbid, a fellow Jew suffering under the “servitude” of addiction, of any kind, we are dutybound to do whatever we can to ensure that he receives the help he needs to regain his freedom.
The Torah in Parashat Behar says about gentile servants, “Le’olam Bahem Ta’abodu” – that they are to remain in service forever (Vayikra 25:46). This verse establishes a Torah prohibition forbidding releasing a non-Jewish servant. Whereas Jewish servants are released either after six years of service, or in the Yobel (jubilee year), gentile servants are not released. Non-Jewish servants are commonly referred to in Halachic literature as “Ebed Kena’ani” (“a Canaanite servant”), but in truth, this status applies to all gentile servants. They are referred to as “Canaanites” because Noah placed a curse upon his grandson, Canaan, that his descendants would work as slaves, and thus the title “Kena’ani” is associated with servitude. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, explains the procedure that was followed when a Jew purchased a gentile servant. The servant spends one year working for the master, and after a year has passed, the master asks the servant if he is prepared renounce his former faith and embrace Jewish belief. If the servant refuses, then he is released, as he cannot be allowed to remain among our people. But if the servant agrees, then he begins the process of conversion by undergoing Berit Mila and immersing in a Mikveh for the purpose of becoming an Ebed Kena’ani. He is then obligated in all Misvot which are binding upon women, and it is then forbidden for the master to release him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this prohibition as based on the notion that Am Yisrael was chosen for a special mission, to devote themselves to the service of the Almighty. As such, it is appropriate that they will have servants to help them with their day-to-day tasks, thus freeing their time so they can tend to their spiritual pursuits. Fellow Jews are also assigned this mission, and so the Torah wants Am Yisrael to have servants from other nations. The reason why an Ebed Kena’ani must undergo partial conversion, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is so that he would not exert a negative influence upon the Jews among whom he lives. On this basis, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains why Halacha permits releasing an Ebed Kena’ani when this is necessary for the sake of fulfilling a Misva. The classic example is a situation where nine men are present for a Minyan, and one wishes to release his servant so that he will become a full-fledged Jew and can thus complete the Minyan. Halacha permits releasing the servant in such a case – even though praying with a Minyan constitutes a Misva De’rabbanan (Misva ordained by the Sages), whereas releasing a servant is forbidden by force of Torah law. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since the purpose of this prohibition is to facilitate our service of G-d, it does not apply in a case where freeing a servant is what is needed to facilitate the fulfillment of a Misva, even a Misva ordained by the Sages. If a Jew cohabited with a gentile maidservant, the product of this union has the status of an Ebed Kena’ani, and all the laws relevant to gentile servants apply to him, as well. If a master treats his servant in a way which clearly indicates his intention to free him, then Bet Din compels the master to release the servant. Examples include having the servant betroth a Jewish woman, having the servant wear Tefillin, or inviting him to conduct the congregational Torah reading. These activities are all done by full-fledged Jewish men, and not by servants, and thus once any of these is done, the master must write a document declaring the servant free. This command applies in all places and in all times. It is binding upon both men and women, though the Sages teach that a woman should not purchase an Ebed Kena’ani, in order to avoid suspicion. One who releases his servant transgresses this command, but is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is introduced in the form of a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). It is important to clarify that when the Sefer Ha’hinuch speaks in this context of Am Yisrael’s unique stature, this refers to the special mission to which we have been assigned. The status of “chosen nation” is not just a privilege – it is a great responsibility, the obligation we bear to devote our lives to the service of G-d, and to disseminate the knowledge of awareness of His existence. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here teaches us of the awesome responsibility that each and every one of us carries as a member of Hashem’s special nation, that we must use our precious time properly, to fulfill our duty to the very best of our ability.
The Torah in Parashat Behar presents a number of laws relevant to an Ebed Ibri (Jewish servant), including the command, “Lo Yimacheru Mimkeret Abed” – that a servant may not be sold in the manner in which servants were normally sold (25:42). In ancient times, servants whose masters wished to sell them were placed on a tall stone, like a podium, where prospective buyers could see them. The Torah forbids selling a Jewish servant in this manner, which was considered demeaning. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command because it is improper to treat a fellow Jew disrespectfully – even if he is an Ebed Ibri, who finds himself in this situation because he stole and was unable to pay the victim. We might have assumed that such a person is allowed to be treated disrespectfully, as he is guilty of a crime, and so the Torah commanded preserving the dignity of even an Ebed Ibri. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that a wealthy person never knows how long his good fortune will last, and he, too, could find himself at some point in financial straits, and needing to sell himself as a servant. He should therefore be sensitive to the feelings of an Ebed Ibri and treat him with respect. This prohibition applies to both men and women, in times when the laws of Ebed Ibri are binding – meaning, in periods when the laws of Yobel (the jubilee year) are applicable (which is when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel in their allotted territories). One who sells a Jewish servant in a demeaning manner is in violation of this command, but is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition can be violated without an action, by verbally instructing the servant to stand on the podium. In the next verse (Vayikra 25:43), the Torah forbids having one’s Jewish servant work “Be’farech” – meaning, perform grueling labor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one example of this prohibition is “Aboda She’en Lah Kisba” – open-ended work. If a master tells the servant to perform a certain task “until I return,” without giving the servant any indication of when he will be returning, this causes the servant psychological torment, and therefore falls under the prohibition of “Be’farech.” Another example of this prohibition is assigning one’s servant a job for no reason, just for the purpose of having him work. Thus, for instance, it would be forbidden to command a servant to prepare a beverage which is not needed, and then discard it. This command applies to both males and females, when the laws of Jewish servants are applicable. One is not liable to Malkut for transgressing this command, as it can be violated verbally, without performing an action. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion of this Misva by noting that although we do not have Jewish servants nowadays, nevertheless, the concept underlying this Misva is no less relevant in our time as it was in the past. When we hire workers or laborers, we must treat them with respect and dignity, with the understanding of the cyclical nature of poverty and wealth. The fact that a person is now wealthy and is able to hire laborers does not mean that this condition will always remain; he might one day find himself needing to perform labor to support himself. Hashem chooses to whom to grant wealth, and He chooses the precise time-frame during which the person will enjoy wealth. A person is not wealthy for even a moment longer than Hashem decided he should be wealthy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even if a person hides all his money, or purchases vast amounts of real estate, Hashem can take away all his property the moment He decides that this person should no longer have wealth. This awareness should prevent us from arrogance and from disrespecting those with less money than we have.
In discussing various laws relevant to a Jewish servant, the Torah commands, “Lo Ta’abod Bo Abodat Abed” – literally, “Do not work him like a servant” (Vayikra 25:39). This is understood to mean that a master who purchases a fellow Jew as an Ebed (servant) is not permitted to assign the servant demeaning work. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives the example of a “Balinta” – having one’s servant accompany him as he walks outside with a cushion for him to put on the ground if the master grows weary and wishes to rest. Another example is having one’s servant carry his towel and other belongings to the bathhouse. These chores are considered beneath the dignity of an Ebed Ibri (Jewish servant), and they are thus forbidden by force of this Biblical command. The Sages in the Talmud remarked that the master’s responsibilities toward his servant extend so far that “Kol Ha’koneh Ebed Ibri Ke’koneh Adon Le’asmo” – one who purchases a Jewish servant in effect purchases a master. The Torah demands treating the servant with respect, like an employee, and not like a servant. Even though the master of course can compel the servant to work, he must ensure to show him respect and dignity. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah issued this command in order to draw our attention to the exalted status of our nation. The Torah commands masters to treat their Jewish servants with special respect and dignity to impress upon us that each and every member of our nation is special. This newfound respect for the Jewish Nation, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, will, in turn, enhance our respect for the Torah which was given to our people. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah wants the master to realize and reflect upon the fact that the servant was forced into this status due to financial hardships, which could befall anyone, even the master. This awareness will lead the master to repent and to strictly follow G-d’s will so he remains worthy of material blessing and will not fall into financial straits. Finally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this Misva serves to accustom people to act kindly and compassionately, and to distance themselves from cruelty and insensitivity. By molding our characters in this way, we become worthy of the great blessings which Hashem wants to bestow upon us. Elsewhere, in the Book of Debarim (15:16), the Torah says about a servant, “Ki Tob Lo Imach” – that life “with” the master is good. The Sages inferred from this verse that the servant must live “with” the master in the sense that he is given the same comforts and standard of living as the master. He is to be fed the same foods and beverages, and given the same comfortable beds, as the master. This Misva applies to both men and women, but only during periods when the laws of servants apply – meaning, when the laws of Yobel apply (which is when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel). One who forces his servant to perform demeaning labor violates this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut. Since this prohibition is generally transgressed verbally, without an action, by simply commanding the servant, one is not liable to Malkut even if he forces the servant through an action. All Jews have the status of servants of Hashem. As such, the command forbidding disrespecting an Ebed Ibri extends, in a sense, to each and every Jew. We must recognize the value and worth of every fellow Jew, as a servant of the Almighty, and ensure not to disrespect or disparage a fellow Jew in any way.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:37) introduces the prohibition of “Ribit” – lending to a fellow Jew on interest. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Torah repeats this command, first forbidding “Neshech,” and then forbidding “Marbit.” These two terms, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, are synonymous; the Torah does not add any new information by forbidding “Marbit” after commanding that a lender may not demand “Neshech.” The reason for the repetition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is to impress upon us the importance of this law, and the severity of charging interest. The Sefer Ha’hinuch draws an analogy to a parent, who, when admonishing a child, will repeat the warning several times for emphasis, in order to impress upon the child how severe a matter this is. This is done out of love and concern for the child, to ensure that the child distances himself from negative behavior. Likewise, G-d, in His great love for us, repeated the prohibition against charging interest in order to draw our attention to the gravity of this violation, so that we distance ourselves from it. The classic case of Ribit is “Ribit Ketzutza” (“fixed interest”), such as when a person lends 100 Dinarim on condition that the borrower repays 120 Dinarim within the year. This type of Ribit is forbidden on the level of Torah law. Another example of Ribit which the Torah forbids is where the lender takes the borrower’s home as collateral, uses it, and gives it back after the receiving from the borrower the full sum which he had lent. In this case, the lender has received back the loan as well as rights to the home rent-free. As such, he transgresses the Torah prohibition of Ribit. The lender would have to deduct the cost of rent for the interim period from the amount owed to him by the borrower. The Sages forbade certain forms of Ribit which are permissible according to Torah law, but resemble forbidden interest. One example is where a person lends money on condition that he will receive the principal in full, as well as a percentage of the profits earned with this money. Since the principal is guaranteed, this resembles a loan, as opposed to a business venture, and is therefore forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Sages also forbade “Ribit Mukdemet” (“preliminary Ribit”), meaning, giving gifts to somebody from whom one wishes to borrow money, and then receiving the loan. The gifts received before the loan resemble interest, and such a loan is therefore forbidden. The same is true of “Ribit Me’uheret” – giving the lender a gift after repaying the full sum of the loan. Another example of Ribit which the Sages forbade is the case where the lender did not have the cash which the borrower requested, so he gave him agriculture produce valued at that amount as a loan. Later, the borrower sells the produce back to the lender at a discounted price, and then, when repaying the loan, he gives the lender the full sum – meaning, the full value of the produce which he received as his loan. This does not constitute Ribit on the level of Torah law, but the Sages nevertheless forbade such as an arrangement, which falls under the category of “Ha’aramat Ribit” – a way that a lender can receive interest through a legal loophole. A person may pay a broker to convince somebody to lend him money. Since the brokerage fee is not going to the lender, this does not violate the prohibition of Ribit. The Sages warn, “Kol Ha’osek Be’ribit Mitmotet” – those who lend on interest in violation of Torah will suffer financial ruin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch goes so far as to say that a single coin earned through lending on interest can cause numerous treasuries to be destroyed. This prohibition applies in all times, in all places, and to both males and females. If one lent on interest in violation of Torah law, the Bet Din would force the lender to return the interest to the borrower. In the case of interest which is forbidden Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment), the Sages do not force the lender to return the money to the borrower. If, however, the borrower acts on his own and seizes the interest which he was unlawfully charged, the Bet Din will not force him to return it. In the aforementioned case of “Ha’aramat Ribit,” if the borrower seized the money which he paid, the Bet Din forces him to return it to the lender. The Gemara comments that one who lends on interest will be excluded from Tehiyat Ha’metim (the resurrection of the dead). Some have explained that this is a fitting punishment for the sin of lending on interest, because charging interest has the effect of “burying” the borrower in his debt. As the interest accumulates, the borrower falls deeper into debt, and is thus unable to “climb” out of the “hole” into which he had sunken. Appropriately, the lender is punished by remaining permanently in the grave, without ever having his life restored.
The tribe of Levi did not receive a territory in the Land of Israel as did the other tribes. Instead, forty-eight cities throughout the land were designated as cities for the Leviyim. Each of these cities was to be surrounded by 1,000 Amot of empty space, and then an additional 2,000 Amot for gardens, orchards and the like. In Parashat Behar (25:34), the Torah forbids altering this prescribed arrangement, and failing to set up the Leviyim’s cities the way the Torah required. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade changing the prescribed arrangement because the Leviyim were the Torah scholars and teachers, to whom people would come to learn and to consult. This is indicated by the verse in Sefer Debarim (33:10) that says about the tribe of Levi, “Yoru Mishpatecha Le’Yaakob Ve’Toratecha Le’Yisrael” – “They shall teach Your statutes to Yaakob, and Your Torah to Yisrael.” In order to engender the people’s respect for Torah, G-d commanded that the Leviyim’s cities should be arranged and maintained in an aesthetically pleasing manner, in a way which leaves a favorable impression and invites admiration. Special attention is given to the proper arrangement of these cities, ensuring open space and fields and orchards outside the city, in order to raise the esteem of the Leviyim in the eyes of the people. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that these cities must be built and maintained “Be’tachlit Ha’yofi” – as beautifully as possible. The Torah prescribed the arrangement which would invite the people’s respect, and it forbade deviating from this arrangement, because this is how the Torah determined that the cities would bring honor to the tribe of Levi. This command applies in the Land of Israel, when the Jewish People reside in the land. It applies to all people – Kohanim, Leviyim and Yisraelim – and to both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that he does not know the precise Shiur (amount) that one must deviate from the prescribed arrangement in order to be liable to Malkut. It is clear, however, that violators would be liable to Malkut, as they have transgressed a Biblical prohibition that involves a concrete action. In this context, the Sefer Ha’hinuch brings the Rambam’s famous comments in his conclusion to Hilchot Shemita Ve’yobel, explaining why the Leviyim were not given a share in the land like the other tribes. The Rambam writes that the members of this tribe were set aside to serve Hashem and to study and teach Torah, and they were therefore absolved from the mundane pressures and responsibilities that occupy other people’s time. Thus, they did not engage in agriculture, and were instead supported by the rest of the nation. They likewise did not serve in the military. The Rambam writes that the Leviyim were considered “Hel Hashem” – “G-d’s army,” and He guaranteed that they would be cared for. The Rambam proceeds to comment that this special status is not reserved only for the tribe of Levi. He writes that anyone who wishes to abstain from the mundane pursuits in which most people engage, in order to devote themselves exclusively to studying and teaching Torah, “is sanctified as the holiest of holies.” This is considered praiseworthy, the Rambam writes, and G-d will care for the person’s basic material needs, just as G-d cared for the needs of the tribe of Levi. The Rambam does not say that such a person should impose himself on the community and demand that he be supported, but rather that if he works minimally to earn enough for his basic sustenance, G-d guarantees that he will be cared for. These famous comments of the Rambam are often cited as an important source for those who wish to devote themselves to full-time Torah learning, compromising their material standards, so they could become scholars who teach Torah, instead of pursuing a lucrative career.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:29) introduces the unique law relevant to the sale of “Bateh Areh Homa” – homes situated in walled cities. After the sale of such a house, the seller has precisely one year to buy it back. If he does not buy it back within a year, then he is not entitled to demand the right to buy it back thereafter. It does not even return to him on Yobel (the jubilee year), when other lands are returned to their original owners. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that due to the special importance of the Land of Israel, the Torah wanted to encourage homeowners who sell their properties to buy them back quickly. It therefore imposed a one-year deadline, so that those who find it necessary to sell a home will be incentivized to repurchase it as soon as possible. When the seller buys back the home, he must pay the full price. Normally, such an arrangement would constitute Ribit (forbidden interest on a loan), because the buyer has, in effect, lent the seller the value of the home, and in exchange received the house rent-free during the interim period. Free access to the home during the interim period, in principle, qualifies as Ribit and is forbidden by Torah law. However, the Torah makes an exception in this case, allowing the seller to buy back the home for full price, without deducting the amount he would have charged to rent the home. A “Bet Areh Homa” may be bought back within a year only by the seller; nobody else can purchase the home from the buyer. The seller must buy it with money he earns or receives in exchange for his possessions; he cannot buy it back with borrowed money. The price must be paid in full all at once, and not in installments. If the buyer dies within the first year after the purchase, the seller can buy the home back from the buyer’s inheritors. Likewise, if the seller dies, his inheritors may buy the home back from the buyer until a year has passed since the time of the transaction. This Misva applies to both males and females, and only in the Land of Israel. It is binding only in periods when the laws of Yobel apply – meaning, when the majority of the Jewish People live in the Land of Israel, and the tribes are living in their allotted territories.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:24) commands, “Ge’ula Titnenu La’aretz” – literally, “You shall grant the land redemption.” This refers to the requirement to return purchased property to its original owner on the Yobel – the “jubilee” observed every fifty years. The buyer must return the land to the original owner free of charge, without receiving any money in return. The reason underlying this command, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch already explained in the context of an earlier Yobel-related Misva, is that it reminds us that G-d created the world and it belongs exclusively to Him. By forcing buyers to return the purchased land to the original owners, the Torah reminds us that G-d exerts ultimate control over the entire earth. This awareness will deter us from stealing or taking other people’s possessions unlawfully, as we will recognize that G-d exerts complete control over the earth, and will thus take away whatever we have that does not rightfully belong to us. An important exception to this requirement is the case of “Bet Areh Homa” – a house in walled city. The Torah establishes that if such a house is sold, the buyer is allowed to buy it back within the first year after the sale, and if he does not, then the house remains forever with the buyer, and does not return on Yobel. Unlike other properties, which return to their original owner in Yobel, a house in a walled city which is not bought back within a year of the sale remains in the buyer’s possession forever, and does not have to be returned on the Yobel year. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if the buyer sells the house to somebody else within a year of buying it, the original owner nevertheless has a year from the time of the original sale to buy it back. The second transaction does not “restart the clock,” so-to-speak, and the buyer can repurchase the home only until a year has passed from the time he sold it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the one-year limit is imposed as a penalty, of sorts, upon the seller, to discourage people from selling homes in Eretz Yisrael. Accordingly, even if the buyer then sells the property to somebody else, there is no reason to extend the strict deadline by which the original owner must buy the property back if he so wishes. If, on the day the year ends, the buyer is not present to receive the money from the seller who wishes to repurchase the home, then he may give the money to Bet Din, and then break into the house to take it over. Since the buyer is not in the area, the seller is allowed to buy the house back by force. If the Yobel begins within the first year after the house was sold, the house is not returned, and its status is unaffected by the onset of Yobel. The seller still has an entire year to buy it back, and if he does not, then it remains forever in the buyer’s ownership. The law of Bet Areh Homa does not apply in the city of Jerusalem, even though it is a walled city. The city of Jerusalem is considered the property of the entire Jewish Nation, and so it is excluded from the rules of Bet Areh Homa. When it comes to a field that is sold, the seller does not have the right to repurchase it within the first two years after the transaction. After two years have passed, he may purchase it whenever he wishes, and if he does not, then he receives it back on Yobel. The Ramban explains that since a field is a source of Parnasa (livelihood), the Torah allowed the seller to buy it back, even many years later, as he likely depends on the field for his sustenance. A house, however, is not a source of sustenance, and so the Torah did not entitle the seller of a house to buy it back, and did not require that it be returned in Yobel. However, since it is embarrassing to sell a home, the Torah granted the seller the right to buy it back during the first year. Once a year has passed, the seller has presumably settled into his new residence, and so he no longer enjoys the right to buy back the home. This Misva applies to both men and women. It is binding only in the Land of Israel, and only when the laws of Yobel apply – meaning, when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in the land. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who does not return land to its original owner on Yobel is deserving of harsh punishment, and is considered as though he denies G-d’s creation of the world. Since the law of Yobel is meant to reinforce our belief in G-d’s control over the world, failing to observe this law is akin to denying the fundamental tenet of creation.
The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:23), “Ve’ha’aretz Lo Timacher Li’tzmitut” – that lands in Eretz Yisrael may not be sold permanently. The precise definition of this command requires some explanation. The law of Yobel establishes that properties which are sold in the Land of Israel return to their original owners in the Yobel – the jubilee year. Thus, it is Halachically impossible to sell a piece of land permanently in Eretz Yisrael, because any land which is sold automatically returns to its owner in Yobel. What, then, is the meaning of this prohibition? The Rambam understood that the Torah here forbids making such a sale despite the fact that the land is not sold permanently. According to the Rambam, the Torah here forbids the very attempt to permanently sell a piece of property. Even though this transaction does not, in fact, result in the permanent sale of the property, as it returns to the original owner in Yobel despite the explicit condition that the sale should be permanent, nevertheless, trying to make a permanent sell violates this prohibition. The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam’s understanding, arguing that the Torah would not forbid a sale that is not permanent just because the attempt was made to sell the land permanently. In the Ramban’s view, it is inconceivable that the Torah would prohibit the attempt to do something which legally cannot be done. The Ramban therefore explains that the Torah here forbids selling land to somebody who cannot be trusted to return it to the original owner in Yobel – such as a gentile, who does not, quite obviously, abide by the laws of Yobel. This kind of transaction results in the permanent sale of land, and thus, according to the Ramban, this is what the Torah forbids when it commands not to permanently sell land in Eretz Yisrael. Interestingly, if a buyer and seller agreed that the transaction should take effect for a specified period of time, then their agreement is binding, even if this period of time extends beyond Yobel. For example, if they stipulated that the transaction would take effect for sixty years, then the stipulation is binding, and the land returns to the seller only sixty years later, and not during Yobel. Since a particular duration of time was specified, the condition is binding. This is in contrast to a sale regarding which no stipulation was made, or which was made on condition that it should be permanent, which is subject to the laws of Yobel. In either case – if the sale was made without any condition, or if the sale was made on condition that it will be permanent – the land returns to the seller on Yobel. This command is binding upon both men and women, and it applies only in the Land of Israel, and only when the laws of Yobel apply – meaning, when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel. If land is sold on the condition that the sale is permanent, then, according to the Rambam, both the buyer and seller violate this prohibition, even though the land returns to the seller during Yobel despite their condition. And if the sale was done through an action, they are both liable to Malkut. According to the Ramban, the buyer and seller in such a case do nothing wrong at all. In his view, one violates this command by selling land in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile, who will not return it during Yobel, as discussed.
The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:17), “Ve’lo Tonu Ish Et Amito” – that we may not cause our fellow distress. The Sages understood this command as forbidding “Ona’at Debarim” – inflicting pain through the spoken word. For example, it is forbidden to remind a Ba’al Teshuba (penitent sinner) about misdeeds that he committed in the past, as this would cause him embarrassment. Likewise, if someone has taken ill, Heaven forbid, or suffers some other sort of hardship, it is forbidden to tell him that the crisis has befallen him because of his misdeeds. This kind of hurtful speech constitutes “Ona’at Debarim.” Another example is recommending to someone who needs to purchase a certain product that he should go to a particular store, knowing that this store does not sell the product. Such pranks fall under the prohibition of “Ona’at Debarim,” because it causes the individual distress through words. It is also forbidden to walk into a store and inquire about the merchandise if one has no intention of purchasing anything, as this causes the merchant distress. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade speaking hurtful words to one’s fellow because this provokes anger and leads to conflict. Peace is the means through which blessing is received, and fighting brings ruin and destruction. The Torah therefore commanded us to refrain from speaking hurtfully to people, in order to maintain peace and avoid conflicts. This Misva applies in all times and in all places, and to both males and females. It is forbidden to speak hurtfully even to a child, and even to one’s own child. Parents must therefore ensure to discipline their children in a manner which does not inflict emotional harm. One who speaks to his fellow hurtfully violates this prohibition, but he is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition is violated without performing an action. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion of this Misva by noting that this prohibition does not forbid responding in kind to a hurtful remark. If somebody approaches a person and speaks hurtfully to him, that person has every right to respond, even sharply. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that just as the Torah permits a homeowner to fight back against a burglar who has broken into his home (a case known as “Ha’ba Ba’mahteret”), the Torah also permits one to fight back against verbal abuse. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because the Torah cannot expect a person to be “Ke’eben She’en Lo Hofchin” – like a stone which people step on and kick around, freely abused without responding. It is unrealistic for the Torah to demand that we simply remain silent when people insult or humiliate us. Moreover, remaining silent appears as an implicit admission to what is being said, and the Torah certainly does not expect a person to accept harsh insults being hurled at him. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, when responding to a verbal attack, a person should strive to do so in a moderate, tempered manner, and limit his anger as much as possible. Moreover, it is a measure of piety to remain silent in the face of verbal abuse. The Gemara famously promises great reward to “Ha’ne’elabin Ve’enan Olbin, Shom’in Herpatam Ve’enam Meshibin” – those who do not respond when they are insulted and humiliated. This is an exalted level of piety to which we should all strive, but on the level of strict Halacha, one is not required to remain silent when he comes under verbal attack.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (25:14) commands, “Al Tonu Ish Et Achiv” – that we may not take advantage of our fellow when engaging in commerce. This establishes a prohibition against charging or paying an unfair price for merchandise without the other party’s knowledge, a law known as Ona’a. The Torah speaks in this verse of a situation where one purchases “Mi’yad Amitekha” – literally, “from your fellow’s hand.” The Sages inferred from this phrase that the laws apply only to Metaltelin – moveable articles, that are actually handed from the buyer to the seller – and not to Karka – real estate. More precisely, the concept of Ona’a applies to real estate transactions, but the laws are less strict in regard to these transactions than they are when moveable merchandise is sold. The reason is because people are more willing to agree to a high price for a piece of real estate, which they will keep permanently. Although one is not allowed to overcharge for Karka, nevertheless, if he did, the sale is final, as we presume that the buyer accepts the transaction despite the unreasonably high price he paid. Explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, very simply, that it is unethical to take people’s money deceptively, charging or paying an unfair price without their realizing that the price is unfair. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, in order for society to function properly, people must commit not to cheat one another. If people all agree to deal with one another fairly and honestly, then they can conduct their affairs in a smooth, workable manner. But if people deceive one another, then commerce cannot be conducted functionally, because nobody will trust his fellow. The prohibition of Ona’a applies to both the seller and the buyer; the seller may not unreasonably overcharge, and the seller may not unreasonably underpay. Meaning, if the seller is unaware of his merchandise’s market value, and so he undercharges, the buyer – who is aware of the market value – is not permitted to pay the low price. He must pay a fair price for the merchandise he purchases. If a seller overcharged by the amount of a “Shetut” (literally, one-sixth), such as if he charged seven units of currency for merchandise valued at six, then the sale is valid, but the seller must repay the difference. The same applies if a buyer paid six for a piece of merchandise valued at seven. If the difference in price was less than a “Shetut,” then the sale is valid and no money is returned, as it is accepted that merchandise will sometimes be sold for a price slightly higher or lower than the market value. If the difference was more than a “Shetut,” then the cheated party has the right to void the sale. The other party, which overcharged or underpaid, does not have the right to void the sale. If, for some reason, the party who committed the Ona’a regrets the sale, despite having overcharged or underpaid, he is not entitled to void the transaction, as this right is given only to the victim. The victimized party can claim Ona’a only within the amount of time which, in the estimation of Bet Din, is needed to determine the fair market price. If the victimized party does not bring a claim until after that duration of time has passed, he may no longer claim Ona’a and have the transaction annulled. The laws of Ona’a apply only to commercially-sold merchandise. When people sell their belongings privately, it is accepted that they do not charge based on market prices, and thus buyers realize that they might be charged a significantly higher price. These laws pertain only to the item’s price. When it comes to an item’s weight or measurement, even the slightest inaccuracy voids the sale. If the merchandise was misrepresented as even marginally larger or heavier than its actual size or weight, the sale is annulled. One violates Ona’a only if he misleads the other party. If the seller is upfront with the buyer, and makes it very clear that he is charging a price significantly higher than the market value, and the buyer expresses his consent, the sale is valid, and the buyer cannot later claim Ona’a. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. One who overcharged or underpaid by an amount of a “Shetut” or more, without the other party’s knowledge, has transgressed this prohibition. He does not receive Malkut, however, as this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’hishabon” – prohibitions which, when violated, can be rectified through the payment of money, and for which one is thus not liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:14) introduces the laws of “Mekah U’memkar” – “buying and selling.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 336 th Biblical command the requirement for Bet Din to apply the principles of Torah law when adjudicating cases involving monetary transactions. He explains that the Torah commands following this system because an effective and just legal system is critical for maintaining law and order, and peaceful relations among people. The Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates on a number of principles relevant to the Torah’s laws governing transactions, including the distinction drawn by Halacha between real estate and moveable possessions. Real estate is transacted in three ways: “Kessef” – the transfer of money; “Shetar” – transferring a valid sale contract; and “Hazaka” – the buyer’s performing certain actions that demonstrate ownership. Once a buyer and seller agree on the deal, any one of these three measures suffices to transfer the property in question to the buyer’s ownership. When it comes to moveable items, different methods effect the transaction in different situations. Some items are transacted through “Hagbeha” – lifting the item; some through “Meshicha” – pulling the item; and other through Mesira – taking physical control over the item. Lightweight items, as a rule, are transacted through “Hagbeha,” but a boat, for example, which obviously cannot be lifted, is transacted through “Mesira” – handing over the ropes to the buyer. The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the view that all these methods of acquisition for Metaltelin (moveable items) were enacted by the Sages. On the level of Torah law, only the transfer of money effects the transfer of ownership, and nothing else is needed. However, the Sages enacted that a sold item does not become the buyer’s legal property until he physically takes possession of it, through the methods mentioned above. The Sages enacted this provision out of concern that after the buyer pays the seller for the item, the seller will not properly guard it, because he already received the money and thus does not care what happens to the item. In order to protect buyers, the Sages legislated that purchased items remain the seller’s property until the buyer takes physical possession, as discussed. An interesting question arises according to this view with regard to Kiddushin – the act whereby a bride becomes Halachically betrothed to the groom. This is done through the groom’s transfer of something he owns – generally a ring – to the bride. In a case where the groom purchased the ring but had yet to pay for it, we might wonder whether the Kiddushin is valid. Even though the groom took physical possession of the ring, nevertheless, this act is an effective means of legal acquisition only Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment; according to Torah law, he does not acquire the ring until he pays the money. Seemingly, a Rabbinically-sanctioned acquisition should not suffice for the bride to be betrothed on the level of Torah law. This might be why some Rabbis have the practice of asking the groom just before the Kiddushin whether he paid for the ring with his own money, to ascertain that an acquisition was made on the level of Torah law. This Misva applies in all times and in all places, and is assigned to the judges of Bet Din. If they fail to follow these principles in adjudicating cases involving property transactions, they are in violation of this affirmative command. However, if the two parties agree to accept a decision that does not follow Torah law, the judges may reach a decision against the Torah’s rules. When it comes to monetary law, the litigants are permitted to agree to a different system of adjudication, and so when they do, the judges are not required to reach a decision based on the Torah’s system.
The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:10), “Ve’kidashtem Et Shenat Ha’hamishim Shana” – “You shall sanctify the fiftieth year.” This is understood as requiring that the fiftieth year – the Yobel (jubilee) – be observed as a sacred year. This observance includes several components. First, agricultural activity is forbidden, and the land’s produce is considered ownerless, just like during a Shemita year. Additionally, all indentured servants are released, and all lands return to their original owners. Debts are not remitted during Yobel as they are during Shemita. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it stands to reason that the Sanhedrin would make a formal proclamation at the onset of Yobel declaring the year sacred, as the literal reading of this verse (“Ve’kidashtem Et Shenat Ha’hamishim Shana”) would suggest. Somebody who failed to observe any of these laws during Yobel has violated this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that such is violator is liable to severe punishment, and he is considered as though he denies G-d’s creation of the world. This concept might be based on the association between the Shemita and Yobel cycles and the story of creation. The seven years of the Shemita cycle, and the seven sets of seven years that comprise the Yobel cycle, correspond to the six days of creation that were followed by Shabbat, and thus one who fails to observe these laws is regarded as though he denies the story of the six days of creation. The Yobel year is not counted toward the next Shemita cycle. Meaning, the 49 th year of the Yobel cycle is a Shemita year, the fiftieth year is Yobel, and the next year begins the first year of the new Shemita cycle. In the next verse (25:11), the Torah introduces a prohibition forbidding agricultural work during Yobel, commanding, “Lo Tizra’u” – “Do not plant.” This applies to both working the land itself, and work involving trees. When it comes to Shemita, the Torah does not directly forbid planting trees, but rather forbids pruning vines (“Lo Tizmor” – 25:4), which enhances the vines. The Sages then deduced that if the Torah forbade on Shemita work which enhances a tree, then certainly planting a tree is forbidden. With regard to Yobel, however, the Torah directly forbids all planting, including planting trees. An additional command that appears in this verse (25:11) is harvesting produce in the usual manner. This refers to “Sefihim” – produce which was planted before Shemita, or that grew on its own during Shemita. Torah law allows harvesting and eating this produce during Yobel, but it forbids harvesting it in the normal manner in which harvesting is done in other years. This verse also issues the corresponding prohibition that applies to trees – “Ve’lo Tibseru Et Nezireha,” forbidding harvesting fruits in the unusual manner during Yobel. The fruits may be collected and eaten, but the harvesting must be done with a “Shinui” – a deviation from the normal manner of harvesting. This Misva applies mainly in the Land of Israel, though the obligation to release servants on Yobel applies even outside the land. The obligation of Yobel applies only when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in the Land of Israel. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that even if the majority of the nation resides in the land, the Torah obligation does not apply unless the tribes are living in their assigned portions of the land. When the Torah obligation of Yobel does not apply in the Land of Israel, the obligation to release servants does not apply outside the land, either.
The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:9-10) that a Shofar must be blown on Yom Kippur at the beginning of Yobel – the fiftieth year. The Shofar sound announced the release of all indentured servants, and the return of all purchased lands to their original owners. Servants are released without having to pay any money. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded sounding the Shofar in order to publicize the release of the servants, such that people will realize that everyone is undergoing this process. Releasing a servant was very difficult for a master, especially if the servant had been working with him for a long time and was already familiar with his work, his routine, and so on. Many masters also had forged a close personal connection with their servants. In order to alleviate the difficulty entailed in releasing servants, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah required sounding a Shofar and reminding masters that this hardship is shared by everybody. The Sefer Ha’hinuch references the adage, “Sa’ar Rabim Hasi Nehama” – “public distress is half-consolation.” When somebody in distress knows that many others are in the same condition, it makes the hardship easier to handle. And thus the Torah commanded sounding a Shofar to announce the release of servants, reminding masters that this difficult situation is being faced by people throughout the land, and this awareness will lessen the distress. The servant, too, might feel uneasy about leaving his master, who has cared for him and with whom he has built a close bond, and so he, too, needs the public Shofar sound to be reminded that others are going this uneasy process just as he is. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that a number of Halachic differences exist between the sounding of the Shofar on Yobel and the Shofar blowing on Rosh Hashanah. For example, when Rosh Hashanah would fall on Shabbat, the Shofar was blown only in the city’s Bet Din. On Yom Kippur of Yobel, by contrast, the Shofar was blown in every city that had a Bet Din, but not necessarily in Bet Din itself. The Gemara teaches that from Rosh Hashanah at the beginning of the Yobel year, until Yom Kippur, the servants were not required to work, but rather ate, drank and rejoiced, celebrating their imminent emancipation. They were then free to return home after the sounding of the Shofar on Yom Kippur. The Misva to sound the Shofar is assigned specifically to Bet Din. It applies in the Land of Israel, in periods when the law of Yobel applied. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s understanding of the reasoning behind this Misva underscores the importance of positive peer pressure. Just as awareness of shared hardship makes the hardship easier to bare, when it comes to Misvot, too, we gain strength from knowing that everyone is sharing the burden. If we are jointly committed to fulfilling the Misvot, it becomes easier for each individual to overcome the challenges and difficulties that are sometimes entailed in Misva performance. Knowing that we are all in this together, that our peers face this struggle just as we do, alleviates the hardship and helps us exert the effort needed to satisfy our obligations, no matter what this involves.
The Torah commands in Parashat Behar (Vayikra 25:24), “Ve’safarta Lecha Sheba Shabetot Shanim” – that we are to count seven series of seven years, meaning, forty-nine years, and then declare the fiftieth year as the Yobel (“jubilee”) year. Every seven years, the Shemita year is observed, and agricultural activity is forbidden during that year. The Torah commands counting seven Shemita cycles, each year for forty-nine years, and then proclaiming the fiftieth year sacred. During the fiftieth year, agricultural work is forbidden as it is during Shemita. In addition, servants are released, and properties are returned to their original owners. This obligation to count the years until Yobel is assigned specifically to the Sanhedrin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d commanded us to observe the Yobel year so we are reminded that ultimately, everything in existence belongs to G-d. Servants are released and sold lands are returned to their original owners to demonstrate that Hashem is the true owner over everything on earth, and He decides who receives what. By counting every year in relation to Yobel, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we become mindful of this fundamental tenet, and this will, in turn, deter us from theft and from coveting our fellow’s possessions. Once we realize that everything belongs to Hashem, and He gives each person all that he has, we will recognize the futility of obtaining things in a way which Hashem forbids, because we will understand that Hashem will take away from us anything we were not supposed to take. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this Misva reflects a “Sod” (“secret”) relating to the number of years that the world as we know it will exist, before the period of Mashiah and the establishment of a new world order. Tradition teaches that this counting – like the Sefirat Ha’omer counting from Pesach until Shabuot – must be done verbally. This is in contrast to the counting of the Zab and Zaba (people who experienced certain types of bodily emissions that render them impure), who must count seven “clean” days without emissions. This counting requires not a verbal statement of the number of days, but rather simply keeping track of the days. By contrast, the counting of the years until Yobel requires the Sanhedrin to make a verbal pronouncement. The Torah uses the same verb in both these contexts (“Ve’safarta Lecha,” and “Ve’safar”/”Ve’safra”), but nevertheless, our oral tradition teaches that the command in the context of Yobel requires a verbal counting, and the command in the context of the Zab and Zaba does not. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that there are other examples of this phenomenon – of a command formulated identically in different contexts, but interpreted differently in each context. For example, the Torah commands us to remember (“Zachor”) Amalek’s attack, the Exodus from Egypt, and Miriam’s leprosy. However, in the first two contexts, this refers to verbally recalling the event, whereas in the case of Miriam, we need to remember the event in our minds, without verbally mentioning it. These different interpretations have been handed down to us through our oral tradition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this context discusses the debate among the Rishonim regarding the Shemita cycle. It is accepted that the year before the destruction of the second Bet Ha’mikdash was a Shemita year, but there is disagreement as to when this calamity occurred. Rashi, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites, maintained that the destruction occurred in 3828 (68 C.E.), such that the year 3827 was a Shemita year. According to this view, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it emerges that the year 5017 (1256-7), which was during the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s lifetime, was a Shemita year. Rabbenu Hananel, however, was of the opinion that the destruction took place in 3829 (69 C.E.), such that 3828 was a Shemita year, and in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s time, 5018 (1257-8) was a Shemita year. Interestingly, the accepted opinion is that the destruction occurred in 3830 (70 C.E.), such that Shemita was observed in 3829. It is based on this assumption that Shemita years are determined in our time. The Misva to count the years until Yobel, as mentioned, is assigned to the Sanhedrin, and thus it applies only when there is a Sanhedrin. Furthermore, the Misva of Yobel itself applies only when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in the Land of Israel. The Misva of Yobel applies in the Land of Israel and partially outside the land – as the requirement to release servants applies in all places, and not only in the Land of Israel. The other laws of Yobel apply specifically in Eretz Yisrael.
The Torah in Parashat Behar introduces several prohibitions that apply during the Shemita year – which is observed every seven years – including the command, “Ve’et Inveh Nezirecha Lo Tibsor” (25:5), forbidding harvesting grapes during Shemita in the usual manner. This command establishes a general prohibition forbidding the collection of all Shemita produce in the usual way of harvesting. It is permissible to partake of the Shemita produce, but the produce must be collected with a Shinui (“deviation”), differently from the usual manner of harvesting, in order to show that the produce is ownerless and readily accessible to everyone. Interestingly, the Torah here refers to the grapes which may not be harvested normally with the expression, “Inveh Nezirecha.” The commentators disagree as to what the term “Nezirecha” means in this verse. The verb N.Z.R. generally means “separate” – as in the word “Nazir,” referring to somebody who vows to abstain from wine – and thus Rashi explains this phrase as speaking of one who set his produce aside for himself, in violation of the laws of Shemita. Instead of making his grapes ownerless, as the Torah requires on Shemita, he kept them “separate” and guarded, reserved for himself. The Torah commands that even though this produce was not declared ownerless, nevertheless, it is subject to the laws of Shemita, and may not be harvested in the usual manner. The Ramban explains this phrase differently, claiming that the Torah speaks simply of a vine which has yet to be harvested. The Torah refers to such vines as “Inveh Nezirecha” because a Nazir does not harvest his grapes, since he is not allowed to eat them or drink wine. After one harvests produce during Shemita, even in a permissible manner, it is subject to various different restrictions. For example, the produce must be used constructively, and may not be wasted. The Tosefta tells that the Sages recognized the practical difficulties caused by the Shemita restrictions on harvesting, and so they instituted the system of “Osar Bet Din” (literally, “the court’s warehouse”). In this system, the Bet Din takes responsibility for the fields, and hires the fields’ owners as its workers to collect the produce and store it. The restrictions of Shemita do not apply to Bet Din, and so this system allows for the restrictions to be circumvented. The Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953) approved of this system in the modern era, and to this day, the Osar Bet Din arrangement is followed to allow for the harvesting and distribution of Shemita produce. The owners of the fields officially work for the Bet Din, and their profits are received as payment for their services.
The Torah in Parashat Behar (25:4) introduces the prohibition against agricultural work during the Shemita year, which is observed every seven years in the Land of Israel. The Sefer Ha’hinuch discussed the reasons behind the Shemita year earlier, in reference to the Misva to declare one’s fields ownerless on the Shemita year (Misva 84). In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who performs forbidden agricultural work during Shemita “Bi’zman Ha’bayit” – in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash – has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The commentaries note that the Sefer Ha’hinuch did not actually mean that the Torah commands regarding Shemita apply specifically during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. For in truth, the Biblical prohibitions relevant to Shemita apply only when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in the Land of Israel. And thus even during the Second Commonwealth, when the Bet Ha’mikdash stood, the Misvot of Shemita did not apply on the level of Torah law, because only a minority of the Jewish Nation was living in the land at that time. When only a minority of the Jewish Nation lives in Israel, the laws of Shemita apply only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists a separate Misva (Misva 327) forbidding work involving trees during the Shemita year (as opposed to working the ground). Interestingly, the Torah does not explicitly forbid planting trees during Shemita. It commands that one may not prune his vine (“Lo Tizmor” – 25:4), an activity which enhances the vine. The Sages deduced that if the Torah forbade an act which is beneficial for a tree, then certainly it is forbidden to actually plant a tree. The Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953) noted that one who plants a tree during Shemita is not liable to Malkut, even though he has transgressed a Torah violation. The rule of “En Onshin Min Ha’din” establishes that the courts do not punish for violations of a law which is derived through logical deduction (Kal Va’homer), and is not explicated in the text of the Torah. Hence, one who plants a tree during Shemita does not receive Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists an additional Misva (328) forbidding harvesting produce which grew during Shemita, produce known as “Sefihin.” This refers to produce which grew on its own, or that had been planted permissibly before the onset of the Shemita year. On the level of Torah law, it is permissible to harvest small amounts of this produce for consumption, but not to harvest normally, in large quantities. Even if a person planted during Shemita in violation of the prohibitions of Shemita, Torah law permits eating this produce, and forbids only harvesting it in large quantities as he normally does. The Sages, however, forbade eating produce which grew during Shemita, because there were people who would plant during Shemita, in violation of Torah law, and then sell the produce claiming that it had been planted before Shemita. This prohibition applies to vegetables, grain and legumes, which grow quickly. It does not apply to fruits, which take a long time to grow, such that there is no concern that they would be deceptively presented as having been planted before Shemita. One who collects “Sefihin” – even nowadays – is liable to “Makkot Mardut” (lashes) for violating the Rabbinic enactment forbidding “Sefihin.”
Amidst the Torah’s discussion in Parashat Emor of the celebration of Sukkot, it commands, “Ba’sukkot Teshbu Shib’at Yamim” – that we must reside in the Sukka throughout the seven days of Sukkot. This means that all meals must be eaten in the Sukka, and one must sleep – even short naps – in the Sukka. One is exempt from eating or sleeping in the Sukka only in a situation of “Mista’er” – if conditions in the Sukka would cause him discomfort and distress. Throughout the seven days of Sukkot, one is required to be in the Sukka only when he chooses to eat a meal with bread, and to sleep. On the first night of Sukkot, however, there is a Torah obligation to eat a Ke’zayit of bread in the Sukka. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded us to reside in the Sukka in order that we remember the great miracles which Hashem performed for our ancestors as they traveled in the wilderness after leaving Egypt. Specifically, the Sukka commemorates the “Ananeh Ha’kabod” – the supernatural “clouds of glory” which encircled Beneh Yisrael in the desert, protecting them from the searing sun during the day, and from the cold at night. According to a different opinion, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Sukka commemorates the actual huts in which Beneh Yisrael resided during their sojourn through the wilderness. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that by remembering the miracles that Hashem performed for our ancestors, we will be inspired to faithfully observe His Misvot, and we will thereby become worthy of His blessings. Hashem’s wish is for us to receive His unlimited blessings, and so He gave us Misvot to observe through which we become deserving of His infinite goodness. The Sukka must be at least 10 Tefahim (handbreadths) tall, but less than 20 Amot tall. Its area must be at least 7 x 7 Tefahim. The Sukka must contains at least three walls, and the Sechach must be thick enough that there is more shade than sunlight. The Sechach must be made from “Pesolet Goren Va’yekeb” – meaning, materials that grew from the earth and which are not susceptible to Tum’a, as they have not been made into a utensil. An empty space of three Tefahim or more in the middle of the Sechach, or at the side of the Sechach, disqualifies the Sukka. The Gemara in Masechet Sukka (9) notes that the Torah formulates the command of Sukka with the phrase, “Hag Ha’Sukkot Ta’aseh Lecha” – “You shall make for yourself the festival of Sukkot” (Debarim 16:13) – emphasizing that the Sukka must be “Lecha,” or “yours.” From this word the Gemara infers that one does not fulfill the Misva of Sukka if he steals a Sukka and uses it for the Misva. Tosafot raise the question of why an inference from the word “Lecha” is necessary, given the general Halachic principle disqualifying a “Misva Ha’ba’a Ba’abera” – a Misva performed through sinful means. Seemingly, this well-established principle should suffice to disqualify a stolen Sukka, even without an inference from a textual nuance. Tosafot answer that the rule of “Misva Ha’ba’a Ba’abera” disqualifies a Misva performed through sinful means only Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Gemara therefore noted a textual nuance indicating the disqualification of a stolen Sukka, to establish that such a Sukka is invalid on the level of Torah law, and not merely Mi’de’rabbanan. This Misva applies in all times, even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and in all places. It applies only to men, as it falls under the category of Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama (Misvot that apply only in specific time-frames), from which women are exempt.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:40) introduces the Misva of “Arba Minim” – to shake the four species on Sukkot. It commands that we should take on the first day of Sukkot a “Peri Etz Hadar” – referring to the Etrog; “Kapot Temarim” – referring to a Lulab; “Anaf Etz Abot” – referring to Hadasim; and “Arbeh Nahal”- referring to Arabot. (Although the Torah writes “Kapot Temarim,” in the plural form, nevertheless, the word “Kapot” is written without a “Vav,” implying that it should be read as “Kapat,” in the singular form. The Sages thus understood that we take just a single palm branch.) In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch reiterates his principle that people’s minds and feelings are impacted by the actions they perform. The time of year when Sukkot is observed – early autumn – is the time of the harvest, when farmers are collecting their produce and bringing it into their homes and warehouses. This is a time of joy and festivity, as the farmers literally reap the fruit of their labor. G-d wanted us to channel this joy toward Him, to transform the joy over material prosperity into an experience of spiritual joy. He therefore commanded us to observe a festive holiday during this time, and to take these four species, an action which, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, evokes feelings of joy. Looking at these plants, and holding them, enhances one’s feelings of jubilation, and so G-d commanded us to take these species as part of our celebration of Sukkot. On other holidays, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we do not need these plants to evoke feelings of joy, because on Pesach we already have the Masa, Marror, and other festive components, and on Shabuot we celebrate the Torah, and thus we do not need any external feature to arouse our joy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds in this context the Sages’ famous teaching that the four species correspond to four parts of the body. The Etrog resembles the heart, the source of the intellect, and we thus take an Etrog to signify the need to devote our minds and thoughts to the Almighty. The Lulab resembles the spine, and it thus represents the subjugation of the body to the service of the Creator. The leaves of the Hadasim resemble the eyes, symbolizing the need to exercise care not to be drawn after that which we see. Finally, the leaves of the Arabot are shaped like the mouth, and thus represent the vital importance of guarding our mouths against forbidden speech. Each of the four species is indispensable for the fulfillment of the Misva. This means that if a person has only three of the four species, he cannot fulfill the Misva; there is no value in taking the three species in such a case. This Misva applies only to males; as it is a “Misvat Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” (an affirmative command that is confined to a specific time-frame), it is not obligatory upon women. This Misva applies in all times, and, on the first day of Sukkot, in all places. Torah law requires taking the four species everywhere on the first day of Sukkot, but only in the Bet Ha’mikdash on the subsequent six days. The Sages, however, enacted that the four species should be taken everywhere even on the last six days. According to some opinions, including that of the Rambam, the Torah obligation to take the four species on all seven days applies not only in the Bet Ha’mikdash itself, but throughout the city of Jerusalem. For this reason, there are those who make a point of going to Israel for Sukkot so they can take the four species in the Old City of Jerusalem on each day of the holiday, and thus have the privilege of fulfilling the Misva on the level of Torah law each day. Others, however, understood that the Torah obligation applies only in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and not elsewhere in Jerusalem.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (23:36) introduces the obligation to offer a special sacrifice on Shemini Aseret – the eighth day of Sukkot, which is considered an independent Yom Tob. This refers to the Musaf offering, which the Torah describes elsewhere, in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 29:35-38). In this same verse, the Torah introduces the prohibition against performing Melacha (constructive work) on Shemini Aseret. This holiday is referred to by the term “Aseret,” which literally means “stopping.” The Rabbis explain that we observe this day as though G-d asks us to stay with Him an additional day. After having been together throughout this season of Yamim Tobim, G-d tells us that He finds it difficult, as it were, to part with us, and so we observe an additional day of Yom Tob when we festively celebrate together with Him. Although Shemini Aseret constitutes a separate Yom Tob, and is not part of Sukkot, nevertheless, Jews in the Diaspora eat in the Sukka on Shemini Aseret. This is due to the “Safek” – the uncertainty that Diaspora communities had in ancient times as to when the new month was declared. Given this uncertainty, they needed to consider the possibility that Shemini Aseret was actually the seventh day of Sukkot. Since residing in the Sukka is a Torah obligation, we eat in the Sukka on Shemini Aseret in case this day is actually the final day of Sukkot. Nevertheless, in the prayer service on Shemini Aseret, we mention only Shemini Aseret, and not Sukkot, because this day cannot be both Sukkot and Shemini Aseret. (This situation differs in this respect from that of Shabbat which is also Yom Tob, when we indeed mention both Shabbat and the Yom Tob in our prayer text, since the day truly is both Shabbat and Yom Tob.) Sitting in the Sukka, however, does not contradict the observance of Shemini Aseret, as mentioning Sukkot in the prayers would, since people occasionally spend time outdoors anyway, irrespective of the obligation of Sukka. As Shemini Aseret is the final holiday discussed by the Torah, the Sefer Ha’hinuch chooses this context as the one in which to discuss the prohibition against working on Hol Ha’mo’ed. (This is ironic, as Shemini Aseret specifically does not feature a period of Hol Ha’mo’ed, like Pesach and Sukkot do.) The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the view of the Ramban and others that working on Hol Ha’mo’ed is forbidden Mi’de’Orayta (by Torah law), and not merely by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Torah did not specify which kinds of work are forbidden on Hol Ha’mo’ed, but instead authorized the Sages to determine which categories of work are prohibited and which are allowed. The Sages established that work is permitted on Hol Ha’mo’ed for the sake of avoiding a financial loss. An exception is the case of work involving a great deal of exertion (“Tirha Yetera”), which is forbidden even to avoid a financial loss, unless one a substantial loss would definitely result from not performing the hard work. Furthermore, it is forbidden to intentionally schedule work for Hol Ha’mo’ed. In ancient times, the rabbinic authorities were empowered to undo work which was scheduled for Hol Ha’mo’ed, such as uprooting plants which were planted in violation of Hol Ha’mo’ed. It goes without saying that one who needs to work on Hol Ha’mo’ed in order to obtain food is permitted to do so. The Rambam disagrees with the aforementioned position of the Ramban, and maintained that work is forbidden on Hol Ha’mo’ed not by force of Torah law, but by force of Rabbinic enactment. In his view, then, if there is some activity whose status vis-à-vis Hol Ha’mo’ed is uncertain, it may be performed on Hol Ha’mo’ed, as we may be lenient in situations of doubt when a Rabbinic law (as opposed to a Torah prohibition) is at stake. In any event, the Sefer Ha’hinuch in this instance does not follow the Rambam’s view, and instead accepts the Ramban’s position, that work on Hol Ha’mo’ed is forbidden by Torah law. The Sages warn us in Pirkeh Avot (3:11) that “Ha’mebazeh Et Ha’mo’adot” – one who disrespects the holidays – forfeits his share in the next world. Rashi explains that this refers to a person who works on Hol Ha’mo’ed. This demonstrates the importance of treating the entire holiday – even Hol Ha’mo’ed – with respect, and of ensuring not to perform work which is not allowed on these days.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:35) that the first day of Sukkot must be observed as a “Mikra Kodesh” (“sacred occasion”), referring to a time of cessation of Melacha (constructive work). In that same verse, the Torah issues a prohibition against performing Melacha on this day (“Kol Melechet Aboda Lo Ta’asu”). Thus, performing work on the first day of Sukkot (like on other days of Yom Tob) is forbidden by force of both an affirmative command to observe this day as a “Mikra Kodesh,” and a prohibition directly forbidding Melacha. These commands apply in all times and places, and to both men and women. Normally, women are exempt from “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands which apply only in certain times. The Misvat Aseh to refrain from Melacha on Yom Tob, however, is associated with the Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibition) against performing Melacha, and so it is binding even upon women. As women are included in all Misvot Lo Ta’aseh, there are included also in the affirmative command to observe Yom Tob as a “Mikra Kodesh,” which is linked to an associated Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. The reason for this prohibition, as discussed in earlier contexts, is to allow us the time and peace of mind to focus our attention on the miracles which the Yom Tob commemorates. Since we abstain from Melacha, we are not preoccupied with work, and we are thus able to think about and reflect upon the events celebrated on the Yom Tob. The Torah here also adds the command to offer special sacrifices on each of the seven days of Sukkot (“Shibat Yamim Takribu Isheh L’Hashem” – 23:36). This refers to the Musaf offering, which is described by the Torah in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 29:12-34). The Musaf offering brought on Sukkot included a large number of Parim (bulls) – 13 on the first day, 12 on the second day, 11 on the third day, and so on, with one fewer bull being offered each day. In all, seventy bulls were offered over the course of Sukkot (13+12+11+10+9+8+7). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in the merit of these sacrifices, the 70 enemy nations were “diminished,” just as the number of bulls was reduced each day. The Musaf sacrifice on Sukkot also included a goat as a sin-offering. The Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797) noted that in reference to the first, second and fourth days of Sukkot, this goat is called a “Se’ir Izim” (Bamidbar 29:16,19,25), whereas in reference to all other days of Sukkot, it is called simply a “Se’ir” (29:22,28,31,34). The Gaon explained that on the first, second and fourth days of Sukkot, a total of 35 bulls were offered (13+12+10) – the same number that was offered on the other four days (11+9+8+7). These two groups of days, the Gaon said, thus correspond to the two general groups of enemy nations – those under the leadership of Edom, and those under the leadership of Yishmael. The Zohar writes that the word “Se’ir” alludes to Esav, the founder of the kingdom of Edom, and thus the days regarding which the word “Se’ir” is mentioned without the word “Izim” correspond to the nations of Edom. The other days correspond to the nations of Yishmael. Immediately after commanding the offering of the Musaf each day of Sukkot, the Torah commands observing the eighth day – which we call Shemini Aseret – as a “Mikra Kodesh,” when work is forbidden. Like the observance of the other days of Yom Tob, this command applies in all times and places, and to both men and women, as discussed above.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (23:27-32) introduces a series of commands relevant to the 10 th of Tishri – the day of Yom Kippur. These include the command to offer a special series of sacrifices (“Ve’hikrabtem Isheh L’Hashem” – 23:27), referring to the Musaf offering, which the Torah describes in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 29:7-11). The Musaf offering on Yom Kippur consists of one bull, one ram and seven sheep as an Ola (burnt-offering), and a goat as a Hatat (sin-offering). Additionally, the Torah issues a command forbidding performing Melacha (constructive work) on Yom Kippur (23:28), and a command forbidding eating and drinking on this day (23:29). Finally, the Torah adds an affirmative command requiring that we observe Yom Kippur as a “Shabbat Shabbaton” – a day of cessation of work (23:32). Thus, refraining from work is required on Yom Kippur by force of both an affirmative command and a prohibition against performing work. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade performing work on Yom Kippur so that we will be able to fully devote our attention to pleading for forgiveness for our wrongdoing. If we would be permitted to work, we would be preoccupied with our workday responsibilities, and would thus not focus on prayer and repentance as we should on this day. All work which is forbidden on Shabbat is forbidden also on Yom Kippur. The only exception is what the Gemara calls “Kenibat Ha’yarak,” which refers to either cutting vegetables, or separating the edible parts of the vegetables from the inedible parts. This is permitted on Yom Kippur afternoon, from the time for Minha, whereas this is forbidden on Shabbat Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, it has become customary to refrain from “Kenibat Ha’yarak” even on the afternoon of Yom Kippur. Another difference between Shabbat and Yom Kippur in this regard is that performing Melacha on Shabbat is punishable by the most severe form of capital punishment – Sekila (stoning) – whereas performing Melacha on Yom Kippur is punishable by Karet. Surprisingly, this distinction is noted by the Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 611) – despite the fact that, seemingly, this point has no practical Halachic implications nowadays. The Shulhan Aruch presents only the practical information relevant for the observance of Halacha in our time, and the question thus arises as to why Maran, the author of the Shulhan Aruch, found it necessary to note the different punishments for these violations. The commentators explain that this point is relevant to the case of one who caused his fellow damage on Shabbat or Yom Kippur in a manner which involved performing a Melacha. The principle of “Kim Leh Be’de’rabba Mineh” establishes that if one performs an act which simultaneously transgresses two prohibitions, he receives only the punishment for the more severe violation, and is exempt from punishment for the lesser violation. However, this is applicable only if the more severe punishment is one administered by the courts – as opposed to Karet, which is delivered only by G-d. Thus, if one damages his friend on Shabbat in a manner which entails Shabbat desecration, he will not be required to compensate his friend for the damage, because this act renders him liable to the severe punishment of Sekila. If, however, this happened on Yom Kippur, he would be liable to pay for the damages, because the punishment of Karet for desecrating Yom Kippur does not absolve him from responsibility for the damages. The prohibition against performing Melacha on Yom Kippur applies in all times and places, and to both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:27) that on the 10 th day of the month of Tishri – the day of Yom Kippur – we are required to “afflict our souls” (“Ve’initem Et Nafshotechem”). The Sages understood this as a reference to “Dabar She’me’abed Et Ha’nefesh” – something which “reduces” the body, meaning, fasting, abstaining from food and drink. In addition, we are to refrain on Yom Kippur from four other types of physical enjoyment – bathing, applying oil or ointment to the skin, wearing shoes, and marital relations. The Rishonim debate the question of whether these four activities are included in the Torah command to “afflict our souls” on Yom Kippur, or are forbidden Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). According to some opinions, Torah law forbids only eating and drinking, and the Sages later enacted that we abstain also from these other four forms of physical enjoyment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in G-d’s infinite kindness, He designated a day on which we attain forgiveness for our wrongdoing through repentance. We are to refrain from food and drink on this day, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, because physical activities have the effect of drawing us toward our physical desires, away from the pursuit of wisdom and the service of G-d. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the true “sweetness” of life is Torah study and Misva observance, whereas the physical pleasures of life are “artificial” sweetness. The more we involve ourselves in physical pleasures, the less likely we are to enjoy and pursue real joy, the joy of serving Hashem. Therefore, on Yom Kippur, when we are judged, we abstain from physical enjoyment to show that we are making an effort to draw ourselves toward the service of G-d. Normally, when the Torah forbids eating something, one transgresses the prohibition by eating a Ke’zayit. On Yom Kippur, however, since the Torah does not directly forbid eating, but rather requires “afflicting our souls,” the command is violated through the consumption of a “Kotebet Ha’gasa” – the volume of a large date, which is larger than a Ke’zayit. The Sages determined that it is only after eating this amount that one experiences a degree of satiation such that he no longer feels “afflicted.” One who drinks on Yom Kippur transgresses this command if he drinks the amount of “Melo Lugmav” (a cheek-full). Addressing the other four prohibitions, the Sefer Ha’hinuch opines that these are forbidden only “Mi’de’rabbanan,” and therefore, if a person has some particular need to perform one of these activities on Yom Kippur, he is allowed to do so. For example, a person with scabs in his scalp which cause him discomfort may apply ointment to alleviate the discomfort. One who needs to cross through water to guard his property, or for some other purpose, he may, even though he will then be bathing. Only leather shoes are forbidden to be worn on Yom Kippur; shoes made from other materials may be worn. An ill patient, Heaven forbid, for whom fasting can be life-threatening, may and in fact must eat on Yom Kippur in order to avoid danger. He may eat if an expert physician says that he must, and even if the doctor determines that his life is not threatened by fasting, he may eat if he feels that he must in order to protect his life. The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions in this context that the fast of Tisha B’Ab, which the Sages enacted for the purpose of mourning the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash and other tragedies, features the stringencies of Yom Kippur. Meaning, the fast begins before sundown the day before, and all five prohibitions must be observed. Moreover, even pregnant women and nursing mothers are required to fast unless this poses a risk, just as they are on Yom Kippur. This command applies in all places and all times, to both men and women. One who eats or drinks the aforementioned quantities on Yom Kippur has transgressed this affirmative command, as well as a separate prohibition, which is punishable by Karet. One who eats accidentally (such as if he did not realize it was Yom Kippur) is required to bring a Korban Hatat (sin offering).
In its discussion of the observance of Rosh Hashanah, the Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:24), “Ve’hikrabtem Isheh L’Hashem” – that a special sacrifice must be offered. This refers to the Musaf offering, which is specified later in the Torah, in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 29:1-6). There we read that the Musaf sacrifice on Rosh Hashanah consisted of one bull, one ram and seven sheep, all of which were brought as an Ola (burnt sacrifice). Additionally, a goat was offered as a sin-offering. The Torah there emphasizes that these are all required in addition to the monthly Rosh Hodesh sacrifice. Rosh Hashanah is observed on the first day of the month of Tishri, and thus it is also Rosh Hodesh. As such, the Musaf offering required on every Rosh Hodesh is required also on Rosh Hashanah. (And, of course, the daily Tamid sacrifice must also be offered on this day.) There is some discussion among the Rishonim as to whether the Rosh Hodesh sin-offering was also offered on Rosh Hashanah. The Rosh Hodesh Musaf sacrifice included a goat as a sin-offering, but it is unclear whether this, too, was offered on Rosh Hashanah. The verses describing the Rosh Hashanah Musaf offering state that this offering must be brought in addition to “the Ola of the [new] month” – specifying the Ola of the Rosh Hodesh Musaf offering (meaning, two bulls, one ram, and seven sheep – Bamidbar 28:11). The sin-offering of the Rosh Hodesh Musaf offering is not mentioned, perhaps suggesting that the sin-offering was not offered on Rosh Hashanah. Tosafot in Masechet Rosh Hashanah (8b) bring this view in the name of Rabbenu Meshulam, who noted the verse in Tehillim (81:4) that refers to Rosh Hashanah as “Keseh Le’yom Hagenu” – the holiday on which something is concealed. Rabbenu Meshulam explained this phrase as a veiled reference to the goat of the Rosh Hodesh Musaf offering, which was “hidden” on Rosh Hashanah, omitted from the other sacrifices offered to mark the occasion of Rosh Hodesh. Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171) challenges Rabbenu Meshulam’s claim in light of a passage in the Tosefta (in Masechet Shabuot) which states that a goat for the Rosh Hodesh sin-offering was brought twelve times during the year, once every month. This clearly indicates that the goat was offered even on the first day of Tishri, Rosh Hashanah. Rabbenu Meshulam then clarified that he did not actually mean to say that the goat is not offered on Rosh Hashanah, but rather that it is not mentioned in the Rosh Hashanah prayer service, and it is in this sense that the goat is “concealed.”
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:24) introduces both an affirmative command to observe the day of Rosh Hashanah as a sacred day, refraining from Melacha (constructive work), and a prohibition against performing Melacha on this day. Thus, as with other holidays, performing Melacha on Rosh Hashanah is forbidden by force of both a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) and a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists these commands as the 310 th and 311 th Misvot of the Torah. In discussing the observance of Rosh Hashanah, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is an expression of Hashem’s boundless kindness that He judges mankind on a yearly basis. If He would not make an annual accounting of people’s conduct, their misdeeds would accumulate and become so numerous that severe punishment would be necessary to atone for them. G-d makes an accounting each year so we repent and then embark on a new, fresh beginning. And if we are deserving of punishment, this would be for relatively few violations, such that our punishment will not be especially severe. If Hashem would not judge us each year, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, mankind’s sins could accumulate to the point where the world would deserve annihilation. Hence, Rosh Hashanah is necessary for sustaining the world and keeping it in existence. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that for this reason, as the fate of the world is at stake, we are to sense a degree of fear and dread on Rosh Hashanah, more so than during the rest of the year. The Torah describes Rosh Hashanah as a day of “Zichron Teru’a,” when a “Teru’a” sound is produced from the Shofar. The “Teru’a” is a “broken” sound – a series of short, rapid blasts, symbolizing the weeping of a broken spirit. On Rosh Hashanah, we are to introspect and “break” our evil inclination, regretting our wrongdoing and committing to make a fresh start. The Sefer Ha’hinuch references in this context the Gemara’s comment that the festive Hallel service is not recited on Rosh Hashanah because the “books of life and death are open.” This is a time of fear, and thus Hallel is not appropriate. The Gemara teaches that one can escape evil decrees on Rosh Hashanah in four ways: by giving charity; crying out to Hashem in prayer; changing one’s name, symbolizing that he has repented and become a different person, such that the decree does not apply to him; and, most importantly, changing one’s conduct. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the Gemara’s comment that “three books are opened on Rosh Hashanah – one of the completely righteous, one of the completely evil, and one of those in the middle.” Those who are righteous are immediately inscribed for life; the wicked are inscribed for death; and the judgment of those in the middle is held in abeyance until Yom Kippur. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Gemara refers here to those who are entirely righteous, without any sin, and those who are entirely wicked, without any virtue. These groups are sentenced on Rosh Hashanah to life and death, respectively. Everyone else is held in abeyance until Yom Kippur, regardless of whether their merits exceed their sins, or if their sins exceed their merits. (The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites proof to this reading from a different version of this teaching cited by the Gemara in the name of Bet Shammai.) On the basis of this explanation, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, a “great difficulty” is resolved. The commentators explain that at first glance, it seems difficult to accept that all the righteous are inscribed for life, and all the wicked are inscribed to death. After all, we see many righteous people who pass away, and many wicked people who survive and prosper. This question is resolved by the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s explanation, that the Gemara refers to those who are perfectly righteous and those who are exclusively wicked. Everyone else has both merits and demerits, and G-d, in His infinite wisdom and pristine justice, determines who among these is worthy of living and who is not. The prohibition against performing Melacha on Rosh Hashanah applies in all times and places. One who performs on Rosh Hashanah Melacha that does not involve food preparation has transgressed these two commands and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah introduces the command to desist from Melacha (constructive work) on Shabuot as both an affirmative command and a prohibition. After commanding that this day must be observed as a sacred occasion when Melacha is not done, the Torah then issues a prohibition against performing Melacha (“Kol Melechet Aboda Lo Ta’asu” – Vayikra 23:21). In discussing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch addresses the date of Shabuot. The Torah does not assign a calendar date to this holiday, and instead commands observing a Yom Tob on the 50 th day from the 16 th of Nissan – the second day of Pesach, when the special Omer sacrifice was offered. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that Nissan has 30 days, and thus we count 15 days in Nissan (from the 16 th through the 30 th ), plus the 29 days of Iyar and the first six days of Sivan, for a total of 50 days. The Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, Poland, 17 th century) noted that from the Gemara, it actually appears that Matan Torah – the event we celebrate on Shabuot – did not occur on the 6 th of Sivan. It emerges from the Gemara’s discussion that Beneh Yisrael left Egypt on Thursday, such that the 16 th of Nissan was that year on Friday. Matan Torah thus should have occurred on Friday, seven weeks later, but Moshe added a day of preparation beforehand, such that the Torah was given on Shabbat. Accordingly, the Magen Abraham notes, it turns out that the Torah was given on the 7 th of Sivan, and not the 6 th . He thus raises the question of why in our prayers on Shabuot we refer to this holiday as “Zeman Matan Toratenu” – the day when the Torah was given. The Magen Abraham speculates that this formulation might be relevant specifically to the second day of Shabuot observed in the Diaspora, which of course is celebrated on the 7 th of Sivan. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, writes explicitly that the holiday of Shabuot is celebrated on the 6 th of Sivan and celebrates Matan Torah. It is possible that he followed a different view mentioned in the Gemara, claiming that the Exodus actually took place on Friday, not on Thursday, and the Torah was given 50 days after the day following the Exodus, on Shabbat, the 6 th of Sivan.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:21) that we must observe the day of Shabuot as a “Mikra Kodesh” (“sacred occasion”), which the Sages understood to mean that we abstain from Melacha (constructive work). As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explained in a previous context, the Torah requires us to refrain from Melacha on special occasions in order to enable us to focus our attention on the significance of the events commemorated on each given occasion. In the case of Shabuot, of course, the event is Matan Torah. The prohibition of Melacha on Shabuot ensures that we will not be preoccupied on this day, such that we will be able to contemplate and reflect upon the precious gift which was given to us on this day – the sacred Torah.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:16) commands that a “Minha Hadasha” – “new grain offering” – must be brought in the Bet Ha’mikdash on Shabuot. This offering consisted of two loaves of leavened bread produced from the new wheat crop. Seven weeks earlier, on the second day of Pesach, the Korban Ha’omer was brought, consisting of a measure of the new barley harvest. On Shabuot, the Sheteh Ha’lehem (“two-loaf”) offering was brought from the new wheat harvest. A quantity of three Se’a of the new wheat was harvested, thoroughly cleaned, and then threshed. After the chaff was removed, the wheat was ground into flour, and the flour was then sifted in twelve sieves, resulting in two Esronim of especially fine flour. One rectangular loaf was then made from each of the two Esronim. Each loaf measured 7 Tefahim (handbreadths) long, four Tefahim wide, and 4 Esbaot (finger-widths) high. The baking was done before Yom Tob, as it was not allowed on Yom Tob. On Shabuot, the loaves were waved together with two sheep offered as a Shelamim sacrifice accompanying the “Sheteh Ha’lehem,” before the sheep were slaughtered. The bread was then eaten by the Kohanim. One loaf was given to the Kohen Gadol, and the other loaf was divided among all the Kohanim. On Yom Tob, all the rotations of Kohanim were apportioned shares of the sacrifices, such that each Kohen received a very small piece of the loaf. According to Torah law, the bread was allowed to be eaten throughout the night after Shabuot, until morning. However, the Rabbis enacted a safeguard, requiring that the bread be eaten before Hasot (Halachic midnight). Accompanying the two loaves were the aforementioned two sheep brought as a Shelamim, as well as seven other sheep, a bull and two rams, which were offered as an Ola (burnt offering). Additionally, a goat was brought as a sin-offering. These sacrifices were required in addition to the Musaf sacrifice which was offered on Shabuot, just as on other Yamim Tobim. The offering of the Korban Ha’omer on the second day of Pesach rendered the new grain permissible for consumption; until this offering was brought, it was forbidden to partake of the season’s new grain (“Hadash”). Correspondingly, the offering of the Sheteh Ha’lehem on Shabuot rendered the new grain permissible for flour offerings in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Prior to the offering of the “Sheteh Ha’lehem,” it was forbidden to bring the new grain as a flour offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that whereas the grain brought for the Korban Ha’omer was not baked, but was rather offered as flour, the Sheteh Ha’lehem was baked into loaves. The reason, he explains, is that the Korban Ha’omer consisted of barley, which was used primarily as animal fodder, whereas the Sheteh Ha'lehem consisted of wheat, which was used for baking bread for human consumption. Therefore, the barley offered as the Korban Ha’omer did not need to be baked, because barley is given to animals raw; the Sheteh Ha'lehem, however, was baked because this is how wheat is primarily used. All the preparations for producing the Sheteh Ha'lehem were done outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, except the baking, which was to be done specifically in the area of the Mikdash. This Misva applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It is fulfilled by the Kohanim, but all Am Yisrael bear the collective responsibility to ensure it is offered.
After the Torah presents the command to offer the special Omer sacrifice on the 16 th of Nissan (the second day of Pesach), it commands, “You shall count for yourselves…from the day you bring the Omer that is waved; they shall be seven complete weeks” (Vayikra 23:15). This introduces the well-known Misva of Sefirat Ha’omer, which requires counting each day for forty-nine days from the 16 th of Nissan through the day before Shabuot. Elsewhere, in the Book of Debarim (16:9), the Torah commands, “Shiba Shabuot Tispor Lach” – “You shall count for yourself seven weeks.” The Gemara thus establishes that one must count both the days and the weeks. According to some Rishonim, this means that at the conclusion of every seven days, one must make a note of the number of weeks that have passed. On the seventh day, for example, one must count, “Today is seven days, which is one week,” and so on. Others, however, maintain that the weeks must be mentioned every day. Thus, for example, on the 15 th day, one must count, “Today is fifteen days, which are two weeks and one day.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is proper to satisfy this second opinion and mention the weeks each day. He adds that this is, indeed, the accepted practice. Even today, this is the view which is followed. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch makes the powerful statement that “Kol Ikaran Shel Yisrael Eno Ela Ha’Torah” – the essence of the Jewish People is the Torah. He adds that it was for the sake of Torah that the universe came into existence. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that when G-d appeared to Moshe for the first time, and informed him that He would be bringing Beneh Yisrael out of Egypt, he said, “When you take the nation out of Egypt, you shall serve G-d on this mountain” – referring to Matan Torah at Mount Sinai (Shemot 3:12). This indicates that the primary purpose of the Exodus from Egypt was not the people’s release from slavery, but their receiving the Torah at Mount Sinai and their subsequent fulfillment of the Torah. The Sefer Ha’hinuch goes so far as to say that the people regarded this objective as even more important than their freedom from slavery. In order to express this notion, that the primary purpose of the Exodus was to receive the Torah, we count the days from after the Exodus until Matan Torah, just as somebody counts the days when anticipating something exciting. A servant, for example, counts the days remaining until he attains freedom. By counting the days to Matan Torah, we express our enthusiasm for Torah and how strongly we want to accept it upon ourselves. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then raises the question of why, according to this explanation, we count incrementally from 1 to 49, mentioning how many days have passed, instead of counting backward, from 49 to 1, counting down the number of days of remaining. Normally, when we anticipate some event, we count downward, so we know how many days are remaining. Why, then, does the Torah command us to count the Omer in the reverse fashion, from 1 to 49? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that if we would count downward, we would feel disheartened by seeing how many days remain. By counting 49 days until Matan Torah, and then 48, 47, 46 and so on, we would feel distressed by these large numbers. The Torah therefore commanded us to count in the reverse order, from 1 through 49. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that one might argue, according to this explanation, that we should count upward during the first half of the Omer period, so as to avoid becoming disheartened, and then, for the remainder of the Omer, count downward, mentioning how many days are left. The Torah did not command us to count this way, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, for the simple reason that it would be awkward to change the system of counting in the middle of the Omer period. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah requires beginning the counting on the second day of Pesach, and not on the first day, “for we should not mix one joy with another joy.” The first day of Pesach is set aside for the celebration of the Exodus from Egypt, and so it is only on the following day when we begin counting in anticipation of Matan Torah. And rather than saying that we count from the second day of Pesach, we say that we count from the offering of the Omer, the significant event which happens on this day. The Misva is to count at night, when the Halachic day begins, so that the counting will be “Temimot” (“complete”), as the Torah requires. Nevertheless, one who forgot to count the Omer at night may count it the next day. Three opinions exist among the Rishonim regarding the case of a person who missed an entire day of counting. The Behag (“Ba’al Halachot Gedolot,” 8 th century) maintained that all forty-nine days of counting comprise a single Misva, such that one who missed a day’s counting can no longer fulfill the Misva. As such, he does not continue counting. The second opinion is that of Tosafot, who argued that each night constitutes an independent Misva, and thus one who missed a day is still required to count on the subsequent nights. According to Tosafot, missing a day of counting has no effect whatsoever on the Misva to count on the subsequent nights, and thus one who missed a day continues counting as usual henceforth. The Sefer Ha’hinuch advances a third opinion, claiming that one who missed a day of counting should mention the missed day the following day. For example, if a person missed the fifth day, then on the sixth day he should say, “Yesterday was the fifth day, and today is the sixth day.” He may then continue counting as usual. This is the opinion of several other authorities, as well, including Rav Hai Gaon (939-1038). This Misva is binding in all places, and only upon males. The accepted view is that the Torah obligation of Sefirat Ha’omer applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, as it is linked to the Omer sacrifice.
The Korban Ha’omer sacrifice consisted of an Omer of the new grain that grew in the early spring, and was offered on the second day of Pesach – the 16 th of Nissan. The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:14) forbids eating any of the new grain before the offering of this sacrifice. It forbids eating three types of products: “Lehem” – bread; “Kali” – roasted kernels, which had been removed from the stalks; and “Karmel” – stalks that were roasted whole. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, maintained that this verse introduces three separate Biblical prohibitions – one forbidding eating bread, another forbidding eating “Kali,” and a third forbidding eating “Karmel.” According to this view, one who eats all three kinds of products before the offering of the Omer sacrifice is liable to three separate sets of Malkut, because he has transgressed three separate Biblical commands. The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam’s listing, and maintains that “Lehem,” “Kali and “Karmel” comprise three aspects of a single Biblical prohibition. According to the Ramban, the Torah here issues just one command forbidding partaking of the new grain before the offering of the Omer sacrifice, and this single command includes all three types. In the Ramban’s view, then, one who eats all three is liable to just a single set of Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23) discusses the Omer offering, which was brought from the first portion of the newly-harvested grain, on the second day of Pesach (the 16 th of Nissan). Amidst this discussion (verse 14), the Torah forbids partaking of the new grain before this offering is brought. The offering of a portion of the new grain is what renders the rest of the produce permissible for consumption. After introducing the prohibition against eating bread produced from the newly-harvested grain before the offering of the Korban Ha’omer, the Torah adds that one may not partake of even “Kali” – roasted kernels. One might have thought that the Torah forbids only eating bread made from flour produced from this grain, but not the grain itself. The Torah therefore adds a separate prohibition forbidding eating “Kali” from the new grain before the offering of the Omer sacrifice on the 16 th of Nissan. Even though the stalks were not ground into flour, and no processing has taken place, nevertheless, the grain may not be eaten. One who eats a Ke’zayit of “Kali” from the new grain before the offering of the Omer sacrifice has violated this prohibition and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:14) forbids partaking of the new grain harvested in the spring before the offering of the Omer sacrifice on the 16 th of Nissan (the second day of Pesach). This sacrifice included an Omer of the newly-harvested grain, and the offering of this sacrifice rendered the new grain permissible. The Torah forbids eating bread produced from the new grain before the offering of this sacrifice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since grain is the human being’s primary source of sustenance, it is proper to offer a portion of the new grain to G-d before partaking of it. Just as the Gemara teaches that eating before reciting a Beracha over the food is akin to “stealing,” as we eat before acknowledging G-d as the One who gives us our food, similarly, eating the new grain before offering a portion to G-d would be inappropriate. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that by waiting until the offering of this portion before partaking of the new grain, we become worthy of G-d’s blessings. The Omer offering was brought specifically from barley, which is the first of the five principal grains to ripen. In the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, the people in Jerusalem – who knew when the Omer offering was brought – were permitted to eat Hadash (the new grain) immediately after the offering. Other areas, however, did not know when precisely the sacrifice was offered. They were required to wait until Hasot (Halachic midday), as they could assume that the Kohanim would not offer the sacrifice any later than midday. After the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, we are to wait until the end of the 16 th of Nissan before eating the new grain. In the Diaspora, where an extra day of Yom Tob observed, the new grain remains forbidden Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment) until the end of the 17 th of Nissan. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. One who partakes of the new grain before the end of the 16 th of Nissan has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The prohibition of Hadash is, unfortunately, neglected by many otherwise observant Jews. As mentioned, it is generally accepted that this prohibition applies even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and even in the Diaspora, and it is thus binding upon us even nowadays, wherever one lives. The Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572) famously suggested defending those who eat Hadash nowadays by proposing that grain which one purchases in stores might be subject to a “Sefek-Sefeka” (“double uncertainty”). First, this grain may actually have been from the previous year’s harvest, and thus became permissible on the 16 th of Nissan. And even if this grain is from the current year’s harvest, the Rama writes, it is possible that it had taken root three days or more before the 16 th of Nissan, in which case it became permissible on the 16 th of Nissan. Given these two possibilities, there is perhaps a basis for permitting grain which one purchases. Later writers, however, challenged the Rama’s theory, noting that this does not qualify as a “Sefek-Sefeka.” This is, essentially, a single Safek (uncertainty) – namely, whether or not the grain is Hadash. A situation of “Sefek-Sefeka” is one where we have two separate uncertainties as to whether or not something is allowed. In this case, there is only a single question – whether this grain was rendered permissible with the conclusion of the 16 th of Nissan. Therefore, as we deal with a Torah prohibition, we must act stringently. Indeed, many Poskim rule that one should refrain from grain unless he has ascertained that it is not Hadash.
T he Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:11-12) that on the second day of Pesach – the 16 th of Nissan – a special offering must be brought, called the Korban Ha’omer. This offering consisted of the season’s first harvested Omer of barley, as well as a sheep. This sacrifice was brought in addition to the Musaf offering which is brought on each of the seven days of Pesach. The barley for this offering was cut on the previous night, the night after the first day of Pesach, even if this was Friday night. It was cut in a field near Jerusalem, and the people from the nearby towns would gather to witness the cutting, so that it would be accompanied by great fanfare. Three Se’a of barley would be harvested and ground. It would then be sifted in thirteen different sieves in order to produce exceptionally fine flour. By the time the sifting process was completed, only a single Isaron of flour remained. This flour was mixed with a Log of olive oil, and then a Kometz (handful) of Lebona (frankincense) was added. The Kohen would take the flour to the eastern side of the altar, where he would perform Tenufa (waving), waving it back and forth, and up and down. He would then bring it up to the southeastern corner of the altar, and offer a handful of the sacrifice on the fire on the altar. The rest would be eaten by the Kohanim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah commanded the offering of this sacrifice as an expression of gratitude for G-d’s providing a new, fresh crop of grain in the springtime. We give a portion back to G-d, as it were, to show our appreciation. This is done on the second day of Pesach, and not on the first day, because on the first day we are to focus our attention on the miracle of the Exodus from Egypt. In the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, we are not to “combine one joy with another,” and so on the first day we focus exclusively on the miracle of Yesiat Misrayim, and only on the second day do we turn our attention to the annual miracle of the rejuvenation of nature and the new crop. This Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and primarily to the Kohanim, who are the ones responsible for bringing the Omer sacrifice. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, as this Misva is assigned to the entire nation collectively, non-Kohanim who are in a position to ensure that the offering is brought, but fail to do so, are guilty of neglecting this affirmative command.
After the Torah issued an affirmative command to observe the seventh day of Pesach as a sacred occasion, when we refrain from work (Vayikra 23:8), it then adds a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh – a prohibition – against performing Melacha (work) on this day: “Kol Melechet Aboda Lo Ta’asu.” Thus, performing Melacha on this day transgresses both an affirmative command and a prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this context elaborates on the concept of “Yom Tob Sheni” – the additional day of Yom Tob observed in the Diaspora after the first and last days of Pesach, after Shabuot, after the first day of Sukkot, and after Shemini Aseret. In the Diaspora, an eighth day of Pesach is observed, even though the Torah speaks of Pesach as a seven-day festival. The background of this practice, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is the system used in ancient times for declaring new months. We follow a fixed-calendar system, but long ago, the new month was declared when the new moon was sighted. This would happen on either the night of the 30 th of the previous month – in which case the 30 th day would be the first day of the new month – or the night of the 31 st of the previous month – in which case the 31 st day would be the first day of the new month. Each month, the Bet Din would dispatch messengers to inform the Jewish communities which day was declared Rosh Hodesh. These messengers would not always reach the distant communities in the Diaspora before Yom Tob, and so these communities would have to observe two days as Yom Tob. Although we no longer have this Safek (uncertainty), nevertheless, it was established that we commemorate our ancestors’ practice and observe two days of Yom Tob in the Diaspora. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes the debate among the Poskim as to whether these two days are treated the same nowadays as they were in yesteryear, when an extra day was necessary due to the uncertainty as to which day was Yom Tob. Back then, if an egg was laid on the first day of Yom Tob, it was permissible on the second day, even though normally an egg laid on Shabbat or Yom Tob may not be used on a different day of Yom Tob. The reason is that if the first day was Yom Tob, then the second day is not Yom Tob, so the egg is permissible, and if the second day is Yom Tob, then the egg was not actually laid on Yom Tob, and so it is not forbidden at all. Nowadays, however, there is no uncertainty; we observe both days as Yom Tob even though we know definitively which day is the actual day when Yom Tob is to be observed. Therefore, some authorities maintained that nowadays, an egg laid on the first day of Yom Tob is forbidden on the second day, as we observe both days definitively, and not due to an uncertainty. Others, however, disagreed, arguing that since our observance of the second day of Yom Tob is purely commemorative, it cannot be treated more stringently than the original practice which it commemorates. Therefore, according to this view, even nowadays, an egg laid on the first day of Yom Tob is permissible on the second day. Interestingly, this practice to observe an additional day of Yom Tob overrides a number of Biblical obligations. For example, we do not wear Tefillin on eighth day of Pesach, which the Torah requires – since, according to Torah law, this day is an ordinary weekday – because we observe this day as a Yom Tob. Likewise, if a baby was unable to undergo Berit Mila on his eighth day, but is able to be circumcised on the second day of Yom Tob, he is not circumcised on this day, because only circumcision on the child’s eighth day is permitted on Shabbat or Yom Tob. Torah law regards this day as a weekday, and thus requires circumcising the infant on this day, but the circumcision is nevertheless delayed because of the custom to observe this day as Yom Tob. Beyond the practical reason for the observance of a second day, as discussed, a deeper reason has also been proposed. This has been explained by way of an analogy to a young child who must be given medicine. In order for the child to receive the full dose that he needs, the parent must administer a slightly higher dose, because the child will spit out some of the medicine. By the same token, outside the Land of Israel, where we are exposed to impurities, we need a higher “dose” of Kedusha in order to receive the spiritual power that Yom Tob is meant to provide us with. Since some of the sanctity of Yom Tob will be lost due to the impurity of the Diaspora, we need an extra day of Yom Tob so we absorb the amount of Kedusha which we are meant to absorb.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:8) commands observing the 21 st of Nissan – the seventh day of Pesach – as a “Mikra Kodesh” (“sacred occasion”), which the Sages understood as referring to a day of abstention from Melacha (constructive work). Just as the Torah commands us to refrain from Melacha on the first day of Pesach, it likewise requires that we abstain on the seventh day, and observe it as a Yom Tob. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch discussed in reference to the first day of Pesach, the Torah commands us to refrain from Melacha on Yom Tob so that we can focus our attention on the meaning and significance of this day. As we are not preoccupied with our workday responsibilities, our minds are free to contemplate the miracles which were performed for us on the Yom Tob. In the case of the seventh day of Pesach, this is the splitting of the sea, which took place on this day, nearly a week after the Exodus from Egypt. Additionally, G-d assigned certain days as Yom Tob, when work is forbidden, to give us opportunities to learn Torah. Freed from weekday pressures and obligations, we have the ability to spend time engrossed in Torah study. The seventh day of Pesach is considered part of the holiday of Pesach, and therefore, we do not recite the Beracha of “She’hehiyanu” on the night of this Yom Tob, as we do on the first night of Pesach. Likewise, in the Amida prayer, we recite “Hag Ha’masot Ha’zeh,” just as we do throughout the rest of Pesach. The seventh day of Pesach differs in this regard from Shemini Aseret, which gives the appearance of the eighth day of Sukkot, but in truth constitutes an independent Yom Tob. For this reason, we recite “She’hehiyanu” on the night of Shemini Aseret, and we recite in the Amida prayer “Shemini Hag Aseret Ha’zeh” instead of “Hag Ha’Sukkot Ha’zeh.” Whereas Shemini Aseret is a separate holiday that follows Sukkot, the seventh day of Pesach is the final day of Pesach, and not a separate Yom Tob.
Amidst its discussion of the celebration of Pesach, the Torah commands in Parashat Emor (23:8), “Ve’hikrabtem Isheh L’Hashem Shibat Yamim” – that we must offer a special sacrifice on each of the seven days of this holiday. This refers to what we call the “Musaf” offering, which consisted of two Parim (bulls), one Ayil (ram), seven Kebasim (sheep), and one Sa’ir (goat). The goat was offered as a Hatat (sin-offering), whereas the other animals were offered as an Ola (burnt-sacrifice, entirely consumed on the altar). In explaining the rationale behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch reiterates the concept which he mentions numerous times in his work – that people are impacted by the actions which they perform and which they observe. Offering a special sacrifice on a Yom Tob, he writes, will draw the people’s attention and emotions to the importance and significance of the day. This will, in turn, have the effect of causing them to reflect upon the meaning of the Yom Tob and the miracles it commemorates. The Musaf sacrifice is offered in addition to the daily Tamid sacrifice. If, for whatever reason, the Tamid cannot be offered, the Musaf is brought nonetheless. Similarly, if part of the Musaf sacrifice cannot be brought, the other animals are nevertheless offered. Thus, for example, if sheep are unavailable, the goat, bulls and ram are brought for the Musaf offering. In addition to these animals, the Musaf sacrifice must include a flour offering (Minha), and a wine libation (Nesachim). Each bull that is offered is accompanied by three Esronim of fine flour mixed with six Lugim of olive oil, and six Lugim of wine as a libation. The ram is accompanied by two Esronim of fine flour mixed with four Lugim of olive oil, and four Lugim of wine. Every sheep is accompanied by one Isaron of fine flour mixed with three Lugim of olive oil, and three Lugim of wine. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that since the bulls and ram feature the same ratio between flour and liquids (oil and wine), their wine libations may be poured together on the altar. The sheep’s libation, however, must be poured separately, and may not be mixed with the wine brought with the bulls or ram. This Misva applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is binding upon the Kohanim, who bear the responsibility to offer the sacrifices. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if the Kohanim did not offer the Musaf sacrifice, they are guilty of neglecting this affirmative command, and the rest of the nation bears no liability for this neglect of the Misva. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, if the people knew that the Kohanim were failing to fulfill their duties, and they had the possibility of forcing or influencing the Kohanim to offer the sacrifices, but failed to do so, then they, too, are held responsible. Since the Musaf sacrifice is, ultimately, an obligation cast collectively upon the entire nation, the people bear responsibility if they were able to ensure that the Kohanim comply, but failed to do so.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (23:7) commands observing the first day of Pesach as a sacred occasion, and then adds a second command, forbidding performing Melacha on this day. Performing Melacha on Yom Tob is thus forbidden by force of both a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) and a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade working on Yom Tob in order to free our minds so that we can contemplate and reflect upon the miracles which we celebrate on that given Yom Tob. Additionally, this prohibition allows people to assemble in synagogues and study halls on Yom Tob to hear words of Torah. The Gemara teaches that Moshe established the practice of gathering on Yom Tob to hear the Rabbi speak about the Yom Tob, and this practice is made possible by the prohibition to refrain from work on Yom Tob. The Torah specifies that on Yom Tob it is forbidden to perform “Melechet Aboda,” as opposed to “Melacha.” The Ramban explains that the term “Melechet Aboda” excludes what he calls “Melacha Shel Hana’a” – work for the purpose of enjoyment, specifically, “Melechet Ochel Nefesh” – work done for the preparation of food. Although the Torah forbids Melacha on Yom Tob, an exception is made for Melacha necessary for the preparation of food, which is allowed on Yom Tob. However, the permission granted to perform “Melechet Ochel Nefesh” on Yom Tob is limited to those Melachot which cannot be done before Yom Tob, as doing them before Yom Tob would compromise the quality of the food. Thus, for example, one may slaughter an animal for food on Yom Tob, because if he slaughters the animal before Yom Tob, the meat would spoil by the time he wants to eat it on Yom Tob. Likewise, cooking and baking may be done on Yom Tob, so that the food is fresh on Yom Tob. Grinding spices is also allowed, because spices ground before Yom Tob would lose their pungency by the time they are used for food on Yom Tob. However, Melachot such as harvesting grain, threshing and grinding may not be performed on Yom Tob, as the quality of the flour is not compromised if it is prepared before Yom Tob. Extinguishing is not permitted on Yom Tob, because this does not contribute to the preparation of food. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this Halacha extends also to other Misva needs, and thus it is permissible on Yom Tob to carry through the public domain a Lulab for the Misva, a Sefer Torah to be read, or a child who requires Berit Mila. A number of commentators note that the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation of this provision appears to differ from the Gemara’s presentation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch implies that the law permitting “Melechet Ochel Nefesh” on Yom Tob itself includes other Misva needs. The Gemara, however, teaches that this stems from a second law, known as “Mi’toch She’hutra Le’sorech, Hutra Nami She’lo Le’sorech” – that once the Torah permits Melacha needed for food, it permits also Melacha needed for other Misva purposes. This seems to refer to a separate provision, an additional step, as it were, whereas the Sefer Ha’hinuch implies that this is included within the law permitting “Melechet Ochel Nefesh.” The answer given by some commentators is that the Sefer Ha’hinuch understood that “Melechet Ochel Nefesh” refers to both food needed for the body and food needed for the soul. The concept of “Mi’toch” mentioned by the Gemara means that “Melechet Ochel Nefesh” includes not only actual food, but also spiritual “nourishment,” thus permitting Melachot needed for the performance of Misvot. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch did not need to mention the concept of “Mi’toch,” because he understood that this concept merely interprets the rule of “Melechet Ochel Nefesh” as including both actual food and Misvot, which is like food for the soul. Washing one’s hands, face and feet is allowed on Yom Tob, even with water that was heated on Yom Tob. Although food preparation is allowed on Yom Tob, “Machshireh Ochel Nefesh” – Melachot needed for the preliminary stages, in order to facilitate the preparation of food – must be done before Yom Tob. Food preparation is allowed on Yom Tob only for those obligated to celebrate Yom Tob. Therefore, one may not perform Melacha on Yom Tob to prepare food for a gentle, or for animals. The famous Mishna in Masechet Besa establishes that an egg which was laid on Shabbat may not be eaten on Yom Tob, because food prepared on Shabbat may not be eaten on Yom Tob. However, an egg laid on the first day of Yom Tob may be eaten on the second day of Yom Tob observed in the Diaspora. The second day is observed due to the uncertainty as to which day is Yom Tob, and therefore, if the first day was Yom Tob, then the second day is not Yom Tob, and thus the egg is permissible on the second day. And if the second day is Yom Tob, then it turns out that the egg was not laid on Yom Tob (because the first day was not Yom Tob), and it is thus entirely permissible. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who performs prohibited Melacha on Yom Tob is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:7) commands that the 15 th of Nissan – the first day of Pesach – should be observed as a “Mikra Kodesh,” a sacred occasion, when we refrain from Melacha (constructive work). The exception is that on Yom Tob, unlike on Shabbat, it is permissible to perform Melacha that involves food preparation (“Melechet Ochel Nefesh”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah requires us to refrain from Melacha on Yom Tob in order to free our minds so we can focus our attention on the miracles that we celebrate on these occasions. We are to reflect upon these miracles and praise G-d in our minds. It appears from the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation that in addition to the actual recitation of Hallel, we are to also give praise to Hashem in our minds, exulting in the great miracles which He performed for our nation that are commemorated by the observance of the Yom Tob. If a person would be busy working on Yom Tob, then his mind would be preoccupied with his work, such that he would be unable to focus his attention on the miracles which the Yom Tob celebrates. Indeed, the Torah describes the cessation of work on Yom Tob with the term “Shabbaton,” which is commonly interpreted to mean “stop,” referring to the discontinuation of constructive work. However, the Ha’ketav Ve’ha’kabbala (Rav Yaakob Svi Mecklenberg, 1785-1865) explained this word as a reference to serenity and peace of mind. This reading of the term “Shabbaton” supports the explanation given by the Sefer Ha’hinuch for the obligation to refrain from Melacha on Yom Tob, viewing it as intended to help us focus on celebrating the miracle which the Yom Tob commemorates. In addition to this affirmative command to observe the first day of Pesach as a sacred occasion by refraining from Melacha, there is also a separate command – a prohibition against performing Melacha on Yom Tob. Hence, Melacha on Yom Tob involves both an affirmative command (Misvat Aseh) and a prohibition (Misvat Lo Ta’aseh). An act which is forbidden by force of both a Misvat Aseh and a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh is treated more stringently. An example of this special status is a situation where meat of the Korban Pesach was leftover after the night of the Seder, and must therefore be burned, as the Torah commands burning leftover meat of this sacrifice. Normally, the rule of “Aseh Doheh Lo Ta’aseh” establishes that a Misvat Aseh overrides a conflicting Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, such that one should perform a Misvat Aseh even if this entails violating a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. Therefore, if burning on Yom Tob were forbidden only by force of Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, leftover meat of the Korban Pesach would be burned on the morning of the first day of Pesach, as the obligation to burn the meat would override the prohibition against Melacha on Yom Tob. However, a Misvat Aseh does not override a prohibition which entails both a Misvat Aseh and Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, and therefore, because of the Misvat Aseh to refrain from Melacha on Yom Tob, the leftover meat of the sacrifice is not burned until after Yom Tob. This command applies in all places, in all times, and to both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:32), “Ve’nikdashti Be’toch Beneh Yisrael” – “I shall be glorified in the midst of Beneh Yisrael.” This verse establishes the obligation to bring glory to G-d by being prepared to surrender one’s life for the sake of the Torah under certain circumstances. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that every person was created solely for the purpose of serving his Creator, and a servant who is not prepared to sacrifice his life for the sake of his master is not a truly faithful servant. Indeed, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, servants of human masters will do anything for their masters, even surrendering their lives. Certainly, then, as servants of the King of kings, we have an obligation to give our lives for His service when this becomes necessary. There are several different situations in which one is required to sacrifice his life for the sake of avoiding a Torah violation. If one is forced at the threat of death to commit any of the three major sins – idol worship, sexual immorality, or murder – then he must refuse, even at the expense of his life. It is forbidden to bow to an idol for the sake of saving one’s life even if one is not truly worshipping the idol, and remains fully loyal to G-d in his heart. This requirement applies at all times, and regardless of whether the sin would be committed publicly or privately. Moreover, it makes no difference whether the gentile forces the Jew to commit the act for the purpose of opposing the Jewish religion, or for some other reason. Under any circumstance, one must refuse to commit any of these three sins even at the threat of death. All other sins, as a general rule, may be violated for the sake of saving one’s life. For example, as we know, Shabbat may be desecrated in the interest of saving human life. However, there are two important exceptions to this rule. One is a case where a gentile forces a Jew to violate the Torah publicly. If the gentile wants the sin committed for his own personal benefit, then the Jew may transgress in order to save his life, but if the gentile’s intent is to have the Jew violate the Torah, then the Jew must surrender his life rather than publicly transgress. The other exception is a “She’at Ha’shmad” – a period of religious persecution, when the foreign government issued edicts to ban religious observance. During such a period, when the authorities launch a campaign to abolish Torah observance, then a Jew must refuse to violate the Torah regardless of whether the act is to be done privately or publicly, and even if this particular gentile forces the Jew to transgress for his own personal benefit. The Ran (Rabbenu Nissim of Gerona, Spain, 1320-1376) explains that in a time of persecution, even private violations become public, as the authorities will inform the other Jews that a Jew had transgressed in order to break their spirit. Therefore, in times of persecution, a Jew must avoid violating the Torah even at the threat of death under all circumstances. This applies even to a “Misva Kala” – a relative minor command. The Gemara says that in a “She’at Ha’shmad,” even if a Jew is told to wear shoes which the gentiles wear and the Jews do not, the Jew must surrender his life to avoid complying with their edict. As mentioned earlier, if a Jew is ordered at the threat of death to take his fellow’s life, he must refuse. The Gemara explains that this is due to the fact that he has no reason to assume that his blood is “redder” than his fellow’s. Nobody can ever decide that his life is worth more than his fellow’s life, and so he is not entitled to take somebody else’s life in order to spare his own life. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this to mean that nobody knows whether he will perform more Misvot in the future than anybody else, and so he has no right to take somebody else’s life to save his. Such calculations cannot be made by a human being. If the authorities demand that the Jews hand over to them one person whom they would kill, and otherwise, they would kill the entire group, then even if the group consists of thousands of Jews, they should all die rather than save their lives by choosing one person to hand over to the gentiles. If, however, the enemy names a particular Jew whom they demand be handed over, then he should be given to them in order to save the group. This entire discussion relates to committing a forbidden act. If, however, the gentiles forbid performing a Misva, such that the Jew can save himself through inaction, by refraining from performing the Misva, then he should save his life by refraining from performing the Misva. An example is Queen Ester, who lived as a gentile king’s wife for many years, even though illicit relations are normally forbidden at the expense of one’s life. The Gemara explains that since Ester was able to save her life by remaining passive, without committing an action, she was not required to surrender her life by refusing to live with Ahashverosh. By the same token, a Jew may, when necessary, save his life by violating the Torah passively, without committing a forbidden act. The requirement to surrender one’s life to avoid committing a forbidden act of Gilui Arayot (illicit relations) applies only to relations with somebody with whom betrothal does not take effect – for example, an immediate relative, or a married woman. One may, however, save his life by having relations with a woman with whom betrothal takes effect. One example is a Kohen Gadol who is forced under the threat of death to have relations with a widow. Other examples include a regular Kohen who is forced to have relations with a divorcee, or a Jew who is forced to have relations with a Mamzeret. In such cases, the person may commit the forbidden act for the sake of saving his life. The Rambam writes that if a person feels an overpowering desire to have a relationship with a certain woman, and says that he will fall ill and die if he cannot satisfy his urge, he is nevertheless not allowed to have a relationship with the woman. One who commits a forbidden act to save his life when the Torah requires martyrdom has neglected this Misvat Aseh (affirmative command), and has transgressed also the prohibition of Hilul Hashem (defiling G-d’s Name). Although one is not liable to Malkut for creating a Hilul Hashem, this is an especially grievous sin. The Rambam, in Hilchot Teshuba, writes that Hilul Hashem is the most grievous of all sins, and is atoned only through the combination of repentance, Yom Kippur, suffering, and death.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:32), “Ve’lo Tehalelu Et Shem Kodshi” – that we must not “defile” G-d’s Name, meaning, that we must not do something which brings Him dishonor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch delineates three different forms of Hilul Hashem (defamation of G-d’s Name) which are included in this command. The first is violating a Halacha to spare one’s life when Torah law requires martyrdom. There are two circumstances in which the Torah obligates one to surrender his life to avoid violating Halacha. The first is during “She’at Ha’shmad” – a time of religious persecution against Jews. When a hostile gentile nation seeks to prevent Jews from observing their religion, it is forbidden to agree to transgress any law, even under the threat of death. Secondly, at any time, even when the Jews do not face persecution, a Jew who is forced to commit one of the three grievous sins must surrender his life to avoid transgressing. These three sins are murder, sexual immorality, and idol worship. In either of these situations, even though the person violates the law in question to spare his life, he is nevertheless considered to have defamed G-d’s Name, and has thus transgressed the prohibition of Hilul Hashem. He is not liable to Malkut, since he transgressed under duress, but nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that “Het’o Asum Me’od” – “his sin is exceedingly severe.” The second type of Hilul Hashem is committing a forbidden act which brings no benefit to the person, purely for the sake of angering G-d. For example, if a person falsely swears for no practical purpose, simply because he wants to violate G-d’s command, this constitutes a Hilul Hashem and violates this prohibition. The third category of Hilul Hashem is when a person known as a G-d-fearing, committed Jew defames the Jewish faith through his conduct. Even if his action does not violate any law, he nevertheless creates a Hilul Hashem if it gives the appearance of impropriety. For example, one Rabbi in the Talmud said that if he would buy meat on credit at the butcher shop, this would constitute a Hilul Hashem, because people might suspect him of stealing, taking meat without truly intending to pay. Other Rabbis said that if they would walk four Amot without learning Torah, or without wearing Tefillin, this would amount to a Hilul Hashem. A person who is renowned for his piety must conduct himself on an especially high standard to avoid any sort of suspicion which could lead to a defamation of Hashem. The opposite of Hilul Hashem, of course, is Kiddush Hashem – the obligation to bring honor to G-d, which the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as a separate affirmative command.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:28), “Oto Ve’et Beno Lo Tish’hatu Be’yom Ehad” – that one may not slaughter an animal and its young on the same day. This applies regardless of whether the animals are slaughtered as sacrifices or for food. The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two explanations for this command. First, he writes that slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day gives the impression as though one wishes to eradicate the species. Symbolically, slaughtering a mother and a child in the same day reflects the destruction of this species of animal. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although animals are not under the same level of Hashgaha (providence) as human beings – as G-d oversees even the details of the life of every human being (called “Hashgaha Peratit” – “detailed providence”), but not of animals – nevertheless, G-d protects every animal species. He ensures to preserve each and every species which He created, and indeed, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, no species which G-d created has ever or will ever become entirely extinct. We are to acknowledge His care for every species by refraining from slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day, which would symbolize the eradication of that species. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah issued this command in order to avoid developing a cruel character. Although we are permitted to slaughter animals for food, nevertheless, the Torah put a number of restrictions in place in order to ensure that we do not develop an element of cruelty as a result of animal slaughter. Slaughtering an animal and its young involves a degree of cruelty, and so the Torah forbade it. This command forbids both slaughtering the mother and then the child, as well as slaughtering the child and then the mother. The Gemara teaches that there were four days during the year when it could be assumed that people who purchased an animal planned on slaughtering it for meat that day. As such, on these four occasions, one who sells an animal after having sold its mother or young that same day must inform the buyer that the animal he purchases may not be slaughtered that day. The buyer is not required to ask whether the animal’s mother or young was sold that day; it is the seller’s responsibility to provide this information to the seller. The reason is that from the buyer’s perspective, this is a situation of “Sefek Sefeka” (two uncertainties). First, he does not know whether or not this animal has a mother or a child in the first place; and, secondly, even if the animal does have a mother or child, it is unknown whether the mother or child is going to be slaughtered that day. If an animal has two children, and, after the mother was slaughtered, one slaughters both children that same day, he has violated this prohibition twice, and is thus liable to two sets of Malkut. This prohibition does not forbid slaughtering an animal and its grandparent or grandchild. Although regarding human beings there is a Halachic principle that grandchildren are, in certain respects, considered like children, this rule does not apply to the animal kingdom. Therefore, it is entirely permissible to slaughter an animal and its grandparent or grandchild the same day. This prohibition applies at all times, in all places, and to both males and females. One who violates this prohibition is liable to Malkut.
The Torah instructs in Parashat Emor (22:27) that a newborn animal becomes eligible to be offered as a sacrifice only on its eighth day. During the first seven days, it is to remain with its mother, and on the eighth it becomes suitable for use as a sacrifice. This verse introduces a prohibition which is formulated as an affirmative command (“Lav Ha’ba Mi’chlal Aseh”), as the Torah commands us to regard an animal suitable for a sacrifice from the eighth day, implying that an animal younger than eight days (called “Mehusar Zeman”) may not be offered as a sacrifice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade offering an animal before its eighth day because it is exceedingly small, and unfit for any purpose. A person would not want to slaughter such an animal for food, sell it, or give it as a gift, and so the Torah forbade offering it as a sacrifice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch reiterates the principle which he has already mentioned on numerous occasions – that people’s minds are affected by appearances. Allowing the offering of such a young animal, which is not suitable for any purpose, would lower the esteem of the sacrifices in the people’s eyes, and so the Torah commanded offering only animals that are at least eight days old. Others explain the reason behind this prohibition differently, drawing a comparison to a child’s circumcision on the eighth day. The Rabbis explain the Misva of Berit Mila by way of an analogy to a person who wishes to have an audience with the king, and the king orders him to first meet the queen before he can then come before the king. Similarly, before an infant enters into a covenant with the King of the world, he must first “meet” the “queen” – Shabbat, which is referred to as the “queen.” Therefore, a Berit Mila is not conducted until the child’s eighth day, after he has experienced a Shabbat. By the same token, some explain, an animal is not deemed eligible as a sacrifice to G-d, expressing closeness to Hashem, until its eighth day, after it had gone through a Shabbat. This law applies specifically to animals brought as sacrifices. Different rules apply to Torim and Beneh Yona, the two species of bird which the Torah allows offering as sacrifices. Namely, when the feathers around the bird’s neck are yellowish, the bird may not be offered. In the case of Torim, this feature indicates that the bird is too young to be offered, whereas in the case of Beneh Yona, to the contrary, this color signifies that the bird has already aged and is thus unsuitable as a sacrifice. The Torah here in this verse speaks of an animal “Ki Yivaled” (“that is born”), implying that only an animal which was born through a natural birth is eligible as a sacrifice. This excludes an animal born through a Caesarean section, which may not be brought as an offering. The verse also states that a newborn animal should remain with its mother during its first seven days of life (“Yihyeh Im Imo”), from which the Sages inferred that an animal must have been born by its mother to be eligible as a sacrifice. If a pregnant animal was slaughtered, and the infant was delivered thereafter, once the mother had died, the infant may not be offered as a sacrifice. At first glance, we would assume that this prohibition applies only to Kohanim, who are the ones who offer sacrifices in the Bet Ha’mikdash. However, the Rambam, in Hilchot Issureh Mizbe’ah (3:10), writes that this command forbids even consecrating a “Mehusar Zeman” as a sacrifice. He compares this prohibition to the command forbidding the offering of a Ba’al Mum (animal with a physical blemish), which is forbidden even to be consecrated. As such, even a non-Kohen, and either a man or a woman, can transgress this prohibition by consecrating an animal before its eighth day. However, one is not liable Malkut for consecrating or offering such an animal, because, as mentioned, the Torah formulates this prohibition as an affirmative command (“Lav Ha’ba Mi’chlal Aseh”), and it is thus treated as a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command), for which one is not liable to Malkut.
After presenting the command forbidding offering blemished animals as sacrifices, the Torah adds (Vayikra 22:5), “U’mi’yad Beneh Nechar Lo Takribu Et Lehem Elokechem Mi’kol Eleh” – that we may not offer such animals as sacrifices even if they are brought by non-Jews. We might have thought that although a Jew is not permitted to offer a blemished animal as a sacrifice, the Kohanim are allowed to accept such an animal sacrifice from a gentile. Gentiles are permitted to bring voluntary sacrifices to the Bet Ha’mikdash (“Nedarim” and “Nedabot”), and we might have assumed that the Torah’s strict standards for our sacrifices, disqualifying a blemished animal, do not apply to gentiles. The Torah therefore clarified that even when a gentile offers a sacrifice, it must be unblemished. In order to maintain the people’s sense of awe and reverence toward the Bet Ha’mikdash and the sacrifices, the Torah demands that all animals brought as sacrifices – even those offered by gentiles – must be unblemished. All 73 physical blemishes which disqualify an animal sacrifice when brought by a Jew likewise disqualify an animal sacrifice brought by a gentile. A Kohen who offers a blemished animal sacrifice brought by a gentile is liable to Malkut for transgressing this prohibition. This command brings to mind the famous, tragic story told by the Gemara in Masechet Gittin (55b-56a) of Bar-Kamsa, who became incensed when he was violently driven from a party to which he was mistakenly received an invitation. In order to avenge his humiliation, he schemed to arouse the Roman emperor’s ire at the Jews by falsely reporting to him that the Jews were planning a revolt. To verify his charge, Bar-Kamsa advised the emperor to send an animal to Jerusalem to be offered as a sacrifice in the Bet Ha’mikdash on his behalf. As the animal was being transported to Jerusalem, Bar-Kamsa made a blemish in the animal which disqualified it as a sacrifice according to Torah law, but not according to the Roman pagan tradition. (The Gemara brings two opinions – that Bar-Kamsa either slit the animal’s lip, or slit its eyelid.) The Rabbis debated whether or not they should offer the animal, as some argued that the animal should be sacrificed despite the blemish, in order to avoid tensions with the Roman government. In the end, however, the decision was made to refuse to offer the sacrifice. The emperor viewed this refusal as compelling evidence of the Jews’ disloyalty, and this ultimately led to the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Maharal of Prague (Rav Yehuda Loew, 1520-1609) raises the question of why the Jews were not upfront with the emperor, and did not simply explain to him that they could not offer the sacrifice because it was blemished en route to Jerusalem. Seemingly, they could have avoided this problem altogether by explaining the situation, and asking the emperor to send a new animal which they would happily sacrifice. The Maharal answers that there was a more fundamental issue at stake. The Romans insisted that the Bet Ha’mikdash belonged to everyone equally, to Jews and gentiles alike, all of whom have the same level of access to the sacred domain. If the emperor would have heard that the Jews refused to offer his animal because it had a blemish which disqualified it according to Jewish law, even though it did not disqualify the animal according to the rules of Roman paganism, he would have been enraged. In his mind, he had the same rights in the Bet Ha’mikdash as the Jews, and so an animal which he deemed suitable should be offered. In truth, the Maharal explains, the gentiles receive the spiritual benefits of the Bet Ha’mikdash only because of the Jews’ service there, and thus the gentiles’ animal sacrifices must adhere to the same standards as the Jews’ sacrifices. Telling this to the emperor would have aroused his ire, and thus the Jews did not have the option of avoiding tensions by asking the emperor to send a different animal. Developing this point further, the Maharal writes that the gentiles have no authority whatsoever over the Bet Ha’mikdash, and did not even have the power to destroy it. As the Gemara (Sanhedrin 96b) states, “Kimha Tehina Tehinat” – when the Romans destroyed the Bet Ha’mikdash, it was as if they were grinding finely-ground flour. The Bet Ha’mikdash was already destroyed because of the Jews’ misdeeds, specifically, the sin of Sin’at Hinam (baseless hatred among the people). It is not the enemy nations who destroy the Bet Ha’mikdash, but rather the Jewish People, through their wrongdoing. The gentiles have no connection to the Bet Ha’mikdash, despite the right they are given to offer sacrifices, and it only our sins which lead G-d to send them to destroy the Mikdash.
After introducing the prohibition against offering a blemished animal as a sacrifice, and listing the disqualifying blemishes, the Torah (Vayikra 22:24) commands, “U’be’arsechem Lo Ta’asu” – “You shall not do so in your land.” This is understood as referring specifically to the blemishes involving the male reproductive organs, such that the Torah here forbids causing such defects. This verse, then, introduces the prohibition against castrating male animals or humans. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids castration because G-d wants all creatures to reproduce and multiply. Indeed, we are commanded, “Peru U’rebu” – to procreate, and the animal species, too, are intended to multiply upon the earth. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that as all creatures are mortal, G-d wants the members of all species to reproduce so as to ensure their perpetuation, as each species was especially created by the Almighty, and must therefore be maintained. One who castrates a creature shows that he does not wish for that species to multiply, and thus expresses disdain for one of G-d’s creations, indicating that he wants this species to disappear and not propagate. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s comments are very relevant to modern times, when people advocate for a lifestyle which does not allow for reproduction. The Torah teaches us that G-d wants all creatures – certainly including human beings – to procreate, and one of our most important obligations is to do what we can to create new life. It is forbidden even to instruct a gentile to castrate an animal owned by a Jew. If, however, a gentile castrated a Jew’s animal without being asked to do so, the Jew may take the animal back and benefit from it. But if the Jew hints to the gentile that he wants his animal castrated, and the gentile castrated it, the Jew may not then use the animal. In such a case, the Rabbis impose a penalty on the Jew and forbid him from benefitting from the animal. If a person severed one part of the animal’s reproductive organ, and another person severed the remaining part, they are both liable to Malkut for jointly transgressing this prohibition. A man is not allowed to make himself sterile even indirectly, by drinking a potion which causes sterility. However, one is not liable for Malkut by making himself sterile in this fashion. Likewise, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one may not place his fellow in the snow to make him sterile. If he does so, he receives Malkut Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Women are not bound by the obligation of Peru U’rebu. Therefore, when the need arises – such as if a woman has a medical condition which makes pregnancy or childbirth dangerous – she may cause herself to become sterile. This prohibition applies in all places and all times, and to both men and women, as a woman is forbidden from castrating an animal or a male human being. One who violates this command is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:22), “Ve’isheh Lo Titenu Me’hem Al Ha’mizbe’ah L’Hashem” – that it is forbidden to place on the altar blemished animal sacrifices. This refers to the “Emurin” – the fats and other parts of the animal sacrifice which are normally placed on the altar. Animals with a physical blemish are disqualified for use as sacrifices, and in this verse the Torah forbids placing the “Emurin” of such animal sacrifices on the altar. Separate commands, as we have seen, forbid consecrating an animal with a physical blemish, slaughtering such an animal, and sprinkling its blood on the altar. Of course, this prohibition applies only when the Bet Ha’mikdash stands, when there is an altar upon which sacrifices are placed. The reason for this command, as explained in regard to previous Misvot, is that the Torah wants to ensure that we look to the Bet Ha’mikdash and the sacrifices with reverence and esteem. Offering blemished animals as sacrifices would lower its esteem in the people’s eyes, and so the Torah forbade offering such animals as sacrifices.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:22) that is forbidden to sacrifice blemished animals – “Lo Takribu Isheh L’Hashem.” This verse is understood as introducing specifically the prohibition against slaughtering a blemished animal as a sacrifice. The Torah assigns separate prohibitions for the various stages of sacrificing a blemished animal, and this verse establishes the prohibition against slaughtering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that one transgresses this prohibition only if he slaughters a blemished animal with the specific intent that it should be a sacrifice. Even if the animal was consecrated as a sacrifice, nevertheless, one who slaughters it does not violate this command if he has some other intent, such as to consume its meat. It is only if one slaughtered it as a sacrifice that he transgresses this prohibition. This prohibition applies even nowadays, even though there is no Bet Ha’mikdash. Since an animal can be consecrated as an animal even in the absence of a Bet Ha’mikdash, one who slaughters a consecrated blemished animal as a sacrifice even nowadays transgresses this command.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:22) lists several physical blemishes that disqualify an animal as sacrifice, and then commands, “Lo Takribu Eleh L’Hashem” – that such animals may not be sacrificed to G-d. The Gemara in Masechet Temura (6) interprets this verse as referring to specifically the sprinkling of the animal’s blood after slaughtering. Separate commands prohibit other stages of the sacrificial process, but this verse introduces a prohibition against sprinkling the blood of a blemished animal sacrifice on the altar. Therefore, if an animal was consecrated and had a blemish, and after it was slaughtered, somebody sprinkled its blood on the altar, he would be liable to Malkut for transgressing this command. Of course, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, this prohibition applies only in the time of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices were offered.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:21), “Kol Mum Lo Yiheyeh Bo” – literally, “…no blemish shall be in it [an animal sacrifice].” The Sages understood this verse to mean not that an animal sacrifice should not have a blemish, but rather that one may not make a blemish in an animal consecrated as a sacrifice, a prohibition known as “Matil Mum Be’kodashim.” The reason behind this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that making a blemish in an animal sacrifice would denigrate the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and lower its esteem in the people’s eyes. The Torah places great emphasis on ensuring that the people look upon the Bet Ha’mikdash and its service with great honor and respect, and therefore it forbids degrading the sacrifices by making a blemish in a consecrated animal. This prohibition applies both to consecrated animals and to a “Temura” – an animal onto which one transferred the sanctity of a consecrated animal. The Torah forbids declaring the transfer of a consecrated animal’s sanctity onto a different animal, but if one did make such a declaration, both animals are deemed sacred. One would then violate the prohibition of “Matil Mum Be’kodashim” by making a blemish in either animal. One who makes a blemish in a consecrated animal, or its Temura, has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The exception to this rule is the case of the Temura of a Bechor (firstborn animal) or of Ma’aser Behema (the tithe of a herd, which are offered as sacrifices). Since the Temura of a Bechor or Ma’aser Behema is not eligible to be brought as a sacrifice, one is not liable to Malkut for making a blemish in such an animal. This prohibition applies at all times, even nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It is possible to consecrate an animal as a sacrifice even nowadays, and if an animal was consecrated, one who makes a blemish in the animal violates this prohibition. Of course, this prohibition is binding upon both males and females.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:21), “Tamim Yiheyeh Le’rason” – that when one offers an animal sacrifice, it must be unblemished. Of course, it makes no difference whatsoever to G-d whether or not an animal sacrifice has a blemish. It goes without saying that He does not need our sacrifices, and so an unblemished animal does nothing for Him more than a blemished animal does. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the reason for this command is our perception, so that we will hold the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash in high esteem. People are very impressionable, and so if blemished animals were offered as sacrifices, they would belittle the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash. By requiring that all animals offered as sacrifices are unblemished, the Torah ensures that the people will feel respect and reverence for the service. The Sages listed 73 blemishes that disqualify an animal for use as a sacrifice. Of these, 50 have corresponding blemishes in human beings which disqualify a Kohen from serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The other 23 are unique to animals. There is a general rule that when it comes to bird sacrifices, blemishes do not disqualify a bird; a bird with a Mum (blemish) may be offered as a sacrifice. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this rule applies only to minor blemishes. Major blemishes – such as a missing leg, or wings that have completely withered – indeed disqualify a bird for use as a sacrifice. Needless to say, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. A person who slaughtered as a sacrifice an animal with a disqualifying blemish, or who sprinkled its blood on the altar or offered its fats on the altar, has transgressed this affirmative command. He has also transgressed a separate Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition) forbidding offering a blemished animal as a sacrifice. The Rambam comments that it is possible for a person to be liable to four sets of Malkut on account of one blemished animal. The Torah forbids even consecrating a blemished animal, and thus one who consecrated such an animal, and then proceeded to slaughter it, sprinkle its blood, and offer its fats on the altar, is guilty of four violations and is liable to four sets of Malkut. In Hilchot Issureh Mizbe’ah (chapter 7), the Rambam writes that besides ensuring to offer specifically an unblemished animal as a sacrifice, one should try to offer the choicest, highest-quality animal. We show respect and love for Misvot by using only articles of the highest quality in observing them, and thus one who brings a sacrifice should choose the highest-quality animal. The Rambam notes that this was the mistake made by Kayin, whose offering was not accepted by G-d because he did not choose his highest-quality produce for his offering.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:20), “Kol Asher Bo Mum Lo Takribu” – that we may not offer a blemished animal as a sacrifice. This verse is understood as forbidding not just the actual sacrificing of a blemished animal, but even the “Hakdasha” – the verbal consecration of such an animal. Simply declaring a blemished animal sacred as a sacrifice transgresses this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies in all places and in all times, even nowadays. Although we are unable to offer sacrifices without the Bet Ha’mikdash, nevertheless, the consecration itself transgresses this command, and thus one can violate this prohibition even nowadays, when we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it would appear, at first glance, that one who violates this prohibition by consecrating an animal would not receive Malkut, as this prohibition seemingly falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which is not violated by committing an action. After all, this prohibition is transgressed by making a verbal pronouncement, declaring the animal sacred, without performing a concrete act. Violations which do not entail an action are not punishable by Malkut, and thus, we would assume, this prohibition, too, is not punishable by Malkut. Surprisingly, however, the Rambam, in Hilchot Issureh Mizbe’ah (1:12), writes that one who consecrates a Ba’al Mum (blemished animal) is, in fact, liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch suggests that the Rambam perhaps likened this case to that of Temura – when one declares the transfer of sanctity from a consecrated animal to a different animal, which the Torah forbids. The prohibition of Temura marks an exceptional instance of a violation which is committed verbally but is nevertheless punishable by Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch speculates that the Rambam perhaps understood that this exception extends to all situations of a forbidden consecration, and thus includes the case of consecrating a Ba’al Mum. In the end, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that he feels that consecrating a Ba’al Mum should not be punishable by Malkut, but nevertheless, he humbly submits to the view of the Rambam, “Ki Malach Hashem Seva-ot Hu” – because he is like “an angel of the G-d of Hosts” (based on Malachi 2:7). In discussing this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one transgresses this command by consecrating blemished animals “Le’hakribam La’mizbe’ah” – “to offer them on the altar.” This would seem to imply that one violates this command only if he consecrates a Ba’al Mum as a sacrifice, and not if he consecrates it for its value, meaning, for the purpose of selling it and using the money for a sacrifice. However, the Minhat Hinuch comments that the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation here is imprecise, for in truth, one violates this prohibition even by consecrating a Ba’al Mum for its value. The Minhat Hinuch explains that consecrating a Ba’al Mum is disrespectful to the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash even if the animal itself is not offered as a sacrifice, and is instead sold for money which is then used to purchase a sacrifice. To prove this point, the Minhat Hinuch cites sources indicating that one violates this prohibition if he consecrates a blemished goat to be used as the “Se’ir Ha’mishtale’ah” on Yom Kippur. This is the goat which was sent out into the desert and cast from a cliff to symbolize the banishment of the nation’s misdeeds. Although this goat is not offered as a sacrifice, nevertheless, one who consecrates a Ba’al Mum for this purpose transgresses this prohibition. This demonstrates that consecrating a Ba’al Mum is forbidden even without the intent of offering this animal as a sacrifice.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:15), “Ve’lo Yehalelu Et Kodsheh Beneh Yisrael Et Asher Yarimu L’Hashem” – literally, “They shall not desecrate the sacred food of Beneh Yisrael, that which they will separate for G-d.” This verse is understood as establishing the prohibition against eating “Tebel” – produce from which the required portions had yet to be separated. The phrase “Kodsheh Beneh Yisrael Et Asher Yarimu L’Hashem” refers to the hallowed portions which have yet to be separated (as the word “Yarimu” – “will separate” – is written in the future tense), such that the Torah forbids “desecrating” these portions by eating the produce before the hallowed portions have been removed. Tebel is forbidden for not only the produce’s owner, but all people. Several portions must be separated from produce for it to be no longer considered Tebel. Specifically, Teruma and Terumat Ma’aser must be separated and given to a Kohen; Ma’aser Rishon must be separated and given to a Levi; Ma’aser Sheni must be separated and brought to Jerusalem; and in some years, Ma’aser Sheni is replaced by Ma’aser Ani, a tithe for the poor. If the portions for the Kohanim (Teruma and Terumat Ma’aser) have yet to be separated from produce, then one who eats this produce is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hand of G-d, as opposed to execution by the court). If these portions had been separated, but the other tithes had yet to be separated, then the punishment for partaking of the Tebel is Malkut. The produce is considered Tebel and is forbidden for consumption until all the required tithes have been separated, but the severe punishment of Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim is applied only if the portions for the Kohanim have yet to be removed. If a portion of Tebel fell into permissible food of the same species – such as if a stalk of Tebel wheat falls into a stack of permissible wheat – then the entire mixture is forbidden for consumption, regardless of the percentage of the mixture. Even if the Tebel constitutes a minuscule percentage of the mixture (“Mashehu”), the entire mixture is forbidden. This is an especially stringent quality of the Tebel prohibition, which resembles in this respect the prohibition against eating Hametz on Pesach, as even a minuscule amount of Hametz forbids a mixture on Pesach. This prohibition applies to all Jews, both male and female, and even to Kohanim and Leviyim. Although a Kohen or Levi who eats Tebel is consuming the portion to which he is entitled, nevertheless, he violates this prohibition, because the portions had not been separated from the produce. This prohibition applies in times and places when separating Terumot and Ma’aserot is required on the level of Torah obligation. The Torah obligation of Terumot and Ma’aserot applies only to “Dagan” (the five principal grains), “Tirosh” (wine) and “Yis’har” (olive oil). If one partakes of Tebel of a different species, from which Terumot and Ma’aserot are required Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment), he is liable to Malkut for violating the Sages’ enactment. The oil extracted from olives, and the juice extracted from grapes, have the same status as the fruits in this regard. Therefore, one who drinks olive oil or wine of Tebel has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to punishment.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:12) that a Kohen’s daughter, who is normally permitted to eat her father’s hallowed food, forfeits this privilege if she has a relationship with an “Ish Zar” – literally, “a foreign man.” This is understood as referring to two different situations. First, it speaks of a Kohen’s daughter who has a relationship with somebody with whom relations are forbidden, in which case she becomes a “Halala” – meaning, she loses her priestly status entirely. She may not ever marry a Kohen, or partake of either Teruma (the portion of agricultural produce given to a Kohen) or Kodashim (the portions of sacrifices which a Kohen may share with his family). Secondly, this verse speaks of a Kohen’s daughter who marries a non-Kohen. Even though this marriage is entirely permissible, nevertheless, she is not permitted to eat Teruma or Kodashim as long as she is married to the non-Kohen. If she is widowed or divorced, and she has no children from the non-Kohen, then she may once again eat her father’s Teruma, but even then, she remains forbidden from eating Kodashim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies in all places, and when Teruma is required on the level of Torah obligation. If a Kohen’s daughter ate Teruma or Kodashim after having had an illicit relationship, or while married to a non-Kohen, or if she ate Kodashim even after being widowed or divorced by a non-Kohen, then she is liable to Malkut. The Minhat Hinuch notes that the punishment for this transgression is Malkut, and not Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hand of G-d, as opposed by court execution). We might have assumed that the woman in this case should be treated like a “Zar” – a non-Kohen, who is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim for eating Teruma. Instead, she is liable to the less stringent punishment of Malkut. The Minhat Hinuch explains that since the woman in this case originally was allowed to eat Teruma and Kodashim, her status differs from that of a full-fledged “Zar,” who was never permitted to eat hallowed food. As such, her transgression is less severe than that of a “Zar” who partakes of Teruma or Kodashim. On the basis of this analysis, the Minhat Hinuch establishes that if a Kohen married a woman forbidden for Kohanim, such as a divorcee, the daughter produced by this marriage would be liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim for eating Teruma or Kodashim. She is a “Halala” from birth, and was never allowed to eat Teruma, as opposed to a woman who was permitted to eat Teruma and then became a “Halala” due to a forbidden relationship. Therefore, her status is that of a full-fledged “Zar,” and not that of a Kohen’s daughter who later became a “Halala.” As such, she would be liable to the severe punishment of Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim, just like a “Zar.”
The Gemara in Masechet Yebamot (70) establishes that an Arel – an uncircumcised male – is forbidden from eating Teruma, the portion of agricultural produce given to the Kohanim. The Sages derived this prohibition on the basis of a “Gezera Shava” – a textual parallel between two verses. The phrase “Toshab Ve’sachir” is mentioned both in the context of the Pesach sacrifice (Shemot 12:45), and also in reference to Teruma (Vayikra 22:10). The Gemara thus inferred that just as an Arel is forbidden from partaking of the Pesach sacrifice (Shemot 12:48), he is likely forbidden from eating Teruma. This prohibition applies regardless of the reason why the man has not been circumcised – whether he intentionally neglected the Misva of Berit Mila, if he did not realize this was required, or even if this was due to circumstances beyond his control, such as if he has a medical condition which makes circumcision dangerous. In all these situations, the Arel is not permitted to eat Teruma (or, for that matter, sacrifices). This Misva is exceptional in that the Rambam counts it as one of the 613 Biblical commands despite the fact that it is not explicit in the text of the Torah. One of the rules which the Rambam stipulated for the listing of the 613 Misvot is that he lists only those commands which are explicit in the Torah. Laws which are derived through the thirteen “Middot She’ha’Torah Nidreshet Bahen” (methods of extracting laws from the text), however, are not included in this list. The prohibition against an Arel’s consumption of Teruma, as discussed, in not explicitly introduced by the Torah, but is rather inferred from a “Gezera Shava” – and yet, the Rambam nevertheless counts this prohibition as one of the 613 Biblical commands. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the Rambam’s comments in Sefer Ha’misvot, where he appears to address this question. According to the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s understanding of the Rambam’s discussion, this prohibition is exceptional because the Gemara explicitly refers to this law as a Torah prohibition, indicating that there was an oral tradition that this Misva should be included as one of the 613 Biblical commands. In other words, the Rambam acknowledges that this prohibition marks an exception to the rule, and is apparently based on an oral tradition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, with great humility, writes that “it is proper to be careful with the ‘coal’ of the Rabbi” – meaning, to give respect and reverence to the Rambam, but, nevertheless, he says that the Rambam’s comments are difficult to accept. There seems to be no valid reason to list this prohibition as one of the Biblical commands in direct opposition to one of the Rambam’s rules for listing the Misvot. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Ramban, in his critique of the Rambam’s Sefer Ha’misvot, disagrees with this rule established by the Rambam – that Misvot which are not explicit in the text should not be counted among the 613 Misvot. The Ramban writes that Rambam’s work is precious and beautiful, but this principle, in the Ramban’s view, is mistaken. The reason why an Arel may not eat Teruma, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because an Arel is, essentially, a “Zar” (non-Kohen). Without a Berit Mila, this individual is, in a sense, not part of Am Yisrael, and so he cannot be considered a Kohen. As such, he is excluded from the consumption of Teruma, just like other non-Kohanim. The Gemara cites Rabbi Akiba as deriving this prohibition from a different source. When the Torah introduces the prohibition forbidding those who are Tameh (impure) from eating Teruma, it says, “Ish Ish Mi’zera Aharon Ve’hu Sarua…” – “Any man from Aharon’s offspring who is stricken with leprosy…” (22:4). Rabbi Akiba understood the repetitious phrase “Ish Ish” as alluding to an Arel, such that an Arel is considered Tameh with respect to the consumption of Teruma. According to Rabbi Akiba, then, an Arel is forbidden from eating Teruma because he has the status of a Tameh. The practical difference between this inference and the “Gezera Shava” mentioned above relates to the punishment for violating this prohibition. As noted by the Minhat Hinuch, according to Rabbi Akiba, it stands to reason that an Arel who eats Teruma would be liable to the punishment assigned by the Torah for eating Teruma in a state of impurity – namely, Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death by G-d, as opposed to execution by the court). However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that an Arel who eats Teruma is liable to Malkut. Consistent with his view, that this prohibition is derived from a “Gezera Shava,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch does not follow Rabbi Akiba’s position, that an Arel has the status of a Tameh. Therefore, if an Arel eats Teruma, he is liable not to the punishment for eating Teruma in a state of impurity, but rather to the standard punishment for violating a Biblical prohibition – Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:10), “Toshab Kohen Ve’sachir Lo Yochal Kodesh” – that a Kohen’s hired employee is not permitted to eat Teruma (the portion of agricultural produce given to a Kohen). A Kohen’s employee differs in this regard from a Kohen’s “Ebed Kena’ani” (non-Jewish servant), who, like the Kohen’s wife and children, is permitted to partake of the Kohen’s hallowed food. An “Ebed Kena’ani” is legally considered the Kohen’s property, and, as such, he is viewed as an extension of the Kohen, like the Kohen’s family, to the extent that he has the right to partake of Teruma. An employee, however, is not the Kohen’s property. Even if he is hired for an extended period of time, or even indefinitely, nevertheless, he is seen as merely having a contractual arrangement with a Kohen, and not as the Kohen’s possession. Therefore, he is no different from any other non-Kohen, who is forbidden from eating Teruma, the hallowed food reserved especially for Kohanim and their households.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:10), “Ve’chol Zar Lo Yochal Kodesh” – that a “foreigner,” meaning, somebody who is not a Kohen, may not partake of the sacred food designated for the Kohanim. This refers to Teruma – the portion of agricultural produce given to a Kohen – and Bikkurim – the first fruits, which are brought to the Bet Ha’mikdash and given to a Kohen. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade non-Kohanim from eating Teruma out of respect for this hallowed food. As this food is considered sacred, it is worthy of being reserved for the Kohanim, who minister before G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and for the members of their households. This includes a Kohen’s Ebed Kena’ani (non-Jewish servant), who is considered “Kinyan Kaspo” – the property of the Kohen, and is therefore entitled to eat his master’s Teruma. He is permitted to eat Teruma as long as he legally belongs to a Kohen, even if he runs away. A Kohen’s Ebed Ibri (Jewish servant), however, does not eat Teruma, because he is an employee, and not under the Kohen’s ownership. A Kohen’s wife may eat Teruma, even if she was not born into a family of Kohanim. As long as she is legally married to a Kohen, she may eat Teruma, even if she is a Moredet – meaning, no longer living with her husband. Even if she is married to a Kohen at a very young age (from three years of age and above), she may eat Teruma. Torah law permits a woman to eat Teruma once she is betrothed by a Kohen, even before they are married. However, the Sages enacted that a Kohen’s Arusa (betrothed bride) does not eat Teruma until they are married. If a Kohen’s daughter had relations with somebody with whom relations are forbidden, she becomes disqualified from eating Teruma for the rest of her life. A Kohen who pulled his foreskin down over the area of his circumcision, to make it appears as though he had never undergone Berit Mila, may not eat Teruma. The Sages enacted this provision as a penalty against somebody who scorned his Berit Mila in this fashion. A non-Kohen who intentionally eats Teruma is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (“death by the hands of G-d,” as opposed to court execution), and must repay the value of the Teruma which he ate. If the Teruma had already been given to a Kohen, then the violator pays the value to the Kohen who owned the Teruma. If the food he ate had been designated as Teruma but had yet to be given to a Kohen, then he is not required to pay anybody, because the Teruma had not belonged to anybody, and there is thus nobody to claim the owed sum. However, the Aharonim (later scholars) write that it is proper for the violator to pay a Kohen the value of what he ate. Interestingly, if a non-Kohen ate Teruma mistakenly, then he must pay not only the value of what he ate, but also a penalty of a Homesh (one-fifth). The commentators explain that one who intentionally violated this prohibition is not given the opportunity to earn atonement by paying a penalty, because he violated such a grievous sin. It is only one who violated accidentally who is allowed to earn expiation by paying a Homesh. This prohibition applies to all Kohanim, both male and female, and anywhere where there is Teruma Mi’de’Orayta (on the level of Torah law).
The Torah in Parashat Emor (22:4) commands that a Kohen who is Tameh (impure) may not partake of “Ha’kodashim” – the “sacred food,” referring to Teruma, the portion of agricultural produce which is given to a Kohen. This portion is considered sacred, and the Torah establishes that it must be eaten in a state of Tahara (purity). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command is intended to raise the people’s esteem for sacred materials. By imposing limits on who is allowed to eat hallowed food, the Torah makes it special in people’s eyes. The Torah issues this command to everyone “Mi’zera Aharon” – “from Aharon’s offspring,” from which the Sages inferred that it applies even to females, meaning, the female members of a Kohen’s family, who partake of Teruma. They, too, are forbidden from eating Teruma in a state of Tum’a (impurity). A Kohen who intentionally violates this command, and eats Teruma in a state of Tum’a, is liable to “Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim” – death at the hands of G-d (as opposed to execution by Bet Din). If he was warned before transgressing, he is liable to Malkut. If he receives Malkut, then he is absolved of the punishment of “Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim.” The Torah here forbids eating “Kodashim” (“sacred food”), which the Sages understood as indicating that if the Teruma had become Teme’a, then the Kohen is not liable to “Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim.” Although it is forbidden to eat this Teruma, nevertheless, since impure Teruma is not considered “Kodashim,” eating it is not included in this prohibition, and thus the violator is not liable to death. A Kohen who is Tameh must immerse in a Mikveh and then wait until sundown (“Ha’areb Shemesh”) before he is permitted to eat Teruma. Although the Misva of Teruma applies only in the Land of Israel, the Sages enacted that Teruma should be given to Kohanim in certain other lands, as well. Since Teruma in these regions is required only “Mi’de’rabbanan” (by force of Rabbinic enactment), it is treated less stringently than ordinary Teruma. Therefore, such Teruma may be given to a minor who has never experienced bodily secretions which bring Tum’a (such as a girl who has yet to menstruate), even if the minor is Tameh for some other reason. There is some discussion as to whether a non-Kohen who eats Teruma in a state of Tum’a also violates this prohibition. A separate prohibition forbids non-Kohanim from eating Teruma, and the question thus arises whether a non-Kohen who is Tameh and eats Teruma violates also the prohibition against eating Teruma while impure. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the prohibition against eating Teruma in a state of impurity applies “to male and female Kohanim,” implying that non-Kohanim do not violate this prohibition. This is, indeed, the conclusion of the Minhat Hinuch (282:15), that a non-Kohen who eats Teruma while impure violates the prohibition forbidding non-Kohanim from eating Teruma, but not the prohibition against eating Teruma in a state of Tum’a. This Torah prohibition applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and when the Torah obligation of Teruma applies – meaning, when the majority of the Jewish People reside in the Land of Israel.
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 22:2) that the Kohanim must not “desecrate My sacred Name” by performing the Aboda (service in the Bet Ha’mikdash) in a state of Tum’a (impurity). This prohibition is especially strict, as violators are liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death by G-d, as opposed to execution by Bet Din). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade Kohanim from serving in a state of impurity out of respect for the Bet Ha’mikdash, and for the Aboda. Allowing somebody impure to perform the service would compromise the honor of both the site and the service, and so the Torah forbade Kohanim from serving in a state of Tum’a. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists a separate Biblical prohibition (Misva 363) forbidding entry into the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of impurity, and one who violates this command is liable to Karet. The question thus arises as to why an additional prohibition is necessary to forbid performing the Aboda in a state of Tum’a. After all, the Aboda, quite obviously, is performed only in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and thus once the Torah forbade entering the area in a state of Tum’a, nothing is seemingly added by a separate prohibition against performing the Aboda in a state of Tum’a. Tosafot in Masechet Shabuot (17) answer this question by envisioning a scenario whereby a Kohen is unaware of the prohibition against entering the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of Tum’a, but is aware of the prohibition against serving in a state of Tum’a. If such a Kohen enters the Bet Ha’mikdash while impure, he has transgressed this prohibition inadvertently, and is thus not liable to Karet for entering the area in a state of impurity. If he then performs the Aboda, he transgresses the second prohibition intentionally, because he is aware of this prohibition. Therefore, although he is not liable to Karet for entering the Bet Ha’mikdash, he is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim for performing the Aboda. Since the Torah issues two separate commands, forbidding entering and serving, the Kohen in this case would be liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim for serving in a state of Tum’a. This command, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash.
After instructing in Parashat Emor that a Ba’al Mum – a Kohen with a physical blemish – is not permitted to serve in the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Torah proceeds to command, “But he shall not come to the curtain, and shall not approach the altar” (Vayikra 21:23). The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, understands this verse as establishing a prohibition forbidding a Ba’al Mum from entering the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash – specifically, the area in between the altar in the courtyard and the indoor “Ulam” section. The reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is to maintain people’s awe and reverence for the sacred site of the Bet Ha’mikdash. As this site represents spiritual perfection, it is deemed inappropriate for a person with a physical blemish to be present there. In order for the people to look upon the site with respect and reverence, the Torah commanded that only unblemished individuals may be present. The Ramban disputes the Rambam’s position, and explains this verse as continuing the discussion regarding the prohibition against serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash with a physical blemish. According to the Ramban’s reading, the Torah here refers not simply to entering the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash, but rather entering the area and performing the service. In the Ramban’s view, then, there is no Biblical prohibition against a Ba’al Mum entering the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash without performing the service. Although the Ramban concedes that this would be forbidden Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment), he maintains that this does not constitute a Biblical prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, who generally follows the Rambam’s listing of the Misvot, lists a Biblical prohibition forbidding a Ba’al Mum from merely entering the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash, even without performing any Aboda (service).
The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, lists the prohibition against serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash with a physical blemish as two separate Biblical commands. One command forbids a Kohen from performing the service with a permanent blemish, and a different command forbids serving with a temporary blemish. An example of a permanent blemish, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is a broken arm or leg which does not completely heal, permanently compromising the limb’s functioning. An example of a temporary blemish is a pimple, boil or wart which heals. Of course, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a Ba’al Mum (person with a physical blemish) an account of which he is disqualified from performing the Aboda (service in the Bet Ha’mikdash). In fact, fundamentally, a Ba’al Mum would likely be best suited for this role, because he feels humbled and subdued, and thus more readily subjugates himself to G-d’s authority. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah disqualifies a Ba’al Mum for serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash because of the impression this would have on the people. Seeing a Kohen with a blemish serving might lower the people’s esteem for the service, because people are impacted by external appearances. As Rashi comments, when a government leader needs to send an emissary to another country, he will naturally choose somebody with an impressive appearance who makes a strong impression. By the same token, the Kohanim, who represent the people before G-d, should be unblemished, so that people regard the service with the respect and reverence it deserves. Although G-d most certainly does not need unblemished Kohanim, this is necessary because of the impression made upon the people. A Kohen who performs the Aboda with a blemish transgresses this prohibition, and the service is invalid. If he violates intentionally, he is liable to Malkut. The Rambam writes (Hilchot Bi’at Mikdash 6:11-12) that the Sanhedrin, which had its offices in the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash, would oversee a “vetting” process, checking each Kohen before he performs the Aboda. They would check his lineage, to ensure he is a valid Kohen, and they would inspect him to ensure he has no disqualifying physical defects. A Kohen who was discovered to be disqualified due to his lineage would be dressed in black garments and escorted out of the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Those whose status as Kohanim was confirmed were dressed in white garments and brought to do the service. If a Kohen was discovered to have a disqualifying blemish, he would be brought to a special room called the “Lishkat Ha’esim,” where the wood for the altar was stored. These blemished Kohanim, who could not perform the actual Aboda, were given the task of inspecting the wood for worms. These Kohanim received a share of the sacrificial food which was distributed among all the Kohanim who were on duty in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Even though they were not allowed to perform the Aboda, they were nevertheless allowed to partake of the sacrifices along with the other Kohanim. It should be noted that unlike the Rambam (and, following his lead, the Sefer Ha’hinuch), who listed two separate Biblical prohibitions for permanent and temporary blemishes, the Ramban listed just a single command, forbidding any Ba’al Mum from performing the Aboda. Although both the Rambam and Ramban came up with 613 Biblical commands (248 affirmative commands, and 365 prohibitions), they followed different methods of counting. For the Rambam, the prohibition against serving with a blemish is divided into two separate commands, whereas the Ramban understood that these are two components of a single Biblical command.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:17) commands that a Kohen who has a physical blemish is forbidden from performing the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash. This command refers specifically to a “Mum Kabu’a” – a permanent blemish. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives the example of broken bones which do not fully heal, and result in a permanent limp or other permanent state of dysfunction. Temporary blemishes, such as skin conditions like pimples, warts and boils, are not included in this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids Ba’aleh Mum (people with physical blemishes) from performing the Aboda because the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash is meant to make an impression upon the people. The impact of the service, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is stronger and more significant when it is performed by people who are healthy and strong, and have a pleasant, impressive appearance, as opposed to those with visible physical defects. In order to ensure that the service will leave a strong impression on the people, the Torah commanded that only Kohanim who are free from physical blemishes may perform the Aboda (service in the Bet Ha’mikdash). The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that as the people’s atonement depends on the service of the Kohanim, it is appropriate for this service to be performed by people who command respect through their appearance. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch comments, seeing a Kohen who is physically unblemished has a spiritual impact upon a person, uplifting his soul, and for this reason, too, the Torah forbade Ba’aleh Mum from performing the service. Only external wounds and blemishes disqualify a Kohen for the service. Internal defects, such as a missing kidney, do not disqualify a Kohen and are not included in this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists 140 defects which disqualify a Kohen from performing the service. Out of these 140 defects, 50 are defects which, in an animal, disqualify the animal as a sacrifice; the other 90 apply specifically to human beings. A Kohen with any one of these 140 defects who performs the Aboda is liable to Malkut. If he has one of the 50 defects which apply also to animals, the service he performed is invalid, whereas performing the service with one of the other 90 blemishes does not disqualify the service, even though the Kohen is liable to Malkut. The Rabbis enacted an extension of this prohibition to include a number of other physical defects which resemble defects which disqualify a Kohen on the level of Torah law. A Kohen who violates this Rabbinic enactment and performs the Aboda with one of these additional blemishes is not liable to Malkut, and the service is not invalidated. Of course, this command applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the Kohanim performed the service.
In the context of the Torah’s discussion of laws relevant to the Kohen Gadol in Parashat Emor, it commands, “Ve’lo Yehalel Zar’o Be’amav” – literally, “He may not defile his offspring among his nation” (Vayikra 21:15). The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin explains that this verse refers to a Kohen Gadol who has a relationship with a widow outside the framework of marriage. The previous verse (21:14) forbids a Kohen Gadol from marrying several kinds of women, including a widow. Now the Torah adds a separate prohibition, which forbids a Kohen Gadol from having a relationship that disqualifies a woman or her offspring from marrying a Kohen. The Sages understood that this refers to cohabiting with a widow out of wedlock, a relationship which is not included in the previous verse, as the previous commands, “Lo Yikah” – that a Kohen Gadol may not marry a widow. This second verse thus adds that a Kohen Gadol may not have a relationship with a widow even out of wedlock. It emerges, then, that if a Kohen Gadol marries a widow and then has relations with her, he is guilty of two transgressions, and thus liable to two sets of Malkut, whereas if he has a relationship with a widow without marrying her, he is guilty only of violating “Ve’lo Yehalel.” (The Gemara notes that if a Kohen Gadol merely betroths a widow, without completing the marriage process, he does not violate the prohibition of “Lo Yikah.”) The Sages inferred that this prohibition applies to other Kohanim, as well, forbidding them from cohabiting with women whom they are forbidden from marrying (a divorcee, a “Halala,” and a “Zona”). If a regular Kohen has a relationship with one of these women out of wedlock, he is in violation of this command. However, he is not liable to Malkut, because Malkut are administered only for violating prohibitions mentioned explicitly by the Torah. This command is introduced specifically in reference to a Kohen Gadol, and the Sages inferred its extension to ordinary Kohanim; since this extension is not explicit, an ordinary Kohen is not liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition. In one sense, this prohibition applies specifically to a Kohen Gadol’s relationship with a widow, and not to relationships with the other types of women whom a Kohen Gadol may not marry (divorcee, “Zona,” and “Halala”). Those women are already disqualified from marrying Kohanim, and thus a Kohen Gadol’s relationship with such a woman does not have the effect of “Hilul” – disqualifying her. This command is relevant only to a Kohen Gadol’s relationship with a widow, whom ordinary Kohanim are permitted to marry, but who becomes disqualified for Kohanim through cohabitation with a Kohen Gadol. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch discusses, this limitation applies only in the rare case of “He’ara” – if only the beginning of intercourse occurred, but not full intercourse that could produce a child. If complete intercourse occurred, then even in a case of a divorcee, a “Halala” or a “Zona,” the Kohen Gadol had committed an act which disqualifies the offspring from marrying Kohanim, and this act would thus be included under the prohibition of “Ve’lo Yehalel.” It is only regarding “He’ara” that this prohibition is limited to a Kohen Gadol’s relationship with a widow, because the other forbidden women are already disqualified from marrying Kohanim. But if complete intercourse occurred, then a Kohen Gadol violates this prohibition even if the woman belonged to one of the other categories of forbidden women. The reason for this prohibition, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explained in reference to earlier commands, is that a Kohen Gadol is to maintain especially strict levels of purity and sanctity. To that end, the Torah forbade him from having a relationship with a widow, whose mind might be on her first husband, thus compromising the sanctity of her union with the Kohen Gadol.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:14) lists several types of women whom a Kohen Gadol is not permitted to marry, including an Almana (widow). Due to the various prohibitions that apply regarding whom a Kohen Gadol may marry, it is possible for a Kohen Gadol to transgress four prohibitions at once, by marrying a woman and then cohabiting with her. This can happen if a widow remarried, received a divorce, and then married a Halal (somebody who is disqualified as a Kohen, such as the product of a marriage between a Kohen and a divorcee). She is now forbidden to marry a Kohen Gadol for three reasons: she is a widow, a divorcee, and a Halala (a woman who had relations with a Halal). If she then marries and is unfaithful to her husband, she is considered a “Zona” and thus forbidden for a Kohen Gadol for yet a fourth reason. If she later marries and cohabits with a Kohen Gadol, he is guilty of four transgressions, and thus liable to four sets of Malkut. The reason underlying this prohibition, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because a widow is likely to have memories and thoughts of her first husband. The Midrash comments, “A young man who marries a widow – three minds are in the bed.” As the Kohen Gadol is to maintain an especially high standard of piety and sanctity, everything regarding his relationship his wife must be pure and pristine, and so the Torah forbade a Kohen Gadol from marrying a widow. If a woman was only betrothed (through Halachic Kiddushin) before the groom died, and the marriage was not completed, she is nevertheless considered an “Almana” and is forbidden to marry a Kohen Gadol. If a Kohen Gadol’s brother died without children, the Kohen Gadol cannot perform the Misva of Yibum by marrying his widowed sister-in-law, as he is forbidden from marrying a widow. Instead, he performs the “Halisa” ceremony whereby the widow becomes permitted to marry anyone she wishes. If a woman was betrothed, but there was some question concerning the validity of the betrothal, and the groom then died, she has the status of “Safek Almana” – meaning, it is uncertain whether or not she is a widow. In such a case, we apply the case of “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” – that we must act stringently in situations of uncertainty regarding a Torah law (as opposed to laws enacted by the Rabbis). Hence, she may not marry a Kohen. If a Kohen marries and cohabits with a widow, he violates not only this prohibition, but also the command, “Ve’lo Yehalel Zar’o Be’amav” (Vayikra 21:15), which forbids a Kohen from having a relationship which disqualifies the woman or the offspring from the priesthood. By marrying a widow, the Kohen Gadol disqualifies her from later marrying even a regular Kohen, and so he transgresses the prohibition of “Ve’lo Yehalel.” If a Kohen has a relationship with a widow without marrying her, then he does not transgress the prohibition against marrying a widow, since they had not married, but he does transgress the prohibition of “Ve’lo Yehalel.”
The Torah commands in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:13) that a Kohen Gadol must marry specifically a Betula (virgin). This Misva is listed as one of the Torah’s 248 Biblical commands. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a person must ensure that his thoughts are pure, because improper thoughts lead to improper conduct. Therefore, the Kohen Gadol, the closest servant of G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, must maintain the strictest standards of thoughts – and this is true of his wife, as well. He must marry a woman whose thoughts are exclusively on him, and not on any other man. A woman who is not a Betula, even if her prior relationships were permissible, is considered unfit for the Kohen Gadol, because she had strong feelings for other men which might still linger, and this would compromise the sanctity of the Kohen Gadol. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this would have an effect on the offspring they produce. Marrying a Betula helps ensure the sanctity of the union and of the offspring. The Sefer Ha’hinuch acknowledges that even a Betula may have had feelings for another man. However, he explains, these feelings are not strong enough to disqualify her for marriage to a Kohen Gadol as long as she never acted upon them and had a physical relationship. It is only if she had such a relationship that her feelings for that other man could compromise the sanctity of her marriage to a Kohen Gadol. One might question the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s explanation in light of the Gemara’s ruling in Masechet Yebamot (59) that once a girl becomes a Halachic adult (at age 12), called a “Bogeret,” she is forbidden for a Kohen Gadol despite never having had a physical relationship with a man. Why should she be forbidden for a Kohen Gadol, the Sefer Ha’hinuch asks, if she has never had a physical relationship? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that at this stage, even if a woman is a Betula, her Yeser Ha’ra (sinful inclination) is especially strong, and she may likely have feelings towards a different man even if she had not a relationship with him. Reaching Halachic adulthood is thus considered akin to having had a relationship. It is only when she is younger that specifically a relationship will result in lingering feelings towards someone, thus disqualifying her for marrying a Kohen Gadol. The Sefer Ha’hinuch also addresses in this context the situation of “Nit’almana Min Ha’erusin” – if a girl was Halachically betrothed to someone who then died before they married. Even though the girl is still physically a Betula, nevertheless, she may not marry a Kohen Gadol. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the betrothal creates strong feelings toward that man, and so the girl is forbidden to marry a Kohen Gadol. It emerges, then, that before Halachic adulthood, a physical relationship or betrothal disqualifies a girl for marriage to a Kohen Gadol, and upon reaching adulthood, she is disqualified even without having been betrothed or having had a relationship. A woman who had a relationship with a man “She’lo Ke’darkah” (not in the usual manner of intercourse) may not marry a Kohen Gadol, even though she is physically still a Betula. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that such an encounter creates feelings for the man, and thus disqualifies the woman for marriage to a Kohen Gadol. This prohibition applies also to a Mukat Etz – a woman who suffered an injury that resulted in her no longer physically being a Betula. Although she did not have a physical relationship with a man, she nevertheless may not marry a Kohen Gadol. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a woman feels a special bond with the man because of whom she is no longer a Betula. Therefore, if she lost her “Betulim” through some other means – even if this did not occur during an intimate relationship – this would compromise somewhat the closeness of her bond with her husband. These laws apply to all Kohanim Gedolim – those who were consecrated with the special Shemen Ha’mish’ha (anointing oi), and those who were consecrated by putting on the special priestly garments. They apply even to a Kohen Gadol who served as a temporary substitute for the Kohen Gadol, and is no longer a Kohen Gadol. They are also relevant to a Kohen Mashuah Milhama – the Kohen appointed to accompany the soldiers when they go out to battle. As mentioned, a woman who was betrothed may not then marry a Kohen Gadol even if the groom died before they could get married. If a Kohen Gadol betrothed a girl and she became a “Bogeret” before the wedding, he should not then marry her. A Kohen Gadol may not marry two women. If a regular Kohen was married when he was appointed Kohen Gadol, he may remain married to his wife. Even if he had only betrothed a woman before his appointment as Kohen Gadol, he may marry the bride after being named Kohen Gadol, since she was permissible to him at the time of the betrothal. This prohibition obviously applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when there were Kohanim Gedolim. A Kohen Gadol who married a woman who was not a Betula would be in violation of this affirmative command, and would be required to immediately divorce the woman. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:21) teaches, “Ben Shemona Esreh Le’hupa” – that already at the age of eighteen, one should get married. Some found an allusion to this teaching in the verse which commands a Kohen Gadol to marry a Betula: “Ve’hu Isha Bi’btuleha Yikah.” The word “Ve’hu” in Gematria equals 18, such that this verse may read to mean, “At 18, one should marry a Betula.”
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:11) commands the Kohen Gadol, “Lo Yitama” – that he may not come in contact with a human corpse, not even the remains of an immediate family member. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this command as a separate prohibition from the previous command in this verse – “Ve’al Kol Nafshot Met Lo Yabo,” which forbids a Kohen from entering a tent or building where a human corpse is present. That command prohibits a Kohen from exposing himself to “Tum’at Ohel” – the specific form of impurity caused by being under the same roof as a human corpse – whereas the prohibition of “Lo Yitama” forbids exposure to other forms of “Tum’at Met” (the impurity caused by contact with a corpse), such as directly touching a corpse. The Torah here speaks of a Kohen Gadol, but the Gemara derives the application of these prohibitions also to ordinary Kohanim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since this application to ordinary Kohanim is not made explicit in the Torah, but is rather extrapolated through a “Gezera Shava” (textual association between a Kohen Gadol and ordinary Kohanim), only the commands relevant to the Kohen Gadol should be listed as Biblical commands. The Rambam established that only commands issued explicitly by the Torah should be counted among the 613 Biblical commands, whereas laws inferred by the Sages from textual nuances should not. Therefore, only the commands as they apply to a Kohen Gadol are listed among the 613 Torah commands. However, an earlier command (“Le’nefesh Lo Yitama Be’amav”) issues the general prohibition against all Kohanim from exposing themselves from “Tum’at Met.” This command applies to Kohanim Gedolim in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash (as only then were there Kohanim Gedolim), and in all places, both in Eretz Yisrael and outside the land. A Kohen Gadol who comes in contact with a human corpse, even the remains of an immediate family member, has violated this command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (21:11), amidst its discussion of the laws relevant to the Kohen Gadol, commands, “Ve’al Kol Nafshot Met Lo Yabo” – that he may not “come upon” a human corpse. This is understood as a reference to “Tum’at Ohel” – the impurity which one attains by coming under the same roof as a human corpse. The Torah here forbids a Kohen Gadol from entering into a tent or building where a human corpse is present, as he thereby becomes impure. The Kohen Gadol is forbidden to expose himself to “Tum’at Met” (the impurity resulting from contact with a corpse) even in the case of an immediate family member who passed away. He is not permitted to bury the family member or grieve over the body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since the Kohanim are designated as an especially holy tribe, who are constantly involved in the service of G-d, they are bidden to distance themselves from Tum’a (impurity). And the Kohen Gadol, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is set apart from the other Kohanim to be “Kodesh Kodashim” – entirely sacred. Although he has a physical body, the Kohen Gadol’s soul is expected to be pure and pristine like the angels in heaven. He is to extend beyond the normal properties of human beings, devoting himself entirely and exclusively to the service of the Almighty. Therefore, the Kohen Gadol is not permitted to mourn and grieve, as he has, in a sense, already separated from his family members by assuming the position of Kohen Gadol and thus rising to an especially high spiritual level. It is almost as though he is not truly living here on earth, and he thus has no need to mourn the loss of family members. This prohibition applies only to the Kohen Gadol, and therefore, by extension, it applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when there was a Kohen Gadol. A Kohen Gadol who entered a building where there was a human corpse – whether in Eretz Yisrael or the Diaspora – would be liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:8), amidst its presentation of laws relevant to the Kohanim, commands, “Ve’kidashto Ki Et Lehem Elokecha Hu Makrib” – “You shall glorify him, for he offers the food of your G-d.” This command requires that we show honor to the Kohanim by granting a Kohen precedence. For example, a Kohen is called to the Torah for the first Aliya in the synagogue; a Kohen is allowed to enter a room first; and when food portions are distributed, the Kohen is invited to choose first. This command requires respecting all Kohanim, even Ba’aleh Mum – Kohanim with a physical blemish that disqualifies them from performing the Aboda (service in the Bet Ha’mikdash). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d commanded us to give honor to the Kohanim because a master receives honor when people honor those who serve him. When we give honor to the Kohanim, this reinforces our sense of awe and our respect for the Almighty Himself, as the Kohanim are honored due to their lofty position as G-d’s ministers. If no Kohen is present in the synagogue, then a Yisrael is called to the Torah; there is no need to call a Levi for the first Aliya. If a Kohen is present but there is no Levi, then the Kohen who received the first Aliya receives also the second. A different Kohen is not called up, as people might mistakenly conclude that the first Kohen was discovered to not be a Kohen. A Kohen who is known to commit sins does not receive this special honor. As the Mishna teaches, a Torah scholar who is a Mamzer (the product of an incestuous or adulterous relationship) takes precedence over a Kohen who is ignorant in Torah. The Rambam writes that a Kohen does not have the right to decline the honor owed to him by force of this Misva. Since, as mentioned, the Kohanim are given honor as an expression of honor to G-d, the Kohen does not have the right to forego this honor. The command “Ve’kidashto” is understood as implying that a Kohen must be given respect even against his will. Later writers raised the question of how to reconcile the Rambam’s ruling with the Gemara’s comment in Masechet Gittin (59) that a Kohen may waive the right to lead the Zimun (the introduction to Birkat Ha’mazon). How is this allowed, if a Kohen may not decline the privileges owed to him? One answer given to this question revolves around the story told by the Mordechi (Rav Mordechai Ben Hillel, Germany, d. 1298) about Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171), who allowed a student, who was a Kohen, to wash his hands for him. When he was asked why this was allowed, Rabbenu Tam replied that the command of “Ve’kidashto” applies only when the Kohanim wear their special garments, as they did in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Nowadays, this obligation does not apply. The obvious problem with this theory is that we continue giving Kohanim the first Aliya in the synagogue, even today. When Rabbenu Tam was confronted with this question, he remained silent. Another student of Rabbenu Tam, named Rabbenu Peter, defended his mentor’s position by explaining that nowadays, Kohanim have the right to decline honor. Accordingly, the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572) rules (Orah Haim 128) that although one may not have a Kohen serve him, this is allowed nowadays if the Kohen waives his right to honor. The Taz (Rav David Segal, Poland, 1586-1667) explains that Rabbenu Tam’s student was allowed to forego his honor because he received greater honor by washing his esteemed Rabbi’s hands. Normally, a Kohen is not entitled to waive the privileges owed to him, but if a Kohen receives greater honor by foregoing, such as to have the opportunity to serve a distinguished figure, then this is allowed. Later writers add that this explains why Rabbenu Tam remained silent when he was asked why he allowed a Kohen to wash his hands. It would be arrogant on his part to say that his student received honor by being granted the privilege of washing his hands. He therefore gave the excuse that nowadays this Misva does not apply, when in truth, the reason this was allowed is because the Kohen received greater honor by serving his great Rabbi. Returning to the Rambam’s ruling, then, it is possible that the Gemara in Masechet Gittin addressed a case where a Kohen received greater honor by inviting a distinguished person to lead the “Zimun.” Although a Kohen generally is not entitled to forego the honor owed to him, this is allowed in a situation where the Kohen enjoys greater honor by declining, and this was the case spoken of by the Gemara. This command applies in all times and all places, and to both men and women.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:7) commands that a Kohen is not permitted to marry a divorcee. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explained in the context of a different prohibition, the Kohanim were chosen to serve G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and must therefore adhere to especially high standards of spirituality. For this reason, the Torah imposed a number of restrictions regarding whom a Kohen may marry, including a prohibition against marrying a woman who had previously been married and was divorced. Even if a woman had only been betrothed, and was divorced before Nisu’in (the completion of the marriage process), she may not marry a Kohen. If a woman had performed Halisa, a Kohen is forbidden from marrying her Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). Halisa is the ceremony which is performed when a man dies without children, and his brother chooses to release the wife from the levirate bond instead of marrying her. The woman then resembles a divorcee, and the Sages therefore forbade her from marrying a Kohen. In some situations, a woman is a “Safek Gerusha” – questionably divorced. One example is a case of a questionable betrothal, where it is uncertain whether the betrothal is binding, and the woman receives a divorce just in case the betrothal had been valid. Her status vis-à-vis marrying a Kohen is thus uncertain. The famous rule of “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” establishes that one must act stringently in situations of doubt when a Torah law is at stake. Therefore, the woman in such a case may not marry a Kohen. If she did, then in the times when Bet Din had the authority to enforce Torah law, Bet Din would compel the Kohen to divorce her. If a woman performed Halisa in a situation where it was questionable whether this was necessary, such that her status vis-à-vis marrying a Kohen is uncertain, then if she marries a Kohen, Bet Din will allow them to remain married. Since the prohibition against a Kohen’s marriage to a “Halusa” (woman who had performed Halisa) is forbidden only “Mi’de’rabbanan,” it is treated more leniently. If the Halisa was clearly unnecessary, but, for whatever reason, it was nevertheless performed, the woman is not considered a “Halusa” and she may marry a Kohen. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is possible for a Kohen Gadol to transgress four Biblical prohibitions by marrying a woman – if she is a widow, a divorcee, a Halala (meaning, she had a relationship with a Halal, the product a Kohen’s forbidden marriage), and a Zona (meaning, she had a forbidden relationship). Normally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, once something is prohibited, it cannot be prohibited a second time when it becomes subject to an additional prohibition. However, if the additional prohibition is an “Issur Mosif” – meaning, it is more expansive than the first prohibition – then it indeed takes effect. In this case, it is possible for each additional prohibition to fall under the category of “Issur Mosif.” If a woman is a widow, who is forbidden from marrying a Kohen Gadol, and she then marries and divorces, she now becomes forbidden from marrying also ordinary Kohanim. If later she becomes a Halala, then if she is the daughter of a Kohen, she may no longer eat her father’s Teruma, which had been permissible until that point. If she then marries and commits adultery, becoming a Zona, she is also forbidden for her husband and for the adulterer. In this case, then, each subsequent status adds a new prohibition, and thus they all take effect, such that if a Kohen Gadol marries her, he would be liable for four transgressions. This prohibition applies to Kohanim in all places and in all times. A Kohen who marries a divorcee and consummates the marriage is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:7) forbids a Kohen from marrying a “Halala” – a woman born from a union between a Kohen and a woman whom Kohanim are forbidden to marry. For example, if a Kohen Gadol marries a widow, or a regular Kohen marries a divorcee, a girl produced from either of these marriages is forbidden for a Kohen to marry. Since she was born from a marriage that is forbidden to Kohanim, she may not marry a Kohen. A woman also becomes Halala if she has a relationship with a Halal – a Kohen who is disqualified from serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash, such as if he was produced by a marriage forbidden for Kohanim. Even though a Halal is permitted to marry an ordinary woman, nevertheless, the woman he marries becomes a Halala and is thus forbidden from marrying a Kohen. A Kohen who marries a Halala and consummates the marriage is liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition. However, he does not become a Halal as a result of this relationship. A woman becomes a Halala by having a relationship with a Halal either “Ke’darkah” (in the normal manner of cohabitation) or “She’lo Ke’darkah” (in an unusual manner). This relationship must have occurred when she was at least three years old, and the Kohen was at least nine years old. If a Halal merely betrothed a woman, she does not become a Halala. If they got married, but never consummated the marriage, then the woman is considered a Halala and may not marry a Kohen; however, a Kohen who marries her is not liable to Malkut. A woman born from a union between a Kohen and a woman in a state of Nidda is not a Halala, and may marry a Kohen. A Halusa – a woman whose husband died without children, and who performed the “Halisa” ceremony in lieu of marrying the husband’s brother – is forbidden from marrying a Kohen “Mi’de’rabbanan” (by force of Rabbinic enactment). By the same token, then, if a Kohen marries a Halusa, the daughter produced by this union is forbidden from marrying a Kohen “Mi’de’rabbanan.” If a Kohen marries somebody in violation of a prohibition that applies to all people, and not just to Kohanim, the daughter produced from this union is not considered a Halala. Thus, for example, if a Kohen has a relationship with his mother’s mother – a relationship forbidden “Mi’de’rabbanan” – and they produce a girl, she is not a Halala. (If a Kohen has a relationship with an immediate family member, then the daughter is, of course, a Mamzeret, and in any event is forbidden from marrying a Kohen.) In some situations, a woman is “Safek Megureshet” – in a state of uncertainty about her status, as to whether or not she is divorced. This happens in a situation where a woman was betrothed but there is some question as to the validity of the betrothal, and so she received a divorce from the man in case the betrothal had been valid. It is now questionable whether she may marry a Kohen, because it is uncertain whether she is a divorcee, or had never been Halachically married. If this woman then marries a Kohen, the daughter is considered a “Safek Halala,” and may not marry a Kohen due to her uncertain status. If this union between a Kohen and a “Safek Megureshet” produced a boy, then he is a “Safek Halal.” He may not eat Teruma (the hallowed food reserved for valid Kohanim), because he might be a Halal, but he may not come in contact with a human corpse, because he might be a valid Kohen. By the same token, he may not marry a woman forbidden for Kohanim. A Bat Kohen (daughter of a Kohen) is permitted to marry a Halal. The son of a Halal is also a Halal. This prohibition applies to Kohanim, in all places and in all times. A Kohen who marries a woman who definitively has the status of Halala is liable to Malkut. If she is questionably a Halala, or a Halala by force of Rabbinic enactment, then he receives Malkut Mi’de’rabbanan.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:7) forbids a Kohen from marrying a “Zona.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this refers to a woman who falls into any one of the following three categories: 1) she is not Jewish; 2) she had a forbidden relationship at any point in the past; 3) she had a relationship with a “Halal,” a Kohen who was the product of a marriage which is forbidden for Kohanim (such as between a Kohen and a divorcee). Even though a woman is permitted to marry a “Halal,” nevertheless, such a relationship renders the woman a “Zona” with respect to the prohibition against a Kohen’s marriage to a “Zona.” The reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is because the Kohanim were designated to serve G-d at all times, and they must therefore live on a higher standard of purity and sanctity. The choice of a marriage partner, of course, has a profound effect on a person’s life, and in fact, a person has his or her marriage partner on his or her mind throughout the day. Therefore, if a Kohen is married to a “Zona,” a woman who might likely have a negative influence on him, this will compromise his level of sanctity. Moreover, it will undermine the dignity and prestige of the priesthood, because people will likely know about this woman’s past, and will now associate the Kohen with her. Not all forbidden relationships render a woman a “Zona” with respect to this prohibition. First, the relationship must be of the type which is forbidden for all people, and not for only some people. For example, if a widow married a Kohen Gadol (a marriage which the Torah forbids), she does not become a “Zona,” because this kind of marriage is forbidden only for a Kohen Gadol, and not for others. A woman becomes a Zona by having a forbidden relationship even if the relationship does not constitute a capital offense. For example, if she has a relationship with a gentile, a non-Jewish servant, a Mamzer, or a convert from Amon, Moab or Edom, she has not committed a capital offense, but she nevertheless is now considered a “Zona” and may not marry a Kohen, because these relationships are forbidden. An intimate relationship with an animal, though it obviously constitutes a grievous offense, does not render a woman a “Zona.” Likewise, having relations while unmarried, or having relations while a Nidda, does not render her a “Zona.” A forbidden relationship renders the woman a “Zona” as long as she was at least three years old and the male was at least nine years. She attains this status already at the first stage of intercourse (“He’ara”), and even if she engaged in intercourse “She’lo Ke’darkah” (not in the usual manner). This prohibition applies to Kohanim, in all times and in all places. A Kohen who has relations with a woman who falls under the category of “Zona” is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Emor (11:32) commands that if a Kohen had become impure and immersed in a Mikveh, he retains his status of impurity until dark – “U’ba Ha’shmesh Ve’taher” (“The sun shall set, and he shall then be pure”). This verse establishes a prohibition forbidding a Kohen from performing the Aboda (service in the Bet Ha’mikdash) after having becoming impure until “Ha’areb Shemesh” – nightfall. During the interim period between his immersion and nightfall, he is called a “Tebul Yom,” and he is forbidden from performing the Aboda during this time. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that as a Kohen serves as Beneh Yisrael’s “agent,” as it were, representing us before G-d, he must maintain the highest standards of cleanliness and purity as he ministers in the Mikdash. Therefore, when a Kohen becomes Tameh (impure), he may not perform the Aboda even after immersion, because a trace of Tum’a (impurity) remains even after immersion, and so he must wait until dark, when he is entirely divested of his spiritual impurity. This Halacha applies to all forms of impurity. It makes no difference whether the Kohen had been exposed to the severe forms of Tum’a, such as Sara’at, or contact with a human corpse, or if he had been exposed to a minor form of Tum’a, such as contact with the carcass of a rodent. In either case, he remains forbidden from performing the Aboda until nightfall after immersing. A “Tebul Yam” has a status called “Sheni Le’tum’a” (“second degree impurity”). This means that if he touches ordinary food, the food’s status is not affected, but if he touches Teruma or sacrificial food, the food becomes defiled. (This is because ordinary food can become only a “Sheni Le’tum’a,” whereas Teruma can become a “Shelishi Le’tum’a” and sacrificial food can become a “Rebi’i Le’tum’a.”) Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Frankfurt, Germany, 1808-1888) offers a beautiful insight to explain the underpinnings of this concept. He writes that after becoming Tameh, a person must undergo a fundamental change, which means leaving both his realm of space, and his realm of time. He therefore requires immersion, whereby he in essence leaves the earth, the dry land which is our normal habitat, and enters the water. Then, he must wait until nightfall, to enter a new zone in time, as it were. These two steps symbolize the process of transformation which must be undergone to divest oneself of impurity and regain his state of purity. The Halacha of “Tebul Yom” is subtly, and surprisingly, referenced by the very first Mishna, which speaks of the earliest time for the nighttime Shema recitation. The Mishna establishes that the earliest time for reciting Shema is “the time when the Kohanim come to eat their Teruma.” This refers to Set Ha’kochavim (nightfall, the time when the stars become visible), the point when Kohanim who had immersed become eligible to eat Teruma. Already the Gemara addresses the question of why the Mishna formulated this Halacha in such an unusual manner. Rather than simply and directly stating that the earliest time for the evening Shema is nightfall, the Mishna found it necessary to link the evening Shema with the law of “Tebul Yom,” which requires Kohanim to wait after immersing until nightfall before eating their hallowed food. The Igleh Tal (Rav Avraham Borenstein of Sochatchov, Poland, 1838-1910) explains the basis for this connection. He writes that the experience of reciting Shema in the morning leaves an impact upon the person, which remains until evening time, at which point he must recite Shema again. The impact of this recitation then endures until the morning, when we read it again. (Indeed, Rav Haim Vital taught that this is why we do not recite Shema at Minha – because the impact of the morning Shema remains with us until the evening.) Likewise, the exposure to Tum’a leaves an impression upon a person, and this impression continues even after immersion. The concept of “Tebul Yom” reflects this idea of an enduring impact which takes time to be entirely eliminated. And thus the Mishna links these two commands – the Shema recitation and the waiting period of the “Tebul Yom” – which both relate to the notion of the enduring impact of a spiritual experience, either positive or negative. This Misva applies to male Kohanim, and only during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. A Kohen who served in the Bet Ha’mikdash while in the state of “Tebul Yom” has violated this command and is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim – death at the hands of G-d (as opposed to execution by the court).
The Torah in Parashat Emor (Vayikra 23:3) commands that a Kohen must become Tameh (impure) in the case of the passing of an immediate family member. Although Kohanim are generally required to avoid Tum’at Met (the impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse), they are specifically obligated to tend to the burial of immediate family members. In fact, the Safra tells of a Kohen named Yosef whose wife passed away on Ereb Pesach, and he did not want to tend to the body, because he would then become Tameh and thus be unable to offer the Pesach sacrifice. The Rabbis forced him to tend to the body, in fulfillment of the Biblical command. The Rambam points to this verse as the source of the general obligation of Abelut – to observe a day of mourning for a deceased family member. The Torah introduced this Misva in the specific context of Kohanim to underscore the fact that even a Kohen, who normally must avoid Tum’at Met, is required to become Tameh in the case of a deceased family member. All the more so, non-Kohanim are required to involve themselves in the burial of family members and observe a day of mourning. Proof that Abelut constitutes a Torah obligation may be drawn from the Gemara’s discussion concerning the suspension of Abelut on Yom Tob. The celebration of Yom Tob overrides Abelut, the Gemara explains, because Yom Tob constitutes an “Aseh De’rabim” – an affirmative command binding upon the entire nation – whereas mourning constitutes an “Aseh De’yahid” – a command binding upon just one individual. The Gemara here explicitly refers to Abelut as an “Aseh” (affirmative command), clearly demonstrating that it regarded mourning as a Biblical obligation. The Torah obligation of Abelut requires observing just one day of mourning – the day of the burial – but the Sages enacted a seven-day period of Abelut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah introduced the obligation to mourn a deceased family member because “a person is affected by his actions,” and thus mourning practices will lead him to reflect and contemplate the painful loss he has suffered. He will realize that this has befallen him because of his misdeeds, and he will thus be stirred to repent and improve his conduct. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that whereas the non-believers dismiss death as a natural occurrence, we are to recognize that everything that happens has been ordained by G-d. And thus after the loss of a loved one, the Torah requires a person to mourn and contemplate his loss so he is driven to repent. As mentioned, the Torah obligation of mourning applies only for one day, and it begins only after the burial. In the case of a “Nefel” – an infant who died within thirty days of birth, Heaven forbid – mourning is not observed, unless it has been determined that the baby was born after a full-term pregnancy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that after the death of certain types of wicked people, mourning is not observed, as their deaths are actually cause of celebration. These include a “Moser” – somebody who reports on his fellow Jews to hostile gentile authorities so they can confiscate their property or imprison them – and those who defect and marry out of the faith. The obligation to mourn a deceased family member applies to both men and women, and in all times and all places.
The Torah in the beginning of Parashat Emor (Vayikra 21:1) commands the Kohanim, “Le’nefesh Lo Yitama Be’amav” – that no Kohen is allowed to become “defiled” through contact with a human corpse. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that as the Kohanim are chosen for the special role of ministering before G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, they are required to avoid Tum’at Met – the impurity caused by exposure to a dead body. This impurity is considered repulsive, and is the strictest form of Tum’a (impurity), and it is therefore not befitting a Kohen to be exposed to this form of impurity. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that although Kohanim are generally required to avoid Tum’at Met, an exception is made in the case of immediate family members. The Torah explicitly permits Kohanim to tend to the burial of immediate family members, even though they will then become Tameh. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this exception based on the general principle of “Deracheha Darcheh Noam” – that the Torah’s “ways are ways of pleasantness.” The Torah acknowledges the human need to weep and grieve over a deceased family member, and so it did not apply the prohibition of “Tum’at Kohanim” to cases of immediate family members who passed away. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah permits Kohanim “Le’hasbi’a Nafsham Be’bechi” – “to satiate themselves with weeping” over a deceased family member, recognizing that this is a basic human need which must be met. A human corpse transmits Tum’a in three ways. The first is “Maga” – direct physical contact. If a person touches any part of a human corpse – even a fingernail or tooth – with any part of his body – such as his hand, foot or tongue – he becomes Tameh. The second method is “Masa” – carrying a corpse, even if one does not directly touch it, such as if one carries a coffin or stretcher with a dead body. A form of “Masa” is “Heset” – causing a dead body to move without touching it, such as moving a rod when the other end is near a corpse, such that it causes the corpse to move. Another example is “Tum’at Bet Ha’setarim” – if a person carries a source of Tum’a under his arm, even though this does not qualify as “Maga” (because he touches the source of Tum’a with a part of the body that is normally concealed), he becomes Tameh. The third way by which one contracts Tum’at Met is “Ohel” (literally, “tent”) – by being under the same roof as a corpse. All people, utensils, foods and beverages that are under the same roof as a corpse become Tameh. Even if a person puts just his hand, or even just one finger, into the building where a corpse is situated, he becomes Tameh. One becomes Tameh even through contact with a portion of a corpse; a Ke’zayit of flesh from a human corpse suffices to transmit Tum’at Met. A complete limb (that is among the 248 limbs of the human body) transmits Tum’a even in a size smaller than a Ke’zayit. A piece of flesh or limb can transmit Tum’a in any of the aforementioned three methods – “Maga,” “Masa” and “Ohel.” Bones, too, can transmit Tum’at Met. There is some discussion among the Poskim as to whether the remains of a Sadik transmits Tum’at Met. One of the sources of this discussion is a famous comment in Tosafot (Ketubot 103b) that Rav Haim Kohen – a prominent Tosafist who was a Kohen – said that if he had been in the area of the funeral of his mentor, Rabbenu Tam (France, 1100-1171), he would have attended the funeral and involved himself in the burial. This might mean that in the view of Rav Haim Kohen, the remains of a Sadik do not emit Tum’a. However, some explain this remark based on the Halacha mentioned in the Talmud Yerushalmi that when a Nasi (head of the Sanhedrin) passes away, he is to be considered like a “Met Misva” – a deceased person with nobody to bury it. For a person of such stature, there will never be enough people to give him the respect he deserves, and therefore, just as a Kohen may bury a “Met Misva,” he may likewise attend the burial of a Nasi. Rav Haim Kohen may thus have felt that Rabbenu Tam, the leading sage of his generation, had the status of a Nasi, such that even Kohanim were bidden to attend his funeral. This command applies in all places and times, and to male Kohanim. A Kohen who comes in contact with the remains of a person who is not one of his immediate family members is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 20:23), “Ve’lo Telchu Be’hukot Ha’goy” – that it is forbidden to follow the practices of the non-Jews. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, based on the ruling of the Rambam (Hilchot Abodat Kochabim 11:1), that this applies even to customs such as style of dress. The Safra adds that we are not permitted to attend the kinds of events that non-Jews attend in “theaters, circuses and stadiums.” Likewise, it is forbidden to cut one’s hair in a manner that resembles the non-Jews’ styles. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade following non-Jewish practices in order that we avoid excessive intermingling with gentiles, which could lead to foreign worship and intermarriage. The Maharik (Rav Yosef Kolon, 1420-1480), in one of his responsa (88), addressed the question of whether a Jewish doctor is permitted to wear the customary doctor’s uniform (such as the white coat in our times). This uniform would be worn not in order to imitate the gentiles, but rather for a practical purpose – so that people would know that he is a physician. Is this nevertheless forbidden? The Maharik replied that since this garment is worn for a beneficial purpose, and not in order to resemble the non-Jews, this is allowed. The Vilna Gaon (1720-1797), however, disagreed. Advancing a much more stringent view on this prohibition, the Gaon maintained that it is forbidden to dress in the style of the non-Jews regardless of the intent. The general consensus among the Halachic authorities permits adopting practices followed by non-Jews that are rational, and forbids adopting practices that have no rational basis. Thus, for example, some Poskim forbid placing candles on a cake for one’s birthday. While there is a rational reason to celebrate a birthday, there is no rational reason for placing candles, and then making a wish and blowing them out. Therefore, Rav Avraham Blumenkrantz (1944-2007) ruled that birthday candles violate the prohibition of “Hukot Ha’goyim.” Similarly, Rav Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986) discusses the question as to whether it is permissible to make a point of eating turkey on Thanksgiving. Leaving aside the question of whether having a celebration on this holiday is allowed, eating specifically turkey has no rational basis, and thus this might fall under the prohibition of “Hukot Ha’goyim.” Some communities do not wear neckties for this reason, claiming that there is no rational basis for wearing this particular kind of garment. Others, however, permit neckties, as they are worn for the purpose of looking respectable. The Poskim also discuss the question as to whether using the Gregorian calendar instead of the Jewish calendar might perhaps violate this prohibition. The underlying principle is that we must not be viewing the conduct of the non-Jews as a model and example for us to follow, as we are bidden to follow the dictates of the Torah. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who conducted himself in a manner resembling the gentiles is in violation of this command and is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch concludes his discussion by emphasizing that we are to distance ourselves from the behaviors of the non-Jews, and devote ourselves fully to fulfilling Hashem’s will, and that those who do so will be rewarded both in this world and in the next world.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 20:14) establishes that certain capital offenses are punishable by Serefa – literally, “burning by fire.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch points to this verse as the source for the general obligation upon Bet Din to administer Serefa to those who commit those offenses which are punishable by this form of execution. Although the simple meaning of “Serefa” means death by fire, the oral tradition teaches that it is carried out differently, in a manner which causes minimal pain to the culprit. The person would be placed in a pit up to his knees, and the court officials would then take two cloths – one made from rough material, and another made from smooth material. The one made from rough material was wrapped inside the cloth made from smooth material, and it was then wrapped around the violator’s neck, such that the smooth material was against his skin. The two witnesses to the transgression pulled the cloth, causing the culprit’s mouth to open. At that point, boiling hot lead was poured down his throat, consuming his interior and killing him instantly. Even in the times when the courts had the authority to administer capital punishment, it was exceedingly rare, because of the numerous conditions that had to be met for execution to be carried out. Mainly, a violator was put to death only if two valid witnesses saw the act, and before the act was committed, they had clearly warned the violator that this sin was punishable by death, and he explicitly expressed to them that he wished to commit the act regardless. Therefore, when capital punishment was administered, the violator was especially brazen, showing clear contempt for Torah and utter disregard for the most serious Biblical commands. And yet, even though we are dealing with such a brazen violator, nevertheless, the Torah requires executing him in the most humane way possible, in a manner which minimizes pain. Instead of actually casting him into fire, lead is poured directly into his body, and even the soft cloth is placed on his skin so it would not be irritated. The Sages derived from the famous command, “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha” (“You shall love your fellow as yourself” – Vayikra 19:18) that even when somebody is deserving of capital punishment, the execution must be carried out in a humane way. At first glance, this inference seems difficult to understand, because the word “Re’acha” (“your fellow”) is generally understand as referring specifically to somebody who leads a proper Torah lifestyle. How could the Rabbis derive from this verse that a person deserving execution for disregarding a capital offense should be treated humanely, if this verse speaks specifically of those who conduct themselves properly? The Shita Mekubeset (Rav Besalel Ashkenazi, 16 th century), in Masechet Ketubot (37), explains that since the violator is now being put to death, and thereby achieves atonement, he is indeed considered “Re’acha” and thus deserves sensitivity and compassion. The Yada Rama (Rav Meir Abulafia, Spain, 1170-1244) explains differently, suggesting that the word “Re’acha” is related to the word “Ra” (“evil”), and can thus be understood as referring to somebody who is being punished for a capital offense. The Torah here shows us how far we must go in extending kindness and compassion. Even in the case of a person who unabashedly commits a capital offense even after being warned, to the point where he must be put to death, the Torah demands treating him with sensitivity. Certainly, when dealing with ordinary Jews, who, despite their many faults and imperfections, do not approach anywhere near this level of evil, we are to act with kindness and compassion, rather than treat them harshly because of their mistakes. If the Torah requires when dealing with a convicted violator, “Beror Lo Mita Yafa” – that he be executed humanely, then certainly when it comes to other Jews, we must try to give them “Hayim Yafim” – “good life,” helping them in any way we can. This command applies only in the Land of Israel during the times when Bet Din had the authority to administer capital punishment, and it of course applies only to Bateh Din. A Bet Din that failed to administer Serefa in a situation which required it has transgressed this affirmative command, and, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, they will be severely punished for failing to fulfill their duties.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (20:19) establishes that cursing one’s parent constitutes a capital crime, and is punishable by Sekila (execution by stoning). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this verse merely establishes the punishment for this offense; the actual command forbidden cursing one’s parent is derived from a series of earlier commands, which forbid cursing people generally. (Specifically, the Torah forbids cursing judges and kings (“Elohim Lo Tekalel, Ve’nasi Be’amecha Lo Ta’or” – Shemot 22:27), and then forbids cursing any person – “Lo Tekalel Heresh” Vayikra 19:14), and thus cursing a parent is subsumed under these commands.) It is forbidden to curse one’s parent even after the parent’s passing. This is in contrast to the prohibition against striking a parent, which applies only during a parent’s lifetime. One who curses a parent with one of the Names of G-d (such as “Havaya” or “Elokim”) is liable to Sekila. If one curses a parent invoking not an actual Name of G-d, but rather a “Kinui” – an indirect reference to G-d, such as “Hanun” (“Gracious One”) or “Rahum” (“Merciful One”) – then he is liable to Malkut. Cursing a grandparent falls under the general prohibition against cursing one’s fellow, and not under the special prohibition against cursing one’s parent. Occasionally, when two litigants stand trial, one can impose upon the other a “Shebu’at Ala” – an oath that consists of a curse, whereby the litigant declares that if he speaks untruthfully, G-d should bring upon him such-and-such calamity. If a parent and child are in court with a legal dispute, the child may not impose such an oath upon the parent, as he in effect is cursing his parent. Just as one may not curse his parent, he may not embarrass or degrade the parent in any way. Bet Din has the authority to administer lashes to somebody who belittles and disrespects his parent. In the case of a Shetuki – a child whose father’s identity is uncertain, as there are questions regarding the mother’s fidelity – who curses his presumed father, he is not liable to “Sekila,” as it is uncertain whether the presumed father is truly his father. Needless to say, he would be liable to “Sekila” if he cursed his mother. A “Mamzer” is liable to Sekila if he curses his parent. Even though his parents produced him through a forbidden act, nevertheless, since they are his biological parents, they are included in the prohibition against cursing parents. If a non-Jewish woman undergoes conversion while pregnant, the child is not liable to “Sekila” if he curses the mother, even though she delivered him when she was already a Jewess. The reason is that since he is not, on the level of Torah law, forbidden from cursing his father, he is also not liable for cursing his mother. The special prohibition against cursing one’s parent is binding only if it applies to both the father and the mother; therefore, in this case, where it does not apply to the father, it also does not apply to the mother. In the case of a “Shetuki,” however, as discussed earlier, the prohibition is inapplicable to the father only because it is uncertain whether he is truly the father, and therefore, the prohibition is applicable to the mother. The reason why the child is not, on the level of Torah law, forbidden from cursing his father in this case stems from the principle of “Ger She’nitgayer Ke’katan She’nolad Dameh” – a person is considered “born anew” upon converting to Judaism. As such, he loses all prior familial relationships as far as Halacha is concerned. Therefore, a convert’s parent is not regarded as his parent. Nevertheless, the Sages enacted that he must continue respecting his parents – not to mention that he may not curse them – as it would bring shame upon the Jewish religion if converts stopped respecting their parents after converting. People will see a convert who had respected his parents before his conversion disrespecting them after his conversion, and will conclude that Judaism is a less ethical religion, Heaven forbid. Therefore, the Sages required that a convert continue respecting his parents after conversion.
After the Torah introduces the prohibition against using false weights and measures in business, it commands that we must maintain just scales, weights and other measuring utensils: “Mozeneh Sedek, Abneh Sedek, Efat Sedek, Ve’hin Sedek Yiheyeh Lachem” (Vayikra 19:36). This verse establishes the affirmative command to ensure that all instruments for weighing and measuring are perfectly calibrated so they give an accurate reading. This verse concludes, “I am Hashem your G-d, who brought you out of the land of Egypt” – which the Sages understood to mean that we were brought out of Egypt to be honest and upright. This command to maintain accurate weights and measures is regarded with special severity, and is even considered the purpose for which G-d brought us out of Egyptian bondage. Additionally, the Midrash explains, the Exodus is mentioned in this context to remind us that on the night when Beneh Yisrael left Egypt, G-d killed all the firstborn of Egypt. He knew exactly which Egyptians were their father’s firstborn children and which weren’t. Certainly, then, G-d knows when somebody tampered with his weighing or measuring device to cheat his customers. The Midrash mentions specifically the practice of crooked merchants to store their scales in salt, which affects the scales such that they make the merchandise seem heavier than it is. The Sages established that scales may not be made from metal, because they eventually rust, such that their reading becomes inaccurate. Additionally, it is forbidden to measure a liquid when it is hot, because it then has foam which makes the volume seem higher than it really is. The Gemara in Masechet Besa (29a) tells of a righteous merchant named Abba Shaul Ben Botnit who followed a number of procedures in order to ensure the accuracy of his measurements. When he measured liquid for his customers, he waited until all the foam settled, so that he would not cheat his customers to even the slightest extent. And when selling oil, he would turn the containers upside down and let them drip throughout the night to ensure that the customers receive every drop to which they were entitled. Many customers did not have the patience to wait for all the foam to settle, and ended up taking less than they were supposed to. Abba Shaul stored the small portion of liquid which they did not take, until he collected 300 barrels’ worth. He decided to donate all this liquid to the Bet Ha’mikdash, as he did not want to benefit from this excess. Rabbinical courts had the obligation to appoint enforcement agents to conduct inspections of merchants’ weights and measures, to ensure that they are accurate. These agents had the authority to punish those whose weights and measures were faulty. The Torah here requires using “Hin Sedek” – an accurate measure of a “Hin,” a measurement of volume. The Gemara comments that the word “Hin” can be read as “Hen,” which means “yes.” This verse thus establishes the obligation to honor our word, that when we say “yes” we follow through on our commitments. This Misva applies in all places, at all times, and to both men and women.
The Torah commands toward the end of Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:25), “Lo Ta’asu Avel Ba’mishpat, Ba’mida Ba’mishkal U’bamesura” – “Do not make a perversion in judgment: in measurement, weight, or volume.” This verse introduces the prohibition against cheating people by using inaccurate weights and measures. The Gemara explains that the word “Mesura” refers to a volume of liquid equaling 1/33 rd of a Log. A Log is just 11.7 ounces, and thus a “Mesura” is an exceedingly small volume. The Torah specified this volume to show that when it comes to weights and measures, even the slightest discrepancy is forbidden and violates this Biblical prohibition. Whereas the prohibition against direct theft is transgressed only if one stole at least the value of a “Peruta” (the smallest unit of Talmudic currency), the prohibition against dishonest weights and measures is violated through even a minimal distortion. Significantly, the Torah introduces this command by stating, “Lo Ta’asu Avel Ba’mishpat” – referring to weights and measures as “Mishpat” (“judgment”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that anytime one weights or measures something for commercial purposes, he is, in effect, “judging,” as he is determining how much the other party needs to pay. As such, one who uses inaccurate weights and measures is no different from a judge who knowingly perverts justice by ruling incorrectly, based on personal biases. The Torah regards the perversion of justice as among the most grievous sins, referring to an individual guilty of this offense as a “Meshukatz” (despicable person) and a “Toeba” (abomination). Furthermore, the Sages warn of five grave consequences of the sin of dishonest weights and measures – it defiles the Land of Israel, defames the Name of G-d, causes the Shechina to leave, causes the Jewish People to be defeated by their enemies, and causes our nation’s exile. The Gemara comments that the punishment for this sin is even more severe than the punishment of the Arayot – forbidden intimate relationships. Moreover, this violation is far more difficult to atone for than Arayot. A sin involving Arayot is an offense “Ben Adam La’makom” – between a person and G-d – and can thus be atoned with relative ease, through the process of sincere repentance. Using false weights and measures, however, is an offense against other people, and thus atonement requires making restitution and asking the victims for forgiveness. However, unlike a thief, who is required to pay the victim twice the amount he stole (“Kefel”), one who deceives people through the use of false weights and measures is required to pay only the amount he received from them unlawfully. The Sages enacted a number of different safeguards to protect against this violation. For example, if a person’s scale or other device was chipped or otherwise became defective, he may not use it even accurately, adjusting the weight or measure to account for the defect. Although he will not be cheating his customers, nevertheless, it is likely that the device will be worn further with time, such that the proprietor will unknowingly be cheating his customers, and it therefore may not be used. Another example has to do with the ropes used for measuring land. If two brothers inherit a property and divide it between them, and Bet Din measures the two halves to ensure they are precisely equal, the Bet Din must measure both in the same season. The Gemara explains that ropes slightly contract in the summer heat, and thus if one property is measured in the winter and the other in the summer, one of the brothers will be receiving a slightly larger portion than the other. Although the discrepancy would be minimal, nevertheless, the Sages wished to avoid even this slight distortion of the relative sizes of the two halves. This prohibition, quite obviously, applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. Violators are not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which can be rectified by paying that which was received unlawfully. The Rambam, in Hilchot Geneba (7:8), emphasizes that this prohibition forbids cheating anyone, whether a Jew or a gentile, and even an idol-worshipper. Furthermore, the Rambam adds, just as it is forbidden to cheat a Jew or gentile through the use of inaccurate weights and measures, it is similarly forbidden to cheat anyone – Jew or gentile – by intentionally miscalculating how much he owes. Tampering with the numbers in order to charge a client or customer a higher amount is strictly forbidden by Torah law. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, goes through a variety of mathematical principles, including concepts such as pi and the Pythagorean theorem. He writes that it is crucial for people involved in commerce to familiarize themselves with mathematics in order to be able to make accurate calculations and thus avoid inadvertent violations of this Torah prohibition. Stories are told of great Sadikim who exercised particular caution when weighing and measuring in order to avoid inadvertent, slight mistakes to the detriment of the customer. When weighing or measuring merchandise, they would make a point of adding a little extra for the customer just in case the scale or measuring device was slightly inaccurate. The story is told of the patriarch of the famous Reichman family who, in his shop, would ensure to clean the dust off his scales each day, lest the weight of the dust slightly affect the weight of the merchandise he weighed for his customers. Some have speculated that it was in this merit that the family became exceedingly wealthy. The Torah affords the highest priority to honesty and integrity, which is why this prohibition is treated with such exceptional severity. We are to be especially scrupulous and honest in all our financial dealings, and avoid taking even slightly more from people than we are rightfully entitled to take.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:32), “Mipeneh Seba Takum, Ve’hadarta Peneh Zaken” – “You shall stand in the presence of the elderly, and give respect to the presence of the aged.” Targum Onkelos translates the word “Seba” in this verse as a reference to somebody who is proficient in Torah, such that this verse requires standing out of respect for a Torah scholar. And the Gemara interprets the word “Zaken” to mean “Mi She’kana Hochma” – “one who has acquired wisdom,” regardless of his age. Thus, the Torah here establishes the obligation to respect Torah scholars. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that human beings are brought into the world for the purpose of acquiring wisdom in order to understand G-d to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, the Torah requires giving respect to scholars, who have acquired wisdom, in order to encourage people to follow their example and devote themselves to the pursuit of knowledge. The honor and prestige shown to Torah scholars will make an impression upon people, showing them the great importance of scholarship, thus motivating them to learn and seek wisdom. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Sages required giving honor even to a “Zaken Ashmai” – an elderly person who is ignorant. Although such a person is not learned, nevertheless, he has acquired a vast amount of life experience, and thus he deserves respect for having attained wisdom. As long as he is not a sinner, even an elderly ignoramus must be respected for the wisdom he has amassed over the course of his long life. The Gemara in Baba Mesia teaches that Torah scholars must respect one another; just as a layman must respect a scholar, a scholar must likewise give respect to his fellow scholar. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (4:12) teaches, “Mora Rabach Ke’mora Shamayim” – one must have the same reverence for one’s Rabbi as he has for the Almighty. Halacha requires granting precedence to one’s Rabbi over one’s parent. For example, if one must decide whether to grant his parent’s request or his Rabbi’s request, he should grant his Rabbi’s request. If somebody finds a lost object belonging to his parent and another object belonging to his Rabbi, he should first return the Rabbi’s lost object. If one’s Rabbi and one’s parent both need assistance with a load they are carrying, he should first help his Rabbi. If both one’s Rabbi and one’s parent are in captivity, rescuing the Rabbi takes precedence. The reason, as the Mishna in Baba Mesia (33a) explains, is because one’s parents bring him into this world, whereas his Rabbi brings him into the eternal world by teaching him Torah. However, if one’s father is a Torah scholar, then even if the father is not on the same level of scholarship as the Rabbi, then the father takes precedence over the Rabbi. It is forbidden to sit in one’s Rabbi seat, or to tell him, “I think you are correct,” as though the Rabbi needs his approbation. It is likewise forbidden to contradict his Rabbi’s words, or to teach in his presence. If one sees his Rabbi act incorrectly, he should point out the mistake in a respectful way, by saying, “Rabbi, did you not teach us such-and-such?” The Sefer Ha’hinuch further notes the Halacha exempting Torah scholars from certain communal responsibilities, in deference to their stature. For example, if a community needs to complete a joint building project, with the labor divided among all the residents, the Torah scholars are exempt from labor. Scholars are likewise exempt from certain taxes levied upon the community. This Misva applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that one who disrespects Torah scholars will be severely punished. Respect for Torah scholars constitutes a crucial foundation of our religion, and thus failure to show them respect is regarded as a grievous sin.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (19:31) forbids practicing the “Yidoni” form of witchcraft. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this refers to the ancient practice to take a bone of a certain species of bird (called the “Yadua”), place it one’s mouth, offer incense and perform other rituals. This would result in a voice coming from the bone and providing information about the future. The Sefer Ha’hinuch references in this context his discussion regarding the previous prohibition, which forbids a similar form of witchcraft called “Ob.” There he explained that the Torah forbade such practices because they have the effect of compromising one’s Emuna. If a person feels that he can “outsmart the system” by receiving information about the future, then he will not place his trust in G-d. Moreover, these practices are closely associated with pagan worship, and for this reason, too, the Torah strictly forbade fortune-telling and witchcraft, in order to distance us from idolatry. As in the case of “Ob,” one who performs the “Yidoni” ritual in the presence of witnesses who had issued a warning is liable to Sekila. If he transgressed without witnesses or a warning, he is punished with Karet. If one consulted with a “Yidoni” practitioner and acted upon his advice, he is liable to Malkut. This prohibition applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:31), “Al Tifnu El Ha’obot” – that it is forbidden to consult with the form of witchcraft called “Ob.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in ancient times, sorcerers would bring a certain type of incense and perform other rituals which would cause a voice to be heard from under the person’s arm. The sorcerers would “consult” with this voice to receive predictions about the future and other pieces of information. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade practicing “Ob” because it could undermine one’s faith in G-d. We are to believe that everything which happens is brought about by G-d, and that He governs and orchestrates our lives in accordance with our deeds. Those who resort to witchcraft feel that they can “outsmart the system,” so-to-speak, that they can work around G-d and control their destiny independent of His governance by consulting with spirits. This undermines their faith in, and sense of subservience to, the Almighty. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, these practices are generally associated with pagan beliefs and pagan worship, and thus the Torah forbade them as part of its firm rejection of idolatry, and to distance us from foreign worship. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. One who performed the “Ob” rituals in the presence of witnesses after having been warned is liable to Sekila (execution via stoning). If he committed this violation without witnesses or without a warning, then he is liable to Karet. If he violated this command unintentionally, then he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). One who consults with an “Ob” sorcerer is liable to Malkut if he acts upon the guidance received from the sorcerer.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:30), “Et Mikdashi Tira’u” – that we must treat the Bet Ha’mikdash with fear and reverence. The Gemara at the end of Masechet Berachot explains that this prohibition forbids treading on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem with one’s walking stick, while wearing shoes or a money belt, or with dirt on one’s feet. It likewise forbids using the Temple Mount as a shortcut, and, quite obviously, spitting on the Temple Mount. Additionally, it is forbidden to sit in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash; the only exception to this rule is a king from Malchut Bet David (the Davidic royal dynasty), who may sit in the Temple courtyard. The Midrash, commenting on this prohibition, emphasizes that we do not treat the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash with reverence because of our fear of the site itself, but rather out of respect for the Shechina, the divine presence, which rests on that site. The reason underlying this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that G-d wanted us to have a special place where we can receive inspiration and elevate ourselves to greater heights in the service of G-d. We must treat this site with reverence in order to create an aura and atmosphere that is conducive to inspiration and spiritual growth. Included in this Misva is a prohibition against entering the Temple Mount except for the purpose of performing a Misva; one may not enter the area just to take a tour, or for no particular reason. Upon completing his Misva, one must immediately leave, walking slowly and backward, like a servant humbly and reverently taking leave of his master. During the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, it was forbidden to relieve oneself toward the direction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, or to position one’s bed east to west, such that one end of the bed would be facing the direction of the Bet Ha’mikdash. One may not build a replica of the Bet Ha’mikdash, a structure in the same shape and dimensions. This prohibition applies to both males and females, and even nowadays, when the Bet Ha’mikdash no longer stands. Anything that was forbidden to do on the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash when it stood remains forbidden on the site even in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Likewise, it is forbidden to enter the same places where it was forbidden to enter in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Haredim (Rav Elazar Azkari, Safed, 1533-1600) maintains that this command requires also treating synagogues with reverence. In his view, the concept of Kedushat Bet Ha’kenesset (the sanctity of a synagogue), which requires conducting oneself with respect and reverence in a synagogue, applies on the level of Torah law, as it is included in the Misva of “Et Mikdashi Tira’u.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch, by contrast, seems to restrict this Misva to specifically the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash. In his view, it appears, the requirements associated with Kedushat Bet Ha’kenesset apply only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment).
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:28) commands, “U’ktovet Ka’aka Lo Titenu Bachem,” which forbids making permanent ink marks in one’s flesh, known today as tattoos. This refers to making an incision in the skin and filling it with ink, such that the mark remains permanently, embedded within the skin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the ancient pagans would tattoo the images of their deities on their bodies as an expression of their fealty and devotion to the deities. In order to show our firm rejection of idolatry, the Torah forbade any tattoos in the skin. Tattoos are forbidden anywhere in the body, both in areas of the body that are visible, and in areas which are normally concealed under clothing. Rav Haim Kanievsky (1928-2022) wrote an entire book on this prohibition, and one of the interesting topics he covered was a question posed to him by surgeons. Occasionally, when operating on a patient’s internal organs, the surgeons need to make marks inside the body. These marks are permanent, and the question thus arises as to whether they might violate the prohibition against tattoos. Rav Kanievsky deduced from the Rambam’s formulation of this prohibition that it applies only to marks made on the body’s exterior, and not to marks made on internal organs. This command applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. One who makes a tattoo is liable to Malkut; one who has a tattoo made by somebody else is not liable to Malkut unless he actively assisted in the process, as Malkut are administered only if the violation was committed through an action. A number of Rabbis addressed the question of whether this command forbids the act of making a tattoo, or the end of result of producing a tattoo. The practical difference between these two perspectives would arise in a case where one person made the incisions in the skin, and somebody else filled them in with ink. If the prohibition is defined as a prohibition against the act of making a tattoo, then it would seem that the second fellow is not in violation of the command, as he did not perform the complete action of making a tattoo. If, however, we define this command as forbidding producing the end result, then it stands to reason that the one who fills the incisions with ink, and has thus produced the result, indeed violates this command and would be liable. This issue is subject to some discussion and debate. In our times, of course, tattoos have become every popular among the general population, and, unfortunately, some Jews have joined this trend. We must realize that permanent tattoos transgress an explicit Torah command, and are strictly forbidden. Another contemporary question concerns the status of permanent makeup and eyeliner. One should consult with his Rabbi for practical guidance in this regard.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:27), “Ve’lo Tash’hit Et Pe’at Zekanecha” – forbidding cutting the hair of one’s face. The Sages understood this command as referring to the removal of one’s hair from five areas of the face – the upper cheeks on both sides, the lower cheeks on both sides, and the chin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade shaving one’s face because it was customary for the ancient pagan priests to remove their facial hair. The Torah thus issued this prohibition in order to emphasize our outright rejection of idolatrous worship. Removing facial hair is forbidden only when it is done with a razor, but not with scissors; indeed, it is customary today for men to shave with electric shavers, which remove hair in a manner similar to scissors. Surprisingly, the Rambam writes that one who removes facial hair with scissors is “Patur” – exempt from punishment, implying that it is nevertheless forbidden. Some explain that the Rambam refers only to scissors which cut hair “Ke’en Ta’ar” – in a manner similar to a razor, whereas cutting facial hair with ordinary scissors would be permissible even according to the Rambam. This prohibition applies in all places, in all times, and only to males. A woman who shaves a man’s beard is not in violation of this command. Non-Jewish male servants are included in this prohibition, even though non-Jewish servants are generally bound only by Torah commands which are binding upon both men and women. Although it is customary to permit shaving with electric shavers nowadays, as mentioned earlier, nevertheless, some brands of shavers act like a razor, and thus could potentially be forbidden. One who uses such a brand is in violation of a Torah command each time he shaves. It is therefore imperative to consult with one’s Rabbi for guidance in this regard. Certainly, it is forbidden to shave with a razor and shaving cream.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:27), “Lo Takifu Pe’at Roshechem,” which forbids cutting the sideburns – the hair at the sides of one’s face, next to the ears. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade cutting one’s Pe’ot (sideburns) because the ancient pagan priests would cut their hair in this fashion, removing all the hair from the back of the ear until the forehead. In order to strengthen our firm rejection of pagan worship, the Torah forbids removing the sideburns the way the pagan priests would. The Gemara in Masechet Yebamot (5) comments that it is forbidden to remove all the hair on one’s head, making himself bald, because in so doing, he removes his Pe’ot. The Sefer Ha’hinuch addresses the question of why this needed to be stated, as it seems perfectly obvious. After all, once the Torah forbids removing one’s sideburns, why would anyone think that it would be permissible to remove all the hair on one’s head, which quite obviously entails the removal of the sideburns? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that the pagan priests specifically did not remove all their hair, and removed only the sideburns. Fundamentally, then, it should not be forbidden to remove all of one’s hair. The Gemara therefore clarifies that indeed, the Torah forbids removing all of one’s hair. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch suggests, is that the Torah forbade this as a safeguard against the removal of only the Pe’ot. According to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, this is a rare instance where the Torah imposes its own safeguard, establishing a secondary prohibition in order to protect against a primary violation. In essence, the Torah forbids removing the Pe’ot alone, without removing the rest of one’s hair, but in practice, it forbids removing all of one’s hair as a safeguard against the removal of only the Pe’ot. This prohibition is directed both toward the barber who cuts the hair, and the individual whose hair is cut. The Gemara establishes that if the one whose hair is cut actively assisted in some way in the cutting of his sideburns, such as by turning his head, or lifting the sideburns for the barber, then both he and the barber are liable to Malkut. If the person receiving the haircut remains entirely passive, then he might nevertheless be in violation of this command for allowing his sideburns to be removed, but he is not liable to Malkut, because he did not perform a forbidden action. The Rambam writes that he heard from the elder scholars that the width of four hairs must remain in order to avoid violating this command. On the level of Torah law, removing one’s sideburns is forbidden only with a razor, but not if one removes the hair with scissors. The reason, presumably, is because it is only with a razor that one is able to completely remove the hairs. Nevertheless, according to some opinions, if the results of removing the sideburns with scissors resemble those of removing with a razor, then this is forbidden. (See Shulhan Aruch, Yoreh De’a 181.) This command applies in all places and in all times, and only to males. Although most Torah prohibitions apply equally to males and females, this command is exceptional in that it is not binding upon women. The reason is because this command is presented together with the prohibition against shaving the hair on one’s face, and it therefore applies only to those to whom that command applies. Quite obviously, the prohibition against shaving facial hair does not apply to women, and thus the prohibition against removing sideburns likewise does not apply to women. By extension, the Torah prohibition does not forbid a woman from removing a man’s sideburns. Nevertheless, the Sages enacted that a woman may not cut a man’s sideburns, and even the sideburns of a young boy. Generally, non-Jewish servants are included only in commands that are binding upon both men and women. Naturally, then, we would have assumed that they are excluded from the prohibition against removing sideburns. In truth, however, they are bound by this prohibition. As mentioned, women are excluded from this prohibition only because they are excluded from the prohibition against shaving facial hair, by virtue of the fact that they do not grow facial hair. Hence, male servants, who have facial hair, are included in the prohibition against removing Pe’ot. One who removed his sideburn on one side is liable to one set of Malkut; if he removed the sideburns on both sides, then he is liable to two sets of Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:26), “Ve’lo te’onenu,” which forbids determining when to act based on superstitious beliefs that certain times are more auspicious than others. It is forbidden to decide on the basis of these beliefs that performing a given task at one time will more likely yield the desired results than performing it at a different time. This command also includes practicing magic, even if it is done in a manner of “Ahizat Enayim” (illusions), deceiving people to make it appear as though one has supernatural, magical powers. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives the example of a person who gives the appearance of pulling a snake out of his shirt, or who throws a ring into the air and then appears to take it out of somebody’s mouth. The reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because practicing magic could lead people to believe that some human beings have the power to overturn nature. This will then undermine their belief in Hashem, because they will assume that people are endowed with the same powers of He is, and they, like Him, can reverse the natural order. By forbidding magic, the Torah seeks to prevent people from mistakenly attributing supernatural powers to human beings, which would threaten their belief in the single Creator who exercises absolute control over the universe. This Misva applies in all places, in all times, and to both men and women. One who performs an action at a specific time on the basis of a superstitious belief in the auspicious nature of that particular time has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. Inquiring as to the most auspicious time for this action does not violate the command of “Lo Te’onenu”; one transgresses this command only by acting upon such a belief. The Poskim address the question of whether modern-day magic shoes are forbidden by force of this command. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986), in Iggerot Moshe (Y.D., vol. 4, Siman 13), writes that since people nowadays realize that the magician has trained in the art of sleight of hand, and do not ascribe to him supernatural powers, today’s magic shows are allowed. He advises, however, that the magician make it clear from the outset that his magic is all illusions, and he does not actually practice magic.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:26), “Lo Tenahashu,” which forbids following superstitions, determining what to do or not to do based on random signs. The Midrash gives several examples of superstitions, such as people who determine that they will have bad luck on the day when a piece of bread fell from their mouth, their staff fell from their hand, a snake crawled to their right, or a fox ran to their left. The command of “Lo Tenahashu” forbids deciding to act a certain way based on these kinds of signs. If a person acts upon such superstitions, he is in violation of this Biblical command. If he does so in the presence of two kosher witnesses after having been warned, he is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids following superstition because it is “Shiga’on” – “inanity,” sheer foolishness. In the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, “It is not fitting for the sacred nation to pay heed to false matters.” As we are G-d’s treasured nation, it is beneath us to accept such foolishness. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, following superstition can compromise our faith in Hashgaha Peratit – G-d’s direct providence and control over everything that happens. If we make decisions based on random occurrences such as a black cat walking in front of us, we will gradually lose our belief that everything that happens is decided by G-d. Indeed, Bilam said in one of his blessings to Beneh Yisrael, “Ki Lo Nahash Be’Yaakob Ve’lo Kesem Be’Yisrael” (Bamidbar 23:23) – that Beneh Yisrael do not rely on magic or superstition, and instead place their trust solely in G-d. The commentators raise the question of how it was permissible for Eliezer, the righteous servant of Abraham Abinu, to come up with a sign with which he selected a match for Abraham’s son, Yishak. As we read in Parashat Hayeh-Sarah (chapter 24), Eliezer decided that he would approach a girl at the well outside Aram Naharayim, and request water from her pitcher. If she would respond by offering him water and also offering to draw water for his camels, Eliezer decided, then she would be the woman to marry Yishak. Seemingly, Eliezer was in violation of the command of “Lo Tenahashu” by determining his course of action based on a sign. Tosafot in Masechet Hulin (95) answer that Eliezer did not actually rely on the sign. Although he said that this would be his manner of determining the girl’s suitability, in truth, this was not his only criterion. Indeed, Tosafot point out, after Ribka responded to the servant’s request by giving him water and drawing water for his camels, he did not give her jewelry, designating her as Yishak’s bride, until she told him who she was and who her father was. This proves that drawing water for the camels was not the sole criterion. (It should be noted, however, that Rashi, in his Torah commentary, disagrees, and writes that Eliezer gave Ribka jewelry immediately after she drew water for his camels, even before he found out who she was.) Others answer, very simply, that the prohibition applies only to random signs which have no rational basis, such as deciding one’s course of action based on the fact that a piece of bread fell from his mouth while he ate. Eliezer, however, wanted to find a righteous girl who excelled in the quality of Hesed (kindness) and was thus worthy of marrying into the family of Abraham Abinu. His sign was not in any way random or irrational; it was his method of assuring that the girl he chose was a girl of outstanding character and generosity. As such, it did not violate the prohibition of “Lo Tenahashu.” This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women alike.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:26), “Lo Tochelu Al Ha’dam” – literally, “Do not eat over blood.” The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin explains this verse as forbidding acting in the manner of a “Ben Sorer U’moreh” (“wayward son”), whom the Torah discusses later, in the Book of Debarim (21:18-20). This son is described as “Zolel Ve’sobeh” – gluttonous, overindulging in meat and wine. The Torah there in Debarim commands putting the youngster to death because of his wrongful conduct. The Gemara notes that the Torah assigns punishment only to those who have violated an explicit command – and thus the Torah must have issued a command forbidding the conduct of the “Ben Sorer U’moreh.” This command, the Gemara explains, is “Lo Tochelu Al Ha’dam,” which is to be understood as forbidding eating in such a way that can lead to bloodshed. A gluttonous person becomes addicted to food and wine, to the point where he is prepared to resort to violence when necessary to obtain them. Hence, when the Torah commands, “Lo Tochelu Al Ha’dam,” it forbids gluttonous eating and drinking, which can bring a person to commit murder. In explaining the reason behind this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that overindulgence in food and drink results in sinful behavior. This is expressed in a number of different contexts, including in the verse in Parashat Ha’azinu (Devarim 32:15), “Va’yishman Yeshurun Vayib’at…Va’yitosh Elo’kah Asahu” – “Yeshurun [Israel] became fattened and rebelled…and abandoned the G-d who made them.” When we are preoccupied with worldly pleasures, we are prone to rebel against G-d. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because food nourishes the flesh, our physical beings, whereas Torah and spiritual engagement nourish the soul. These two entities – the body and soul – are polar opposites of one another, such that the more we tend to the body, the more we neglect the soul. The righteous focus their attention on attaining spiritual “nourishment,” and so they exercise moderation in their physical indulgence, in order to give primacy to the soul. If a person does just the opposite, focusing his attention mainly on physical delights, he compromises his spiritual sustenance, and can thus easily be led to sinful behavior. Although this message is, of course, relevant at all ages and in all stages of life, nevertheless, the prohibition of “Lo Tochelu Al Ha’dam” applies only during early adulthood – specifically, during the first three months after a boy becomes a Halachic adult (usually at 13 years of age). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that it is especially important for a youngster who begins adulthood to develop the critically important skill of self-restraint and avoid overindulgence, and so the Torah forbade gluttonous eating and drinking specifically during the first months of adulthood. While we must avoid overindulgence generally, the particular prohibition of “Lo Tochelu Al Ha’dam” refers specifically to the conduct of a “Ben Sorer U’moreh.” Namely, the youngster steals money from his parents in order to purchase meat and wine, and he eats partially-cooked meat (“Ke’ma’achal Ben Derusai”) and partially-diluted wine – the way criminals eat and drink. Interestingly, the youngster does not violate this prohibition if he partakes of non-kosher meat and wine, or if he eats this way on a fast day, when eating and drinking are forbidden. The “Ben Sorer U’moreh” is described as somebody who disobeys his parents (“Enenu Shome’a Be’kol Abiv” – Devarim 21:18), implying that it is only they whom he disobeys. If a youngster acts gluttonously in a Halachically forbidden manner, such that he also disobeys G-d, he does not meet the criteria of a “Ben Sorer U’moreh.” This Halacha applies only in the Land of Israel. The Torah in Debarim speaks of the parents bringing the child to the court which then puts him to death – and courts are authorized to administer capital punishment only in the Land of Israel. Hence, this command does not apply outside the land. This prohibition applies only to boys, and not to girls. The Gemara brings a debate among the Tanna’im as to whether there ever was a situation of a young man who met all the criteria of “Ben Sorer U’moreh” and was put to death. According to one view, such a situation will never happen, and the Torah presented this law only so that “Derosh Ve’kabel Sechar” – we can learn this subject and thereby receive reward. One understanding of this expression is simply that the Torah presented us with additional Torah to learn – even laws which are not practically applicable – so we have more opportunities to earn reward for Torah learning. Alternatively, Rav Samson Rafael Hirsch (Germany, 1808-1888) explained the Gemara’s comment to mean that by learning the laws of “Ben Sorer U’moreh,” we earn the “reward” of raising children properly. These laws express several important principles relevant to childrearing and education, and thus by studying these rules, we receive the “reward” of learning how to raise children effectively.
After establishing the Orla prohibition, which forbids benefitting from fruits grown during the first three years after a tree’s planting, the Torah (Vayikra 19:24) commands that in the fourth year, the fruits must be treated as “Kodesh Hilulim Le’Hashem” – “sacred, praising G-d.” This means that one must bring the fruits to Jerusalem and partake of them there, giving praise to G-d. These fruits are called “Neta Rebai.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two reasons for this Misva. First, he writes, the fruits that grow in the fourth year are the highest quality fruits, and so the Torah commands bringing them to Jerusalem and expressing praise to Hashem, showing that he devotes his choicest fruit to Hashem. This will bring G-d’s blessing upon all his trees and produce. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah presents a number of commands that require people to go to Jerusalem and spend time there – such as the offering of sacrifices, Ma’aser Sheni, Ma’aser Behema, and Neta Rebai. Hashem wants us to spend time in Jerusalem because Jerusalem is the center of Torah learning and spiritual devotion. The requirement to occasionally visit and spend time in Jerusalem will cause people to make arrangements such as purchasing property there, or having their children live there, thus strengthening their connection to the city. This will, in turn, strengthen their devotion to Torah learning, because, as mentioned, Jerusalem is the center of Torah study. The Ramban writes that the fruits grown in a tree’s fourth year are the first of the tree’s fruits that are healthful. In the Ramban’s view, the Torah forbade partaking of a tree’s fruits during its first three years because these fruits are detrimental to one’s health (just as the Ramban explains much of the Torah’s dietary restrictions as aimed at protecting our health). Hence, the fruits grown in the fourth year are, in a sense, the tree’s first fruits. The Torah therefore commanded bringing those fruits to Jerusalem and giving praise to G-d, thanking Him for the first beneficial fruits produced by the tree. If the Neta Rebai fruits are too numerous to bring to Jerusalem, one has the option of “Pidyon” – “redeeming” them by transferring their sanctity onto money. He then brings the money to Jerusalem, and uses the money to purchase food which he eats there in the city. One who redeems his own fruits must add a “Homesh” (one-fifth) to the fruits’ value, whereas one who redeems somebody else’s fruits does not need to add a “Homesh.” This Misva applies to both men and women, but only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Rambam maintains that this Misva applies only in the Land of Israel, and has no application at all outside the land. Some Rishonim, however, maintained that when it comes to Kerem Rebai – grapes grown in a vine’s fourth year – the Sages enacted that the grapes are subject to these laws. Accordingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if one grew grapes outside Israel during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, the grapes that grew during the fourth year would be redeemed, through the transfer of their sanctity onto money. The grapes would then be permissible, and the money would be destroyed such that nobody could use them. One who neglected to follow this procedure in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash would be in violation of this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that those who abided by these laws received great blessing.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:23) commands that after one plants a fruit tree, the fruits grown during the first three years may not be eaten. These fruits are called “Orla” and are forbidden for consumption. The reason behind this command is to train us to exercise discipline and self-restraint, as rather than immediately benefitting from the produce of trees which are planted, we abstain from them for several years in deference to G-d’s authority. The Torah here speaks of an “Etz Ma’achal” – a tree planted for food. Hence, this prohibition applies only to a tree planted for the purpose of producing fruit; if one plants a tree for wood, and it produces fruit, those fruits are not forbidden. However, if one planted a tree for wood and then changed his mind, deciding that he wishes to use the tree for fruit, then the prohibition of Orla applies and the fruits are forbidden during the first three years. The Torah formulates the prohibition with the expression “Et Piryo” (“its fruit”), and the Sages understood the word “Et” as indicating that the peel around the fruit is included in this prohibition. Thus, just as the fruits themselves are forbidden during the tree’s first three years, the peel around such fruit is forbidden for benefit, as well. This prohibition in all times, and to both men and women. The Torah introduces this command by stating, “When you enter the land,” implying that the prohibition of Orla applies only in the Land of Israel. However, the Rambam writes that a Halacha Le’Moshe Mi’Sinai – an oral tradition received by Moshe at Mount Sinai – extends this prohibition even to other regions. Hence, even fruit trees grown outside Israel are subject to the Orla prohibition. However, the Orla prohibition outside Israel differs from the prohibition which applies in Israel, in that outside Israel, “Safek Orla” – fruits whose Orla status is uncertain – is permissible. Normally, when it comes to laws forbidden by the Torah (as opposed to laws enacted by the Sages), we must act stringently in situations of doubt to avoid the possibility of transgressing. And, laws taught through Halacha Le’Moshe Mi’Sinai have the status of Torah law in this regard. Orla outside Israel marks an exception to this rule, as only fruits which one knows definitively to be Orla are forbidden. Accordingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if someone takes fruit which he does not realize is Orla, his fellow who knows the fruit’s status does not have to inform him that the fruit is forbidden. Furthermore, the Rambam writes that one who intentionally eats Orla outside Israel receives Malkut only by force of Rabbinic enactment. This is in contrast to one who knowingly eats Orla in Israel, who is liable to Malkut on the level of Torah law. The later commentators explain that since there is no textual basis for forbidding Orla outside Israel – as the Torah speaks only of trees planted in Israel – one does not receive Malkut by force of Torah law for eating Orla outside Israel. Nevertheless, he does receive Malkut by force of Rabbinic enactment.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:19), “Sadecha Lo Tizra Kil’ayim,” forbidding planting different species of seeds together. For example, one is not permitted to plant wheat and barley seeds together. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition includes not just planting seeds of different species together, but also activities that promote the growth of different species that have been planted together. For example, it is forbidden to prune (remove weeds from) two plants that are growing together, as this facilitates their growth. It is likewise forbidden to take earth and cover seeds of different species that are already together in the ground, whether this is done by hand, by foot, with a utensil, or in some other manner. Planting different species is forbidden not only in the ground, but also in an “Asitz Nakub” – a flowerpot with a hole on the bottom, such that the plants are connected to the ground. This prohibition does not apply to planting together different species which are used not for eating, but for medicine. Since these species are not edible, they are not included in this prohibition. The Torah forbids not only planting together different species of seeds, but also grafting different species of trees – meaning, taking a branch of one species and grafting it onto a tree of a different species. If some seeds of one species happen to fall into seeds of a different species, they may be planted together if the minority species constitutes 1/42 nd or less of the mixture. In such a proportion, the seeds are considered negated by the majority (“Bittul”), and thus the seeds may be planted without first separating them. The Mishna teaches that on Rosh Hodesh Adar, the religious leaders would send officials to the fields to ensure that no Kil’ayim (combination of different species) was growing, and to uproot any Kil’ayim which they found. The Torah forbids planting Kil’ayim in “Sadecha” – “your field,” which the Sages understood as a reference to specifically the Land of Israel. Thus, the prohibition against planting different species of seeds applies only in the Land of Israel, and not in other lands. Outside the Land of Israel, one may plant different species of seeds together. However, the prohibition against grafting different species together applies even outside the Land of Israel. In Israel, one may ask a gentile to plant different species of seeds. Both in Israel and in the Diaspora, one may not ask a gentile to graft a branch onto a different species of tree which is owned by a Jew. This command applies in all times, and to both males and females. One who violates this prohibition, planting different species of seeds together, or grafting a branch onto a different species of tree, is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:19), “Behemtecha Lo Tarbi’a Kil’ayim,” which forbids mating a male animal and a female animal from different species. Crossbreeding is forbidden regardless of whether one mates two Behemot (domesticated animals) from different species, or two Hayot (non-domesticated animals) from different species. This prohibition applies also to mating land creatures with sea creatures. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d forbade crossbreeding because He created the world with the precise species with which He wanted the world to be inhabited. The Torah tells that after the process of creation, “G-d saw everything He made, and behold, it was very good” (Bereshit 1:31). He was pleased with His creations, and does not want more species to come into existence. Therefore, He forbade creating new species through crossbreeding. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that G-d’s blessing is not bestowed upon new species which are created through the mating of different animal species. Nevertheless, if one violated this prohibition and mated animals of different species, the product is permissible for benefit. If both parents’ species are kosher, then the animal they produced is permissible for consumption. There is some discussion as to how the offspring’s status is determined – whether it assumes the status of the father’s species or the mother’s species. Halacha treats Behemot differently from Hayot, and thus if a Behema is mated with a Haya, we must determine whether to regard the offspring as a Behema or a Haya. It appears from the Rif (Rav Yishak of Fez, Morocco, 1013-1103) that the product of crossbreeding assumes the status of the mother, and thus, for example, if the mother is a Haya, then the offspring is treated as a Haya. This prohibition applies in all places, in all times, and to both men and women. One who actively mates animals of different species has violated this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. Since this violation is transgressed through committing an action, violators are liable to Malkut for their offense. If one causes the animals to mate indirectly, such as by making certain sounds, or bringing them together into the same pen, then he is guilty of violating a Rabbinic enactment, and receives Malkut for disobeying this provision. Hacham Bension Abba Shaul (Jerusalem, 1924-1998), in one of his responsa (Or Le’sion, vol. 2, p. 141), addresses the status of fruits produced via grafting a branch of one species onto a tree of a different species. He writes that one who eats this fruit for the first time in a year does not recite the Beracha of “She’he’hiyanu,” which is normally recited when one eats a fruit for the first time that year. We obviously cannot celebrate the opportunity to enjoy something which the Torah did not want produced, and thus reciting “She’he’hiyanu” would be inappropriate. If, however, seeds from this hybrid fruit were planted, and yielded additional fruit, one who eats that fruit does, in fact, recite “She’he’hiyanu,” because planting these seeds is entirely permissible, and thus the fruit has been produced through permissible means. Hacham Bension also addresses the question of whether one would recite “She’he’hiyanu” over such a fruit if he had already eaten that season both species from which it was produced. One might figure that this fruit is not new for the individual, since he had already eaten the two “parent” fruits. However, Hacham Bension rules that one does, in fact, recite “She’he’hiyanu” in such a case, because this fruit is considered an entirely new entity, fundamentally different from the two species from which it was produced.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim issues one of the most famous of its 613 commands: the command of “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha” – “You shall love your fellow as yourself” (Vayikra 19:18). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah requires us “to love every Jew with a deep love,” explaining that we are to care for our fellow Jew and his property the way we care for our own wellbeing and our own property. The Sifra cites Rabbi Akiba’s timeless teaching that the command of “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha” constitutes “Kelal Gadol Ba’Torah” – “a great principle of the Torah.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that observing this Misva facilitates numerous other Misvot. If a person fulfills this command and truly loves his fellow, then he will not steal, commit adultery, deceive, hurt people, encroach on their property, or commit other interpersonal offenses. Hence, this Misva is “Kelal Gadol Ba’Torah,” a central pillar which leads to the fulfillment of so many other Misvot. The underlying rationale of this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that if we act lovingly toward other people, they will, in turn, act lovingly toward us. This will help create a peaceful, harmonious society, which is, of course, one of the important goals of Torah life. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command includes not only ensuring to avoid causing our fellow physical or financial harm, but also speaking in praise of people, and refraining from speaking disparagingly about them. Just as we want people to speak favorably about us, and not to speak about us disparagingly, we must do the same for others. This Misva applies in all places, in all times, and to both men and women. One who causes his fellow pain or harm transgresses this affirmative command. The commentators raise the question of how the Torah could possibly demand that we love other people as much as we love ourselves. We innately concern ourselves primarily with our own wellbeing. Is it reasonable to expect us to feel the same love and concern for others as we feel for ourselves? Moreover, the same Rabbi Akiba who described this command as “a great principle of the Torah” explicitly ruled that one’s own wellbeing takes precedence over that of others. As the Gemara discusses in Masechet Baba Mesia (62), Rabbi Akiba maintained that if a person suffers from dire dehydration while traveling in a desert, and has just enough water to sustain his life, he may drink it, even though his companion will then die. He is not required to sacrifice his life to save his fellow traveler’s life, because a person’s own life takes precedence over other people’s lives. How can this ruling be reconciled with the Biblical command of “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha”? One explanation is based upon the famous story told of a gentile who came to Hillel and said he would convert if Hillel could teach him the entire Torah in a single sentence. Hillel replied, “That which you despise – do not do to your fellow.” Notably, Hillel mentioned only refraining from doing to others what one dislikes; he does not mention the converse – that one should actively do to others that which he wants done to him. Some have thus proposed that the command of “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha” does not actually require loving others to the same extent as one loves himself, but rather forbids doing to others that which one does not want done to him. The Ramban explains differently, understanding this Misva as requiring us to wish for our fellow’s wellbeing, and to celebrate his success, just as we wish for our own wellbeing and rejoice over our success. We must wish that our fellow enjoys good health, a good livelihood, happiness and honor, just as we wish all this for ourselves. Rav Haim Palachi (Turkey, 1788-1868) offered a creative reading of this verse, explaining that it refers to loving the person whom one finds it most difficult to love – one’s business competitor. The Torah commands us to love “Re’acha Kamocha” – “your fellow who is like you,” meaning, the person who is in the same business as you. People normally resent and dislike their competitors, and so the Torah requires making a special effort to love those with whom he is in competition. Rav Haim Palachi explains that sometimes, it is the competitor who brings blessing to the industry, and thus, counterintuitively, the competitor does not stand in the way of one’s success, but to the contrary, helps facilitate it. Indeed, Rav Haim Palachi notes, he witnessed situations where a successful merchant left the area, to the joy of his competitors who assumed that they would then prosper, but in the end, the merchant’s relocation harmed the entire industry, and the competitors were forced to close down their businesses. Finally, the Ba’al Shem Tob (Rav Yisrael Ba’al Shem Tob, 1698-1760) explained that loving one’s fellow has the effect of “sweetening” G-d’s harsh judgment, and transforming His attribute of judgment into compassion. This is alluded to in the word “Kamocha,” which in Gematria equals 86 – the same Gematria as the divine Name “Elokim,” the Name that signifies G-d’s attribute of justice. The verse reads, “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha Kamocha, Ani Hashem,” which the Baal Shem Tob understands to mean that “Ve’ahabta Le’re’acha” – we must love our fellow – and then “Kamocha Ani Hashem” – the attribute of justice, represented by the word “Kamocha,” will be transformed to kindness, represented by “Ani Hashem” (the Name of “Havaya,” which expresses G-d’s attribute of kindness).
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:18), “Ve’lo Titor” – that we may not harbor feelings of resentment in our heart toward someone who has wronged us. As opposed to the prohibition of “Lo Tikom” (“You shall not take revenge”), which forbids actually avenging wrongdoing, the prohibition of “Ve’lo titor” forbids bearing a grudge in one’s heart, even without doing anything to the person who has wronged us. The classic example given by the Sages is a person who asked if he could borrow his fellow’s sickle, and his fellow refused, and then, the next day, that fellow asks him if he could borrow his axe. The prohibition against revenge forbids the man from refusing to lend him his axe to avenge his refusal to lend his sickle the previous day. The prohibition of “Ve’lo Titor” forbids the man from saying as he lends the axe, “I’m not like you; you refused to lend to me, but I am lending to you.” Even though he agrees to lend his axe, nevertheless, he has violated the command of “Ve’lo Titor” by harboring resentment, as expressed in his hostile remark. The rationale underlying this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is the same rationale which he presented to explain the previous command, the command against taking revenge. One of the basic tenets of Jewish faith is that everything which happens to us has been willed by G-d, and therefore, if somebody wrongs us, we must recognize that this happened because Hashem decided that this must happen. It is therefore senseless to harbor negative feelings toward the person who wronged us, who was but G-d’s messenger. We should instead recognize that Hashem had this happen as a call to introspect and strive to improve our conduct. The Torah forbids taking revenge and even harboring resentment so that we realize that everything we experience has been brought about by G-d for a reason. This prohibition applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who violates this command is not liable to Malkut, because this violation is committed in one’s mind and heart, without performing an action. As mentioned, the example given by the Sages is a monetary offense, when a person refused to lend something to his fellow. The later Rabbis addressed the question of whether the prohibitions against taking revenge and bearing a grudge apply also to other kinds of offenses, such as if a person caused his fellow physical harm, or embarrassed him. Would it be permissible for the victim in these cases to take revenge or harbor feelings of resentment? Some Rishonim indicate that in such situations, the victim would, in fact, be allowed to take revenge or bear a grudge. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, implies otherwise. In defining the prohibition against taking revenge, he speaks of a case where someone did any sort of wrong to his fellow (“She’si’aro Be’ehad Min Ha’derachim”) – suggesting that even if one caused his fellow physical harm or embarrassment, the victim may not take revenge or bear a grudge. The Hafetz Haim, in his work on the laws of forbidden speech (introduction, Be’er Mayim Haim notes), shows that the Rambam, too, ruled stringently in this regard, and felt that these prohibitions apply in all cases of wrongdoing, and not just in situations of financial damage. In light of these different opinions, the Hafetz Haim writes, we apply the famous rule of “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” – that we must act stringently when faced with uncertainty with regard to a Biblical law. As the Torah commands of “Lo Tikom” and “Ve’lo Titor” are at stake, we must follow the stringent opinion and refrain from revenge and resentment in all situations, regardless of what kind of wrong we suffered.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:18), “Lo Tikom” – “You shall not take revenge.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if a person wronged his fellow, causing him any sort of harm or distress, in any way, that fellow is not permitted to do something against him in return, for revenge. Even if the person committed an offense to which people would naturally react with revenge, the Torah requires the victim to overcome his instinctive tendency, as well as the societal expectation to take revenge, and not do something to harm the perpetrator. The Sifra establishes that this applies even to relatively minor offenses. For example, if a person asks his friend to lend him his sickle, and the friend refuses, then if later the friend asks him to lend him his axe, he may not refuse to lend it to him out of revenge. Even though the friend refused to lend him his sickle the previous day, he may not refuse to lend him his axe to “settle the score.” Explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch develops one of the foundational elements of Emuna (faith) – that everything which happens to a person has been ordained by G-d. If somebody wronged us, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this could not have happened unless Hashem decided that we needed to endure this pain, harm or loss, and we were deserving of this punishment. Once we accept this belief, then there is no sense in seeking retribution against the person who wronged us, as he was simply a messenger of G-d. The Rabbis of the Mussar movement explained this concept by way of analogy to somebody striking his fellow with his stick. There is no sense in becoming angry at the stick, as the beatings are being done not by the stick, but by the person holding it. But if a dog is being struck, then it might likely grow angry at the stick, because it lacks the intelligence to recognize that it is a person, and not the stick itself, that hurts it. By the same token, if somebody harms us, we must recognize that this person is but the “stick” used by Hashem. Rather than take revenge, we must respond by introspecting and improving our behavior. Notably, the Sefer Ha’hinuch introduces this discussion by stating that “a person must know and place in his heart” this fundamental tenet of Jewish faith. It is possible for a person to know something in his mind, but fail to internalize it in his heart such that it informs his behavior. The Sefer Ha’hinuch urges us to not only know this concept, but to place it in our hearts and make it an integral part of our outlook and attitude. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah forbids revenge in the interest of maintaining peace and avoiding fighting and strife among people. If people take revenge, each strikes the other to avenge what they did to each other, resulting in a full-blown fight, which we are to strive to prevent. This command applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who takes revenge against his fellow has violated this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, because this violation generally is not committed through an action. Although this command can be violated through an action, such as if one acts violently to avenge an offense, nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that one is not liable to Malkut for violating a prohibition which can be violated without an action, even if he violated it by performing an action.
In the context of the obligation to reprimand one’s fellow who has acted wrongly, the Torah warns in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:17), “Ve’lo Tisa Alav Het” (“Do not bear iniquity on his account”). The Sages understood this command to mean that when reprimanding one’s fellow, he must speak to him privately, in order not to embarrass him. This command thus establishes a Biblical prohibition against causing one’s fellow embarrassment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that embarrassment is the worst form of pain and distress that a person can experience, and so G-d, who wishes for the wellbeing of all His creatures, forbade us from causing our fellow embarrassment. Therefore, even when a person has acted wrongly and needs to be reprimanded, this must be done in a manner that does not cause him embarrassment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a person sins against G-d (as opposed to interpersonal offenses), and he refuses to accept private criticism, then there is a Misva to publicly censure the person in order to steer him back to the proper path of conduct. Indeed, the prophets would publicly reprimand the people and publicize their sins in an effort to lead them to change. The Talmud teaches, “It is preferable for a person to throw himself into a fiery furnace rather than publicly embarrass his fellow.” This is inferred from the story of Tamar, the daughter-in-law of Yehuda. She became pregnant, and unbeknownst to Yehuda, he was the father, having impregnated Tamar when she was disguised. Yehuda ruled that Tamar must be put to death for having an illicit relationship. Rather than publicly announce that Yehuda had impregnated her, Tamar instead sent a subtle message to Yehuda that he was the father, in order not to embarrass him. She was prepared to be executed by fire rather than cause Yehuda embarrassment for the purpose of saving herself. (In the end, of course, Yehuda came forward and acknowledged that he had impregnated Tamar, and so she was not punished. A full explanation of this complicated incident lies beyond the scope of our discussion.) This shows that it is preferable to endure great personal sacrifice than humiliate another individual. The Gemara also teaches that causing a person embarrassment is akin to killing him. The Maharal of Prague (Rav Yehuda Loew, 1520-1609) explains this teaching based on the concept of “Selem Elokim,” that every person is created in G-d’s image. When the Mazikin (harmful spiritual forces) see this image, they are frightened, and leave the person alone. The stronger the “Selem Elokim” within a person, the stronger an effect this has. And thus when a righteous person walks about, even the animals intuitively sense the divine image, and they are frightened. This is why the prophet Daniel was not harmed when he was cast into the lion’s den, because his “Selem Elokim” had a profound impact, frightening the lions. However, this divine image is very fragile, and can easily be damaged. When one embarrasses his fellow, this diminishes from the power of that person’s “Selem Elokim,” and thus leaves him vulnerable. The Maharal explains on this basis the special obligation to escort one’s guest as he leaves. If a host fails to show his guest this courtesy and respect, he diminishes from the guest’s divine image, and this leaves the guest exposed to the dangers that lurk during travel. By the same token, when a person embarrasses someone, treating him like he has no worth, this has the effect of reducing the power of his fellow’s “Selem Elokim,” such that he is now vulnerable to the harmful spiritual forces, and he could easily get hurt. And thus the Gemara teaches that embarrassing someone is akin to murder, because this could easily result in actual physical harm. This prohibition applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who embarrasses his fellow transgresses this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is violated verbally, and not through an action. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns, G-d has many ways with which to punish somebody for this particularly grave prohibition. Preserving other people’s dignity involves more than protecting them from the uncomfortable feeling of embarrassment. As we have seen, their very lives could be at stake. It is within the power of each and every one of us to look out for our fellowman’s wellbeing by treating him with respect, and ensuring to never cause him embarrassment.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:17), “Hochi’ah Tochi’ah Et Amitecha” – “You shall surely reprimand your fellow.” This command establishes the obligation to approach somebody whom we observe committing a misdeed – whether an interpersonal offense, or a sin against G-d – in an attempt to correct his behavior. The Torah issues this command with the double expression “Hochi’ah Tochi’ah,” which the Sages understood as indicating that if our initial attempt to correct the individual’s behavior does not succeed, we must try again. Even if we need to approach the person and speak to him one hundred times in an effort to lead him to change, we are obliged to do so. The verse continues, “Ve’lo Tisa Alav Het” (“You shall not bear iniquity on his account”), which the Sages interpreted to mean that one is not permitted to embarrass his fellow in the course of reprimanding him. The words of rebuke must be spoken lovingly, calmly and respectfully, and not in an angry outburst which will cause the sinner to feel embarrassed. A person must repeatedly reprimand his fellow, if necessary, until he fears that the sinner will respond with physical violence if he persists. At that point, there is no longer an obligation to reprimand the sinner. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that before speaking words of rebuke in fulfillment of this Misva, one should offer a prayer to G-d, asking that his efforts should be successful. Teshuba (repentance) is possible only with G-d’s assistance, and so one should first pray that his efforts to inspire his fellow to repent will succeed, and trust in His help. The Sefer Ha’hinuch also emphasizes that one is worthy of great reward if he succeeds in leading a sinner back to the path of proper behavior. Conversely, a person who is in a position to correct his fellow’s behavior but fails to do so bears a degree of responsibility for his fellow’s continued wrongdoing. This obligation applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who fails to reprimand a sinner whom he could have led to repentance transgresses this affirmative command, and, as mentioned, bears guilt for the sinner’s misconduct henceforth. The later scholars addressed the question of whether one transgresses this Misva if he neglects to reprimand a sinner but the sinner then repents on his own, without this individual’s intervention. Rav Yehonatan Eibshutz (1690-1764), in Ya’arot Debash (11), maintained that the individual is not considered to have neglected this Misva in such a case. He explains that the obligation to reprimand a sinner is rooted in the principle of “Kol Yisrael Arebim Zeh La’zeh” – that we are all responsible for each other’s religious observance. If a person committed a sin, then those who could have prevented it bear a degree of accountability for that misdeed. Hence, Rav Eibshutz writes, if the person repented, then those who failed to reprimand him have nothing for which to be held responsible, since the sinner repented and did not continue acting wrongly. As such, they have not transgressed this Misva. Others, however, disagree, claiming that once the Torah obligates a person to try to correct his fellow’s behavior, he is in violation of this command once he fails to do, even if his fellow repents on his own. In conclusion, it is worth noting the significance of the aforementioned Halacha requiring one to reprimand his fellow even one hundred times if necessary. This Halacha demonstrates that we do not give up on our fellow Jew, even after numerous unsuccessful attempts to influence him to improve. We are to firmly believe in every person’s capacity to repent and improve his behavior, and never assume that a sinner will always continue his current improper behavior patterns.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:17), “Lo Tisna Et Ahicha Bi’lbabecha” – “Do not despise your fellow in your heart.” This refers specifically to a situation where one harbors hostility toward his fellow, but he keeps his hostility concealed, acting towards the person as though he likes him. The Torah demands that if we have some claim against our fellow, we should approach him and seek to resolve it, rather than keeping the hatred hidden within us. An example of this command is the Torah’s description of Yosef’s brothers’ feelings of animosity toward him: “They despised him, and they were unable to speak to him peacefully” (Bereshit 37:4). The Midrash comments that although the brothers were wrong for their hostile attitude toward Yosef, they are to be commended for not pretending to like him. They did not speak to him in a friendly manner as though they loved him, but rather made they feelings clear. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explained that the Torah forbids hating a fellow Jew because strife and divisiveness is “the lowliest and the absolutely most despicable quality.” Besides being inherently repugnant, hatred of other people leads to serious crimes such as physical violence and Mesira (informing about one’s fellow to hostile government authorities). This command, quite obviously, applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. Someone who despises a fellow Jew in his heart, without seeking reconciliation, transgresses this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, as Malkut are administered only for violations committed through a concrete action. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Torah forbids despising “your brother,” which implies that this prohibition applies only to “Ahicha Be’misvit” – a fellow Jew who is our “brother” with respect to Misva observance. As such, there is no prohibition against despising a Rasha (evil person). For the purposes of this command, a “Rasha” is defined as somebody who has transgressed the Torah on multiple occasions after being warned, openly defying the warnings. As this individual completely disregards the Torah, the prohibition of “Lo Tisna Et Ahicha Bi’lbabecha” does not apply. The Gemara in Masechet Yoma (9) famously teaches that G-d destroyed the second Bet Ha’mikdash on account of the sin of Sin’at Hinam (baseless hatred), because of the fighting among the Jews at the time. The first Bet Ha’mikdash, by contrast, was destroyed because of the people’s violation of the three cardinal sins of idol-worship, illicit relationships, and murder. Rabbenu Bahya (Spain, 1255-1340), in his Kad He’kemah, explains that the Gemara does not mean that Sin’at Hinam is equivalent to the combination of the sins of idolatry, illicit relations and murder. Rather, he writes, the Shechina (divine presence) cannot reside among us when we are divided and plagued by discord. G-d is one, and He thus can reside only among single, unified entities. When there is unity among Am Yisrael, and we are one people, G-d can reside among us; but when we break into different groups that quarrel with one another, the one G-d cannot reside among us, because we are then not a single entity. And once the Shechina departs, we are left without G-d’s protection, and thus vulnerable to our hostile enemies. Therefore, Jerusalem was destroyed as a result of the people’s Sin’at Hinam, which left the Jews without Hashem’s protection against the Roman Empire. It emerges, then, that “Lo Tisna Et Ahicha” is not only a Biblical command which we are obliged to obey, but also advice for our own benefit. We must avoid hatred and friction among Jews to obey this Misva, and, secondly, for our own protection, so that the Shechina will reside among us and protect us from harm.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (19:16), “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” – “Do not stand idly by your fellow’s blood.” This command forbids inaction when one’s fellow Jew faces physical or financial danger, and he is in a position to assist his fellow in some way. If one’s life, wellbeing or property is at risk, and we are able to save him or his property, then it is forbidden to refrain from doing so. The Gemara states that even if one is unable to personally save his fellow, he is required to summon somebody who can. For example, if somebody requires urgent medical attention, and a person who is not a physician is present, that person must call an ambulance. Another example of this prohibition is a case where somebody witnessed an incident and is eligible to testify on his fellow’s behalf in court. The Torah command of “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” requires him to come and testify in order to save his fellow from a financial loss. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah issued this command so that all people will be concerned for one another and be prepared to help, as this facilitates a stable and secure society. G-d wants the world to be settled and society to function properly, and so He commanded us to help one another when necessary, for the benefit of us all. This Misva, of course, applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who refrains from rescuing his fellow’s life or property when he is in a position to do so has transgressed this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, as this prohibition is violated through inaction, and not by committing a sinful act. One of the obligations that fall under this Biblical command in Pidyon Shebuyim – rescuing captives. As the Rambam discusses in Hilchot Matenot Aniyim (8:10), Pidyon Shebuyim takes precedence over all other forms of charity. He explains that captives are generally deprived of food, water and clothing, and their lives are threatened, and thus the Misva of Pidyon Shebuyim encompasses all forms of the Misva of charity, as well as the obligation to rescue an endangered fellow Jew’s life. The Rambam goes so far as to say that there is no Misva greater than Pidyon Shebuyim. Nevertheless, the Sages forbade paying an exorbitant price to ransom a Jewish captive, meaning, more than “Kedeh Damav” (the price for which the captive would be sold on the slave market). The Gemara brings two reasons for this prohibition: that it is intended either to avoid financially crippling the community, or to avoid encouraging the captors to take additional captives by showing that the Jews are prepared to pay any price for ransom. The practical difference between these two reasons arises in a case where the captive has an exceptionally wealthy relative who offers to personally pay the exorbitant ransom demanded by the captors. If the reason for the prohibition is to avoid crippling the community, the family would be permitted to pay the ransom, as this would not affect the community. If, however, the reason is to ensure that the captors are not encouraged to continue kidnapping Jews, then this would be forbidden. The Rishonim debate the question of which reason is accepted as Halacha. An exception to this rule is the case of an imprisoned Torah scholar, who may be ransomed from captivity at any price. It is well-known that the great German scholar Rav Meir of Rottenburg (“the Maharam” of Rottenburg, 1213-1293) waived this privilege when he was captured and imprisoned by the German authorities. The Jewish community succeeded in raising an exorbitant sum for the ransom of their beloved Rabbi, but he did not allow them to pay it, lest this lead to the imprisonment of other Rabbis. The Maharam of Rottenburg remained in prison until his death, and even after his passing, the authorities kept his body for approximately fourteen years, until it was released for burial. He was buried alongside the Jew who paid for the ransom of the body. The command of “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” instructs that when our fellow Jew faces any sort of problem, we must see it as our problem, as well. We are not entitled to ignore his or her plight, and must instead do what we can to help, out of a sense of duty and responsibility for all our fellow Jews.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:16), “Lo Telech Rachil Be’amecha,” which is understood as a warning against gossiping. Specifically, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, if somebody heard Reuben talk pejoratively about Shimon, he may not report to Shimon what Reuben said about him. This is allowed, however, if the person shares this information with Shimon so that Shimon can protect himself from harm which Reuben seeks to inflict upon him, or if his intention is to prevent a conflict between them. But sharing this information for a non-constructive purpose is forbidden. The Midrash brings a number of different approaches for the etymology of the word “Rachil” (“gossiping”). One view associates this term with the word “Rochel” – “peddler.” The gossiper “peddles” his wares – not tangible merchandise, but rather “inside information” about other people. Another view claims that the word “Rachil” means “Rach La’zeh Ve’kasheh La’zeh” – “soft to this one, harsh on the other one.” The gossiper is “soft,” or kind, to the person he speaks to, sharing with him information, but is “hard” – unkind – to the person spoken about, as he does not want his words to be repeated and shared with other people. The reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is that Hashem is concerned about our wellbeing, and He therefore does not want people to be hurt through gossip, which causes friction and divisiveness. It is also forbidden to speak in praise of somebody to a person who we know dislikes that individual. Hearing that fellow’s praise will cause the person to respond by speaking derogatorily about the fellow, in an effort to change the speaker’s positive assessment, and so this is not allowed. If somebody was, G-d-forbid, convicted of a capital offense, executed and hung, then it is forbidden to say to his family member, “Can you hang up this fish for me,” because the word “hang” brings to mind the loss which he suffered, thereby causing emotional pain. This Misva applies in all times, in all places, and to both males and females. One who shares gossip about his fellow violates this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, because this violation is committed verbally, and not through an action. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that G-d has an unlimited number of methods at His disposal to punish those who share gossip about their fellow Jew. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this command includes also the grave prohibition of “Mesira” – informing hostile, non-Jewish government authorities about a fellow Jew so they can take his money or imprison or kill him. For the sake of protecting the Jewish community from such villains, the Sages enacted that it is even permissible to kill a Moser (one who informs the government about a fellow Jew), after the Moser is warned and says explicitly that he is going to commit this offense despite the warning. The Rambam writes that a Moser may be killed only if he intends to share information about a Jew, but not after the fact, unless it is known that he is likely to repeat the crime. In the case of a Moser who is planning to reveal information, the Rambam writes, “Kol Ha’kodem Le’horgo Zocheh” – the first one to kill the Moser is meritorious, as this man poses a grave threat and must be eliminated as swiftly as possible. A person who is a proven, repeated offender, providing the government with information on multiple occasions, may be killed even without warning. A Moser cannot excuse his conduct by claiming that he has come under pressure to divulge information about his fellow Jews to the authorities; even in such a case, he must be put to death for the sake of protecting the Jewish community. If a Moser is killed, his money is not confiscated, but is rather left to his inheritors, who might likely be righteous.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:15), “Be’sedek Tishpot Amitecha” – “You shall judge your fellow justly.” As the Sefer Ha’hinuch discusses, this command has several different applications. First, it requires a judge to treat both litigants equally, without according special respect to one over the other. (The Torah previously introduced a prohibition against favoritism in court; now the Torah adds an affirmative command to treat the litigants equally.) For example, a judge may not allow one litigant to speak as much as he wants, but instruct the other to speak briefly. Similarly, the judge may not allow one litigant to sit, while requiring the other to stand. If one litigant is dressed in expensive, fancy garments, and the other is dressed in simple clothes, the judge must instruct the first litigant to either provide equally fine clothing to the other litigant, or change into simple clothing, so they will both be equal. However, although both litigants must be treated equally, Halacha does establish an order of precedence when people are waiting for their cases to be tried. A case involving a widow or orphan is given precedence over others, and a case involving a Torah scholar takes precedence over cases involving unlearned individuals. A case involving a woman takes precedence over cases involving men. The command of “Be’sedek Tishpot Amitecha” also includes an obligation upon qualified to scholars to accept the responsibility of judging. If a person has the requisite knowledge and intellectual capabilities, he should not shy away from this important role, and should instead accept the job of judge. Additionally, this Misva requires all people – and not only courtroom judges – to judge their fellowman favorably, by giving them the benefit of the doubt whenever possible. If there are two sides to a story, we are required to assume the side which exonerates our fellow, rather than presume guilt. Explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a judge accords greater respect to one litigant than to the other, then people will be reluctant to bring their cases to court, seeing that the courts are not run fairly. And, when a litigant is in court, he might feel intimidated if he sees the judge treating the other party with greater respect, and will not present all his arguments and evidence. This will then result in an incorrect decision. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that society cannot run properly without an effective judicial system, and thus the Torah requires the judges to treat the litigants equally so that people will come to court and receive a correct ruling. As for the requirement that capable scholars agree to serve as judges, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if worthy prospects refuse to serve as judges, then the positions will be filled by ignoramuses or corrupt judges, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the legal system. Giving the benefit of the doubt, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, serves to foster peace and friendship among people. This Misva applies in all times and in all places. The obligation to give one’s fellow the benefit of the doubt is binding upon all people, both men and women, whereas the elements of this Misva relevant to courtroom proceedings are, quite obviously, binding only upon judges or those capable of serving as judges.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:15), “Ve’lo Tehedar Peneh Gadol,” forbidding a judge from showing special respect to one of the two litigants. If one of the litigants is a prominent, distinguished individual, or comes from a distinguished family, the judge might feel compelled to show that litigant special respect. The Torah forbids showing this litigant respect, and requires treating both litigants equally in the courtroom, regardless of who they are. One example of this law is that a judge may not allow a distinguished litigant to sit, while having the other stand. Rather, both litigants must stand during the court proceedings. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Shechina is present in a Jewish court, as the verse in Tehillim (82:1) states, “Elokim Nisav Ba’adat Kel” – G-d sits among judges in a Bet Din. Therefore, it is appropriate for the litigants to stand in Bet Din out of respect for the Shechina. Nowadays, however, it is customary for the litigants – as well as the witnesses – to sit, due to the concern that the litigants might not obey the Dayanim (judges) if the Dayanim force them to remain standing during the trial. Nevertheless, the Bah (“Bayit Hadash,” Rav Yoel Sirkes, 1561-1640) writes that it is proper for a G-d-fearing person to stand in court out of respect for the judges and for Hashem. This prohibition applies to judges in all times and in all places. A judge who accords special respect to one of the two litigants transgresses this prohibition as well as the affirmative command of “Be’sedek Tishpot Amitecha” – “You shall judge your fellow justly,” which the Torah presents immediately following the prohibition of “Lo Tehedar Peneh Gadol.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes an exception to this law – if one litigant is a Torah scholar and the other is not, then the judge should have the Torah scholar sit, in fulfillment of the obligation to respect Torah scholars. In such a case, the other litigant should be allowed to sit, but is not required to, whereas the judge should insist only that the scholar sit. On the basis of this Halacha, Tosafot in Masechet Sanhedrin (19) question the Gemara’s account of the time when the Jewish king, Yannai, stood trial. The Gemara relates that the judge, Rabbi Shimon Ben Shetah, forced him to stand. Tosafot observe that if a Torah scholar is told to sit in court, then certainly, a king should be told to sit, as well. After all, the honor due to a king exceeds that owed to a Torah scholar, as evidenced by the fact that Halacha allows a Torah scholar to waive the honor owed to him, whereas a king is not entitled to waive the honor to which he is entitled. Seemingly, then, Rabbi Shimon Ben Shetah should not have instructed King Yannai to stand during his trial. Several different answers have been given for this question. One simple answer, suggested by the Tumim (Rav Yehonatan Eibshutz, 1690-1764), is that a king must be given respect only if he acts righteously; a wicked king is not owed respect. King Yannai, who belonged to the heretical Sadducee sect (which denied the authority of the Torah She’be’al Peh), and killed a large number of Torah scholars, was clearly a wicked king. Therefore, he was not owed any respect, and Rabbi Shimon Ben Shetah made him stand during his trial.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (19:15), “Lo Ta’asu Avel Ba’mishpat” – which forbids judges from perverting judgment, issuing a ruling that runs in opposition to the legal precepts outlined by the Torah and the oral tradition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that peace and stability in society require a just and effective legal system, and such a system, quite obviously, depends upon judges who rule fairly and honestly. The Torah therefore strictly forbids judges from perverting judgment by knowingly issuing incorrect rulings. This prohibition includes “Inui Ha’din” – unnecessarily delaying judgment. Certainly, judges must be patient and deliberate in reaching a decision, in order to ensure a correct ruling, as the Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (1:1) famously exhorts, “Hevu Metunim Ba’din” – “Be patient in judgment.” However, once a judge has reached his decision, he is not permitted to delay issuing his ruling. The Poskim apply this rule also to Rabbis who are asked Halachic questions. Once the Rabbi has done the research and analysis, and has arrived at a decision, he should present his ruling immediately, without delay. The Maharshal (Rav Shlomo Luria, Poland, 1510-1573) extended this notion further, maintaining that a Rabbi is required to answer every question brought to him, and may not refuse to hear a halachic question. In fact, the Maharshal instructed his family that if somebody came looking for him with a question, then no matter what he was doing – even if he was eating or sleeping – they should interrupt up to hear the question. According to the Maharshal, the prohibition of “Inui Ha’din” means that a Rabbi needs to stop whatever he is doing to hear a question, so that the individual asking the question will not have to wait to receive his answer. Most other Poskim, however, maintain that a Rabbi must not unnecessarily delay answering a question that he had agreed to address once he has determined the answer, but is not required to accept every question. Another law relevant to this prohibition requires less experienced judges to consult with older, more learned judges before issuing a ruling. Moreover, judges are required to approach each and every case with the same degree of interest and concentration, and treat each one seriously. The rule of “Din Peruta Ke’din Me’a” requires a judge to accord a case involving a single coin the same degree of importance as a case involving one hundred coins. No matter how much money is at stake, the judge is to preside over the case with the same level of seriousness. A judge is required to try to suggest a Peshara (compromise) between the two parties. The Sages inferred this requirement from the verse in the Book of Shmuel II (8:15) which describes King David as “Oseh Mishpat U’sdaka Le’chol Amo” – “doing justice and charity for his entire nation.” The word “Mishpat” (justice), of course, refers to adjudicating, and the word “Sedaka” implies that the justice was conducted in a “charitable” manner, meaning, through making compromises between the two parties. This prohibition applies in all times and in all places, but of course, it applies only to judges. A judge who intentionally issues an incorrect ruling transgresses this prohibition, but is not liable to Malkut, for two reasons. First, this prohibition is violated verbally, and not through committing an action, and Malkut are administered only for violations committed through an action. Secondly, this prohibition has the status of a “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which can be rectified through payment. If a judge issued an incorrect ruling, and the party that he wrongly found guilty paid the other party, then the judge must pay out of pocket to compensate the litigant. A violator is not liable to Malkut if the violation can be corrected by paying the victim, and thus a judge is not liable to Malkut for issuing an incorrect ruling.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:14), “Ve’lifneh Iver Lo Titen Michshol” – that one may not “place a stumbling block before a blind man.” The Sages understood this command as forbidding intentionally causing one’s fellow to “stumble” by giving him bad advice. When somebody asks our advice, we are to advise him honestly, recommending what we truly believe is the best course of action for him. Of course, people who give advice could make mistakes, and sometimes, sincere advice could backfire. Certainly, the Torah does not hold a person accountable for making an honest mistake. This prohibition refers to intentionally misleading somebody. The classic example is recommending to one’s fellow to sell a piece of property because he wants it for himself. If he knows that selling the property is not in this fellow’s best interests, but he nevertheless advises selling it so he can acquire it, he violates the prohibition of “Lifneh Iver.” This prohibition includes also leading somebody to “stumble” spiritually, meaning, to commit a sin. Even though the person commits the forbidden act intentionally, knowing that it is forbidden, nevertheless, one may not facilitate his violation, causing him to “stumble.” Hence, when one lends money on interest, both the lender and the borrower transgress not only the prohibition of interest, but also the prohibition of “Lifneh Iver.” The Torah forbids both lending on interest and taking a loan on interest, and thus the lender facilitates the borrower’s sin, and the borrower facilitates the lender’s sin, violating the command of “Lifneh Iver.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade intentionally misleading people because for society to function properly, people need to consult with one another, and trust their fellow’s advice and guidance. If people cannot trust anyone to give them sound advice, then society will break down, and people will be unable to receive the guidance that they need. The Sefer Ha’hinuch references the Gemara’s discussion in Masechet Aboda Zara regarding the prohibition against selling an animal to an idolater shortly before his pagan holiday. Since the idolater will likely use the animal as a sacrifice to his deity, selling the animal would violate the prohibition of “Lifneh Ever,” as it facilitates idol worship (which is forbidden even for gentiles). However, the Gemara writes, it is permissible to lend an idolater money shortly before his holiday, despite the possibility that he will use this money to purchase an animal which he will then sacrifice to his god. Lending money is two steps removed from the sin (“Lifneh De’lifneh”), as the idolater must first purchase the animal and then offer as a sacrifice. This kind of indirect facilitation of a sin does not violate the prohibition of “Lifneh Ever,” and is permissible. Another example of “Lifneh Ever” mentioned by the Sefer Ha’hinuch is selling weapons to hostile gentiles, who are likely to use them to kill. If the weapons will be used permissibly – for defending the innocent – then this is, of course, permissible. It is forbidden to sell weapons to a Jewish arms dealer who is likely to then sell them to people who will use them to kill. This does not fall under the category of “Lifneh De’lifneh” (indirect facilitation of a sin), because one directly facilitates the dealer’s sin of selling them and thereby facilitating murder. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. One who intentionally misleads his fellow by offering bad advice violates this prohibition, but he is not liable to Malkut, because he does not commit an action (but rather verbally misleads the victim), and violations are punishable by Malkut only if they are committed via an action. Curiously, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even in the case of one who facilitated a sin, such as by giving wine to a Nazir to drink, the facilitator does not receive Malkut, because this is considered a prohibition which is not transgressed via an action. Later scholars sought to explain why giving a cup of wine would not be considered an action, thus rendering the violator liable to Malkut. Some commentators suggested that the prohibition of “Lifneh Ever” is violated not when the person hands the wine to the Nazir, but only once the Nazir drinks the wine. At that moment, of course, the person who had handed the Nazir the wine performs no action, and for this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch maintained that he is not liable to Malkut. Each day, as part of our Vidui (confession), we confess violating the sin of “Ya’asnu Esot Ra’ot” – “we gave bad pieces of advice.” On some occasions, we recite, “Ya’asnu Esot Ra’ot Ad En Heker.” Some people mistakenly understand the phrase “Ad En Heker” to mean “limitless,” such that we confess that we gave bad advice countless times. Of course, this is simply not true. The actual meaning of “Ad En Heker” is that we gave advice “without investigating,” without doing proper research. While we are not held accountable for honest mistakes, we are held accountable for rashly giving advice regarding matters about which we have insufficient knowledge to offer advice. Honestly saying, “I don’t know” is preferable to giving poor advice. When we are approached for advice, we must acknowledge what we do not know, and help if we can, without trying to help if we cannot.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:14), “Lo Tekalel Heresh” – “Do not curse a deaf person.” The Gemara explains this verse as prohibiting cursing even somebody who is not present and thus does not hear the curse. The Torah forbids cursing anybody, and mentions “Heresh” (“deaf person”) in this verse to emphasize that one may not curse even somebody who is “deaf” in the sense that he does not hear the curse. The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers several different explanations for why the Torah prohibited cursing one’s fellow. First, he writes, people become frightened when they are cursed. Even if they are cursed by a simple, ordinary person, they take the curse to heart, and feel concerned and distressed. Just as we may not inflict physical harm upon our fellow, we are likewise not to inflict emotional harm, and the Torah therefore forbade cursing another person. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Gemara teaches that “Berit Keruta La’sefatayim” – G-d made a “promise” to the lips, that a person’s words are impactful. Hence, a curse will have some harmful effect. The Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates on this concept, explaining that the power of speech emanates not from a person’s physical properties, but rather from his soul, which originates from the heavens. The Torah relates in Parashat Bereshit that after G-d created the physical human being, “Va’yipah Be’apav Nishmat Hayim” – “He blew a living soul in his nostrils.” Onkelos translates the expression “Nishmat Hayim” as “Ru’ah Memalela” – “a spirit that speaks.” This shows that the power of speech is a manifestation of the human soul. As such, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the words one speaks have immense power, and can have an impact upon other people. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the greater a person’s spiritual level is, the greater the impact of his words (which is why, for example, we ask the Sadikim for blessings). And so the Torah forbade cursing, because such words will inflict some degree of harm upon the other person. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then adds yet another reason, explaining that the Torah forbade cursing in order to help prevent fighting among people. Naturally, when somebody curses his fellow, the fellow will respond angrily, and conflict will ensue. The Torah strives to maintain peace among people, and it therefore forbids cursing, which instigates strife and quarreling. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that one might question this explanation in light of the fact that the Torah forbids cursing one’s fellow even in private, behind his fellow’s back, which will not cause any fighting. Responding to this challenge, the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites King Shlomo’s teaching in Kohelet (10:20) that one should avoiding cursing people even in private, “Ki Of Ha’shamayim Yolich Et Ha’kol” – “because the bird in the sky will bring the sound…” In contemporary jargon, this is expressed as, “Walls have ears.” Even when somebody speaks in private, somehow, the words get around. Therefore, the Torah forbids cursing somebody even in private, as the curse may very well become known to that person, resulting in friction and strife. The Rambam suggests a different reason for why the Torah forbade cursing, explaining that cursing has the effect of accustoming a person to anger and vengeance. The curse perhaps has absolutely no effect whatsoever on the person against whom it was spoken, but it engenders a hostile nature within the speaker, compromising his Middot (character taits), and for this reason, the Torah commanded that we may not curse our fellow. This prohibition is exceptional in that violators are liable to Malkut despite not committing any action. Normally, only violations committed through a concrete action are punishable by Malkut; when it comes to cursing one’s fellow, however, due to the severity of this sin, violators are liable to Malkut despite the fact that they merely spoke, without performing an action. However, one is liable to Malkut for this violation only if he cursed his fellow mentioning G-d’s Name, or some reference to G-d, in any language (for example, “G-d should do to you such-and-such”). Although one violates the Torah prohibition even without mentioning G-d, Malkut are administered only if one curses with a Name of, or reference to, G-d. The Gemara comments that there is one situation where a person can be liable to four sets of Malkut for cursing a single individual – if a person curses his father, who is the both the Nasi (similar to the position of Chief Rabbi in Talmudic times) and the head of the Sanhedrin (“Ab Bet Din”). The son has violated four separate prohibitions: cursing one’s father, cursing a Nasi, cursing an Ab Bet Din, and cursing a fellow Jew. Needless to say, this prohibition applies at all times, in all places, and to both men and women.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:13), “Lo Talin Pe’ulat Sachir Itecha Ad Boker” – “Do not keep with you the wages of a hired worker until the morning.” The Sages understood this verse as referring to the wages owed to an employee who works during the day. The employer has the entire night, until the next morning, to pay the worker the wages owed for that day’s work. Elsewhere (Debarim 24:15), the Torah requires paying a worker by sundown (“Ve’lo Tabo Alav Ha’shemesh”), and the Rabbis explained that this refers to an employee hired to work during the night. His wages must be paid by sundown the following day. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah issued this command because G-d “Hafetz Be’kiyum Ha’adam” – wants people to be able to sustain themselves. Clearly, one who does not get paid for his work will not have a livelihood, and will thus be unable to purchase food or his other necessities. The Torah allows the employer to delay payment for a night or a day, the Sefer Ha’hinich explains, because people occasionally fast for an entire day, and so a person’s sustenance is not threatened if he needs to wait a day before receiving his wages. Beyond one day, however, the worker will need his money in order to purchase food, and so the Torah commands the employer to pay by the end of day or night after the work was completed. If a person worked for several hours during the day, then the employer must pay him by the end of that day, and if a person worked for several hours during the night, the employer must pay him by the end of the night. If a person is hired on a weekly, monthly or annual basis, then if he stops working during the day, he is to be given his wages by the end of the day, and if he finishes working during the night, then he must be paid by the end of the night. This prohibition applies not only to wages for work, but also to the payment of rent for the use of one’s animal or utensil. This, too, must be paid on time. If a person brings something to a professional to repair, or a garment to be cleaned or sewn, then he must pay the craftsman on the day he comes to pick it up. As long as the article is with the craftsman, the owner is not required to pay. But once he picks it up, he must pay by the end of that day. One violates this prohibition only if he delays payment after the worker asked to be paid. If the worker has yet to request payment, or if it was understood that the wages would be paid later, this prohibition is not violated. If the employer does not have money with which to pay the worker, then he does not transgress this command by delaying payment until funds become available. If the employer had told the worker that a third party would be paying for his services, and the worker accepted this arrangement, then the employer is not in violation of this command if the third party fails to pay. Since the worker accepted this arrangement, he must now try to obtain the funds from the third party; the employer is not responsible to ensure that the worker receives his wages. If the worker asked for his wages, and the employer did not pay by the deadline set by the Torah, he has transgressed this prohibition. If he continues to delay payment, then he violates a prohibition enacted by the Sages forbidding continuing to withhold a worker’s wages. Of course, this prohibition applies at all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who transgressed this prohibition does not receive Malkut, as he instead simply pays the worker the money he is owed.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (19:13) commands, “Lo Tigzol” – “You shall not steal,” which the Sages understood as referring to robbery perpetrated openly. Whereas the term “Geneba” denotes stealing stealthily, by secretly seizing somebody else’s property (such as burglarizing a home in the middle of the night), “Gezela” refers to brazenly confronting a person and grabbing his possession, such as in the case of armed robbery. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the reason behind this prohibition is clear and obvious, as theft is something which we all intuitively recognize as evil and a behavior which can lead to the complete breakdown of society. The Rambam writes that the prohibition of “Gezela” applies to stealing at least a “Shaveh Peruta” – the value of the smallest unit of Talmudic currency. Stealing less than this amount is still forbidden, though, by virtue of the principle of “Hasi Shiur,” which proscribes even violating partial amounts of Torah prohibitions. It is forbidden to steal from both Jews and gentiles, and even from idol-worshippers. The specific prohibition of “Lo Ta’ashok,” which forbids withholding money from those to whom one is indebted (such as for a loan or for work performed), also applies even to withholding payment from gentiles. Moreover, one is not allowed to steal even from dangerous evildoers whom Halacha permits to eliminate (such as those who cooperate with hostile governments against the Jewish community). One might have thought that since these people are allowed to be killed, their property should be treated as ownerless and allowed to be taken. In truth, however, their money may not be taken, because such people may have deserving inheritors, whose inheritance rights must be respected. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, irrespective of the inheritors, the Torah does not want people to accustom themselves to stealing. Therefore, even if, in principle, the money of these evildoers is indeed permissible to be taken, this would not be allowed, for people might then get into the habit of taking money and possessions which do not belong to them. The Torah requires a thief who stole an object to return the object to its owner. However, the Sages enacted a provision called “Takanat Ha’shabin” (“provision for the penitent ones”), which allows a thief to pay the value of the object instead of returning it. This provision was enacted out of the concern that thieves might be deterred from repenting and making amends if they needed to return the actual object that they stole. If, for example, a thief stole a beam which he then used in constructing a building, he is not likely to repent for his crime if this necessitates dismantling the building in order to return the beam. The Sages therefore instituted that the thief can keep the beam, and simply pay the victim the value of the beam which he stole. If a thief stole something in an inhabited area, he cannot return it to the victim out in the open area, where it is not protected, without the victim’s consent. The victim has the right to insist that the object be returned in the town, where it is easier to guard. If the thief ignores the victim’s demand, and returns it out in the open, then he bears responsibility for the object if it is lost or damaged. If a person stole from a store and is too ashamed to repay what he stole, he may return to the store and overpay for a different piece of merchandise. If, for example, he stole an item worth $100, he can go back to the store and pay the shopkeeper $110 for a $10 product, and thereby fulfill his obligation. If a thief died before returning what he stole, his inheritors are required to pay the victim from the real estate which they received as part of the inheritance. If the thief had no real estate, then the inheritors are not required to repay the victim from the Metaltelin (moveable property) which they inherit. However, the Geonim enacted that the victim receives what he is owed from the inherited Metaltelin if the thief did not leave behind any real estate. If a person is known to be a thief, then it is forbidden to derive benefit from any of his possessions, as they are all suspected of being stolen goods. Needless to say, this prohibition applies in all places, in all times, and to both males and females. One who transgresses this prohibition and steals something belonging to his fellow does not receive Malkut, because he can and should simply return what he stole, or pay its value. This prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a prohibition which can be “rectified” through the performance of an associated affirmative command, in this case, returning the stolen object. Violations of such prohibitions are not punishable by Malkut, as the violator returns the object or pays its value, instead. If a thief falsely denied his crime on oath, and then confesses his wrongdoing, he must return the object and pay a 20 percent penalty. In addition, he must bring a special Korban Asham (guilt offering) for atonement. This prohibition reminds us of how careful we must be when it comes to other people’s property, that we are expected to conduct our financial dealings with impeccable honesty, and never take anything which does not rightfully belong to us.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:13), “Lo Ta’ashok Et Re’acha,” which the Sefer Ha’hinuch interprets as referring to a prohibition against withholding money which we owe our fellow, either by force or through deception. For example, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, if someone owes another person money, it is forbidden to repeatedly tell him, “Leave and come back another time” when he asks for his money. The Sefer Ha’hinuch describes such conduct as a “Mida Ra’a Be’yoter” – an especially evil quality. This prohibition includes withholding payment for work. If somebody hired a worker who completed the job satisfactorily, and he refuses to pay him, the employer has violated this command. The Gemara cites Raba as commenting that one who withholds money which is owed to his fellow violates two prohibitions – the prohibition of “Lo Ta’ashok,” and the prohibition against theft. Refusing to pay someone that which he rightfully deserves is no different than theft, and thus one who refuses to pay what he owes has the status of a thief. The Gemara explains that the Torah nevertheless introduced a separate command of “Lo Ta’ashok” so that one who transgresses will be in violation of two Biblical commands, and not merely the general prohibition against theft. The Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that the Torah introduces multiple commands for the same prohibition when the prohibition is especially severe. In order to help ensure we avoid such prohibitions, the Torah adds a second command forbidding the act in question, such that a transgressor will be guilty of two violations, and not just one. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that one must not make the mistake of thinking that G-d introduces a second command out of a vengeful desire to bring more punishments upon people. To the contrary, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, G-d is compassionate and merciful, and not at all vengeful. As the Sages famously taught, “Rasa Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu Le’zakot Et Yisrael” – G-d wants us to have the ability to earn great merit, and for this reason He gave us a large corpus of Torah to learn, and numerous Misvot to observe. By adding an additional command forbidding the withholding of payment, G-d enables us to earn even greater merit, for we are rewarded for our compliance with each and every command. The Rambam writes that the prohibition of “Lo Ta’ashok” includes failing to repay a loan once the agreed-upon time for payment has arrived. Some commentators questioned the Rambam’s position in light of the Gemara’s discussion in Masechet Ketubot (66) concerning the case of a debtor who refuses to pay his debt. Rav Papa, as the Gemara cites, states that in times when Bet Din had the authority to utilize coercive measures, Bet Din would undertake such measures and coerce the debtor to pay what he owes. The reason, Rav Papa explains, is because Bet Din has the authority to force people to perform Misvot Aseh (affirmative commands) which they are obligated to perform. Rashi explains that the Misva to which the Gemara refers is the command, “Ve’hin Sedek Yiheyeh Lachem” (Vayikra 19:36). (Literally, this command refers to the obligation to use accurate weights and measures, and not to deceive customers. However, the Gemara interprets the word “Hin” to mean “Hen” – “yes,” such that the Torah commands that when we agree to do something, we must follow through on our commitment. Thus, a borrower who commits to pay the debt by a certain time is bound by this command to do so.) From the Gemara it seems clear that one who fails to repay a loan is in violation only of an affirmative command – seemingly disproving the Rambam’s position, that failing to repay a loan violates the prohibition of “Lo Ta’ashok.” Some suggest answering this question by distinguishing between one who intends to repay the loan, but delays the payment so that he can continue using the money, and one who has no intention of repaying. The Rambam referred to the latter case, a borrower who does not intend to ever repay the loan, and who thus transgresses the prohibition of “Lo Ta’ashok.” Rav Papa, however, addresses the situation of a person who intends to pay but repeatedly delays the payment. A person in this case does not transgress the prohibition of “Lo Ta’ashok,” but fails to fulfill the affirmative command to honor his word, by failing to pay at the time by which he committed to repay his debt. This prohibition applies in all places, at all times, and to both males and females. One who violated this prohibition by refusing to pay money which he owes does not receive Malkut, as this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a prohibition which can be rectified through the performance of an associated Misva. The violator can correct his behavior by simply paying the money he owes, and thus he is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch comments in reference to this Halacha, “She’gadol Koah Ba’al Teshuba” – the penitent sinner has great power. Even if one has committed a grievous sin, he is given the opportunity to correct his conduct and thereby avoid punishment. Unfortunately, some people think that failing to repay debts or pay workers is simply a matter of “not being nice,” of delinquency, which is something which can be done on occasion. But the truth is that failing to pay money which one owes constitutes an outright Torah violation. The Torah strictly demands that we honor our word and pay in full those to whom we owe money.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:12), “Ve’lo Tishabe’u Bi’Shmi La’shaker” – that it is forbidden to make a false oath. The Sages understood this verse as referring to a “Shebu’at Bitui” – an oath about something that one did or did not do in the past, or about something that one will do or not do in the future. The four classic examples of this violation are: 1) if one swore that he ate a particular food at a particular time, and he did not; 2) if one swore that he did not eat a particular food at a particular time, and he did; 3) if one swore that he will eat a particular food at a particular time, and he does not; 4) if one swore that he will not eat a particular food at a particular time, and he does. A “Shebu’at Bitui” does not take effect with regard to something which the Torah commanded. For example, if a person swears that he will perform a certain Misva, and he fails to do so, then he is not in violation of making a false oath, because this oath was not binding. Even if he swore regarding the past, that he fulfilled a certain Misva, when he in fact had not, he has not violated this prohibition, as the oath has no validity. Similarly, if a person swears that he will cause harm to his fellow, this oath is not binding, as the Torah forbids intentionally causing one’s fellow harm. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if one swore to cause himself harm, then the oath is binding. The commentators raise the question of how such an oath can take effect, given that the Torah forbids harming oneself. One answer given is that this prohibition is not presented explicitly in the Torah, and is rather inferred from a textual nuance, and only laws explicated in the Torah are excluded from the prohibition of false oaths. This prohibition only applies to oaths involving something over which a person has control. For example, if a person swears to his fellow that he will appeal to government officials on his behalf, and he has connections in the government, then the oath is binding. But if he swears to do something which is beyond his control, then the oath is not binding. This prohibition applies in all times, in all places, and to both males and females. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who transgresses this prohibition is liable to Malkut. According to some commentators, the Sefer Ha’hinuch refers here specifically to situations where one violates this prohibition by committing an action, namely, where one swears he will not do something and he does. In all other circumstances of violations of this prohibition, one transgresses either through inaction – by not doing what he swore to do – or through speech – by uttering a false oath about the past. Hence, he is not liable to Malkut, which are administered only for violations committed through an action. Others, however, understand that in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s view, the prohibition against false oaths marks an exception to the rule, due to its unique severity, and one is liable to Malkut for violating this command even without committing an action. One who violates this prohibition mistakenly brings a special sacrifice called a “Korban Oleh Ve’yored” (literally, “the ascending and descending sacrifice”). It is so named because the offering depends on the person’s financial status. One who can afford an animal brings an animal sacrifice; a disadvantaged person brings two birds; and an impoverished violator brings a flour offering.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:11) forbids falsely denying that one does not have his fellow’s item in his possession, such as if he borrowed something or was given something to guard, and falsely denies it, keeping the object for himself (“Lo Techahashu”). In the same verse, the Torah commands, “Lo Teshakeru” (literally, “Do not lie”), which is understood as a command forbidding making such a denial on oath. Thus, if somebody falsely denies having received his fellow’s object to use or to guard, and swears that he did not receive it, he transgresses two prohibitions – one for his false denial, and one for falsely swearing. This prohibition, of course, applies in all times, in all places, and to both men and women. Surprisingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who violates this prohibition, falsely denying on oath that he never received his fellow’s item to guard or use, is liable to Malkut. If witnesses testify that the item in question is in fact in his possession, then he is punished for transgressing this prohibition and falsely swearing that he never received the item. Normally, one is liable to Malkut only if he violates a Biblical prohibition by performing a forbidden act. In this instance, however, the command is transgressed through speech, not by committing any action. Nevertheless, according to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, the violator is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this prohibition marks an exception, due to the unique severity of a false oath. This sin is especially grievous, and thus one who swears falsely is liable to Malkut, even though he did not commit an action. Other Rabbis, however, take issue with this position, noting various sources in the Talmud which seem to clearly indicate that Malkut are not administered in such a case.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (19:11) commands, “Lo Techahashu” – “You shall not deny,” referring to “Kohesh Be’fikadon” – falsely denying having received one’s fellow’s object. For example, if somebody borrowed his fellow’s object, or was given it to guard, but when his fellow asks for it to be returned, he denies having received it, he transgresses this prohibition. If he is found to be lying – such as if witnesses see the item in question in his possession – then he is disqualified from serving as a witness, as he is considered a “Rasha” (evil person). Furthermore, once he falsely denies having received the item, he is considered a thief with respect to his liability for loss or damage. Normally, a guardian has limited liability for the loss of, or damage to, the item entrusted to him, whereas a thief has full responsibility for anything that happens to the object. Thus, once a guardian falsely denies having received the item, thereby becoming a thief, he assumes full liability. This prohibition, of course, applies in all places and in all times, and to both males and females. One who transgresses this prohibition, and falsely denies having been entrusted with his fellow’s item, is not liable to Malkut, for two reasons. First, this prohibition is violated through speech, without performing an action, and Malkut are administered only for violations committed through an action. Secondly, this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – prohibitions which one can rectify by paying the victim. After falsely denying having received the item, the violator can simply confess and return the object to its owner, thereby rectifying his transgression. Hence, he is not liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:11), “Lo Tignobu,” establishing the prohibition against stealing money. One violates this prohibition by stealing a value of at least Shaveh Peruta (the smallest unit of currency), from either a Jew or non-Jew, and from either an adult or a minor. This prohibition of course applies at all times, in all places, and to both males and females. One may not steal money even with the intention of returning it, such as if one wishes to play a joke on his friend and take something of his without his knowing. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is forbidden to purchase stolen goods, as one who does is supporting criminal activity. This command includes also the prohibition of “Genebat Da’at” (literally, “theft of the mind”) – misleading someone. One example, discussed by the Gemara in Masechet Hulin (94), is selling non-kosher meat to a gentile without informing him that the meat is non-kosher. A gentile who receives meat from a Jew naturally assumes that the meat is kosher, and thus thinks that it is higher quality. Therefore, a Jew who sells a gentile non-kosher meat – such as if a mistake was made in the slaughtering, and thus the meat is forbidden for consumption – must inform the gentile that the meat is non-kosher, so he knows precisely what kind of meat he receives, and is not misled into thinking he receives kosher meat. Another example is a host who tells his guest that he is opening a new barrel of wine in his honor, when in truth he would have opened it even if the guest was not present (such as if it would soon spoil). The guest would feel flattered by such a gesture, and would decide that he needs to reciprocate the goodwill shown to him – when in truth the host did not do anything special in his honor. The prohibition of “Genebat Da’at” forbids misleading a guest in this way. Similarly, it is forbidden to extend to somebody an invitation which he knows that the person cannot accept. For example, if one knows that his friend is traveling the next week, it is forbidden for him to approach the friend and invite him for a Shabbat meal, pretending that he does not know that the friend will be away. The friend will wrongly think that he received a sincere invitation, and will feel a need to reciprocate. This kind of deception is forbidden by force of the prohibition of “Genebat Da’at.” It goes without saying that one may not sell his fellow merchandise without disclosing defects, or misrepresent merchandise as newer or higher quality than it really is. The Gemara observes that when it comes to financial dealings, people are prone to justifying dishonesty, because of the human being’s natural lust for money. Therefore, whenever any sort of questionable circumstance arises, it is vitally important to consult with a Rabbi or an objective third party for guidance, as one’s own judgment will, almost invariably, be biased in his own favor, and he thus runs the risk of violating the grave prohibition of theft.
The requirement of “Peret” obligates the owner of a vineyard to leave for the poor grapes which fall to the ground during the harvest. The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:10) formulates this Misva as both an affirmative command, requiring one to leave these grapes for the poor, and a prohibition, forbidding taking these grapes for oneself. Halacha defines “Peret” as one or two grapes which fell to the ground during the harvest. If, however, three or more grapes fall together, then they are not considered “Peret,” and the vineyard’s owner may keep them for himself. This does not apply if the harvester knocked all the grapes to the ground, and then proceeded to collect them from the ground and place them in a basket. In such a case, no matter how many grapes were left on the ground after the harvester left, they are all considered “Peret” and belong to the poor. If one places a basket underneath the vine as he harvests to collect the grapes that fall, he is considered a thief, as he steals the “Peret” from the poor. The prohibition against keeping the “Peret” for oneself falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a prohibition which can be rectified, and for which violators are thus not liable to Malkut. If one transgressed this prohibition, he corrects his mistake by transferring the grapes in question to the poor, and so he is not liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:10) commands that one must leave certain portions of his vineyard for the needy, including “Peret” – grapes which fall to the ground during the harvest. This obligation parallels the Misva of “Leket,” which requires leaving for the poor stalks of grain which fall to the ground during the harvest. As in the case of fallen stalks of grain, any grapes which fall to the ground during the initial harvesting must be left for the poor, and the vineyard’s owner is not permitted to return to collect them for himself.
The Biblical requirement of “Olelot” – to leave certain portions of one’s vineyard for the poor – includes two commands: an affirmative command to leave these portions unharvested (Misva 220), and a prohibition against harvesting them for oneself (Misva 221). As discussed in Misva 220, the Rambam understood this command as the parallel of the Misva of Pe’a, which requires leaving the corner of one’s field for the poor. In regard to vineyards, the Rambam explains, instead of an obligation of Pe’a, the farmer has the obligation to leave behind the Olelot. The Ramban, however, disagrees. In his view, the obligations of Pe’a and Olelot are two entirely separate Misvot. The Olelot, according to the Ramban, are small grapes with certain unique features, and they must be left for the poor in addition to, and not in place of, the corner of the vineyard. The Ramban notes that the Rambam himself appears to have changed his mind on this subject. In Hilchot Matenot Aniyim (1:7), the Rambam lists four different portions of a vineyard which must be left for the poor, and he names Pe’a and Olelot as two separate portions – clearly indicating that both Olelot and Pe’a must be given from a vineyard. As the obligation of Olelot entails both an affirmative command and a prohibition, one is not liable to Malkut if he harvests the Olelot and keeps them for himself. A famous rule establishes that one is not liable to Malkut for transgressing a “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a violation which can be rectified by fulfilling an associated affirmative command. As long as the Olelot are still extant, the violator can rectify his mistake by giving them to the poor, and so he is not liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:10) requires leaving certain portions of one’s agricultural produce for the poor, including “Olelot,” to which the Sefer Ha’hinuch refers as “Pe’at Ha’kerem” (literally, “the corner of the vineyard”). This obligation, which applies specifically to the produce of vineyards, parallels the Misva of Pe’a, which requires leaving the corner of one’s field for the poor. However, unlike the obligation of Pe’a, the obligation of “Pe’at Ha’kerem” does not require leaving a specific area of the vineyard. Rather, as the Rambam explains, it requires leaving behind the clusters of grapes that remain after the harvest. When a vineyard is harvested, it is likely that some smaller clusters will be left unharvested by the workers. The Torah commands that instead of returning to the vineyard to harvest these remaining grapes, they must instead be left for the poor. Just as one who grows other produce must leave the corner of his field for the poor, so must the owner of a vineyard leave behind the clusters which were forgotten during the grape harvest.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (19: 9-10) presents the obligation of “Leket” – leaving for the poor harvested stalks of grain which fell to the ground during the harvest – as both an affirmative command and a prohibition. It commands the farmer to leave these stalks for the poor, and forbids the farmer from taking them for himself. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists these as two of the Torah’s 613 commands – the obligation to leave “Leket” for the poor (Misva 218), and the prohibition against taking the “Leket” for oneself (Misva 219). As such, the prohibition against keeping “Leket” for oneself falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – violations which can be rectified after the fact. If one transgresses this prohibition by taking the “Leket,” he has the opportunity to reverse his violation, and thereby avoid Malkut, by giving it to a needy person. As long as the stalks which had been taken in violation of this command are still extant, the field’s owner can avoid Malkut by giving them to the poor, which fulfills the affirmative command of “Leket” and rectifies the violation of the prohibition against taking “Leket” from one’s field.
In addition to the affirmative command obligating a farmer to leave the corner of his field (“Pe’a”) for the poor, the Torah also formulates a separate command forbidding harvesting the entire field, without leaving a portion for the poor (“Lo Techaleh Pe’at Sadecha” – Vayikra 19:9). As we discussed in regard to the affirmative command (Misva #216), the Torah does not assign a minimum required amount which must be left for the poor. One satisfies his Torah obligation by leaving even a very small portion of his produce. However, the Sages enacted that one should leave at least one-sixtieth of the produce for the poor. As the Torah requires Pe’a as both an affirmative command and a prohibition, this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a violation which can be rectified. If one violated the prohibition by harvesting the entire field, he can rectify his violation and thus avoid the punishment of Malkut by giving a portion of the harvested produce to the poor. As long as the produce is still extant, the violator is not liable to Malkut, because he can correct his wrongdoing by giving the required portion from the harvested produce.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:10) requires leaving several portions of one’s produce for the converts and the needy, including “Leket” – stalks of grain which drop during the harvest. As a person harvests the grain, either with a sickle by hand, it occasionally happens that a stalk or several stalks drop from his hand to the ground. The term “Leket” refers to stalks which a person pulled from the ground during the harvest, but which then fell back to the ground. These stalks must be left for the poor. This obligation applies only if the person dropped one or two stalks. If three or more stalks fell at once from the harvester’s hand to the ground, this does not qualify as “Leket,” and the field’s owner may keep them for himself. Moreover, the requirement applies only to stalks that fell naturally out of the harvester’s hand. If his hand struck something that caused the stalks to fall, they are not considered “Leket,” and the field’s owner may keep the stalks. If some stalks are seen on the ground, and it is uncertain whether or not they are “Leket,” they are given to the poor. The Gemara cites the verse in Tehillim (82:3), “Ani Va’rash Hasdiku,” which requires favoring the poor and indigent. Hence, when an uncertainty arises, we must presume that the produce in question rightfully belongs to the poor. The rationale behind this Misva, of course, is the same as that underlying other obligations involving charity to the poor – that we are to act kindly and generously to others, so we will be worthy of G-d’s kindness and generosity. The Misva of “Leket” applies in the Land of Israel, when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides there. The Sages extended this obligation to apply also in certain areas in the Diaspora.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (19:10) commands leaving certain portions of one’s agricultural produce to the poor, including Pe’a – the corner of one’s field. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the Pe’a obligation as the 216 th Biblical command. The Torah instructs that the corner of the field must be left for the “Ani” (pauper) and “Ger” (foreigner). The word “Ger” in this context refers to a “Ger Sedek” – a gentile who converted to Judaism with sincere motives. However, the Sages enacted the even needy gentiles are permitted to take produce from the corner of a field in the interest of “Darkeh Shalom” (peaceful relations with non-Jews). The famous first Mishna of Masechet Pe’a lists a number of Misvot which have no “Shiur” (fixed amount), including Pe’a. As far as Torah law is concerned, there is no minimum required size of the corner of a field which must be left for the poor. However, the Sages enacted that one should leave at least one-sixtieth of one’s field as Pe’a. To explain the reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d wants us to develop proper character traits, including generosity. By leaving for the poor a portion of one’s yield, which he invested a great deal of hard work and effort to produce, one is trained to become generous. As a result, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the person becomes worthy of G-d’s kindness, because the way a person treats the others is the way he is then treated by the Almighty. Conversely, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, if one insists on keeping all his produce for himself, then he develops the trait of stinginess, and he will thus be unworthy of G-d’s blessing. This obligation applies to both men and women, and to Kohanim, Leviyim and Yisraelim. It applies in the Land of Israel, when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives there. The Sages enacted that this Misva should be observed also in certain other places, as well. If one failed to leave the corner of his field in Eretz Yisrael for the poor (when this command applied), then he is in violation of this affirmative command, and also transgresses the prohibition against harvesting the entirety of one’s field (“Lo Techaleh”). However, as long as the harvested produce is extant, he can still fulfill the Misva by giving the poor the required quantity of the harvested produce. If he had made the grain to bread, then he can give the poor the required amount of bread, and thereby fulfill the obligation. If, however, there is no longer any possibility of giving the required amount to the poor, such as if the produce was all consumed by a fire, then he is liable to Malkut for violating the prohibition of “Lo Techaleh.” As long as he still has the possibility of rectifying his mistake and giving the required percentage to the needy, he does not receive Malkut; but once this is no longer possible, he is liable to punishment.
The Torah assigns each sacrifice a deadline by which the sacrificial food must be eaten, and after which the food becomes “Notar” – “leftover,” and thus unfit for consumption. In the Book of Shemot (29:33), the Torah forbids eating sacrificial food which became unfit for consumption – “Lo Ye’achel Ki Kodesh Hem.” And in the Book of Vayikra (29:33), the Torah writes that eating Notar is punishable by Karet (“Ve’ochelav Avono Yisa…Ve’nichreta Ha’nefesh Ha’hi Me’ameha”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the prohibition against eating Notar as the 215 th Biblical command. Certain parts of an animal sacrifice are not included in this prohibition, and eating them does not violate the prohibition of Notar. These include the animal’s skin, the liquid it emits, the small pieces of meat stuck to the skin, the sinews, the horns, the hooves, the fingernails, and (in the case of a bird sacrifice) the beak and feathers. Moreover, one who consumes blood of the sacrifice after the final time for the sacrifice’s consumption does not violate the prohibition of Notar, as blood is not included in this prohibition. However, he quite obviously violates the separate prohibition forbidding the consumption of blood. The frankincense which accompanies certain grain offerings is likewise not included in the Notar prohibition. If a gentile offers a sacrifice in the Bet Ha’mikdash, the sacrificial food is not subject to the prohibition of Notar. This prohibition, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It applies to both males and females. One who intentionally partakes of a Ke’zayit of Notar is, as mentioned, liable to Karet. If one transgresses this prohibition mistakenly, he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that a person is liable to Karet even if he ate half a Ke’zayit of Notar and half a Ke’zayit of Pigul – meat of a sacrifice that the Kohen prepared with the wrong intention (intending to partake of the sacrifice after the allotted time). Normally, one who eats half a Ke’zayit of one kind of forbidden food and a half a Ke’zayit of a different kind of forbidden food is not punished, because the different prohibitions do not combine to the amount of a Ke’zayit. This case marks an exception, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, because the prohibitions of Notar and Pigul are both introduced in the same verse in the Book of Shemot (“Lo Ye’achel Ki Kodesh Hem”), as mentioned above. Therefore, they are treated like a single prohibition, such that half a Ke’zayit of Pigul and half a Ke’zayit of Notar combine to render one liable to Karet.
The Torah commands in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:4), “Al Tifnu El Ha’elilim” – “Do not turn toward idols.” This has been explained to mean that one is not allowed to turn his mind toward idolatry, to entertain thoughts about the possible veracity of a pagan belief, Heaven forbid, or to verbalize such sentiments. The reason for this prohibition, as the Sages explain in the Safra, is that entertaining thoughts of, and allowing one’s interest to be drawn toward, idolatry could ultimately result in the actual worship. If a person seriously considers such beliefs, he might be misled and lured, leading to idol worship. Therefore, the Torah forbade paying attention to idolatry, as a safeguard against the worship of idols. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds a second reason for this prohibition, explaining that we should not be wasting our precious time on meaningless matters such as pagan beliefs. We are here to serve our Creator, and we should not be wasting our time analyzing foreign religious doctrines. The Sages in the Midrash interpreted the verse in this vein, reading “Al Tifnu El Ha’elilim” to mean that we may not turn our heart away from the one, true G-d, but should instead use our limited time on earth in devotion to the service of Hashem, rather than wasting our time contemplating foreign beliefs. This prohibition includes seriously entertaining any ideas that could lead a person to deny any part of Torah. As a general rule, sinful thoughts are not regarded as tantamount to sinful actions. If one thinks about committing a Torah violation, he is not considered to have sinned. However, idolatry marks an important exception to this rule. Even thinking about pagan worship in one’s mind is forbidden, and one who thinks about worshipping a pagan god is considered to have actually done so. This command, of course, applies in all times and in all places. Surprisingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who intentionally violates this prohibition is liable to Malkut. Later writers addressed the question of why one would be liable to Malkut for this violation, as he did not perform a concreate action. Malkut are administered only for sins committed through an action, so how could this prohibition, which is violated in one’s mind, be punishable by Malkut? And if one claims that this is because thinking about idolatry is tantamount to the actual worship, as mentioned, then the violator should be punished with Sekila (execution by stoning), which is the punishment for idol worship, and not Malkut. The writers who addressed this issue suggested three ways in which one can violate this prohibition by performing an action, and thus be liable to Malkut. The Samag (Sefer Misvot Gadol by Rav Moshe of Coucy, France, 1200-1260) writes that one is liable to Makut for violating this prohibition if he joins a group of pilgrims going to worship a pagan god. Since he joins them out of interest in the god, he has violated the prohibition of “Al Tifnu El Ha’elilim,” and he would be thus liable to Malkut, because he transgressed by performing an action. Others give the example of embracing or kissing an idol. If this is the usual manner of worship, then this would violate the capital offense of idol worship, but if not, then the individual is in violation of “Al Tifnu El Ha’elilim” by giving attention and affection to the idol. Since he committed an action, he would be liable to Malkut. Finally, the Maharshal (Rav Shlomo Luria, Poland, 16 th century) gives the example of a person who went over to a covered idol and removed the covering to see it. This constitutes a forbidden action of giving attention to an idol, and the individual would thus be liable to Malkut. If, however, an individual did not perform an action, but merely thought about or contemplated a pagan belief, then although he has transgressed this prohibition, he is not liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:4) commands, “V’eloheh Masecha Lo Ta’asu Lachem” – forbidding making an idol for pagan worship. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah here forbids making an object with the intention that it would be worshipped by another person. Even though the one who makes the idol has no intention at all of worshipping it, nevertheless, making the idol for somebody else to worship transgresses this Biblical command. The Torah forbids deriving any sort of benefit from an article of idolatrous worship. A gentile’s idol becomes forbidden for use immediately once the idol is completed, even before anybody worships it, whereas a Jew’s idol becomes forbidden for benefit only once it is worshipped. The idol’s accessories, which are not actually worshipped, are also forbidden for benefit, but they become forbidden only once the idol is worshipped, even in the case of a gentile’s idol. If a Jew receives payment for making an idol, then although he has violated this Biblical command, the money is nevertheless permissible for benefit. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that benefitting from this money is not considered benefitting from the idol, because the idol does not become forbidden until it is completed, when the Jew does the last bit of work to complete the idol. As such, the only money which would, in theory, be forbidden is the money received for the final action performed to complete the idol. The value of this final action is less than Peruta’s worth – meaning, less than the smallest unit of currency, and a sum this small cannot be forbidden. Therefore, the Jew may benefit from the payment he receives for making an idol. The Rishonim debate the question of whether one is required to sacrifice his life to avoid violating this prohibition. Idol worship is among the three sins which one must avoid even at the threat of death, but it is unclear whether this includes also the prohibition against making an idol for an idol worshipper. If a pagan orders a Jew to make an idol, threatening to kill him if he refuses, is he required to surrender his life rather than make an idol? This question is subject to debate. Some draw proof that one does not need to surrender his life from Rashi’s comments in the Book of Shemot (32:21) explaining Moshe’s conversation with Aharon following the sin of the golden calf. Rashi writes that Moshe asked Aharon what kind of “Yisurim” – “suffering” – the people subjected him to when forcing him to fashion an idol. It seems from Rashi’s comments that Aharon came under a great deal of pressure to make the golden calf, and he withstood the suffering inflicted upon him, but he did not go so far as to surrender his life. This would seem to suggest that one is not required to give up his life to avoid fashioning an article of pagan worship. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who makes an idol for somebody for the purpose of worship – whether that other person is a Jew or gentile – is liable to Malkut. One who makes an idol for himself has violated also a second prohibition, and is thus liable to two sets of Malkut.
The Torah commands in the beginning of Parashat Kedoshim (19:3), “Ish Imo Ve’abiv Tira’u” – that one must show reverence for his father and his mother. The Gemara explains that “reverence” in this context means that one may not sit in his parent’s place, speak in a parent’s place when the parent in speaking to other people, or contradict a parent’s words. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even if a parent acted improperly by striking or spitting at the child, the child should not disgrace the parent. It must be noted, however, that it is forbidden for a parent to strike his or her grown child, as this will likely cause the child to become very angry and strike the parent in response. By striking the child, the parent is thus in violation of the prohibition of “Lifneh Iver,” which forbids causing another person to sin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even if the parent’s mental faculties become compromised, and the parent acts insensibly, the child must continue treating the parent with respect. If the parent loses his or her sanity altogether, the child is permitted to put the parent under the care of someone who is capable of treating and caring for the parent. A Mamzer – the product of an incestuous or adulterous relationship – is obligated to show respect and reverence to his parents. Although he obviously has a legitimate grievance against his parents, for producing him through an illicit relationship which resulted in his status as a Mamzer, nevertheless, he is bound by the obligation to show his parents respect and reverence. However, a Mamzer is not liable to capital punishment for striking or cursing a parent, as others are. If a parent instructs a child to violate Torah law, or even to violate a law enacted by the Sages, the child must respectfully disobey. The Rambam, surprisingly, ruled that just as one may not address his parent by name, he may not even address by name someone who shares the parent’s name. Even if the parent is not present, the Rambam maintained, one is not permitted to call someone by name if that person has the same name as his or her parent. The Gaon of Vilna (Rav Eliyahu of Vilna, 1720-1797) suggested that the Rambam’s view is sourced in the story of the famous Talmudic sage Abayeh, who was orphaned at a young age. He was raised by Rabba, who gave him the name “Abayeh,” the Aramaic word for “father.” Rather than give him his deceased father’s name – Nahmani – Rabba decided to name him “Abayeh.” The reason, the Gaon of Vilna suggested, is because Rabba’s father was also named Nahmani, and thus Rabba was not able to call another person by this name. Of course, common practice does not follow this opinion, and in fact, among Sefaradim, it is customary to specifically give one’s child the grandparent’s name even during the grandparent’s life. This Misva applies in all times and in all places, and to both men and women. One who fails to treat his or her parent with the required reverence transgresses an affirmative command, unless the parent waives his or her right to reverence, as Halacha absolves a child of this obligation if the parent waives this requirement.
In the same verse in which the Torah forbids a man from cohabiting with an animal, the Torah forbids a woman from cohabiting with an animal (Vayikra 18:23). Although intuitively we might have viewed these prohibitions as two aspects of a single Biblical command forbidding bestiality, the Rambam maintained that these are, in fact, two separate Torah commands. He drew proof from the Gemara’s discussion in the beginning of Masechet Keritut, where it lists the 36 prohibitions for which violators are liable to Karet. A man’s cohabiting with an animal and a woman’s cohabiting with an animal are listed as two separate commands. This prohibition applies in all places and in all times. If a female aged 12 or above cohabits with an animal, either in the normal manner of intercourse (“Ke’darkah”) or in the abnormal manner (“She’lo Ke’darkah”), and there are witnesses to the act, then both she and the animal are put to death through Sekila (stoning). If this was done by a girl between the ages of 3 and 12, then the animal is put to death, but the girl is not. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that she should be given some punishment for committing such an act. If the girl was younger than 3, than neither she nor the animal is put to death. If there were no witnesses to the act, then the violator is liable to Karet. If this violation was committed accidentally (meaning, if the woman was not aware that this is forbidden), then she must bring a Hatat (sin-offering), and the animal is not put to death. Intercourse with an animal falls under the category of “Arayot” (forbidden intimate relations) which is included among the seven Noachide laws that are binding upon all mankind, even gentiles. Thus, even non-Jews are bound by this prohibition. It should be noted that not all relationships forbidden by the Torah are forbidden for gentiles. The category of “Arayot” which is binding upon gentiles includes seven relationships: with one’s mother, with one’s father’s wife (even if she is not one’s mother), one’s sister from the same mother, another man’s wife, homosexual intercourse, and bestiality. A gentile is not forbidden from having relations with his sister with whom he shares a father but not a mother. The rule of “Ger She’nitgayer Ke’katan She’nolad Dameh” establishes that once a non-Jew converts and becomes a Jew, he is considered a newborn with respect to familial relationships. This means that he is no longer considered by Halacha to be related to his biological family members. On the level of Torah law, then, a convert is allowed to marry even his immediate family members – his mother and his sister – since he is not Halachically related to them. However, the Sages enacted that a convert may not marry any family member with whom marriage was forbidden before his conversion, so as not to appear as having fewer restrictions as a Jew than he did as a gentile. In order that a convert not give the impression as declining morally after converting, the Sages established a prohibition against marrying after conversion anyone whom he was not permitted to marry before his conversion. However, a convert is allowed to marry family members whom gentiles are permitted to marry, even if such a relationship is forbidden for Jews. And thus a convert is allowed to marry his half-sister with whom he shares only a father, as this relationship was allowed when he as a non-Jew.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (18:23) forbids a male from engaging in intercourse with an animal. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbids such an act because G-d wants all creatures to reproduce their own species, and not to mix with other species. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, creatures produced through crossbreeding are incapable of reproducing. For example, a mule – the product of a horse and donkey – cannot reproduce, and fruits produced through grafting are likewise unable to reproduce. G-d arranged the natural world in such a way that products of crossbreeding are not blessed with the ability to reproduce because he wanted all the original species to mate only within the same species to reproduce that species. All the more so, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, G-d does not want the human being, the crown jewel of creation, to mix with the lower species by mating with animals. This prohibition forbids intercourse with both Behemot (domesticated animals) and Hayot (non-domesticated animals). Although the Torah mentions here only “Behema,” this prohibition applies to all creatures. This prohibition applies to an animal of any age, even an animal that has just been born. Both regular intercourse (“Ke’darkah”) and abnormal intercourse (“She’lo Ke’darkah”) are forbidden by force of this Biblical command. If a man willfully transgressed this prohibition and had intercourse with an animal, in the presence of witnesses who warned him in advance, then he is liable to Sekila (execution by stoning), and the animal is likewise put to death through Sekila. The Gemara explains that the animal is executed for two reasons. First, even though the animal quite obviously cannot be blamed for what happened, nevertheless, since it did, after all, cause a person to commit this grievous sinful act, it needs to be put to death. Secondly, allowing it to live would bring shame to the perpetrator, as people who see the animal would immediately be reminded of the repugnant act the sinner had committed. The Torah has great sensitivity even to sinners, and wishes to protect their honor, and thus even if someone commits this grave sin, for which he is put to death, nevertheless, he is protected from additional shame. The animal is put to death only if the one who performed the act is at least nine years old. Of course, the one who committed the act is not executed unless he is a Halachic adult (age thirteen or above). Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even if the perpetrator is a minor, he should receive some punishment for this shameful act as part of his training to observe the Torah’s laws. If the perpetrator was younger than age nine, then the animal is not put to death. This prohibition applies in all times and in all places. As mentioned, one who intentionally violates this prohibition in the presence of witnesses is liable to Sekila. If no witnesses saw the violation, then he is liable to Karet. If one transgressed this prohibition unintentionally – meaning, he was not aware that the Torah forbids such an act – then he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering).
The Torah commands in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:22), “Ve’et Zachar Lo Tishkab Mishkebeh Isha, To’eba Hi” – “And you shall not sleep with a man in the manner of sleeping with a woman; it is an abomination.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d wishes that the world be populated, and He therefore commanded that a man must not waste his seed by having a homosexual relationship, which, quite obviously, cannot result in reproduction. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, such an act is inherently “filthy, repulsive and unseemly in the eyes of all intelligent people.” As we were all created to the serve the Almighty, it is unfitting for someone to get involved in such unbecoming behavior. If two male adults engage in an intimate relationship, and the act was seen by two witnesses, then they are liable to Sekila (execution by stoning). If one of the two males is a child under the age of nine, then they have not transgressed the Biblical prohibition, but are liable to Malkut by force of Rabbinic enactment. If one is an adult and the other is a child between the ages of nine and twelve, then the adult is liable to Sekila and the minor is liable to Malkut by force of Rabbinic enactment. Amidst his discussion of this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch addresses the unusual case of a man who has intercourse with an “Androginus” – a person with the Simanim (physical properties) of both a man and a woman. If a man commits a homosexual act with an “Androginus,” then he is guilty of transgressing this prohibition; if he commits a heterosexual act with an “Androginus,” then he does not violate this prohibition, but is liable to Malkut by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Sages enacted that one should not allow a child to be alone with an adult non-Jewish male, such as a private tutor, as a safeguard against this prohibition. This prohibition applies in all places and in all times. As mentioned, violations of this command in the presence of witnesses are punishable by Sekila. If no witnesses saw the act, then one is liable to Karet. If one transgressed unintentionally, then he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). This prohibition is included among the Arayot (forbidden intimate relationships), and it thus applies also to gentiles, as the command of Arayot is among the seven Noachide laws which are binding upon all mankind. The only exception, as the Rambam writes, is an Ebed Kena’ani (gentile servant owned by a Jew), who is not bound by the Arayot prohibitions. An Ebed Kena’ani has begun the process of conversion but has yet to complete it, and he thus is considered neither a gentile nor a full-fledged Jew. As such, these commands do not apply to him.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:21) commands, “U’mi’zar’acha Lo Titen Le’ha’abir La’molech” – that one may not hand over his offspring for the worship of the pagan god called Molech. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the followers of this pagan cult would bring their child and hand him to the priests, who would then wave the child up and down, and bring him to the statue. The priests would then hand the child back to the parent and light a fire, whereupon the parent would bring the child through the fire. Some Rishonim, including Rashi and the Rambam, maintained that the child was not burned, but rather passed harmlessly through this fire as a ritual. According to Rashi, two fires were lit, and the child was brought in between them; according to the Rambam, the child was quickly passed through the fire, without suffering any harm. By contrast, the Ramban understood that the child was actually burned to death, as a sacrifice to Molech. The question arises as to why the Torah issued a separate command prohibiting the worship of Molech. The Torah already forbade worshipping foreign deities; why, then, did it specify a prohibition forbidding the worship of Molech? The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, based on the Rambam, that at the time the Torah was given, the pagans were especially devoted to this evil idolatrous rite, and so the Torah found it necessary to single it out in particular. The Ramban offers a different approach, explaining that the prohibition against Molech is unique in that one violates this command even if one worships Molech differently from its normal manner of worship. When it comes to other pagan gods, one is in violation of idol worship only if he worships the idol in the manner accepted by followers of that deity. The prohibition of Molech, however, is transgressed even if one deviates from the usual manner of worship. A unique – and surprising – aspect of the Molech prohibition is that one transgresses this command only if he gives one or several of his children over to Molech, but not if he gives all his children. The verse forbids giving “Mi’zar’acha” – “from among your offspring” – for the worship of Molech, implying that it is forbidden only to give some of one’s offspring; giving all of one’s children does not violate this command. Of course, this requires explanation. How could giving all of one’s children for the worship of Molech possibly be less severe than giving only one child? The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the priests of Molech would fiendishly lure the masses to give over their children for this rite by assuring them that they would be rewarded with success and blessing for their other children. The only way the priests would convince parents to surrender their children for this rite would be by making promises that their other children would be healthy and successful. Therefore, Molech could only be worshipped through the passing of one or several children, but not by passing all of one’s children, because parents only agreed to participate in this worship for the benefit of their other children. One violates this command by handing over any child to Molech, even a child who is a Mamzer (the product of an incestuous or adulterous relationship). This prohibition is transgressed regardless of whether one handed over a son or a daughter, and even if he handed over a grandson, great-grandson, or any descendant. If one hands over a sibling, however, he is not liable for violating this command. For that matter, one does not violate this prohibition if he offers himself for the worship of Molech. (Incidentally, this Halacha has been cited as proof that the Molech worship does not entail burning to death; the fact that it needs to be said that one is not liable to punishment for handing himself over to Molech worship proves that one who is given over to Molech is not killed in the process.) This prohibition applies in all times and in all places, and to both men and women. One who intentionally violated this command in the presence of witnesses who warned him in advance is liable to Sekila (execution by stoning); if there were no witnesses or there was no warning, then he is liable to Karet. If one violated this command unintentionally, he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). This prohibition applies even to gentiles, as idol worship is included among the seven Noachide laws which are binding upon all mankind.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:19) commands that one may not have relations with a woman “Be’nidat Tum’atah” – when she is in a state of impurity due to menstruation. Once a woman becomes a Nidda (menstrual woman), she remains impure until she immerses in a Mikveh, and relations with her are thus forbidden until after the immersion. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains the reason for this command as based upon Hashem’s concern to distance us from anything which could be harmful. He writes that beyond the spiritual harm that could be caused by having a relationship with a Nidda, this could also cause physical harm, and so the Torah forbade marital relations during the time the wife is a Nidda. On the level of Torah law, the status of Nidda extends for seven days from the time bleeding first occurred, and the woman can then immerse and become Tehora (pure) the night after the seventh day. The verse states in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 15:19), “Shibat Yamim Tiheyeh Benidatah” – “She shall be in her state of impurity for seven days.” The Rabbis understood the word “Tiheyeh” (“shall be”) to mean that a woman remains a Nidda even after the bleeding ceased, and even beyond seven days, until she immerses in a Mikveh. Therefore, relations remain forbidden until after immersion. This immersion, according to Torah law, can be performed after the seventh day since the onset of bleeding, even if bleeding continued throughout the seven days, as long as it has ceased before the immersion. The accepted practice, however, is that a woman who becomes a Nidda does not immerse until after seven “clean days” – meaning, until after she goes through seven days without experiencing bleeding. The Gemara says that Jewish women accepted this stringency to avoid confusion between ordinary menstruation and bleeding which requires waiting a period of seven “clean days.” When the bleeding stops, the woman performs an internal inspection called “Hefsek Tahara” to ascertain the cessation of bleeding, whereupon the seven “clean days” begin. She then performs an inspection each morning and afternoon during the seven days, and if no blood is seen, she immerses the night after the seventh day. Any female that experiences menstrual bleeding becomes a Nidda, regardless of her age. Theoretically, if even an infant girl would experience such bleeding, she would attain the halachic status of Nidda until seven days have passed and she immerses. A Shifha Kena’anit (non-Jewish maidservant) likewise becomes a Nidda as a result of menstruation, as she has begun the process of becoming a Jew. On the level of Torah law, a non-Jewish woman does not attain the status of Nidda, but the Sages enacted that even a non-Jewish woman is considered a Nidda as a result of menstruation. Therefore, a man who cohabits with a non-Jewish woman is regarded to have violated the prohibition of relations with a Nidda (as well as other prohibitions, represented by the acrostic “Nashgaz”: “Nidda,” “Shifha,” “Goya,” “Zona”). As far as Torah law is concerned, a woman becomes a Nidda only if she bleeds with a “Hargasha” (“sensation”), feeling the flow of blood. If a woman did not feel any bleeding but saw a bloodstain, then, according to Torah law, she does not attain the status of Nidda. The Sages, however, enacted that the discovery of a stain indeed renders the woman a Nidda, depending on the stain’s color and size. Halacha forbids relations with one’s wife not only during the time when she is a Nidda, but also when the onset of bleeding is expected, based on the menstrual cycle (“Ona Ha’semucha Le’vestah”). In order to safeguard against violations of this prohibition, the Sages enacted “Harhakot” – certain measures intended to create some distance between a husband and wife during the time the woman is a Nidda. The husband and wife during this time may not even casually touch one another, or directly hand each other objects. The immersion after the seven “clean days” must be performed specifically at night, and not during the day. This prohibition applies in all times and all places. If a man and woman cohabit when the woman is a Nidda, they are both liable to Karet. If this violation was committed unintentionally, then they must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). Normally, a child produced through a forbidden relationship that is punishable by Karet is considered a Mamzer. In the case of a relationship with a Nidda, however, this is not the case, and the child is not considered a Mamzer. The child is, however, considered “Pagum” (“tainted”) because of the forbidden manner in which he or she was produced. The law of Nidda is one of the three primary Misvot assigned to women listed by the Mishna in Masechet Shabbat, the other two being Halla (separating a portion of the dough during baking) and Shabbat candle lighting. The Maharal of Prague (Rav Yehuda Loew, 1520-1609) drew an association between these three Misvot and the famous teaching of the Midrash describing the three constant miracles that occurred in the homes of our matriarchs Sara and Ribka: the candle lit on Ereb Shabbat burned for an entire week, until the next Ereb Shabbat; the bread prepared on Ereb Shabbat remained fresh throughout the week; and a cloud hovered above the entrance, representing the divine presence which rested upon the home. Clearly, the miracle of the candle is associated with the Misva of Shabbat candle lighting, and the miracle of the dough is associated with the Misva of Halla. It thus follows that the third miracle – the cloud signifying G-d’s presence – is associated with the Misva of Nidda. The Maharal explains that this shows that the observance of Taharat Ha’mishpaha (family purity) is what brings the Shechina into the home. This Misva is what brought the special cloud, which represented Hashem’s presence in the homes of our saintly patriarchs and matriarchs. The Talmud teaches, “Ish Ve’isha Zachu, Shechina Benehem” – “If a husband and wife are meritorious, then the Shechina rests among them.” This is alluded to in the words “Ish” (“man”) and “Isha” (“woman”), which contain the same two letters (“Alef” and “Shin”), with the letter “Yod” added to form “Ish” and the letter “Heh” added to form “Isha.” These two letters – “Yod” and “Heh” – spell one of the Names of G-d. The Rabbis explained that the combined Gematria (numerical value) of “Yod” and “Heh” is 15, which alludes to the fifteen inspections that a woman makes before she may immerse and regain her status of purity (the initial Hefsek Tahara inspection, and the two daily inspections throughout the seven “clean days”). It is through the meticulous observance of the laws of Nidda that “Shechina Benehem” – the divine presence rests in a Jewish home. In order to bring Hashem’s presence and blessing in our lives, we must observe this special Misva and maintain the unique quality of holiness and purity in the home.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:18) commands that one may not marry his wife’s sister “Be’hayeha” – “during her lifetime.” This means that once a man marries a woman, he may not marry or have relations with that woman’s sister, even after he divorces his wife, until after his wife dies. Once his wife passes away, he is permitted to marry her sister. This prohibition forbids both betrothing the wife’s sister, and having a relationship with her without marriage. One who betroths the sister or has an intimate relationship with her outside the framework of marriage has transgressed this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains the reason for this prohibition as rooted in the Torah’s concern to maintain peace and harmony among people. Certainly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah seeks to avoid friction among family members, who are naturally drawn to love and cherish one another. If two sisters marry the same man, this would likely lead to jealousy, friction and competition, thus ruining the relationship between the two sisters, and for this reason, the Torah forbade marrying two sisters. In the interest of maintaining peaceful relations among sisters, the Torah commanded that one may not marry his wife’s sister unless his wife has passed away. This prohibition applies regardless of whether the sisters are full sisters, half-sisters who share the same father, or half-sisters who share the same mother. The Rabbis enacted a safeguard to protect against violations of this prohibition, forbidding relations with the sister of one’s deceased brother’s wife in a situation of Yibum. If a married man dies without children, then his brother is required to either marry the widow (Yibum), or to release her from this bond by performing the Halisa ceremony. The Sages enacted that once a married man dies without children, his brother may not marry the deceased’s wife’s sister, even if Yibum does not occur. Even before the brother marries the widow, or even after the brother performs Halisa, he may not marry the widow’s sister as long as the widow is alive, since he has an automatic bond to the widow and she thus resembles his wife. This enactment is called “Ahot Zekukato” (the sister of the woman to whom one is bound by the Misva of Yibum) and “Ahot Halusato” (the sister of the woman to whom one performed Halisa). This prohibition applies in all places and in all times. If one transgressed this prohibition, and had an intimate relationship with his wife’s sister or married her during his wife’s lifetime, then he is liable to Karet. If he committed the violation in the presence of witnesses who warned him in advance, then he is liable to Malkut. If the prohibition was violated unintentionally, then he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). If he had relations with “Ahot Zekukato” or “Ahot Halusato” (as discussed above), then he receives Malkut for violating the Rabbinic edict. If a person marries his wife’s sister in violation of this command, then this marriage does not halachically take effect. There is a rule that if a person betroths a woman with whom relations are forbidden and punishable by Karet, then the betrothal does not take effect at all. Therefore, in the case of a man who marries his wife’s sister during his wife’s lifetime, the marriage does not take effect, and he must leave the sister without needing to grant her a Halachic divorce, since the betrothal never took effect. Many writers addressed the question of how Yaakob Abinu was permitted to marry Leah and Rachel, who were sisters. Since the patriarchs observed the Torah’s laws, how is it possible that Yaakob would be married to two sisters? There are three classic answers to this question. The first is the famous approach taken by the Ramban, who advanced the theory that it was primarily in Eretz Yisrael where the patriarchs observed the Misvot. The Land of Israel is where the Misvot are ideally to be observed, and thus the patriarchs, who lived before the Misvot became obligatory, observed the Misvot when they were in the land, but not necessarily during the time they spent outside the land. Yaakob married Leah and Rachel in Haran, outside Eretz Yisrael, and so he was allowed to marry two sisters. Indeed, the Ramban says, right when Yaakob returned to Eretz Yisrael, the second sister whom he had married – Rachel – passed away, such that he was not married to sisters in the Land of Israel. The Maharal of Prague (Rav Yehuda Loew, 1520-1609) explained differently, noting that whereas we observe the Torah which was taught to Moshe and then transmitted through the generations, the patriarchs observed the Torah through Ru’ah Ha’kodesh, which is a form of prophecy. Their entire observance of the Misvot was based on prophetic inspiration, and it was through prophetic inspiration that Yaakob determined that he was to marry Rachel even after marrying Leah. Since the patriarchs to begin with observed the Misvot as revealed to them through Ru’ah Ha’kodesh, Yaakob married both Leah and Rachel because it was revealed to him through Ru’ah Ha’kodesh that with them he would produce the twelve tribes of Israel. Finally, many scholars posited that before Leah and Rachel married Yaakob, they had the status of gentiles, and they underwent conversion to marry him. There is a famous Halachic principle that “Ger She’nitgayer Ke’katan She’nolad Dameh” – a gentile who converts is considered born anew, such that he is not considered Halachically related to his biological relatives. Hence, once Rachel and Leah converted, they were no longer considered sisters, and thus Yaakob was permitted to marry them. Returning to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, this Misva shows us the great importance the Torah accords to peace and harmony within families. We must do everything we can to preserve the natural feelings of closeness and love that exist among family members and relatives, and to avoid tension and conflicts within the family. The Torah demands that we live joyfully and peacefully with one another – especially with our family members, with whom we are to forge especially close bonds of love and devotion.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:17) commands that once a man marries a woman, he may never then have relations with or marry her daughters or granddaughters, even those produced with a different man. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 203 rd Biblical command the prohibition against relations with one’s wife daughter; as the 204 th Biblical command the prohibition against relations with one’s wife’s son’s daughter; and as the 205 th Biblical command the prohibition against relations with one’s wife’s daughter’s daughter. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this 205 th command, summarizes the various family members of one’s wife whom one may not marry or cohabit with. On the level of Torah law, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, six of one’s wife’s relatives are forbidden – three “above” and three “below.” The three relatives “above” are the wife’s mother, and both her grandmothers. The three “below” are the wife’s daughter, her son’s daughter, and her daughter’s daughter. The Rabbis added a safeguard, forbidding an additional six relatives – four “above” and two “below.” The four “above” are the wife’s four great-grandmothers, and the two “below” are the wife’s great-granddaughters – the granddaughter of her son and the granddaughter of her daughter. These prohibitions apply in all places and in all times. If one had a relationship with his wife’s granddaughter, from either her son or her daughter, while the wife was still alive, then both he and the woman he cohabited with are liable to Serefa (execution by fire). If the wife had already passed away, then the punishment is Karet, and if this was done unintentionally, then the violator must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). If one had intercourse with a family member with whom the Rabbis forbade relations – such as his wife’s great-grandmother or great-granddaughter – then he is liable to Malkut for transgressing the Rabbis’ edict.
In the context of the prohibition against having intimate relations with one’s wife’s daughter (even though the daughter was fathered by a different man), the Torah forbids also relations with one’s wife’s daughter’s daughter (Vayikra 18:17). The Rabbis enacted a safeguard to this prohibition, forbidding relations with one’s wife’s great-granddaughter, specifically, the wife’s son’s granddaughter. This prohibition applies in all places and in all times. If somebody married a woman and then had relations with her granddaughter, then if the relationship occurred during the wife’s lifetime, the man is liable to Serefa (execution by fire). If the wife had already passed, then the punishment is Karet. If one transgressed this prohibition mistakenly, then he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). If one violated the Rabbinic enactment, having a relationship with his wife’s great-granddaughter from her son, then he is liable to Malkut for transgressing a Rabbinic edict.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:17) forbids having intimate relations with “Isha U’bitah” – a woman and her daughter. This means that if a person marries a woman, he may not then ever marry that woman’s daughter, even though the daughter was fathered by a different man. This prohibition applies only to the daughter of a woman whom one marries. However, if a man had an illicit relationship with a woman, out of wedlock, then Torah law does not forbid him from marrying her daughter from a different man. Since the man never married the mother, the daughter is not forbidden for him. The Sages, however, enacted a provision forbidding one from marrying all immediate family members of a woman with whom he had an illicit intimate relationship. The reason is that if one marries a family member, it is likely that the woman with whom he engaged in relations will occasionally visit. And since she and this man are comfortable with one another, having already been intimate together, they might have an adulterous relationship. The Sages therefore forbade marrying a family member of a woman with whom one had once illicitly engaged in relations. The prohibition of “Isha U’bitah” applies in all places and in all times. If one had relations with his wife’s daughter from a different marriage during the mother’s lifetime, then both he and the daughter are liable to Serefa (execution by burning). If this relationship took place after the mother’s passing, then the punishment is Karet. If this prohibition is transgressed unintentionally, then the violator must bring a Hatat (sin-offering).
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:15) commands that one may not engage in intimate relations with “Eshet Ahicha” – one’s brother’s wife. This applies regardless of whether the person and his brother share both parents, only a father, or only a mother. Additionally, even if the brother merely betrothed a woman, and had yet to complete the marriage, one is forbidden from engaging in relations with the bride, forever. Even if the brother subsequently dies or divorces his wife, she remains forbidden for the brother-in-law. The famous exception to this rule is a situation of Yibum – where a married man dies without any children. In such a case, it actually becomes a Misva for the deceased’s brother to marry the widow. Whereas generally a sister-in-law is forbidden for marriage even after the brother’s death, in this instance, there is a Misva for the brother to marry the widow. This command applies in all times and in all places. If one had relations with his brother’s wife while the brother was still married to her, then they are liable to Henek (execution by strangulation) for violating the prohibition of Eshet Ish (adultery). If this encounter occurred after the brother had died or divorced the woman, then the violator is liable to Karet for transgressing the prohibition of relations with one’s sister-in-law. If one committed this transgression mistakenly, he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). It is worth reflecting on the fact that a relationship which is generally strictly forbidden, and regarded as a capital offense, can become not only allowed, but a Misva, in certain circumstances. The institution of Yibum, which designates as a Misva a marriage between a man and his childless brother’s widow – a marriage which would otherwise be forbidden – shows us how we must humble ourselves before the Torah’s authority. Only G-d Himself determines when something is permitted, forbidden, or a Misva. We are to humbly submit to the Torah’s commands, without ever thinking that we can intuitively decide what Hashem wants of us.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:15), “Ervat Kalatecha Lo Tegaleh” – it is forbidden to have intimate relations with one’s daughter-in-law, the wife of his son. This prohibition applies even if the son only betrothed a woman, without completing the marriage; once the betrothal occurred, the father may not have relations with the woman. Furthermore, even after the son dies or divorces, his father may not marry the son’s wife. She remains forbidden for the father for all time. This prohibition applies even if the son is a Mamzer – the product of an adulterous or incestuous relationship. A Mamzer is recognized by Halacha as his biological father’s son, and thus a Mamzer’s father is forbidden from having relations with the Mamzer’s wife. The Rabbis extended this prohibition to include the wife of one’s son’s son, or the wife of his son’s son’s son, for all generations. They further enacted that one may not marry the wife of one’s daughter’s son. This prohibition, however, does not extend further than the first generation; one may not marry his daughter’s daughter-in-law, but that daughter-in-law’s daughter-in-law is permissible. This prohibition against having relations with one’s daughter-in-law applies in all times and in all places. If one engaged in such a relationship in the presence of two witnesses who warned him in advance, then he is liable to Sekila (execution by stoning). If a person transgressed without witnesses, then he is liable to Karet. For an unintentional violation of this command, one must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). If someone had relations with one of the relatives with whom intercourse is forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment – such as with his grandson’s wife – then he is liable to Malkut, as ordained by the Sages.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:14) commands regarding one’s father’s brother, “El Ishto Lo Tikrab, Dodatecha Hi” – “Do not approach his wife; she is your aunt.” This verse establishes a prohibition against having relations with the wife of one’s father’s brother. This prohibition applies even after the uncle died or divorced his wife; once one’s father’s brother marries a woman, the nephew may never have an intimate relationship with that woman. Furthermore, this prohibition applies even to a woman whom the uncle merely betrothed, even before the marriage was completed. The Biblical command applies only to the wife of one’s father’s brother from the same father. If one’s father has a half-brother from the same mother, but not from the same father, that the nephew is, on the level of Torah law, allowed to marry a woman to whom the uncle had been married. The Sages, however, enacted a provision prohibiting such a relationship. This prohibition applies in all times and in all places. If one intentionally transgressed this command, and had a relationship with his father’s brother’s wife while she was married to the uncle, then the nephew and the aunt are punished by Henek (execution by strangulation), for violating the prohibition of adultery. If the uncle and aunt were no longer married, then their forbidden act is punishable by Karet. If witnesses saw the act, then the violator is liable to Malkut. If the act was committed unintentionally, then the violator must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). If one had intercourse with the wife of his father’s brother from the same mother but not from the same father, then he receives Malkut by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Torah later (Vayikra 20:20) says about those who engage in such a relationship, “Aririm Yamutu” – “they shall die childless.” The Gemara (Yebamot 55) explains this to mean that the violators will be unable to beget children, and if they already had children, the children will die during their lifetime. Rashi writes that this verse establishes that part of the punishment of Karet is childlessness; the Torah here states that whenever someone deserves Karet, his punishment will include having no offspring. Tosafot, however, disagree, and maintain that only when one is guilty of a sin involving Arayot (forbidden intimate relationship), his punishment includes childlessness. Sinners who are liable to Karet for other offenses, by contrast, are not, in Tosafot’s view, subject to this punishment of childlessness. During the Vidui (confessional) prayer on Yom Kippur, we confess “Al Hataim She’anahnu Hayabim Alehem Karet Va’ariri” – “for sins for which we are liable to Karet and childlessness.” This text is readily understandable according to Rashi’s opinion, that every sin which carries a punishment of Karet also carries the punishment of childlessness. Naturally, then, we mention these two punishments together, in reference to the same category of sin. According to Tosafot’s opinion, we must explain this prayer text as referring first to all sins punishable by Karet, and then specifically to those that carry the additional punishment of childlessness – meaning, sins of Arayot. Interestingly, the Maharil (Rav Yaakob Moelin, Germany, 1365-1427) had the practice to include the word “Va’ariri” in this passage only during the Minha service on Yom Kippur afternoon. The likely explanation is that he followed Tosafot’s opinion, that the punishment of “Ariri” is reserved only for violations of Arayot. The Maharil therefore made mention of this punishment specifically during Minha, when the portion read from the Torah is the section in Parashat Ahareh-Mot which introduces the Arayot prohibitions. Having just read the section of Arayot, the Maharil felt, we should make special mention of these sins in our confessional prayer.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:14) commands that one may not engage in intimate relations with “Ahi Avicha” – one’s father’s brother. Of course, such a relationship is already forbidden due to the prohibition of Mishkab Zachur (male homosexual intercourse). The Torah here adds a second prohibition, such that one who transgresses and commits such as act is in violation of two Biblical commands. This prohibition applies regardless of whether the man and one’s father share both parents, only a father, or only a mother, and regardless of whether the uncle was the product of marriage or of an illicit relationship. This command applies at all times and in all places. If a man and an uncle intentionally violate this prohibition, they are both liable to Sekila (execution by stoning). If this transgression is committed unintentionally, the violator must offer two Hataot (sin-offerings) – one to atone for the sin of Mishkab Zachur, and a second to atone for the particular sin of relations with an uncle.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:13) introduces the prohibition against having intercourse with one’s mother’s sister. As with regard to the prohibition against relations with one’s father’s sister, this prohibition applies regardless of whether one’s mother and this woman share two parents, only a father, or only a mother. In either case, relations with her are forbidden. Likewise, it makes no difference whether the mother’s sister was produced through a legal marriage, or through an illicit relationship; regardless, if they share the same father or the same mother, relations between the sister and her nephew are forbidden. Needless to say, this prohibition applies in all places and in all times. One who intentionally has intercourse with his mother’s sister is liable to Karet; one who commits this transgression mistakenly must bring a Hatat (sin-offering).
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:12) forbids engaging in intimate relations with “Ahot Abicha” – “your father’s sister.” This prohibition applies even if the woman is the father’s half-sister, regardless of whether they share the same father or the same mother. Moreover, even if the sister was conceived out of wedlock, nevertheless, since she and her brother share the same father, relations between her and the brother’s son are forbidden. This prohibition applies in all times and in all places. One who intentionally transgresses this prohibition is liable to Karet, and one who commits this violation unintentionally must offer a Hatat (sin-offering).
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot introduces a prohibition against having intercourse with “the daughter of your father’s wife.” If one’s father produced a daughter with a wife, then this command forbids relations with that daughter. A separate prohibition forbids relations with one’s father’s daughter even if she was produced by rape, meaning, if the father forced himself on a woman, thereby impregnating her, and she delivered a girl. If one’s father produced a daughter with a wife, whether or not that wife is this son’s mother, relations between the son and the daughter violate two prohibitions – the general prohibition forbidding relations with one’s sister, and this specific prohibition forbidding relations with the daughter of one’s father’s wife. One who intentionally violates this prohibition, and engages in relations with his sister, is liable to Karet. If this was done unintentionally, then he must offer two Hatat sacrifices (sin-offerings), unless the sister had been produced through a forced relationship, in which case he must offer just a single Hatat, as only one of these two commands has been transgressed. As mentioned in reference to an earlier Misva, Halacha does not forbid marrying a stepsibling. If one’s father married a woman who has a daughter from a previous marriage, the son may marry that daughter.
The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 195 th Biblical command the prohibition against intimate relations with one’s daughter – a prohibition which, interestingly enough, is not explicitly introduced anywhere in the Torah. The Gemara initially suggests deriving this prohibition through logical deduction (Kal Va’homer) – the Torah explicitly forbids relations with one’s granddaughter, so all the more so, it must forbid relations with one’s daughter, who is a closer relative. However, there is a rule that punishment is not administered to those who violate prohibitions which are deduced through a Kal Va’homer, and have no textual source. As there is a punishment for having relations with one’s daughter (as we will mention later), there must be some source for this prohibition. The Gemara therefore concludes that the Torah alludes to this prohibition through a “Gezera Shava” – the use of a common word in two different contexts. The Torah says about “revealing the nakedness of” (meaning, intimate relations with) one’s granddaughter, “Ervatecha Hena” – “they are your nakedness.” The word “Hena” appears also in regard to the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s wife’s daughter or granddaughter even from a different man. The Gemara thus established that just as the prohibition against relations with the offspring of a woman with whom he engaged in relations includes her daughter, likewise, the prohibition against relations with one’s granddaughter applies also to one’s own daughter. This prohibition applies even to the product of rape; if a man forced himself on a woman, Heaven forbid, and she conceived and had a daughter, the man is forbidden from having relations with the daughter. One who intentionally commits this transgression in the presence of witnesses after being warned is liable to Serefa (execution by burning). If witnesses did not see the act, then he is liable to Karet. If one violated this prohibition unintentionally, then he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). If he had produced this daughter with a wife, then he is in violation of two prohibitions – the prohibition against relations with one’s daughter, and the prohibition against relations with one’s wife’s daughter. If a man engaged in relations with a woman outside of marriage, then according to Torah law, he is permitted to marry that woman’s daughter from a different man. However, the Sages enacted that this man may not marry any of her close relatives – that is, her sister, daughter, mother, either grandmother, or granddaughter (from either her son or daughter). They enacted this prohibition out of the concern that if the man marries this woman’s close relative, and the woman visits their home, they may then have an adulterous relationship, since they are already comfortable with one another. Therefore, as a safeguard, the Sages forbade marrying a close relative of a woman with whom one had engaged in relations out of wedlock.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh Mot introduces the prohibition against engaging in intimate relations with one’s granddaughter. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this prohibition as two separate Biblical commands – a prohibition against relations with one’s son’s daughter (“Ervat Bat Beno”), and a prohibition against relations with one’s daughter’s daughter (“Ervat Bat Bito”). This prohibition applies even to the daughter of an illegitimate child. For example, if one’s son is a Mamzer (product of an illicit relationship such as adultery), and this son then has a daughter, relations between the grandfather and the granddaughter are forbidden. Likewise, if a man has a legitimate son, and that son produces a Mamzeret, relations between the grandfather and the granddaughter are forbidden. Even though the granddaughter is the product of an illicit relationship, nevertheless, this prohibition applies. The Sages extended this prohibition further, forbidding relations with one’s great-granddaughter – regardless of whether she is one’s son’s granddaughter, or one’s daughter’s granddaughter. This prohibition is binding in all times, and in all places. One who transgressed this prohibition in the presence of two valid witnesses, after being warned, is liable to Serefa (execution by burning). If no witnesses saw the violation, then the violator is liable to Karet. If the violation was committed unintentionally, then one must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). One who violates the Rabbinic enactment forbidding relations with a great-granddaughter is liable to Malkut for violating the words of the Sages. Different opinions exist as to the definition of “Karet.” Some explain that it refers to early death, meaning, passing away between the ages of 50 and 60. Another opinion is that “Karet” means sudden death, without first growing frail and ill. (It goes without saying that this does not allow us to say about someone who died young, or who died suddenly, that he or she committed a grave violation and was thus punished with “Karet.” We are never entitled to claim to know why a person was punished in such a manner.) The Ramban, in his Torah commentary (Parashat Ahareh-Mot), writes that there are three different forms of Karet: 1) losing one’s share in the afterlife; 2) dying young; 3) a combination of the previous two – meaning, losing one’s share in the afterlife, and dying young. The Ramban explains on this basis the different expressions with which the Torah refers to the punishment of Karet. In some contexts, G-d warns that the violator will be “Nichrat…Mi’lefanai” – “cut off…from My presence.” The Ramban writes that this refers to the loss of one’s share in the next world, being denied the privilege of being in G-d’s presence in the afterlife. In other instances, the Torah warns that “Ha’ish Ha’hu” – “that person” – will be “cut off,” referring to the loss of physical life, meaning, an early death. And on some occasions, the Torah speaks of Karet with a double expression – “Hikaret Tikaret,” which the Ramban understands as a reference to the worst form of Karet – where one both dies young and forfeits his share in the world to come.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:9) forbids “revealing the nakedness of” – meaning, engaging in intimate relations with – one’s sister, even if they share only the same father or only the same mother. If they share one parent, then this prohibition applies. One may not engage in intercourse with one’s half-sister even if she is the product of an illicit relationship. Thus, for example, if one’s father forced himself on a woman, thereby producing a daughter, or if one’s mother had a forbidden relationship which produced a daughter, the brother may not engage in intercourse with that girl. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Torah in this section also issues a command forbidding relations with “the daughter of your husband’s wife,” even though it already forbids relations with one’s sister. This second verse, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, adds a second prohibition, such that one who engages in intercourse with his sister who is also the daughter of his father’s wife is guilty of two violations. This prohibition does not apply to stepsiblings. If one’s father married a woman who has a daughter from a previous marriage, he may marry that daughter. Torah law permits such a marriage, and the Sages did not enact a prohibition forbidding marrying a stepsibling. The prohibition against relations with one’s sibling is binding also upon gentiles, as this is included in the prohibition of “Arayot” – forbidden relations – which constitutes one of the seven Noachide laws. However, whereas for a Jew intercourse is forbidden with a sibling who shares even just a father or just a mother, for gentiles, intercourse is forbidden with a sibling only if they share the same mother. If a non-Jew has a sister with whom he shares a father but not a mother, they are allowed to marry. A gentile who transgresses one of these prohibitions is liable to the death penalty, even if the violation was unintentional, and even if no prior warning was given, as long as the act was seen by two witnesses. The testimony of witnesses is accepted for this purpose even if the witnesses would not be eligible to testify against a Jew. When non-Jews lived under Jewish control, the Jewish authorities were empowered to enforce these prohibitions by administering punishment. This prohibition applies at all times, and in all places. One who intentionally engages in intercourse with a sibling is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation); Bet Din does not put one to death for violating this prohibition. If one committed this transgression unintentionally, he is required to bring a Hatat (sin-offering).
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:8) commands that one may not “reveal the nakedness” of – meaning, engage in intercourse with – one’s father’s wife. A separate prohibition forbids engaging in relations with one’s mother; this command forbids intercourse with one’s father’s wife even if she is not the person’s mother. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in addition to the reasons for the other prohibitions of Arayot (forbidden relations with one’s relatives), this command is also aimed at maintaining respect for one’s father. Having relations with a woman who is or was married to one’s father is very disrespectful to the father, and so the Torah forbids having such a relationship. This prohibition applies even after the father divorced the woman, and even after he has died. Once a man marries a woman, his sons may never engage in intercourse with her at any point thereafter. This command applies even to a woman whom the father had only betrothed, and has yet to marry. Although the father has not had any physical relationship with the woman, as he had only betrothed her (such as by giving her a ring and declaring that she is thereby betrothed to him), his sons may not engage in relations with her at any point thereafter. It should be noted that the prohibition of “Eshet Ab” (having relations with one’s father’s wife) is binding even upon gentiles – like all prohibitions of Arayot – but for them, this prohibition applies only once the father consummated the marriage. Whereas a Jew may not have relations with a woman whom his father had merely betrothed, without consummating the marriage, a gentile is permitted to have relations with a woman whom his father betrothed but had yet to have a physical relationship with. The Sages expanded this prohibition, forbidding relations also with the wife of one’s father’s father. One may not engage in relations with a woman whom his grandfather had married, even if they are no longer married, and even if the grandfather had died. This applies also to the grandfather’s father, and his father, etc. The Sages also forbade relations with the wife of one’s mother’s father. However, they did not extend this prohibition to include even that grandfather’s father, and prior generations. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah prohibition which the Sages sought to safeguard was that of “Eshet Ab” – one’s father’s wife – so they expanded the prohibition to include one’s father’s father and all prior generations, but not for all prior generations of one’s mother’s father. Relations with these “Sheniyot” (“secondary” relatives), which are forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment, are permissible for gentiles. They are bound only by the Biblical laws of Arayot, and not by the Rabbis’ expansion of these prohibitions. The prohibition of “Eshet Ab” applies at all times, and in all places. One who had intercourse with his father’s wife is liable to Karet (external excision from the Jewish Nation), and if there are witnesses to the act, then he is liable to Sekila (execution by stoning). One who committed this violation unintentionally must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). A person who had relations with any of the “Sheniyot” – relatives with whom relations are forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment – is liable to Malkut for violating the Rabbis’ decree.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:7) forbids “revealing the nakedness” of one’s mother – meaning, engaging in intercourse with her. The Rambam writes that the Torah forbade intercourse with family members because it seeks to promote moderation in the area of intimate relationships, and to prevent a person from excessive involvement in such activity. Since a person’s family members are generally nearby and accessible, the Torah forbade intimacy with family members, with whom he would otherwise be able to frequently cohabit. Additionally, the Rambam writes, intercourse with a family member is inherently shameful, and thus forbidden by the Torah. The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam’s analysis, noting that if this were the Torah’s intent in forbidding incestuous relationships, then it wouldn’t have allowed a man to marry multiple wives. According to Torah law, a man is allowed to marry as many women as he wishes. The Ramban therefore argues that there must be reasons “Al Pi Ha’sod” (based on Kabbalistic concepts) why intimate relationships with family members are not allowed. If one has relations with his mother who is also his father’s wife, then he has transgressed two prohibitions – the prohibition against intercourse with one’s mother, and the prohibition against intercourse with one’s father’s wife. This applies even if after the father’s death; intercourse with his wife, who is also one’s mother, transgresses both these prohibitions, since she had been married to the father. The Sages extended this prohibition to include relations with one’s mother’s mother – that is, his maternal grandmother. This enactment applies also to the maternal grandmother’s mother, and her mother, and so on. Likewise, the Sages enacted a prohibition forbidding intercourse with one father’s mother – his paternal grandmother – and her mother, and so on. Intercourse is forbidden also with one’s grandfather’s mother. This prohibition, of course, applies in all places and in all times. One who committed such an act intentionally is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation), and if witnesses saw the violation, then he is liable to Sekila (execution through stoning). If one transgressed this prohibition unintentionally, then he is required to offer a Hatat (sin-offering). In the case of a relationship forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment, one is liable to lashes Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of the Rabbis’ decree).
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:7) commands, “Ervat Abicha…Lo Tegaleh” – that one may not “reveal his father’s nakedness,” a euphemism for intercourse with one’s father. A separate Biblical command, of course, forbids homosexual intercourse, which obviously would include an intimate relationship between a man and his father. The Torah added a separate command forbidding intercourse with one’s father, such that one who commits such an act is liable for two violations. Inserting even just the “Atara” (“crown”) of the organ transgresses this prohibition. This prohibition applies at all times and in all places. A person who intentionally transgressed this prohibition, in the presence of witnesses, is liable to Sekila (execution via stoning). One who transgressed this prohibition unintentionally is required to bring two sin-offerings – one for engaging in relations with his father, and a second for violating the prohibition against homosexual intercourse.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 18:6), “El Kol She’er Besaro Lo Tikrebu Legalot Erva.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, interprets this verse as a command forbidding one to “approach” a woman with whom intercourse is forbidden in a manner that can lead to intercourse. This refers to intimate acts such as hugging and kissing, which can easily result in full intercourse. The Torah says in regard to this and similar prohibitions, “Ve’lo Ta’asu Mi’kol Ha’to’ebot Ha’eleh” – “You shall not commit any of these abominations.” Forbidden acts such as these are considered “To’eba” – an “abomination.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this word to mean that one who engages in such conduct distances himself from all that is good, and causes G-d’s providence to leave him. Moreover, the Torah warns that this conduct is “Ma’aseh Eretz Mitzrayim” – the conduct of the Egyptians – and “Ma’aseh Eretz Kena’an” – the conduct of the Canaanite peoples. The Sifra explains that in these ancient societies, men would marry men, women would marry women, and a woman would marry two men. We are to distance ourselves from such practices, even if they have become accepted in general society. Besides affectionate physical contact with someone with whom relations are forbidden, Halacha also forbids any sort of flirtatious conduct, including gestures such as a wink or a suggestive hand motion. It is forbidden even to approach a woman to smell the perfume she is wearing. Moreover, it is forbidden to gaze at a woman – even a bride at her wedding – with the intention of enjoying her attractive appearance. One is allowed to gaze in this way only at his wife, and this is permitted even when she is a Nidda and thus relations are forbidden. This is permitted when the wife is a Nidda because she will soon immerse whereupon they will reunite, and so it is unlikely that they would engage in intercourse illicitly when it will soon become permissible. However, when one’s wife is a Nidda, he is allowed to look only at those parts of her body that are normally exposed, and not those which are normally covered. One may not look upon a woman’s clothing, even if she is not wearing it, if he knows what she looks like, as this could lead to arousing thoughts. It is forbidden also to send friendly greetings to a married woman, such as to tell someone, “Tell your wife I say hello.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that many people figure that they do not need to observe these restrictions, because they feel confident that such activities will not lead them to forbidden intercourse. They are convinced that engaging in such conduct will not have any effect, and will not arouse desire that could result in sin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that these “guarantees” are made by a person’s evil inclination, and they cannot be trusted. He adds that although the Talmud tells of some Rabbis who came improperly close to women – for example, there was one Rabbi who would carry the bride on his shoulders at weddings – they were allowed to do so because of their exceptionally high spiritual level, due to their constant engagement in Torah study and Misva observance. They were involved in Torah at every moment of the day, and their minds were entirely immersed in sacred matters. As such, they reached the point where such conduct would not affect them in any way. We, however, are very far from this spiritual level, and we must therefore exercise extreme caution to avoid situations which could lead to temptation. When a person experiences temptation, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, he should – as the Gemara teaches – read Shema, learn Torah, or remind himself of his mortality, that the day will come when he will be taken from the world. These measures can help a person overcome temptation and thus avoid wrongdoing. The Torah forbids Yihud – secluding oneself with someone with whom relations are forbidden, except with immediate family members. Later, King David enacted a prohibition against secluding oneself with an unmarried woman. Centuries later, Hillel and Shammai forbade seclusion with a gentile woman. It is permissible to look upon a woman whom one is dating in consideration for marriage. In fact, Halacha forbids marrying a woman without first looking upon her to ensure that he wishes to marry her. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies in all places and in all times, and to both males and females. Just as a man is forbidden from purposely engaging in inappropriate thoughts about women other than his wife, a woman, too, may not engage in inappropriate thoughts about men other than her husband. If one intentionally engaged in affectionate physical contact with someone with whom intercourse is forbidden, in violation of this Biblical command, he is liable to Malkut. If he acted flirtatiously without physical contact, then he transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition, and is liable to lashes Mi’de’rabbanan (as prescribed by the Sages). The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam in this regard, and maintains that all forms of contact other than actual intercourse are forbidden only by force of Rabbinic enactment. In his view, Torah law forbids only actual intercourse, and all safeguards to protect against intercourse were ordained by the Sages. The Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, maintain that even other forms of physical affection are prohibited. It must be emphasized that although our society considers it acceptable for men and women who are not married to one another to “socially” touch, hug or kiss, this is strictly forbidden according to Halacha, and, in the Rambam’s view, this violates a Torah prohibition.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 17:13) commands that when one slaughters a Haya (non-domesticated animal) or a bird, he must cover the blood that spills on the ground as a result of the slaughtering, an act called Kisui Ha’dam. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that it would be cruel to partake of a creature’s flesh while it’s blood, which sustained the creature when it was alive, and thus symbolizes life, is exposed. The blood of a Behema (domesticated animal) does not require covering because these animals are suitable to be offered as sacrifices, and their blood is needed to attain Kappara (atonement) by being sprinkled on the altar. Since the blood of an animal sacrifice cannot be covered, as it is to be sprinkled on the altar, the Torah did not command covering the blood of any Behema, even one which is not being offered as a sacrifice. Although some birds are also offered as sacrifices, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that there are very few birds suitable as sacrifices, and, moreover, animal sacrifices are offered very rarely. The Torah therefore established that the blood of all birds requires covering, since it is in only very rare instances that a bird’s blood is sprinkled on the altar. In introducing this Misva, the Torah speaks of one who hunts a Haya or bird and then slaughters it. At first glance, it might appear that this obligation applies only if one hunts the creature. In truth, however, the blood must be covered even if the animal or bird did not need to be hunted, such as if it came into one’s yard on its own and was trapped there. This Misva applies only to Hulin – meaning, creatures which have not been consecrated as a sacrifice. Once an animal has been consecrated, it does not require Kisui Ha’dam after it is slaughtered. The Sages discussed a creature called a “Koi,” whose status is uncertain; it is unknown whether this creature is classified as a Behema or as a Haya. Therefore, one who slaughters a Koi must cover the blood, in case it is a Haya, but no Beracha is recited, in case it is a Behema and thus does not require Kisui Ha’dam. Kisui Ha’dam must be performed by placing earth both underneath and over the blood spilled during slaughtering. If one observes his fellow slaughter a Haya or a bird without then covering the blood, the observer has an obligation to cover it. The Torah formulates this command by stating, “He spills his blood – he shall then cover it with earth.” The Sages inferred from this verse that the act of covering the blood must resemble the act of spilling the blood, meaning, the act of slaughtering. Just as slaughtering is performed by hand, the Kisui Ha’dam must likewise be performed by hand, and not by kicking dirt with one’s foot over the blood. The Sages viewed this Halacha as establishing the general rule that Misvot must be performed in a manner which shows respect for the Misva, and not in a manner which belittles it (such as kicking dirt). The Misva of Kisui Ha’dam applies in all times – even today – and in all places. It is binding upon both males and females. One who slaughters an animal and fails to cover its blood is in violation of this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 17:1-4) warns that one who slaughters an animal sacrifice outside the Azara (courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash) is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). Interestingly, the Torah does not directly forbid slaughtering a sacrifice outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, but only warns that this act is punishable by Karet. Now there is a general rule that the Torah does not punish without issuing a prohibition forbidding the act for which it warns of punishment. The question thus arises as to how the Torah could warn of punishment for slaughtering a sacrifice outside the Bet Ha’mikdash if it never issued a prohibition against such an act. The Gemara explains that the Torah in a separate context forbids placing a sacrifice on an altar outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, and the offering of a sacrifice on the altar is linked to the slaughtering. As such, the prohibition against placing the sacrifice on the altar outside the Bet Ha’mikdash is extended to forbid slaughtering a sacrifice outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the reason for this Misva is because G-d designated one particular site as the place for the offering of sacrifices, in order for people to be moved and inspired by the awe and sanctity of that site. If it were permissible to offer sacrifices anywhere, then people would have less esteem for the Bet Ha’mikdash, and then the experience of visiting the site would be less impactful. The Torah warns in this context that if one slaughters a sacrifice outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, then “Dam Ye’hasheb Le’ish Ha’hu, Dam Shafach” – “This will be considered like bloodguilt for that person; he has spilled blood.” In a certain sense, this person is guilty of murder. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d allowed killing animals only for our practical needs – such as eating – and for atonement through the offering of sacrifices. Killing an animal for no reason, however, is wrong. Therefore, if a person slaughtered an animal outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, where this is forbidden, then he has shed blood, taking an animal’s life for no valid, constructive purpose. One violates this prohibition and is liable to Karet once he slaughters the sacrifice, even if the animal is later offered on the altar in the Bet Ha’mikdash. This prohibition applies only to animal sacrifices which are suitable to be offered. If an animal is, for whatever, unfit as a sacrifice, then slaughtering it outside the Bet Ha’mikdash does not transgress this prohibition. This prohibition applies in all locations and in all times, even nowadays. If an animal is consecrated as a sacrifice, and somebody slaughters it, he has transgressed this prohibition. If one slaughtered the animal with the intention of transgressing this prohibition, he is liable to Karet, and if he committed the violation unintentionally, then he is required to offered a Korban Hatat (sin-offering).
The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 185 th Biblical command the Misva of the special Yom Kippur service which the Kohen Gadol would perform each year in the Bet Ha’mikdash on Yom Kippur, through which to earn atonement for the Jewish Paople. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this Misva was given as a great act of kindness on G-d’s part, offering us the opportunity to attain forgiveness for our sins through repentance. The Torah commands performing this service each year, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, in order to ensure that our sins do not accumulate to the point where the world will be deserving of destruction. The yearly observance of Yom Kippur is thus vitally important not only for each person individually, but also for the world at large, allowing it to continue existing. The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions in this context the tradition that the notion of an annual day of atonement existed already at the time of creation. In telling of the six days of creation, the Torah concludes its account of each day with the expression, “Va’yehi Ereb, Va’yehi Boker, Yom…” – “It was evening and it was morning, [such-and-such] day.” The days are referred to as “Sheni” (“second”), “Shelishi” (“third”), “Rebi’i” (“fourth”), and so on. The exception is the first day, which is referred to as “Yom Ehad” (“day one”), as opposed to “Yom Rishon” (“the first day”). The Rabbis understood the expression “Yom Ehad” as an allusion to “the singular day,” the special day chosen as the day on which to attain atonement – namely, Yom Kippur. Thus, the notion of Yom Kippur was conceived already at the earliest stages of the world’s creation. Already then, G-d designated Yom Kippur as a day uniquely suited for earning atonement and cleansing ourselves of our misdeeds. The special sacrifices offered on Yom Kippur are in addition to the daily Tamid offering, which involves the offering of a sheep each morning and each afternoon; this sacrifice is offered even on Yom Kippur. Moreover, like every other Yom Tob, the occasion of Yom Kippur requires a Musaf offering. This offering, as the Torah tells us in Parashat Pinhas (Bamidbar 29:8-11), consists of a bull, a ram, seven sheep, and a goat as a Hatat (sin-offering). The meat of a Hatat must be eaten by the Kohanim; in the case of the Hatat brought as part of the Musaf sacrifice on Yom Kippur, the meat obviously cannot be eaten on Yom Kippur, when fasting is required, and so it is eaten at night, after the conclusion of the fast. The special Yom Kippur sacrifices include a personal offering brought by the Kohen Gadol with his money: a bull as a Hatat, which is entirely burnt, and a ram offered as an Ola (burnt-offering). Additionally, the Kohen Gadol offers on behalf of the nation (from public funds) two goats – one which is sacrificed as a Hatat, and another which is sent to the desert and killed there (“Sa’ir La’azazel”). A ram as an Ola is also offered on the nation’s behalf. Altogether, excluding the goat sent to the desert, fifteen different sacrifices are offered on Yom Kippur. All Avodot (services) performed in the Bet Ha’mikdash on Yom Kippur must be performed specifically by the Kohen Gadol. A special Halacha requires the Kohen Gadol to be married in order to perform the Yom Kippur service. This Misva, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that nowadays, we conduct the Yom Kippur service through prayers and supplications, humbly begging G-d for forgiveness, and these prayers are offered in lieu of the special atonement sacrifices which we are presently unable to offer.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ahareh-Mot (Vayikra 16:2) that the Kohen Gadol is forbidden from entering the Kodesh Ha’kodashim (inner sanctum of the Bet Ha’mikdash) except when this is required as part of the Yom Kippur service. This verse introduces a prohibition forbidding entering the Bet Ha’mikdash when not performing the Aboda (service). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command was issued to ensure that we maintain proper respect and reverence for the sacred domain of the Bet Ha’mikdash. If it would be permissible to enter the Bet Ha’mikdash whenever one wished, for whatever reason, then we would not regard the site with the esteem and awe that it deserves. The Kohen Gadol enters the Kodesh Ha’kodashim four times over the course of the special Yom Kippur service. If he enters that area even once unnecessarily, he has violated this command and is liable to capital punishment. The Rambam maintains that a Kohen is liable to capital punishment only if he enters the Kodesh Ha’kodashim; if a Kohen enters the Hechal – the other section of the interior of the Bet Ha’mikdash – unnecessarily, then he is liable to Malkut, not capital punishment. Furthermore, the Rambam maintains that this prohibition forbids entering the Bet Ha’mikdash for any purpose other than performing the Aboda. Even if a Kohen enters the Bet Ha’mikdash to bow, he is, according to the Rambam, liable to Malkut, even though he came in for a constructive purpose. Since the Kohen did not enter the Bet Ha’mikdash to perform the Aboda, he has violated this prohibition. The Ramban disagrees, maintaining that this prohibition forbids only entering the Bet Ha’mikdash for no reason at all. According to the Ramban, if a Kohen enters the Bet Ha’mikdash to bow, then he is not in violation of this command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies even nowadays, when there is no Bet Ha’mikdash, forbidding us from treading on the site where the Bet Ha’mikdash stood. The Torah warns in Parashat Behukotai (Vayikra 26:31), “Va’hashimoti Et Mikdeshechem” – “I shall lay your Temples desolate,” implying that the area is still considered “Mikdeshechem” – a sacred site – after its destruction. Therefore, even nowadays, the site is sacred, and it is thus forbidden to enter the area, since we obviously are not offering sacrifices. Even if we could divest ourselves of our status of Tum’a (impurity), it would still be forbidden to enter the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash due to the prohibition against entering the site unnecessarily.
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 15:26-29) discusses the process of purification that a woman must undergo after becoming a “Zaba Gedola.” The status of Zaba Gedola is attained when a woman experiences bleeding for three consecutive days during the time of month when menstruation is not expected, such that this bleeding signifies some form of illness. After seven days without experiencing any bleeding, the woman brings a sacrifice – specifically, two birds – and is then considered Tehora (pure). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this sacrifice as the 183 rd Biblical command. The Torah requires also a “Zab” – a man who experiences an unusual bodily discharge – to bring this same sacrifice as part of his purification process. Interestingly, the Rambam lists these two sacrifices – that of the Zab, and that of the Zaba Gedola – as two separate Misvot, even though they are identical, and they are brought for the same reason. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that these are counted as separate Misvot because these two statuses of Tum’a (impurity) are very different from one another. A woman becomes a Zaba as a result of a flow of blood, whereas a man becomes a Zab as a result of an unusual white discharge. Since these two phenomena differ significantly from one another, the Rambam lists the sacrifices required of a Zab and a Zaba as distinct Misvot. This is in contrast to the sacrifice required by a Mesora as part of his or her purification process. A man and woman, quite obviously, experience Sara’at identically, and thus a male Mesora’s sacrifice and a female Mesora’s sacrifice are considered a single Misva. But the statuses of Zab and Zaba result from two entirely different biological phenomena, and the Rambam therefore lists these sacrifices as separate Misvot. This Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. A woman who became a Zaba Gedola and failed to offer the purification sacrifice has violated this affirmative command. She also retains her status of Tum’a, and it thus remains forbidden for her to partake of hallowed food and to enter the site of the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 15:25) assigns a status of Tum’a (impurity) to a “Zaba” – to a woman who experiences menstrual bleeding “Be’lo Et Nidatah” – during a time in the month other than the time when normal menstruation is meant to occur. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that such bleeding signifies the presence of a contagious illness, and the Torah therefore commands that a Zaba is impure, so that people will keep a distance from here and thereby avoid exposure to this ailment. A woman becomes a Zaba is she experiences bleeding during the eleven days following the seven-day Nidda period. When a woman experiences regular menstrual bleeding, and thus becomes a Nidda, she may, according to Torah law, immerse after the seventh day – as long as the bleeding has ceased – and she then becomes Tehora (pure). During the eleven days following this seven-day period, any bleeding that occurs renders the woman a Zaba. If this occurs only once, then she is considered a “Zaba Ketana,” which means she is impure only through the following day (“Shomeret Yom Ke’neged Yom”). She may immerse the following day, and she is then considered Tehora. If the bleeding occurs for two days, then she is Teme’a (impure) through the third day. If, however, the bleeding occurs for three consecutive days, then she is considered a “Zaba Gedola,” and remains Teme’a until she completes a period of “Shiba Nekiyim” (“seven clean days”) – meaning, seven days during which she experiences no bleeding at all. If she bleeds after this period, then she becomes a Nidda, and the cycle begins anew. The Torah commands the woman to count the “seven clean days” (“Ve’safera Lah”), just as it commands counting the forty-nine days of the Omer period each year. However, the Ramban writes that unlike Sefirat Ha’omer, which requires verbally counting the number each day, a Zaba is not obligated to make a formal, verbal counting each day of the “Shiba Nekiyim.” Rather, she needs simply to keep track of the days so she knows when this period concludes. Tosafot, however, seem to have held a different position. In Masechet Ketubot, Tosafot raise the question of why a woman does not recite a Beracha when counting each day of the “Shiba Nekiyim,” just as we recite a Beracha each day of the Omer period. Tosafot answer that the woman might subsequently experience bleeding, thereby voiding the count to this point and necessitating the beginning of a new count, in which case the Berachot she had recited will turn out to have been recited in vain. This entire discussion, seemingly, reflects the perspective that a Zaba’s counting resembles Sefirat Ha’omer, and requires a formal, verbal counting, in contradistinction to the Ramban’s position. Nowadays, in order to avoid confusion, women observe a period of “Shiba Nekiyim” regardless of when or for how long bleeding occurs, and they abstain from marital relations until they immerse in a Mikveh following a period of “seven clean days.” This practice is mentioned already by the Gemara in Masechet Shabbat, which states that women took on the custom to observe “Shiba Nekiyim” even if they saw only “a drop of blood like a mustard seed.” No distinction is drawn between bleeding during the times when menstruation is expected, and bleeding during the subsequent eleven days; regardless, women observe a period of “Shiba Nekiyim” before immersing and regaining their status of Tahara (purity).
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 15:19) establishes that a woman who experiences menstrual bleeding is considered Teme’a (impure) for a period of seven days. During this period, anything she touches becomes impure, and, like all Teme’im (individuals with impurity), she is forbidden from entering the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash and from partaking of hallowed food. Intriguingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch chose not to elaborate in his discussion of this Misva, and simply cites the source verse, and notes that this command applies in all places and in all times. A woman who fails to follow the Torah’s guidelines relevant to the status of impurity assigned to a Nidda (woman who experienced menstruation) is in violation of this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 15:16) establishes that a man who experiences a seminal discharge is considered Tameh (impure), such that he may not enter the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash or partake of hallowed food (such as sacrifices). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that such a discharge occurs only as a result of base, physical desires, and the Torah wanted to convey the message that we are to moderate our involvement in physical pleasures, and avoid excessive preoccupation with such activity. To that end, the Torah assigned a status of impurity to a man who experienced a seminal emission, showing us that we must limit our involvement in physical pleasures, and focus our attention instead on the study of Torah and the service of G-d. A man becomes Tameh after the emission of even a single drop. He himself becomes Tameh, and also anybody who touches the discharge becomes Tameh. A seminal emission brings impurity regardless of whether it occurred intentionally or unintentionally, during sleep. The only exception is when the man did not feel any sensation when the discharge occurred, neither at the beginning nor at the end of the emission; in such a case, the individual does not become impure. If a man had arousing thoughts during the day, and then at night he dreamt about having intercourse, then he must assume that he experienced an emission, even if there is no indication of discharge in the morning. He most likely experienced an emission and the substance was absorbed by his garments or bedding, and so he is considered Tameh. This Halacha applies in all places and at all times, even nowadays. In our time, however, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, there is no practical application of this Halacha, as in any event we do not go to the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash or partake of sacrifices. Ezra – the religious leader at the time of the beginning of the Second Commonwealth – enacted a law forbidding one who experienced a seminal discharge from praying or studying Torah until he immerses in a Mikveh, or until he has nine Kabim (approximately 12 liters) of water poured on him (like a shower). This provision was enacted in order for people to maintain a high standard of purity, and so that husbands and wives would not excessively engage in marital relations. During Ezra’s time, people observed this law, and men immersed in a Mikveh each time they experienced an emission. Later, however, as the Gemara discusses in Masechet Berachot, the Rabbis realized that this requirement was too difficult for the masses to observe, and so it was annulled. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is a “Mida Toba U’meshubahat” – “a good and praiseworthy measure” – to observe Ezra’s enactment and immerse after experiencing a seminal emission. Likewise, the Rambam famously wrote in a letter that although immersing after experiencing an emission is not Halachically required, nevertheless, he made a point of observing Ezra’s enactment, and never missed a single immersion. Thus, although there is certainly no requirement for a man to immerse after experiencing an emission, it is proper for one who can to immerse from time to time in order to maintain a higher level of Kedusha.
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 15:2) assigns a status of Tum’a (impurity) to a “Zav” – a man who experiences an unusual bodily discharge. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this discharge differs from seminal emissions, as it leaves the body without the man experiencing desire or pleasure. He adds that this discharge resembles the water used when producing barley dough. A man who experiences such a discharge – even just a single drop – on two occasions has the status of a Zav, and is considered impure. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this status of impurity as the 178 th Biblical command. Any surface that a Zav sits on, lies upon, or rides (such as a saddle) during his period of impurity becomes Tameh. The Sefer Ha’hinuch posits that the Torah established this status of Tum’a because this unusual discharge can result from overindulgence in food. Although we are certainly entitled and encouraged to eat as necessary to maintain our health and strength, we are to avoid excessive indulgence in physical enjoyment. The Torah therefore assigned a status of Tum’a to one who experiences the effects of overindulgence, to convey the message that he must moderate his food intake and not inappropriately indulge. This law applies in all places and at all times, even nowadays, though in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, this status has no practical relevance, as we in any event do not go to the Bet Ha’mikdash or eat hallowed food. In the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, a man who experienced such a discharge and went to the sacred domain of the Mikdash, or partook of hallowed food, would be in violation of this affirmative command. The Torah later (15:13) commands that if a man experiences such an emission three times, then in order to regain his state of purity, he must not only immerse in a Mikveh, but also bring special sacrifices. These sacrifices are to be offered on the eighth day after experiencing these emissions. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the offering of these sacrifices as the 179 th Biblical command. The Zav is required to offer two birds – one as a Hatat (sin offering) and the other as an Ola (burnt offering). Even after the Zav immerses in a Mikveh, he remains Tameh until these sacrifices are offered. His interim status until the sacrifices are offered is called “Mehusar Kapara.” There is an exceptional Halacha allowing the required sacrifices to be offered on behalf of a “Mehusar Kapara” even without him knowing. Generally speaking, a sacrifice must be offered by the individual willingly, with his knowledge. However, in a situation where the Torah requires bringing a sacrifice to complete the process of purification, once the individual designates the animals as his sacrifice, they may be offered on his behalf even without his knowledge, and he is then considered Tahor (pure). The Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953) explains this unique Halacha based on the principle of “Zachin Le’adam She’lo Be’fanav” – an acquisition may be made on a person’s behalf without his knowledge, if this is to his benefit. Since the offering of these sacrifices is clearly to the individual’s benefit, they may be offered even without his knowledge. This Misva, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. If a man experiences three emissions that render him a Zav and require him to offer these sacrifices, and he fails to do so, then he has violated this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (14:35) addresses the situation of “Nigeh Batim” – discolorations that appear on the walls of a person’s home. It commands such a person to approach a Kohen, and inform him that there is a suspected Sara’at affliction in his home. The Kohen then comes to the house to inspect the discoloration. The Torah presents a series of guidelines that must be followed depending on the nature of the affliction on the wall. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d would bring an affliction upon a person’s house as a relatively mild punishment, before bringing more severe afflictions. In His infinite compassion, G-d would first strike a person’s home to alert him of the need to repent and improve his conduct. If the person failed to repent, then G-d would bring a Sara’at affliction upon his garments, and if he continued to persist in his wrongful conduct, then G-d would bring the most severe affliction – bodily Sara’at, which surfaces on the individual’s skin. G-d never wishes to bring punishment, and He does so only for the purpose of awakening the person to repent. If the person fails to heed the call, then more severe measures are needed in order to arouse him to repent. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, G-d would bring Sara’at upon a home for the person’s benefit, so he would discover treasures hidden behind the walls. The Emorim, who inhabited the Land of Israel before Beneh Yisrael, would hide their treasures inside their walls. G-d would therefore afflict the home, thus requiring the walls to be dismantled, and the person – who might at first lament having to dismantle house – would discover the hidden treasures and instantly become wealthy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d could have shown the people these treasures through some other means, such as by sending a prophet to inform them of the hidden treasures, but G-d always prefers following the laws of nature, and minimizing miracles. He thus arranged that people would need to dismantle their homes and discover the treasures in the process. In order for a house to be declared afflicted with Nigeh Batim, there must be two adjacent discolorations, twice the size of a Geris (a certain type of bean). If the discoloration is very dark green, or very dark red, then the house is immediately declared to be afflicted with Sara’at. Likewise, if the discoloration spreads after the Kohen’s initial inspection, the home is declared to have Sara’at. The Torah writes that a person who sees a suspected Sara’at affliction in his home must approach a Kohen and state, “Ke’nega Nir’a Li Ba’bayit” – “The likeness of an affliction appeared to me in my home.” The Sages understood from the word “Ke’nega” (“The likeness of an affliction”) that even if the homeowner is learned, and proficient in the laws of Sara’at, he may not make a definitive ruling about the discoloration in his home. This ruling is issued only by a Kohen, and so even if the homeowner knows with certainty that the discoloration he sees qualifies as Sara’at, he must not speak in definitive terms, and should instead tell the Kohen that he sees “Ke’nega,” something resembling a Sara’at affliction. A house without windows is not subject to the laws of Sara’at Ha’bayit. This is inferred from the homeowner’s statement to the Kohen, “Ke’nega Nir’a Li” – that the affliction is “seen to me,” implying that he sees without any illumination (in the Sages’ words, “Li Ve’lo Le’ori”). This indicates that the discoloration must be visible without a candle, with only sunlight, and thus the home must have windows in order to be declared as having a Sara’at affliction. The house must be at least four square Amot, contain four walls, and be made from either stone or wood; a house made from marble is not subject to the laws of Nigeh Batim. It must also stand on the ground, and thus a treehouse, for example, is not subject to the laws of Nigeh Batim. The Torah introduces this subject by speaking of a Sara’at affliction “Be’bet Eretz Ahuzatchem” – “in a house in the land of your inheritance,” indicating that only homes in Eretz Yisrael are subject to these laws. A house outside the Land of Israel cannot be declared afflicted with Sara’at. Furthermore, the Talmud establishes that these laws do not apply to homes in the city of Jerusalem, because Jerusalem was not allotted to any particular tribe (“Lo Nit’haleka Li’shbatim”), and was thus considered in a sense shared by the entire nation. The command to follow the procedures relevant to Nigeh Batim applies to both male and female homeowners, and only in times when there are Kohanim proficient in these laws and thus capable of issuing rulings to determine the status of discolorations. The aforementioned verse, “Ke’nega Nir’a Li Ba’bayit,” has been understood as conveying an important lesson about Emuna (faith). Anytime we experience any sort of hardship, we must trust that the difficulty we face is only “Ke’nega” – “the likeness of an affliction,” something which appears as a misfortune, but which is actually to our benefit. We must remember that everything Hashem does, even that which causes hardship, is actually a blessing. Indeed, the word “Nega” (“affliction”) has the same letters as “Oneg” – “delight,” teaching us that there is a hidden blessing latent within every difficult situation. This is the message of the hidden treasures within the walls – the homeowner initially bemoans his misfortune, having to take down his house, but this ultimately leads him to great fortune. This concept can be understood in light of an incident that occurred a number of years ago when a fellow was arrested by the police and badly beaten. The fellow sued the police, and they were found guilty of unjustly beating him. They reached a settlement, amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars. A calculation was made that this fellow received $20,000 for every blow that he suffered. In an interview, the man joked that he wished the police beat him even more, because he would then have become even wealthier… This humorous remark may be seen as illustrative of the message of the hidden treasures inside the walls that are stricken with Sara’at. Everything Hashem does is a blessing, though often it is disguised as “beatings” and misfortune. Even when Hashem punishes us, He punishes us as a loving father, hoping to steer us in the right direction. And thus we learn from the Misva of Nigeh Batim to always view every seeming misfortune as “Ke’nega” – something resembling an “affliction,” but which is, in truth, to our ultimate benefit.
The Torah in Parashat Mesora outlines the procedure required of a Mesora in order for him to complete his process of purification. Even after undergoing the first stage (a ceremony involving two birds and other items, and immersing in Mikveh), the Mesora must then complete the process by bringing a series of Korbanot (sacrifices) to the Bet Ha’mikdash. Specifically, he must bring three animals – one as a Hatat (sin offering), the second as an Ola (burnt offering), and the third as an Asham (guilt offering). If the Mesora is poor and cannot afford three animals, then he brings an animal as an Asham and two birds for the Hatat and Ola. In addition, the Mesora must bring a flour offering and some oil. The Mesora retains his status of Tum’a (impurity) until he completes the offering of these sacrifices. In previous contexts, the Sefer Ha’hinuch presented his approach to explain the meaning underlying Korbanot. The animal sacrifice, he writes, represents the animalistic tendencies within the human being, which lead us to sin. Thus, the sacrificing of an animal signifies the need to sacrifice our negative impulses, to try to eliminate the “animal” within us and empower the spiritual component of our beings. When the Mesora brings these offerings to the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Asham sacrifice is slaughtered first. One Kohen sprinkles some of the blood on the altar, and a second Kohen take some blood and places it on three spots on the Mesora’s body: his right earlobe, his right thumb, and his right big toe. The Hatat and Ola are then slaughtered, after which one of the Kohanim pours the oil brought by the Mesora into the other Kohen’s left hand. The first Kohen then dips a finger from his right hand into the oil in his fellow Kohen’s hand, and applies some oil onto the three spots on the Mesora’s body where blood from the Asham was placed. The leftover oil is then smeared on the Mesora’s head. If some oil remains, it is given to the Kohanim, who may consume the oil in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash, just like other Kodasheh Kodashim (sacrifices of a higher level of sanctity). The Gemara addresses a simple dilemma that presents itself regarding this process. As the Mesora remains Tameh until these sacrifices are offered, he is not permitted to enter the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash. How, then, can the blood of the sacrifice and the oil be placed on his earlobe, thumb and toe, if he is not permitted in the area where this service is being performed? The Gemara answers that there was a gate into the Kodesh (sacred domain) called Sha’ar Nikanor, and that entranceway was intentionally not endowed with halachic sanctity so that the Mesora could stand there as his sacrifices are offered. From that spot, he would thrust his head, hand and foot inside the Kodesh so that the blood and oil could be placed on the required spots. This is allowed, the Gemara explains, because “Miksat Bi’a Lav Shemeh Bi’a” – putting a small part of one’s body in the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash is not considered entering the sacred domain. Somebody in a state of impurity may not bring his entire body, or the majority of his body, into the sacred domain, but he may put a small part of his body – such as his head, a hand or a foot – into that area. Therefore, the Mesora was allowed to remain outside the Temple courtyard and then thrust inside his head, hand and foot to receive the blood and oil. The Gemara also brings a second opinion explaining, very simply, that the Torah gave the Mesora a special dispensation, allowing him to thrust his head, hand and foot into the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash for the purpose of this procedure. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this procedure is required of any Mesora, male or female. A Mesora who fails to offer these sacrifices and undergo this process has transgressed this affirmative command. The Torah imposes these obligations upon the Mesora because of his sin Lashon Ha’ra – negative speech about other people. The lengthy, intricate process required of a Mesora should serve as a reminder to us of the special severity of this violation, and the importance of exercising caution when speaking about other people, and ensuring to avoid forbidden speech.
In discussing the process of purification undergone by a Mesora (person stricken with Sara’at), the Torah in Parashat Mesora instructs that the Mesora must immerse in water in order to regain his status of purity (“Ve’rahatz Et Besaro Ba’mayim Ve’taher” – Vayikra 14:9). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this instruction as one of the 613 Biblical commands, establishing that immersion is required for one to become Tahor (pure) after having become Tameh (impure). The Rambam writes that a person who had become Tameh is not obligated to purify himself by immersing in a Mikveh; if he wishes, he may remain Tameh. It is only if he wishes to enter the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash or eat hallowed food that he is required to divest himself of his impure status through immersion. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that pious individuals ensure to purify themselves and eliminate their status of Tum’a, because, in his words, “impurity is repulsive and purity is beloved.” As for the reason behind the concept of immersion as means of attaining purity, the Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two explanations. First, he writes, the Mikveh symbolizes the world in its incipient stages, at the beginning of creation, when it was filled with water. The impure individual is to see himself as being created anew, and thus he immerses in water and then emerges, just like the world was filled with water and then took shape. This sense of “re-creation” is to inspire the individual to begin a new chapter by breaking his bad habits and improving his conduct. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the immersion in a Mikveh represents a process of cleansing, and the experience is intended to motivate the person to “cleanse” himself spiritually through introspection and repentance. The Sages understood this verse in Parashat Mesora – “He shall bathe his flesh in water” – as indicating that one must immerse in an amount of water that covers the entire body. This amount has been determined by the Sages to be 40 Se’a of water. According to the opinion of Rav Haim Naeh (1890-1954), this equals 87.65 gallons. However, the Torah allows immersing also in a Ma’ayan – a natural fountain or spring – regardless of the quantity of water. As long as one’s body is entirely covered by the water of the Ma’ayan, the immersion is valid. As far as Torah law is concerned, “Mayim She’ubim” – rainwater which had been transferred from the place where it had initially fallen – may be used for immersion. However, the Sages enacted that any water which had been drawn with a utensil may not be used for a Mikveh. Even if rain fell into a utensil and it overflowed into a Mikveh, that water is invalid for immersion. Nowadays, in order to avoid the disqualification of “Mayim She’ubim,” there are two methods that are used in constructing Mikavot. One is called “Hazra’a,” whereby a cistern is filled directly with at least 40 Se’a of rainwater, and alongside it there is a Mikveh, with a hole in the wall between the cistern and the Mikveh. Then, water is added to the cistern containing rainwater, such that the water overflows through the hole into the adjoining Mikveh. Halacha allows adding “Mayim She’ubim” to a Mikveh once it had been filled with 40 Se’a of rainwater, and thus the overflow into the adjoining Mikveh is suitable for immersion. The second method is called “Hashaka,” whereby a cistern is filled with 40 Se’a of rainwater, and the adjoining Mikveh is filled with regular tap water. A hole is drilled through the shared wall, such that the two bodies of water are touching each other. Since the tap water in the Mikveh is touching the pure rainwater in the adjoining cistern, it is suitable for immersion. Many Mikvaot employ both methods, as each has certain Halachic advantages. A person who requires Tebila (immersion) must immerse without clothing. If a person immersed while wearing clothing, then the immersion is nevertheless valid, as long as the clothing was loose, such that the water came in direct contact with his or her entire body. Immersion must be performed during the day, except in the case of a Nidda (a woman who became impure as a result of menstrual bleeding) and a Yoledet (woman who became impure as a result of childbirth), who immerse specifically during the nighttime hours. All those who are impure and require immersion may immerse in either a Mikveh or a Ma’ayan, except for a Zab (man who experienced an unusual discharge), who must immerse specifically in a Ma’ayan. Substances on the body which obstruct the water are called “Hasisot,” and, under certain circumstances, invalidate the immersion. As far as Torah law is concerned, Hasisot invalidate the immersion only if they cover the majority of the body, and are substances which people generally do not want and make a point of removing. The Rabbis, however, extended this Halacha to require removing before immersion any Hasisa that one normally makes a point of removing, regardless of its size. This Misva applies in all times and in all places, and to both men and women. If a person became Tameh and fails to immerse in a Mikveh, and he then goes to the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash, he has neglected this affirmative command.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra 14:9) that on the seventh day of the process of a Mesora’s purification, he must remove all the hair on his head and his body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah requires a Mesora to remove his hair so that he resembles a newborn baby, as infants are generally born without hair. The Mesora is to view himself as being “born” anew, as embarking on a new beginning, such that he will now improve his conduct and henceforth and abandon the wrongdoing that led to his becoming a Mesora. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, after a person’s hair is removed, his body is especially clean, as dirt and grime collect in hair. Thus, the removal of the Mesora’s hair symbolizes cleanliness and purity, and he will be moved to cleanse his soul by repenting and refraining from improper conduct henceforth. This Misva requires the Mesora to remove all the hair from his head, beard and body, including his underarms and private areas. The Gemara establishes that he must remove all his hair until he resembles a “Dala’at” (pumpkin), which is completely smooth without any hair. The hair must be removed with a razor – even the hair of the Mesora’s beard, which normally may not be removed with a razor. The affirmative command requiring a Mesora to remove his hair overrides the prohibition against shaving one’s beard with a razor, and so even the Mesora’s facial hair must be removed with a razor. If even two hairs remain on the Mesora’s body, he has not fulfilled his obligation. In the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, “Lo Asa Kelum” – the Mesora has “done nothing” if even two hairs remain. This obligation is binding upon both men and women who become a Mesora, and in all places. It applies only when there are Kohanim who are proficient in the laws of Sara’at and thus capable of declaring a person a Mesora. A person who was declared a Mesora and failed to follow this procedure has violated this affirmative command, and remains Tameh (impure).
The Torah in Parashat Mesora (Vayikra, chapter 14) outlines the procedure that must be followed by a Mesora – a person who was stricken with bodily Sara’at (leprosy) – upon being cured of the condition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes in this context that we find in the Torah three different methods of purification for various categories of impurity. The first method is immersion in a Mikveh, which is shared by all forms of Tum’a (impurity); the purification from any type of Tum’a includes immersion. The second method is sprinkling with the special waters prepared with the ashes of the Para Aduma (red heifer), which is required specifically for purification from Tum’at Met – the impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse. The third method is the special process required of a Mesora to divest himself of his impure status. As will soon be explained, this process involves a piece of cedar wood, hyssop, a crimson string, and two birds. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the cedar – an especially tall tree – symbolizes arrogance, whereas hyssop represents humility. The Mesora is shown that his Sara’at resulted from his hubris, and he must now humble himself like a lowly bundle of hyssop. The string is colored with dye extracted from a Tola’at (worm) – yet another symbol of humility. The process includes birds, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, to symbolize the Mesora’s inappropriate “chirping” – his reckless, wanton speech, specifically, his having spoken Lashon Ha’ra (negative speech about people), for which he was punished with Sara’at. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here offers an insightful explanation for the meaning of the Mikveh as a means of purification. He notes that in the incipient stages of the world’s creation, water filled the entire earth. And thus, when a person immerses in a Mikveh and then emerges, he is to regard himself as having been created anew – just like the world was filled with water and then emerged as a new creation. Now that he has been “recreated,” he is to embark on a new, fresh beginning, breaking bad habits and putting himself on the path of proper conduct. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, one must immerse in a Mikveh dug into the ground, and not in water which was drawn and placed in a utensil, such as a bathtub. The Tameh (impure individual) is to experience the state of the earth at the dawn of creation, as though the earth itself is filled with water. The process of a Mesora’s purification begins with slaughtering the nicer of the two birds over an earthenware utensil containing water drawn from a natural spring, such that the blood falls into the water. A furrow is then dug in the ground, where the slaughtered bird is buried. Then, the Kohen takes a piece of cedar that is at least one Ama long, and the width of one-quarter the width of a bedpost, along with with a crimson string that weighs approximately one shekel. These are tied together with the hyssop and the live bird, and they are all dipped into the water with the slaughtered bird’s blood. The water is sprinkled seven times on the back of the Mesora’s hand, and the bird is then released. All this must be done during the daytime (as opposed to the nighttime), and by a Kohen. After this stage of the process, the Mesora must remove all the hair from his entire body, including his underarms and private areas. He immerses his clothing in a Mikveh, and he himself immerses, as well. The Mesora remains Tameh for an additional seven days, during which marital relations are forbidden. On the seventh day, he removes whatever hair had grown in the interim, and again immerses himself and his garments. At this point, he is allowed to eat Ma’aser Sheni (produce separated as the tithe to be brought to Jerusalem), but (if he is a Kohen) he is not yet permitted to partake of Teruma (the hallowed portion of food given to a Kohen). On the next day – the eighth day of the process – he brings special sacrifices, after which his purification process is complete. This Misva applies to both men and women who had been stricken with Sara’at, and in all places. It applies only when there are Kohanim with proficiency in the laws of Sara’at and who are thus able to declare a person a Mesora. One who was stricken with Sara’at and fails to follow this procedure has violated an affirmative Biblical command.
The Torah in Parashat Tazria (13) establishes the procedures that must be followed in the case of “Sara’at Ha’beged” – a form of Sara’at (“leprosy”) that affects garments and other cloth materials. The Sefer Ha’hinuch counts following these procedures as the 172 nd of the Torah’s 613 Biblical commands. Explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d sometimes brings punishment upon a person the way a parent occasionally must punish a child. The punishment is done not out of vengeance or a desire to inflict harm, but rather out of love, so that the child will learn how to behave properly. In His infinite kindness, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, G-d would bring Sara’at infections upon a person’s garment in order that he will recognize this supernatural phenomenon, repent, and thus avoid more severe punishment. The sudden discoloration of garments is clearly miraculous, and does not occur naturally. The garment’s owner will thus understand that G-d is warning him to repent, before He brings upon him the more grievous form of Sara’at – that which afflicts a person’s body. G-d lovingly would cause this to occur as a “wakeup call,” to inspire the individual to repent. Materials are determined to have this form of Sara’at only if they are made from either wool or linen; garments from other materials are not subject to the laws of Sara’at Ha’beged. The garment is considered stricken with Sara’at only if the discoloration is at least the size of a “Geris” (a type of small bean). If the discoloration is “Yerakrak” – a sharp green – or “Adamdam” – a sharp red – then the garment is confirmed stricken with Sara’at, and must be burned. If the garment’s status could not initially be confirmed, and a follow-up inspection was required after a waiting period, then the garment is confirmed to have Sara’at if the discoloration spread in the interim. These Halachot apply not only to garments, but to all cloth materials that are susceptible to Tum’at Met (the impurity resulting from contact with a human corpse) and Tum’at Sheretz (the impurity resulting from contact with one of the eight impure rodents). These include curtains and cloth coverings of Sifreh Torah that are made from wool or linen. All such materials are subject to the laws of Sara’at Ha’beged. These Halachot apply to the garments of both men and women, and in times when there were Kohanim proficient in the laws of Sara’at and thus capable of determining the status of suspected Sara’at infections. One who has a garment on which signs of Sara’at have appeared but neglects to follow the Torah’s guidelines has transgressed this affirmative command.
The Torah commands in Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 13:45) that a Mesora – a person who has been confirmed to have a Sara’at skin infection – is required to tear his garments and let his hair grow. The Sifra adds that other Teme’im (people with impurity), such as those who came in contact with a human corpse or experienced certain bodily emissions, are required to announce their status so that people know to keep a distance and thus avoid becoming Tameh (impure). A Mesora, however, has an additional requirement to publicize his status by wearing torn garments and allowing his hair to grow, besides announcing that he is Tameh. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah imposed this obligation upon the Mesora so that he will reflect upon the fact that he is isolated from people due to his misdeeds, on account of which he was stricken with Sara’at. Socialization is one of the basic joys of life which we naturally desire, and this joy is denied to the Mesora because of his wrongdoing. The Torah therefore requires the Mesora to publicize his mandated state of isolation so that he will recognize his sins and repent. Furthermore, the Midrash teaches that Sara’at would befall a person due to the sin of Lashon Ha’ra – spreading negative information about people. The Torah requires the Mesora to live in isolation “Midda Ke’negged Midda” (“measure for measure”): as he caused relationships between people to break through spreading negative information, he is forced to live in isolation. Disseminating unflattering information about people has the result of causing friction between husband and wife, and between friends, and thus, appropriately, the Mesora is required to live alone, away from society. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes in this context that when we speak about G-d punishing people “Midda Ke’negged Midda,” this must not be misunderstood as indicating that G-d is vengeful, Heaven forbid. This is not about G-d seeking to vent His anger and avenging sin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d embodies the ultimate goodness and kindness, and His blessing is constantly descending from the heavens. However, we are able to receive these blessings only if we conduct ourselves properly. We need the “vessels” to contain these blessings, and if we act wrongly, then we do not have the “vessels” to receive G-d’s blessings. The Sefer Ha’hinuch draws an analogy to a person who is walking along a road, alongside which are prickly thorn bushes. If the person decides to walk on the edge of the road instead of the middle of the road, and he gets scratched by the thorns, he has nobody to blame but himself. This cannot be blamed on G-d, because it was the pedestrian’s irresponsible conduct that caused his injury. Similarly, when a person suffers punishment for his sins, this is not actually G-d punishing the individual, but rather his wrongdoing which harms him by denying him the ability to receive G-d’s blessing. The obligations to rend garments and allow one’s hair to grow apply to a “Muhlat” – a person who has been confirmed as a Mesora. A “Musgar” – someone who after the initial inspection by a Kohen must observe a waiting period before his status can be conclusively determined – is not required to tear his clothing or let his hair grow. One who has been confirmed as a Mesora, and is then cured of his Sara’at, removes all his hair as part of his purification process. This Misva applies only when there are Kohanim with proficiency in the laws of Negaim (Sara’at infections) who can issue rulings to determine the status of a discoloration on a person’s skin. One who has been determined to be a Mesora and neglects to rend his garments or let his hair grow transgresses this affirmative command. The word “Musgar” (from the root “S.G.R.” – “closed”) is generally understood to mean that the individual is “closed off” from society, as he must be quarantined until his status is confirmed. However, Rav Yehonatan Eibshutz (1690-1764) offers a different explanation, suggesting that this term refers to the closing of the gates of heaven. If a person misuses his mouth for sinful purposes, Rav Eibshutz explains, then his mouth is tainted, and thus his prayers are ineffective. As the individual stricken with Sara’at had sinned with his mouth, by speaking Lashon Ha’ra, the heavens are “closed” with respect to his prayers, and they cannot ascend to G-d. For this reason, the Mesora must ask other people to pray on his behalf – because he is incapable of praying for himself. This concept is alluded to in a verse in the Book of Bamidbar (30:3), where the Torah commands, “…he shall not defile his speech; he shall do in accordance with all that leaves his mouth.” This has been explained to mean that if a person does not defile his speech, then G-d will do “in accordance with all that leaves his mouth” – He will answer his prayers and fulfill his requests. But if a person defiles his mouth through forbidden speech, then his prayers are ineffective. This might also be the reason why we begin the Yom Kippur service with “Kal Nidreh,” declaring the annulment of our vows and asking forgiveness for sins involving speech. As we prepare to spend the majority of the next twenty-five hours praying and begging for forgiveness, we must first seek atonement for sins involving speech, so that our mouths will be pure and thus our prayers will be able to rise and reach the heavens.
One of the forms of Sara’at (“leprosy”) is called “Netek,” and it manifests itself through the unexplained loss of hair in an area of one’s head of beard. If two yellow hairs grow in the middle of the bald spot that had formed, then the person is declared to have “Netek.” The Torah in Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 13:33) forbids removing these two yellow hairs (“Ve’et Ha’netek Lo Yegale’ah”). A person who experiences this condition is not permitted to remove the hairs in order to avoid being declared a Mesora (person stricken with Sara’at), and must instead follow the procedures required of a person who is determined to have Sara’at. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command to teach that we must humbly endure punishments which G-d brings upon us, without trying to resist it or thinking that we can somehow prevent G-d’s plan from materializing. The person who experiences a “Netek” infection must accept his condition, and not think that he can escape G-d’s punishment by removing the bodily signs of this status. When a person experiences any sort of malady or other hardship, his response must be to humbly beg G-d for forgiveness and assistance, and not to try to “outsmart” the divine decree. This command applies to both and women, and in all places, but only in the times when there are Kohanim who are proficient in the laws of Nega’im (Sara’at infections) and are thus able to reach decisions as to the status of skin discolorations. Somebody with a “Netek” infection who removes the yellow hairs is in violation of this command and liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 13:2) commands that if one sees a white discoloration on his skin, he must approach a Kohen who will then determine whether the discoloration qualifies as Sara’at. Rather than dismiss the discoloration as some medical condition, he must acknowledge that it has been sent by G-d on account of his sins, and that he is therefore required to undergo the process dictated by the Torah to rectify his wrongful conduct. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command was given in order to reinforce our belief in Hashgaha – divine providence, that everything that happens in the world is caused by G-d, and nothing occurs randomly. When a person sees a discoloration on his skin, he must immediately recognize that this did not simply happen for no reason, but rather has been brought by G-d for the purpose of awakening him to repent for his sins, particularly for the sin of Lashon Ha’ra (negative speech about other people). This strengthens his awareness of the fact that nothing occurs randomly, and that all events have been orchestrated by G-d. The individual consults with a Kohen, rather than a physician, because the Kohanim were assigned the role of achieving atonement on behalf of the people through the offering of sacrifices, and the Kohen would thus guide the person towards repentance and the rectification of his misdeeds. The Torah establishes that there are two shades of white which qualify as a Sara’at infection. The first is “Se’et,” which is white like wool, and the other is “Baheret,” which resembles the whiteness of snow. Each of these two categories also has a subsidiary category, called a “Sapahat.” The “Sapahat” of “Se’et” is a white color resembling “Kerum Besa” – the inner membrane of an egg, and this is the lowest level of whiteness which qualifies as Sara’at. A skin discoloration at least as white as “Kerum Besa” is considered a Sara’at infection. In order qualify as a Sara’at infection, the discoloration must be at least the size of a “Geris” – that is, the area of six hairsbreadths by six hairbreadths. If the Kohen sees a white hair that grows from the infected area, then the individual is conclusively determined to be Tameh (impure). Likewise, if he sees “Mihyat Basar” – some healthy skin forming in the middle of the dead skin in the infected area, then he declares the person Tameh. If the Kohen sees neither of these two symptoms, but the color of the infected skin is one of the colors of Sara’at, then he declares a seven-day waiting period call “Hesger.” After this period, if the Kohen sees that the discoloration had spread, then he declares the individual Tameh. If not, and neither of the aforementioned two symptoms have surfaced, then a second seven-day waiting period is proclaimed, and if nothing changes during the second seven-day period, then the individual is proclaimed Tahor (pure). If even after the first week, the discoloration fades and becomes less white than the whiteness of a “Kerum Besa,” then the person is declared Tahor. This law applies to both men and women, and is applicable only when we have Kohanim who are qualified to reach decisions regarding the status of a suspected Sara’at infection. The Rambam writes that a person who has a Sara’at infection nowadays must make a note for himself that when the Bet Ha’mikdash is rebuilt, he needs to offer the purification sacrifices required of a Mesora (person stricken with Sara’at). If, in times when these laws were practically applicable, a person saw what appeared to be a Sara’at infection, but he ignored it and did not consult with a Kohen, then he transgressed this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that it would seem that such a person would be punished with Sara’at afflicting him and his offspring for all time. Conversely, if the person complied with the Torah’s commands, then he would be worthy of healing. The Rishonim debate the question of what precisely the “Hesger” waiting period entailed. Some explain that the person was quarantined for these seven days, and the word “Hesger” means “confined.” Others, however, define this term to mean “frame,” and explain that the Kohen would make a mark on the person’s skin around the discoloration. Seven days later, he would inspect the skin and see if the discoloration expanded. The Minhat Hinuch observes that the Rambam appears to have followed the first opinion. In Hilchot Sara’at, the Rambam addresses the case of a Kohen who made the initial inspection, declared a period of “Hesger,” and then died, such that a different Kohen is needed for the follow-up inspection after the period of “Hesger.” In such a situation, the Rambam writes, the second Kohen cannot declare the person Tameh based on the expansion of the discoloration, because he had not previously seen the discoloration and thus cannot determine whether it had expanded. Clearly, the Rambam did not follow the view that a mark was made around the original discoloration, as if he did, he would not have written that the second Kohen is unable to determine the expansion of the infected area in such a case. The practical lesson of this Misva is that we must never regard anything that happens as random or coincidental. When we suffer some malady or misfortune, we are to view the situation as having been sent to us by G-d for the purpose of examining our conduct and see where we need to improve and in what ways we can grow and become better.
The Torah in the beginning of Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 12:6) introduces an obligation upon a woman to bring a sacrifice after delivering a child. She first observes a period of Tum’a (impurity), which is then followed by a period during which she is considered Tehora (pure) even if she experiences emissions. After the conclusion of this process, she must then bring a sacrifice – a year-old sheep as an Ola (burnt-offering), and a dove or turtledove as a Hatat (sin-offering). If she cannot afford a sheep, then she brings two doves or turtledoves – one as an Ola and the other as a Hatat. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Ola sacrifice is brought in order to arouse the woman to express her gratitude to G-d for safely emerging from the dangerous situation of labor. Surviving the ordeal of childbirth, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, is nothing short of a miracle, and thus the woman must show her appreciation to G-d for performing this miracle and allowing her to survive childbirth. As for the Hatat, the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the Gemara’s comment that a woman requires atonement after childbirth because while enduring labor pains, she regrets having cohabited with her husband, and swears to never have relations again. After the delivery, she regrets this oath, and she thus offers a sin-offering to atone for having taken this inappropriate vow. The sacrifice is offered on the 41 st day after the birth of a boy, or on the 81 st day after the birth of a girl. If the woman did not offer the sacrifice on this day, she offers it afterward. However, she is forbidden from eating Kodashim (hallowed food) until she brings her sacrifice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that a Korban Yoledet (woman’s sacrifice after childbirth) is exceptional in that it may be offered on her behalf even without her knowledge. If a woman after childbirth designated the animals for this sacrifice, then they may be brought to the Bet Ha’mikdash and offered on her behalf without her knowing, and her obligation is fulfilled. A woman who fails to offer this sacrifice after childbirth has neglected this affirmative command, and, as mentioned, she is barred from partaking of Kodashim until she brings the sacrifice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that it would be most unfortunate if the woman dies without having offered the sacrifice which she is obligated to bring (“Oy Lah Im Tamut Kodem She’takribenu”). Nowadays, of course, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, this Misva does not apply, and a woman cannot bring a sacrifice after childbirth. However, a number of Poskim – including the Sitz Eliezer (Rav Eliezer Waldenberg, 1915-2006) and Hacham Ovadia Yosef – ruled that a woman should recite Birkat Ha’gomel after going through labor, to express gratitude to Hashem for safely emerging from this ordeal. As this Beracha must be recited in the presence of a Minyan, a woman should recite the Beracha in the synagogue from the women’s section. (In the case of the birth of a baby boy, the woman can also recite the Beracha during the customary Zohar reading at her home on the night before the Berit.) It should be noted that the text of Birkat Ha’gomel reads, “Ha’gomel Le’hayabim Tobot” – that G-d performs kindness for “Hayabim,” those who are “guilty” and undeserving of kindness. The question arises as to why a woman recites this text after childbirth, as she seemingly does not belong in the category of “Hayabim”; after all, she certainly did nothing wrong by conceiving and facing the dangerous situation of labor. One explanation given is that she is considered “guilty” for having sworn during labor to never again cohabit with her husband, as mentioned earlier. Additionally, we might explain based on the Gemara’s teaching that whenever a person encounters a situation of danger, his record is carefully assessed to determine whether he is deserving of being rescued. Thus, during childbirth, too, as in all situations of danger, a woman is judged, and thus she recites the text of “Hayabim,” insofar as all people are guilty of some wrongdoing, on account of which they are undeserving of G-d’s special protection. Through the recitation of Birkat Ha’gomel, one acknowledges G-d’s kindness and compassion in rescuing him from danger despite being unworthy of deliverance.
In Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 12:4), amidst the Torah’s discussion of a woman’s state of impurity after childbirth, it commands, “Be’chol Kodesh Lo Tiga” – literally, “She shall not touch anything hallowed.” The Sages understood this verse as introducing a prohibition forbidding somebody in a state of Tum’a – Halachic impurity – from eating sacred food, namely, Teruma (the mandatory gift to a Kohen from agricultural produce) and sacrifices. The reason behind this command, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is to maintain our high esteem and reverence for the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Torah impresses upon us the great importance and significance of the Bet Ha’mikdash and the sacrifices offered there by forbidding partaking of the sacrifices in a state of impurity. A person who is Tameh according to Torah law (as opposed to a status of impurity legislated by the Sages) and eats a Ke’zayit of sacrificial food, intentionally violating this command, is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). However, this applies only if he ate the food after it became permissible through the sprinkling of the blood and the offering of fats on the altar. Sacrificial meat becomes permissible for consumption only after everything is placed on the altar as required, and it is only at that point when the prohibition against eating sacrifices in a state of Tum’a takes effect. This transgression is especially severe. Whereas other misdeeds are atoned for through the offering of one atonement sacrifice, the sin of entering the Mikdash in a state of Tum’a, or eating sacrifices in a state of Tum’a, requires the offering of thirty-two sacrifices. The Se’ir La’azael – the goat sent to the wilderness on Yom Kippur – serves to atone for these violations, as does the goat brought as a sin-offering twelve times a year, each Rosh Hodesh. In addition to these thirteen sacrifices, the goat brought as a sin-offering on every Yom Tob as part of the Musaf offering also serves to atone for this violation, for a total of 32 sacrifices. There is a special law called “Tum’a Hutra Be’sibur” which allows offering sacrifices in a state of impurity if the majority of the Jewish Nation is Tameh, in order to allow for the opportunity to achieve atonement. As a general rule, sacrifices may be offered in a state of impurity under such conditions, but the meat may not be eaten. The important exception to this rule is the Korban Pesach, which is offered on the 14 th of Nissan. If the majority of the nation is Tameh, then the Korban Pesach is both offered and consumed in a state of Tum’a. The reason for this exception is because the primary aspect of the Korban Pesach is the consumption of the meat of the sacrifice. When it comes to other offerings, the primary component is the sprinkling of the blood on the altar for atonement. In the case of the Korban Pesach, however, the consumption of the meat constitutes the most important element of the Korban, and so even the consumption of the meat is permitted in a state of Tum’a when the majority of the nation is impure. This Misva applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is binding upon both men and women. As mentioned, somebody who was Tameh by force of Torah law and intentionally ate a Ke’zayit of hallowed food is liable to Karet. If he transgressed this command unintentionally, he offers a special sacrifice called the Korban Oleh Ve’yored. If a person who had been Tameh immersed in a Mikveh, but he ate sacrificial food before waiting until sunset, he has violated this prohibition, but he is liable to Malkut, rather than Karet. Since he is not completely divested of his impure status until sundown, he is still considered Tameh, and thus he may not eat hallowed food during this interim period. The same applies in the case of a form of impurity which requires a sacrifice for purification. If the person ate sacrificial food after immersing in a Mikveh but before offering the required sacrifice, he is liable to Malkut. The practical lesson that we might learn from this Misva is that we must strive to maintain an appropriate level of purity in order to be able to properly involve ourselves in sacred pursuits. As we regularly pray, come to the synagogue, and study Torah, we must ensure to maintain our purity. This prohibition teaches us that engagement in Kedusha requires purity, and we must therefore endeavor to remain pure at all times so that we can come before G-d to serve Him in the proper state.
The Torah establishes in Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 12:2-5) that a woman who delivers a child becomes Teme’a (“impure”). This status results in a prohibition against marital relations, and a prohibition against entering the Bet Ha’mikdash and against partaking of hallowed food (such as Teruma and the meat of sacrifices). The woman remains Teme’a for seven days after delivering a boy, and for fourteen days after delivering a girl. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, presents his theory regarding the concept underlying the status of Tum’a resulting from various bodily discharges. He writes that when the body is ridding itself of some excess material, this signifies that it is not perfectly healthy. We know this, of course, from medical phenomena such as nasal congestion and a loose bowel; excessive discharge indicates that the body is in a compromised condition. During menstruation, too, a woman generally feels weak and unwell. Therefore, the Torah determined that certain bodily discharges – including childbirth, whereby an entire organism is expelled from the body – bring upon a person the status of Tum’a. As this person is in a compromised physical condition, he or she is considered “impure” so that others will keep their distance. Marital relations, of course, constitutes the closest form of physical contact between people, and so the Torah forbade relations during the wife’s period of Tum’a. As for the difference between the birth of a boy and the birth of a girl, the Sefer Ha’hinuch suggests that the birth of a girl signifies the mother’s tendency to have a higher body temperature, whereas the birth of a boy indicates her tendency to have a lower temperature. Excessive body heat, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is more debilitating than insufficient body heat. Therefore, after the birth of a girl, which indicates a tendency to have a higher body temperature, the mother generally requires a longer period of recovery than after the birth of a boy. For this reason, the Torah established a longer period of Tum’a after the birth of a girl than following the birth of a boy. The Rebbe of Kotzk (Rav Menachem Mendel Morgenstern, 1787-1859) offered a different approach. He explains that Tum’a results from the loss of Kedusha (sanctity). For example, the most severe form of Tum’a is that generated by a human corpse, because a living human being possesses a sacred soul, and thus the loss of that soul creates an enormous vacuum. This vacuum is the source of Tum’a, and the larger the vacuum is, the more severe the Tum’a is going to be. After childbirth, the Rebbe of Kotzk explained, the woman’s body loses something sacred and precious – a human organism – and she therefore becomes Teme’a because of the vacuum which is created. As females are capable of delivering children, a female fetus is considered significantly holier than a male fetus, and thus the delivery of a girl generates a higher level of Tum’a than the delivery of a boy, because a larger vacuum is created after a girl leaves the woman’s body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here also advances a number of theories to explain the reason why G-d created women such that they experience the monthly cycle of menstruation. First, he suggests, women tend to be more emotional, which could lead them to act rashly. The monthly discomfort of menstruation has the effect of helping to reduce their haste and impulsivity. Secondly, he writes, the Torah wanted to create a regular period of distance between a husband and wife in order to maintain their desire for one another. If there was never any period of separation between a husband and wife, they would become too accustomed to one another, and their interest might then be drawn to other people. A woman becomes Teme’a at childbirth even if no blood appears to leave the body. As the Gemara states, “En Petihat Ha’keber Be’lo Dam” – the uterus does not open without at least some bleeding. Therefore, even if no blood is seen, the woman becomes Teme’a at childbirth. A woman becomes Teme’a even after a miscarriage, Heaven forbid. Needless to say, this Halacha applies at all places and at all times, even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shemini (11:44), “Ve’lo Te’tame’u Et Nafshotechem Be’chol Ha’sheretz Ha’romes Al Ha’aretz” – that we must not “defile” ourselves by eating creatures which crawl on the earth. The Sifra (Halachic Midrash on the Book of Vayikra) explains this verse as referring specifically to creatures which are produced on their own from refuse – such as spoiled food – as opposed to being produced from the mating of a male and female. The Rambam writes that the Torah used here the verb “Romes” (“crawl”), rather than the verb “Shoretz,” because “Romes” refers specifically to creatures produced through spontaneous generation. Thus, the Torah here introduces the prohibition eating such creatures. The Ramban disputes the Rambam’s reading, demonstrating that the verb “Romes” is occasionally used even in reference to creatures which are produced through mating. Regardless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the Rambam’s understanding of this verse as referring specifically to creatures produced through spontaneous generation. This prohibition, of course, applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. One who intentionally eats a whole creature (“Beriya”) belonging to such a species is liable to Malkut regardless of its size. If the creature one consumes is not whole, then he is liable to Malkut only if he eats the quantity of Ke’zayit.
The Torah commands in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:43), “Do not make yourselves repulsive through all creatures that crawl, and do not be defiled by them.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, interprets this verse as referring specifically to “Sheres Ha’mayim” – small creatures that float in water, establishing a prohibition against eating such creatures. One who intentionally eats a whole creature (“Birya”) is liable to Malkut regardless of the creature’s size, because even a very small whole creature is considered a significant entity. If one consumes such creatures which are not whole, then he is liable to Malkut only if he eats the quantity of a Ke’zayit. Different water creatures can combine to this amount, thus rendering one liable to Malkut. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes, even eating less than a Ke’zayit violates a Biblical prohibition. The principle of “Hasi Shiur” establishes that it is forbidden to partake of forbidden foods in any quantity, even amounts smaller than the amount needed to be liable to punishment. The Ramban disagrees with the Rambam’s view in regard to the classification of this command. According to the Ramban, this verse (“Do not make yourselves repulsive through all creatures that crawl”) refers not specifically to “Sheres Ha’mayim,” but rather to all living creatures which the Torah forbids for consumption. In the Ramban’s view, the Torah here concludes its discussion of forbidden creatures by introducing an additional, all-inclusive prohibition against eating any of these creatures (animals, insects, birds and fish). Hence, this command falls under the category of “Lav She’bi’chlalut” – a general prohibition, for which one does not receive Malkut. The prohibition against eating “Sheres Ha’mayim,” the Ramban writes, is derived from an earlier verse (11:10), which says regarding creatures in the water that do not feature fins and scales, “Sheketz Hem Lachem” – they should be regarded as “repulsive.” In the Ramban’s view, this includes not only non-kosher fish, but also other water creatures, and it is here where the Torah commands that such creatures may not be eaten. Since the Torah does not formulate this command as a prohibition (by stating, “Do not eat…”), but rather states affirmatively that we must regard these creatures as forbidden, Malkut are not administered for violations of this command. Thus, whereas the Rambam maintains that one receives Malkut for partaking of “Sheres Ha’mayim,” the Ramban is of the opinion that this prohibition is not punishable by Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this context also mentions a different fundamental debate between the Rambam and the Ramban. The Rambam writes that if the Torah reiterates a prohibition on several occasions, a violator is nevertheless liable to just a single set of Malkut. Even if the Torah would have repeated a prohibition 100 times, one who would violate such a command would receive only one set of Malkut. The Rambam must therefore contend with the Gemara’s famous comments in Masechet Makkot (16) regarding the consumption of insects. The Gemara states that eating a certain insect is punishable by four sets of Makkot; for eating a different creature one is liable to five sets of Malkut; and there is another creature whose consumption is punishable by six sets of Malkut. The straightforward understanding of the Gemara’s remarks is that the Torah repeats the prohibition against eating such creatures several times, and so violators are liable to multiple sets of Malkut, one for each time the Torah issues the command. The Rambam, however, reads the Gemara differently, claiming that each of these creatures has several different physical properties that place it in several different categories, on account of which they are forbidden by force of different Biblical commands. It is only for this reason, the Rambam writes, that one would receive several sets of Malkut for eating a single creature, and not because the Torah reiterated the command. The Ramban disagrees, following the simple understanding of the Gemara. In his view, if the Torah repeats a prohibition, then one is liable to an additional set of Malkut for transgressing that prohibition. Thus, if the Torah repeats a prohibition several times, a violator would receive several sets of Malkut, one for each time the Torah issues the given command.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:42) forbids eating “Kol Ha’sheretz Ha’shoretz Al Ha’aretz” (“all the crawling creatures which crawl on the ground”), which the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains as referring to insects which grow in fruits and vegetables and have left onto the ground. Once these insects leave the fruit or vegetable in which they have grown, they are forbidden for consumption. As long as they remain inside the fruit or vegetable, there is no prohibition against eating them, but once they leave, they are forbidden, even if they then return to the fruit. This prohibition applies only to insects that grow in produce while the produce was still attached to the ground. Insects that grow in produce after harvesting are not included in this prohibition. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it is all but impossible to determine whether an insect grew in a fruit or vegetable before or after it was harvested, and thus we must refrain from all insects that grow in produce. The Rambam, in Sefer Ha’misvot, rules that if an insect emerged from inside a fruit, but remained on the fruit’s surface instead of leaving and going onto the ground, it is nevertheless included in the prohibition, and one would be liable to Malkut for eating such a creature. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this ruling is mistaken, because the Gemara writes explicitly that the insect’s status at this point is uncertain, and thus, while it is forbidden to eat the insect, one would not be liable to Malkut if he does, given the uncertainty of its status. In fact, the Rambam himself, in his Yad Ha’hazaka, codifies the Gemara’s ruling that the insect’s status if it remained on the fruit’s surface is uncertain. Insects found inside fish are assumed to have originated outside the fish, and are thus forbidden. This applies also to insects found inside the stomach of an animal. Insects found in water are permissible if they grew in the water, but not if they originated outside the water and then went into the water. (A number of years ago, there was a debate concerning small insects found in the New York City water system, as it was uncertain whether they originated outside the water or grew in the water.) This prohibition, of course, applies in all times and in all places, and to both males and females. One who intentionally eats a complete insect is liable to Malkut. If, however, the insect is incomplete – even it is missing just a single leg – then one is not liable to Malkut unless he consumes a Ke’zayit of insects. In order to avoid this Biblical command, it is imperative that one carefully inspects his produce to ensure that they do not contain insects. The Gemara in Masechet Makkot states that it is possible to violate five or six commands by consuming an insect. It is famously told that the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909) once saw a woman checking lettuce on Ereb Pesah casually, without making a thorough inspection. He turned to the woman and asked how many hairs were on her head. “How many hairs?!” she asked. “There are so many – I cannot possibly know how many!” “You will be responsible for more violations than hairs on your head for failing to properly check the lettuce,” the Rabbi said. He explained that each guest she will be serving at the Seder could end up consuming large numbers of insects, and for each one, he will be liable to numerous sets of Malkut, because of her failure to inspect the produce… To give us some perspective, if a person eats a hamburger in a non-kosher restaurant, he transgresses only a single prohibition – the consumption of Nebela (meat from an animal which was not properly slaughtered) or Terefa (meat from an animal with a terminal physical ailment). But if one eats a salad in a non-kosher restaurant, he violates hundreds of prohibitions, as he consumes an untold number of insects. It is thus vitally important to exercise caution in this regard and ensure to avoid eating produce which has not been properly inspected.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (11:41) forbids eating any “Sheretz Ha’shoretz Al Ha’aretz” – rodent or insect that crawls on the ground. This command forbids eating a “Ke’zayit” of the flesh of such creatures, except when it comes to the “Shemona Sherasim” – the eight rodents listed earlier (11:29-30) which impart Tum’a (impurity) after they die. A piece of the flesh of these creatures imparts Tum’a even if it is smaller than a Ke’zayit – if it is at least a “Ke’adasha,” the size of a lentil. By extension, the Torah prohibition against eating Sherasim (creatures that crawl on the ground) forbids eating even this small amount of their flesh. Whereas regarding other Sherasim, the prohibition applies only to the consumption of a “Ke’zayit,” the consumption of even a “Ke’adasha” of these eight creatures is forbidden. Moreover, the Minhat Hinuch comments that consuming a whole creature (“Beriya”) violates this command regardless of its size. Even if a creature is smaller than a Ke’zayit, one is in violation of this Biblical command if one eats it whole, because a whole creature is considered significant in any size. This command applies in all places, in all times, and to both men and women. One who intentionally consumes an “Ke’adasha” of the eight special rodents, a “Ke’zayit” of other creatures, or a whole creature regardless of its size, is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:39-40) establishes that if an animal dies without proper Shehita (slaughtering), the carcass – which is called a “Nebela” – imparts Tum’a (impurity). This means that a person or utensil that touches a Ke’zayit of flesh from the carcass becomes Tameh (impure). One who carries this amount of flesh from the carcass, even without touching it – such as if one carries a utensil containing the flesh – then he and his clothing are impure. This means that the halachic slaughtering of a kosher species of animal accomplishes two things – it renders the meat permissible for consumption, and also prevents the carcass from becoming a source of Tum’a. An animal which dies in any manner other than proper Shehita is considered a Nebela, and thus imparts Tum’a; hence, slaughtering an animal prevents it from becoming a source of impurity, in addition to allowing the meat to be eaten. There are a number of rare circumstances in which slaughtering a kosher species of animal does not render its meat permissible for consumption, but does have the effect of preventing the carcass from becoming a Nebela. One such circumstance is slaughtering an ordinary animal – meaning, one which has not been consecrated as a sacrifice – in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Slaughtering a non-consecrated animal in the Bet Ha’mikdash is forbidden (“Hulin Ba’azara”), and if this does occur, then the meat is forbidden for consumption. Nevertheless, since the animal was properly slaughtered, the carcass is not considered a Nebela, and it does not impart Tum’a. This applies also in the reverse case – where an animal consecrated as a Korban (sacrifice) was slaughtered outside the Bet Ha’mikdash. This, too, is strictly forbidden (“Shehuteh Hutz”), and the meat becomes forbidden for consumption, but it does not impart Tum’a, since the animal was killed via a proper Shehita. If one slaughtered an animal improperly – such as if the knife turned out to be invalid, or if one did not sever the animal’s trachea and esophagus to the required extent – then the carcass is considered a Nebela. Since the Shehita was invalid, this animal is no different than an animal that died without Shehita, and its carcass imparts Tum’a like any other Nebela. A non-kosher species of animal becomes a Nebela that imparts Tum’a even if it is slaughtered. Slaughtering such an animal has no halachic effect, as the animal is forbidden for consumption regardless, and thus its carcass is a Nebela that imparts Tum’a. An animal carcass imparts Tum’a only once it has died. If the animal is still convulsing (“Pirkus”), but has yet to die, it is not considered a Nebela, and one who touches it at this point does not become Tameh.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:34) establishes that food can become Tameh (ritually impure) through direct contact with sources of impurity, under certain conditions. First, food is susceptible to Tum’a (impurity) only if it is designated for human consumption. Animal fodder does not become Tameh. Secondly, food is susceptible to Tum’a only if it is no longer attached the ground. Produce which is still attached to a tree or to the ground, even if it is ripe and edible, cannot become Tameh. Finally, food does not become susceptible to Tum’a until it was first moistened by liquid. The Torah states that the food must first have had water fall on it, but the oral tradition teaches that any of the “seven liquids” has the effect of rendering food susceptible to Tum’a. These liquids are commonly represented by the mnemonic “Yad Shahat Dam.” The “Yod” represents “Mayim” (water); the “Dalet” stands for “Dam” (blood)”; the “Shin” refers to “Shemen” (oil); the “Het” alludes to “Halab” (milk); the “Tet” stands for “Tal” (“dew”), the second “Dalet” is “Debash” (honey); and the final letter, “Mem,” refers to the most common liquid – “Mayim” (water). Any of these seven liquids has the ability to be “Machshir” – to “prepare” food for receiving Tum’a. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this law by drawing a comparison to the obligation of Terumot and Ma’aserot – the various portions which must be separated from one’s agricultural produce and given to a Kohen or Levi. The obligation of Terumot and Ma’aserot takes effect only at the point of “Gemar Melacha” – when the process of harvesting has been fully completed. Somewhat similarly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, produce attains the status of “food” such that it can become Tameh only after it has been rinsed, as it is only at that point when it is considered edible, since people do not eat produce before first rinsing it. A liquid prepares a food to become Tameh only if the owner specifically wanted it to come in contact with the liquid. The Talmud gives the example of a person who wishes to hide his produce from thieves, and he hides the fruits or vegetables in a bucket of water. This produce came in contact with water, but this was not the owner’s intent; he put the produce in the bucket to hide it, not to rinse it. Therefore, the food is still unable to become Tameh. Additionally, the liquid makes the food susceptible to Tum’a only if the liquid is intended to be used for either cleaning or drinking. If, for example, a person has a leak in his home, and he places a bucket at that spot in order to catch the water so it does not damage his home, the water in that bucket is unable to be “Machshir” food. The person has no intention to use that water for any purpose – for neither drinking nor rinsing – and therefore, it does not have the halachic status of “Mashkeh” that can render food susceptible to Tum’a. If, however, the person placed the bucket where the rain is dripping in order to clean the bucket, then this water is indeed considered a “Mashkeh” and has the ability to render food susceptible to impurity. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this law applies in all places and in all times. Even nowadays, food can become Tameh if the necessary conditions are met, though there is no practical Halachic ramification to this status, since today we in any event do not eat food which is forbidden to be eaten if it becomes Tameh (such as Teruma and the food of sacrifices).
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:29) establishes that eight species of Sherasim (rodents) are to be regarded as Tameh (ritually impure). The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, elaborates at length on the general topic of Ta’ameh Ha’misvot – the reasons underlying the Torah’s commands. He explains that the human mind is very limited, and thus incapable of fully comprehending the infinite wisdom of G-d. As such, we can never hope to gain a complete understanding of the reasons for G-d’s commands. Even Moshe Rabbenu, the greatest prophet who ever lived, did not achieve perfect wisdom, reaching just short of the “50 th level of understanding.” And Shlomo Ha’melech, the wisest man who ever lived, said about the depth and wisdom of Torah, “Rehoka Mimeni” – its complete understanding remained unattainable. G-d is the source of all wisdom, and so we limited human beings cannot possibly fully grasp His Torah. Nevertheless, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we should strive to understand as much as we can, and it is for this reason that he wrote this book – in an attempt to uncover the reasons for the Misvot that we can understand with our limited intellect. With regard to the laws of Tum’a, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we must assume that objects which impart Tum’a must have some adverse spiritual effect upon a person, causing, in his words, “the fountains of the intellect to malfunction.” We, of course, do not really understand the nature of the human soul, and therefore, we do not understand why certain things cause a degree of contamination to the soul. We must rely upon G-d, who created us, and obviously knows what is beneficial and what is detrimental for us, to determine the sources of Tum’a from which we should try to abstain. It is for our benefit that the Torah imposed certain restrictions upon those who come in contact with sources of Tum’a, in order to discourage us from such contact and thereby preserve the pristine condition of our souls. The eight Sherasim listed by the Torah have the status of “Ab Ha’tum’a,” which means that they transmit Tum’a to people and utensils which come in direct contact with them. Only their carcasses emit Tum’a; touching a live Sheres does not result in Tum’a. One becomes Tameh only by directly touching the dead Sheres, and not if he carries it without touching it (such as if he carries a basket which turns out to contain the remains of a Sheres). The remains of a Sheres impart Tum’a only in the size of an “Adasha” – a lentil. Small pieces of several different species of Sherasim can combine to this minimum required amount and impart Tum’a. A person who became Tameh through direct contact with any of the Shemona Sherasim is forbidden from eating hallowed food, such as Teruma (the gift to a Kohen from agricultural produce) or sacrifices, and from entering the Bet Ha’mikdash. He must first divest himself of his impure status through immersion in a Mikveh. This law, assigning Tum’a to one who comes in direct contact with any of the Shemona Sherasim, applies in all places, to both men and women, and in all times. Even nowadays, one who touches one of these creatures becomes Tameh. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although there is no prohibition against touching a Sheres, nevertheless, it is proper to refrain from doing so, as it is beneficial for the soul to avoid impurity. Rabbenu Bahya (Spain, 1255-1340), in his Torah commentary (Vayikra 11:30), raises the question of why the snake is not included among the creatures which impart Tum’a. The snake is the most detestable of all creatures, having lured Hava to sin in Gan Eden, thus giving rise to all the problems and pain which mankind has endured ever since. How could it be that other creatures emit Tum’a, but snakes do not? Rabbenu Bahya answers based on the principle, “Deracheha Darcheh Noam Ve’chol Netivoteha Shalom” – “Its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace” (Mishleh 3:17). Torah life is meant to be pleasant and peaceful, and therefore, the Torah does not want to discourage people from killing snakes, an especially dangerous creature. If a snake’s carcass would impart Tum’a, then people might be deterred from killing snakes, so as to avoid Tum’a, and dangerous snakes would then remain alive and inflict great harm. The Torah therefore does not include snakes in its list of creatures whose carcasses impart Tum’a, so that people will not be discouraged from eliminating them. (This reason applies also to scorpions, which are likewise not included in the list of creatures that impart Tum’a.)
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Parashat 11:21) establishes the requirement to determine the status of different species of grasshoppers vis-à-vis their permissibility for consumption. As we know, locusts and grasshoppers used to be eaten as food. In fact, the Rabbis teach that when G-d ended the plague of locusts that struck Egypt, the locusts which the Egyptians had captured and pickled to make into delicacies miraculously returned to life and flew away. G-d thereby ensured that they would receive no benefit whatsoever from the plague. The Torah in Parashat Shemini presents the basic guidelines for determining which species are permissible and which are forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that just like the other rules regarding permissible and forbidden foods, the Torah here has determined that certain species are either physically or spiritually harmful and thus forbade us from partaking of these species. The Gemara teaches that there are eight species of kosher grasshoppers, called “Hagab,” “Zarbanit,” “Hargol,” “Arsubya,” “Arpa,” “Saparat Keramim,” “Solam,” and “Yohana Yerushalmit.” The identifying characteristics of kosher grasshoppers are: four wings covering the majority of the creature’s body; four legs; and protrusions from the legs with which the creature hops. The laws, of course, apply in all places and in all times, and to both males and females. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that one who ate a species of grasshopper without first determining its status has violated this affirmative command, even if the creature turned out to belong to a kosher species. This Misva commands us to determine a creature’s status before eating it, and thus one transgresses this command by neglecting to do so regardless of whether the creature was forbidden or permissible. Nowadays, although some communities – particularly among Yemenite and Moroccan Jews – eat kosher species of grasshoppers, the majority of Jews do not. Already the Or Ha’haim Ha’kadosh (Rav Haim Ben-Attar, 1696-1743) opposed this practice, claiming that we do not have the ability to definitively determine the kosher species, and we do not have a strong tradition as to which species are permissible and which are forbidden. Incidentally, Rav Chaim Kanievsky wrote an entire book entitled Karneh Hagabim on the topic of the physical properties of kosher grasshoppers. I once heard from Rav Chaim Kreiswirth (1918-2001) that Rav Kanievsky was able to identify all eight species of kosher grasshoppers and point to their “Simanim” – the “signs” of their kosher status. There was only one extremely rare species which he was not able to find and actually see, so he identified its characteristics based on the relevant halachic literature. One day, he was learning near an open window, and a grasshopper flew inside and landed on his book. He looked at it – and immediately recognized it as the species which he had been unable to find. He was able to confirm that it had the necessary characteristics to be determined kosher. This story shows how Hashem intervenes to help the sages who toil in Torah, so they can arrive at the truth.
Misva #156: To Not Eat Impure Fish The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:11) forbids eating fish belonging to a non-kosher species. As discussed in an earlier Misva, a fish is considered kosher if it has fins and scales; otherwise, it is not kosher and forbidden for consumption. One who eats a Ke’zayit of flesh from a non-kosher species of fish is liable to Malkut. This command is binding in all times and in all places, and upon both males and females. Misva #157: To Not Eat Impure Fowl The Torah in Parashat Shemini (11:13) introduces the command forbidding the consumption of non-kosher species of birds. The reason behind this command, of course, is the same as the reason for the Torah’s other dietary restrictions. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, G-d knows that certain foods are harmful to either our body or our souls, and so He commanded us to refrain from certain foods for our own benefit, in order to preserve our physical and spiritual wellbeing. The Torah does not specify the properties which signify a bird’s kosher or non-kosher status, as it does for animals and fish. It lists twenty-four species of birds which are forbidden, making it clear that all other species may be eaten, but it gives us only the names of the species, and the identity of some of these species cannot be definitively ascertained. The Rabbis, through oral tradition, presented a number of guidelines for determining the kosher status of different species of birds. First, any “Dores” – “bird of prey” – is forbidden for consumption. This refers to any bird that thrusts its claws into another bird to kill it. If a bird is not a bird of prey, then it is kosher if it features all of the following three properties: one of its fingers is longer than the others; it has a crop (part of the stomach), and its Kurkuban (gizzard) is shaped in a certain way (“Niklaf”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even if a bird which is not predatory has just one of these three properties, it may be presumed kosher. He explains that the only non-kosher bird which is not predatory and has just one of these properties is the Oreb (raven), which is a widely recognized species. Hence, if one encounters a different species that is not predatory and has just one of these three properties, it can be presumed kosher. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch asserts, if a bird has none of these properties, it may nevertheless be presumed kosher as long as it is not a “Dores.” The reason, he explains, is that the only two non-kosher birds that are not predators and have none of these properties are the “Peres” and “Ozniya,” and according to tradition, these species live in remote areas, and not in regions populated by human beings. Hence, we need not be concerned that this kind of bird which we come across belongs to one of these two species. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites those who claimed that nowadays, we must be concerned that these species may, in fact, live in areas of human habitation, and we thus must refrain from species with none of these three properties, as they may be a “Peres” or “Ozniya.” However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch dismisses this claim as an unnecessary measure of stringency. If a bird is not predatory, and has exactly two of the three physical properties mentioned above, then, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we must be concerned that it might belong to one of the non-kosher species. Therefore, he writes, such a species may be eaten only if there is a tradition that it is permissible. In light of the various opinions that exist regarding the determination of a given species’ status, it is generally accepted to eat only those birds regarding which there is a tradition permitting them for consumption. This practice has given rise to some controversy surrounding the consumption of turkey, which was found only in America, and not in Europe or in Sephardic lands. As there was no tradition allowing the consumption of turkey, some Poskim, including Rav Shlomo Kluger (Galicia, 1783-1869), forbade the consumption of turkey. Most Poskim, however, felt that are enough reasons to assume that the turkey is a kosher species, and thus those who are accustomed to eating turkey certainly have Halachic authorities upon whom to rely. The prohibition against eating non-kosher birds applies in all places and in all times, and to both men and women. One who intentionally eats a Ke’zayit of meat from a non-kosher species of bird is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11:9) establishes that only fish with both “Senapir” and “Kaskeset” – fins and scales – may be eaten. The fins resemble wings that protrude from the fish’s body, and scales are a series of small discs attached to the fish. The Gemara teaches that every species of fish with scales also has fins; therefore, if scales are seen on the fish’s body, one does not need to look for fins, because a fish that has scales also has fins. Conversely, however, a fish with fins does not necessarily have scales. A fish is considered kosher even if only a single scale is seen on the body. If a species of fish naturally grows scales, then a fish of this species may be eaten even if it is still young and had yet to grow scales by the time it was removed from the water. Additionally, if a fish had scales and they fell off the fish’s body after it was drawn from the water, the fish is nevertheless permissible for consumption. This command applies in all times and places, and to both males and females. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one transgresses this Biblical command by eating a fish without first ascertaining its kosher status. Even if it turns out that the fish was permissible for consumption, nevertheless, one is in violation of this Misva if he eats the fish without first checking to ensure it has scales. As mentioned, once a fish has been determined to feature scales, one does not need to check for fins, because every fish with scales also has fins. But if one ate a fish without first determining that it has scales and is thus permissible, then he has violated this command even if the fish was kosher. The Gemara in Masechet Hulin (66) raises the question of why the Torah bothered to mention that a fish needs fins to be permissible for consumption. After all, once it has scales, then it necessarily has fins, and thus, seemingly, the Torah could have simply said that a fish needs to have scales to be permissible. The Gemara answers that the Torah mentioned also the requirement of fins for the purpose of “Yagdil Torah Ve’ya’adir” – to add more material for us to study. At first glance, this means simply that the Torah added words which were not actually necessary so that we will have more to read and through which to earn reward. The Ritba (Rav Yom Tob of Seville, Spain, d. 1320), however, suggests a different explanation, proposing that perhaps “they, too, cause it to be permissible.” Meaning, it is possible that the presence of both fins and scales on a fish’s body is the reason why that species is considered kosher. Intuitively, we might have assumed that the fins and scales serve merely as a sign indicating to us that this species is permitted by the Torah for consumption. The Ritba, however, suggests that perhaps these features are not the indicators of a fish’s kosher status, but the cause, or reason, for the fish’s kosher status. While we do not understand why, G-d instructed that these properties are what make a fish kosher and permissible for us. If these properties were only indicators that a species is kosher, then it would suffice for the Torah to mention only scales. But since these properties are the reason why a fish is kosher, the Torah mentioned both to teach us this very point – that the presence of both fins and scales makes a species permissible for consumption, that for reasons that we cannot understand, these features elevate a fish’s status, making it worthy of being consumed.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (11:4-7) prohibits eating meat from a species of an animal that has only one of the two “Simanim” (“signs,” or properties) of a kosher animal – split hooves, and chewing its cud. These are the camel, rabbit and hare – which chew their cud but do not have split hooves – and the pig – which has split hooves but does not chew its cud. Likewise, in the Book of Debarim (14:6) the Torah says about animals with both these properties, “Otah Tochelu” – “that you shall eat” – implying that other animals may not be eaten. These are the sources for the Biblical command prohibiting eating meat from a species of animal which does not have both these properties. Interestingly, the Torah never explicitly prohibits eating the meat of an animal with neither of these two properties; it expressly forbids eating those species with just one property, but does not specifically state that species with neither property are forbidden for consumption. This prohibition is inferred through logical deduction (“Kal Va’homer”) – if an animal with one of the “Simanim” is prohibited, then certainly species with neither of these properties is forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question of how, then, one who eats meat from an animal with neither of the “Simanim” can be liable to Malkut. There is a rule that “En Onshim Min Ha’din” – one does not receive punishment for violating prohibitions established via logical deduction, which are not directly forbidden by the Torah. If the prohibition against eating meat from a species with neither of the “Simanim” is deduced through a “Kal Va’homer,” then why is one liable to punishment for violating this prohibition? The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that in truth, this prohibition is not established only via a “Kal Va’homer.” By presenting the two properties of kosher species of animals, and forbidding eating a species with just one of these properties, the Torah makes it perfectly clear that it is forbidden to eat an animal with neither of the two properties. This prohibition is thus considered to have been directly and explicitly issued by the Torah. As for the reason why the Torah forbade eating the meat of creatures which do not have both “Simanim,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch reiterates what he had written previously regarding other forbidden foods. G-d knows which foods are beneficial, and which are harmful to our physical and spiritual wellbeing, and He thus forbade eating the meat of non-kosher animals, because this meat is unhealthful and can also have adverse spiritual effects, making it difficult for a person to connect to G-d. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that human flesh is not included in this prohibition. Although humans, quite obviously, do not have split hooves or chew their cud, nevertheless, the consumption of the meat of human beings does not fall under this command which forbids eating the meat of creatures without the two “Simanim.” Based on the view of the Rambam, the Sefer Ha’hinuch asserts that cannibalism is nevertheless forbidden by Torah law for a separate reason – because the Torah listed seven species of animals which may be eaten, and this list was intended to exclude human beings, whose meat is forbidden for consumption. The Ramban, however, disagrees, and maintains that on the level of Torah law (as opposed to Rabbinic enactment), human meat is not forbidden. He proves this from the fact that a human being’s blood is not forbidden like the blood of animals, and a nursing mother’s milk is likewise permissible for consumption. There is a general rule that “Ha’yoseh Min Ha’assur Assur” – a substance which originates from a creature that is forbidden for consumption is likewise forbidden for consumption. Thus, if human beings were forbidden for consumption, then the blood and milk produced by human beings would also be forbidden. The fact that they are permissible, the Ramban argues, proves that human flesh is not forbidden for consumption by Torah law. (It goes without saying that all agree that this should not be done.) The prohibition against eating non-kosher species of animals applies at all times, in all places, and to both men and women. One who intentionally ate a Ke’zayit of meat from such an animal, or consumed a Rebi’it of its fat, is liable to Malkut.
Misva #153: Identifying the Kosher Status of Animals Length: 5:41 The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 11) establishes the “Simanim” – the features that determine an animal’s status vis-à-vis its permissibility for consumption. Specifically, it states that an animal with split hooves and that chews its cud is permissible, whereas an animal which either does not have split hooves, or does not chew its cud, is forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, maintains that inspecting an animal to determine its kosher status constitutes one of the 613 Biblical commands. The Gemara states that every animal which chews its cud also has split hooves, except for the camel, the rabbit and the hare. Conversely, every animal with split hooves also chews its cud, with the exception of the pig. Torah law also distinguishes between two categories of animals – Behemot (domesticated animals) and Hayot (non-domesticated animals). One difference between these two categories relates to the consumption of Heleb (certain fats): the Heleb of Behemot is forbidden for consumption, whereas the Heleb of Hayot is permissible. Secondly, after slaughtering a Haya, one must perform Kisui Ha’dam (covering the blood), whereas after slaughtering a Behema, this is not required. The Torah does not inform us how to distinguish between a Behema and Haya, but tradition teaches that a creature’s status can be determined by its horns. The horns of a Haya are “Keruchot” (layered), “Hadukot” (notched) and “Hadurot” (round), and thus an animal with horns featuring all three properties is to be regarded as a Haya, and other animals fall under the category of Behema. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, following the Rambam, that if one ate an animal’s meat without bothering to determine its status, whether or not it has the required properties, then he has transgressed this affirmative command. Even if the animal is later determined to have been a kosher species, nevertheless, the individual is in violation of a Biblical command by neglecting to check and ascertain its kosher status. Generally speaking, the Rambam maintains that the principle of “Safek De’Orayata Le’humra,” requiring one to act stringently in situations of doubt concerning a Torah law, was enacted by the Sages. As far as Torah law is concerned, if one is uncertain regarding a matter involving a Biblical command, he made act leniently, and it was the Sages who enacted that he must act stringently. An exception to this rule is the kosher status of a species of animal. If a person is uncertain as to whether a given species is kosher, Torah law forbids him from eating the animal’s meat until he ascertains the status of its species. Rav Yishak Arama (Spain, d. 1494) goes even further, asserting that this Misva requires identifying an animal’s status based on its physical properties even if one has no intention of eating the animal’s meat. According to this view, there is an obligation to know how to identify kosher and non-kosher species, regardless of whether one intends to eat any given creature. This command underscores for us the great importance of Kashrut. The Torah made a point of singling out this particular area, requiring special vigilance to ascertain that what we eat is permissible, and to ensure to distinguish between kosher and non-kosher species, showing how vitally important it is to make sure to eat only that which G-d permits.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 10:9) commands the Kohanim not to enter the Bet Ha’mikdash after drinking wine. This command includes also a prohibition forbidding issuing a Halachic ruling after drinking wine. The Sefer Hahinuch explains that this is forbidden because one’s mind should be clear and settled when he engages in the most important matters – serving G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and learning Torah. These sublime activities require a proper state of mind and the ability to focus, and so the Torah forbade serving in the Mikdash and reaching Halachic decisions after drinking wine, which of course has a detrimental effect on a person’s mental faculties. A Kohen who performed Aboda (service) in the Bet Ha’mikdas after drinking wine is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hand of G-d, as opposed to execution by the court). The Aboda he performed is invalid, and must be repeated. Entering the Bet Ha’mikdash after drinking wine, without performing the Aboda, is forbidden by the Torah, but is punishable by Malkut, as opposed to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim. This is the view of the Rambam, which is the generally accepted position. The Ramban disagreed, and maintained that simply entering the Mikdash after drinking wine, without performing Aboda, is forbidden only Mi’de’rabbanan (by force of Rabbinic enactment). This prohibition applies to one who had drunk at least a Rebi’it (slightly more than 3 ounces) of wine which is at least forty days old. If a Kohen did not drink wine, but drank a different intoxicating beverage, he is forbidden from entering the Bet Ha’mikdash, but if he performs the Aboda, he is liable to Malkut, not Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim, and the service he performed is valid. There is a separate obligation of “Mora Mikdash” which requires entering the grounds of the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of awe and reverence. Thus, even a Yisrael who visits the Bet Ha’mikdash may not enter the site after he drank wine, when wearing torn clothing, or with long hair. (Kohanim may not enter the Bet Ha’mikdash if they haven’t taken a haircut in thirty days; for a Yisrael, it is permissible to enter the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash unless his hair is overgrown and he looks disrespectfully unkempt.) Learning Torah is permissible after drinking wine; this prohibition applies specifically to giving Halachic rulings. One who serves as the Posek (Halachic authority) for his community may not teach Halacha after drinking wine, because for such a person, teaching Halacha is no different from issuing Halachic rulings. The prohibition against entering the Bet Ha’mikdash after drinking wine of course applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. However, the prohibition against issuing Halachic rulings after drinking wine applies at all times, even nowadays. It applies in all places, and to both men and women. A learned woman who is asked Halachic questions may not issue a ruling after drinking wine, just as this is forbidden for a male scholar.
The Torah commands the Kohanim in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 10:7), “U’mi’petah Ohel Mo’ed Lo Tes’u Pen Tamutu” – “You shall not leave from the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, lest you die.” This command is understood as a prohibition forbidding the Kohanim from leaving the Bet Ha’mikdash in the middle of the Aboda (service). Once a Kohen has begun serving, he may not leave until he completes the service. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if a Kohen leaves the Aboda in the middle, he disrespects the Aboda, giving the impression that something else is more important than the service of G-d. The Torah forbade leaving in the middle of the Aboda in order to maintain the respect for the service, and to make it clear that there is nothing more precious or important than the Aboda. A distinction exists in this regard between ordinary Kohanim and the Kohen Gadol. If an ordinary Kohen learns while performing the Aboda that one of his immediate family members has died, he must complete the Aboda, and only then leave the Bet Ha’mikdash. An Onen (somebody whose family member has died but has yet to be buried) does not perform the Aboda, but the Kohen must nevertheless continue serving until he completes the Aboda before he is allowed to leave. A Kohen Gadol, however, does not leave the Bet Ha’mikdash even if he becomes an Onen. He continues serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash even if he loses a family member, and does not leave to tend to the body or attend the funeral. The Maharam Shick (Hungary, 1807-1879) notes that this special provision regarding the Kohen Gadol is alluded to in Moshe’s praise of the tribe of Levi before his death. Moshe said about this tribe, “He who said to his father and mother, ‘I have not seen him,’ and did not recognize his brother, and did not know his son” (Debarim 33:9). This refers to the aftermath of the sin of the golden calf, when Moshe instructed the members of the tribe of Levi to execute those who worshipped the calf, and the Levites complied, killing even their family members who had committed this sin. They showed no favoritism, treating guilty family members like ordinary people with whom they had no affiliation. The Maharam Shick writes that this verse may also allude to the Kohen Gadol, who is to remain in the Bet Ha’mikdash even when a family member dies, as though he does not even know the family member. This command, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only to Kohanim. A Kohen who leaves the Bet Ha’mikdash in the middle of his performance of the Aboda is liable to Malkut. Although this prohibition does not apply nowadays, its underlying message is very relevant even in our time. Just as the Kohanim show disrespect to the Aboda if they leave in the middle of the service, we likewise disrespect our service of G-d in the synagogue if we leave – either literally or figuratively – in the middle. If we allow ourselves to be distracted by other things – such as our phones – during the prayer service, then we give the appearance of regarding other things as more important than our service of G-d. When we are in the synagogue, we must direct our attention exclusively toward the service until it is finished, even if for no other reason than to make it clear that serving our Creator is our highest priority.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 10:6) commands the Kohanim, “Bigdechem Lo Tifromu” – not to tear their garments before entering the Bet Ha’mikdash to perform the Aboda (service). This command forbids the Kohanim from performing the service while wearing torn garments. The definition of a “torn garment” for the purpose of this Halacha is the same as the definition of the requirement for a mourner to tear his garment – namely, a rip of at least a Tefah (handbreadth). This prohibition applies differently to regular Kohanim and to the Kohen Gadol. The Kohen Gadol may not ever tear his clothing – even when he is not performing the Aboda, and even to mourn the passing of an immediate family member. For other Kohanim, this command forbids entering the Bet Ha’mikdash with a torn garment. If a Kohen performed the Aboda in the Bet Ha’mikdash with a torn garment, he is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hands of G-d, as opposed to execution by the court). If he did not perform the Aboda with torn clothing, but he entered the area in between the outdoor altar and the Ulam (entrance to the Bet Ha’mikdash) with a torn garment, then he has still transgressed a Biblical prohibition, but is liable to Malkut, and not death. This is the opinion of the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch. The Ramban disagrees, and maintains that simply entering the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash wearing torn garments, without performing the Aboda, is forbidden only Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment. In his view, the Torah prohibition forbids only performing the Aboda with torn garments, and not entering the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash with such clothing. If a Kohen performed the Aboda while wearing torn clothing, then even though he has violated the Torah command, the service he performed is not invalidated. The reasoning behind this Misva, of course, is to maintain an aura of majesty and grandeur in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Bet Ha’mikdash is to be a place which inspires and uplifts people, motivating them to submit to G-d’s authority and obey His will. To that end, the Kohanim are required to be dressed in a dignified manner, as appearing in torn clothing would undermine the aura of majesty, and is thus forbidden. Furthermore, wearing torn clothing is a sign of mourning, and the Bet Ha’mikdash is to instill joy and enthusiasm for the service of G-d. Hence, it would be inappropriate to wear torn clothing – an expression of grief – in the Bet Ha’mikdash.
The Torah in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 10:6) commands the Kohanim, “Rashechem Al Tifra’u” – that they must not let their hair grow long. This establishes a prohibition forbidding the Kohanim from serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair. The Gemara explains that this refers to letting one’s hair grow for thirty days. This conclusion is reached based on the parallel between the word “Tifra’u” and the related word “Pera” used in reference to the Nazir’s obligation to allow his hair to grow. Just as a Nazir’s status lasts for thirty days unless he stipulates otherwise, the period beyond which a Kohen may not allow his hair to grow before serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash is thirty days. It is uncertain whether we apply the rule of “Miksat Ha’yom Ke’kulo” (“part of the day is regarded as the entire day”) to consider the Kohen’s hair long already on the morning of the thirtieth day, or if it is considered long only after the conclusion of the thirtieth day. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the purpose of this prohibition is “Le’hagdalat Ha’bayit” – to help maintain an aura of awe and grandeur in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Bet Ha’mikdash is to be a place where people are inspired to repent and to humble themselves before G-d. Therefore, it was vitally important for the Kohanim to create an atmosphere of reverence that would have this kind of impact upon the people. If the Kohanim were to enter appearing disheveled, this would undermine the atmosphere of awe, thus diminishing from the emotional impact that the experience of visiting the Bet Ha’mikdash is meant to have upon the people. Moreover, just as Megilat Ester says that it was forbidden to appear in the royal courtyard wearing sackcloth – the clothing of mourners – all the more so, it is inappropriate to appear in the Bet Ha’mikdash looking like a mourner. The Kohanim are to exude joy and vitality, and if they serve with long hair, they appear like mourners, as though they are unhappy serving G-d. Thus, the Torah commanded the Kohanim not to appear in the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair. A regular Kohen violates this prohibition only by entering the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair, whereas the Kohen Gadol transgresses this prohibition by letting his hair grow for thirty days, regardless of where he is. Due to his unique stature of sanctity, the Kohen Gadol may not allow his hair to grow even if he does not enter the Bet Ha’mikdash. Of course, this command is applicable only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only to the Kohanim. A Kohen who serves in the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair is liable to Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim (death at the hands of G-d, as opposed to execution by the court). A Kohen who enters the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair but does not perform the Aboda (service) is liable to Malkut. Aboda performed by a Kohen with long hair is not invalidated, even though the Kohen violated the Torah’s command by performing the service in such a state. The Ramban was of the opinion that the Torah prohibition applies only to performing the Aboda with long hair. In his view, simply entering the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair, without performing any service, is forbidden only Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, follows the view of the Rambam, that even just entering the Bet Ha’mikdash with long hair constitutes a Torah violation, albeit one which is punishable by Malkut and not Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim. The Kohanim were divided into different Mishmarot – rotations, with a different group of Kohanim serving in the Bet Ha’mikdash each week. The policy was that every Kohen would need to take a haircut before beginning his Mishmar (rotation) in the Bet Ha’mikdash. They were not permitted to take haircuts during the week of their Mishmar, in order to ensure that they would not begin their Mishmar appearing disheveled. This resembles the prohibition enacted by the Sages forbidding haircutting during Hol Ha’mo’ed, in order to ensure that one properly grooms himself before Yom Tob and does not enter Yom Tob looking unkempt. Likewise, the Sages did not allow the Kohanim to take haircuts during their week of service in the Bet Ha’mikdash, so that they would make a point of cutting their hair before beginning their rotation. Nevertheless, if a Kohen, for whatever reason, did not take a haircut before the beginning of his Mishmar, and the thirty-day period since his last haircut would end during his Mishmar, he is permitted to cut his hair in order to avoid violating this severe Torah prohibition. Although this command does not apply nowadays, the underlying message is directly relevant to the way we appear in the synagogue, which is called a “Mikdash Me’at” (“miniature” Bet Ha’mikdash). Just as the Kohanim were to enter the Bet Ha’mikdash appearing dignified and presentable, we, too, must ensure that we are properly dressed and groomed every time we enter the synagogue to pray and serve the Almighty.
The Torah commands in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 7:26) that it is forbidden to consume the blood of animals or birds. The blood of kosher species of fish, however, is permissible for consumption. On the level of Torah law, human blood may be consumed, as well, but the Sages forbade the consumption of human blood due to the concern of “Mar’it Ha’ayin” – that it gives the appearance of consuming animal blood. Blood found in eggs is permissible for consumption, unless there is some concern that the yolk had begun developing into an embryo. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that drinking blood could engender a cruel nature within a person, as he consumes that which constitutes the primary lifeline of the animal. Moreover, he adds, consuming blood could have the effect of engendering base, animalistic tendencies within a person, and so the Torah forbade the consumption of blood. Halacha distinguishes with respect to this prohibition between different types of blood. “Dam Ha’nefesh” is the initial spurt of blood caused when an animal is slaughtered. This category also includes blood found in the cavity of the animal’s heart, and the blood that flows from the animal during bloodletting. Consuming blood of this type is punishable by Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). The second category of blood is called “Dam Ha’tamsit,” referring to the blood that trickles from the animal after the initial spurt of blood caused by slaughtering. This category also includes the blood in the animal’s organs. Consuming blood of this type is punishable by Malkut. The third type of blood is the blood absorbed in the meat, which is permissible as long as it had not left the meat. For this reason, raw, uncooked meat (referred to as “Umsa” in the Gemara”) is permissible for consumption, even though it contains blood within it, as long as it had been rinsed to remove blood from the surface. However, cooking meat has the effect of extracting the blood, and it is immediately reabsorbed into the meat. Since this blood had left the meat, it is forbidden for consumption. Therefore, the Sages enacted that before meat is cooked, it must be salted in order to thoroughly remove all absorbed blood. Any blood which is not extracted through the process of Meliha (salting) can be presumed not to be then extracted through cooking, either, and is thus permissible. Certain portions meat of meat – specifically, the liver and the brain – contain such large quantities of blood that the Sages required roasting them in order to extract all the blood. Salting does not suffice for the liver or the brain. This prohibition applies in all places, at all times, and to both males and females.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 7:23) forbids partaking of the Heleb – certain fats – of oxen, sheep and goats. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade consuming these fats because, quite simply, they are unhealthful, and can cause physical harm. A person’s health, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, depends largely on the food he eats, because the body is always decomposing, and food is needed to replenish the body. In essence, then, the food one eats becomes his body, and therefore, ingesting good food causes the body to be strong and healthy, whereas ingesting bad food is harmful to the body. G-d, in His infinite kindness, commanded us to refrain from foods which cause us harm, and He thus forbade the consumption of Heleb, which is unhealthful. As mentioned, the Torah specifies the Heleb of oxen, sheep and goats, and thus the Heleb of other animals is permissible. This prohibition applies even to the Heleb of a Nebela – animal which died in a manner other than proper Shehita (slaughtering) – and of a Terefa – animal which suffers from a fatal physical condition. The meat of these animals, of course, is forbidden because of the prohibition against eating meat of a Nebela or Terefa, and the Heleb is also forbidden just like the Heleb of properly slaughtered, permissible animals. If a pregnant animal is slaughtered, then the Heleb of the fetus is permissible for consumption. Since the fetus is considered part of the mother’s body, and the mother underwent proper Shehita, the fetus’ Heleb may be eaten. However, the Rambam maintains that this does not apply if the pregnancy had reached full-term, such that the fetus was fully developed and ready for birth when the slaughtering occurred. In such a case, according to the Rambam, the fetus is regarded as a separate animal, such that its Heleb is forbidden. Most other authorities dispute this ruling of the Rambam. The prohibition of Heleb features a unique leniency, as it is permissible to sell it commercially. Whereas it is generally forbidden to do commerce with forbidden foods, one may engage in commerce selling Heleb. This leniency results in an interesting distinction between Behemot (domesticated animals) and Hayot (non-domesticated animals). The fats of non-domesticated animals are not only permissible, but not even considered “Heleb” at all. Therefore, if such an animal is a Nebela or Terefa, its fat may not be sold commercially, since it does not qualify as “Heleb” and is therefore not subject to this special leniency. This fat is treated like the other portions of the Nebela or Terefa, which are forbidden for consumption and also for commercial use. It is only the fat of domesticated animals, which has the formal status of “Heleb,” which may be sold commercially. The Heleb prohibition applies in all places, in all times, and to both men and women. One who intentionally eats a Ke’zayit of Heleb is liable to Malkut and Karet. If one accidentally eats a Ke’zayit of Heleb, he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering).
The Torah commands in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 7:19) that if the meat of a sacrifice had come in contact with something which renders it Tameh (ritually impure), it must be burned. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if the meat became Tameh in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash, then it must be burned there in the courtyard; if it became Tameh outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, then it is burned there, in the place where it had become Tameh. This obligation applies also to Notar – meat of a sacrifice which had been left over beyond the final time allotted for its consumption. For example, a Korban Shelamim may be eaten until sundown the day after the sacrifice was offered, and it may be eaten anywhere in the city of Jerusalem. If a person brought the meat of the Shelamim to his home in Jerusalem, and some meat was left over past sundown the following day, he must burn the leftover meat in his home. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that as a general rule, the bones of a sacrifice which were left over need to be burned only if there is edible marrow inside them. The marrow is considered meat, and it is thus subject to the same laws that apply to ordinary sacrificial meat. Leftover bones which do not contain marrow, however, do not require burning, because the bones themselves are not considered meat. The exception to this rule is the meat of the Korban Pesach. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah forbids breaking the bones of the Korban Pesach, and therefore, when the Korban Pesach is carved, the carving is done very carefully so as not to break any bones. As the carving is done at a distance from the bones, it is very likely that some meat remains attached to the bones. Hence, leftover bones of the Korban Pesach must be burned, regardless of whether or not they contain marrow. Another example of a sacrifice which must be burned is an “Asham Talui” – an atonement sacrifice brought in situations of a possible violation – when the person determined after the slaughtering that he did not, in fact, commit the sin in question. Since it has been ascertained that the sacrifice was not necessary, the meat cannot be eaten, and so it is burned. Likewise, a bird sacrifice which was offered to atone for a possible violation may not be eaten. Unlike ordinary birds, which are killed via standard Shehita (slaughtering the front of the neck), bird sacrifices are killed via Melika – piercing the back of the neck with a fingernail. If a bird sacrifice was not, in fact, required, then the meat of the bird is forbidden for consumption, since it had been killed via Melika, and not Shehita, and Melika is a valid form of slaughtering only for birds offered as sacrifices. Therefore, if a bird sacrifice is offered to atone for a possible violation, the meat may not be eaten, due to the possibility that a sacrifice was not required, and so it must be burned. Other items which require burning include the hair of a Nazir, which he cuts after the completion of his term of Nezirut and must then burn, and Kileh Ha’kerem – grain and grapes which were grown together, in violation of Torah law. One who failed to burn that which the Torah required burning is in violation of this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 7:19) commands that if sacrificial food came in contact with a source of Tum’a (impurity), that food is forbidden for consumption. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command is intended to maintain our respect and reverence for the sacrifices. By demanding that we eat sacrificial food only if it is in a state of purity – and if we ourselves are in a state of purity – the Torah ensures that we regard the sacrifices as special and sacred. This command is binding upon both men and women. One who eats a Ke’zayit of sacrificial meat which had become Tameh on the level of Torah law receives Malkut. If the meat had contracted a type of Tum’a which was decreed by the Sages, then he receives “Makat Mardut” – lashes for violating the enactments of the Rabbis.
The term “Pigul” refers to a sacrifice which the Kohen offered with the intention of eating its meat, or placing the designated portions on the altar, beyond the prescribed time. There are deadlines by which the meat of every sacrifice must be eaten, and by which the Kohen must placed the required portions on the altar. If the Kohen performed any of the major stages of the sacrificial process with the intention to eat the sacrifice or place the required portions of the sacrifice on the altar beyond the prescribed time, the sacrifice is considered “Pigul” and disqualified. The Torah in Parashat Sav (7:18) strictly forbids eating Pigul, and doing so is punishable by Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command because of the central importance of thoughts in the context of sacrifices. The offering of sacrifices serves to atone for wrongdoing, and all wrongdoing begins with sinful thoughts. Sacrifices, which atone for sin, need to rectify the improper thoughts that lead people to sin, and thus offering a sacrifice with improper thoughts invalidates the sacrifice. The prohibition of Pigul applies only to the portions of the sacrifice that are offered on the altar, and the parts which are eaten. It does not apply to the “Matir” – that which is offered as a precondition for allowing the meat to be eaten or the required portions to be placed on the altar. Thus, for example, if one consumed blood of a sacrifice that became Pigul, although he has, of course, violated the prohibition against eating blood, he does not violate the prohibition of Pigul. The blood is sprinkled on the altar as a prerequisite for allowing the sacrificial meat to be eaten and the portions to be placed on the altar, and so the prohibition of Pigul does not apply to the blood. Likewise, when a Minha (flour) offering is brought, a handful is placed on the altar, and the rest is eaten by the Kohanim. The Pigul prohibition applies to the portion eaten by the Kohanim, but not to the Kometz (handful on the altar), which is placed on the altar as a “Matir,” to permit the Kohanim’s consumption of the rest of the sacrifice. Therefore, although it is certainly forbidden to eat the Kometz for other reasons, one who does so is not in violation of the command of Pigul. The Pigul prohibition does not apply to the wine used as libations, or to the exceptional Minha offerings which are entirely burned on the altar and not eaten by the Kohanim. This Misva, quite obviously, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It is binding upon all people – Kohanim and non-Kohanim, and both male and female. One who intentionally eats a Ke’zayit of Pigul is liable to Karet, and one who does so unintentionally must bring a Korban Hatat (sin offering). Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Germany, 1808-1888) offers an insightful explanation for the concept underlying the prohibition of Pigul. One who performs the sacrifice with the intention of eating its meat beyond the prescribed time essentially creates a gap between the offering of the sacrifice, and the consumption of the sacrifice. These two stages, Rav Hirsch explains, must be closely linked. The offering of the sacrifice represents the “slaughtering” of evil, the elimination of sin, and the consumption of the sacrifice represents the need to incorporate Kedusha (sanctity) into our ordinary, physical lives. These two values are inextricably linked, and therefore Torah strictly forbids Pigul, partaking of a sacrifice that was conducted with a separation between the two stages of sacrificing and consumption. In conclusion, it is worth nothing how this command demonstrates the great importance that the Torah accords to thoughts. Even though the Kohen performs the sacrifice properly, in precise accordance with all the laws and guidelines, and merely thinks an improper thought, the sacrifice is invalid, and strictly forbidden for consumption. This shows that the mind is a crucial component of religious life, and that we must not only act and speak the right way, but also think the right way, as the Torah commands us.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 7:17) commands that if sacrificial food was left over beyond the final time when it may be eaten, it must be burned. A separate command forbids allowing sacrificial food to remain uneaten by the deadline for its consumption. But if this food was left over, in violation of the Torah’s command, there is a Misva upon the Kohanim to burn it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded burning the leftover sacrificial food so that it would not be seen in its state of decay. When meat is left over, it quickly rots and emits a foul stench. In order that we maintain our esteem and respect for the hallowed food, the Torah required destroying it before it rots and becomes repulsive. Specifically, the Torah commanded burning the food, because, the Sefer Ha’hinich explains, no destruction is as complete as the destruction wrought by burning, which leaves only ashes and no actual trace of the original item. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah commanded burning leftover sacrificial food in order to strengthen our Bitahon, our trust in G-d. People who limit their consumption in order to save for later do so because they fear not having enough for the future. We are to trust that G-d will always provide us with our needs, without worrying about the future. Therefore, the Torah commanded burning leftover sacrificial food to discourage hoarding, and to remind us to always trust that G-d will care for us. This obligation applies not only to Notar (sacrificial food which has passed the deadline for its consumption), but also to sacrificial food which became disqualified for consumption due to some other reason. If one is uncertain about the status of a certain portion of sacrificial food, whether or not it has become Notar or otherwise unfit for consumption, then he leaves it until its appearance changes due to rotting, and then burns it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a person found a portion of an animal in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash, then he must assume that it is from an Ola (sacrifice which is entirely burnt on the altar). If one finds there a small piece of meat, he must assume it is from a Hatat (sin-offering, the meat of which is eaten by the Kohanim in the Temple courtyard). And if a piece of meat is found somewhere in Jerusalem, it must be assumed that it is from a Shelamim (sacrifice which may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem). Moreover, it must be assumed that the meat has passed the deadline for its consumption. Therefore, it is left until it starts to rot, and then burned. Sacrificial food which must be burned is to be burned specifically by day, and not during the night. A Kohen who fails to burn Notar or other sacrificial meat which is no longer permissible for consumption has transgressed this affirmative command. Additionally, leaving over sacrificial food past the final time for its consumption violates a Biblical prohibition. This prohibition is not punishable by Malkut, however, because it is violated without performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”).
The Torah in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 7:15) establishes that when one brings a Korban Toda (thanksgiving offering), he may eat the sacrifice the day he brings it, and the following night, but he may not leave over any of the sacrifice until morning. The Sages understood that this command applies to all sacrifices which are eaten – it is forbidden to leave over the meat beyond the final time prescribed for eating it. The Torah stipulates that if one violated this prohibition and left over sacrificial meat beyond the prescribed time, then he must burn the leftover meat. The prohibition of “Notar” (leftover sacrificial meat) thus falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a prohibition which, if violated, requires one to do something which in a sense rectifies the violation. Such prohibitions are exceptional in that those who violate these commands do not receive Malkut. The Korban Toda belongs to the Shelamim category of sacrifices, but it differs from other Shelamim in that the Torah prescribed a shorter time-frame for its consumption. Other Shelamim sacrifices may be eaten for “two days and one night” – meaning, the day the sacrifice is offered, that night, and the following day, until sundown. If, for example, a standard Shelamim sacrifice is offered on a Monday afternoon, its meat may be eaten until sundown on Tuesday. The Korban Toda, however, as mentioned earlier, may be eaten only through the next night. If a Toda was offered on Monday, then it may be eaten only until dawn Tuesday morning. Ironically, the Torah prescribed a shorter time-frame for the Korban Toda despite the fact that there is more to eat when a Korban Toda is offered than when other Shelamim sacrifices are offered. A Korban Toda, unlike other Shelamim offerings, consists of not only an animal, but also forty loaves of bread. The question thus arises as to why the Torah would require eating the largest Shelamim sacrifice – the Korban Toda – within a shorter time-frame than that prescribed for other Shelamim sacrifices? A famous answer to this question is offered by Abarbanel (1437-1508), in his Torah commentary. He writes that the purpose of the Korban Toda is, of course, to express gratitude and thanksgiving to G-d. Specifically, the Toda offering would be brought after one emerged safely from one of four dangerous situations – illness, captivity, a sea voyage, or desert travel. These are described in the 107 th chapter of Tehillim, which says that people who emerge from these situations shall praise G-d for His kindness (“Yodu L’Hashem Hasdo”), and shall exult Him publicly (“Vi’yromemuhu Bi’khal Am”). When a Toda offering is brought, it is done for the purpose of publicly praising G-d for His graciousness. For this reason, Abarbanel explains, the Torah required one who brings a Toda to include a large amount of food which must be eaten within a short period of time – to ensure that he will invite guests with whom to share his feast, and to whom he will speak of how G-d assisted him and extricated him from danger. The extra food required with this sacrifice, and the shorter time-frame allowed for its consumption, have the effect of enhancing the public nature of the sacrificial feast, as a large gathering will be invited to participate, thus bringing glory to G-d. On this basis, we can perhaps explain the comments of Rabbenu Bahya (Spain, 1255-1340), in his Torah commentary to Parashat Sav (6:2). He notes the famous verse in the Book of Yirmiyahu (33:11) foreseeing the time when “the sound of rejoicing, the sound of happiness, the sound of a groom and the sound of a bride” will again be heard in Jerusalem. The verse continues, “…the sound of people saying: ‘Give thanks to the G-d of Hosts, for G-d is good, for His kindness is eternal,’ as they bring a thanksgiving offering in the House of G-d…” The implication of this verse, Rabbenu Bahya writes, is that in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, a bride and groom would offer a Korban Toda, and this was the food that would be served at the wedding. In light of what we have seen, we understand why this was done. A Korban Toda was offered for the purpose of giving public expression to one’s feelings of gratitude to G-d. Naturally, then, when a bride and groom get married and celebrate together with a large gathering, they bring a Korban Toda and distribute the food to their guests. The offering of a Korban Toda at a wedding might also serve an additional purpose – to impress upon the new couple the importance of gratitude, and of never taking anything for granted. One of the causes of tension in marriage is the resentment resulting from unfulfilled expectations, when a spouse feels the other is obligated to do something which he or she fails to do. The best “menu” for a wedding is the Korban Toda – not only to give public praise to G-d, but also to convey to the bride and groom the message of gratitude, to always be appreciative, and not to take anything the other spouse does for granted. Each and every favor, big or small, routine or out-of-the-ordinary, should be appreciated and respected. When a couple begins their wedding with a Korban Toda, they understand the importance of appreciating everything that is done for them, a necessary ingredient for a happy home. Although we cannot bring a Korban Toda today, we nevertheless observe the concept underlying this offering by reciting Birkat Ha’gomel after emerging safely from a dangerous situation in the presence of ten people. Additionally, it is customary after experiencing an especially dangerous situation, such as serious illness, to host a large Se’udat Hoda’a to publicize G-d’s kindness.
One of the sacrifices discussed by the Torah in the beginning of the Book of Vayikra (beginning of chapter 3, and 7:11-12) is the Shelamim offering. Generally, Shelamim sacrifices are offered by individuals. The exception to this rule is the special Sheteh Ha’lehem offering brought on Shabuot, which consisted of two sheep and two loaves of bread, that were eaten by the Kohanim. This is the only example of Shalmeh Sibur – a Shelamim sacrifice offered collectively by the nation. Among the various types of Shelamim sacrifices which were offered is the “Shalmeh Hagiga” – the Shelamim sacrifice which one would offer when making his pilgrimage to Jerusalem on Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot. Another is “Shalmeh Toda” – the thanksgiving offering which one would bring to express his gratitude to G-d after being extricated from a dangerous situation (as discussed below). Yet another type of Shelamim is the offering brought by the Nazir after the successful completion of the period of Nezirut which he had accepted upon himself (“El Nazir”). When a Toda sacrifice was offered, the animal sacrifice was accompanied by forty breads – thirty of which were unleavened, whereas the other ten were baked as Hametz. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the thirty unleavened breads consisted of three groups of ten breads each. The first group was called “Ma’afeh Tanur,” and these were prepared by adding oil to the flour and then baking it. The second type was Rekikim, breads which were baked without oil, with the oil being added after they came out of the oven. The third type, called Murbechet, was prepared by boiling the flour in hot water, after which it was briefly baked and then deep fried, like a donut. Ten Esronim of flour were used for all thirty unleavened breads. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, following the view of the Rambam, maintained that offering a Toda sacrifice is voluntary, and not an obligation. The Sages taught that one would bring a Korban Toda after surviving four dangerous situations – illness, a sea voyage, captivity, and a journey through the desert. This is inferred from the 107 th chapter of Tehillim, which describes people giving praise and offering sacrifices to G-d after being rescued from these four dangers. Nevertheless, the Rambam maintained that this chapter in Tehillim merely encourages offering a thanksgiving sacrifice after safely enduring these experiences, but does not establish a Halachic obligation to do so. Some suggest drawing proof for the Rambam’s position from the Halacha mentioned in the Sifra that Ma’aser Sheni money may be used to purchase a Toda offering. This money (onto which one exchanged the sanctity of the tithe of his produce and brought to Jerusalem) may not be used for obligatory offerings, and thus this Halacha would seem to prove that a Korban Toda is not mandatory. A Kohen who fails to perform the Shelamim sacrifice in the manner prescribed by the Torah is in violation of this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (beginning of chapter 7) introduces the guidelines for the offering of the Korban Asham (“guilt sacrifices”) which was required to atone for certain misdeeds. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the obligation upon the Kohanim to comply with these guidelines as the 140 th Biblical command. The Ramban, commenting to Parashat Vayikra (5:15), discusses the difference between the two different kinds of sin offerings – Hatat and Asham. The Torah makes it clear that these are two separate categories of sacrifices, despite the fact that both are brought to atone for wrongdoing. The Ramban explains that the word “Het” (“sin”) literally means “miss,” as in missing the target when shooting arrows. One is said to commit a “Het” when he makes a mistake, when he “misses” the goal that he was expected to accomplish. And thus the Hatat offering is brought primarily for unintentional sins, for instances where one simply “missed the mark” and did not act as he was supposed to act. The word “Asham,” however, is derived from the word “Shemama,” which refers to desolation and destruction. An Asham is required for situations of more severe wrongs, for which one is deserving of “destruction,” but he is granted the opportunity to atone for his wrongdoing by offering a sacrifice. Indeed, on some occasions, an Asham is offered even for an intentional violation of a Torah command. A Kohen who fails to follow the procedures outlined by the Torah for offering the Asham sacrifice has transgressed this affirmative command.
The Torah prescribes different procedures to be followed for the offering of different Hatat sacrifices (sacrifices brought for atonement). The blood of some Hatat offerings is sprinkled on the outdoor Mizbe’ah (altar), whereas the blood of other Hatat offerings is sprinkled inside the Mishkan, on the incense altar. The Torah in Parashat Sav (6:23) establishes that in the case of a Hatat Penimit – a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled inside the Bet Ha’mikdash – the meat is not eaten, but rather brought outside Jerusalem and burned. Whereas the meat of other sin-offerings is eaten by the Kohanim, the meat of a “Hatat Penimit” is burned outside the city. The Sifra, commenting to this verse, explains that the Torah here introduces a prohibition against eating the meat of such sacrifices. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that no reason can be offered for this command, because detailed laws such as this have no accessible reason, and we must unquestioningly accept it as G-d’s will without trying to give any reason for it. This command also includes a prohibition against eating meat of other sacrifices, whose blood is to be sprinkled on the outdoor altar, if the blood was, for whatever reason, brought inside the Bet Ha’mikdash. If the blood was brought through the entrance to the Bet Ha’mikdash from the courtyard, then the sacrifice’s meat becomes forbidden for consumption, just like the meat of a “Hatat Penimit.” By the same token, if the blood of a “Hatat Penimit” was, for whatever reason, brought into the Kodesh Ha’kodashim, the inner chamber of the Bet Ha’mikdash, the sacrifice is invalidated. Anybody – a Kohen or non-Kohen, male or female – who eats the meat of a “Hatat Penimit” transgresses this prohibition, and if the violator eats a Ke’zayit, then he or she is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (chapter 6) introduces the procedure for bringing the Korban Hatat – the sin-offering which is required for atonement in certain situations of wrongdoing. The Ramban was of the opinion that all the various forms of sacrifices are to be counted as but a single Misva. In his view, there is one Biblical command to offer the sacrifices – the Hatat, Asham, Ola and Shelamim – and the differences between the sacrifices are merely details of this single Misva. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, follows the view of the Rambam, who maintained that each sacrifice constitutes a separate Misva. According to his listing, the Misva to perform the Hatat is the 138 th Biblical command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes in his discussion of this Misva that it is futile to try to understand the underlying rationale of the Korbanot, as the true explanation lies beyond the reach of our limited comprehension. He writes that an exceptionally learned man, with a thorough knowledge of Kabbalah, might perhaps be able to arrive at some semblance of understanding of the reasons for the sacrifices. But even that is beyond the grasp of the vast majority of us, and so we should not waste our time or mental energy in the futile quest to understand the meaning behind the Korbanot. The Sefer Ha’hinuch outlines the various laws and guidelines relevant to this sacrifice. Depending on the circumstances, he writes, the Korban Hatat can be either sheep, goats, large cattle, doves or turtledoves. In some situations, individual sinners are required to offer a Hatat, but there are also occasions when a Hatat is brought on behalf of the entire nation: the goats brought as sin-offerings on Rosh Hodesh and the Yamim Tobim; in a case when the Sanhedrin issued a mistaken ruling (“Par Healem Dabar Shel Sibur”); a mistaken transgression of the entire nation of the prohibition against idolatry; and the goats brought as part of the Yom Kippur atonement service. The blood of some sin-offerings is sprinkled on the outdoor altar (“Hataot Hisoniyot”), and the blood of others is sprinkled inside the Bet Ha’mikdash, on the incense altar (“Hataot Ha’penimiyot”). In the former case, the meat of the sacrifice is eaten by the Kohanim, whereas in the latter case, the meat is brought outside the Bet Ha’mikdash and burned there. In all cases, certain portions of the Hatat are placed on the altar. These include the fats on the stomach, the kidneys, the fats on the kidneys, and a piece extending from the liver (“Yoteret Al Ha’kabed”). When a sheep is offered as a Hatat, the tail and the spinal cord are also placed on the altar. A Kohen who was to have offered a Korban Hatat and failed to do so has transgressed this Biblical command. The Gemara tells of great Rabbis who lived after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and who mistakenly committed forbidden acts requiring a Korban Hatat. They recorded the incident in their ledger, so they would remember that when the Bet Ha’mikdash is rebuilt, they will have to offer a Hatat. In the meantime, as long as we do not have a Bet Ha’mikdash, the Rabbis have taught us that by reading and studying the verses and Mishnayot that speak about the Korban Hatat, we are considered, in some sense, as though we have actually brought the sacrifice and thereby earn atonement.
The Torah commands in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 6:16), “Ve’chol Minhat Kohen Kalil Tiheyeh Lo Te’achel” – “Every flour offering of a Kohen shall be offered whole; it shall not be eaten.” Normally, when a Minha (flour offering) is brought, a handful of the sacrifice is placed on the altar, and the rest is eaten by the Kohanim. The Torah here establishes that an exception is made when a Kohen offers a Minha, as a Kohen’s offering is to be entirely burnt on the altar, and it is forbidden for anyone to eat any part of the offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the purpose of a sacrifice is to arouse the heart of the person who brings it, and therefore, the Torah forbade eating a Kohen’s Minha. If a Kohen’s Minha would be eaten like ordinary Minha offerings, then the Kohen who brings a Minha would end up eating his own offering, and it would thus be no different to him than an ordinary meal, and would not have any emotional impact. In order to ensure that a Kohen’s Minha sacrifice would have the desired effect upon his heart, the Torah commanded that the entire offering be placed on the altar, and not eaten. This command, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It applies to Kohanim and non-Kohanim alike, and to both men and women. Anyone who partakes of a Kohen’s Minha offering violates this prohibition, and one who eats a Ke’zayit of a Kohen’s Minha offering is liable to Malkut. The concept underlying this Misva is that when one brings an offering to G-d, he must offer something of value and significance. As Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Germany, 1808-1888) noted, the word “Korban” (“sacrifice”) is derived from the word “Karob” – “close,” because the purpose of a sacrifice is to draw a person closer to G-d. When a person sacrifices something of value which he owns, this brings him closer to the Almighty. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (5:23) teaches, “Le’fum Sa’ara Agra” – “The reward is proportional to the pain.” The Maharal of Prague (1520-1609) explains that the more a person exerts and sacrifices for the sake of a Misva, the closer he draws to Hashem. Therefore, when a person brings a sacrifice, he should offer something of significance. This point is developed at length by the Rambam (Hilchot Issureh Mizbe’ah 7:11), where he writes, “One who wishes to bring himself merit should subdue his evil inclination, extend himself, and bring a sacrifice from the nicest and choicest of that species from which he can bring.” He brings as an example the story of Hebel, who brought his choicest sheep as an offering to G-d, and it was accepted. Anything which one donates for G-d, the Rambam writes, should be the best. When building a synagogue, the Rambam instructs, one should make it beautiful, more so than his home; when feeding or giving clothing to a needy person, he should give the highest quality food or garments. Just as the Kohen Gadol’s offering is not eaten, so that his offering would be something substantial, anything we give for the sake of a Misva should be substantial, as befitting something as important as a Misva.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (6:13) introduces the command that the Kohen Gadol must bring a Korban Minha – flour offering – each day. This offering is called “Minhat Habitin,” or “Minhat Kohen Mashiah.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that given the Kohen Gadol’s unique stature, as Am Yisrael’s agent who prays on our behalf, and through whose prayers and sacrifices we earn atonement, it is appropriate for him to offer a special sacrifice. Just as the daily Tamid sacrifice is offered each morning and afternoon by the entire nation, likewise, the Kohen Gadol offers a personal sacrifice each morning and afternoon. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this is a private sacrifice, which the Kohen Gadol purchases with his own money, because a personal sacrifice has a far greater impact upon an individual than a public offering. This offering is intended to arouse the Kohen Gadol, reminding him of his unique stature and of the great responsibility which rests upon his shoulders. The Kohen Gadol would take one Issaron of flour, and, with the special measuring cup used in the Bet Ha’mikdash, would divide it into two equal portions, each measuring a half-Issaron. One half was offered in the morning, and the other in the afternoon. He added a total of three Lugim of olive oil – or twelve Rebi’iot – as well as hot water, kneading the dough into a total of twelve loaves, six from each half-Issaron. He then placed the six loaves in a frying pan and fried them. Afterward, he broke each loaf into two halves, and these were offered on the altar together with a handful of Lebona (frankincense). Unlike other Minha offerings, from which only a handful was placed on the altar while the rest was eaten by the Kohanim, Minha offerings brought by Kohanim – such as the Kohen Gadol’s daily offering – were completely burned on the altar. The same procedure was performed for the other six loaves in the afternoon. In the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s presentation of the laws relevant to this Misva, he follows the Rambam’s position, that the six loaves of each offering were broken into two halves, such that twelve separate pieces were offered on the altar. This is the implication of the Gemara in Masechet Menahot (87) which discusses whether the loaves were divided by hand or with a utensil – clearly indicating that the loaves were split. The Ra’abad (Rav Abraham Ben David of Posquières , France, d. 1198) disagreed, and maintained that the six loaves of each offering remained whole and were not divided. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that although this offering was brought twice each day, it is to be counted as a single Misva. He adds that even the Ramban, who maintained that the daily Tamid sacrifice – which was likewise brought each morning and afternoon – should be counted as two separate Misvot, concedes that the Misva of Minhat Habitin constitutes but a single Misva. Needless to say, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is binding only upon the Kohen Gadol.
In its discussion of the Korban Minha (flour offering), the Torah commands in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 6:10) that the Kohanim may not bake their portion of the sacrifice into Hametz. When a Minha is offered, a handful is placed on the altar, and the rest is eaten by the Kohanim, but they must eat the flour as Masa; they may not prepare it as Hametz. Accordingly, the Mishna states in Masechet Menahot (55) that one who bakes the Minha into Hametz violates this Biblical command and is liable to Malkut. Even if one person baked the Minha as Hametz in violation of this command, and then someone else baked it again, the second person violates this prohibition (“Mehametz Ahar Mehametz”). This prohibition applies only to a Minha Keshera – meaning, a Minha offering which is permissible for consumption. If, however, a Minha has, for whatever reason, become invalid for consumption, one does not transgress this command by baking it as Hametz. This prohibition applies to the portion of the Minha eaten by the Kohanim. If the Kohen offers the Kometz (handful) on the altar and makes it Hametz there, he does not violate this command. Even non-Kohanim are bound by this prohibition. Any man or woman who bakes the Minha as Hametz transgresses this command and is liable to Malkut. The question arises as to why the Torah forbids baking the Minha as Hametz, but does not forbid eating it with honey or other sweet foods. Earlier, the Torah forbade offering on the altar two types of food products – Hametz, and sweet foods. Yet, when it comes to the consumption of the Minha, the Torah forbids turning it into Hametz, but does not forbid eating it with sweet food products. The answer might emerge from the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s analysis of the prohibition against offering Hametz or honey on the altar. He explains that Hametz symbolizes arrogance – as the dough rises when it ferments, representing haughtiness – and also symbolizes laziness, as dough becomes Hametz when it is inactive, and not being handled. Sweet foods, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, represent excessive indulgence in physical enjoyment. These products are forbidden on the altar to teach us of the need to avoid these qualities – arrogance, laziness, and overindulgence. On this basis, we can perhaps understand why the Torah permits eating the Minha with sweet foods, while forbidding eating it as Hametz. Arrogance and laziness have no place whatsoever in the life of a Torah Jew; they are never acceptable. Indulgence in physical enjoyment, however, is acceptable when it is done in the framework of a Misva. On Shabbat and Yom Tob, for example, it is a Misva to enjoy delicacies and beverages. There are other occasions, too, when a festive meal is eaten in fulfillment of a Misva. And thus the Torah allows the Kohanim to eat the Korban Minha with honey and other sweet foods, indicating that in the context of Misvot, physical enjoyment is acceptable, notwithstanding the importance of generally exercising restraint and moderation in our pursuit of physical delights. Hametz, however, is forbidden even when eating the Minha, because the qualities it represents – arrogance and laziness – are unacceptable in any contexts.
When a Korban Minha – grain offering – was brought in the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Kohen performing the sacrifice would take a handful of the offering and place it on the fire on the altar. The Torah commands in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 6:9) that the remainder of the offering, called “Shiyureh Minha,” is to be eaten by the Kohanim. The verse states, “Ve’ha’noteret Mimena Yochelu Aharon U’banav” – “Aharon and his sons shall eat that which remains from it.” The rationale behind this Misva, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that the consumption of the offering by the Kohanim, G-d’s servants in the Bet Ha’mikdash, shows honor to the offering. Additionally, the one who brings the offering earns atonement through its being used to feed the righteous servants of Hashem. As a general rule, all Minha offerings follow this format – a handful is placed on the altar, and the rest is eaten by the Kohanim. The exception to this rule is a Minhat Zichreh Kehuna – a Minha offering brought by a male Kohen. Any Minha offered by a Kohen is completely burned on the altar, without a handful being removed, and without any of it being eaten. This includes the Minhat Hinuch – the Minha offering that every Kohen brings the day he serves as a Kohen in the Bet Ha’mikdash for the first time; the Minhat Habitin – the Minha brought each day by the Kohen Gadol; a Minhat Hoteh – a Minha that a Kohen is required to offer to atone for a sin he committed; and a Minhat Nedaba – a Minha which a Kohen volunteers to offer. All these Minha offerings are burned entirely on the altar, and no portion is eaten, since they are brought by a Kohen. A Kohen’s daughter, however, is not considered a Kohen with regard to this Halacha, and thus a Minha offering brought by a Kohen’s daughter is eaten after a handful is placed on the altar, just like other standard Minha offerings. The Misva to eat the “Shiyureh Minha” applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only to male Kohanim. A Kohen who fails to eat a Minha offering that is to be eaten violates this affirmative command.
The Torah in Parashat Sav (6:6) says about the fire on the altar, “Lo Tichbeh” – “it shall not be extinguished,” establishing a prohibition against extinguishing any part of the fire that burned on the altar. Even if someone took a fiery coal off the altar and then extinguished it somewhere else, he has violated this command. The prohibition forbids extinguishing not only fire which burns on the altar, but even fire which had been taken from the altar. The exceptions to this rule are coal taken for burning the Ketoret (the daily incense which was offered in the Bet Ha’mikdash), and coal taken for the purpose of lighting the Menorah. Once a piece of coal was taken for the Ketoret or for the Menorah, it is no longer considered fire from the altar, as its status has changed, and therefore, one does not violate a Biblical command by extinguishing that coal. This Halacha applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is binding not only on the Kohanim, but on all people, both men and women. Anyone who extinguishes coal from the Mizbe’ah in the Bet Hamikdash transgresses this prohibition. The question arises in light of this prohibition as to how the Mizbe’ah was transported through the wilderness. Beneh Yisrael constructed the Mishkan – a portable Bet Ha’mikdash – at Mount Sinai, and they carried it and all its furnishings with them as they traveled through the desert. How did they carry the altar, if they were not permitted to extinguish the fire? The Tanna’im (cited in the Sifra to Vayikra 6:6) debate the question of what happened to the fire on the altar during travel. G-d commanded that before each time Beneh Yisrael journeyed, they were to prepare the altar – “Ve’dishnu Et Ha’mizbe’ah” (Bamidbar 4:13), but it is unclear what this means. Rabbi Shimon understood this verse as a command to sweep and clean the altar, removing all the coals. Rabbi Yehuda, however, disagreed, noting that removing the coals would violate the prohibition against extinguishing the fire on the Mizbe’ah. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the top of the altar was covered with a special utensil during travel, such that the fire continued to burn throughout Beneh Yisrael’s journeys. The command “Ve’dishnu Et Ha’mizbe’ah,” according to Rabbi Yehuda, required adding extra fuel to the fire to ensure that it continued burning throughout the journey. (Rabbi Yehuda understood “Ve’dishnu” as a reference to “Deshen” – “fat,” or fuel.) The question remains as to how, in Rabbi Shimon’s view, the coals were allowed to be removed from the altar before travel, given the prohibition against extinguishing fire on the altar. The Rash Mi’Shantz (France, late 12 th -early 13 th century) explained that according to Rabbi Shimon, the coals were not extinguished, but were rather removed from the altar and placed in a special utensil, where they continued burning. This way, the Kohanim who prepared the altar cleared its surface without violating the prohibition against extinguishing the altar’s fire. The Brisker Rav (Rav Yishak Zev Soloveitchik, 1886-1959) explained this theory by asserting that there are two separate laws relevant to the fire on the altar. First, the Kohanim are to ensure that a fire always burns on the altar. Secondly, they are forbidden from extinguishing the fire. According to Rabbi Shimon, the Torah required clearing the altar before travel, and so the first law, requiring the Kohanim to ensure to maintain the fire’s presence on the altar, did not apply during travel, having been suspended by G-d Himself. The second law, however, remained in force, and so the coals were placed in a special container without being extinguished. Rabbi Yehuda, by contrast, understood the command of “Ve’dishnu Et Ha’mizbe’ah” differently, as requiring covering the Mizbe’ah, such that both laws remained applicable when Beneh Yisrael traveled. They therefore covered the altar so the fire would continue burning as they journeyed.
The Torah commands in Parashat Sav (Vayikra 6:6), “Esh Tamid Tukad Al Ha’mizbe’ah” – a constant fire must burn on the Mizbe’ah (altar) in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch addresses the question of why this command was necessary, given that, according to tradition, a miraculous fire descended from the heavens onto the altar each day. Why did the Torah require the Kohanim to kindle fire on the Mizbe’ah, if fire was already provided via a miracle? The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that when G-d performs a miracle, He minimizes its supernatural quality. The classic example was the splitting of the sea, which was preceded by strong gusts of wind which blew throughout the night. G-d minimized the supernatural element of this miracle by making strong winds such that the sea appeared to split as a result of wind. He does this, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, because it is only those who seek recognition and fame that go out of their way to publicize their actions and put themselves on display. G-d, in His infinite greatness, has no need to prove Himself to anybody; He does not find it necessary to “promote” Himself. Therefore, even when He performs miracles, He does so discreetly, minimizing the suspension of the natural order. Human beings feel a need to attract attention through extraordinary public displays, but G-d has no such need. Therefore, in the Bet Ha’mikdash, too, even though a miraculous fire descended from the heavens, G-d wanted to minimize the miracle by commanding the Kohanim to kindle fire on the altar each day, making it appear as though the fire was lit naturally. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to offer a second understanding of this Misva, explaining that lighting fire on the altar had an impact upon the people. Human beings, he writes, are composed of a number of different elements, which must all be perfectly balanced and proportioned in order for a person to be healthy and stable. One of these components is fire. The “fire” within a person gives him energy and enthusiasm, and keeps him driven and motivated to act, achieve and produce. If the fire within a person is too strong, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, then he develops a fever and falls ill. And if the fire is too low, then a person feels weak and feeble, bereft of energy and rigor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that kindling fire on the altar has an effect upon the “fire” within the people, ensuring that it remains properly balanced. He draws proof from the tragic story of Nadab and Abihu, Aharon’s two older sons, who offered an “Esh Zara” (“foreign fire” – Vayikra 10:1) on the altar, whereupon they were immediately consumed by fire. The additional fire on the altar disrupted their internal equilibrium, resulting in their death by fire. Each morning, the Kohanim would arrange two rows of firewood for the morning Tamid (daily) sacrifice, and they would prepare another two rows later in the day for the afternoon Tamid. This was one of the three fires which burned on the altar. There was a second from which coals were taken for the daily offering of Ketoret (incense), and a third which was lit not for any practical purpose, but strictly to fulfill this Misva. The Torah’s command to kindle a fire on the altar was not functional, to ensure the presence of a fire to burn the sacrifices, but rather required lighting a separate fire on the altar which served no practical purpose. Of course, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only to the Kohanim. If the Kohanim fail to kindle the third fire on the altar, they transgress this Biblical command.
The opening verses of Parashat Sav (Vayikra, chapter 6) introduce the Misva of “Terumat Ha’deshen,” the daily ritual of removing ashes from the top of the altar. The Torah commands that the Kohen must wear his special priestly garments, walk up the ramp to the top of the altar, and remove ashes that had collected. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the purpose of this Misva is to maintain the beauty and grandeur of the Bet Ha’mikash. Before the Kohanim begin offering sacrifices each morning, they must first clean the surface of the altar so that G-d’s “table,” so-to-speak, would be clean. Just as we do not eat on a dirty table, it is likewise appropriate to first ensure to clean the top of the altar each morning before proceeding to offer sacrifices to G-d. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, fire burns stronger on a surface that is clean of ashes, and so the ashes were removed each morning so that the fire on the altar would burn properly. While we might have intuitively thought that Terumat Ha’deshen is nothing more than custodial work, the Sages teach that it had the status of a formal “Aboda” (service). As such, the Kohen who performed the Terumat Ha’deshen needed to wear his Bigdeh Kehuna (priestly vestments), and could not carry out this duty wearing ordinary clothes. However, the Gemara teaches that the Kohen would wear lower quality garments (“Begadim Pehutim”), as it would be inappropriate to wear the same clothing while cleaning the altar and while performing the other rituals. Nevertheless, even these lower quality garments needed to be formal Bigdeh Kehuna. The Terumat Ha’deshen was performed each morning at Alot Ha’shahar – daybreak. On the three Regalim (pilgrimage holidays – Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot), however, it was performed earlier, during the last third of the night. The reason is that the pilgrims offered sacrifices on the Regalim when they visited the Bet Ha’mikdash, and there was thus a large amount of ashes to remove at these times. Hence, the Terumat Ha’deshen began earlier. On Yom Kippur, when the Kohen Gadol performed the entire service, the Terumat Ha’deshen took place already at Hasot (midnight as defined by Halacha). It was done then to give the Kohen time to rest before proceeding to perform the rest of the day’s service. A “Payis” (lottery) was held each morning to determine which of the Kohanim who were on duty would have the privilege of performing the Terumat Ha’deshen. The chosen Kohen would immerse in a Mikveh, don his Bigdeh Kehuna, wash his hands and feet from the Kiyor (the special faucet in the Temple courtyard), and then take a silver shovel and walk up the ramp to the top of the Mizbe’ah (altar). He would move the coals around the altar with the shovel, and then fill the shovel with ashes from the area where the most ashes had collected. He would walk down the ramp to the ground, and then walk northward for ten Amot along the eastern side of the altar. He reached a site three Tefahim (handbreadths) away from the ramp to the altar where he would place the ashes. Afterward, other Kohanim would ascend the ramp to the top of the altar to do maintenance work – sweeping the ashes into a large pile in the center of the altar, which was called the “Tafuah.” Every so often, when this pile became very large, a Kohen would go to the top of the altar with a special, large utensil called the “Pesachter” to remove this pile of ash and bring it outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, where it was discarded. This process is called “Hosa’at Ha’deshen.” Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Germany, 1808-1888) offers an especially meaningful explanation for the daily ritual of Terumat Ha’deshen. He suggested that the daily shovel’s worth of ashes removed from the altar parallels Kemisa – the handful of grain that was taken from the Minha (flour offering) and placed on the fire on the altar. The purpose of the daily removal of ashes, Rav Hirsch explained, was to remind the people that each day’s sacrifices were continuing the previous days’ Aboda. People would see the ashes on the floor alongside the altar and realize that they were produced by the sacrifices which were offered on the altar on previous days. This would heighten their awareness of the fact that every day, we have the opportunity to build on our successes and achievements of the previous day. The sight of the ashes reminded the people in the Bet Ha’mikdash to continue their momentum, showing them that they’ve already accomplished in the past, and have a strong foundation upon which to build in the present.
The Torah commands in Parashat Vayikra (5:23) that a thief who stole an object must return it to the victim (“Ve’heshib Et Ha’gezela Asher Gazal”). This obligation applies only when the item still exists in its original form; if it has undergone a permanent change (“Shinui She’eno Hozer Li’briyato”), which cannot be reversed, then the thief pays the victim the value of the stolen item, instead. One example given by the Gemara is a thief who stole wood which he used as firewood. Since, quite obviously, the ashes cannot be turned back into wood, the thief pays the victim the value of the wood he stole. Another example is a thief who stole wool which he proceeded to dye a different color, or make into a sweater. In such cases, too, the thief pays the victim money, since he cannot return the stolen object. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a person stole something which is valued at less than a “Shaveh Peruta” (the value of the smallest unit of currency), then although he has transgressed the prohibition against theft, he is not required to return the object. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because Am Yisrael “are the children of Abraham, Yishak and Yaakob, generous people, children of generous people,” and even an indigent member of our nation will forgive the theft of something so insignificant. Since it can be assumed that the victim foregoes on this small item, the thief is not obligated to return it, even though he has committed a forbidden act of theft. The obligation to return a stolen item applies as long as it is in the possession of the thief or his inheritors. It applies even if the victim had already despaired of ever receiving the item back; if it remains in the thief’s possession, he must return it to the victim. The Gemara says that this obligation requires the thief to travel even across the world to find the victim so he can return what he stole. Even if he stole a very inexpensive item, worth just a “Peruta,” he must go through whatever trouble is necessary to return it to the victim. However, the Sages enacted that if the victim lives far away, the thief can bring the object to Bet Din and leave it with them. This provision was enacted out of concern that thieves would not bother repenting for their crimes if this required going through the trouble and incurring the expense of traveling great distances to return what they stole. In the interest of encouraging thieves to repent, the Sages allowed them to leave the stolen goods with Bet Din rather than have to travel to the victim. If the stolen item’s market value rose in the interim, while it was in the thief’s possession, the thief must nevertheless return the item, and cannot demand the appreciation value. If, however, the item intrinsically appreciated, such as if one stole an animal and it grew wool or gave birth to more animals, then the thief can keep the value which the animal appreciated. This provision, too, was enacted by the Sages in the interest of encouraging thieves to repent. The Gemara states that if a person owned an empty apartment, and a squatter came and lived there without permission, the owner cannot demand payment from the squatter unless the apartment is normally leased. Assuming the squatter did not cause any damage to the property, he owes nothing to the owner, because this situation falls under the category of “Zeh Neheneh Ve’zeh Lo Haser” – literally, “this one benefits, and this one does not lose.” Since the owner did not lose anything as a result of the squatter’s presence in the apartment, he cannot demand payment. To the contrary, the Gemara says, in a certain sense, having somebody living in a residence is beneficial for the property, as it protects it from being overrun by Mazikin (harmful spirits) which occupy empty homes. It is only if the owner normally leases the apartment, and was prevented from doing so because of the squatter, that he may then demand payment, since the squatter caused him a financial loss. (Nowadays, of course, the squatter would in any event be required to pay for utilities such as water and electricity, as well as the “wear and tear” of appliances and furniture.) This Misva applies in all places and in all times, and to both males and females. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a thief does not return the stolen goods to the victim, then he will be punished not only for the sin of theft, but also for failing to seize the opportunity he was given to rectify his mistake. If the Torah offers a person the opportunity to repair the damage he inflicted, and he chose not to, then this itself is a very grievous sin. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here teaches us a lesson which is directly relevant not only to theft, but to all forms of wrongdoing. The Torah offers us the opportunity to correct all our mistakes through the process of Teshuba. This is an opportunity which we can ill afford to squander. We may learn from this Misva that whenever we fail, we must do what we can to rectify the failure through repentance, as soon as we can.
There are five circumstances in which one must bring what is called an “Asham Vadai” – a guilt-offering to atone for a certain violation. (This is in contrast to an “Asham Talui,” a guilt-offering brought when one might have possibly transgressed a severe violation, but does not know with certainty that he transgressed.) The situations requiring an Asham Vadai are as follows: 1) Asham Gezelot. As the Torah describes in Parashat Vayikra (5), one who falsely denies on oath having money which belongs to somebody else, and then confesses his wrongdoing, must bring an Asham sacrifice to atone for his sin. In addition to paying what he owes to the other party, he must also bring this sacrifice. This includes situations of outright theft, and when one receives collateral or an object to guard, and he then denies having received it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that one might have thought to justify these forms of theft by figuring that eventually he will return the object or money in question, and this is sufficient. The Torah therefore demands that the individual also bring a sacrifice, to teach that stealing or denying having in one’s possession somebody else’s property is inherently sinful, even if he later returns the item in question. One brings an Asham Gezelot whether he committed the crime unintentionally or intentionally. 2) Asham Me’ilot. One who mistakenly derived personal benefit from sacred property – “Me’ila” – must not only pay the Temple treasury the value of the benefit he received, and a penalty, but also offer an Asham sacrifice. 3) Asham Nazir: One who takes the Nazirite vow is bound by a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition against coming in contact with a human corpse. If a Nazir does come in contact with a corpse, whether intentionally or accidentally, he must bring a special Asham sacrifice. 4) Asham Mesora. A Mesora – somebody who was declared to have the Sara’at skin disorder – must undergo a special process of purification once he has been cured of his condition. This process includes the offering of an Asham sacrifice. 5) Asham Shifha Harufa. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, this sacrifice is required in the complicated case of a Shifha Kena’anit (non-Jewish maidservant) who is half freed, and half servant. For example, her master decided, for whatever reason, to release only half of his hold on the woman. The half that was released is a full-fledged Jew, but the other half remains a maidservant, who cannot marry a Jewish man. If a Jewish man then betroths this woman, she is considered “quasi married,” as the betrothal is effective with respect to the half which was released from servitude, but not vis-à-vis the other half, which is still in servitude. If another man then has relations with this woman, he must bring an Asham sacrifice. Since this woman is not fully married, this does not constitute outright adultery, which would be considered a capital offense. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since this woman is not regarded by people as an Eshet Ish (married woman), people would not consider it adultery to have a relationship with her. Hence, this violator did not intend to commit a grievous sin, and so the Torah treats this offense more leniently, and allows him to earn atonement through the offering of an Asham. Of course, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and it is binding upon both men and women. One who is required to offer an Asham sacrifice but fails to do has neglected a Misvat Aseh. Interestingly, however, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that in the case of Asham Gezelot, although the thief will be punished for failing to offer this sacrifice, his punishment will not be excessively harsh, since he did, after all, return what he stole.
The Torah in Parashat Vayikra (5:17-18) addresses the case of a person who performed an act which may have transgressed a command, but he is unsure. In such a case, the individual must offer a sacrifice called “Asham Talui” to atone for possibly having committed a transgression. This applies specifically if the transgression which may have been committed is one for which one would be liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish People) if he transgresses intentionally, and a Hatat (sin-offering) if he transgresses unintentionally. The classic case of Asham Talui is where one had in front of him two pieces of meat – one which was Heleb (forbidden fat), and the other which was entirely permissible for consumption. The person then ate one of the two pieces, but he does not know which one he ate, and the remaining piece was lost and thus could not be identified. As eating Heleb is punishable by Karet, the individual in this case would be required to offer an Asham Talui, because he may have violated the prohibition of Heleb. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah requires the individual to offer an atonement sacrifice in such a case in order to encourage people to be attentive and careful to avoid wrongdoing. If a person is unsure whether or not he committed a violation, this means he was not paying close enough attention to what he was doing – and it is for this inattentiveness that he requires atonement. Indeed, if a person learns after offering an Asham Talui that he did, in fact, commit the sin in question, then he must bring a sin-offering to atone for the wrongful act. This proves that an Asham Talui atones not for the sin which may have been committed, but rather for what the Sefer Ha’hinuch calls “Asluto” – his “laziness,” or carelessness, which allowed him to possibly commit a severe transgression. An Asham Talui is required only if one knows for certain that the situation involved a potential prohibition. For example, in the case described earlier, there was certainly a forbidden piece of Heleb, and the question is only whether this is the piece which the person ate. If, however, one ate a single piece of meat, and he then realized that it might have been Heleb, then he does not require an Asham Talui, because it is not certain that something forbidden was present. Another example of a situation requiring an Asham Talui is where one had an intimate relationship with a woman who had been married, but it is uncertain whether she had received a valid divorce prior to the relationship. In this instance, too, it is certain that the woman in question had been married, such that relations with her were forbidden, but it is uncertain whether she was still married at the time of the intimate encounter. In such a case, an Asham Talui would be required. This is in contrast to a case of a relationship with an unmarried woman who had received a Halachically questionable Kiddushin (betrothal). In this situation, it is not clear to begin with that the woman was an Eshet Ish (married woman) with whom relations are forbidden, as every woman is presumed unmarried and hence permissible until we have reason to believe otherwise. This case, then, is akin to the case of one who ate a piece of meat which may have been Heleb, and thus an Asham Talui is not required. This command applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and it is binding upon both men and women. One who is required to offer an Asham Talui but fails to do so has neglected a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). The Rambam, in Hilchot Tum’at Met (9:12), takes a controversial position regarding the famous principle of “Safek De’Orayta Le’Humra” – that we must be stringent in situations of Halachic uncertainty when Torah law is at stake. (This is in contrast to laws enacted by the Rabbis, regarding which we may act leniently in situations of uncertainty.) According to the Rambam, this rule was enacted by the Sages; on the level of Torah law, we may be lenient in situations of Halachic uncertainty, even if this means potentially violating a Torah law, but the Sages required acting stringently. Many later writers questioned the Rambam’s theory in light of the obligation of Asham Talui. In cases where one is in doubt as to whether he transgressed a prohibition, the Torah mandates that he must bring a sacrifice. Does this not imply that the Torah itself requires avoiding situations of uncertainty, and acting stringently when in doubt regarding the violation of Torah law? The Kessef Misheh (commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah by Maran, Rav Yosef Karo, 1488-1575) writes that he discovered a manuscript written by the Rambam himself, addressing this question. In this manuscript, the Rambam writes that a distinction exists between Torah prohibitions punishable by Karet, and other Torah laws. When it comes to prohibitions punishable by Karet, then indeed, the Torah itself requires one to assume the stringent possibility, as evidenced by the law of Asham Talui. With regard, however, to other laws, then the Torah does not require acting stringently in situations of uncertainty, and this requirement was enacted later by the Sages. Although the obligation of Asham Talui does not apply nowadays in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, its underlying message – the importance of attentiveness and caution to avoid wrongdoing – is as relevant now as ever. Rav Yehuda Ades, Rosh Yeshiva of Kol Yaakob (contemporary), was once asked the question of which is worse – forgetting to add Ya’aleh Ve’yavo in the Amida prayer on Rosh Hodesh, or not remembering whether one recited Ya’aleh Ve’yabo. He replied that not remembering whether one added Ya’aleh Ve’yabo is worse, because one who cannot remember must have been inattentive while praying. If one paid attention to his prayer but forgot it was Rosh Hodesh, this is a mistake which all people are prone to making on occasion. It is far worse to pray mindlessly, without paying attention. The law of Asham Talui teaches of the need to live attentively, to be mindful of our conduct and try to ensure that we are always doing the right thing.
If one mistakenly uses sacred property (“Hekdesh”) for personal benefit, he has committed “Me’ila,” an act which imposes upon him a number of obligations. One obligation is to pay a “Homesh” – a penalty of one-fifth the value of the benefit he derived. He must pay the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash not only the actual value of the benefit he received, but also an additional one-fifth. The Torah introduces this command in Parashat Vayikra (5:16): “Va’hamishito Yosef Alav” (“…and he must add onto it one-fifth”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah imposed this penalty as a deterrent, in order that people will exercise caution and ensure to avoid accidental desecration of sacred property. Once a person mistakenly uses a sacred item for personal benefit, the item is divested of its status of sanctity. Therefore, Halacha establishes that “En Mo’el Ahar Mo’el” – if somebody else then derives benefit from the item, he has no obligation to pay anything, since the item was no longer sacred at the time he benefited from it. If, however, somebody intentionally benefited from a sacred item, and then somebody benefited from that item accidentally, the second fellow is indeed obligated to pay, since the item had been sacred and it was he who caused it to lose its status of sanctity. Certain items possess what is known as “Kedushat Ha’guf” – intrinsic sanctity, and do not lose their status even after Me’ila has been committed. Specifically, animals which have been consecrated to be offered as a sacrifice, and the sacred utensils of the Bet Ha’mikdash, retain their status of sanctity, and therefore even after one has mistakenly made personal use of these items, others who do so are likewise required to pay. In order to be considered an act of Me’ila, the benefit which one received must be worth at least one Peruta (the smallest unity of currency). The laws of Me’ila do not apply in a case where a non-Kohen ate sacrificial meat which is allowed only for Kohanim, if he ate it after the meat became permissible for Kohanim. Once the blood of a Hatat (sin offering) or Asham (guilt offering) has been sprinkled, the meat is then allowed to be eaten by the Kohanim. If a non-Kohen unlawfully partakes of such meat at this point, this does not constitute Me’ila, because he ate the meat at a time when it was already permissible for human consumption. Although he acted wrongly by eating the meat, this does not fall under the law of Me’ila, and he is not required to pay. This Halacha applies even if he ate the meat after it had, for whatever reason, become disqualified for consumption. Since it had become permissible for consumption, this meat is no longer subject to Me’ila, even after it subsequently becomes invalid for consumption. It should be noted that whenever the Torah requires paying a “Homesh” (“one-fifth”), it does not mean 20 percent. A “Homesh” of $100, for example, is calculated by dividing 100 into four – yielding a quotient of 25 – and then adding that value to the principal. Thus, when one is required to pay the principal plus a “Homesh,” and the principal is $100, he must pay $125 (a 25 percent penalty). This law, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and it applies to both men and women. As mentioned earlier, this applies only to one who derived benefit from sacred property accidentally. Separate laws apply to one who intentionally derived personal benefit from sacred property. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if somebody is uncertain whether he derived benefit from sacred property, then he is exempt from both the sacrifice which would normally be required, and from payment. He does not bring the sacrifice because if he had not, in fact, derived benefit from the item in question, then his atonement sacrifice is not a real sacrifice, and he will thus be in violation of sacrificing an ordinary animal in the Bet Ha’mikdash. As for the monetary payment, there is a famous rule that “Ha’mosi Me’habero Alav Ha’re’aya” – one who wishes to extract money from his fellow bears the burden of proof. Since it is uncertain whether this payment is required, it is the Temple treasury which must prove that Me’ila has occurred in order for the person to be required to pay. As long as the payment requirement is uncertain, the individual cannot be obligated to pay the Temple treasury.
Normally, when a Korban Minha (grain offering) is brought, olive oil and Lebona (frankincense) are added to the flour. An exception to this rule is the Minhat Hoteh – the Minha offering brought by a sinner to atone for his misdeed. In certain situations, the Torah prescribes a Minha – which is far less expensive than an animal sacrifice – for a sinner who is poor and cannot afford an animal. The Torah (Vayikra 5:11) commands that when this grain offering is brought, oil and Lebona must not be added. The Mishna in Masechet Menahot (59b) teaches, “Hayab Al Ha’shemen Bi’fneh Asmo Ve’al Ha’lebona Bi’fneh Asmah” – adding oil and Lebona to a Minhat Hoteh violates two separate commands, and the violator is thus liable to two separate sets of Malkut. The simple reading of this statement is that if one adds oil and then Lebona to a sinner’s grain offering, he transgresses two prohibitions. This is, indeed, how Rashi and Tosafot understand the Mishna’s comment. Rabbenu Tam (Rashi’s grandson, France, 1100-1171), however, argued, noting that once oil has been added, the Minha is disqualified, such that adding Lebona cannot then be considered a forbidden act. Once the Minha is no longer valid, Rabbenu Tam contends, adding the Lebona is of no significance, and thus cannot violate the Biblical command. Rabbenu Tam therefore explains the Mishna differently, as referring to two separate Menahot – if a person added oil to one Minha and Lebona to another, he has committed two separate violations, and is liable to two sets of Malkut. The Gaon of Rogatchov (Rav Yosef Rosen, 1858-1936), in Sofnat Pa’ane’ach, notes a subtle nuance in the Rambam’s formulations of these two prohibitions – against adding oil, and against adding Lebona. In discussing these prohibitions in his Sefer Ha’misvot (Lo Ta’aseh 102-103), the Rambam writes that “placing oil” on a Minhat Hoteh renders one liable to Malkut, but in regard to the Lebona, he writes that we are commanded “not to offer a Minha with Lebona.” Curiously, when it comes to the oil, the Rambam writes that the prohibition is violated when one places the oil on the Minha, but with regard to the Lebona, the prohibition is violated when one offers the Minha on the altar with Lebona. The Gaon of Rogatchov explains this distinction very simply, by noting that once oil is added to flour, it is absorbed and cannot then be removed. Frankincense, however, is dry, and can thus be removed after it is added to flour. Therefore, it is only once the Minha has been placed on the fire with the Lebona that the prohibition is violated, whereas one who adds oil to a Minha violates a prohibition immediately, because the act cannot be undone. The reason for the prohibition against adding Lebona to a Minhat Hoteh is the same reason why the Torah forbids adding oil, which has already been discussed (in Misva 125). As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, adding oil and spices is a sign of grandeur and stature, and one who has sinned and requires atonement must be humbled. Therefore, the Torah prescribed for him a simple, austere offering. Secondly, since the Minhat Hoteh is offered by a destitute pauper, who cannot afford an animal sacrifice, the Torah has compassion and does not require him to incur the additional expense of oil and frankincense.
In certain situations where a sinner is required to offer an atonement sacrifice, the sacrifice which he brings depends on his financial status, as a sinner who is poor brings a less costly sacrifice – a Minha (grain offering). In such a case, the Torah commands, “Lo Yasim Aleha Shemen” – oil should not be placed on the sacrifice (Vayikra 5:11). Normally, grain offerings are mixed with oil, but in the case of a grain offering brought to atone for a sin, no oil may be added. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids adding oil to a sinner’s offering because oil signifies stature and importance. Oil floats to the top, and thus symbolizes superiority. For this reason, oil was used to formally anoint kings and Kohanim Gedolim as an expression of their position of leadership and prestige. Withholding oil from a sinner’s Minha indicates the vital importance of eliminating arrogance as part of the Teshuba process. As arrogance is a leading cause of sin, the sinner is shown that he must avoid arrogance and maintain humility in order to distance himself from wrongdoing in the future. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, oil is not added to this offering out of compassion to the pauper, to spare him an additional expense. The Torah has mercy on a needy person to the extent that even if he had sinned, he is not required to spend for his atonement offering more than the small amount needed to purchase some flour, not even for the usual quantity of oil. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition applies only to Kohanim, and a Kohen who adds oil to a sinner’s Minha offering is liable to Malkut. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question of why the Sefer Ha’hinuch felt that only Kohanim are bound by this prohibition. When other Minha offerings are brought, it is not necessary for specifically a Kohen to add the oil; the oil may be added by anybody. Why, then, would the prohibition against adding oil to a sinner’s Minha be directed specifically at the Kohanim, if they are not the ones normally assigned this role? One answer that has been suggested arises from the Rambam’s formulation in discussing this prohibition in Hilchot Ma’aseh Ha’korbanot (12:8). The Rambam writes that one who “placed oil on the sinner’s grain offering and offered it [on the altar]” has violated this command. Notably, the Rambam writes that one transgresses this prohibition only if he adds oil and then offers the Minha on the altar. Perhaps, then, the Sefer Ha’hinuch followed this opinion, and therefore determined that this prohibition is directed specifically to the Kohanim, as they are the only ones who place the Minha on the altar. Although a non-Kohen is able to add the oil, he cannot perform the later stages of the process, and therefore, non-Kohanim are not included in the prohibition against adding oil to a sinner’s Minha, which forbids adding oil and then offering the Minha on the fire on the altar.
In describing the procedure for the offering of a Hatat Ha’of (bird sin-offering), the Torah commands, “Lo Yabdil” – that the bird’s head may not be completely severed from its body (Vayikra 5:8). As opposed to animals brought as sacrifices, which are killed via standard Shehita – slaughtering the front of the neck – bird sacrifices are killed by a method called Melika. The Kohen thrusts his fingernail into the back of the bird’s neck, until it pierces the pipes extending from the bird’s mouth, killing the bird. (Melika ranked among the more difficult rituals performed in the Bet Ha’mikdash, as it required great skill to thoroughly pierce the bird’s neck with one’s fingernail.) In the case of a Hatat Ha’of, the Torah commands that the bird’s head must not be severed after Melika, but should rather remain attached to the body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah prescribed Melika, as opposed to Shehita, when a bird sacrifice is offered because it is a quicker process. Bird sacrifices were generally offered by the poor, who could not afford to sacrifice an animal, and who also cannot afford too much time away from work. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, when a poor person brings a sacrifice, it is important to expedite the process in order to minimize the amount of worktime he loses. The Torah thus instructed that the Kohen kill the bird with his fingernail, which obviates the need to look for and prepare a knife for slaughtering. For the same reason, the Torah allowed sacrificing the bird offering anywhere in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash, as opposed to requiring a particular location (as it does for other sacrifices), in order to save time so that the poor man can quickly return to work. Rather than require the Kohen to bring the bird to a specific location, the Torah allowed the Kohen to perform Melika anywhere, thus saving time. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then offers a second explanation for why Melika is performed on bird offerings, noting that Beneh Yisrael has been compared to a dove – one of the species offered as a bird sacrifice. Our nation is, by nature, stubborn and unyielding, a quality represented by the back of the neck, as in the expression, “Kesheh Oref” – “stiff-necked.” Breaking the bird offering’s neck thus symbolizes the need to “break” our stubbornness, to overcome our “stiff-necked” quality which causes us to refuse to obey G-d’s commands. As for the prohibition against severing the bird’s head, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the offering appears more substantial and respectable when the bird is whole, and not separated into two detached pieces. The Torah wanted to ensure that an underprivileged individual who offers a bird sacrifice should at least have the satisfaction of his sacrificing appearing substantial, and not feel distressed at seeing his offering severed into pieces. It therefore commanded that the bird’s head should remain attached to the body. Interestingly, the Torah distinguishes in this regard between the two different kinds of bird sacrifice – the Hatat Ha’of and the Olat Ha’of (bird which is burned entirely on the sacrifice). The head of the Hatat Ha’of, which is offered for atonement, is not to be completely severed, whereas the head of the voluntary Olat Ha’of specifically is to be detached from the bird’s body. Rav Meir Shapiro of Lublin (Poland, 1887-1933) suggested that this alludes to the hostility with which other nations often view the Jewish People. When it comes to “Hatat Ha’of” – the sins, the wrongful actions which Jews sometimes commit – then “Lo Yabdil” – the hostile gentiles do not “separate,” they make no distinction between different Jews. They charge that the Jew who acted wrongly represents the entire Jewish Nation, and that all Jews conduct themselves that way. But when it comes to “Olat Ha’of” – the admirable things which Jews do, their outstanding achievements and accomplishments, then the hostile gentles “separate,” insisting that the Jew in question is special and exceptional, and does not represent the entire Jewish Nation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this command applies not only to Kohanim, but to all Jews. Anybody – a Kohen or non-Kohen – who detaches the head of the Hatat Ha’of after Melika transgresses this Biblical command, and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Vayikra (chapter 5) requires violators who commit certain offenses to offer a sacrifice known as the “Korban Oleh Ve’yored” – “fluctuating sacrifice.” It is so named because the offering depends on the offender’s financial status. A financially stable sinner brings a goat or sheep; one who struggles financially brings two birds; and a destitute person brings the cheapest sacrifice – a flour offering. This offering is brought by the following groups of sinners: one who mistakenly ate hallowed food (such as sacrifices) in a state if Tum’a (impurity); one who entered the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of Tum’a; one who violated a Shebu’at Bitui (vow) by doing something he vowed not to do, or failing to do something he vowed to do; and one who made a false Shebu’at Ha’edut – oath denying having information which he could provide as testimony in a court case. This final case marks an exceptional situation where a sin-offering is required for an intentional violation; normally, sin-offerings are brought to atone for unintentional transgressions. In explaining the reason behind this unique sacrifice, the Sefer Ha’hinuch establishes that sins committed verbally are particularly common, as people tend to be less careful about the way they speak than about the way they act. The Torah therefore made atonement for this type of sin accessible to all people, even those with limited means, by allowing the poor to bring an inexpensive offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch applies this rationale also to the sins involving Tum’a, noting that these offenses, too, were very common, given the practical difficulty entailed in avoiding sources of ritual impurity. And thus for these violations, too, the Torah ensured that even destitute violators would have the ability to earn atonement through an inexpensive sacrifice. As for the requirement to bring a sacrifice after intentionally making a false Shebu’at Ha’edut, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this offense is especially common. People would frequently need to summon witnesses, and witnesses would easily be tempted to conveniently deny having information, claiming that they did not remember. Additionally, people do not generally regard this false denial as a crime, since no money is actually being stolen. In truth, however, this indeed constitutes a serious offense, as it undermines the judicial process. Hashem, in His kindness, made atonement available for even the intentional violation of this offense, even for the poor, because this is so common. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that a sinner required to offer a Korban Oleh Ve’yored must then set up “fences” – meaning, safeguards – for himself, to ensure to avoid these sins in the future. Offering the sacrifice alone is insufficient; the violator must recognize his weakness and strategize in order to overcome it. Just as a recovering addict must put in place safeguards to keep a distance from the object of his addiction, one who has violated a prohibition must figure out ways to protect himself from repeating the misdeed. The Sefer Ha’hinuch surprisingly writes that if a poor individual is obligated to bring a Korban Oleh Ve’yored, and he voluntarily chooses to offer the standard sacrifice, despite his limited means, he does not fulfill his obligation. Intuitively, of course, we would have assumed that this pauper should be congratulated for voluntarily incurring this additional expense to offer a more respectable sacrifice, even though the Torah allowed him to offer a cheaper sacrifice due to his financial struggles. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that to the contrary, he does not even fulfill his basic requirement. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah here conveys to us the crucial lesson that we must not spend beyond our means. Once the Torah allowed this pauper to bring an inexpensive offering, it is wrong for him to waste his limited resources on a costlier sacrifice – teaching us to always ensure not to spend more than we can. If the Torah said this about a sacrifice to G-d, then it applies even more so to spending on other, mundane possessions and pursuits. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that those who spend beyond their means end up stealing to pay for their luxuries, and so the Torah taught us to avoid spending more than we can by demanding that one who must bring a Korban Oleh Ve’yored offer only the sacrifice he is supposed to offer, and not a more expensive sacrifice. If a financially stable individual set aside money to purchase an animal to be brought as a Korban Ola Ve’yored, and then he suddenly became poor, he must exchange the sanctity of this animal on birds, and then bring them as his sacrifice. Since he became poor before consecrating an animal, he offers the sacrifice of a poor person. Conversely, if a poor individual set aside money for his inexpensive Korban Ola Ve’yored, and then suddenly became wealthier, he must add money to purchase an animal for his sacrifice. This Misva, of course, applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It applies to both males and females, except that the case of Shebuat Ha’edut is relevant only to males, as women do not serve as witnesses. One who is obligated to offer a Korban Oleh Ve’yored but failed to do so has neglected a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). Although this Misva does not apply on a practical level nowadays, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, nevertheless, as we have seen, a number of concepts underlying this Misva are as relevant today as they were in the past. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of this Misva demonstrates to us how each and every law in the Torah is eternally relevant and has profound meaning and significance for each and every one of us, even those Misvot which are practically no longer applicable.
The Torah in Parashat Vayikra (5:1) says about somebody who has information that could be used as testimony in Bet Din, “Im Lo Yagid Ve’nasa Avono” – “If he does not speak, then he shall bear his iniquity.” This establishes a Biblical command requiring those who are able to serve as witnesses and testify before Bet Din to do so. When it comes to Dineh Mamonot (civil disputes), one is required to testify only if he is summoned to the court. When it comes to Dineh Nefashot (capital cases), one who witnesses a crime must come to court and testify even if he is not summoned, in order to ensure public safety by having criminals prosecuted. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes a number of exceptions to this Misva. A Torah scholar is not required to testify before a court of a lower scholarly caliber, as this would be beneath his dignity, and the command to show respect to Torah scholars overrides the command to testify. Similarly, a Kohen Gadol is not required to testify, because of his unique stature. A special enactment was made that kings do not testify and are not testified against. Kings of Malchut Bet David (the Davidic dynasty), however, do testify, and are testified against. Although a judge cannot preside over a case involving a close friend, as he would be unable to maintain strict impartiality, a witness may testify for or against a friend, or for or against an enemy. The verse in the Book of Sefanya (3:13) says, “She’erit Yisrael Lo Ya’asu Avla” – “The remnant of Israel does not commit injustice.” Jews are not suspected of acting dishonestly, and thus we do not suspect that a witness would falsely testify in favor of a friend or against an enemy. Once witnesses deliver testimony in Bet Din, they cannot then retract their testimony; Bet Din acts upon their testimony even if they later say that it is not true. This rule is known as “Kevan She’higgid Shub Eno Hozer U’maggid” (“Once he spoke, he cannot then say something different”). A document signed by two witnesses is accepted in Bet Din as authoritative, just like two witnesses verbally testifying before Bet Din. Thus, for example, if a document states that Reuben lent Shimon money, and two witnesses signed the document, Bet Din will require Shimon to pay Reuben the stipulated amount on the basis of this document. The Rambam was of the opinion that this is a provision enacted by the Sages. According to the Rambam, Torah law does not regard a Shetar (document) as valid testimony, but the Sages instituted the use of signed documents because otherwise, prospective lenders would be reluctant to lend money. If people knew that they would have to bring the witnesses to court to prove that they lent money, they would be discouraged from lending, and so the Sages enacted that a Shetar signed by two witnesses should have the legal power of two witnesses. The Ramban disagreed, and maintained that a Shetar functions as valid testimony on the level of Torah law, and not merely by force of Rabbinic enactment. Bet Din accepts a Shetar as authoritative only after first verifying the authenticity of the witnesses’ signatures. There are several different ways in which this can be done. One is to have two witnesses come and testify to the signatures’ authenticity, stating that they recognize the witnesses’ signatures. Even relatives – who are normally disqualified from serving as witnesses – can serve as witnesses to authenticate signatures on a Shetar. The judges themselves can also authenticate the signatures if they happen to recognize the witnesses’ signatures. And, of course, the witnesses themselves can come to court and verify that they were the ones who signed the document. Another method is to compare the signatures with these witnesses’ signatures on other documents. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this Halacha applies in all times and places, and that it applies only to males, as females do not serve as witnesses because “Da’atan Kalot” (literally, “their minds are weak”). This should not be understood to mean that, Heaven forbid, women lack the intelligence to testify about events which they witnessed. Rather, I believe, it means that women are more easily persuaded and intimidated. When witnesses come to testify, they are thoroughly interrogated and cross-examined to ensure that they testify honestly and accurately. The concern is that during this process, women might too easily second guess themselves and decide not to testify, and so they do not serve as witnesses. A witness who is able to testify but refrains from doing so has neglected a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that “Onsho Gadol Me’od” – this individual is severely punished, because an effective justice system is crucial for maintaining law and order, and preventing chaos. One who refuses to testify undermines the effectiveness of the judicial system, as he denies Bet Din the ability to hold people accountable for their actions, and thus he threatens the very fabric of society. If one falsely swore that he does not have information to present as testimony, and he then confesses that he lied, then he brings a sacrifice called the Korban Oleh Ve’yored, which is discussed in a separate Misva (123).
The Torah in Parashat Vayikra (4:27) addresses the case of a person who mistakenly commits a sin, and it requires the offender to offer a Korban Hatat – atonement sacrifice. This sin-offering is called a “Hatat Kebu’a” – a “fixed sin-offering,” referring to the fact that everyone obligated to bring this offering brings the same kind of animal as a sacrifice. This is in contrast to the Korban Oleh Ve’yored – “fluctuating sacrifice” – which depends on the sinner’s financial status. A Korban Hatat is required if one mistakenly violates a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibition) for which he would have been liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation) if he had transgressed intentionally. The prohibition must fall under the category of “Lav She’yesh Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which is transgressed by committing an action, as opposed to prohibitions which are violated without an action. Therefore, if one mistakenly failed to offer a Korban Pesach, he does not bring a Hatat, even though neglecting the Misva of Korban Pesach is punishable by Karet, because he violated a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command), and not a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. This is true also of one who neglected to undergo Berit Mila, which, like Korban Pesach, is a Misvat Aseh for which violators are liable to Karet. One who mistakenly blasphemes G-d does not offer a Hatat, even though blasphemy is Misvat Lo Ta’aseh which is punishable by Karet, because this transgression does not entail an action, and is violated though speech. The two exceptions to this rule are eating sacred food (such as meat of sacrifices) in a state of Tum’a (impurity), and entering the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of Tum’a. Both constitute the violation of a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh that is punishable by Karet through an action, but nevertheless, the Torah made an exception in these cases, requiring the accidental violator to bring a Korban Oleh Ve’yored instead of a Korban Hatat. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists forty-three transgressions for which one brings a Korban Hatat if he transgressed unintentionally. Most of these are sins involving Arayot (forbidden intimate relationships). The Rabbis teach that G-d does not punish violators under the age of twenty. Whereas the Bet Din here on earth punishes violators from the age of Halachic adulthood (generally assumed to be twelve or thirteen), the Heavenly Tribunal does not punish until the age of twenty. It should be clarified that this concept has no bearing on the obligation of a Korban Hatat. Even though G-d will not punish a violator under the age of twenty with Karet, nevertheless, if a person this age mistakenly transgresses a prohibition which is punishable by Karet in cases of willful violation, he must bring a Korban Hatat. As for the concept itself – that G-d does not punish violators under the age of twenty – several Aharonim noted that this cannot mean that such violators go unpunished. The Hacham Tzvi (Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi, 1656-1718) writes that such a notion “Enah Mistaberet” – is untenable. It is inconceivable, he argues, that Bet Din will put to death a young violator for committing a capital crime, but G-d’s Heavenly Tribunal does not. Likewise, the Hatam Sofer (Rav Moshe Sofer, 1762-1839), in one of his responsa (Y.D. 155), writes that we cannot possibly conclude that somebody younger than twenty who commits a sin will not be punished. This point is made also by the Noda Bi’yehuda (Rav Yehezkel Landau of Prague, 1713-1793), in one of his responsa (Mahadura Tinyana, Y.D. 164), where he comments that if this were the case, then the world would fall into chaos, as youngsters would have no fear of divine punishment. The Aharonim explain that this concept means not that violators under the age of twenty do not receive punishment, but rather that their punishment is suspended and held in abeyance, in the hope that they will repent as they grow older. If a person below the age of twenty commits a violation, then because of his young age, he is given a reprieve, the opportunity to avoid punishment through repentance. After the age of twenty, however, one who commits a sin is liable to Karet immediately unless he repents.
The Torah in Parashat Vayikra (4:13) speaks of a case where “the entire nation mistakenly sins” because “a matter was concealed from the ‘eyes’ [leaders] of the congregation.” This refers to a situation where the Sanhedrin – the highest Rabbinical court, consisting of seventy-one leading scholars – issued a mistaken ruling, permitting something which is forbidden and punishable by Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). If the majority of the nation accepts their ruling and violates the prohibition in question on the basis of this mistaken ruling, then a special atonement sacrifice must be offered, consisting of a bull, called the “Par He’alem Dabar Shel Sibur.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if the great Rabbis of the Sanhedrin issued a mistaken ruling, this reflects a deficiency in their intellect, which in turn indicates that their physical beings overpowered, if only somewhat, their intellectual faculties. An intellectual error testifies to the intellect’s having been subdued by one’s physical essence. The offering of a sacrifice symbolizes the need to subdue our animalistic, physical qualities, and to instead elevate and enhance our spiritual beings. Therefore, when the Sanhedrin errs, a special sacrifice is brought to remind them of the primacy of the Sechel (intellect) and that it must never yield to our base, physical inclinations. This obligation applies only if all seventy-one members of the Sanhedrin issued the mistaken ruling, together with the Ab Bet Din (head of the court). All seventy-one members had to have been eligible to sit on the Sanhedrin, to the exclusion of Gerim (converts), those of advanced age, and others who are disqualified from serving on the Sanhedrin. Moreover, this sacrifice is required only if the majority of the nation accepted the ruling, trusting and relying on the Sanhedrin’s wisdom and scholarship. If the people figured that the Sanhedrin issued an erroneous ruling, but they decided to nevertheless act upon the mistaken leniency, then this Misva does not apply. Furthermore, this obligation applies only if the Sanhedrin mistakenly concluded that something was permissible, but not if they denied the prohibition in question. For example, if the Sanhedrin determined that Heleb – animal fat which the Torah strictly forbids – is actually permissible for consumption, then the sacrifice is not offered. The sacrifice is required only if the Sanhedrin wrongly determined that a certain part of the animal is not included in the Heleb prohibition, when it in fact is considered Heleb and forbidden. This command applies only if Bet Din is aware of the precise ruling which they issued and which turned out to be mistaken. If they acknowledge in a general sense that they had made a mistake, this sacrifice is not offered; they must be able to specify to the particular error that was made. In a case requiring a “Par He’alem Dabar Shel Sibur,” each of the twelve tribes must offer this sacrifice. If the mistaken ruling permitted a certain action which in fact constitutes forbidden idol worship, then in addition to this sacrifice, each tribe must also offer a goat to atone for mistakenly violating the prohibition against foreign worship. This Misva applied only when the Sanhedrin convened in its office in the Lishkat Ha’gazit – the special chamber in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash designated for the Sanhedrin. Forty years before the destruction of the second Bet Ha’mikdash, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Lishkat Ha’gazit, and ever since that time, this Misva has not applied.
The Torah commands in Parashat Vayikra (2:13), “Ve’lo Tashbit Melah Berit Elokecha Me’al Minhatecha” – “Do not withhold the salt of the covenant of your G-d from upon your offering.” This establishes a prohibition against refraining from adding salt to sacrifices. Adding salt to sacrifices is required by force of both this prohibition, as well as a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). In discussing the prohibition against offering a sacrifice without salt, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that he already discussed the rationale underlying this law in his analysis of the Misvat Aseh to add salt. In the common editions of the Sefer Ha’hinuch, the Misvat Aseh actually appears after the prohibition, but it is clear from this remark that the Sefer Ha’hinuch wrote about the Misva Aseh first. This is because the Sefer Ha’hinuch composed his work by dividing the Misvot Aseh and Misvot Lo Ta’aseh (prohibitions), first discussing the Misvot Aseh in every Parasha, followed by that Parasha’s Misvot Lo Ta’aseh. Naturally, then, he discussed the prohibition against “withholding” salt from sacrifices only after discussing the affirmative command to add salt to sacrifice. In later editions, however, this division was not made, and all the commands – both the Misvot Aseh and the Misvot Lo Ta’aseh – appear in the order in which they are presented in the Torah. The sacrifice must be salted on both sides, but Be’di’abad (after the fact), if even a small amount of salt was added, the Misva has been fulfilled. The salt used for the sacrifice is funded by the public treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The salting was performed in three different locations. There was a special chamber called “Lishkat Ha’melah” (“the salting chamber”) where the hides of the animals offered as sacrifices, which were given to the Kohanim, were salted. Secondly, the animal parts that were placed on the altar were salted on the ramp which led to the top of the altar. Other offerings which were placed on the altar – specifically, grain offerings (Menahot), the Lebona (frankincense) from the Shulhan (table), and the Olat Ha’of (bird sacrifice) – were salted on the top of the altar. Everything that went onto the altar required salting. Of course, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only to the Kohanim. A Kohen who offered a sacrifice without first salting it has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The Ra’a (Rav Aharon Ha’levi, Gerona, Spain, 13 th century) – whom many identify as the author of the anonymous Sefer Ha’hinuch – composed a work called Bedek Ha’bayit, and this book features a discussion about the command to salt sacrifices. In this discussion, the Ra’a writes that the requirement applies not only to the portions of the sacrifices that are placed on the altar, but also to the portions which are eaten by the Kohanim; they, too, must be salted. This directly contradicts the position taken by the Sefer Ha’hinuch, that only portions of offerings which are placed on the altar require salting. This discrepancy between the view taken in Bedek Ha’habit and that taken in Sefer Ha’hinuch would appear to call into question the theory that the Ra’a authored the Sefer Ha’hinuch. As the Minhat Hinuch notes, we must conclude either that the Ra’a changed his position in between the composition of these two works, or that he is not, in fact, the author of the Sefer Ha’hinuch.
The Torah commands in Parashat Vayikra, “Al Kol Korbancha Takrib Melah” – that salt must be added to every offering brought on the altar. This Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) comes in addition to the Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition) that forbids bringing an offering that does not include salt. The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two explanations for why the Torah requires adding salt to sacrificial offerings. First, everything that is done in the Bet Ha’mikdash is intended to create an aura which impacts and inspires those who come there, and to that end, the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash must appeal to all of a person’s senses. Adding salt to meat, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, enhances not only the taste of the meat, but also its aroma, and it thus contributes to creating a pleasing and impressive aura in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch also suggests that salt acts as a preservative, preventing the food from rotting, and it is thus included with sacrifices to indicate to us that sacrifices have the effect of “preserving” a person. They have a spiritual impact upon the one who offers them, and thus protects him from “rotting” – meaning, from spiritual ruin. Salt is added so that the person offering the sacrifice will reflect on the value of the sacrifice, how it is acting to spiritually “preserve” him. The Rambam, in Moreh Nebuchim (3:46), offers a different reason for this command, explaining that it is intended to oppose the practices of the idolaters. It is well-known, the Rambam writes, that the ancient pagans made a point of not adding salt to their offerings, and so the Torah requires us to do just the opposite, and specifically ensure to add salt to every offering placed on the altar. The Rambam explains other commands relevant to sacrifices in a similar manner. For example, he writes that the ancient pagans would smear their sacrifices with honey, and that they would bring elaborate breads as offerings, and for this reason, the Torah forbids offering leavened products or sweet food items as sacrifices. Everything offered on the altar must have salt added to it, except the wine and water libations, the sacrificial blood that is sprinkled on the altar, and the wood placed on the altar to sustain the fire. An offering that was placed on the altar without salt is nevertheless valid, with the exception of the Minha (grain offering), which is invalid if salt is not added. The Torah commands that salt must not be withheld “Me’al Minhatecha” – “from upon your Minha,” indicating that this sacrifice, in particular, must include salt, and is invalid if salt is not added. A Kohen who fails to add salt to an offering he places on the altar violates both a Misvat Aseh as well as a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, and is liable to Malkut for transgressing the Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. The Rabbis teach us that nowadays, when we do not have a Bet Ha’mikdash, the table in our home is considered our “altar.” Accordingly, a number of Poskim, including the Arizal (Rav Yishak Luria, Safed, 1534-1572) and the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), ruled that one should always keep salt on his table, and this has the power to “preserve” and protect us from harmful spiritual forces.
The Torah commands in Parashat Vayikra (2:11), “Kol Se’or Ve’chol Debash Lo Taktiru Mimenu Isheh l’Hashem” – “you shall not offer as a fire-offering to G-d any leaven or honey.” This verse establishes a prohibition against offering on the altar any leavened product, or any sweet product. “Debash” (“honey”) in the Torah normally refers specifically to the juice extracted from dates, but in this context, it includes any sweet food item. All sweet products may not be offered on the altar. This prohibition forbids not only directly placing sweet products on the altar, but also including sweeteners among the ingredients of the Ketoret (incense). The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers several different approaches to explain the reasoning behind this command. First, he suggests that Hametz symbolizes laziness. Dough rises and ferments when it sits for a period of time without being handled, and thus Hametz is the result of inactivity. By banning Hametz from the altar, the Torah expresses to us the importance of zeal, energy and alacrity in the service of G-d. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah allows Hametz to be brought as a public offering: on Shabuot, a special sacrifice called the “Korban Sheteh Ha’lehem” was offered, which consisted of two loaves of leavened bread. When it comes to a communal project, people feed off each other’s energy, and so there is no need to warn about the dangers of laziness. This warning is needed only in the private, personal realm, and so leaven is not allowed in the framework of individual sacrifices. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Lehem Ha’panim – the showbread which was placed on the Shulhan (table) in the Bet Ha’mikdash – was a public offering which was nevertheless baked unleavened. He explains that since the Lehem Ha’panim was constantly on the Shulhan, it was made unleavened in order to reinforce the lesson of the dangers of laziness. As for the prohibition against offering sweet products, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this conveys the message that we should strive to limit our consumption of sweet food products. Of course, we need to eat in order to survive, but we must do just that – eat so we can live, as opposed to living so we can eat. We are to avoid gluttony and overindulgence, and exercise moderation in our enjoyment of food, and so the Torah forbade offering sweet food products on the altar, as a symbol of the need to curb our lust for tasty food. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, leavened and sweet products both represent arrogance. Dough rises when it ferments, and honey naturally forms bubbles that rise above the surface. The Torah therefore forbade offering these products on the altar to express the need to eliminate arrogance, as the verse states, “To’abat Hashem Kol Gebah Leb” – “Everyone haughty of heart is abominable to G-d” (Mishleh 16:5). Thirdly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the Ramban as commenting that G-d wants only that which is in its natural, organic form to be placed on the altar. Leavened bread is the product of flour which has been altered and engineered by yeast, and so it forbids bringing leavened products on the altar. As for sweet products, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that sweetness represents extremes, which we must avoid. G-d created the world in such a way that it requires a delicate balance between different extremes, such as between Din (strict justice) and Rahamim (mercy). We are therefore commanded not to offer sweet products on the altar, representing the need to avoid extreme behavior. The Torah forbids offering “Mimenu” (literally, “of it”), which the Sages understood to mean that even the smallest amount of Hametz or sweet products may not be placed on the altar. Even if a small amount is mixed with other food, the mixture may not be offered. The prohibition forbids only offering leaven or sweet products as part of a sacrifice; such products may be placed on the altar as fuel, to sustain the fire. In listing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the view of the Rambam, that these two prohibitions – offering Hametz and offering sweet products – constitute a single Biblical command. In his view, one who at once places both leaven and a sweet product on the altar is liable to only a single set of Malkut. The Ramban, however, disagrees, and maintains that these should be counted as two separate Biblical commands. In his opinion, one who places Hametz and a sweet product on the altar at the same time receives two sets of Malkut. Needless to say, this prohibition applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and applies only to the Kohanim.
One of the sacrifices discussed in the first section of the Book of Vayikra is the Minha offering, which was unique in that it involved not an animal, but rather flour. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the procedure for offering the Minha as the 116 th Biblical command. He explains that the purpose of this offering is “Hachna’at Ha’yeser” – subduing the evil inclination. When a person sees that his hard-earned assets are burned in fire because of his wrongdoing, he will be deterred from misconduct in the future, and will be more likely to restrain his sinful instincts. The word “Minha” means “gift,” and the Sefer Ha’hinuch presents two explanations for why the Torah uses this word in reference to the grain offering. First, he writes, the word “Minha” has the specific connotation of a small gift, like a small present one gives his fellow as a symbolic gesture in the hope of earning his favor. The Minha offering, of course, was far smaller and less costly than animal sacrifices, and so it is referred to with the term “Minha.” Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the word “Minha” refers to a gift given voluntarily, and it is therefore used in reference to the grain offering, which was primarily offered as a voluntary sacrifice, notwithstanding the fact that some Minha offerings were obligatory (as we will soon see). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists three special Minha offerings which were brought on behalf of the entire nation: the Omer offering from the first harvested grain, which was offered on the second day of Pesach; the “Sheteh Ha’lehem” offering, which consisted of two leavened loaves and offered on Shabuot (marking the only time when a Minha was prepared as Hametz); and the “Lehem Ha’panim” – the bread baked each week and placed on the Shulhan (table in the Bet Ha’mikdash). The Sefer Ha’hinuch then lists the nine types of Minha offerings which were brought by individuals: 1) Minhat Hoteh – a sinner’s offering. In some situations, a sinner who must offer an atonement offering, but cannot afford an animal, is allowed to bring the less expensive Minha offering, instead. 2) Minhat Kena’ot – the Minha offering brought by a woman suspected of marital infidelity (“Sota”) as part of the special process by which her guilt or innocence was determined. 3) Minhat Hinuch – the Minha offering brought by every Kohen the first day he began serving as a Kohen. 4) Minhat Habitin – the Minha offering brought each day by the Kohen Gadol. 5) Minhat Solet – a voluntary offering consisting of raw flour and oil. 6) Minhat Mahabat – a voluntary offering consisting of flour fried in oil in a shallow pan. 7) Minhat Marheshet – a voluntary offering consisting of flour deep fried in oil. 8) Minhat Ma’afeh Tanur – a voluntary offering consisting of flour and oil that were baked into thin crackers in an oven. 9) A second type of Minhat Ma’afeh Tanur, which was baked into thick loaves, as opposed to thin crackers. The person who brings a Minha offering would place the offering in a metal utensil and give it to a Kohen. The Kohen would consecrate the utensil, and bring it to the top of the altar. He would take a “Kometz” (“handful”) and place it onto the fire on the altar, and the rest would be eaten by the Kohanim. This Misva applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikash, and to the Kohanim. A Kohen who did not follow the prescribed procedure for the offering of the Minha has violated this affirmative command. A person who vowed to offer a voluntary offering and failed to do has transgressed the separate Misva forbidding violating one’s vows.
The opening verses of the Book of Vayikra describe the procedure for the offering of the Korban Ola (burnt offering), and the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this procedure as the 115 th Biblical command. He mentions in this context that he had already presented his analysis of the general concept of Korbanot (sacrifices) earlier in his work (Misva 95). The Korban Ola is to be slaughtered specifically in the Azara (the outdoor courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash). It may be slaughtered even by somebody who is not a Kohen, but all the subsequent stages of the procedure, from the collection of the blood until the end of the entire process, must be performed by a Kohanim. The animal’s blood is sprinkled on the altar, and the carcass is then skinned and divided into different pieces. Every limb remained fully intact, except the leg, which needed to be opened in order to remove the Gid Ha’nasheh (sciatic nerve), as the Gid Ha’nasheh was not permitted on the altar. The verse in the Book of Yehezkel (45:15) speaks of “Mashkeh Yisrael” (literally, “the beverages of Israel”) being offered as sacrifices on the altar, and the Sages understood this to mean that only that which is permissible for consumption by Am Yisrael may be placed on the altar. Since the Gid Ha’nasheh is forbidden for consumption, it likewise may not be placed on the altar, as we may not offer to G-d food which we ourselves are not permitted to eat. (Of course, the blood is sprinkled on the altar, even though it is forbidden for consumption, because the Torah explicitly required sprinkling the blood. The Torah never instructed offering the Gid Ha’nasheh, and so we apply to it the rule of “Mashkeh Yisrael,” forbidding placing on the altar that which we are not allowed to eat.) After the skinning and dissection of the carcass, the various parts of the animal are then placed on the altar. Unlike the other animal sacrifices, the Korban Ola is placed in its entirety on the altar. The Gemara tells in Masechet Yoma that no fewer than eight Kohanim were needed to bring the various parts of the animal up the ramp to the altar. The animal’s hair, bones, sinews, horns and hoofs are also placed on the altar, if they remained on the carcass during the skinning process. However, if any of these fell off the carcass during skinning, those parts are not placed on the altar. Of course, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices are offered, and it applies only to the Kohanim, who are commanded to perform this procedure properly. A Kohen who deviated from the instructions regarding the Korban Ola has transgressed this Biblical command. The Korban Ola could be brought as a voluntary sacrifice, but on some occasions was obligatory, as in the case of the daily Tamid sacrifice, which was an Ola. The same guidelines applied for both types of Korban Ola – the obligatory sacrifices and the voluntary sacrifices.
The Torah commands in Parashat Vayakhel (Shemot 35:3), “Lo Teba’aru Esh Be’chol Moshebotechem Be’yom Ha’Shabbat” – “Do not burn fire in any of your residences on the day of Shabbat.” At first glance, it appears that the Torah here introduces the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat. However, the Gemara notes that this cannot be the meaning of the verse, because kindling fire on Shabbat is already included under the general prohibition forbidding Melacha (work) on Shabbat, as kindling is among the thirty-nine forms of Melacha. Moreover, the Torah here specifies “Moshebotechem” – “your residences,” and kindling fire is, of course, forbidden on Shabbat everywhere. The Gemara therefore explains that the Torah here addresses Bet Din, and forbids the court from executing an offender who deserves the punishment of Serefa (execution through fire). The word “Moshabot” is used as a reference to Bet Din, and thus the Torah here commands that Bet Din may not execute offenders through Serefa on Shabbat, and that they should instead delay the execution until after Shabbat. The Sages established that this command is not limited only to Serefa, but rather applies to all punishments administered by Bet Din, forbidding Bet Din from punishing any offenders on Shabbat. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this is forbidden because G-d wants us to respect Shabbat by having all people – even the sinners – enjoy rest on this day. Indeed, the Rabbis tell us that even the sinners in Gehinam are granted a respite from their punishment each week on Shabbat. One of the expressions of the special status and sanctity of Shabbat is that everybody is given the opportunity to rest on this day, even the sinners who deserve to be punished. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if Bet Din executes an offender on Shabbat, then since this was not allowed on Shabbat, the executioner is guilty of desecrating Shabbat. Like all Shabbat violators, he is liable to Sekila (death by stoning) if he transgressed intentionally, and must bring a sin-offering if he committed this violation mistakenly. The Rambam, in Hilchot Shabbat (24:7), clarifies that this prohibition applies not only to capital punishment, but also to Malkut (lashes). Even though whipping somebody does not entail any Melacha, this punishment may not be administered on Shabbat. This explains why the prohibition against punishing offenders is counted as a separate Biblical command. At first glance, one might have assumed that once the Torah forbids administering punishment on Shabbat, a court that does administer punishment has violated the prohibition against violating Shabbat. As such, there is no reason to list a separate prohibition against punishing offenders. But once the Rambam clarifies that this prohibition includes administering Malkut, we understand why this is considered a separate prohibition. If Bet Din administers Malkut on Shabbat, they are not guilty of Shabbat desecration, but they have transgressed the separate prohibition against punishing offenders on Shabbat. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even the judges who instructed the court official to administer punishment on Shabbat are in violation of this command, simply by giving the instruction. However, they do not receive punishment, because they transgressed the command without committing an action.
Three times, the Torah issues the command, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Shemot 23:19 & 34:26, Debarim 14:21), forbidding cooking meat with milk. The Rabbis understood that these three verses establish three prohibitions – cooking meat with milk, even without the intention of eating it; eating meat with milk; and deriving other forms of benefit from meat that had bene cooked with milk, such as selling it. Although the Torah introduces three separate commands, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that these are to be counted as only two of the Torah’s 613 Misvot, because the prohibitions against eating and deriving benefit are essentially a single law. Anything which the Torah forbids for consumption is forbidden also for other forms of benefit, and thus the prohibition against eating meat with milk and the prohibition against deriving benefit from such a mixture compromise a single Biblical command. The Gemara raises the question of why the Torah did not explicitly forbid eating meat with milk, and instead alluded to this prohibition by repeating the command against cooking meat with milk. The answer, the Gemara explains, is that the Torah wanted to instruct that eating meat with milk is forbidden even if one eats in a manner that does not provide any enjoyment. Normally, Torah law forbids eating prohibited food only “Derech Hana’a” – in an enjoyable manner, as the verb “A.Ch.L.” (“eat”) indicates. The Torah does not use this verb in reference to the prohibition of “Basar Be’halab” to teach that one transgresses this prohibition even if one eats in a non-enjoyable manner. For example, if one eats meat that has been cooked with milk and is still scalding hot, such that it burns his mouth and throat, and he receives no enjoyment whatsoever, he has nevertheless violated the Biblical command of “Basar Be’halab.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions numerous different laws that apply with regard to this prohibition: 1) It applies only to kosher species of animal; cooking meat from a non-kosher species with milk does not transgress this prohibition. 2) It applies only to domesticated animals (Behemot), not to non-domesticated animals (Hayot). Cooking meat of a non-domesticated animal with milk does not transgress this Biblical prohibition. Likewise, this prohibition does not include poultry. As we know, however, the Sages enacted a provision requiring treating poultry as meat in this regard, such that one may not cook chicken with milk, or partake of such a mixture. 3) The Sages forbade even putting meat and milk on the same table at the same time, even if one plans on eating only one and not the other. 4) Another law enacted by the Sages forbids consuming milk after eating meat. It is thus customary to wait six hours after eating meat before partaking of milk or dairy products. The Sages extended this prohibition to require waiting even after eating poultry. 5) The Sages did not forbid eating fish or kosher species of grasshoppers with milk. 6) There is an extraordinary law which applies specifically to the prohibition of “Basar Be’halab” known as “Haticha Na’aset Nebela.” This refers to the case of a piece of meat which had absorbed some milk, and was then added to a pot of kosher meat. In such a case, the food in the pot is permissible only if the piece of meat which had been mixed with milk constitutes one-sixtieth or less of the food. Even though it was mixed with only a small amount of milk, nevertheless, the entire piece of meat is regarded as forbidden – like a piece of Nebela (meat from an animal which was not properly slaughtered) – and thus a ratio of 60:1 against the entire piece of meat is needed to permit the food. This situation differs from the case of a piece of meat that had been mixed with a small amount of other forbidden food – such as Heleb (forbidden fat) – and was then added to a pot of kosher meat. In that case, the contents of the pot are permissible if the quantity of forbidden food comprises one-sixtieth or less of all the food in the pot; a 60:1 ratio is needed only against the forbidden food, not against the entire piece of meat. Due to the unique severity of “Basar Be’halab,” however, a piece of meat which had been cooked with milk is treated as a piece of forbidden meat, such that a ratio of 60:1 is needed against the entire piece, and not just against the milk it had absorbed. 7) If one burned meat that had been cooked with milk, the ashes are forbidden for any sort of benefit. 8) Milk taken from a dead animal is not included in the Torah prohibition against cooking meat with milk. Therefore, on the level of Torah law, after a female animal is slaughtered, it is permissible to cook its udder with its milk and then eat it. However, the Sages enacted a requirement to first extract the milk from the udder in order for it to become permissible for consumption. However, milk found in the animal’s stomach after slaughtering is permissible to be consumed with meat, for two reasons – it was taken from a dead animal, and, milk in the stomach is not considered milk, as it has already decayed and no longer resembles milk. 9) An animal embryo is considered meat with regard to this prohibition, and it thus may not be cooked with milk. However, an animal’s skin, sinews, bones, hoofs and horns are not considered “meat” with regard to this prohibition, and thus the prohibition of “Basar Be’halab” does not apply to them. Of course, this prohibition applies at all times, in all places, and to both males and females. One who eats a Ke’zayit of a mixture of meat and milk has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if someone derives some other form of benefit from “Basar Be’halab,” then he does not receive Malkut. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because it is possible to receive benefit from “Basar Be’halab” without performing action – such as by warming oneself with the heat of a piece of meat that had just been cooked with milk. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, since this prohibition can be violated without an action, one is not liable to Malkut even if he violates it by committing an action, such as selling meat that had been cooked with milk.
The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 32:21) that every seventh year, “Be’harish U’ba’kasir Tishbot” – one must refrain from plowing and harvesting. This verse introduces an affirmative command to observe the Shemita year by refraining from tilling the land. Earlier in the Book of Shemot, in Parashat Mishpatim (23:11), the Torah already introduced the obligation to proclaim one’s produce ownerless during the Shemita year; here, it introduces the obligation to refrain from agricultural work during this year. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that he has no need to explain the various reasons underlying the law of Shemita, because he had already presented them earlier, in the context of the aforementioned command in Parashat Mishpatim. Interestingly, though, in making mention of that command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch refers to it as having been introduced “in Parashat Im Kesef Talveh Et Ami.” He identifies the Parasha not as Parashat Mishpatim, but rather as the Parasha called “Im Kesef Talveh Et Ami” – a verse that begins one of the sections of Parashat Mishpatim (22:24), in which the Misva of Shemita appears. We know that some communities in earlier generations followed a different system of dividing the Torah into Parashiyot with regard to the weekly reading on Shabbat. It seems that the Sefer Ha’hinuch followed a different custom from that which we observe, one which divided what we call Parashat Mishpatim into two Parashiyot. The second part of Parashat Mishpatim, beginning with the verse “Im Kesef Talveh Et Ami,” was, apparently, read as a separate Parasha, and for this reason the Sefer Ha’hinuch makes reference to “Parashat Im Kesef Talveh Et Ami.” The Torah obligation of Shemita applies only during times when the laws of Yobel (the jubilee year) apply, and only in the Land of Israel. Nowadays, the Misva of Shemita applies Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment. However, even Mi’de’rabbanan, this law applies only in the Land of Israel, and not elsewhere. The Misva of Shemita applies to both men and women, despite the fact that it seemingly falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands that apply at specific times. As a general rule, women are exempt from such Misvot, and yet, women are included in the affirmative command to observe Shemita, which applies at a specific time – once in seven years. One explanation given is that observing Shemita is required both by force of this affirmative command, and also by force of a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition) forbidding agricultural work, which the Torah introduces later. Therefore, since women are included in the prohibition against performing agricultural work during Shemita (as women are, as a rule, included in all Misvot Lo Ta’aseh), they are included also in the affirmative command of Shemita. The Minhat Hinuch offers a different explanation. He posits that the rule exempting women from a “Misvat Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” applies only to “Misvot She’begufo” – commands binding upon a person himself. In the case of Shemita, the Misva affects the status of the land, requiring that it life fallow. This is not a directly personal obligation, but rather one which flows from the status conferred upon the land during Shemita. Since it does not directly impose a requirement upon a person, it does not fall under the rule exempting women from time-bound affirmative commands.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 34:12-15) warns against entering into treaties with the pagans, which will result in partaking in their sacrificial offerings. The warning is formulated with the expression “Hishamer Lecha” (literally, “Guard yourself”), and according to tradition, when the Torah uses this formulation, it establishes a prohibition. And thus the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as one of the Biblical prohibitions the command forbidding eating or drinking anything which had been offered as a pagan sacrifice. The reason for this command, quite obviously, is that the Torah wanted to distance us as much as possible from pagan worship, to the point where it forbade eating or drinking any food or beverage that was part of a pagan ritual. The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions a number of Halachot relevant to this prohibition, noting, for example, that it applies to anything offered as a pagan sacrifice, even something small and insignificant, like salt, or water. This prohibition includes also “Yayin Nesech” – wine poured as a libation to a pagan god. The Halacha of “Yayin Nesech” is exceptional in that Torah law forbids consuming even a single drop of this wine, even it is mixed in permissible foods. This provision is learned from the verse in the Book of Debarim (13:18), “Ve’lo Yidbak Be’yadecha Me’uma Min Ha’herem” – “Nothing at all shall remain in your hand from the forbidden property.” If a person drinks even one drop of “Yayin Nesech,” he has transgressed this Biblical prohibition and is liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions also the Rabbinic prohibition of “Setam Yenam” – ordinary wine owned by a gentile. Even though it is not known whether this wine had been used in a pagan ritual, it is nevertheless forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment. Similarly, a statue in a gentile’s home is forbidden for any sort of benefit even if it is not known whether it was worshipped. The Sages extended the prohibition of “Stam Yenam” a step further, forbidding even wine owned by a Jew that was touched by a non-Jew. Due to the singular severity of the prohibition of Aboda Zara (foreign worship), the Sages forbade even wine which a gentile merely handled. Another expression of this unique standard of severity is the Halacha forbidding one to receive payment for destroying barrels containing “Yayin Nesech.” Although this person is being paid specifically to destroy this wine, nevertheless, if he receives payment, he has interest in this wine’s temporary existence, in that its existence enables him to earn money. Therefore, such an arrangement is forbidden, and one who receives payment to destroy these barrels may not use the money paid to him. This prohibition applies at all times, in all places, and to both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of this command is exceptional, marking the only time that he does not follow the Rambam’s view regarding the Biblical source of a Misva. The Rambam understood that the source forbidding deriving benefit from pagan wine libations is not the verses in Parashat Ki-Tisa, but rather a verse in Parashat Haazinu (Debarim 32:38) which says of the pagans, “who eat the fat of their sacrifices, drink the wine of their libations.” The verse compares the pagans’ sacrificial foods with the wine of their libations, and the Rambam thus infers that just as the sacrificial food is forbidden (as the Rambam derives from a different verse), the wine used for libations is likewise forbidden. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although throughout his work he follows the Rambam’s view, in this instance, he felt compelled to accept the Ramban’s understanding, inferring the prohibition against partaking of pagan offerings from the aforementioned verses in Parashat Ki-Tisa. He explains that the verse in Parashat Haazinu cited by the Rambam makes no reference whatsoever to a prohibition; it merely states as a fact that the pagans offered sacrifices and libations to their gods. In the verses in Parashat Ki-Tisa, by contrast, as noted earlier, the Torah issues a warning with the phrase “Hishamer Lecha,” which establishes a prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch thus found the Ramban’s view more compelling, and so he understood that it is in Parashat Ki-Tisa where the Torah introduces the prohibition against partaking of pagan offerings.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 30:37-38) introduces the prohibition against producing the combination of spices in the same measurements as those used to make the Ketoret (incense) in the Bet Ha’mikdash. This prohibition is violated only if one prepares the spices for the purpose of using it, as the verse says, “A person who mixes it in order to smell it…” In explaining the reason behind this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch references his earlier discussion (Misva 108) regarding the prohibition against producing a replica of the Shemen Ha’mish’ha (anointing oil). There he explained that things which are rare and not easily accessible are regarded as more precious and valuable. If everybody was allowed to create the Ketoret, then the scent of the Ketoret in the Bet Ha’mikdash would not have much of an impact. The Torah wanted the experience of visiting the Bet Ha’mikdash to be special and impactful, and so it forbade making a replica of the Ketoret, such that it would be unique and exclusive to the Bet Ha’mikdash. It is permissible to produce the Ketoret as part of the training process, to learn how to make it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is also permissible to make the Ketoret to sell it to the Bet Ha’mikdash. Later writers noted that in truth, it is forbidden to sell the Ketoret, as one would thereby be deriving benefit from it. Hence, it seems likely that there was a copyist’s error in the text of the Sefer Ha’hinuch, and it should say “Le’mosrah” (“to give it”) instead of “Le’mochrah” (“to sell it”). One violates this prohibition even if he does not make a complete quantity of Ketoret, as long as he uses the same spices in the same proportions as those used when making the Ketoret. This prohibition applies to both men and women, in all places, and in all times. Even nowadays, if a person can obtain all the spices used in the Ketoret, and he grinds them and mixes them in the same proportions as were used to make the Ketoret, in order to smell it, then he violates this command. One who transgresses this prohibition intentionally is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish People), and one who violates it mistakenly must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition forbids producing incense like the Ketoret to enjoy its scent, but not smelling the actual Ketoret in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Smelling the Ketoret itself violates the separate prohibition of deriving personal benefit from hallowed articles. Later scholars addressed the question of how it was permissible for anyone to go to the Bet Ha’mikdash, given that visitors would invariably smell the fragrant scent of the Ketoret. In fact, the Gemara teaches that the scent of the Ketoret was so strong that it was smelled far away in the city of Yericho. And, the Gemara teaches that brides in Jerusalem did not need to apply perfume, because just by being present in the city, they had the pleasing fragrance of the Ketoret. How could anybody be present in Jerusalem, if they would be enjoying the fragrance of the Ketoret? The commentators explain that the prohibition against benefitting from the Ketoret applies only until the Misva is fulfilled – meaning, until the spices are burned on the coals on the altar. And thus by the time the scent was produced, the prohibition no longer applied. However, even after the incense was placed on the coals, it was forbidden to go out of one’s way to smell the Ketoret, but there was no prohibition at that point against enjoying the scent if one happens to be in an area where the fragrance was present.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa discusses the Shemen Ha’mish’ha – the special oil that Moshe prepared for the purpose of anointing the Kohanim Gedolim and kings. In the context of this discussion, the Torah commands (Shemot 30:32), “U’be’matkunto Lo Ta’asu” – that one may not prepare oil with the same ingredients in the same proportions as in the Shemen Ha’mish’ha. The word “Matkunto” means “its measurement,” as in the expression “Matkonet Ha’lebenim” (Shemot 5:8), which refers to the prescribed amount of bricks which Beneh Yisrael were forced to produce as slaves in Egypt. The Torah here forbids making a replica of the Shemen Ha’mish’ha by using the precise same spices in the precise same amounts as those used for the Shemen Ha’mish’ha. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbids producing additional Shemen Ha’mish’ha because, quite simply, this was unnecessary. Tradition teaches that the initial supply of Shemen Ha’mish’ha which Moshe prepared at Mount Sinai miraculously endured and would endure forever. Even after being used for anointing many Kohanim Gedolim and kings, it was never and will never be depleted. The Torah therefore commands us to never prepare any additional Shemen Ha’mish’ha. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies in all places and at all times, even today. Somebody who produces a replica of the Shemen Ha’mish’ha, using the same ingredients in the same quantities as used to produce the initial supply of Shemen Ha’mish’ha, has violated this prohibition. If he transgressed this command intentionally, then he is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation), and if this was done mistakenly, he must bring a Korban Hatat (sin-offering). One of the spices included in the Shemen Ha’mish’ha was a product called Mor Deror. The Rambam, in Hilchot Keleh Ha’mikdash (1:3), identifies this substance as “Musk,” which originated from the blood of a certain non-kosher species of animal. He explains that blood collects in a protrusion from the animal’s stomach, and with time, it congeals. In the summertime, the animal feels a need to scratch its skin against bushes, which has the effect of opening this protrusion, thereby releasing the congealed blood onto the bushes. It is then collected and used as an aromatic spice. According to the Rambam, this is the substance to which the term “Mor Deror” refers, and which was included in the Shemen Ha’mish’ha. The Ra’avad (Rav Abraham Ben David of Posquières, Provence, d. 1198), in his critique of the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, strongly disagrees. It is inconceivable, he writes, that the Torah would include the blood of a non-kosher species of animal in the Shemen Ha’mish’ha, which was used to consecrate the Kohanim Gedolim and the kings. In his view, the Mor Deror was a fragrant substance extracted from a certain tree. The Kessef Mishneh (commentary to the Mishneh Torah by Maran, Rav Yosef Karo, 1488-1575) defends the Rambam’s view by positing that once the blood dried, it is considered like mere dust, and is no longer seen as a product of a non-kosher creature. Since it has been fundamentally altered, we may disregard its origins and thus include it as part of the Shemen Ha’mish’ha.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 30:32) commands that the Shemen Ha’mish’ha – the special oil used for anointing Kohanim Gedolim and kings – may not be used by anybody other than those for whom it is intended. An ordinary person may not take this oil and place it on his body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that something which is earmarked for a certain exclusive use is naturally respected and regarded as special. Something to which most people do not have access is seen as a uniquely precious commodity. The Torah therefore forbade the use of the Shemen Ha’mish’ha by anybody besides those who are to be anointed with it, in order to raise the oil’s esteem in people’s eyes, which will, in turn, raise their esteem for the people anointed with this special oil. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes the tradition that the initial supply of Shemen Ha’mish’ha which Moshe prepared will miraculously last forever, and will never be depleted. As such, the prohibition against misusing the Shemen Ha’mish’ha remains binding even today, because this oil is still in existence. If, somehow, this oil is discovered, it would be forbidden for anybody to use it. One who intentionally violates this prohibition by applying this oil on his body is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). If one violates this prohibition mistakenly, then he must bring a sin-offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that only kings from Malchut Bet David – the Davidic royal dynasty – are anointed with the Shemen Ha’mish’ha. Other kings are anointed with a different oil – the fragrant “Shemen Afarsamon.” This distinction gives rise to a question regarding the formal anointing of the first king of Israel – Shaul, who was from the tribe of Binyamin, and ruled before David. According to most Rishonim, Shaul was anointed with the Shemen Ha’mish’ha. Seemingly, if only kings from Malchut Bet David are to be anointed with this oil, Shaul’s anointing with this oil transgressed this grave prohibition, which is punishable by Karet. How, then, was Shaul allowed to be anointed with the Shemen Ha’mish’ha? One answer given is that it was only once David became king that this distinction took effect. Before David’s ascent to the throne and the establishment of his line as the eternal Jewish dynasty, anyone appointed as king over Israel was to be anointed with the Shemen Ha’mish’ha. It was only once David was designated as the founder of the exclusive, eternal dynasty that other kings were no longer given the distinction of being anointed with this special oil. The Meiri (Rav Menahem Meiri, 1249-1310) suggested a different answer. He posits that Shaul was chosen to be king – despite the fact that the kingship was to emerge from the tribe of Yehuda – because at the time when Beneh Yisrael requested a king, nobody from Yehuda was worthy of the position. The most suitable person for the position at that time was Shaul, and so he was appointed king even though he did not belong to the tribe of Yehuda. Essentially, the Meiri writes, Shaul served as a temporary “substitute” for Malchut Bet David. Although he was not from the Davidic line, he was taking the place of David’s family in the interim until a worthy candidate would arise. Therefore, as he was filling the role of Malchut Bet David, he was anointed with the Shemen Ha’mish’ha as though he was actually from the line of King David.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 30:25) commands Beneh Yisrael to prepare the Shemen Ha’mish’ha – special oil that was used for formally anointing the Kohanim, and for consecrating the sacred articles of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch thus lists as the 107 th Biblical command the obligation to have this oil prepared for the anointing of those requiring anointing with this special oil. Specifically, the Kohen Gadol was anointed with this oil upon receiving the appointment to his post, and kings from the Davidic dynasty would be anointed with this oil upon ascending the throne. (Other kings were not anointed with the Shemen Ha’mish’ha.) The original utensils of the Bet Ha’mikdash, too, required anointing with this oil, but subsequent utensils did not, and instead became formally consecrated by being used for the first time. The Sages inferred this rule from the verse in which G-d says about the Shemen Ha’mish’ha, “Yiheyeh Zeh Li Le’dorotechem” – “this [anointing oil] shall be for Me for your generations” (Shemot 30:31), implying that the anointing of the initial utensils sufficed for all the utensils that would be made in future generations. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that anointing a Kohen Gadol impresses upon him, and upon the nation generally, the singular importance of his role and of the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Formal anointing with oil was a customary ceremony when appointing kings and dignitaries in the ancient world, and so the Torah required anointing the Kohen Gadol to demonstrate his great stature and the significance of his role. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah demands that Shemen Ha’mish’ha must always be available in the Bet Ha’mikdash just as the homes of wealthy people and aristocrats are always stocked with supplies. The homes of people of distinction always have everything that they would need readily available, and so in the Bet Ha’mikdash, too, the Torah required having the Shemen Ha’mish’ha available at all times in case the need arose to anoint a new Kohen Gadol or king. The Shemen Ha’mish’ha was made from 12 “Log” of olive oil, which was boiled with several spices – 500 Shekel of “Mor,” of “Kinnamon,” and of “Kida,” and 250 Shekel of “Keneh Bosem.” Some of the mixture would evaporate during the cooking process, and the result would be a total of 12 “Log” of anointing oil. This is alluded in the aforementioned verse, “Yiheyeh Zeh Li Le’dorotechem,” as the word “Zeh” in Gematria equals 12, alluding to the quantity of 12 “Log” of oil which was prepared. This Misva, of course, applied only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this Misva is assigned not to any individual or group of individuals, but rather collectively to the entire nation. As cited earlier, the Torah describes the Shemen Ha’mish’ha as anointing oil that would serve “Le’dorotechem” – “for your generations.” The Sages understood this term to mean that the initial supply of oil which Moshe Rabbenu prepared lasted forever, such that no new Shemen Ha’mish’ha would ever need to be prepared again. The question thus arises as to why the Sefer Ha’hinuch listed this obligation as one of the Torah’s 613 commands. After all, this list includes only those Misvot which apply for eternity, as opposed to commands which were applicable only at one time. Seemingly, once Moshe prepared the Shemen Ha’mish’ha, this Misva was never again practically relevant. Why, then, did the Sefer Ha’hinuch list this Misva as one of the 613 Biblical commands? One fairly simply answer emerges from a close reading of the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation of this Misva. He defines it not as an obligation to produce the Shemen Ha’mish’ha, but rather as an obligation “She’yiheyeh Shemen Ha’mish’ha Muchan Tamid” – to ensure that the anointing oil is always ready. This command requires protecting the supply of Shemen Ha’mish’ha so that it is always available whenever it is needed. Indeed, the Sefer Ha’hinuch does not list as one of the 613 commands the obligation to prepare the Shemen Ha’mish’ha, because this was necessary only once, during the time of Moshe Rabbenu. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch does list a Misva to guard that supply of oil so as to assure its constant accessibility in the Bet Ha’mikdash. May we soon see the rebuilding of the Bet Ha’mikdash and the anointing of the Kohen Gadol and of the Mashiah, speedily and in our times, Amen.
The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 30:19-20) commands the Kohanim to wash their hands and feet from the Kiyor – the special sink in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash – when they enter the Bet Ha’mikdash to perform the service. The reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is “Le’hagdil Kebod Ha’bayit” – to enhance the aura of majesty and grandeur in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Ensuring to wash oneself upon entering the Bet Ha’mikdash to serve G-d impresses upon him the importance of the Bet Ha’mikdash and the service, and how seriously this responsibility must be approached and fulfilled. This requirement is clearly not based on any hygienic concerns, as evidenced by the fact that a Kohen needs to wash only once each day, upon entering the Bet Ha’mikdash. As long as he does not fall asleep, use the restroom, leave the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash, or distract his mind from the service, he does not have to wash again, even if his hands are dirtied. Clearly, then, this Misva is intended not to maintain hygienic standards, but rather to enhance the Kohen’s appreciation and cognizance of the sanctity and importance of the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The only occasion on which the Torah mandates multiple washings in one day is Yom Kippur. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this unique requirement as a function of “Humro Shel Yom” – the special importance and gravity of Yom Kippur. The Kohen must wash in the morning even if he remained awake throughout the night; the night itself disqualifies the previous day’s washing, such that a new washing is required in the morning. As indicated earlier, if a Kohen leaves beyond the wall of the Azara (courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash) at any point, he must wash upon returning. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that there is a Misva for the Kohanim to wash each morning their face, hands and feet. As the Minhat Hinuch notes, there does not appear to be any source for a requirement for the Kohanim to wash their face; the Misva is to wash only their hands and feet. The Minhat Hinuch writes that the word “Panav” (“face”) must have been erroneously added by a copyist, and was not actually written by the author of the Sefer Ha’hinuch. The washing must be conducted from the Kiyor, and the water must be poured over the Kohen’s hands and feet. The Sefer Ha’hinuch is of the opinion that when it comes to the Netilat Yadayim washing before eating bread, it suffices to dip one’s hands in water, but he concedes that this does not suffice for the Kohanim as they enter the Bet Ha’mikdash. This washing must be performed through the pouring of water from the Kiyor over their hands and feet. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Kiyor must contain at all times at least the amount of water needed to pour on the hands and feet of four Kohanim. This is inferred from the Torah’s command that “Aharon and his sons” must wash from the Kiyor, referring to Aharon, his two sons – Elazar and Itamar – and Elazar’s son, Pinhas. As they were altogether four Kohanim, the Sages understood that the minimum quantity of water required in the Kiyor is the amount needed for four Kohanim. The water needed to be brought from either a Mikveh or a natural spring. Water that was left overnight became invalid for the Kohanim’s washing. The washing was performed by the Kohen placing his right hand on his right foot, and then having water poured on them; afterward, he would place his left on his left foot, and water would be poured on them, as well. The Kohen was required to stand while washing, because the washing is considered part of the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and all parts of the service must be performed while standing. A Kohen who performs the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash without having first washed is liable to Miya Bi’ydeh Shamayim – death at the hands of G-d – and the service he performs is invalid and must be repeated. This obligation applies both to the Kohen Gadol and to ordinary Kohanim. The Netilat Yadayim which we perform before eating bread has no connection at all to the Kohanim’s washing before performing the service in the Bet Ha’mikdash. However, according to some opinions, the obligatory hand washing which we perform each morning is modeled after the Misva upon the Kohanim to wash. Just as the Kohanim wash before they enter the Bet Ha’mikdash to serve G-d, we, too, wash as we begin our day of service to the Almighty. (Of course, there are also other reasons for why we must wash our hands each morning.)
The Torah in the beginning of Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 30:13) requires every male aged twenty and above to pay each year a Mahasit Ha’shekel (half-Shekel) to the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this money was used for all the public offerings brought in the Bet Ha’mikdash on behalf of the entire nation. These include the two daily Tamid sacrifices; the additional Musaf sacrifices offered on Shabbat, Rosh Hodesh and holidays; the Nesachim (libations) that accompanied the public sacrifices; the salt that was added to the sacrifices; the wood placed on the altar to sustain the fire; the Lehem Ha’panim (show bread); the special Omer sacrifice offered on the 16 th of Nissan; the Sheteh Ha’lehem offering brought on Shabuot; the Para Aduma (red heifer); the Sa’ir Ha’mishtaleah (the goat sent into the wilderness on Yom Kippur for atonement) and the crimson string which was tied to its horns. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d commanded this Misva for the nation’s benefit, so that we will all have a share in the sacrifices. All people – both rich and poor – donated the precise same amount, such that everyone, regardless of his financial status, had an equal portion in the sacrifices which were offered on the nation’s behalf. It was a great merit for the nation that everyone participated collectively to fund the public offerings. The Mishna in the beginning of Masechet Shekalim teaches that each year, on Rosh Hodesh Adar, the announcement was made that everybody must send their Mahasit Ha’shekel to the Temple treasury. The “fiscal year” of the Bet Ha’mikdash began at the beginning of Nissan, so one month prior, at the beginning of Adar, the authorities would begin collecting the mandatory half-Shekel donation. As mentioned, all people – both rich and poor – were required to pay the amount of a half-Shekel. Somebody who could not afford this amount needed to even sell his clothing if necessary to obtain the money to fulfill this obligation. The half-Shekel needed to be paid all at once; it could not be paid in installments. This Misva is binding upon all males, including Kohanim, Leviyim, Yisraelim, Gerim (converts), and gentile servants who were freed. It applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, but when the Bet Ha’mikdash stood, even Jews living outside the Land of Israel were required to send in their Mahasit Ha’shekel payment each year. If a child volunteers to donate the Mahasit Ha’shekel, his donation is accepted. If a non-Jew volunteers to donate the Mahasit Ha’shekel, his donation is not accepted. Somebody who neglected to pay the Mahasit Ha’shekel has transgressed an affirmative Biblical command. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, he would be severely punished for separating himself from the nation by not participating in this collective donation. And, since he did not participate, he would not be included in the atonement earned through the offering of the public sacrifices. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, it is customary nowadays on the Shabbat before Rosh Hodesh Adar to read in the synagogue the command of the Mahasit Ha’shekel, in commemoration of this Misva. We commonly refer to this Shabbat as “Shabbat Parashat Shekalim.” There is also a different custom, which the Sefer Ha’hinuch does not mention, to make a special donation before or on Purim in commemoration of the Mahasit Ha’shekel. This custom is noted by the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), at the end of the laws of Purim. Rabbi Akiva Eiger (1761-1837) writes (in Siman 106) that since women are exempt from the obligation of Mahasit Ha’shekel, it follows that they are also exempt from the Musaf prayer on Shabbat, Rosh Hodesh and holidays. The other prayers are recited both to commemorate the daily sacrifices in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and to invoke G-d’s compassion. Therefore, women recite these prayers, because although they did not participate in the funding of the daily sacrifices through the Mahasit Ha’shekel payment, they quite obviously require G-d’s compassion no less than men. The Musaf prayer, however, is recited solely to commemorate the Musaf sacrifice. Thus, Rabbi Akiva Eiger asserts, women are not obligated to recite Musaf, because they did not take part in paying for the Musaf sacrifice in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Later writers discussed and debated this theory advanced by Rabbi Akiva Eiger. The Misva of Mahasit Ha’shekel shows us the special power of Misvot performed collectively by a community. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the joint effort of the entire nation to fund the public sacrifices had a profound effect and brought them great merit. We, too, earn great merit when we join together in unity to perform a Misva collectively.
Inside the Bet Ha’mikdash, there was an altar called the Mizbah Ha’zahab (“the golden altar”), which was earmarked specifically for the daily offering of incense, and for the sprinkling of sacrificial blood on a number of rare occasions (such as Yom Kippur). The Torah in Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 30:9) issues a prohibition forbidding offering anything else on the altar – such as an unwarranted incense offering, an Ola (burnt-offering), Minha (grain offering) or Nesech (libation). In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the reason underlying this command is known only to the scholars of Kabbalah. He composed his work for the purpose of presenting rational explanations of the Misvot, as opposed to the explanations based on the esoteric teachings of Kabbalah. And rational explanations, he writes, can be given only for the generalities of the Torah’s commands, but not for the details. Therefore, he cannot offer a rational explanation for why the Torah demanded that only certain offerings be brought on the Mizbah Ha’zahab and forbade bringing other offerings on this altar. This distinction, between the general commands and the specific details, is developed at length by the Rambam, in the third chapter of the Moreh Nebuchim. The Rambam cites a comment of the Midrash concerning the Misva of Shehita – slaughtering an animal in order for its meat to be permissible for consumption – which requires slaughtering the animal specifically in the neck, and not in the back of the head. The Midrash notes that it clearly makes no difference to G-d whether an animal is slaughtered from the front or from the back, but “the Misvot were given only to cleanse people.” The Rambam explains that whereas the generalities of the Torah’s commands can be understood through reason, the particular details are established purely for the sake of “cleansing” and refining our characters by forcing us to live in humble subservience to G-d, faithfully obeying His detailed instructions. The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows this approach, as well, and he writes that there is no rational reason for why the Torah wants certain offerings brought on the Mizbah Ha’zahab and forbids bringing other offerings. The reasons for such details are found only in the wisdom of Kabbalah, but within the framework of the rational explanations of the Torah commands, there is no reason for these commands other than to refine our characters through our humble obedience to these detailed laws and guidelines. Of course, this prohibition applies only in the times in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and only to the Kohanim, as they in any event are the only ones suitable for bringing offerings in the Bet Ha’mikdash. A Kohen who brings an unwarranted offering on the Mizbah Ha’zahab, or who sprinkles sacrificial blood on the altar when this is not required, is in violation of this command and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 30:7-8) commands that the Ketoret (incense) must be offered on the special gold altar inside the Bet Ha’mikdash each morning and afternoon. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this Misva also includes the obligation to prepare the Ketoret in advance so it can be offered each day. The Rambam maintains that the two daily offerings of Ketoret comprise a single Misva, whereas the Ramban was of the opinion that these constitute two separate Misvot – one to offer Ketoret in the morning, and another to offer Ketoret in the afternoon. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the purpose of the Ketoret is to enhance the aura of grandeur and majesty in the Bet Ha’mikdash. A pleasing fragrance is very enjoyable, and people are drawn to places with a pleasant scent, and thus G-d commanded offering fragrant incense in the Bet Ha’mikdash to produce a pleasing aroma that people will enjoy. In fact, the Gemara comments that when the Ketoret was offered on the altar, the fragrance was so strong that it could be smelled from a distance, in the city of Yeriho. The Ketoret was a composite of eleven spices, four of which are mentioned explicitly in the Torah, whereas the other seven are known from tradition. It was brought each morning and afternoon by either the Kohen Gadol or an ordinary Kohen, except on Yom Kippur, when it was offered specifically by the Kohen Gadol. If, for whatever reason, the Ketoret was not offered in the morning, then a double portion was offered in the afternoon. The afternoon portion of Ketoret was brought after the offering of the afternoon Tamid (daily sacrifice), and before the completion of the preparation of the Menorah for kindling. After five of the seven lamps were prepared for kindling, the Ketoret was offered, and then the final two lamps were prepared. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes about this Misva, “Ha’maktir Ke’dino Kiyem Aseh” – “One who offers the incense properly has fulfilled an affirmative command.” Normally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch specifies that one who fails to perform the required act has neglected an affirmative command, or, in the case of a prohibition, that one who commits the prohibited act has violated a Biblical prohibition. In this instance, however, he writes that one who performs the required act has fulfilled a Misvat Aseh. Some commentators suggested that the Sefer Ha’hinuch deviated from his normal formulation in this context because it was very unlikely that no Kohen would offer the Ketoret. The Gemara teaches that offering the incense in the Bet Ha’mikdash brought the Kohen wealth, and thus this was a very coveted service which all Kohanim wished to perform. It was therefore not necessary for the Sefer Ha’hinuch to warn that failing to offer Ketoret constitutes the neglect of a Misva, because it was a Misva which everyone sought to fulfill. The Gemara in Masechet Keritut (6) comments that as the spices were ground to prepare the Ketoret, the person who did the grinding would announce, “Hadek Heteb, Heteb Hadek” – “Ground finely, finely ground!” This was done, the Gemara explains, “Mipeneh She’ha’kol Yafeh La’besamim” – “Because the sound is beneficial for the spices.” Somehow, saying these words during the grinding enhanced the quality of the spices. Tosafot explain that the expression “Hadek Heteb, Heteb Hadek” contains four instances of the letter “Heh,” which is pronounced by blowing air, and the warmth of the person’s breath had a beneficial effect upon the spices. A different explanation is given by Abarbanel (Portugal, 1437-1508), who writes that maintaining a rhythm while grinding was beneficial for the spices. Therefore, the person grinding the spices would repeatedly say, “Hadek Heteb, Heteb Hadek” in order to maintain a rhythm during the grinding. Although we are unable to bring the Ketoret in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Sages teach that by reading the verses and Talmudic passages that discuss this Misva, we are considered as though we offer Ketoret, and thus gain the great benefits of this Misva. Indeed, we have a custom to recite passages about the Ketoret three times each day. May we soon be granted the privilege of having the Ketoret offered on the altar in the Bet Ha’mikdash, Amen.
The Torah commands in Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 29:34), “Ve’achelu Otam Asher Kupar Bahem” – that the Kohanim must eat the sacrifices, through which those who offer sacrifices earn atonement. As the Gemara explains in Masechet Pesahim (59), “Kohanim Ochelim U’be’alim Mitkaperim” – “the Kohanim eat, and the owners [of the sacrifice] receive atonement.” The Kohanim’s consumption of the sacrifice is a precondition for the atonement which the person seeks in bringing the offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this Misva applies to all the sacrifices – both Kodasheh Kodashim, the meat of which is eaten only by the Kohanim, and Kodasheh Kalim, the meat of which is shared by the sacrifice’s owner and the Kohanim. The Kohanim’s consumption of their portion of Kodasheh Kalim is obligatory, just like their consumption of Kodasheh Kodashim. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, this Misva includes also the Kohanim’s consumption of Teruma – the portion of agricultural produce which a farmer must give to a Kohen. There is, however, one important difference between the Kohanim’s consumption of Kodasheh Kodashim and their consumption of Kodasheh Kalim and Teruma. When it comes to Kodasheh Kodashim, the person who brought the sacrifice does not achieve atonement unless the Kohanim eat the sacrifice. When it comes to Kodasheh Kalim and Teruma, by contrast, the owner fulfills his obligation by giving the Kohanim their due portion; whether or not the Kohanim fulfill their Misva to eat the portion, the owner has fully satisfied his requirement. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the purpose of the sacrifice is to subdue a person’s animalistic tendencies, and to embolden his mind and increase his spiritual awareness. To that end, everything in the Bet Ha’mikdash is conducted in a manner of distinction and grandeur, which has the effect of humbling a person and inspiring him with fear of G-d. This effect, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, will remain with the person even after he leaves the Bet Ha’mikdash and returns home. The special atmosphere in the Bet Ha’mikdash leaves an impression that will have a significant, long-term impact. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the Torah mandated that the sacrifices be treated in a very special way – they must be eaten by the distinguished servants of G-d (the Kohanim), within a specific time-frame, and only in the Bet Ha’mikdash. These restrictions contribute to the aura of grandeur and distinction that makes the experience of visiting the Bet Ha’mikdash very impactful. The Sefer H’hinuch writes that a Kohen who neglects this Misva, and does not eat the sacrifices as required, is worthy of severe punishment, because he has denied the person who offered the sacrifice the opportunity to achieve atonement. The Ramban (Rav Moshe Nachmanides, Spain, 1194-1270) disagrees with the Sefer Ha’hinuch regarding the classification of this Misva. According to the Ramban, the obligation upon the Kohanim to eat the sacrifice is part of the Misva of the sacrifice. In his view, there is no separate Misva for the Kohanim to eat the sacrifice; rather, the required procedure when bringing a sacrifice includes an obligation upon the Kohanim to eat the sacrifice. This is in contrast to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, who maintained that there is a separate command directed toward the Kohanim to eat the sacrifices.
One of the special garments worn by the Kohen Gadol was the Me’il (the robe). In the Torah’s discussion of the Me’il in Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 28:32), it says that there must be a lining around the top opening, through which the Kohen Gadol’s head extends, and “Lo Yikare’a” – “it shall not be ripped.” This verse establishes a prohibition against tearing the Me’il. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that tearing a garment, quite obviously, expresses disdain and disregard for the garment, showing that one does not consider it important. This is particularly so when this is done to the top rim, which has the effect of essentially ruining the garment. The Kohen Gadol was to wear his special garments with a sense of awe and reverence, realizing the importance of the special role which these garments represent, and so the Torah forbade treating the garments in a degrading manner, such as by ripping them. The Sefer Ha’hinuch comments that this prohibition applies only during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. At first glance, this might seem obvious, but the Minhat Hinuch observes that this remark is actually imprecise. Even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, if a person would happen to discover the Me’il that had been worn by the Kohen Gadol in the Bet Ha’mikdash, and it was intact, it would be forbidden to tear it. Thus, at least in principle, this prohibition is applicable even after the Bet Ha’mikdash’s destruction. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command is directed to both males and females; if either a man or a woman tears the Me’il, he or she has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, one violates this prohibition regardless of whether he tore the Me’il with his hands, or with scissors. The Minhat Hinuch explains this comment of the Sefer Ha’hinuch as implying that the prohibition of “Lo Yikare’a” forbids ripping the Me’il not only in a destructive manner, but even for other purposes, such as if one wishes to expand the neck opening of the Me’il. Even though his intent is not to ruin the garment, this is nevertheless forbidden. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch speaks only of the Me’il, indicating that this prohibition is limited to the Me’il, and does not apply to the other Bigdeh Kehuna (priestly vestments). As the Minhat Hinuch notes, this appears to contradict the Gemara’s explicit comment in Masechet Yoma (72) that the prohibition of “Lo Yikare’a” forbids tearing any of the special garments worn by the Kohanim. The Minhat Hinuch answers that the Gemara elsewhere, in Masechet Zebahim (95a), seems to take a different view. There Resh Lakish addresses the case of a Me’il which was stained with sacrificial blood, and must therefore be laundered in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash, but in the meantime, it had been taken outside the Bet Ha’mikdash and became Tameh (impure). If this would happen to a different garment, then since it is forbidden to bring an impure garment to the Bet Ha’mikdash, the garment would first be torn into pieces smaller than the minimum size that can contract impurity. Since these pieces are no longer considered impure, they may be brought into the Temple courtyard to be laundered. The Me’il, however, may not be torn, and so Resh Lakish rules that a different solution must be implemented, bringing the garment slowly into the courtyard, a little bit at a time. The fact that Resh Lakish says that this must be done only in the case of a Me’il strongly implies that it is only the Me’il which the Torah forbids tearing, whereas other garments of the Kohen Gadol may be torn. Hence, the Minhat Hinuch writes, the Sefer Ha’hinuch followed Resh Lakish’s view, that this prohibition applies only to the Me’il, and he did not accept the Gemara’s ruling in Masechet Yoma, that this command refers to all the Bigdeh Kehuna. Even according to the position of the Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, tearing one of the other Bigdeh Kehuna is forbidden by force of a different command – “Lo Ta’asun Ken L’Hashem Elokechem” (Debarim 12:4), which forbids ruining sacred articles. Although the Sefer Ha’hinuch viewed the command of “Lo Yikare’a” as limited to the Me’il, tearing any of the Bigdeh Kehuna would in any event transgress the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta’asun Ken.”
The Kohen Gadol wore eight special garments, which included the Hoshen – breastplate, in which were embedded the twelve precious stones that corresponded to the twelve tribes – and the Efod – apron. The Torah in Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 28:28) requires attaching the Hoshen to the Efod with special threads, and commands, “Ve’lo Yizah Ha’hoshen Me’al Ha’efod.” Targum Onkelos translates this to mean that the Hoshen may be separated from the Efod. This verse thus introduces a prohibition against detaching the Hoshen from the Efod, to which it must always be tightly fastened. In discussing the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Kohen Gadol’s garments must be worn at the highest aesthetic standards, so that he will have a majestic appearance that will have an impact upon those who see him. To that end, the Torah commanded that the Hoshen should be firmly fastened to the Efod, and not jostled, which would look unbecoming. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that he would be open to hear other, more compelling, explanations for the rationale underlying this command. (It should be noted that in his discussion of an earlier Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch conceded that the real reasons behind the Misvot involving the Bet Ha’mikdash are found in the wisdom of the Kabbalah.) Of course, this Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the Kohen Gadol wore his special garments. It applies to both men and women; anyone who separates the Hoshen from the Efod has violated this command, and is liable to Malkut. The Rambam, in Hilchot Keleh Ha’mikdash (9:10), writes that “anyone who separates the breastplate from the apron and undoes their connection in a destructive manner, receives lashes.” Intriguingly, the Rambam ruled that this prohibition is violated only if one separates the Hoshen “Derech Kilkul” – in a destructive manner. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question as to why the Rambam imposed this condition on the violation of this command, requiring not only that one separate the Hoshen from the Efod, but that this be done in a destructive manner. The Torah states merely that the Hoshen may not be separated from the Efod, without any conditions. On what basis did the Rambam impose the condition of “Derech Kilkul”? The Minhat Hinuch suggests that the Rambam reached this conclusion based on simple, intuitive logic. If the Hoshen needs repair, and the artisan removes the Hoshen from the Efod so he can repair it, he clearly cannot be said to be in violation of this command. Necessarily, then, the Torah’s command forbids separating the Hoshen in a destructive manner, and not doing so for a non-destructive purpose. Rav Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk (1853-1918) offered a different explanation. He notes the prohibition of “Lo Yikare’a,” which forbids tearing any of the Bigdeh Kehuna (priestly vestments). Although the Torah introduces this command specifically in the context of the Kohen Gadol’s Me’il (robe), it is understood as applying to all the special garments of the Kohanim. Rav Chaim suggested that in the Rambam’s view, the Torah introduced the prohibition of “Ve’lo Yizah Ha’hoshen” to establish that separating the Hoshen from the Efod is also considered “tearing.” Although nothing is being torn, the Torah issued a command that separating the Hoshen from the Efod is forbidden as though they were sewn together and are now being torn apart. Accordingly, Rav Chaim explained, this prohibition is violated only if the Hoshen is separated from the Efod “Derech Kilkul,” in a destructive manner. Just as the prohibition of tearing one of the Bigdeh Kehuna is violated only if this is done destructively, separating the Hoshen, too, violates the Torah prohibition only if it is done destructively. As this command is defined as a prohibition against “tearing” the Hoshen from the Efod, it is subject to the same parameters as the general prohibition against tearing the Bigdeh Kehuna, and so, by definition, this command is violated only if the act is done “Derech Kilkul.”
The Torah in Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 28:4) commands making special garments for the Kohanim. These are commonly referred to as the Bigdeh Kehuna (priestly vestments). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains the reason for this command based on a principle which he emphasizes numerous times in his work – that people are internally affected by the impression made by external conditions. Appearances create a certain atmosphere and aura which affect the way we think and feel. Likewise, the clothing we wear also influences our mindset. When the Kohanim are dressed with special garments, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, they are reminded that they are working as humble servants of the Creator. The Sefer Ha’hinuch draws a comparison between the Bigdeh Kehuna and Tefillin, as Tefillin are worn in order to instill within us feelings of reverence for, and submission to, G-d. As Kohanim are assigned a unique role, to serve G-d in the Bet Ha’mikdash, they are required to wear not only Tefillin, but also the Bigdeh Kehuna, to intensify their sense of reverence and humble subservience. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Bigdeh Kehuna have an effect on others who see the Kohanim dressed in their special garments. These garments contribute to the aura of grandeur and majesty in the Bet Ha’mikdash, which inspires the people to seek to draw closer to G-d. The regular Kohanim – as oppose to the Kohen Gadol – wore four garments, which together are called the “Bigdeh Laban” (“white garments”). They were: Ketonet (tunic), Michnesayim (short pants), Abnet (belt), Migba’at (hat). The Kohanim were allowed to wear these garments even when they were not performing the Aboda (service in the Bet Ha’mikdash). The Sages reached this conclusion on the basis of the fundamental principle, “Lo Nitena Torah Le’malacheh Ha’sharet” – “the Torah was not given to the ministering angels.” If it were forbidden for Kohanim to wear their garments when they were not performing the Aboda, then they would have to remove them all the precise moment they finished the Aboda, which would be impossible. Necessarily, then, the Kohanim were permitted to wear the garments even when they were not performing the Aboda. The Rabbis explain that the Bigdeh Kehuna were made with the intention that the Kohanim would wear them even when they were not performing the Aboda, essentially imposing a condition on their status of sanctity, and such a condition is acceptable. The exception to this rule is the Abnet (belt), which consisted of both wool and linen – a combination which is normally forbidden to wear due to the prohibition of Shaatnez. This prohibition was waived when a Kohen needed to wear the Abnet as required for performing the Aboda, but the moment he concluded the Aboda, the Kohen needed to immediately remove the Abnet to avoid violating the Shaatnez prohibition. The Kohen Gadol wore these four garments, as well, though instead of a Migba’at (hat), he wore a Misnefet (turban), which was larger and more elaborate than the Migba’at. Additionally, the Kohen Gadol wore four other garments, which were called the “Bigdeh Zahab” (“golden garments”). They were: Hoshen (breastplate), Efod (apron), Me’il (robe), and Sitz (golden headband). After the Kohen Gadol performed the special Aboda on Yom Kippur, he would never again use the “Bigdeh Laban” which he wore for that day’s service. The Torah commands (Vayikra 16:23), “Ve’hiniham Sham” – “He shall place them [the garments] there,” which the Sages understood as meaning that the garments require Geniza (burial), and may never be used again. The Talmud teaches that if a Kohen performs the Aboda without wearing any of the required garments, or while wearing extra garments, beyond the required Bigdeh Kehuna, then he is considered like a non-Kohen performing the Aboda. If he is not properly dressed with the Bigdeh Kehuna, then he does not have the status of Kohen with respect to the Aboda, and he has thus violated the prohibition against non-Kohanim performing the Aboda, which is punishable by Mita Bi’Ydeh Shamayim – death at the hands of G-d. As this is an especially grave violation, the Kohanim needed to be especially careful to ensure to wear all the garments required while performing the Aboda, and not to wear any other garments.
In the beginning of Parashat Tesaveh (Shemot 27:21), the Torah commands that the Kohanim should arrange the candles of the Menorah in the Bet Ha’mikdash each day – “Ya’aroch Oto Aharon U’banav…” Needless to say, G-d does not need us to provide light for Him; He is the one who illuminates the entire earth. However, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch repeatedly emphasizes, the Torah’s commands are given for our benefit, because of the positive impact and effect that they have upon us and upon our lives. In this instance, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, we are commanded to light a candelabra in the Bet Ha’mikdash because people who want to make their homes look beautiful and majestic ensure that they are well lit. This was particularly so before electric lighting, when candles and candelabras were needed throughout the home in order for the home to have a warm, impressive appearance. The atmosphere in the Bet Ha’mikdash was intended to instill within those who visited a sense of awe and reverence for G-d, and thus, as part of the effort to create this atmosphere, the Torah commanded that lights be kindled there. The illumination contributed to the general aura which would help motivate and inspire the people to draw closer to G-d. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that this is the reason for the kindling of the Menorah on the level of Peshat – the simple, straightforward understanding. He concedes that the scholars of Kabbalah are aware of deeper, more profound explanations behind the significance of this Misva. The lamps of the Menorah were kindled each and every day in the Bet Ha’mikdash (as opposed to our kindling of the Hanukah lights for eight nights, which commemorates the Hanukah miracle, not the daily kindling of the Menorah in the Bet Ha’mikdash). The Torah refers to the light of the Menorah as a “Ner Tamid” (“constant flame”), indicating that this Misva overrides the Shabbat prohibitions, and thus the Menorah was lit even on Shabbat. The word “Tamid” (“constant”) instructs that the given Misva must be performed even on Shabbat; for example, the daily sacrifice – “Korban Tamid” – was offered even on Shabbat. By the same token, the Menorah was kindled even on Shabbat. Each lamp of the Menorah needed to be filled with a half-Log of olive oil for the kindling. The Sages determined that this was the quantity of oil needed to sustain the flames throughout the night during the period around the time of the winter solstice, when the nights are longest, and so this amount was established as the standard quantity of oil required. The Misva to light the Menorah includes also the obligation of “Hataba” – preparing the Menorah by cleaning the lamps, changing the wicks, and pouring new oil. The Ner Ha’emsa’i – the middle lamp – was to always remain lit. If it was ever extinguished, it would be kindled anew from the fire on the Mizbe’ah Ha’hison (the altar in the outdoor courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash). All the other lamps were lit from this candle; they had long wicks which were lit from the flame of the middle candle. The Rambam controversially maintained that the obligation to kindle the Menorah and the obligation of Hataba both comprise a single Misva. The vast majority of Rishonim (including Rashi, the Rashba, the Ramban and the Ra’abad), however, disagreed, and held that these are two separate Misvot – to prepare the Menorah for lighting, and then to light it. The Rambam also advances another surprising, unique view regarding the kindling of the Menorah, claiming that this does not need to be performed by a Kohen. The conventional understanding is that the kindling, just like the other rituals in the Bet Ha’mikdash, must be performed specifically by a Kohen. Indeed, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes explicitly that this Misva is charged upon the Kohanim. The Rambam, however, in Hilchot Bi’at Mikdash (9:7), writes that even a “Zar” – somebody who is not a Kohen – is suitable for the kindling of the Menorah. He draws proof from the Gemara’s comment in Masechet Yoma (24) that the lighting of the Menorah does not have the formal status of “Aboda” – a ritual of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Of course, non-Kohanim are not permitted to enter the Bet Ha’mikdash, but the Rambam writes that a Kohen can prepare the Menorah and then bring it outside into the “Azara” (courtyard), where a non-Kohen may then light the lamps. (The Rambam concedes that the “Hataba” must be done by a Kohen, because it is only the “Hadlaka” – the kindling – that the Gemara does not consider an “Aboda.”) Rav Haim of Brisk (1853-1918) raised the question of how, according to the Rambam, the Misva can be fulfilled in this fashion. If the Menorah is not kindled in its proper place, but rather brought outside, kindled, and then returned, how is the Misva fulfilled? Should we not assume that the Menorah needs to be kindled in its proper location? Rav Haim answers this question by positing that according to the Rambam, the Misva is defined not as an obligation to light the Menorah, but rather as an obligation to see to it that the Menorah is lit. The Misva – even in the Rambam’s view – is charged upon the Kohanim, but the Misva is to ensure the Menorah is lit, and not the act of kindling. Therefore, the Kohanim can fulfill the Misva by bringing the Menorah out into the “Azara,” having a non-Kohen light it there, and then returning it to its place inside the Bet Ha’mikdash.
In describing the Shulhan (table) in the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Torah commands in Parashat Teruma (25:30), “Ve’natata Al Ha’shulhan Lehem Panim Lefanai Tamid” – we are to place the special bread, called the Lehem Ha’panim, on the table at all times. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d, quite obviously, has no need for our bread. We must not think for even a moment that G-d needs us to serve Him food. The purpose of this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is to give us the opportunity to earn blessing in our livelihoods by preforming a Misva involving bread, the basic staple of human sustenance. The Sefer Ha’hinuch establishes that when we use something for a Misva, we earn blessing in regard to that particular object. For example, on Pesach, we are judged with regard to grain, and so on the second day of Pesach we bring the Korban Ha’omer – an offering of the first harvested grain, so we earn G-d’s blessing in our grain. And on Sukkot, when we are judged with regard to rainfall during the coming winter months, we are to perform the Misva of Nisuch Ha’mayim – pouring water on the Mizbe’ah (altar) in order to earn blessed rainfall. Likewise, G-d commanded placing bread on the table in the Bet Ha’mikdash so we can earn blessing in our “bread” – meaning, our livelihoods. The Lehem Ha’panim consisted of twelve loaves, which was divided into two sets of six. Each set was held in a special container called a “Ma’arechet.” Alongside the two “Ma’archot” were two spoons, called “Bazichin,” which contained a spice called “Lebona” (frankincense). The bread and the “Bazichin” are both indispensable to the Misva; if one was placed without the other, then the Misva was not fulfilled. The twelves loaves were baked on Ereb Shabbat, and then, the next day, on Shabbat, they were placed on the table. The old bread would be removed from the table and distributed among two groups of Kohanim – those who had completed their weeklong shift in the Bet Ha’mikdash that Shabbat (“Mishmeret Ha’yoseh”), and the Kohanim who had come to begin their shift that day (“Mishmeret Ha’nichnas”). The Kohen Gadol also received a portion. Four Kohanim would approach the Shulhan – two carrying the two “Ma’archot,” and two carrying the two “Bazichin.” Another four Kohanim would remove the old “Ma’archot” and “Bazichin” from the Shulhan, and the moment those were removed, the new bread and “Bazichin” were placed. The Torah requires having the Lehem Ha’panim on the table “Lefanai Tamid” – “before Me, always,” and so the new bread needed to be placed on the table the moment the old bread was removed. The Rambam, based on the Gemara in Masechet Hagiga, describes how on the Regalim (pilgrimage festivals – Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot), the Kohanim would lift the Shulhan and bring it out to the Azara (courtyard), where the people were assembled. They would show the people the two great miracles that occurred to the Lehem Ha’panim – that it remained fresh throughout the week, without growing stale or becoming moldy, and that it remained hot. The Kohanim would exclaim, “Look how beloved you are before the Almighty!” – as demonstrated through the miraculous Lehem Ha’panim. Although the Lehem Ha’panim needed to be placed “Lefanai Tamid” – before G-d at all times, it was nevertheless acceptable to bring the bread outside to the Azara, as the Azara, too, was considered “before G-d.” After all, the Torah requires slaughtering the animal sacrifices “before G-d,” and the slaughtering was performed in the Azara. Thus, with regard to the Lehem Ha’panim, too, it was considered present “before G-d” even when it was brought outside to the Azara to be shown to the people on the festivals. Although we are unable to fulfill the Misva of Lehem Ha’panim in our time, when we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash, we can nevertheless access the blessing it brought by studying this subject. By learning about the Lehem Ha’panim, we are considered as though we fulfilled the Misva, and in this merit, may G-d bestow upon us His blessing in our livelihoods, Amen.
The Aron (ark) which was stored inside the Mishkan – and, later, the Bet Ha’mikdash – contained the original Sefer Torah as well as the Luhot (stone tablets). It was carried during travel with two transport poles, which were inserted into the rings that were affixed to the four corners of the Aron. The Leviyim assigned the role of transporting the ark would carry the poles on their shoulders, and this is how the Aron was moved from one place to another. In commanding the construction of the Aron, the Torah says about the poles, “Lo Yasuru Mimenu” – “They shall not be removed from it” (Shemot 25:15). This verse establishes a prohibition against removing the poles from the rings in which they were placed. Even when the ark was at rest, and not being carried, the transport poles were to remain in place alongside the Aron. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this command is relevant “Le’dorot” – for all times. It was not intended as a one-time provision relevant to the generation in the wilderness, who constructed the Aron, but rather as an eternally binding law – whenever we have an Aron, we must not remove the transport poles from the sides. The commentators raise the question of how to reconcile this command with a verse later in the Torah (Bamidbar 4:6), in which G-d gives His instructions in preparation for the nation’s first journey from Mount Sinai. In describing how the Aron was to be prepared for travel, G-d commanded that the Kohanim should cover it with several cloths, and then instructed, “Ve’samu Badav” – “They shall place its poles.” Apparently, the poles were not in place before Beneh Yisrael traveled, and they needed to be brought into place in preparation for travel. How, the commentators ask, is this possible, given the prohibition against removing the poles from the sides of the Aron? The Ramban (Rav Moshe Nachmanides, Spain, 1194-1270) explains that “Ve’samu Badav” refers not to placing the poles in the rings on the sides of the Aron, but rather to placing them on the Leviyim’s shoulders. As the nation prepared to travel, the Kohanim were to lift the Aron and place the poles on the shoulders of the Leviyim who would carry it, and this is the meaning of “Ve’samu Badav.” Alternatively, the Ramban suggests, “Ve’samu Badav” might mean that the poles were fastened tightly in place. Although the Torah forbids removing the poles completely from the sides of the Aron, they did not always have to be tightly fastened. And so when the time came to travel, the Kohanim who prepared the Aron for transport would fasten the poles so they would not move back and forth. The Hizkuni (Hizkiya Ben Manoah, France, 13 th century) offers a different explanation, suggesting that this prohibition did not take effect until after the Kohanim placed the poles in the rings for the first time. When the Aron was first constructed, it was assembled by Moshe Rabbenu, who was a Levi, not a Kohen. It was only after the Kohanim affixed the poles for the first time that it was then forbidden to remove the poles. Thus, the first time the nation traveled, the Kohanim needed to put the poles in place, because until then, it had not been forbidden to remove the poles. As for the reason behind this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that there were times when the Aron had to be transported suddenly, such as when Beneh Yisrael were in the wilderness, and they needed to be prepared for travel at all times. If the poles were not already in place, then, in the rush to get it ready for transport, the Kohanim might not ensure that the poles were tightly fastened. If they aren’t, then the ark might fall, Heaven forbid, during travel. The Torah therefore commanded that the poles should always remain in place alongside the Aron, so the Aron would always be ready for transport and there would be no risk of it falling during transport. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then presents a second possibility, based on the mystical concept that the furnishings of the Mishkan are associated with “Inyanim Gedolim Ve’elyonim” – “great, sublime matters.” When a person sees or conjures in his mind one of the furnishings, this image has a spiritual impact upon his being. Without explaining any further, the Sefer Ha’hinuch posits that the image of the Aron with the two transport poles alongside it has such an impact, and it is thus imperative that the poles remain in place so that this becomes the image of the Aron in people’s minds. Another reason is that the transport poles, which were used to carry the Aron, represent the supporters of Torah. Whereas the Aron itself, which contained the Sefer Torah and the tablets, represents the Torah scholars, the transport poles which carried the ark, symbolize those who facilitate Torah learning by supporting those who devote themselves to fulltime study. Those who support Torah study are considered no lower than those whom they support, and in fact, the Torah says that they are even greater, because they facilitate learning. G-d therefore commanded that the transport poles should always remain alongside the ark, to impress upon us that those who support Torah are one and the same with the students of Torah. They are full-fledged partners and will be eternally rewarded together with those who learn, and so the poles must forever remain attached to the ark – illustrating the everlasting bond between those who learn Torah and those who support them.
The Torah famously commands in Parashat Teruma (Shemot 25:8), “Ve’asu Li Mikdash” – “They shall make for Me a sanctuary,” establishing the Biblical command to construct a Bet Ha’mikdash, a site for the ritual service of G-d. This command includes the construction of the actual building, as well as the various furnishings which are needed for performing the service, such as the Menorah, the Shulhan (table) and the two altars. The Sefer Ha’hinuch discusses this Misva with extensive elaboration, incorporating poetic passages in offering his insights into the meaning and purpose behind the command to build a Bet Ha’mikdash. We present here the crux of his explanation and the primary points which he develops in this context. The Sefer Ha’hinuch prefaces his remarks with a brief poem expressing the fear and reverence with which he approaches this topic. He writes that he is frightened “to approach the sanctuary of G-d,” knowing the dangers posed to those who come closer than they deserve, approaching without having properly cleansed themselves in advance. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then proceeds to present his understanding of this Misva, establishing first that G-d’s ultimate purpose is to bestow upon us goodness. He wants us to be deserving of His blessings so He can shower us with His bounty. G-d quite obviously has no need for our Misvot, for our prayers, or for our sacrifices, but He gave us commands so that we can thereby be deserving of all the goodness which He has in store for us. And the highest level one can attain, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is the performance of Misvot out of a genuine desire to bond with the Almighty. Many people, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, are driven to perform the Misvot by the desire to attain their future rewards. Such people, he says, will certainly earn a portion in Gan Eden, but they fall short of the ideal, which is to be driven out of genuine love for Hashem and a fierce desire to attach oneself to Him. Therefore, G-d commanded us to build a large, beautiful site for prayer and sacrifices – to inspire us to love G-d and desire a connection with Him. He quite obviously does not need a Bet Ha’mikdash, but He commanded that we build such a site for our own benefit, so we are overcome by love for Him. Our feelings and emotions are impacted by our actions, and visiting the Bet Ha’mikdash and serving G-d at that site will influence us and arouse our hearts with love and devotion to our Creator. (This is also the reason why we build large, impressive buildings as synagogues where we come to pray and learn.) The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that G-d commanded establishing this site in Jerusalem, which was situated in the center of the ancient world, because the center is generally regarded as more significant than the periphery, and thus this location will enhance the impact of the experience of visiting the Bet Ha’mikdash. Turning his attention to the purpose of the sacrifices, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that in order to impress upon us the gravity of sin, G-d wants us to do more than merely confess when we err. He wants us to do something far more substantial and demanding, taking a costly animal and making a trip to the Bet Ha’mikdash to offer it as a sacrifice. This elaborate process will impress upon the sinner the severity of a misdeed, thus helping to ensure that he will not repeat it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to cite the famous comments of the Ramban (Rav Moshe Nahmanides, Spain, 1194-1270) explaining how the procedure for offering a sacrifice corresponds to the process of sin and thereby brings atonement. The Semicha – placing one’s hands on the sacrifice – corresponds to the sinful act, whereas the Vidui (verbal confession) corresponds to the speech which was involved when committing the sin. The animal’s Kereb (stomach) and Kelayot (kidneys) are burned on the altar, representing sinful desire, which originates in the Kereb, and sinful thoughts, which originate in the Kelayot. The animal’s legs, too, are sacrificed, atoning for the individual’s having run to commit the forbidden act. The animal’s blood alludes to the person’s animalistic nature which led him to sin. The sprinkling of the blood, and the burning of portions of the animal, indicate to the person that in principle his blood should be shed, and his body burned, because of his sin, if not for G-d’s boundless compassion, allowing him to offer an animal in his place. The animal’s blood is spilled in exchange for his blood, and the animal’s life is taken in exchange for his own life. The sacrificial meat is eaten by the Kohanim, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, in order to support the Kohanim, who served as the nation’s scholars and teachers. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that every animal sacrifice was accompanied by an offering of wine and flour. He explains that the Torah wanted a person to sacrifice that which people generally crave and cherish the most – meat, wine and bread – for the sake of achieving atonement for their wrongdoing. The Sefer Ha’hinuch further notes that the offering of an animal sacrifice also serves another purpose. When a person sins, he acts mindlessly, without using his G-d-given faculties of thought and discretion. In essence, the sinner behaved like an animal, which acts on impulse, without thinking and considering whether the action should be performed. To atone for sin, therefore, the Torah required slaughtering and burning an animal to symbolize the eradication of this kind of thoughtless behavior. The process of sacrifice illustrates in our minds the notion that acting thoughtlessly has no place whatsoever in the life of a G-d-fearing person. We must conduct ourselves not impulsively, like animals, but rather with careful thought and discretion. The act of slaughtering and sacrificing an animal creates a powerful image of our rejecting the animalistic quality of mindless behavior. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that watching the animal being slaughtered will enhance the individual’s appreciation of the fact that he is not an animal, but rather a human being with a soul, through which the body will be resurrected at the time of Tehiyat Ha’metim (the resurrection of the dead). This process, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, along with the sinner’s sincere remorse, will earn him forgiveness. However, he adds, sacrifices generally achieve atonement only for inadvertent sins; for intentional transgressions, sacrifices do not suffice. If someone brazenly commits a sinful act, knowing full well that it is forbidden, then the symbolism of the sacrifices will not have any impact upon him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites King Shlomo’s teaching in the Book of Mishleh (26:3), “Ve’shebet Le’gev Kesilim” – “and a rod for the back of the fools.” Fools who willfully transgress G-d’s laws will not be impacted by symbolic acts such as sacrifices, but only by the pain of punishment. Therefore, intentional violations require punishment by the court, as sacrificial offerings do not suffice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch observes that the Torah also establishes a system of “Korbenot Nedaba” – voluntary sacrifices, which are offered not for atonement, but rather voluntarily, whenever one wishes. The reason for these offerings, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is that the symbolic message of sacrifices, that we must eradicate the animalistic tendency to act mindlessly, on instinct, without thinking, is something which we must all learn and internalize. Therefore, it is appropriate even for one who did not commit a transgression to offer a sacrifice to reinforce this vitally important concept. The Sefer Ha’hinuch in this context discusses as well the most unusual of all sacrifices – the Sa’ir La’azazel that was offered on Yom Kippur. This was a goat which was not slaughtered and not placed on the altar, but was instead sent out into the desert and cast from a cliff. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this sacrifice represents the “Hot’im Gemurim” – completely iniquitous individuals, wicked people who have thoroughly abandoned and rejected the Torah, and who bring great harm to the Jewish People. Other sacrifices are offered in the Bet Ha’mikdash to indicate that even sinners retain a connection to G-d. The Sa’ir La’azazel, however, is taken outside the Bet Ha’mikdash to demonstrate that the “Hot’im Gemurim” have lost all connection to G-d. The goat was cast off the mountain and dismembered, symbolic of the eternal destruction suffered by these sinners. After presenting all these explanations of the purpose of the Bet Ha’mikdash and the sacrifices, the Sefer Ha’hinuch then concedes that ultimately, the real reasons are found in the wisdom of the Kabbalah. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that we have no choice but to humbly submit to the Kabbalists’ scholarship, as only they truly understand the meaning behind these Misvot. He then proceeds to outline some of the basic details regarding the structure of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The inner chamber of the Bet Ha’mikdash was called the “Kodesh Ha’kodashim,” next to which was the “Kodesh.” Outside the “Kodesh” was an area called the “Ulam.” These three areas together comprised the “Hechal,” the indoor section of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The outdoor area outside the “Hechal” was surrounded by a wall and called the “Azara” (“courtyard”). The “Azara” consisted of different regions, one where only Kohanim were permitted, and another where even non-Kohanim were allowed to enter. Various offices – called “Leshakot” – were situated around the Bet Ha’mikdash, and the equipment needed for the Bet Ha’mikdash was stored in these rooms. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that unlike most other Misvot, the Misva to construct the Bet Ha’mikdash is binding collectively upon the nation as a whole, and not upon individuals or groups of individuals. He concludes his discussion by writing, “When the house will be rebuilt, speedily and in our days, this affirmative command will [again] be fulfilled.”
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:33), “Lo Yeshebu Be’arsecha Pen Yahatiu Otecha Li” – “They shall not reside in your land, lest they cause you to sin against Me.” This command forbids granting idolaters residence in the Land of Israel. The Torah itself provides the reason behind this command, explaining, “lest they cause you to sin against Me” – having idolaters living among us could lure us away from the belief in God, to the belief in pagan deities. This prohibition forbids selling property in Eretz Yisrael to an idol-worshipper, and forbids even leasing a residence to an idol-worshipper, because the tenant would bring his idol into the property. It is permissible, however, to rent a property to an idolater for his business, as idolaters would not bring idols into their businesses. Additionally, it is forbidden to allow three idolaters to reside in three adjacent homes in the Land of Israel, as this gives idol-worshippers a foothold in the land. This command applies to both males and females. Quite obviously, it applies only in Eretz Yisrael. One who sold or leased a property to an idolater in the Land of Israel has violated this prohibition, but he does not receive Malkut, since this violation does not require a concrete action. Halacha permits granting residence in the Land of Israel to a Ger Toshab (“resident alien”), meaning, a gentile who proclaims before Bet Din his rejection of idolatry. The Rambam, in Hilchot Melachim (8:11), states that to become a Ger Toshab, the gentile must pronounce not only his rejection of paganism, but also his commitment to all seven Noachide Laws – the Misvot which are binding upon even gentiles. (These are the prohibitions against murder, idolatry, adultery/incest, theft, blasphemy, and eating meat from a live animal, and the obligation to establish a just civil court system.) Moreover, the Rambam states, the gentile must accept the Noachide Laws not because of their intuitive logic or ethical value, but out of the belief that G-d commanded that all human beings abide by these laws. Later scholars understood from the Rambam’s discussion that the Ger Toshab is not simply a gentile who does not worship idols, but rather somebody with an entirely different status. Although he is clearly not a Jew, as he did not undergo conversion, he is not a regular gentile, either, but rather has a distinct status. In the Rambam’s view, it seems, the Ger Toshab must appear before Bet Din not merely as a practical matter, so we can ascertain his rejection of idolatry, but rather because he is undergoing a change of status. Just as actual Gerut (conversion) requires a Bet Din, likewise, according to the Rambam, the status of Ger Toshab is attained specifically under the formal auspices of a Bet Din. It turns out, then, in the view of the Rambam, that there are three different levels: an ordinary gentile, a full-fledged Jew, and the in-between status of Ger Toshab. The concept underlying the command of “Lo Yeshebu Be’arsecha” is one which applies to each and every one of us. The Torah forbade granting residence to idolaters in the Land of Israel out of concern of the negative influence they might have, teaching us the importance of placing ourselves under positive influence, and avoiding sinful influences. The Mishna in Pirkeh Abot (1:7) exhorts, “Harhek Mi’shachen Ra, Ve’al Tit’haber La’rasha” – “Keep a distance from an evil neighbor, and do not attach yourself to a wicked person.” We must avoid the company of people who could have a negative influence upon us, and lead us to act improperly. Instead, we must seek to place ourselves among people who will influence us positively and encourage us to live the way we should.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:32), in reference to the seven nations which inhabited the Land of Israel (Canaan) at that time, “Lo Tichrot Lahem Ve’l’Elohehem Berit” – that it is forbidden to make a treaty with these peoples. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that these nations – who are knowns as the seven nations of Canaan – were the “Ikar Aboda Zara Ve’yesod Ha’rishon” – the primary “foundation” of idol-worship in the ancient world. As G-d wants us to eliminate idolatrous beliefs and practices, so that all of humanity recognizes Hashem as the single, true G-d, we are commanded not to make peace with the Canaanite peoples, and to instead eliminate them. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that this command also forbids making a treaty with any idolatrous people, though a distinction exists in this regard between the seven Canaanite nations and other pagans. When it comes to the seven Canaanite nations, we are forbidden from making a treaty with them even if they do not seek to wage war against us. Since they are, as mentioned, the primary idolaters, we are not to deal peacefully them even if they are not interested in conflict. When it comes to other nations, however, we are permitted to enter into peace treaties with them as long as they do not seek to engage in conflict. Proof to this position may be drawn from the story told in the Book of Yehoshua of the Gibonim, a tribe that belonged to the seven nations and which approached Beneh Yisrael disguised as a foreign nation. Knowing that Beneh Yisrael set out to eliminate the seven nations, the Gibonim pretended to have originated from a distant land, and asked to make a treaty with Beneh Yisrael. Even after discovering that the Gibonim were actually from Eretz Yisrael, the leaders of Beneh Yisrael nevertheless decided to honor the treaty, and had them work as woodcutters and water-carriers. The Rabbis explained that they honored the treaty because if they had killed the Gibonim after having made a treaty with them, this would have created a Hilul Hashem (defamation of G-d). Although the treaty was made under deception, nevertheless, killing the Gibonim would have given the appearance of breaking an agreement, thus creating a Hilul Hashem. It emerges, then, that if not for the concern of a Hilul Hashem, Beneh Yisrael would have eliminated the Gibonim, even though they did not seek hostilities and were interested in peace. This proves that when it comes to the seven nations – as opposed to other pagan peoples – the prohibition against making a treaty applies even if these nations are not interested in war. Even when it comes to the seven nations, however, if they commit to abandon idolatry, then we may accept their repentance and make a treaty with them. Indeed, the Midrash (Debarim Rabba) relates that before Beneh Yisrael waged war against the seven nations, Beneh Yisrael’s leader – Yehoshua – sent a message to these nations offering them peace in exchange for their rejection of idolatry. One who enters into a peace treaty with one of the seven nations, or a different pagan nation that is hostile to Beneh Yisrael, violates this prohibition. The violator does not receive Malkut, however, because this violation does not involve a concrete action. This prohibition reflects the broader notion that the Jewish People are charged with the responsibility of leading the entire world to the recognition of the one, true G-d. This mission will be fully accomplished in the times of Mashiah, when, as the famous prophecy foresees, “Ve’haya Hashem Le’melech Al Kol Ha’aretz, Be’yom Ha’hu Yiheyeh Hashem Ehad U’shmo Ehad” – “Hashem shall be the King over the entire earth; on that day, Hashem shall be one and His Name shall be one” (Zecharya 14:9).
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:19) presents the command, “Lo Tebashel Gedi Ba’haleb Imo” – “You shall not cook a young goat in its mother’s milk.” The Gemara explains that this command forbids cooking the meat of any animal in milk, not just goat meat. Even if nobody eats the meat after it was cooked in milk, merely cooking meat and milk together violates this prohibition. This prohibition is, clearly, a “Hok” – a command whose rationale is not readily discernible. Nevertheless, the Rishonim endeavored to find possible explanations for why the Torah forbade cooking meat and milk. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, references his comments earlier, regarding the prohibition of sorcery. There he posited that the Torah condemns sorcery and witchcraft so strongly because they seek to subvert the normal forces according to which G-d wants the world to run. G-d created the world such that it should follow certain systems, and the sorcerer tries to invoke other energies to circumvent these systems. By the same token, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, certain items are not meant to be combined. Mixing meat with milk creates a spiritually toxic combination, and runs in opposition to the way G-d wished the world to run. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proves this point by noting that cooking meat with milk itself is forbidden, even if the meat is then discarded without ever being eaten. This shows that it is the combination itself which the Torah opposes, as milk and meat are entities which are meant to remain separate. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the Rambam’s comments in his Moreh Nebuchim (Guide for the Perplexed) that there was an ancient pagan practice that involved mixing meat with milk. The Rambam posited that it is for this reason that the Torah forbade cooking meat with milk, as part of its effort to distance us from idolatrous practices. The Sefer Ha’hinuch expresses his disapproval with this explanation, commenting, “Ve’chol Zeh Enenu Shoveh Li” – “All this is not worth anything to me.” The Ramban offers a different explanation, suggesting, interestingly enough, that this prohibition is intended to lead us away from cruelty. The case spoken of by the Torah is where one cooks a young animal in its mother’s milk. Such a thing is clearly an act of heartlessness and cruelty. But the Torah went further, forbidding cooking even a different animal in an animal’s milk, as this, too, entails some degree of cruelty. Rabbenu Bahya (Spain, 1255-1340) offers an entirely different explanation, noting the Gemara’s comments that milk originates from the mammal’s blood, which turns to milk after childbirth. The Torah forbids eating an animal’s blood, because the blood would impart within us the creature’s animalistic nature. When milk is cooked with an animal’s meat, Rabbenu Bahya writes, it reverts back to its origin, and assumes the properties of blood. It can then be spiritually detrimental, and so the Torah forbade cooking meat with milk. Rabbenu Bahya concedes, however – as do the other Rishonim – that the real reason behind this command will remain unknown until the time of Mashiah’s arrival. This prohibition applies at all times and in all locations, and to both males and females. One who cooks meat with milk has transgressed this prohibition and is liable to Malkut.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:19), “Reshit Bikkureh Admatecha Tabi Bet Hashem Elokecha” – requiring one to bring to the Bet Ha’mikdash his first fruits that ripen, which are called “Bikkurim.” Tradition teaches that this Misva applies only to the “Shibat Ha’minim” – the seven species for which the Land of Israel is praised (in Debarim 8:8). These are wheat, barley, grapes, figs, pomegranates, olives and dates. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Sages arrived at this conclusion based on the simple fact that the Torah never makes mention of any other fruits that grow in the Land of Israel. If the Torah here states simply that one must bring the first “fruit of the land” to the Bet Ha’mikdash, it stands to reason that this refers to the fruits mentioned elsewhere, namely, the seven species. The Seforno (Rav Ovadia Seforno, Italy, d. 1550), commenting on this verse, suggests a different explanation. He writes that this verse, at first glance, seems redundant. The words “Bikkureh Admatecha” mean “the first fruits of your land,” such that the word “Reshit” (“first”), seemingly, is superfluous. Necessarily, Seforno writes, the word “Reshit” in this verse means not “first,” but rather “choicest.” The Torah requires bringing to the Bet Ha’mikdash the first of the best species of fruits in Eretz Yisrael – referring to the seven special species. The reason underlying this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is that it helps remind us that Hashem is the source of all blessings in the world. When a farmer receives his produce, he takes a portion and gives it to G-d, as it were, acknowledging that it is G-d who blessed him with his fruit. This recognition will then help ensure his continued blessing and prosperity. The fruits brought as Bikkurim would be distributed among the Kohanim serving that week in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The fruits needed to be presented in a utensil; one could not simply bring the fruits by themselves. And, the Bikkurim needed to be presented “Derech Noi” – in an aesthetically pleasing manner. The farmer would thus decorate the baskets. The farmers bringing their Bikkurim would march in a procession through the streets of Jerusalem on their way to the Bet Ha’mikdash, and the shopkeepers would leave their stores to greet the farmers and sing for them. The Misva applies only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and is binding only upon males. The Torah obligation of Bikkurim is limited to the Land of Israel. However, the Sages enacted that Bikkurim must be brought also from the fruits of “Suria” – certain regions in Syria captured by King David – as well as the fruits of Eber Ha’yarden (Transjordan, the region inhabited by the tribes of Reuben and Gad). As mentioned, the Misva of Bikkurim applies to the seven special species, which include wheat and barley. There is a debate among the Aharonim as to whether it applies also to the other three principal grains – rye, oats and spelt. These species are generally grouped together with wheat and barley, such as with regard to the laws of Berachot: products made from any of these grains require “Ha’mosi” and Birkat Ha’mazon. Accordingly, the Maharsha (Rav Shmuel Eidels, 1555-1631), in Masechet Pesahim (36), writes that with regard to Bikkurim, too, these grains are treated like wheat and barley, and are included in the Bikkurim obligation. By contrast, the Minhat Hinuch cites the Peneh Yehoshua (Rav Yaakob Yehoshua Falk, Germany, 1680-1756) as contending that these three grains do not fall under the category of “Reshit” – the choice species of the Land of Israel, and therefore are not included in the Misva of Bikkurim. Nowadays, of course, in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, we cannot fulfill the Misva of Bikkurim. Nevertheless, the idea behind this Misva is no less relevant today, and it is thus appropriate whenever we receive money or assets to allocate a portion to G-d through a donation to charity or for the support of Torah scholars to show that we recognize the source of our blessings.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:18), “Ve’lo Yalin Heleb Hagi Ad Boker” – “the fats of My festival sacrifice shall not ‘sleep’ until morning.” This command forbids neglecting to place on the altar the parts of the sacrifice which are to be burned on the altar, throughout the night. If a sacrifice was offered, and the Kohanim neglected to place the fats on the Mizbe’ah (altar) before morning, they have transgressed this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that laxity of this sort reflects a lack of respect for the sacrifices, and so the Torah issued a special command forbidding the delay of the placement of the sacrificial fats on the altar. In regard to the timing of the placement of the fats on the altar, an important distinction exists between the Korban Pesach – the special sacrifice offered during the afternoon of the 14 th of Nissan – and other sacrifices. When it comes to other sacrifices, their fats are to be placed on the Mizbe’ah either the day the animal is slaughtered, or the following night, before morning. The fats of the Korban Pesach, however, are offered specifically during the afternoon; they are not permitted to be placed on the altar at night, after the onset of Yom Tob (the first night of Pesach). Halacha forbids burning on Yom Tob sacrifices which were slaughtered on a weekday, and thus the fats of the Korban Pesach need to be placed on the altar during the day, and not at night, after Yom Tob has began. The exception to this rule is a situation where the 14 th of Nissan fell on Shabbat. Although the slaughtering of the Korban Pesach overrides the Shabbat prohibitions, and thus the sacrifice is slaughtered that day, the fats may not be burned on Shabbat. In such a case, Halacha allows – and mandates – burning the fats at night, after the onset of Yom Tob. Ordinarily, however, when the 14 th of Nissan falls on a weekday, the fats of the Korban Pesach must be placed on the altar that day. If they are not, then the Kohanim are in violation of the prohibition of “Lo Yalin Heleb Hagi Ad Boker,” because they are unable to place the fats on the altar during the night. A Kohen who violates this prohibition does not receive Malkut, because this command is violated through inaction, by neglecting to place the fats on the altar on time. A famous rule establishes that a violator is liable to Malkut only if he violates a prohibition by committing a forbidden act, and not if he violates a prohibition by failing to perform a required act. It should be noted that this prohibition differs from the parallel prohibition that applies to sacrificial meat which is supposed to be eaten. Such meat may not be left over until the morning, just as the sacrificial fats which are to be burned on the altar must be placed on the altar before morning. However, if one left over sacrificial meat until the morning, he can “rectify” his violation by burning the meat, as the Torah requires when meat is left over. The fats, however, are not burned if they are left over until morning, and thus this prohibition – against neglecting to place the fats on the altar – cannot be rectified.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:18), “Lo Tizbah Al Hametz Dam Zibhi,” forbidding offering the Pesach sacrifice while one has Hametz in his possession. The Pesach sacrifice is offered on the afternoon of the 14 th of Nissan, and it is forbidden to have Hametz in one’s possession while the sacrifice is being offered. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that this prohibition applies to everyone involved in the sacrifice – including the one who slaughters the animal, the Kohen who sprinkles the blood on the altar, the Kohen who places the fats on the altar, and all participating members of this sacrifice. According to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, anyone who had registered to be included in a Korban Pesach violates this prohibition if he or she possesses Hametz at the time the sacrifice is offered. The reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is because every Misva has its designated time, and the Misva of the Korban Pesach is to be performed once one has rid Hametz from his possession. This sacrifice is, of course, part of the observance of Pesach, when Hametz is forbidden, and so naturally the Torah expects us to eliminate all Hametz before proceeding to perform the Korban Pesach. This Misva is, quite obviously, applicable only during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the Korban Pesach was sacrificed, and it is binding upon both men and women, as both are included in the obligation of Korban Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that those who transgress this prohibition are liable to Malkut, though the Minhat Hinuch raises the question of why this should be the case. If a member of the group who is not involved in the offering of the sacrifice has Hametz in his possession, he has not performed any forbidden act. A famous rule establishes that Malkut are administered only when one violates a Torah prohibition by committing a forbidden action. It thus seems difficult to understand why the Sefer Ha’hinuch maintained that one is liable to Malkut for having Hametz in his possession at the time of the offering of the Korban Pesach. The Minhat Hinuch leaves this question unanswered. Tosafot in Masechet Pesahim (63) advance a different position, maintaining that only those who actually perform the rituals associated with the Korban Pesach are included in this prohibition. According to Tosafot, this command is directed towards only those who slaughter the sacrifice, sprinkle its blood, and place its fats on the altar. The members of the group do not violate this prohibition by having Hametz in their possession at the time of the offering. Rav Leib Malin (1906-1962) explained that this debate between the Sefer Ha’hinuch and Tosafot reflects a fundamental question regarding the nature of this prohibition. Namely, is this prohibition a law relevant to the sacrifice, forbidding offering the Korban Pesach while possessing Hametz? Or, is this prohibition part of the laws of Hametz, requiring one to eliminate his Hametz before the time the Korban Pesach is offered? Tosafot, apparently, viewed this prohibition as part of the guidelines regarding the offering of the Korban Pesach, and thus in their view, only those who offer the sacrifice are bound by this prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, maintained that this prohibition is part of the laws of Hametz, and thus all people are bound by this command, and may not have Hametz in their possession when their Korban Pesach is offered. These perspectives likely underlie an interesting question posed by the Minhat Hinuch as to whether, hypothetically, this prohibition would apply to meat of the Korban Pesach which is not consumed on the altar until after Pesach. Let us imagine that the sacrifice was placed on the altar in its proper time, on the 14 th of Nissan, but, for whatever reason, some of the meat was not burned throughout the seven days of Pesach, and remained on the altar when Pesach ended. Would it be permissible for the person who offered that sacrifice to take possession of Hametz at that point? The Minhat Hinuch is inclined to say that even though Pesach has ended, the person would not be permitted to have Hametz in his possession, since the Korban Pesach is still being burned on the altar. This view, seemingly, reflects the perspective viewing this prohibition as part of the laws of the Korban Pesach, such that as long as the sacrifice is not consumed, one may not own Hametz, even after Pesach. If, however, we perceive this prohibition as part of the laws of Hametz, then it clearly does not apply after Pesach, when Hametz is entirely permissible.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:14), “Shalosh Regalim Tahog Li Ba’shana” – that we must celebrate three “Regalim,” referring to the pilgrimage festivals: Pesach, Shabuot and Sukkot. This verse introduces the requirement to go to the Bet Ha’mikdash on each of the three festivals. The word “Tahog” (“celebrate”) is understood as referring to the Hagiga sacrifice offered on holidays, such that the command to make the pilgrimage includes a requirement to bring a sacrifice upon coming to the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, very simply, that it would be disrespectful and inappropriate to appear before G-d on these special occasions emptyhanded, without an offering, and so part of the Misva of Aliya Le’regel – making the holiday pilgrimage – is to bring a sacrifice. Simply appearing in the Bet Ha’mikdash is not sufficient; one must appear with an offering. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that we must not think that G-d needs, or benefits in any way from, our offerings. It goes without saying that G-d is lacking nothing, and has no needs for us to fill for Him. Certainly, He does not eat our sacrificial offerings. King David says in Tehillim (50:12) that G-d tells us, “Im Er’ab Lo Omar Lach” – “If I were hungry, I would not tell you.” We should never think that G-d will turn to us to provide anything that He is lacking, because He does not lack anything. He provides sustenance for the entire earth; He does not need us to provide His sustenance. The reason why He commands us to offer sacrifices on the three Regalim, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is for our benefit. The site of the Bet Ha’mikdash is uniquely sacred, and a place where we have the ability to earn G-d’s favor and blessing. It is therefore appropriate when we arrive there to offer a sacrifice and thereby become worthy of G-d’s bountiful blessings. The Torah elsewhere formulates this command as a requirement assigned to “Zechurecha,” which the Gemara interprets to mean “your males.” As such, the Misva of Aliya Le’regel applies only to males. Of course, it is binding only when the Bet Ha’mikdash stands. The Gemara in Masechet Hagiga establishes that those who are physically unable to participate in the pilgrimage are exempt from this Misva. And thus those who are ill, otherwise frail, lame or blind are not included in the obligation of Aliya Le’regel. Moreover, the Gemara adds, those who work in a profession that results in their emitting a foul odor are exempt from this Misva. Such people cannot come to Jerusalem together with the rest of the nation, because others cannot be near them due to the stench that they emit. The Gemara gives the example of a “Mekametz,” somebody whose job it was to collect manure for fertilizing. Another example is tanning – treating animal hides with chemicals so they could be used. Both these professions caused the practitioner to emit a foul odor, and thus people who worked in these professions were exempt from the Misva of Aliya Le’regel. The Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch maintain that in truth, practitioners of these professions are not entirely exempt from the Misva. Rather, they should bathe and change their clothes, so they no longer emit an odor, and then participate in Aliya Le’regel. It is only as long as they emit a stench that they are exempt. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that once these people bathe and change their clothes, “Hen Mekubalim Lefanav Ki’she’ar Yisrael” – “they are accepted before Him like the rest of Israel.” We must not think for a moment that G-d looks with disdain upon the Misvot performed by somebody who works in professions involving dirt and a foul odor. A person who works in a sewer is no less precious in G-d’s eyes than a brain surgeon. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, “She’tinuf Ha’nefesh Hu Ha’mam’is Beneh Adam Lifneh Ha’Makom, Ve’lo Ha’umanut” – “for it is the filth of the soul that makes people repugnant before G-d, not the profession.” G-d is repulsed not by a profession that involves a foul odor, but rather by sinful conduct, and thus those who work in less-than-prestigious professions are not one iota less precious in G-d’s eyes than those who work in prestigious professions. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that this is on condition that the person works “Be’ne’emanut” – honestly and faithfully. As long as a person is honest and conducts himself properly, he is beloved by G-d. One who does not go to the Bet Ha’mikdash with a sacrifice on one of these holidays has neglected this positive command. If he comes to the Bet Ha’mikdash without a sacrifice, then he has also transgressed the prohibition of “Ve’lo Yera’u Panai Rekam,” which forbids appearing before G-d “emptyhanded,” without a sacrifice. Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Germany, 1808-1888) offers a very meaningful explanation for why people who are ill, infirm or handicapped are exempt from the obligation of Aliya Le’regel. Certainly, it would be possible for them to travel to Jerusalem by wagon or some other means of transportation, and yet, the Torah saw fit to exempt them from this Misva. Rav Hirsch suggests that this was done to make it clear that the pilgrimage to the Bet Ha’mikdash is not done for the sake of having one’s ailments cured and his problems solved. In other religions, Rav Hirsch writes, the believers visit temples in the hope of receiving what they need or want. Judaism, however, is not a supermarket, where we come to receive the things we want to have. We are to come to the Bet Ha’mikdash – and, in our times, to the synagogue – to attain spiritual elevation, to experience sanctity, to grow, and to draw close to G-d. This is not something we do in an attempt to earn a greater livelihood, cure our illnesses or solve our other problems. Of course, we believe that religious devotion brings us blessing, but this should not be our motivation for coming to the synagogue, praying, studying, and performing Misvot. This should be done out of a desire to grow and enhance our relationship with our Creator. And for this reason, Rav Hirsch writes, the Torah required specifically those who are healthy to make the pilgrimage to the Bet Ha’mikdash, to make it clear that we come before G-d in order to draw close to Him, and not for any other purpose.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:13) says about foreign deities, “Ve’lo Yishama Al Picha” – that these gods should not be mentioned by our mouths. The Sages understood this as referring to an attempt to persuade others to worship an idol. Such a person, who lures others to worship foreign gods, is referred to in Halachic literature as a “Madiah” (“lurer”). The Torah here warns against speaking to people about a foreign god in an effort to convince them to worship it. Even if the person himself does not worship the idol, or even believe in it, luring people to worship an idol transgresses this prohibition. This command refers specifically to a “Madiah”; there is a separate command regarding one who is “Mesit” (“incites”). Several differences exist between these two prohibitions. First, a “Madiah” is one who lures at least two people to worship a foreign deity; luring just one individual falls under the category of “Mesit.” Secondly, the prohibition of “Mesit” is violated by the mere attempt to convince somebody to worship an idol, whereas the prohibition of “Madiah” is transgressed only if one succeeds in convincing two or more people to worship. If they refuse, then the prohibition of “Madiah” has not been violated. This violation is punishable with the severest of all punishments – execution by Sekila (stoning). Needless to say, it applies to both men and women, in all places and at all times. In discussing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes the observation made by the Rambam that in reference to idol worshippers, the Torah speaks of G-d becoming “angry,” “incensed,” “jealous,” “vengeful,” and an “enemy” of such people. The Rambam noted that these descriptions are unique to the context of idol worship; in response to no other sin is G-d described as becoming angry, vengeful and jealous. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that G-d does not experience any emotions. We should not think for a moment that our actions have any impact upon Him, and can make Him angry, jealous, vengeful, or hate us. G-d does not need human beings, and nothing we do has any effect on Him. When the Torah speaks of G-d in these terms, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, it seeks to express the severity of idol worship by depicting G-d as though He is angry and vengeful. The Torah warns us that He will act toward one who worships an idol the way somebody would act if, Heaven forbid, somebody had a relationship with his wife. Just as the husband would be enraged, and would be driven to curse the adulterer and bring calamity upon him, this is how G-d will respond to punish an idol worshipper. Clearly, however, G-d does not actually become angry and does not experience emotions such as jealousy and enmity.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:10), “Ve’shem Elohim Aherim Lo Tazkiru, Lo Yishama Al Picha” – “and you shall not mention the name of other deities; it shall not be heard upon your mouth.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch brings three interpretations of this command. The first is that this verse forbids swearing in the name of a foreign deity, and even causing a pagan to swear in the name of his god by demanding that he take an oath during a civil dispute. If a Jew claims that a pagan owes him money, and the pagan refuses, the Jew may not sue him, because he will then be causing the gentile to swear in the name of a pagan god. Secondly, this command forbids conducting business with a pagan on or shortly before his religious holiday. If a gentile closes a lucrative deal before or on his holiday, he will express praise and thanksgiving to his deity, and the Jew will thus have caused him to speak in praise of his god. Therefore, it is forbidden by force of this command to engage in commercial dealings with pagans before or during their holiday. Thirdly, this command forbids using an idol as a landmark. For example, one cannot tell his fellow, “Meet me at the corner, next to the idol.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that all this is forbidden because of the importance of distancing ourselves from anything associated with pagan worship. Idol worship is so detestable that the Torah does not want us even mentioning a pagan god’s name or even indirectly facilitating its worship. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah mentions the prohibition against idolatry forty-four times, in order to emphasize its singular severity and the need to firmly reject it and distance ourselves from it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, and the Rambam, maintain that this prohibition marks an exception to the standard rule that violators of prohibitions which are transgressed without performing an action are not liable to Malkut. One who takes an oath in the name of a foreign deity, according to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, is liable to Malkut, even though this violation is committed verbally, and not by performing an action, due to the unique severity of idolatry. This command, of course, applies to both men and women, both in Eretz Yisrael and outside the land, and at all times. Already the Rishonim, approximately a thousand years ago, took note of the common practice among Ashkenazic Jews to permit conducting business with gentiles before and during their holidays. The Rishonim justified this practice by stating that this was allowed due to the concern of “Eba” – enmity that would be aroused by refusing to engage in commercial activities with the gentiles. If the Jews would suddenly discontinue trade and commerce with the gentiles during their holiday season, causing the gentiles financial losses, they will naturally resent the Jews, leading to hostility. Out of this concern, the Rabbis permitted doing business with the gentiles before and during their holidays. Likewise, the custom developed to permit Jews to sue gentiles who owed them money, even though the gentiles would then swear in the name of their god. This was permitted due to the severe financial losses Jews would incur if there unable to bring gentiles to court. These leniencies led Rav Moshe Feinstein (Russia-New York, 1895-1986) to the conclusion that these two prohibitions – conducting business with pagans during their holiday season, and demanding an oath from a pagan in court – were enacted by the Sages. In his Iggerot Moshe (Yoreh De’a, 1:71), Rav Moshe noted that if these were forbidden on the level of Torah law, they could not be allowed due to the concern of enmity or to avoid financial losses. Evidently, Torah law allows business with pagans during their holiday season, and demanding an oath from a gentile, and these prohibitions were enacted by the Rabbis. Rav Feinstein explains this theory based on the principle of “Dabar She’eno Mitkaven,” which means that Torah law does not forbid an action which could result in an unintended violation. As long as the act is not committed with the intention to transgress a Torah law, and it is not certain that the act will have such a result, the act is allowed. When a Jew engages in commerce with a gentile during the gentile’s holiday season, he does not intend at all that the gentile will give thanks to his god, and this is clearly not certain to occur. Therefore, as far as Torah law is concerned, this is permissible, but the Sages enacted that this should be avoided in the interest of distancing ourselves from pagan worship. Likewise, when a Jew brings a gentile to court, he has no intention that the gentile would swear in the name of his pagan god, nor is this certain to happen. To the contrary, the Jew hopes that the gentile will simply admit to owing the money he claims in order to avoid falsely swearing. Therefore, Torah law does not forbid suing a pagan who will likely swear in the name of his god, but this was prohibited by the Rabbis. Hence, as these prohibitions apply not on the level of Torah law, but rather by force of Rabbinic enactment, they are suspended when this will likely invite hostility, or when a substantial financial loss is at stake. It should be noted, however, that the Sefer Ha’hinuch presents these three prohibitions – suing a pagan, conducting business with a pagan during a holiday season, and mentioning the name of an idol – as three interpretations of the verse “Ve’shem Elohim Aherim Lo Tazkiru.” This would certainly imply that in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s view, all three are forbidden by the Torah. Rav Moshe, apparently, felt that common practice does not follow this view, and instead regards the first two as applying only by force of Rabbinic enactment, such that leniencies can be introduced when the need arises.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:12), “U’ba’yom Ha’shebi’i Tishbot” – that we must rest on the seventh day, Shabbat. Earlier, as part of the Ten Commandments, the Torah had introduced a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (prohibition) forbidding the performance of Melacha – certain types of constructive activity – on Shabbat. Here, the Torah introduces a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) obligating one to observe Shabbat as a day of rest. The Sefer Ha’hinuch draws our attention to the fact that the Torah mentions the Misva of Shabbat no fewer than twelve times, in order to underscore its great importance and the severity of the sin of Shabbat desecration. The Ramban (Rav Moshe Nahmanides, Spain, 1194-1270) writes that the Misvat Aseh of “U’ba’yom Ha’shebi’i Tishbot” demands more than simply refraining from the thirty-nine categories of forbidden activity on Shabbat. He notes that it is possible for a person to refrain from all these activities but still miss the entire purpose of Shabbat – to serve as a day of relaxation and enjoyment. For example, a person can spend the entire day rearranging his house, moving furniture from one place to another, or cleaning out the garage, without performing any of the thirty-nine Melachot. The Ramban writes that the command “U’ba’yom Ha’shebi’i Tishbot” requires that we not only refrain from the technical prohibitions of Shabbat, but also observe the day as a day of relaxation and rest. This comment of the Ramban reflects a broader concept, which is a crucially important principle regarding Torah life. Beyond the technicalities of the Torah’s laws, there are also overarching ideals that must characterize and inform the way we live. Thus, on Shabbat, we are required to not only abstain from the specific forbidden activities, but also to lend Shabbat a distinct aura and character. The Ramban makes this point regarding two other commands, as well. One is the command of “Kedoshim Tiheyu” – “You shall be sacred” (Vayikra 19:2). The Ramban explains that a person can refrain from prohibited intimate relationships, and prohibited foods, but still live an “unholy life” by marrying many wives and overindulging in intimacy, or by gluttonously overindulging in permissible food and wine. The command of “Kedoshim Tiheyu” obligates us to live a “sacred” life by exercising moderation in our indulgence in physical pleasures. The Ramban writes that one who overindulges without violating any technical prohibitions is a “Nabal Bi’rshut Ha’Torah” – one who acts “repugnantly” within the parameters of what the Torah permitted. The Torah therefore issued the command of “Kedoshim Tiheyu” to instruct that we must conduct ourselves in a holy, refined manner even with regard to that which is technically allowed. The other context in which the Ramban makes this point is the command of “Ve’asita Ha’yashar Ve’ha’tob Be’eneh Hashem” – “You shall do that which is upright and good in G-d’s eyes” (Debarim 6:18). The Ramban explains that it is possible for one to technically observe the Torah’s interpersonal code, doing nothing that can legally be defined as stealing or harming one’s fellow, but still act unethically. A person is able to deceive people, or act unjustly, even while avoiding technical Halachic violations. The Torah therefore commanded, “Ve’asita Ha’yashar Ve’ha’tob Be’eneh Hashem,” that we act in a just, moral, kindhearted and sensitive manner even beyond the technical laws governing interpersonal conduct. As in regard to the Misva of Shabbat observance, the Ramban demonstrates that Torah commitment entails both strict adherence to all the relevant technical Halachic details, as well as following the spirit of the law, recognizing the overarching values which the Misvot are meant to express, and conducting ourselves according to those values.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:11), “Ve’ha’shebi’it Tishmetena U’netashtah,” requiring a farmer to abandon his agricultural lands during the Shemita year, which occurs every seven years. This means that he must proclaim all the produce ownerless, and allow all people access to it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, who usually gives just one reason for every Misva, in this instance points to three different reasons underlying the Misva. First, he explains that the command of Shemita, like the Misva of Shabbat, reinforces our belief in the creation of the world. As opposed to the belief held by the ancient Greek philosophers, and others, that the world always existed, we firmly believe that the world was created by G-d. To affirm this belief, the Torah requires us to remind ourselves of the six days of creation by observing Shabbat every seven days, and observing Shemita every seven years. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, it is critically important for us to recognize that the world is owned by G-d, and that we are here as His “tenants,” who are entitled to live on and use the earth subject to His rules. And so once in seven years we abandon our fields to express our cognizance of His ownership over the land, that we use it only by His authorization. Secondly, the Misva of Shemita helps engender within us the precious quality of “Vatranut,” a willingness to forego on what is rightfully ours, rather than insistently standing on principle. By declaring his produce ownerless every seven years, allowing everyone who wishes to partake of it, the farmer accustoms himself to foregoing on his property. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that nothing engenders “Vatranut” more than giving to somebody without expecting any reciprocation, and so the Torah commanded farmers to forego on their produce every seven years. Thirdly, and perhaps most obviously, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that abandoning one’s field for an entire year has the effect of strengthening one’s Bitahon, his trust in Hashem as the one who provides his needs. By allowing everybody to partake of his produce, the farmer effectively pronounces that he trusts in G-d to care for him and provide him with his sustenance. This Misva is binding upon both men and women, and applies only in Israel. According to Torah law, the command of Shemita applies only when the majority of the Jewish Nation lives in Israel, but the Sages enacted that Shemita be observed in Israel even nowadays. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, the Sages enacted that Shemita be observed in “Surya” – referring to parts of what is today Syria. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that King David captured certain areas in Syria, such as Damascus and Halab (Aleppo), and although these regions are not considered part of Israel, the Sages enacted that Shemita be observed there. The Rambam (Hilchot Shemita Ve’Yobel 4:27) explains that since these regions are very close to Israel, the Sages feared that people would move there to avoid the Misva of Shemita, and so they legislated a requirement to observe Shemita in these areas. A farmer who prevented people from accessing his fields during Shemita, such as by erecting a fence around it and locking the gate, has violated this command. The farmer himself is allowed to partake of his produce just like everyone else. He may not collect large amounts of produce as he normally would from his fields, in order to make it clear that he does not consider himself the owner, but he may collect small portions just as others may.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:8), “Ve’shohad Lo Tikach” – “And you shall not accept a bribe,” establishing a Biblical prohibition which forbids judges from accepting a bribe from either litigant. The Gemara clarifies that the Torah forbids accepting a bribe even from the litigant whom the judge feels is correct. Although the bribe in such a case does not distort the trial, and the same decision is reached as would have been reached without the bribe, accepting the bribe nevertheless violates this Biblical command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade accepting bribes even from the correct litigant so that judges do not accustom themselves to accepting bribes. If judges accept bribes from the correct litigant, they will end up receiving bribes even from the other litigant and will thus be driven to rule dishonestly. Even if a litigant does not give anything to a judge, but he compliments him or does a small favor, this constitutes a bribe, as the judge becomes predisposed to rule in his favor. If a judge receives a compliment from a litigant, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, he must make a conscious effort to ignore it and pay no attention to it whatsoever. (This resembles the Halacha requiring one who heard Lashon Ha’ra – negative speech about another person – to consciously reject the information, and not believe what he heard.) Even so, as the Gemara establishes in Masechet Ketubot, a judge whom a litigant attempts to bribe in any way becomes disqualified from trying that case. A judge who accepts a bribe transgresses this prohibition, but he does not receive Malkut because he can rectify his violation by returning the bribe (“Lav Ha’nitan Le’hishabon”). He is also included in the curse which the Torah pronounces against those who accept bribes (“Arur Loke’ah Shohad” – Debarim 27:25). The litigant who offered the bribe is in violation of the Torah prohibition of “Lifneh Iver Lo Titen Michshol” – “You shall not place a stumbling block before a blind man” (Vayikra 19:14), which forbids luring one’s fellow to sin. The Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953), in his work Emuna U’bitahon (chapter 3), raises the question of how to reconcile this prohibition with the Halacha allowing a Torah scholar to rely on his own lenient rulings. For example, if a Torah scholar inspects an animal which he slaughtered and needs to eat, to ensure that it is kosher, he may rely on his determination that the meat is permissible for consumption. Even if he is destitute, and if this meat is found to be forbidden he will have nothing to eat, nevertheless, he may rely on his conclusion that the meat is permissible. Similarly, if a scholar has a large amount of Hametz which may have been in his possession during Pesach, in which case it would be forbidden, he is trusted to determine its status and to keep the Hametz if he concludes that it is permissible. The reason, the Hazon Ish explains, is because the most important concern for a Torah scholar is the truth, and he can thus be trusted to issue a truthful ruling rather than wrongly reach a lenient conclusion because of a vested interest. But if this is the case, the Hazon Ish asks, then why are judges not allowed to accept bribes? A judge, quite obviously, is appointed only if he is an accomplished Torah scholar. Why, then, can he not be trusted to reach a correct, truthful decision despite receiving a bribe? The Hazon Ish answers that bribes possess “a special impure force which closes the mind of the judge.” Just like the Sages taught that forbidden foods have deleterious spiritual effect upon those who eat them, similarly, a bribe has the spiritual power to impair judgment. This is the meaning of the verse which warns that a bribe “blinds the eyes of the wise.” Even those who are passionately committed to the truth are adversely affected by bribes and are prone to ruling dishonestly, because of the unique “impurity” which a bribe imparts within a judge’s heart. Therefore, although Torah scholars are presumed to be unflinchingly committed to the truth, judges are nevertheless forbidden from taking a bribe, which could lead them to rule untruthfully.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:7), “Ve’naki Ve’sadik Al Taharog” – “You shall not kill an innocent or righteous man.” The Sages interpreted this command as forbidding Bet Din from convicting a defendant based on anything other than the testimony of two witnesses who saw the defendant commit the wrongful act after explicitly warning him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives the example of a person who chased his fellow with a knife, and two witnesses warned him that killing the pursued individual constitutes a capital offense, punishable by execution, but then lost eye contact with the pursuer. A few moments later, they saw the pursued individual lying lifeless on the ground, with the knife which the pursuer had been carrying in his chest, and the pursuer had blood on his hands. Although it is quite clear that the fellow was killed by the pursuer, nevertheless, Bet Din may not convict the killer because no witnesses saw the act of murder. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if Bet Din were allowed to convict the killer in such a case, then they would likely end up convicting even on the basis of less compelling circumstantial evidence. As a result, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, people will occasionally be punished for crimes which they did not commit. The Sefer Ha’hinuch further notes that “Yesh La’efsharut Rahab Gadol” – there is an exceedingly wide range of possibilities, and at times we make assumptions which seem clear and self-evident but turn out to be mistaken. Therefore, the Torah forbids convicting a defendant based on anything less than clear testimony by witnesses who saw the act, because circumstantial evidence of guilt does not provide conclusive proof. This verse also includes a command not to convict a suspected offender if two witnesses testify about two different capital offenses. One example is the case of a witness who testifies that somebody violated Shabbat, while another witness testifies that this person worshipped an idol. Even though two witnesses testified that this person committed a capital offense, Bet Din cannot convict and execute the defendant based on these testimonies, because only one witness testified about each offense. Even if one witness testified that the person worshipped the sun, and another testified that he worshipped the moon, Bet Din cannot convict the defendant, because they did not hear two witnesses testify about the same forbidden act. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites a different interpretation of this verse in the name of the Ramban. The Ramban noted that the Torah here forbids executing a “Naki” (innocent person) and a “Sadik” (righteous person). The word “Naki,” the Ramban explains, refers to the case of somebody who was convicted of a capital offense, but before the execution, somebody came forward saying that he has new exonerating evidence. The Torah in this verse forbids killing the defendant in this situation, until first reconvening the Bet Din and revisiting the case in light of the new evidence. The term “Sadik” refers to the opposite situation – where a defendant was declared innocent, and then somebody came forward claiming to have new incriminating evidence. The Torah here forbids Bet Din from reexamining the case and convicting based on the new evidence. These prohibitions, which are derived from the command “Ve’naki Ve’sadik Al Taharog,” reflect the extreme care the Torah requires taking to avoid even the remote possibility of convicting and punishing an innocent person. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that a Bet Din which violates one of these prohibitions is liable to especially severe punishment, because it has issued a ruling resulting in an unwarranted execution.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:6), “Lo Tateh Mishpat Ebyonecha Be’ribo” – “Do not distort the judgment of an impoverished person in his trial.” The plain meaning of this verse is that judges may not rule in favor of a poor litigant who they feel is guilty, out of compassion for his plight. However, this command was already issued several verses earlier (“Ve’dal Lo Tehedar Be’ribo” – Shemot 23:3), and thus does not need to be repeated here. The Gemara therefore understood the word “Ebyon” (“impoverished person”) in this verse as a reference to somebody who is spiritually “impoverished,” meaning, a sinful person. The Torah here commands judges not to convict a sinful person unjustly, just because he is an evildoer. Every court case must be tried fairly and honestly, and the decision must be reached based on the objective facts, and not on external factors such as a litigant’s spiritual standing. The question arises as to why the Torah found it necessary to issue this command. Why would we have thought to allow judges to convict somebody based on the level of his religious observance? It seems obvious that just as it is clearly forbidden to steal from somebody who commits sins, it is likewise forbidden for judges to rule that he owes somebody money when he in fact does not. One explanation given by the commentators is that this command is needed to establish this prohibition in the exceptional case of a sinner from whom stealing is permissible. According to Halacha, a “Moser” – somebody who cooperates with hostile gentile governments by informing them where the Jews’ property is so it could be confiscated – forfeits all rights to his own property. Since he disregards his fellow Jews’ right to their money, he loses rights to his own money, and it may be seized. A judge might therefore find it legitimate to rule against a “Moser” when he is taken to court, even if in this particular case he is innocent, since in any event he has forfeited all rights to his property. The Torah commands that this is not allowed, and even if one of the litigants is a “Moser,” the judge is required to decide the case fairly and impartially, treating the “Moser” no differently than any other litigant. In truth, this question was already asked by Rabbi Shimon Bar Yohai, as cited by the Mechilta. Rabbi Shimon answered that a judge might feel that since this litigant transgresses certain commands, he must be suspected of dishonesty. If he is willing to violate some Torah laws, then perhaps he can be presumed to be willing to speak falsely, as well. The Torah therefore commands judges to treat sinners in the courtroom no differently than other litigants, because the fact that they transgress some commands does not necessarily mean that they cannot be trusted to speak the truth. The reason underlying this command, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that equality must be strictly maintained in the courtroom. In order to ensure a fair and just judicial system, it is critical that judges try every case objectively, and not be predisposed in favor or against either litigant for any reason. A judge who rules against a litigant because he is a sinner, disregarding the actual facts of the case, is in violation of this command. He does not receive Malkut for this violation, however, because the violation is committed without performing an action, and because it can be reversed by paying the litigant the money he was unjustly forced to pay the plaintiff. Violations which do not entail an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”) and violations which can be reversed by repaying the money (“Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin”), are not punishable by Malkut, and so for both these reasons, a judge who transgresses this command does not receive Malkut.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:5) addresses the situation of a person who sees his enemy’s donkey struggling under a heavy load, and it commands the person to assist his enemy in unloading the cargo despite his hostile feelings towards him. The Gemara addresses the question of how it is possible that somebody despises a fellow Jew, given the prohibition of “Lo Tisna Et Ahicha” (Vayikra 19:17), which forbids hating one’s fellow. The answer, the Gemara explains, is that the Torah speaks of a case where the person had previously seen the animal’s owner prepare to commit a sin, and even after he warned him to desist, he persisted in his wrongdoing. It is permissible to despise such a person, and thus the Torah speaks here of a situation where this person’s donkey was seen struggling under a heavy load, and it requires helping the person even though one legitimately dislikes him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this Misva applies even if it is a different animal which struggles under a heavy load; this law is not limited to donkeys. As for the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah wants us to train ourselves to act compassionately, and so we are to assist those who need our help – even somebody whom we have a right to dislike. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that if the Torah requires us to help ease the burden of an animal who bears too heavy a load, then certainly we must come to help a person – even somebody whom we dislike – who is struggling to carry a heavy load and needs assistance. The Gemara addresses the situation of a person who sees his friend needing help unloading his donkey, and at the same time sees his enemy needing help to load his donkey. Normally, when a person must choose between helping somebody load his animal and helping somebody unload, precedence is given to the one who needs help unloading, because the animal is in distress. In this instance, however, the Gemara rules that one should help the person he dislikes load his animal, in order to “subdue his evil inclination” – meaning, to overcome his feelings of hostility towards that person. This concern, to overcome the negative feelings, overrides the consideration of lightening the load on the back of his friend’s donkey. The Rishonim debate the question of what kind of enemy the Gemara refers to in this discussion. The Sefer Ha’hinuch understood that the Gemara must be speaking of an ordinary enemy, somebody whom the person simply dislikes, in violation of the prohibition of “Lo Tisna.” After all, if the Gemara says that the person must “subdue his evil inclination” and overcome his hostile feelings toward that individual, then these feelings must be illegitimate. Necessarily, then, we are dealing with an “enemy” whom he is not permitted to despise. Tosafot, however, in Masechet Baba Mesia (32), explain differently. They claim that the Gemara speaks of an “enemy” whom one is allowed to dislike, but even so, it is important for the person to “subdue his inclination.” Although he is allowed to dislike this sinner because of his improper conduct, nevertheless, if he acts with hostility toward the sinner, then the sinner will despise him in return, and this will have the effect of intensifying the person’s hatred for the sinner. King Shlomo teaches in Mishleh (27:19), “Ka’mayim Ha’panim La’panim, Ken Leb Ha’adam La’adam,” which our Sages understood to mean that just as water reflects a person’s image back to him, a person’s heart reflects to his fellow the feelings felt by his fellow towards him. The way we feel towards others affects the way they feel towards us. And thus, if a person hates somebody who he is, in principle, allowed to hate, this will invite that person’s hatred, which will in turn intensify the original feelings of hate – and those additional feelings are not allowed. Although the Torah permits hating a sinner in certain circumstances, one is not allowed to hate the sinner even more because of the sinner’s hatred towards him. Therefore, Tosafot explain, one should endeavor to “subdue his evil inclination” and overcome his feelings of hatred even towards those whom he is allowed to hate. So much so, in fact, that one should help such an “enemy” load his donkey, subduing his natural hostile feelings, rather than assist his friend unload his donkey. The Gemara establishes that one must go one-seventh of a Mil out of his way to assist somebody in loading or unloading cargo. He must be willing to unload even without pay, but he is required to help load cargo only if the person who needs help is willing to pay for his work. After helping the person to load the cargo onto his animal, he must escort the animal for a short while to ensure the cargo is secure and will not fall off. He may charge the animal’s owner for the time taken to escort the animal. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who fails to fulfill this Misva, and does not help his fellow unload or load his cargo, shows that he is a cruel person, and just as he does not have compassion for others, Hashem will not have compassion for him.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:3), “Ve’dal Lo Tehedar Be’ribo” – it is forbidden for a judge to favor a poor man who is standing trial before him. This command is repeated in the Book of Vayikra (19:15), where the Torah states, “Lo Tisa Peneh Dal.” Targum Onkelos translates the word “Tehedar” to mean “Terahem” – “have compassion.” As the Sefer Ha’hinuch cites from the Sifreh, this means that a judge might figure that since the Misva of charity obligates all people, including him and the other litigant, to assist the needy litigant, he should rule in his favor. Even if the other litigant is actually correct, the judge might think that he fulfills the Misva of charity by ruling in favor of the needy litigant. The Torah therefore commands the judges to decide the case objectively, even if this means ruling against the pauper and thereby exacerbating his financial hardship. Rashi interprets the word “Tehedar” differently, to mean that the judges should not show the poor litigant special honor. Out of compassion for the pauper, the judge might speak to him in a kinder, more respectful manner than the way he speaks to the other litigant. The Torah forbids doing so because judges must treat both litigants equally, in order to ensure fairness and impartiality in the courtroom. A judge who shows favoritism to a needy litigant has violated this command, though he does not receive Malkut because this law is transgressed verbally, without performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”). The verse in the Book of Shemuel II (8:15) says about King David, “Va’yehi David Oseh Mishpat U’sdaka Le’chol Amo” – he served as a judge for the people, in the capacity of which he performed “Mishpat” (justice) and “Sedaka” (kindness). The Gemara raises the question of how David could perform both “Mishpat” and “Sedaka.” These two are, in a sense, opposites, as “Mishpat” refers to strict justice, and “Sedaka” means extending kindness beyond that which is deserved. Several answers are given to explain this verse. One view is that this refers to “Peshara” – compromise. David achieved both “Mishpat” and “Sedaka” by working with the litigants to arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise, thereby blending justice with kindness. Others explain that when the defendant was poor, and David ruled in favor of the plaintiff, David would pay the plaintiff out of his own pocket in order to assist the pauper. This way, he performed “Mishpat” by giving the correct ruling, but also performed “Sedaka” by paying the plaintiff in order to assist the underprivileged defendant. Yet a third explanation is that if the defendant indeed owes the plaintiff money, then it is in his best interest for the court to rule against him, so he will not bear the guilt of keeping money which does not rightfully belong to him. Thus, when David ruled in favor of the plaintiff, he performed both “Mishpat” and “Sedaka” – he issued the correct ruling, and also helped the defendant by ensuring that he would not keep with him somebody else’s money unlawfully.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:2), “Ahareh Rabim Le’hatot,” establishing the rule that we must follow the majority view among the Rabbis. When disagreements arise among the scholars, Halacha is determined based on the majority position. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this applies only when the Rabbis involved in the dispute are of equal caliber. It would be insensible, he says, to think that we should follow the view of a group of ignoramuses – even if they are, in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, “as numerous as the number of people who left Egypt” – over a small group of learned scholars. Only when Rabbis of equal scholarly stature argue does Halacha require following the majority. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that although the majority may at times issue a mistaken ruling, one should nevertheless follow the majority with confidence, as this is what the Torah requires. If the ruling turns out to have been incorrect, it is the Sages who bear accountability and need to atone for their mistake. The Sefer Ha’hinuch further explains that the Torah required following the majority “Le’hazek Kiyum Datenu” – “to strengthen the upholding of our religion.” If everyone acted in accordance with his or her opinion, without deferring to the majority, then every individual or group of individuals will follow different practices, and our nation will divide into several different religions. In order to ensure that we all follow a single set of laws, the Torah required following the majority view among the scholars. This command, of course, applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. One who violates the law by disregarding the majority view, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, will be severely punished, because of the particular importance of this command for maintaining our religion. This Misva also yields two other Halachot involving the concept of “Rov” – following the majority. The first is a rule known as “Kol De’parish Me’ruba Parish,” which means that we must assume something originated from the majority unless we have reason to believe otherwise. The classic example is a piece of meat that was discovered on a street which has both kosher and non-kosher butcher shops, and it is unknown from which of these shops the meat originated. If the majority of the shops are kosher, then we may assume that the meat is kosher, and it may be eaten. Conversely, if most of the shops are not kosher, then the meat may not be eaten. The second Halacha that stems from this command is that of Bittul, or “negation.” The classic example is where two pieces of kosher meat and one piece of non-kosher meat become mixed together, and they are indistinguishable from one another. The law of Bittul establishes that the minority is considered negated by the majority, such that all three pieces may be eaten.
The 77 th Biblical command listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch is introduced in Parashat Mishpatim (23:2): “Ve’lo Ta’aneh Al Rib Li’ntot,” a verse which the Sages interpreted in four different ways. All four interpretations are included under this Biblical prohibition, thus serving as a striking example of the precept taught by the Midrash, “Shibim Panim La’Torah” – there are numerous (“seventy”) different levels on which the Torah can be understood. The first interpretation is that the Torah here forbids judges from deviating from their own opinion in order to go along with the others. A judge might decide that although he feels one way, he will vote like his colleagues in deference to them. The Torah here commands judges presiding over a “Rib” (court case) not to deviate – “Li’ntot” – from what they feel is the correct ruling, and demands that they vote for the side which they truly feel is correct. Secondly, the Torah here commands that when judges are trying a case involving a capital offense, a judge who finds a reason to acquit should not then argue for a conviction. He should continue advocating on behalf of the defendant and arguing for an acquittal. At the end of the trial, when the judges vote, he may change his mind, but during the deliberations, once he proposed a reason to acquit he may not then argue for convicting. The third explanation of this verse is that the Torah commands the Bet Din not to begin their deliberation of a case involving a capital offense with the arguments for convicting the defendant. Rather, they should begin by hearing the reasons to acquit. Finally, the word “Rib” in this verse is written without the letter “Yod,” such that it could be read as “Rab,” alluding to the leading member of the Bet Din. The Torah here commands the Bet Din that when trying a case involving a capital offense, as the judges begin presenting their opinion, they should not begin with the greatest judge. Instead, they should begin with the lowest-level judge and conclude with the highest-level judge. According to this reading, “Ve’lo Ta’aneh Al Rib” means that no judge may give his opinion after the leading member of the court, who states his opinion last. Explaining the first command presented in this verse – that judges should not deviate from their view in deference to the others – the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah wanted to ensure that a death sentence would not be issued by a single judge. When it comes to a capital sentence, it is important that the court as a whole reaches the conclusion to convict and execute the defendant, rather than the court simply going along with the position of one judge who decides to convict. Therefore, the Torah prohibits judges from accepting another judge’s viewpoint with which they disagree, and to instead issue the ruling which they truly believe to be correct. This way, when a court convicts, the conviction will be the consensus view of the entire court, and not the opinion of one judge. Interestingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch chooses this context to address the tangentially related question of how the prophetess Debora served as a judge, as the verse tells in the Book of Shofetim (4: 4 ), given that women are disqualified from serving as judges. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives two answers, the first is that Debora did not actually serve as a formal judge. When the verse states that Debora “judged,” it means that the Rabbis would consult with her because of her great knowledge and wisdom, but not that she was appointed formally. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, Halacha allows the litigants to bring their case to somebody who is disqualified from serving as a judge if they so desire. If they both accept the judge, despite his disqualification, then that judge may try the case and his decision is binding. Accordingly, it is possible that that people respected Debora and accepted her as a judge. A Bet Din that violates any of these prohibitions transgresses this Biblical command, but the judges do not receive Malkut because these prohibitions are violated verbally, and not by performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”).
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:2), “Lo Tiheyeh Ahareh Rabim Le’ra’ot” – literally, “Do not follow the majority for evil matters.” The Sages understood this verse as commanding a court not to convict a defendant charged with a capital offense based on a simple majority. When it comes other cases, the majority opinion among the judges of the Bet Din is accepted even if the majority exceeds the minority by just a single vote. When it comes to capital cases, however, which are tried by a tribunal of twenty-three judges, the defendant is convicted and put to death only if at least thirteen judges vote to convict. If a court executes a defendant who was found guilty by a vote of 12-11, then the court is in violation of this Biblical command, and are deserving of severe punishment for killing somebody who did not deserve execution. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since the death penalty cannot be reversed, extra caution must be taken to avoid a mistaken conviction in capital cases. Therefore, we are bidden to follow G-d’s quality of “Rab Hesed,” extending beyond the strict letter of the law and judging favorably, for the sake of preventing even the remote possibility of an erroneous guilty verdict. Therefore, as an extra precaution, the Torah required a majority of at least two judges to convict someone accused of a capital offense. The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin (17) establishes the counterintuitive Halacha that if all twenty-three judges unanimously decide upon a guilty verdict, then the defendant is acquitted. Different reasons are given for this surprising Halacha. One approach taken is based on a different Halacha requiring the judges of a Bet Din to wait overnight before finalizing their decision to convict. In order to ensure a correct ruling, the judges are not to finalize their decision the same day it is reached, but rather delay the final ruling to the next day. The reason is that over the course of the night, they might perhaps revisit the case in their minds and view it from a fresh perspective, such that they will see some merit in the argument to acquit. But if no judge voiced the opinion to acquit, then the judges cannot observe this Halacha. Since no argument was made in defense of the suspect, the judges cannot rethink and consider the argument to acquit, as it was never expressed in the first place. For this technical reason, some have argued, the defendant is acquitted if no judges vote to acquit him. The Maharitz Hiyut (Rav Tzvi Hersh Chajes, 1805-1855) offers a different explanation. He notes that every offender always has some line of defense; whenever somebody is suspected of committing a crime, there will be some argument, however weak, that can be made on his behalf. And thus if the Bet Din unanimously decided to convict, then necessarily they did not thoroughly examine all sides of the case. Therefore, the defendant is acquitted. Others claim that if a person committed a capital offense so openly and brazenly, such that there is no possible argument that can be brought in his defense, then the death penalty is not a severe enough punishment. Bet Din therefore does not punish the violator, and the punishment is left to G-d, who will ensure that the violator receives what he or she deserves. The Or Ha’hayim (Rav Haim Ben-Attar, 1696-1743) observes that these laws – that an offender is not put to death based on a simple majority, or if the court convicts unanimously – could potentially be manipulated by a judge. If a judge feels that the defendant is innocent, and he sees that all his twenty-two colleagues feel that the defendant is guilty, he might decide to dishonestly vote to convict, such that the court will unanimously convict and the defendant will thus be acquitted. If he votes to acquit, then there will be a decisive majority for a conviction, and the defendant will be put to death, and so the judge might choose to join his colleagues in voting for a conviction. The Or Ha’hayim writes that the command, “Lo Tiheyeh Ahareh Rabim Le’ra’ot” includes a prohibition against following the majority in this case, when one judge feels that the others are mistaken. Even though the end result will be precisely what the judge feels is appropriate – an acquittal – nevertheless, the judge must vote for what he feels to be correct, and may not vote dishonestly. Conversely, if all the judges feel the defendant is guilty, one of them might be tempted to vote for an acquittal so that the vote will not be unanimous and then violator will receive his punishment. If they unanimously convict, then, as discussed, the defendant will be acquitted, and so one judge might decide to dishonestly vote for an acquittal so the defendant will be found guilty and punished. The Or Ha’hayim writes that this, too, is forbidden by the Torah. Others, however, disagree with the Or Ha’hayim on this point, and maintain that a judge may dishonestly vote in favor of an acquittal to ensure that the conviction will not be unanimous. Given the importance of punishing those guilty of capital offenses, a judge who feels with certainty that a defendant is guilty should, according to these Poskim, do anything necessary to ensure a conviction, including falsely voting for an acquittal.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:1), “Al Tashet Yadecha Im Rasha Li’hyot Ed Hamas” – literally, “Do not place your hand with a wicked person to be a false witness.” Our oral tradition interprets this verse to mean that a Bet Din may not “lend a hand” to a wicked person and allow him to testify in the court. The phrase “Ed Hamas” is understood as referring to a thief who serves as witness, and the Torah forbids courts from accepting testimony from such a witness. We might wonder, at first glance, why the Torah disqualifies a sinner from serving as a witness. If he indeed witnessed the event, then what difference does it make whether or not he observes the Torah’s commands? The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that if a person has no regard for his own wellbeing, violating G-d’s will without worrying about the consequences of his misconduct, then he presumably does not care about the wellbeing of others, either. If he does not look after himself by ensuring to obey G-d’s laws, then he cannot be trusted with respect to other people, and we must therefore suspect that he might testify falsely. In discussing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists the ten categories of people who are disqualified from serving as witnesses according to Torah law: 1) Women. It is clear that the Torah does not regard women as less trustworthy than men. After all, wives are trusted to determine their halachic status vis-à-vis the prohibition of Nidda (relations with a menstrual woman), which is punishable by Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). If a woman tells her husband that she is Tehora (ritually pure, such that relations are permissible), then she is trusted. Likewise, women are trusted with regard to the permissible status of food which they prepare and serve. Nevertheless, there is a Gezerat Ha’katub (“Scriptural decree”) which disqualifies women from serving as witnesses, for reasons which we are unable to grasp. 2) Servants. 3) Minors. 4) People who cannot hear or cannot speak. 5) Shoteh – a person whose mental faculties are impaired. 6) A blind person. While at first this might seem obvious, in truth, we might have assumed that a blind person can testify about what he heard somebody speak. Halacha therefore clarifies that a blind man is not accepted as a witness. 7) Reshaim – wicked people. This refers to people who commit violations punishable by either Malkut or execution, or who commit financial crimes. 8) “Anashim Bezuyim Be’yoter” – people who act in a self-degrading manner. The Poskim give the examples of people who eat outside in the marketplace, or who walk about unclothed. 9) Family members are not accepted as witnesses to testify about one another, neither in their favor or against them. This disqualification does not stem from any suspicion of dishonesty, as evidenced by the fact that family members cannot even testify against one another. Moreover, the Gemara states that Moshe would not have been accepted as a witness to testify about his brother, Aharon, even though Moshe would certainly never be suspected of dishonesty. This disqualification rather constitutes a “Gezerat Ha’katub.” 10) “Noge’a Be’edut” – somebody who has some vested interest in the case, and is thus biased. In addition, the Rabbis enacted that a “Mesahek Be’kubya” – a career gambler, who gambles for a living, rather than engage in a constructive profession – may not serve as a witness. One reason given for this disqualification is that his earnings are, in a sense, received via theft. When he gambles against other people, they all hope to win, and they relinquish their money to the winner reluctantly, such that this money was not transferred wholeheartedly. Secondly, Rashi writes in Masechet Erubin (82) that a career gambler makes his money easily, and does not appreciate the hard work and effort that other people need to invest in order to earn money. As such, he might not be careful with other people’s money, and therefore cannot be trusted to serve as a witness. This prohibition applies at all times and in all places, and is binding upon Bet Din. It is unclear whether the second witness, who testifies together with the disqualified witness, violates this prohibition in that he enables the disqualified witness to testify (since Bet Din does not accept a lone witness). It is also unclear whether the disqualified witness himself transgresses this command by testifying; these two questions are addressed by the Poskim.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:1), “Lo Tisa Shema Shav” – a difficult verse which the Sages understood as a prohibition against placing oneself in a position where he will hear false, misleading information. Specifically, the Torah here commands judges not to hear one litigant’s arguments when the other litigant is not present. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a litigant is more prone to speak untruthfully in the other party’s absence, because people generally do not have the audacity to speak falsely about somebody to his face. Therefore, the Torah forbade judges from hearing a litigant’s arguments when the other litigant is not present, because the litigant might lie and thereby mislead the judges to accept his claims. If a judge agrees to hear a litigant’s claims in the other’s absence, in violation of this command, the litigant is forbidden by force of this Biblical command from presenting his claims until the other litigant arrives. This command also introduces the broader prohibition against involving ourselves in any sort of falsehood. Additionally, the Sages interpreted this verse as establishing the famous prohibition of Lashon Ha’ra – speaking or accepting unflattering information about another person. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch elaborates upon the particular importance of honesty in Torah life. He says that dishonesty is “Nit’ab” – “abominable,” adding, “En Dabar Ma’us Mimenu” – “There is nothing more repulsive than it.” If a person speaks untruthfully, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, then “his home becomes filled with curse.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that “Emet” (truthfulness) is one of G-d’s qualities, and blessing is attained by those who follow G-d’s example and live in accordance with His attributes, such as compassion, kindness and honesty. We bring upon ourselves G-d’s blessings by acting as He does. Conversely, if a person conducts himself in a manner that is contrary to G-d’s attributes, he brings upon himself the opposite of blessing, Heaven forbid. Therefore, one who engages in falsehood brings, in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, “the opposite of blessing, the opposite of joy, the opposite of peace, and the opposite of enjoyment.” And for this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah commands several verses later (23:7), “Mi’debar Sheker Tirhak” – that we must distance ourselves from falsehood. Nowhere else does the Torah command us to “keep a distance” from a specific kind of misconduct. This is said only about falsehood because of its uniquely grotesque nature. Hence, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah forbids judges from hearing a litigant’s claims in the other’s absence, even though the litigant might actually be speaking the truth, because of the risk that he will speak falsely. This is one example of the Torah’s insistence on avoiding even the remote possibility of falsehood. The Sefer Ha’hinuch further notes that the Gemara repeatedly speaks in praise of honest judges, and condemns dishonest judges, testifying to the critical importance of integrity. This Misva applies at all times and in all places. One who transgresses this prohibition is not liable to Malkut, because this violation is committed verbally, without the performance of an action. The broader message of this Misva is that we must always speak honestly and as accurately as possible. Sometimes people impulsively state things which they do not actually know to be true. The value of “Emet” demands that we have the humility to acknowledge what we do not know, and to ensure to speak the precise truth at all times.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:30) commands that we must not eat “Basar Ba’sadeh Terefa” – “meat of a devoured animal in the field.” This command prohibits eating meat of a kosher species of animal which was attacked by a beast and suffered a fatal injury. However, the Sages understood that this prohibition applies to an animal with any sort of fatal injury that is not expected to live for another year. The Torah gave the most common case of such an animal – where an animal was attacked out in the field – but the prohibition applies even to animals suffering from other fatal conditions, and they are all considered “Terefa” and hence forbidden for consumption. Additionally, the Gemara inferred from this verse that any meat which was taken “Ba’sadeh” – “into the field,” meaning, outside the boundaries of where it is supposed to remain, becomes forbidden for consumption. Namely, certain forms of sacrificial meat (“Kodasheh Kodashim”) are to be eaten specifically in the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash, and other forms of sacrificial meat (“Kodasheh Kalim”) are to be eaten in the city of Jerusalem. The Sages inferred from this verse that sacrificial meat which was taken outside its boundaries – either outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, or outside Jerusalem, depending on which type of sacrifice it is – becomes forbidden for consumption. Another example is meat of the Korban Pesach, which is not to be removed from the Habura – the group which offered the sacrifice. Meat of the Korban Pesach which left its designated area has the status of “Terefa” and becomes forbidden for consumption. Explaining the reason behind the prohibition of “Terefa,” the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah forbade activities which are detrimental to our physical health, as poor physical health adversely affects our minds. Therefore, the Torah forbade eating meat of a “Terefa,” which is detrimental to the body. The Sefer Ha’hinuch acknowledges that it is unknown why such meat has an adverse effect on a person’s physical wellbeing, but he insists that we must place our trust in G-d, the “dependable Healer,” who is infinitely wiser than us and medical experts. He has determined that meat of a “Terefa” is harmful, and for this reason He has commanded us to refrain from such meat. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then anticipates that some might wonder how an animal’s meat could suddenly be considered detrimental to one’s health upon developing a fatal condition. One moment, the meat is presumed perfectly healthful, and then the next moment – when the animal becomes a “Terefa” – it is deemed unhealthful, and some might question how this could happen. The Sefer Ha’hinuch dismisses this question, noting that “Le’chol Dabar Hat’hala” – every situation has a beginning point. If we acknowledge that food can be healthful at one time and be detrimental at a later time, then necessarily, we acknowledge that at one point this change occurs. And thus the Torah has determined that when an animal develops one of the conditions that render it a “Terefa,” from that moment its meat is presumed detrimental to our wellbeing and thus becomes forbidden. The Gemara in Masechet Hulin discusses the various kinds of physical conditions which render an animal a “Terefa,” listing 72 different forms of “Terefot.” There is also an additional condition which occurs in birds, and thus renders a bird a “Terefa.” Not coincidentally, the prohibition of “Terefa” is the 73 rd Biblical command, alluding to the 73 types of “Terefot.” This prohibition is applicable in all times and places, and to both men and women. Interestingly, the verse in the Book of Yehezkel (44:31) states, “Kol Nebela U’trefa…Lo Yochelu Ha’kohanim” – that Kohanim may not eat meat that is from a “Nebela” (carcass of an animal that perished without proper slaughtering) or a “Terefa.” Of course, these prohibitions apply to all Jews, and not only to Kohanim. The Sages explained that Yehezkel clarified that this prohibition applies also to Kohanim, because they would eat the meat of bird sacrifices in the Bet Ha’mikdash which were sacrificed through “Melika” – puncturing the back of the bird’s neck with one’s fingernail. Since the Kohanim were allowed to eat bird sacrifices which were killed without proper slaughtering, one might have assumed that they are excluded from the standard restrictions that apply to the consumption of meat. Therefore, Yehezkel found it necessary to clarify that even Kohanim, who are permitted to eat the bird sacrifices which are killed through “Melika,” are forbidden from eating meat of a “Nebela” or “Terefa.” One who eats a Ke’zayit of “Terefa” meat is liable to Malkut. Some Rabbis addressed the question of why this prohibition does not fall under the category of “Lav She’bi’chlalot” – Torah prohibitions which encompass more than one command. After all, as mentioned, the prohibition of “Terefa” includes both meat from an animal with a fatal condition, and sacrificial meat which was taken outside its designated area. A number of Rishonim, including the Rambam and Ramban, discussed this question and distinguished between this command and a “Lav She’bi’chlalot.” Practically speaking, an animal that is slaughtered can be presumed not to have any conditions that would render it a “Terefa,” such that its meat may be eaten without first inspecting the carcass. Nevertheless, since lesions on the lungs are common, the lungs are inspected after the animal is slaughtered to ensure that it did not suffer from this condition. Inspections for the other conditions, however, are not necessary.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:25), “Melei’acha Ve’dim’acha Lo Te’aher,” which literally means, “Do not delay your grain or your wine and oil.” The Sages understood that the Torah here introduces a prohibition against giving the obligatory gifts from one’s agricultural produce out of order. The Torah requires separating certain portions from one’s produce, and in this verse, the Torah forbids separating these portions in a different sequence than that which the Torah stipulated. The procedure for separating the required portions is as follows: First, one who grows produce must give a small portion to a Kohen, and this portion is called Teruma. As far as Torah law is concerned, even a single stalk suffices as Teruma for an entire pile of grain (“Hita Ahat Poteret Et Kol Ha’keri”). However, the Sages enacted that it is proper for one to give one-fiftieth (2 percent) or more of his produce as Teruma. After separating Teruma, one must separate one-tenth from the remaining produce, and give the separated portion to a Levi. This portion is called “Ma’aser Rishon” (“the first tithe”). Then, the person must again separate one-tenth of the remaining produce. In most years, the separated produce must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. This tithe is called “Ma’aser Sheni” (“the second tithe”). (In some years, this tithe is given to the poor instead of being brought to Jerusalem.) One who separates these portions out of the required sequence transgresses the prohibition of “Melei’acha Ve’dim’acha Lo Te’aher.” The Gemara in Masechet Temura presents an additional reading of this verse, explaining that “Mele’acha” refers to Bikkurim – the first ripened fruits, which one must bring to a Kohen in the Bet Ha’mikdash – and “Dim’acha” refers to Teruma. Accordingly, the Torah here requires bringing Bikkurim before giving Teruma. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command in order to ensure that one gives these portions properly, accurately separating the required amounts and giving them to those who are to receive the produce. These gifts, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, are a “Dabar Gadol Be’kiyum Ha’dat” – an especially important matter for the sake of preserving our religion. The Torah therefore issued a special command that one not deviate from the proper procedure when separating these portions. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then adds that if scholars arrive at a more compelling reason for this command, then he would accept it, expressing some reservation about his approach. If one gave the required gifts in the wrong sequence, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, he has violated this command, but he does not receive Malkut. The commentators explain that this violation is not punishable by Malkut because the violation is committed by verbally designating the wrong portion, for example, by declaring a portion as Ma’aser Rishon before declaring a portion Teruma. Since this violation is committed verbally, and not by performing a forbidden act, it is not punishable by Malkut. The Minhat Hinuch adds that since this is the case, a person who has transgressed this command has the possibility of retroactively correcting his mistake and erasing his violation. Declaring a designated portion as Teruma or Ma’aser essentially functions as a Neder (vow), as one verbally assigns a special status to the produce. Therefore, just as with standard vows, a declaration of Teruma or Ma’aser can be undone through the process of Hatarat Nedarim – the annulment of vows by a Bet Din. Thus, the Minhat Hinuch writes, if a person, for example, separated Teruma before Bikkurim, in violation of this Torah command, he can perform Hatarat Nedarim to annul his declaration of Teruma, and he then will be retroactively considered to not have separated the Bikkurim, and will thus retroactively not be in violation of this command. The Hatam Sofer (Rav Moshe Sofer of Pressburg, 1762-1839) raises the question of how one is allowed to retroactively annul his declaration of a portion as Teruma, for example, given that a Beracha is recited when fulfilling the Misva. When one separates Teruma, he recites the Beracha, “Baruch Ata Hashem…Asher Kideshanu…Ve’sivanu Le’hafrish Teruma.” Seemingly, then, if one annuls his declaration of Teruma, he is retroactively considered to not have designated Teruma, and thus his Beracha retroactively becomes a Beracha Le’batala – a Beracha recited in vain – since it turns out that he had not fulfilled the Misva. How, the Hatam Sofer asks, can we permit one to annul his designation of a portion of produce as Teruma, if this has the effect of transforming his Beracha into a Beracha Le’batala? The Hatam Sofer answers this question by asserting that when we recite a Beracha over a Misva, the Beracha refers to all the various different Halachot relevant to this Misva. Therefore, since the possibility of undoing one’s designation of Teruma through Hatarat Nedarim exists, and it is part of the system of Halachot relevant to this Misva, the Beracha does not become a Beracha Le’batala after the designation is retroactively annulled. After all, the person recited the Beracha over all aspects of the Misva – including the possibility of annulling the declaration of Teruma. As such, the Beracha which was recited remains valid even if the individual ultimately reverses his designation through Hatarat Nedarim.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:27), “Ve’nasi Be’amcha Lo Ta’or” – not to curse a “Nasi,” referring to either a Jewish king, or the head of the Sanhedrin. This verse, then, establishes a Biblical prohibition against cursing either of these two leadership figures. In explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that every society needs leadership, people whose decisions and rules are accepted and obeyed. Otherwise, everyone will follow his or her own decisions and guidelines, and chaos would ensue, as people will fight with one another. In both religious matters as well as general matters, there need to be leaders with the authority to determine policy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that even though a leader will, on occasion, likely err and make the wrong decision, it is nevertheless imperative that the people accept the leader’s authority in order to prevent chaos and lawlessness. It is preferable to have a flawed leader who occasionally errs than no leader at all. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, in light of the great importance of stable leadership, the Torah requires showing respect to leaders, because otherwise, if people degrade and insult their leaders, they will not obey their laws, and the social fabric will then begin to unravel. For this reason, the Torah forbade cursing a king – the political leader – or the head of the Sanhedrin – the religious leader. Of course, this law applies to both men and women, and when there is a king or Sanhedrin. One who curses one of these leaders has transgressed this prohibition, and if the person invoked the Name of G-d, then he receives Malkut. Although generally one is not liable to Malkut for transgressing a prohibition without committing an action, an exception is made in the case of one who invokes the Name of G-d. (The Sages inferred this exception from a pair of verses in the Book of Debarim (28:58-59).) The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that there is a separate Torah prohibition that forbids cursing any Jew, and there is also a separate Torah prohibition that forbids cursing a judge. Therefore, one who curses the head of the Sanhedrin – who is also a judge – has transgressed three Torah prohibitions, and is thus liable to three sets of Malkut. If the head of the Sanhedrin is one’s father, and he curses him, then he receives four sets of Malkut, as there is also a distinct prohibition against cursing one’s parent. The Torah formulates this command as forbidding cursing “Nasi Be’amcha” – “a leader in your nation.” The Gemara understands this as referring specifically to a leader who acts in accordance with “Ma’aseh Amcha” – the way Jews are supposed to act, to the exclusion of a sinner. As such, the Torah prohibition against cursing a Nasi does not apply to cursing a wicked leader. Some maintain that a wicked king is not to be shown respect at all, as evidenced by the story told in the Gemara of Rabbi Shimon Ben Shetah, who testified in court against King Yannai, a wicked king. Generally, a defendant is required to stand when the witnesses testify about him, but when a king is on trial, he is not required to stand, due to the special respect owed to him. Rabbi Shimon Ben Shetah, however, ordered King Yannai to stand, seemingly proving that no respect is owed to a wicked king. Others try drawing proof to the contrary from the story of the prophet Eliyahu, who ran ahead of King Ahab in order to show him respect after the revelation of G-d on Mount Carmel. Ahab was clearly a wicked king, and thus the fact that Eliyahu showed him respect would seem to indicate that even wicked kings must be respected. However, some dismissed this proof by claiming that after the spectacle at Mount Carmel, when the nation recognized G-d and proclaimed, “Hashem Hu Ha’Elokim” (“Hashem is G-d”), Ahab was, at least for a short while, considered a Ba’al Teshuba (penitent sinner), and for this reason Eliyahu showed him respect. But once Ahab resumed his sinful conduct, then there was no requirement to treat him with respect.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:27), “Elohim Lo Tekalel” – that it is forbidden to curse “Elohim.” As explained in our discussion of the preceding Misva (#69), the primary meaning of “Elohim” in this verse is “judges,” and the Torah here introduces the prohibition against cursing a judge. Additionally, however, the Sages understood that the standard meaning of “Elohim” – “G-d” – is also implied, such that this verse here introduces the prohibition against cursing the Name of G-d. This violation is considered especially severe, and is punishable by Sekila (stoning). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the faculty of speech is what distinguishes us from the animal kingdom, and is a special gift granted to us by the Almighty for us to use to become great. If a person uses this precious gift to blaspheme G-d, he is, in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, “repulsive as a rodent, and even beneath it.” A person who misuses the power of speech to defame G-d is considered even worse than the lowest creatures, because far more is expected of a human being than from a creature, and he uses his unique capabilities for sinful purposes. Of course, this prohibition applies to both men and women, and is binding in all places and at all times. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that nowadays, when courts do not have the authority to administer punishment, one who is found guilty of cursing G-d, Heaven forbid, is excommunicated, and people are instructed to distance themselves from him. Generally, in order for Bet Din to convict a suspected violator, two witnesses must testify before Bet Din that they saw the suspect commit the act in question. In the case of blaspheming G-d, this requirement poses a problem, because the witnesses need to repeat precisely what they heard the suspect say, which they are not permitted to do. The Gemara says that when witnesses come to testify that somebody blasphemed G-d, they use a Kinui – a “nickname” of G-d, and they repeat the blasphemy substituting G-d’s Name with the Kinui. (Specifically, the Gemara says that the witnesses use the nickname “Yossi,” which in Gematria equals 86, the same of “Elokim.”) However, before the judges finalize their conviction, they send everybody out of the courtroom except the witnesses, and ask the greater of the two witnesses to state verbatim what he heard the person say. He then repeats precisely what he heard, with G-d’s actual Name, and the court then turns to the other witness and asks him to confirm that this is what he heard. Without repeating the blasphemy, the second witness testifies that he heard the exact same words. The judges then stand and tear their clothing, expressing their grief over hearing words of blasphemy. They are not permitted to ever mend their garments. The requirement to rend one’s garments upon hearing blasphemy applies when one hears a fellow Jew blaspheme G-d; one who hears a gentile curse G-d is not required to tear his clothing. The Gemara, in discussing this Halacha, notes the story told of the Assyrian general Rabshakeh, who blasphemed G-d as the Assyrian army besieged Jerusalem. King Hizkiyahu’s officers tore their garments upon hearing these words of blasphemy (Melachim II 18:37). The Gemara explains that Rabshakeh was actually a Jew who had abandoned the faith and joined the Assyrians, and for this reason those who heard his blasphemy were required to tear their garments. The Megadef (blasphemer) is unique among other sinners in that before his execution, Bet Din places their hands upon his head and announces that he bears full accountability for his death. This is not done in any other case of a capital offense. The Sages inferred this requirement from the story told in the Book of Vayikra (24:14) of a blasphemer upon whose head the people who heard his blasphemy placed their hands before his execution. Another unique feature of this violation is that, according to some Rishonim, the blasphemer is liable to capital punishment even if he was not warned about the punishment before he committed the act. Normally, a violator is punished only if the witnesses had explicitly warned him before he committed the act of the punishment for that offense. However, in the aforementioned story of the Megadef in the wilderness, the Torah tells that he was detained after uttering his curse because it was not known which punishment he should receive. Only afterward did G-d inform Moshe that this violation is punishable by Sekila. Clearly, then, the Megadef had not received Hatra’a (warning) in advance. Some Rishonim thus concluded that blasphemy, due to its unique severity, marks an exception to the general rule requiring advanced warning, and a Megadef is put to death even if he was not warned ahead of time that this violation is punishable by Sekila. Others, however, refute this proof, asserting that the case of the Megadef in the wilderness constituted a Hora’at Sha’a – a one-time ordinance – that cannot serve as a precedent for the standard rules of a Megadef.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:27), “Elohim Lo Tekalel” – “You shall not curse ‘Elohim’.” The Rabbis understood the word “Elohim” in this verse (a word which normally refers to G-d) to mean “judges,” and this verse thus establishes a prohibition against cursing a judge. Although a separate prohibition forbids cursing any Jew, this verse adds a special prohibition forbidding cursing a judge. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah wanted to ensure that judges did not come under intimidation. If people would be permitted to curse judges, then judges would be frightened of people, and when such a person comes before a court, the judge might be partial towards him. Additionally, cursing judges could lead to actual violence against judges, which would have the effect of discouraging people from serving as judges. Qualified judges are crucial for the proper functioning of society, and so the Torah established a separate prohibition against cursing judges. Although the primary meaning of the word “Elohim” in this verse, as mentioned, is “judges,” it alludes to G-d, as well, such that this verse warns against blaspheming the Almighty. Elsewhere, the Torah establishes that blaspheming G-d is a capital offense punishable by death, but there is a rule that one cannot be punished if the Torah never expressly forbade the act in question. The Sages thus understood that the verse “Elohim Lo Tekalel” not only forbids cursing judges, but also warns against blaspheming G-d. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah goes out of its way to issue commands, rather than simply stating that those who commit certain actions are to be punished, because some people might otherwise decide to commit these acts and endure the punishment. If the Torah had only mentioned the punishments, without explicitly commanding us not to commit these actions, people might think that it is legitimate to commit these actions and accept the punishment. The Torah therefore not only stated the punishments, but also clearly commanded us to refrain from these actions. Needless to say, this prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who curses a judge using one of the Names of G-d, or even one of the words used to describe G-d (such as “Hanun,” or “Kana”), receives Malkut. Although generally one is not liable to Malkut when transgressing a prohibition without performing an action, cursing with the Name of G-d marks an exception to this rule, and one who violates this prohibition is indeed liable to Malkut. The Sages derived this exception from a pair of adjacent verses in the Book of Debarim (28:58-59): “If you do not ensure to observe all the words of this Torah…to fear this respected, awesome Name…then G-d will strike you remarkably…” The Torah here juxtaposes respecting the Name of G-d with lashes (“Ve’hifla Hashem Et Makotecha”), thus establishing that unlike other sins committed verbally, without an action, blaspheming with the Name of G-d is punishable by Malkut. If one curses a judge without mentioning a Name of G-d, he does not receive Malkut, but he has nevertheless transgressed this Torah violation. The Minhat Hinuch writes, however, that if one cursed a judge and then immediately, “Toch Kedeh Dibbur” (within a few seconds), retracts his comments, then he is not liable to Malkut. If the judge forgives the one who cursed him, the person has nevertheless transgressed this prohibition, and if he invoked a Name of G-d, he receives Malkut. One violates this prohibition regardless of whether he uttered the curse in Hebrew or in any other language.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:24) that when someone lends money to his fellow, “Lo Tesimun Alav Neshech” – “You shall not place on interest upon him.” The Gemara in Masechet Baba Mesia explains this verse as introducing a prohibition against not only charging interest on a loan, but against facilitating interest. This means that besides the lender, other people involved – the guarantor, the scribe who writes the contract, and the witnesses who sign the contract – violate the Biblical prohibition of “Lo Tesimun Alav Neshech.” The lender himself is also in violation of six other Biblical commands, and even the borrower transgresses two Biblical commands. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah was especially strict when it comes to lending with interest – going so far as to prohibit even facilitating the loan – because of the grave consequences of interest. A person who borrows money on interest, many times, will find himself gradually falling into financial ruin. The Torah refers to interest with the word “Neshech,” which is derived from the verb “bite” (“N.Sh.Ch.”), because interest slowly “bites” at a person’s finances until he is left with nothing. In order to prevent people from lending on interest, the Torah forbade not only the lending itself, but also facilitating such a loan, so that one who seeks to lend on interest will have a difficult time finding a scribe, a guarantor and witnesses. Moreover, the Torah is especially strict about this law because people are naturally inclined to seek quick, easy ways to earn money, and lending money on interest to people in need of cash offers such an opportunity. The prospect of effortlessly earning a considerable profit is very alluring, and so the Torah forbade even facilitating a loan on interest to discourage those who might be tempted to extend such a loan. It should also be noted that in a certain sense, the facilitators of the loan have committed an even more egregious sin, in that they do not stand to benefit from their wrongful act. As opposed to the lender, who stands to receive a large amount of money, the scribe might receive some small fee, and the witnesses and guarantors receive nothing. They do not even face any temptation to violate this command, and so, at least from one perspective, their sin is even greater than the lender’s. This prohibition applies in all places and at all times, and is binding upon both men and women. One who facilitates a loan on interest has transgressed this command, but does not receive Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition is not punishable by Malkut because the lender himself does not receive Malkut for transgressing this command. Lending on interest falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which can be rectified by paying the person who was wronged, and such violations are not punishable by Malkut. A lender who charged interest can return the interest, and so he is not liable to Malkut for his violation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah could not make abetting such a loan a more grievous sin than actually lending on interest, and so since the lender himself is not liable to Malkut, those who facilitate the loan are not liable, either. In conclusion, it is worth noting that the Torah’s command forbidding facilitating a loan on interest shows us that we must try to not only avoid wrongdoing, but avoid playing any role in wrongful behavior. We are responsible not only for ourselves, to ensure to conduct ourselves properly, but also for others, and are to refrain from doing anything that might facilitate that which the Torah forbids.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:24) commands that when a person lends money to somebody, “Lo Tiheyeh Lo Ke’nosheh” – he may not apply pressure on the borrower to repay. Of course, a lender is fully entitled to claim the money when repayment is due. However, if the lender knows that the borrower does not have the ability to repay the loan, then he is not permitted to pressure him. This prohibition includes intentionally walking by one’s debtor without saying anything, because even seeing the lender will cause the borrower to feel pressured. A somewhat surprising extension of this prohibition involves lending money on interest. A separate prohibition forbids lending money to a fellow Jew on interest, but one who does so is also in violation of the prohibition of “Lo Tiheyeh Lo Ke’nosheh,” because the interest automatically applies pressure upon the borrower. Even if the lender does not say anything to the borrower, the very fact that he demands interest constitutes a form of pressure, as the borrower knows that any delay in repayment will cost him additional interest. Therefore, lending a fellow Jew on interest violates two separate Biblical prohibitions. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva, like many others, is intended to engender within us the qualities of sensitivity, kindness and compassion for others. The essence of this Misva relates to not the benefit of the borrower as much as the benefit of the lender, who will develop fine qualities through which he will earn the great rewards which G-d wishes to bestow upon all of us. This prohibition applies at all times, in all places, and to both and women. Violators of this command do not receive Malkut, because it falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – prohibitions that are not violated through the performance of a concrete action, which are not punishable by Malkut. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question of how one can ever claim a loan, given the possibility that the borrower does not at that time have the ability to pay. After all, the famous rule of “Safek De’Orayta Le’Humra” establishes that in situations of uncertainty regarding a Torah law (as opposed to a law enacted by the Sages), we must act stringently in order to avoid the risk of transgressing. Seemingly, then, since the lender does not have definitive knowledge about the borrower’s financial condition, and thus any time he claims the loan he runs the risk of violating a Torah prohibition, a lender should never be allowed to ask for the loan’s repayment. Clearly, such a conclusion is untenable. The Minhat Hinuch answers this question by clarifying that the Torah law applies only when the lender knows with certainty that the borrower is unable to repay the loan. This law does not take effect unless the lender has somehow learned that the borrower is not in a position to repay, and thus in all other instances, the lender may claim the loan. Proof to this theory may be drawn from the Sefer Ha’hinuch, which defines this prohibition as forbidding claiming a loan from a borrower who cannot repay “Le’sa’a’ro” – “to cause him distress.” The very definition of this command is that one may not claim a loan for the purpose of making the borrower upset. Necessarily, then, this command applies only in the case of a lender who knows with certainty that the borrower does not have the ability to repay, such that the only purpose served by asking for the money is to cause the borrower anguish. In all other situations, however, it is perfectly acceptable for the lender to ask for his money back, because his intent is to receive the money owed to him, and not to make the borrower upset. As part of the Torah’s concern for the welfare of underprivileged debtors, certain limits are placed on the lender’s right to collect the loan. Specifically, if all the borrower has is money for thirty days’ worth of food, the lender may not collect. Likewise, he may not collect his debt from the borrower’s clothing if he has only one years’ worth of clothing. The debt may also not be collected from the borrower’s tools or equipment which he needs for his livelihood. If the borrower had purchased clothing for his wife and children, these garments, too, may not be taken as payment for the loan. Another restriction is that the lender cannot demand that the borrower take a loan on interest from a gentile in order to be able to repay. All these restrictions serve to cultivate within us a sense of compassion and sensitivity for those facing difficult financial struggles.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:24) introduces the prohibition against charging interest on a loan by stating, “Im Kesef Talveh Et Ami” – “If you lend money to [somebody from] My nation…” The implication of the word “Im” is that lending money to a person in need is optional. However, the Sages received an oral tradition that in three instances of the word “Im” in the Torah, the reference is to an obligation, and not an optional act. Thus, the Torah here establishes a Biblical command to lend money to a person in need of a loan. A number of Rabbis suggested reading this phrase to mean, “Im Kesef” – if one has money, then “Talveh Et Ami” – he should generously lend to the needy. Additionally, a number of Rishonim (Medieval Talmudic scholars) explained that the word “Im” is used in this context to indicate that there are occasions when one is not required to lend to a person who requests a loan. Namely, if one knows that the person requesting the loan will be unable to repay it, he is not required to lend. In fact, the Poskim rule that one should specifically not grant a loan in this case. The Torah forbids a lender from claiming the loan if he knows that the borrower is unable to pay. Thus, by lending money to a person who is likely to be unable to repay, one puts himself at risk of later transgressing the Biblical prohibition against claiming a loan from a borrower who cannot pay. Of course, if one is able to, he should give the pauper a charitable gift in such a case instead of a loan. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing the Misva to lend, makes the surprising statement that lending money to a person in need constitutes a greater Misva than giving charity. He explains that a person who collects charity has already grown accustomed to soliciting help, and thus he no longer experiences a great deal of shame and humiliation. By contrast, one who asks for a loan has not yet reached the point where he must ask for charity, and he agonizes over the prospect of having to do so. By lending money to such a person, one offers him the possibility of financial recovery – as he can invest the money to earn more – and thereby saves him from the embarrassment of having to ask for charity. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that G-d commanded us to assist the poor, even though He is, of course, capable of providing all people with their needs, for our benefit, so that we cultivate within ourselves a kind, compassionate and generous character. Hashem appointed us as His messengers to assist the poor so we accustom ourselves to feel compassion and dispense kindness, and thereby earn great merit. As the Sages famously teach, a pauper does more for the benefactor than the benefactor does for the pauper, as a donor earns merit through his act of kindness. From the pauper’s perspective, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, G-d arranges that he will be dependent on the grace and kindness of others for his benefit, so that he will earn atonement through the humiliation this causes, and will also learn to exercise moderation in his consumption. The Sefer Ha’hinuch defines this Misva as an obligation “to lend money to the poor” – implying that this Misva does not apply to lending money to the rich. Wealthy businessmen often require loans to buy merchandise or to expand in their enterprise, and the question arises whether lending money to a person in this case constitutes a Misva. The Shulhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat 97:1) writes explicitly that it is a Misva to lend even to a wealthy individual in need of a loan. And thus, regardless of whether the specific command of “Im Kesef Talveh Et Ami” includes lending to the rich, certainly, the general Misva to act kindly to people requires even granting loans to wealthy people when the need arises.
Misva #65: Causing Pain to a Widow or Orphan Length: 9:38 The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:21), “Kol Almana Ve’yatom Lo Te’anun” – that it is forbidden to “afflict” a widow or orphan. The reason for this command, of course, as the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that widows and orphans are particularly vulnerable, as they do not have a husband or father to stand up for them and defend them. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah here commands us to treat widows and orphans with care and respect just as we would if they had a husband or father behind them to protect their rights and their wellbeing. Moreover, the Torah commands us to extend even further, and give them the benefit of the doubt to a greater extent than we must give to others. Needless to say, this prohibition applies in all place, at all times, and to both males and females. One who mistreats or takes advantage of a widow or orphan has transgressed this command. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the violator does not receive Malkut, because only G-d can know with certainty that the violator acted as he did with malicious intent, and so Bet Din cannot definitively determine that the violator in fact transgressed this prohibition. Although Bet Din cannot punish those who transgress this command, the Torah itself warns that G-d will bring severe punishment upon those who mistreat widows and orphans. Immediately after issuing this command, G-d warns that if a person causes a widow or orphan pain, and the widow or orphan cries out to G-d, “I shall assuredly hear his cry. I will become incensed, and I will kill you by the sword, such that your wives will be widows and your children, orphans.” G-d will punish the violator “measure for measure” by killing him, turning his wife into a widow and his children into orphans. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that if the violator is a woman who mistreated orphans, then G-d will kill her, and her husband will marry another woman who will treat the first wife’s children unkindly. As mentioned, the Torah warns that G-d will “assuredly hear” the cries of a widow or orphan who is mistreated. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes the tradition derived from this verse that G-d more readily accepts the prayers of widows and orphans than the prayers of other people. Of course, all prayers are effective, but G-d is especially close to widows and orphans, because they cry out to Him for help in situations when they would otherwise turn to their husband and father. G-d immediately accepts their prayers and responds accordingly. From the Torah’s warning to those who transgress this prohibition, we may deduce that conversely, those who specifically assist widows and orphans will be duly rewarded. If G-d says He will punish those who cause pain to widows and orphans, then naturally, those who provide widows and orphans with support and assistance will be blessed with long life, prosperity and joy. As part of the Torah’s effort to assist and protect widows and orphans, Bet Din is required to grant them special treatment, in five different respects: 1) Normally, if a person produces a Shetar (contract) stating that somebody owes him money, then once the Shetar’s authenticity is verified, Bet Din requires the defendant to pay the stated sum. If, however, the defendant is a widow or orphan, Bet Din will first have the plaintiff swear that his claim is correct before ruling in his favor. 2) When widows or orphans are involved in a court case, Bet Din will actually provide the widow and orphan with the claims that they could make in arguing their case. Ordinarily, of course, Bet Din hears the claims and then reaches a decision, and does not assist either litigant. In a case involving a widow or orphan, however, since the widow or orphan does not have a husband or father to help him or her, Bet Din intervenes to inform the widow or orphans of the claims that they are able to make in court. 3) Bet Din appoints a wealthy man as administrator of the orphans’ inheritance. This man must be a person with real estate holdings which are pledged against the orphans’ money as security. 4) Bet Din will invest the orphans’ money in an enterprise, making a special arrangement ensuring that the principal is guaranteed. In other words, the investment can only yield profits, but not lose. Normally, such an investment is prohibited by force of Rabbinic enactment, as it resembles Ribit (interest). In the case of orphans, however, Bet Din will arrange for this kind of investment on their behalf. 5) An orphan who agrees to buy or sell is allowed to back out of the deal if the market price decreases (in the case of buying) or increases (in the case of selling). Normally, once a person commits to a transaction, he is subject to a curse if he rescinds his agreement so he could go elsewhere to buy for less or sell for more. Orphans, however, due to their unique condition of vulnerability, are allowed to back out of a deal. Although we are obligated to treat widows and orphans with special sensitivity and respect, it is permissible, when necessary, to chastise them. A teacher, for example, who teaches an orphan Torah, or a profession, is allowed to discipline the orphan as needed. But even for a teacher, there is a Misva to be softer and more delicate in disciplining the orphan.
The prohibition of “Ona’at Mammon” forbids merchants from selling products for a significantly higher price than the standard market price. In Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:20), the Torah introduces a separate obligation forbidding overcharging a convert (“Ve’lo Tilhasenu”). Although this is in any event forbidden, as the Torah prohibits overcharging any Jew, a separate prohibition was issued with regard to a convert, due to a convert’s unique condition of vulnerability. As a foreigner with no family support, a convert can easily be taken advantage of, and merchants might be tempted to capitalize on his vulnerability and overcharge. The Torah therefore issued a separate command forbidding overcharging a convert, in addition to the standard prohibition of “Ona’a.” As discussed in regard to the previous Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explained the Torah’s special prohibitions regarding treatment of a convert as intended to accustom us to restrain our natural instincts. It might be very tempting to take advantage of a convert, and the Torah’s prohibition helps us develop our power of self-restraint by requiring us to refrain from taking unfair advantage of the convert. This Misva applies at all times, in all locations, and to both males and females. A merchant who overcharges a convert has transgressed this prohibition, but he does not receive Malkut because he returns the money he unfairly charged, and any prohibition which can be rectified is not punishable by Malkut. The prohibition of “Ona’a” applies only to “Metaltelin” – moveable objects, as opposed to real estate. One who overcharges for a piece of property is not in violation of this command. The standard prohibition of “Ona’a” applies only to overcharging a fellow Jew committed to religious observance. The special command forbidding overcharging a convert, however, applies even to converts who act sinfully, due to the unique sensitivity and consideration that is required when dealing with converts. The laws of overcharging depend on the amount which the merchant overcharged the customer. If the price was less than a “Shetut” (one-sixth) above the standard market value, then the sale is valid, and the customer cannot bring any claims against the seller. If the price was precisely a “Shetut” above market value, then the customer can claim the excess money he paid from the merchant in Bet Din, but he cannot demand the revocation of the sale. If the price charged exceeded the market value by more than a “Shetut,” then the customer is able to demand that the sale be annulled. If the customer explicitly agrees to pay a significantly higher sum than market value, then the sale is valid, even though the price exceeded the market value by more than a “Shetut,” since the customer expressly agreed to these terms. He cannot then demand the sale’s revocation. The laws of “Ona’a” apply only to commercially sold merchandise. If an individual is not a merchant, but sells personal possessions, he may charge any price he wishes, and he does not violate the prohibition of “Ona’a.” When an ordinary person sells his possessions, it is expected that he does so to earn money and raises the prices well above market prices, and so the prohibition of “Ona’a” does not apply.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:20), “Ve’ger Lo Toneh” – that it is forbidden to hurt a convert’s feelings by speaking to him offensively. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that of course, it is forbidden to speak hurtfully to any Jew, but the Torah established a separate prohibition forbidding hurtful speech to a convert because converts will likely suffer greater emotional harm from hearing hurtful words than other Jews would. One reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is because converts do not have family members to defend them and stand up for them when they are harassed or humiliated. Furthermore, a convert who suffers shame and embarrassment might be led to leave Judaism and return to his previous religion. Therefore, the Torah presented a special prohibition forbidding speaking hurtful words to a convert. As an example of the kind of hurtful words that the Torah forbids, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one may not say to a convert something to the effect of, “Yesterday you worshipped idols, and today you think you can bask under the wings of the Shechina?!” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this prohibition helps to reinforce our realization that not everything which we are capable of doing is proper. It is very easy to embarrass and insult a convert, who, as mentioned, does not have the support of family. By refraining from doing so, we help hone our character, as we accustom ourselves to restraining ourselves from things which we are instinctively led to do. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that the Torah presents this prohibition twenty-four times, to emphasize just how grievous a sin it is to speak hurtfully to a convert. (The Minhat Hinuch points out that the Torah actually issues this command thirty-six times, not just twenty-four times.) Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Torah commands in one context, “Va’ahabtem Et Ha’ger” (“You shall love the convert” – Debarim 10:19). The only other instance of such a command – “You shall love” – is the famous command, “Ve’ahabta Et Hashem Elokecha” – “You shall love Hashem your G-d” (Debarim 6:5). The Torah compares the love we must have for a convert to the love we must have towards G-d Himself, reinforcing the extent to which we must ensure to treat a convert with graciousness and kindness. Needless to say, this command applies at all times and in all locations, and to both males and females. One who speaks hurtful words to a convert transgresses this prohibition, but does not receive Malkut, as this prohibition is violated verbally, and not through an action. The question arises as to the difference between this prohibition and the prohibition against speaking hurtfully to a regular Jew. Are these two prohibitions identical, or are there practical differences (“Nafka Minot”) between them? In three respects, we find that the prohibition against speaking hurtfully to a convert has broader application than the prohibition against speaking hurtfully to other Jews. First, the Torah formulates the command against speaking hurtfully to fellow Jews as, “Ve’lo Tonu Ish Et Amito” – “You shall not torment each his fellow” (Vayikra 25:17), from which the Sages inferred that it is limited to Jews who observe the Misvot. The word “Amito” refers to our fellow Jews who act as we do, with a commitment to the Torah’s laws, and so this command does not refer to sinners. When it comes to converts, however, no such stipulation is made, and thus it is forbidden to speak hurtfully to any convert, regardless of whether he properly observes the Misvot. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writers later (Misva 338) that one may respond in kind to somebody who began harassing him or insulting him. Although in general it is forbidden to insult a fellow Jew, if a fellow Jew initiated a verbal assault, one may respond strongly to defend himself. When it comes to a convert, however, this provision does not apply. Even if a convert initiates verbal hostilities, one may not respond in an offensive manner. Finally, if one unintentionally said something hurtful to a fellow Jew, not realizing that it would make him feel bad, he has not violated the prohibition against speaking hurtfully to people. In the case of a convert, however, one who unwittingly insults him is guilty of an unintentional Torah violation. Since converts are especially vulnerable and fragile, extra care must be taken to avoid even unintentionally hurting their feelings. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question of whether this prohibition applies also to children born from a union of two converts. If two converts get married and have children, these children are considered Gerim (converts) with respect to the Halacha permitting a convert to marry a Mamzer (product of an adulterous or incestuous relationship). Just as a convert is permitted to marry a Mamzer, the child of converts is likewise allowed to marry a Mamzer. Perhaps, the Minhat Hinuch writes, we should conclude that the children of Gerim are considered Gerim also with respect to the prohibition against speaking hurtfully to a convert. On the other hand, however, one might argue that since the children of converts have a family, and are thus not alone and vulnerable, they differ from actual converts, and thus the prohibition should not apply to them. The Minhat Hinuch concludes that it is likely that the children would, in fact, be included in this prohibition.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:17), “Mechashefa Lo Tehayeh” – “You shall not allow a witch to live.” This establishes a prohibition forbidding Bet Din from failing to put to death one who is found guilty of practicing witchcraft. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, who lists this prohibition as the 62 nd Biblical command, clarifies that the Torah refers here to both male and female sorcerers. It mentions specifically a “Mechashefa” (female witch) only because women more commonly involved themselves in such practices than men in ancient times. The reason why the Torah regards witchcraft as such a grievous sin, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because a sorcerer seeks to subvert or avoid the natural order which Hashem put into place. G-d created the world to follow the laws of nature, and it was His will that the world should run in this fashion, and that we humans conduct ourselves according to the laws of nature. Witchcraft is an attempt to create realities or produce results through supernatural means, utilizing a system that is beyond the natural order. The sorcerer seeks to transcend the laws of nature, in direct violation of the divine will, and he or she is therefore deemed worthy of capital punishment. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s comments bring to mind a well-known passage in the Ramban’s commentary to the Torah regarding Noah’s ark. The Ramban raised the question of why G-d commanded Noah to construct such a large ark, if in any event a miracle was needed for the ark to contain all the animals. Quite obviously, there was no possibility of building a structure large enough to contain all species in the animal kingdom, and it took a miracle for this occur. Why, then, did G-d command Noah to build a large ark? The Ramban answers that G-d wants the world to run according to the natural order, and so even when a miracle is necessitated, He minimizes the miracle as much as possible. Therefore, although a miracle was needed for the ark to contain all the animals, nevertheless, G-d instructed Noah to create a large ark. The command not to allow a sorcerer to live, as mentioned, is directed to Bet Din, specifically, to a 23-member Bet Din consisting of Semuchim – judges ordained through the line extending back to Moshe – as only such courts are authorized to administer capital punishment. A Bet Din that shirks its responsibility and fails to punish a convicted sorcerer has transgressed a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibition). The judges are not liable to Malkut because this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – prohibitions violated through inaction, and not by committing a forbidden act – for which one does not receive Malkut. The Rambam observes in Hilchot Sanhedrin (14:3) that the prohibition of witchcraft is unique in this regard. Normally, when an offender is deserving of capital punishment but Bet Din fails to administer the punishment, Bet Din has transgressed a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) – the command to punish convicted offenders. In the case of witchcraft, however, as we have seen, a Bet Din that fails to put the convicted sorcerer to death has transgressed a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh. Remarkably, if a person was found to have murdered, or desecrated Shabbat, and Bet Din failed to administer capital punishment, the judges have transgressed only an affirmative command, whereas in the case of a sorcerer, they have transgressed a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, which is a more severe violation. Later writers noted that the Rambam seems, at first glance, to contradict this statement later in Hilchot Sanhedrin (20:4), where he writes that Bet Din may not refrain from killing a convicted murderer. The judges might figure that since executing the killer in any event will not help the victim or his family, it is preferable to allow the murderer to live rather than have two people killed. The Rambam writes that the court may not make such a decision, and he quotes as a source the verse in the Book of Debarim (19:13), “Ve’lo Tahos Enecha, U’bi’arta Dam Ha’naki” – “You shall not have pity, and you shall eliminate the innocent blood.” Here the Rambam appears to establish another instance where refraining from executing a convicted offender constitutes a violation of a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh – when Bet Din fails to put a convicted killer to death. Why, then, does the Rambam earlier say that this is unique to the case of a sorcerer? The Brisker Rav (Rav Yishak Zev Soloveitchik, Brisk-Jerusalem, 1886-1959) answered that these two passages refer to two distinct prohibitions. In the latter passage, where the Rambam speaks of a murderer, he writes that the prohibition of “Ve’lo Tahos Enecha” forbids Bet Din at the time they try the case to have compassion for the killer and consider allowing him to live even if he is convicted. Indeed, in this same passage, the Rambam discusses the prohibition that forbids granting special favor to a poor man when he is standing trial, in consideration of his plight. In this context, the Rambam discusses not the court’s conduct after the decision is reached, but rather the process of reaching a decision, and he writes that the Torah forbids having compassion for a murderer during this process. In the earlier passage, however, the Rambam speaks of situations where an offender was found guilty, and then Bet Din decides not to administer the appropriate punishment. The court is then in violation of a Misvat Aseh – except in the unique case of a sorcerer, when the Bet Din who fails the execute the convicted offender violates a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh.
The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 61 st Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to adjudicate cases involving a “Mefateh” – a man who verbally lures a young girl, from the age of 3 to 12.5, to engage in intimacy. The Torah establishes the law relevant to such a case in Parashat Mishpatim (22:15), stating that the man must marry the girl, if she and her father wish, or else to pay her the sum of 50 coins. This sum is paid if any of the three parties involved – the man, the girl or her father – does not consent to the marriage. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that in addition to this payment, the man must also pay the girl and her father “Pegam” – compensation for the girl’s diminished desirability as a mate – and “Boshet” – compensation for the embarrassment she suffered. Certainly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the honor of a Jewish girl is worth far more than 50 coins; this payment is made in addition to the “Pegam” and “Boshet” which the victim suffered as a result of the crime committed by the “Mefateh.” In cases where the marriage is Halachically forbidden, then Bet Din will, of course, force the “Mefateh” to make the payment instead of marrying the girl. For example, if this crime was committed by a Kohen Gadol, who may not marry a woman unless she is a Betula (had never previously engaged in intimacy), he cannot marry the girl, and so he must make this payment. The commentators offer different theories to explain why the Torah requires the “Mefateh” to marry the girl. The Hizkuni (Rav Hizkiya Ben Manoah, 1250-1310) writes that unlike in the case of “Oness,” where a man forcibly violates a girl, a “Mefuta” (seduced girl) is violated through lures and deception. She is not only violated, but also made to appear foolish, gullible and weak. When she later marries, the husband will learn of what happened, and might likely look down on her for having fallen prey to a seduction attempt. This is not the case when a girl was forcibly violated, because she was simply overpowered by physical force. Therefore, in the case of a “Mefuta,” the Torah requires the man to marry the girl so she would not have to live with a man who would be unimpressed by her having been previously lured to commit an act she did not really want to commit. The Abarbanel (Spain-Portugal, 1437-1508) explains differently, suggesting that a common tactic of seducers would be to target a girl from a lower socioeconomic group, and make an insincere promise to marry her after she commits the act. He would then abandon her. The Torah therefore demands that a “Mefateh” marry the girl in fulfillment of the promise he made. Although he might consider it beneath his dignity to marry a girl from a lower socioeconomic background, nevertheless, since he had made this promise, the Torah demands that he follow through rather than simply abandon the girl.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:13) addresses the case of a borrower – one who receives an item from its owner to use as a favor, without having to pay for it. Unlike other Shomrim (“watchmen”) who are entrusted with another person’s object, a Sho’el (borrower) bears liability even in a situation of Oness – where the item was lost or damaged due to circumstances beyond his control. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 60 th Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to preside over disputes that arise between an object’s owner and a borrower, and to rule in accordance with the principles of Torah law. Although a Sho’el generally bears liability for anything that happens to the object, an important exception is “Meta Mahamat Melacha” – literally, “it dies as a result of work.” This means that if the borrowed item was damaged as a result of normal activity, then the Sho’el does not bear liability. The classic case of “Meta Mahamat Melacha” is an animal which is borrowed to perform labor, and over the course of the animal’s normal activity, it dies. Since the borrower quite obviously borrowed the animal to use it, and he used it in a normal manner which the owner clearly expected, the borrower does not bear liability. Likewise, if someone borrowed a piece of equipment, and he used it normally, he does not bear liability if the object broke. The rule of “Meta Mahamat Melacha” applies only if the borrower did not deviate from the lender’s specifications. For example, if the lender instructed the borrower not to have the animal ride in a mountainous terrain, and the borrower then defied the lender’s instructions, the borrower bears liability if the animal dies, even if it died over the course of its normal activity. This applies even in the reverse case, if the owner instructed the borrower not to ride the animal in flat terrain, and the borrowed disobeyed. Even though riding on flat terrain is less arduous for the animal, nevertheless, since the borrower deviated from the owner’s instructions, the borrower is liable if the animal died while riding on the flat terrain. When one lends money, then the borrower is expected to repay the loan within thirty days, unless a different arrangement was specified. In the case of lending objects, however, the time-frame depends on the nature of the object. For example, if somebody borrows a suit or outfit for Sheba Berachot, then, quite obviously, it is expected that the borrower needs it for a week, and so the lender cannot demand it back before the end of that week. The Torah makes an interesting exception to the rule of the Sho’el, absolving him of liability in a case of “Be’alav Imo” – if the owner works for the borrower at the time he borrowed the object and the object was lost or damaged. If the object’s owner is “borrowed” by the borrower along with the object, then the borrower is not responsible if something happens to the object. A fascinating application of this rule appears in the Shulhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat, 346:13), who discusses the situation of a teacher who teaches a group of students. If the arrangement is such that the students must learn whichever Masechet the teacher chooses, then they are considered “borrowed” by the teacher, in that they are committed to study with him whatever he chooses. (The underlying assumption is that a teacher benefits from having students to teach, as it leads him to carefully review and clarify the material.) Therefore, if one of the students lends something to the teacher during the period when this arrangement is binding, the teacher is not held responsible if something happens to the object. Conversely, if the teacher is committed to teach whatever Masechet the students decide, they the teacher is considered “borrowed” by the students. And thus if he lends something to a student, the student would not be held responsible if something happens to the object.
The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 59 th Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to preside over cases involving a “Shomer Sachar” (“paid watchman”) and a “Socher” (“renter”), and to rule according to the Torah’s guidelines. Both a person who is paid to watch something, and one who pays for the right to use an item, receive benefit from the arrangement, and therefore bear a higher level of liability than somebody who watches an object voluntarily, without pay (a “Shomer Hinam”). As the Torah establishes in Parashat Mishpatim (22:9), if the object is lost or stolen, the Shomer Sachar or Socher must pay the owner the value of the item. However, if the item was lost due to an “Oness” – circumstances beyond the watchman or renter’s control, such as in the case of armed robbery, or of an animal that died of natural causes, the watchman or renter is absolved of liability. He must, however, take an oath that he was not negligent in caring for the item. The Sefer Ha’hinuch mentions numerous different details that apply to this law. We present here a small sampling of these Halachot. If a craftsman is given a utensil to repair, and will be receiving payment for his work, then he is considered a “Shomer Sachar” who is paid for watching the item. Therefore, if he ruins the utensil, he is responsible to compensate the owner. If a money changer receives payment for evaluating coins, and mistakenly identifies a coin as legitimate currency, when in truth it was counterfeit, causing a merchant to accept the coin as payment and thereby lose money, the money changer must compensate the merchant. If Reuben entrusted an object to Shimon, and Shimon then then gave it Levi to watch, then if something happens to the item, Shimon – the first guardian – bears responsibility and must compensate Reuben. Even if Levi watches on a higher standard than Shimon, nevertheless, Reuben never authorized Levi to watch the item, and placed his trust only in Shimon. Hence, Shimon was not entitled to have Levi watch the item, and so he – Shimon – bears responsibility. An exception to this rule is that a watchman may have his family members guard the item. When somebody entrusts his object to a watchman, he understands that the watchman will not home all the time, and so he implicitly accepts the watchman’s family members as watchmen. Likewise, a person who rents somebody’s object may not sublease it to somebody else. However, the Rambam draws a distinction in this regard between moveable property and homes. When it comes to moveable objects, the owner can claim that he trusted only the first renter, whereas he was not prepared to trust the third party, that he would not take the item for himself. A home, by contrast, cannot be “taken,” and so there is no reason to trust one person any more or less than another person. Thus, according to the Rambam, one who rents a home may sublet it without the owner’s knowledge. However, the renter is allowed to sublet the property only to the same amount of people. He may not sublet the property to a larger family, because a larger family causes more wear-and-tear on the home, and the owner can claim that he was prepared to lease the home only to a certain number of residents, and not to a higher number of people.
The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 58 th Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to try cases involving a “To’en Ve’nit’an” – a plaintiff and a defendant, when a person has a financial claim against his fellow. The source of this command is a verse in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:8) which speaks of a certain situation of a monetary claim, and instructs, “Ad Ha’elohim Yabo Debar Shenehem” – the matter should be brought before a Bet Din. According to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, it is here where the Torah commands Bet Din to hear cases whenever a person has a financial claim against his fellow. Whether it’s a situation of theft, damage, an unpaid loan, or an object entrusted to one’s fellow which was not returned, people must have legal recourse when they feel they are rightfully owed money. The Torah therefore commands Bet Din to try these cases and issue a proper ruling according to the Torah’s principles of civil law. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this Misva is included among the Noachide Laws, the commands which apply to all mankind, and not only to the Jewish Nation. He explains that society cannot function properly without a fair and effective justice system, and therefore the Torah demands that all nations must have courts that hear people’s claims against one another and adjudicate fairly. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites in this context the Mishna’s teaching in Pirkeh Abot (1:18) that the world “stands upon three pillars,” one of which is the “pillar” of “Din” – justice. Without justice, society would be overrun by chaos, as people would not feel accountable for their actions. And so all societies bear an obligation to establish courts where people who feel they have been wronged can bring their claims. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here presents a very long list of principles that apply in the Torah’s system of civil law. We will briefly mention some of these rules: “Modeh Be’miksat Ha’ta’ana”: If a person claims that his fellow owes a certain sum, and the defendant agrees that he owes part of the sum, then the defendant must take a Shebu’a (oath) that he does not owe more than he says. This oath is required if the sum he admits owing is at least a “Peruta” (the smallest unit of money), and the amount he denies is at least two “Ma’a.” The exception is when the plaintiff claims the defendant owes two utensils, and the defendant admits to owing just one. In such a case, even if the utensils are worth less than a “Peruta” – such as if the plaintiff claims two small, simple needles – the defendant must nevertheless take an oath. “Hoda’a Mi’min Ha’ta’ana”: The defendant must take an oath only if he confesses to part of the plaintiff’s claim, and not to owing something else. For example, if the plaintiff claims that the defendant owes wheat, and the defendant confesses that he owes barley, this does not qualify as “Modeh Be’miksat Ha’ta’ana,” since the defendant did not agree to anything claimed by the plaintiff, and so no oath is administered. “Meshib Abeda Eno Nishba”: If a person returns a lost item or sum of money to its owner, and the owner claims that the finder actually found more and kept some from himself, the finder is not required to swear. Although this is a situation of “Modeh Be’miksat Ha’ta’ana,” as the finder confesses to half of what the owner claims he owes, nevertheless, the Sages enacted a provision exempting a finder from an oath, due to the concern that people would otherwise refrain from returning lost objects which they find. “Kofer Ba’kol”: If the defendant denies the claim altogether, then he does not need even need to swear, and is not required to pay unless the plaintiff can provide witnesses to substantiate his claim. “Hoda’at Ba’al Din Ke’me’a Edim Dameh”: A litigant’s confession has the legal weight of the testimony of one hundred valid witnesses. If a litigant confesses to owing something, his confession obligates him to pay the item or sum in question to the plaintiff. “Shomrim”: Watchmen who are entrusted with somebody’s object, which they claim was lost, stolen or damaged, bear liability under certain circumstances, depending, in part, on the nature of their arrangement with the owner. For example, in the case of a Shomer Hinam – an unpaid watchman – who claims that the item was lost, Bet Din requires him to take three oaths: that the item is not in his possession, that he was not negligent in his duties as a watchman, and that he did not take the object for himself. After taking these oaths, the watchman does not need to pay the owner anything. “Hashud Al Ha’shebu’a”: If a defendant is required to take a Shebu’a, but his past history of dishonesty gives Bet Din reason to suspect that he may be prepared to swear falsely, he cannot swear, and must instead pay the plaintiff. “Migu”: If a defendant could have given a response to the plaintiff which would have been Halachically acceptable, then he is believed even if he gives a different response. “Gilgul Shebu’a”: In cases where a defendant is required to take an oath, Bet Din will impose upon him also oaths for other claims which otherwise would not have been required. “Pore’a Hobo Al Yedeh Shali’ah”: If a borrower gives money to a messenger and instructs him to bring the money to the lender, he cannot then retract the Shelihut (assignment of agency). “En Mekabelin Edut Ela Bi’fneh Ba’al Din”: Bet Din hears a witness’ testimony only if the litigant against whom he testifies is present. “Ma’amad Shelashtan”: If Reuven owes Shimon money, and he is together with Shimon and another person, Levi, to whom Shimon owes money, then Shimon can tell Reuben to give the money to Levi, and this verbal instruction suffices to transfer the obligation, such that Reuben must now pay Levi the sum he had owed to Shimon. “Ha’mosi Me’habero Alav Ha’re’aya”: Bet Din does not award a plaintiff money he claims from the defendant without proof. One who claims money from his fellow bears the burden of proof. “Masranut”: If a person wishes to sell his property, he must grant the owner of the neighboring property the right of first refusal. This is predicated upon the command, “Ve’asita Ha’yashar Ve’ha’tob” (“You shall do that which is upright and good” – Debarim 6:18), requiring that we conduct ourselves with basic decency and goodwill. This is just a small, brief sampling of the numerous principles on the basis of which Bet Din reaches decisions in civil cases, for the purpose of maintaining a just, peaceful society.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim addresses several different situations where a person accepts the responsibility to watch something belonging to his fellow. In such cases, the watchman’s level of liability depends on the kind of arrangement the two parties had made. One case (Shemot 22:6) is that of a Shomer Hinam – an unpaid watchman. Since he receives no payment for watching the item, and he is not entitled to use it, his liability is limited. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 57 th Biblical command the obligation on Bet Din to preside over cases involving items entrusted to a Shomer Hinam that were lost and ruined, and to rule based upon the Torah’s principles. This Misva applies even today, as nowadays, too, Bateh Din are authorized to preside over civil disputes such as these. One of the laws that apply in the case of a Shomer Hinam relates to a “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon” – a watchman who takes hold of the item entrusted to him with the intention of keeping it for himself. If he does this, then he now assumes full liability, and must compensate the owner even if the item is lost or damaged due to circumstances beyond his control (“Oness”). A Shomer Hinam, as mentioned, normally bears limited liability, but once he picks up the object with the intention of keeping it for himself, he is considered a thief and bears full responsibility to return it or its value, regardless of the circumstances. The later scholars raised the question of why it was necessary for the Torah to introduce a separate law of “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon.” At first glance, a Shomer Hinam who takes the item for himself is no different than any other thief. Once the Torah already outlines the laws regarding theft, establishing that a thief bears full responsibility to return the item or pay the owner its value, why was it necessary to introduce a distinct Halacha for a “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon”? The Aharonim identify several differences between the situation of a “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon” and ordinary theft. First, if a thief lifts someone’s barrel of wine intending to steal only a portion of its contents, his liability extends only to the wine which he intended to steal. However, in the case of a Shomer Hinam entrusted with a barrel, even if he lifts the barrel with the intention to steal only some of the wine, he bears full responsibility for all the wine in the barrel. Another difference is that a “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon” becomes a thief and assumes full liability even though he did not, technically speaking, bring the item out of the owner’s property. A person who steals his fellow’s object attains the Halachic status of a thief only once he brings the object outside the owner’s property. In the case of a watchman, since he was appointed by the owner to guard the item, his hand is considered, in a sense, like the owner’s hand. Therefore, when he lifts the item to steal it, he cannot be said to have actually taken the item out of the owner’s property. And thus the Torah needed to introduce a separate Halacha of “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon,” to establish that the watchman is considered a thief even though his act would not qualify as “theft” in other contexts. Another difference involves the case of one who seizes the item to keep it for himself, but with the intention to pay the owner its value. Ordinarily, the thief does not assume full liability when he takes the item with this intention, since he is not, technically speaking, a “thief,” as he plans on paying the owner. In the case of “Shole’ah Yad Be’fikadon,” however, since the watchman betrays the owner’s trust, he assumes full liability like a thief even if he takes the item with the intention of paying the owner its value.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 22:5) establishes that if a person lit a fire which ended up spreading into his fellow’s property, causing damage, then the one who kindled the fire must pay for the damages. Even though the person lit the fire in his own property, he is nevertheless responsible if it spread to his fellow’s property and caused damage. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 56 th Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to try these cases, and to hold people accountable for damages caused by fires which they lit. This Misva, of course, is one of many examples of the Torah’s concern to ensure that people act responsibly and refrain from reckless behavior which could cause harm to others. Bet Din must hold people accountable for the damages they caused so that people will exercise care and conduct themselves in a responsible fashion. The exception to the guilty party’s liability for fire damage is “Tamun” – damage caused to items which were not visible. If the victim had hid utensils, for example, under the shrubbery in his field, and the fire destroyed these utensils, the one who started the fire is not responsible to compensate for the damaged utensils, since the utensils were not visible at the time they were consumed by the fire. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Kama brings a famous debate among the Amoraim as to the nature of a person’s liability for damages caused by a fire he kindled. Rabbi Yohanan maintained that “Isho Mishum Hesyo” – one is liable for these damages just as he is liable for damages he causes by shooting an arrow. According to Rabbi Yohanan, when a person lights a fire, then even though it then spread to his fellow’s property on its own, or as a result of the wind, the person is considered to have himself damaged that property. Resh Lakish, however, disagrees, noting that whereas an arrow damages because of the person’s force – as he pulled back the bow, giving the arrow the power to go forth – the fire spreads as a result of “Ko’ah Aher” – another force, such as the wind. According to Resh Lakish, a person’s liability for damages caused by a fire he kindled is “Mi’shum Mamono” – due to the fact that the coal is his property. Just as a person bears liability for damages caused by his animal, because the animal is his property, so is one liable for damages caused by a fire he kindles, of which he is the owner. In other words, Rabbi Yohanan maintained that the person is considered to have personally caused the damage by lighting the fire, whereas Resh Lakish argued that it is the person’s property, and not the person himself, that caused the damage. This fundamental debate yields a number of interesting practical ramifications. One involves the case of one who kindles a fire which then spreads into another person’s property and causes bodily harm. When it comes to physical injury – as opposed to property damage – Halacha distinguishes between the case of a person who himself caused his fellow bodily harm, and the case where a person’s property causes his fellow bodily harm. If the person himself hurts his fellow, the he must make five different payments (which were outlined in Misva #49). According to Rabbi Yohanan, then, if one’s fire spread and physically hurt his fellow, then the person who kindled the fire must make all five compensatory payments. According to Resh Lakish, however, the one who lit the fire is not considered to have damaged the victim, and so he needs to only make the basic payment to compensate the victim. Tosafot (Baba Kama 56) assert that this debate also affects the question of whether one is held liable for murder if he intentionally murders by kindling a flame which then spreads to the victim. According to Rabbi Yohanan, it would seem, the guilty party is considered to have actually set fire to the victim, and he should then be liable to the death penalty. According to Resh Lakish, however, the person is not considered to have directly killed, and so he would not be liable to execution. Others disagree with Tosafot, and insist that even Rabbi Yohanan would agree that one would not be considered guilty of murder in such a case. Rabbi Yohanan might concede that a person cannot be considered to have killed without a “Ma’aseh Resiha” – an act of murder. In the case under discussion, the person did not commit such an act, as he merely kindled a fire which the wind then carried to the victim. Therefore, even according to Rabbi Yohanan, perhaps, the person would not be held liable for murder.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 23:4) addresses the case of an animal that damages somebody’s property through its normal activity – meaning, it trampled on property as it walked, or ate food. If this happened in the victim’s property, then the animal’s owner must compensate the victim for the damage. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 55 th Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to abide by this rule and hold an animal’s owner liable in such a case. Both males and females are liable for the damages caused by their animals, and it makes no difference whether the victim was a male or female. The guilty party in such cases must pay either money, objects of value, or a portion of his highest-quality land (“Idit”) which equals the value of the damage. The Torah specifies that the animal’s owner must pay “Metab Sadehu” – “the best of his fields,” indicating that if he pays with land, he must give a portion of his highest-quality property. As mentioned, an animal’s owner is liable for damages it causes by eating or treading only if this occurred in the victim’s property. If an animal eats or tramples upon somebody’s property in the public domain, the animal’s owner is not responsible to compensate the victim. The Rambam explains that the owner is exempt in such a case because the animal has the right to walk in the public domain. Since animals are allowed in the public domain, and eating and trampling are normal and natural activities, the owner bears no liability for damages caused as a result of the animal’s eating and walking there. According to this explanation, the animal’s owner is exempt even if the animal somehow caused damage in somebody’s property by stepping on something in the public domain. Since the damage was caused by the animal as it walked in the public domain, the owner is not responsible. Others disagree, and claim that the owner is exempt only if the damage was caused in the public domain, but not if it occurred in somebody’s property, even if it was caused by the animal’s treading in the public domain. These authorities maintain that the owner is absolved if the damage occurred in the public domain not because the animal had the right to walk there, but for a different reason. Some explain that he is absolved because the victim should not have had his belongings in the public domain, where they could be damaged. Others assert that this exemption is simply a “Gezerat Ha’katub” – a “Scriptural decree” that is not based upon any reasoning which we can grasp. Proof to this theory may be drawn from the Shulhan Aruch’s ruling that if an animal went into someone’s property, took some food, and then brought it to the public domain and ate it there, the owner does not bear liability. Even though the animal brought the item from the victim’s property, where it did not have the right to be, the owner is nevertheless exempt, since the damage occurred in the public domain. This would seem to prove that the exemption constitutes a “Gezerat Ha’katub,” and is not rooted in any rationale which we can understand. Further proof may be drawn from the fact that this exemption extends even to animals which may not be raised in Eretz Yisrael. The Sages enacted that certain animals which are dangerous or frequently cause damage should not be bred in the Land of Israel, but nevertheless, if such an animal eats or tramples on someone’s possessions in a public domain in Eretz Yisrael, the owner does not bear liability. Clearly, the animal did not have the right to be present in the public domain; it did not have the right to be in the country at all. The fact that the owner is nevertheless exempt would seem to prove that this exemption was introduced as a “Gezerat Ha’katub,” and not because the animal had the right to be present in the public domain.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (21:37) establishes the basic laws that apply when a person is found to have surreptitiously stolen something from his fellow. As opposed to a “Gazlan” – somebody who steals openly, confronting the victim and forcibly seizing his possession – the “Ganab” is somebody who steals secretly in an effort to conceal him crime. The Torah states that a person who was discovered to have stolen secretly must pay not only what he stole, but “Kefel” – double the amount, as a penalty. If he stole an ox which he subsequently slaughtered or sold, he must repay the victim five oxen, and if he stole a sheep which he then slaughtered or sold, he must pay four sheep. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 54 th Biblical command the obligation on Bet Din to preside over cases of theft and impose these payments upon somebody convicted as a “Ganab.” This command, of course, seeks to deter potential criminals and maintain law and order in society. The category of “Ganab” includes a person who is asked to watch somebody else’s possession, and then keeps it for himself, falsely claiming that it was stolen. The watchman in this case is considered a “Ganab,” and must repay twice the value of what he stole. A “Ganab” who was unable to repay what he stole would be sold as a servant in order to obtain the funds. If somebody breaks into another person’s home to steal, the burglar is considered a “Rodef” (“pursuer”), who seeks to kill the homeowner. Since he anticipates the likelihood that the homeowner might be present and will confront him, he is prepared to kill, and, as such, he has the status of a “Rodef,” he may be killed. Nowadays, a Bet Din does not have the authority to impose penalties such as “Kefel.” These may be imposed only by a Bet Din consisting of “Semuchim” – judges who received the formal ordination passed from teacher to disciple since the time that Moshe ordained Yehoshua. Once this chain of Semicha (ordination) was broken, judges no longer have the authority to impose Kenasot (penalties). They are, however, authorized to issue rulings requiring a thief to pay the principal amount which he stole. Although judges nowadays are not “Semuchim,” nevertheless, in the interest of maintaining law and order, they have been authorized by the “Semuchim” of prior generations to preside over cases and require thieves to repay what they stole. The Poskim debate the question of whether a victim of theft who seized from the thief the “Kefel” – the extra amount fundamentally owed to him by the thief – is forced to return it. Some Poskim maintained that since Bet Din does not have the authority nowadays to require the “Kefel” payment, the victim has no right at all to this money, and so if he seizes it, Bet Din must force him to return it to the thief. Others, however, felt that since the Torah requires the thief to pay the “Kefel,” and it is only due to a technical limitation on Bet Din’s authority that a thief is not forced to pay “Kefel,” a victim who seizes the “Kefel” cannot be forced to return the money.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:33) addresses the case of a person who opens a pit in a public area, and an animal falls in and dies. The person who dug the pit is responsible to compensate the animal’s owner for his financial loss. The Gemara explains that although the person cannot be said to legally own the pit, as it is situated in the public domain, nevertheless, the Torah places it under his ownership so that he can be held responsible to pay. Like the other laws of damage liability, this Halacha demonstrates the Torah’s demand that we live with a sense of responsibility to the people around us, and exercise care in ensuring we do not cause people harm. This command is directed at Bet Din, requiring them to rule these cases appropriately, and hold the guilty party responsible to pay. A person who digs a put in a public area is responsible only for the damages caused to animals who fall into the pit. He is not responsible if a person falls in, because people are expected to watch carefully where they walk. If a person falls into a pit, he is to blame for failing to exercise caution as he walks, and thus he cannot claim damages from the person who dug the pit. For the same reason, the person who made the pit is not responsible for damages caused to utensils, which quite obviously do not travel on their own, but are rather carried by human beings, who are expected to carefully watch where they walk to avoid harm. The person who opened a pit is responsible for damages only if the pit is at least ten Tefahim (handbreadths) deep, because otherwise, it is not considered capable of killing an animal who falls inside. In certain circumstances, a person is allowed to place something in the public domain even though it might pose a hazard. For example, a drain pipe from the roof of a house is allowed to extend into the public domain, since this serves a necessary purpose. Likewise, when building a home, one is allowed to keep building materials piled in the public domain near the building site. Nevertheless, although in these cases the person is allowed to create a potential hazard, he is responsible to pay for damages it causes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if one needs to erect a foundation around the building site as he constructs a home, and this foundation extends into the public domain, then he is not held responsible for damages it causes. Since this is something which people generally need to do when building, and it is thus necessary for ensuring sufficient housing, people implicitly waive each other’s responsibility for damages caused by these structures.
The Torah establishes in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:28) that an ox that fatally gored a human being is sentenced to death by stoning, and the verse adds, “Ve’lo Ye’achel Et Besaro” – “its flesh shall not be eaten.” This means that a “Shor Ha’niskal” – an ox sentenced to stoning for having killed a person – is forbidden for any sort of benefit. Even if somebody came along and properly slaughtered the ox, following all the detailed guidelines of Shehita (halachic slaughtering), the meat is forbidden for consumption. Likewise, all other parts of the animal – the hair, the horns, the bones, the hide, the blood and the sinews – may not be used for any purpose. This applies not only to an ox, but to any animal that kills a human being. Once Bet Din rules that the animal must be put to death, the animal becomes forbidden for any sort of benefit. If the animal is a female mammal, its milk, too, is forbidden, by force of the halachic principle of “Ha’yoseh Min Ha’tameh Tameh” – something which emerges from the body of a forbidden creature is itself forbidden. By the same token, if a bird is sentenced to death for killing a person, its eggs are forbidden. This prohibition applies to both men and women. One who transgresses this prohibition and eats the meat of such an animal is liable to Malkut. The reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is to show us the severity of inflicting harm on people. The Torah went so far as to forbid benefit from an animal which killed somebody, even though the animal, quite obviously, cannot be held personally accountable for its actions, to show us that even accidentally causing people harm is something repugnant. Seeing how the Torah treats a “Shor Ha’niskal,” we will be motivated to exercise care to ensure that we do not cause any sort of damage or harm to anybody, even accidentally. Although the animal becomes forbidden only once Bet Din sentences it to stoning, and not any earlier, nevertheless, the animal may not be slaughtered after it killed somebody. In order to give Bet Din a chance to sentence the animal, Halacha forbids slaughtering it even before the sentencing. This Halacha gives rise to the question of whether an animal that kills a person may be slaughtered and eaten nowadays, a question raised and discussed by the Bah (Rav Yoel Sirkis, Poland, 1561-1640). Nowadays, when courts do not have the authority to sentence offenders to capital punishment, they also lack the authority to sentence animals to execution. We might assume, then, that the prohibition against benefiting from a “Shor Ha’niskal” has no practical relevance nowadays, and an animal that kills somebody may be slaughtered and eaten. This is, in fact, the view of several Poskim. Some even specifically recommend slaughtering the animal because it poses a threat. Others, however, maintain that even nowadays, one should not slaughter an animal that had killed somebody, because each day, we anticipate the rebuilding of the Bet Ha’mikdash and the restoration of the full authority of Bet Din. Although now courts do not have the authority to execute an animal that killed somebody, we hope every day for the arrival of Mashiah, at which point Bet Din will indeed have this authority. Therefore, according to this opinion, an animal that killed should not be slaughtered, and we should instead wait and hope that Bet Din can conduct a proper trial.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:28-32) discusses situations of “Nizkeh Behema” – where a person’s animal causes damage to another person, such as when an ox gores another ox, or gores a human being. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 51 st Biblical command the obligation upon Bet Din to preside over these cases and require the responsible party to compensate the victim. A fundamental distinction exists between cases where an animal caused damage while acting abnormally, and situations of an animal who damaged through normal behavior. Oxen, for example, generally gore, and so if an ox fatally gores another ox, the owner is responsible to pay only “Hasi Nezek” – half the value of the damage caused. And, if half the value of the damage exceeds the value of the ox, then the owner can just give his ox to the victim. Since this violent conduct was unusual and thus could not have been expected, the owner’s responsibility is lower. However, if the ox had gored on three separate occasions, and the owner was warned to guard the animal against violent behavior, then if the ox gores another ox, the owner must pay full compensation for the damages. Since the animal had established a habit of violent behavior, the owner is held fully responsible for damages it causes. In the case of an ox that fatally gored a human being, Bet Din stones the animal. If, for whatever reason, Bet Din did not kill the animal, and the animal managed to kill three people on three separate occasions, then the owner must make a payment to the victim’s inheritors to protect himself against punishment by G-d. A person is held responsible for his animal’s damages only if the damage was caused in the victim’s property, or in a public area. If, however, an ox went into somebody else’s property, and was then gored by an ox belonging to that property’s owner, then the owner bears no responsibility, because the incident occurred on his property. Different standards of protection are required in the case of a “Shor Tam” – an ox that had not yet gored three times – and in the case of a “Shor Mu’ad” – an ox that had gored three times. The Gemara establishes that the owner of a “Shor Tam” that damages is required to pay compensation unless he had guarded the animal at the standard of “Shemira Me’ula” – a high level of protection. In the case of a “Shor Mu’ad,” however, whose owner would be required to pay more for damages, the owner is absolved even if he guarded the animal at a low standard of protection (“Shemira Pehuta”). The nature of this obligation, to compensate for damages caused by one’s animal, has been understood in several different ways. Some Rabbis understood that the owner must pay compensation for failing to properly guard the animal; it is only because he did not properly protect against damage that he bears responsibility to pay. Others, however, maintained that one’s property should be viewed as an extension of himself. Just as a person is responsible for the damages which he causes, he is similarly responsible for the damages caused by his animal, which is an extension of himself. Yet a third, particularly novel, theory was advanced by the Serideh Esh (Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg, 1884-1966), who suggested that in essence, an animal that causes damage should be held responsible to compensate the victim. But since an animal cannot, quite obviously, be forced to pay compensation, the responsibility is transferred to the owner. Regardless, this Misva reminds us of the emphasis the Torah places on sensitivity and consideration, that religious life requires us to live in a way that keeps other people’s safety and wellbeing in mind. By commanding the Bet Din to preside over these cases and hold people accountable for damages caused by their animals, the Torah ensures that we all act responsibly and do what we can to maintain a safe, secure environment for everybody.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:20) addresses the case of somebody who fatally beats his Ebed Kena’ani (non-Jewish servant), and states, “Nakom Yinakem” – “He shall assuredly be avenged.” The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin understood this to mean that the man is executed by “Sayif” – the sword. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists as the 50 th Biblical command the Misva for Bet Din to administer “Sayif” to those who are deserving of this form of capital punishment. Although the Torah introduces the punishment of “Sayif” specifically in the context of one who kills his servant, it applies to all cases of murder; the punishment for a person found guilty of murder is death by the sword. This form of execution is deemed less severe than Sekila (stoning) and Serefa (burning), but more severe than Henek (strangulation). The Torah sentences a master to capital punishment for this crime, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, in order to help us eliminate feelings of cruelty. Although the Torah allows for the purchase of servants, who become the master’s property, nevertheless, the master must avoid cruelty, to the point that if he becomes so angry at his servant that he fatally strikes him, he is put to death. There is a rule that when Bet Din convicts an offender to capital punishment, “Yad Ha’edim Tiheyeh Bo Ba’rishona” – the witnesses who testified about the crime begin the process of execution. In the case of Sekila, for example, the witnesses throw the first stones. The Ralbag (Rav Levi Ben Gershon, France, 1288-1344) explains that this was done to help ensure the accuracy of the witnesses’ testimony. Knowing that they will be participating in the execution, the witnesses are more likely to be deterred from presenting false or imprecise information, and will exercise greater care to speak accurately. An exception is made in the case of murder, when instead of the witnesses, the victim’s family begins the execution. Another exception is a case where the witnesses do not have hands. The Torah commanded, “Yad Ha’edim Tihyeh Bo” – that the witnesses’ “hands” strike the convicted offender first, and therefore, if the witnesses do not have hands, the offender is not put to death. After an offender receives “Sayif,” the knife used for the execution becomes forbidden for any sort of benefit, and it must be buried. It is not buried in the grave together with the offender, but is rather buried nearby. Of course, Bet Din no longer has the authority to administer punishment. However, the Gemara teaches that even when Bet Din cannot punish sinners, Hashem arranges that willful sinners who do not repent will receive their due punishment in a manner similar to the way Bet Din would have punished them. This system is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the Misvot, and to allow us to create the just, stable, moral society that we are to create.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:18) addresses the case of someone who strikes his fellow, and the fellow does not die, but suffers an injury. In such a case, the Torah establishes, the guilty party must compensate the victim. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this obligation as the 49 th Biblical command, requiring Bet Din to impose this compensatory payment upon the guilty party. The underlying reason behind this Misva, of course, is that people must be held accountable for the damage they cause, for if not, then anarchy will ensue, as people will act however they wish without regard for the wellbeing of others. This Misva is assigned to Bet Din. Quite obviously, the person whom Bet Din finds responsible to pay bears an obligation to abide by the ruling and compensate the victim. Both men and women are included in this law, holding a person responsible for damages which he or she caused. The Gemara specifies five separate payments which one is required to pay if he caused his fellow bodily harm: Nezek, Sa’ar, Ripui, Shebet, and Boshet. Nezek refers to the person’s loss of value as a result of a permanent injury caused to him by his fellow. If, for example, he lost a limb, Heaven forbid, then there are certain jobs which he is no longer capable of performing. Bet Din therefore assesses the victim’s value if he would be sold as a servant before suffering the injury, and his value now, after the injury, and the guilty party is required to pay the difference. Sa’ar means “pain,” and it refers here to the amount of money a person would be willing to pay in order to be spared the pain suffered by the victim. This amount must be paid by the guilty party. Ripui refers to the medical expenses incurred as a result of the injury inflicted. Shebet refers to the victim’s loss of income. If he lost worktime because of the injury, then the guilty party must pay him the amount of money he would have earned during the time he was unable to work. Finally, if the victim suffered embarrassment as a result of the injury, then Bet Din makes an assessment of the value of this embarrassment, and the guilty party must pay this amount, as well. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Kama establishes the rule of “Adam Mu’ad Le’olam,” which means that people are held accountable for damages they caused regardless of whether or not they were caused intentionally. Even if the damage was caused due to circumstances beyond the person’s control, he is nevertheless responsible to compensate the victim. A person cannot claim that he is excused from paying because the damages were caused accidentally; we are all always responsible for our actions. Halacha makes an exception in the case of a physician who inadvertently causes harm to his patient. Although a person generally bears responsibility even if he damaged inadvertently, a doctor who makes a mistake will operating on a patient, for example, causing him physical harm, is exempt from paying compensation. Some Poskim explain that this law was enacted in order not to discourage people from pursuing a career in medicine. If doctors were held responsible to pay for every mistake made while tending to patients, few people would want to accept this risk, and there would be no physicians. The Sages therefore enacted an exemption for doctors who mistakenly inflict harm while treating a patient. Others explain that in ancient times, physicians received formal authorization from Bet Din to practice medicine, and therefore, since they practiced their profession with Bet Din’s authorization, they were exempt from payment. Today, too, when physicians receive a formal government license to practice medicine, they are exempt from paying for damages they cause, since they treat patients with government permission. An important exception to this rule is a case of gross negligence. If, for example, a surgeon amputated the wrong limb, or a dentist extracted the wrong tooth, the doctor or dentist would be liable for the damages, since he acted negligently. The exemption applies only when an innocent, understandable mistake was made. Even when a doctor is exempt from compensation, he might still bear an obligation “Bi’ydeh Shamayim,” as far as G-d’s judgment is concerned. Even if the Bet Din cannot force him to pay, he might still bear accountability and be liable to punishment by G-d since he did, after, inflict harm upon another person, and thus he should pay compensation. The Torah in a number of places establishes the law of “Ayin Tahat Ayin” – “an eye for an eye,” that one who inflicts physical harm is punished by having done to him what he did to the victim. The Gemara, however, understood that this is not meant literally, and refers instead to compensatory payment. The Gaon of Vilna (Rav Eliyahu of Vilna, 1720-1797) explained that the Sages reached this conclusion by reading the phrase “Ayin Tahat Ayin” in a different way. The word “Tahat” normally means “underneath,” and thus the phrase “Ayin Tahat Ayin” can be understood as alluding to the letters “underneath,” or after, the letters of the word “Ayin.” The letter after an “Ayin” is “Peh”; the letter after “Yod” is “Kaf”; and the letter after “Nun” is “Samech.” These three letters – “Peh,” “Kaf” and “Samech” – spell the word “Kessef” (“money”), and thus the Sages concluded that “Ayin Tahat Ayin” refers to not the literal infliction of injury, but rather to compensatory payment. Others explain that the phrase “Ayin Tahat Ayin” cannot be understood literally because the harm caused to the perpetrator will never be precisely equal to the harm he caused to the victim. For example, if somebody gored the eye of somebody who was unable to see with the other eye, thus making him completely blind, this damage will not be completely compensated by removing one of the perpetrator’s eyes, as he would still be able to see with the other eye. More generally, no two people’s situations are identical, and thus even if the same injury is inflicted upon the perpetrator, the damages he suffers will not be identical to those suffered by the victim. Necessarily, then, “Ayin Tahat Ayin” must refer to monetary compensation.
The Torah states in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:15), “One who strikes his father or mother shall be put to death,” establishing that striking one’s parent constitutes a capital offense. Tradition teaches that the phrase “Mot Yumat” (“shall be put to death”), unless otherwise stated, refers to Henek (strangulation), and thus one who intentionally strikes his parent is liable to Henek. This applies only to striking in a manner which results in bleeding. Normally, when a person strikes his fellow, he is required to make certain compensatory payments to the victim. Striking a parent, however, is a far more grievous offense, given the respect and gratitude one owes to his parents, and thus the Torah legislates that striking a parent is punishable by death. There is a general rule that a violator cannot be punished unless there is an “Azhara (“warning”), meaning, unless the Torah issues a clear command not to commit the act in question. In the case of striking a parent, the Torah states that this offense is punishable by death, but nowhere does it explicitly command that one is not allowed to strike his parent. The Sages explain that the prohibition against striking a parent is included in the command of “Arba’im Yakenu, Lo Yosif” (Debarim 25:3), which forbids exceeding the number of lashes administered to a violator receiving Malkut. If the Torah commands the person administering the lashes not to strike the violator beyond that which he deserves, then certainly, it is prohibited to strike one’s parent. Needless to say, this prohibition applies at all times and in all locations, and to both males and females. The Gemara observes that the Torah requires putting to death one who strikes his father even though it cannot be proven that the victim was his father. As opposed to a mother, whom people saw deliver the child and can thus be proven to be a person’s mother, a man is identified as a person’s father only by force of a Hazaka (presumption). Since they have a father-son relationship, and people know them to be father and son, we presume that this is indeed the case. On this basis, the Gemara proves that Bet Din can punish based on a Hazaka, even if there no ironclad proof. In the case of a convert, the Torah command not to strike one’s parent does not, technically speaking, apply. The rule of “Ger She’nitgayer Ke’katan She’nolad Dami” establishes that once a gentile converts and becomes a Jew, he loses all familial relationships. He is considered to have been newly “born” at the time of his conversion, and thus, Halachically speaking, he is no longer related to his biological family members. Thus, as far as Torah law is concerned, a convert who strikes his parent is considered no different from one who strikes somebody else. Nevertheless, the Sages enacted that he must treat his parents with respect – and, it goes without saying, refrain from hurting them – so people do not say that he became less respectful after converting to Judaism. If a father, for whatever reason, never underwent circumcision, and his son is a Mohel, would it be permissible for the son to circumcise him? Does the Misva of circumcision override the prohibition against inflicting a wound in one’s parent, or is inflicting a wound forbidden even for the sake of the Misva of Berit Mila? Some tried drawing proof from the fact that the Misva of Berit Mila overrides the Shabbat prohibitions. Even though Shabbat desecration constitutes a capital offense, the Torah allows – and requires – performing Berit Mila on Shabbat, despite the fact that inflicting a wound is normally forbidden on Shabbat. This would seemingly prove that the Misva of Berit Mila overrides also the prohibition of inflicting a wound in one’s parent, which is similarly a capital offense. In truth, however, this proof is hardly compelling, because a Berit Mila may be performed on Shabbat only if it takes place on Bi’zmanah – at the ideal time, on the child’s eighth day. If a child did not undergo circumcision on the eighth day, and the Berit is being performed later, it may not be performed on Shabbat. Quite obviously, if a son is circumcising his father, this Berit is taking place well after the father’s eighth day, and there is no proof that such a Berit Mila overrides a severe Torah prohibition. Another argument that has been advanced is that Berit Mila should override this prohibition just as Berit Mila overrides the prohibition against removing a Sara’at (leprosy) infection. The Torah forbids surgically removing a piece of skin infected with Sara’at, but nevertheless, if such an infection appears on the foreskin, the Berit Mila is performed. Similarly, perhaps, the Misva of Berit Mila should override the prohibition against inflicting a wound in one’s parent. However, the Rabbis noted a clear distinction between the two cases. In the situation of Sara’at on the foreskin, there is no guarantee that the infection will ever disappear, and thus the Misva of Berit Mila might never be performed if it is not allowed when a Sara’at infection is present. When it comes to circumcising one’s father, however, it is possible to wait until a different Mohel is available, and so perhaps the son should not be allowed to perform the Berit Mila. Yet a third argument is that circumcising one’s father should be no different from performing a medical procedure for one’s parent which causes bleeding. In principle, Halacha allows a child to perform such a procedure for his parent, and thus, seemingly, just as this is allowed for Refu’at Ha’guf – bodily healing, it should be allowed as well for Refu’at Ha’nefesh – healing of the soul, meaning, the performance of a Misva. It should be noted, however, that in practice, Halacha does not allow a child to perform a medical procedure on a parent that will cause the parent to bleed, unless nobody else is available to perform the procedure. Although this is, technically, permissible, nevertheless, there is a chance that the child might cause slightly more bleeding than necessary for the procedure, such as if he accidentally makes a larger or deeper incision than he needs to. This extra blood-letting, which does not serve a medical purpose, would violate the prohibition, and so Halacha generally forbids performing such a procedure for one’s parent. (This applies also to giving injections; a child should not give his parent an injection, due to the concern of causing more bleeding than is necessary, unless nobody else is available.) By the same token, then, a Mohel should not circumcise his father, unless no other Mohel is available. In a case where nobody else is available to perform the medical procedure or the Berit, the child should first ask the parent Mehila, to waive the obligations owed to him or her as a parent.
Certain Torah violations are punishable by execution – either Sekila (stoning), Serefa (burning), Sayif (death by sword), or Henek (strangulation). The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists each form of execution as a separate Misvat Aseh, an affirmative command requiring Bet Din to administer the given form of punishment. According to the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s listing, Henek is the 47 th Biblical command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that capital punishment is necessary as a deterrent against grievous sins. If there was no fear of punishment, then people would kill one another and commit other grave violations, and so the Torah commands Bet Din to put to death those who have been convicted of severe misdeeds. Six sins are punishable by Henek: an adulterous relationship with a married woman, kidnapping, inflicting a wound in one’s father or mother, Zaken Mamreh (a scholar who opposes the majority view of the Sanhedrin), prophesying in the name of a foreign deity, prophesying falsely in G-d’s Name. Surprisingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that murder is also punishable by Henek, despite the fact that the Gemara explicitly states that murder is punishable by Sayif (death by the sword). This question was noted by the Minhat Hinuch, who leaves it unanswered. Indeed, it is very difficult to explain the basis of the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s comment. In any event, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that Henek is the swiftest form of execution, and it is administered to murderers because they generally kill their victim swiftly, in order to avoid being caught. Other violations, which are committed more slowly, are punishable by other forms of execution, which cause death to occur more gradually. Another difficulty in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of Henek is his comment that capital punishment is administered only in Eretz Yisrael. The Minhat Hinuch noted that the Gemara in Masechet Makkot states that capital punishment is administered anywhere, even outside the Land of Israel, as long as the Bet Ha’mikdash stands and the Sanhedrin meets in the Lishkat Ha’gazit (its special chamber in the area of the Bet Ha’mikdash). It is thus very difficult to understand why the Sefer Ha’hinuch wrote that capital punishment is limited to Eretz Yisrael. No Beracha is recited over the fulfillment of this Misva, and the commentaries explain that this is because G-d does not wish for violators to be executed. As the verse in Yehezkel (33:11) says, “I do not desire the death of the wicked, but rather that the wicked repents from his path and lives.” The Gemara teaches in Masechet Hagiga that when a sinner suffers as punishment for his wrongdoing, G-d Himself is pained, as it were, because of His love for all people, even sinners. Therefore, since punishing sinners brings distress to the Almighty, so-to-speak, no Beracha is recited when administering punishment, even though it fulfills a Torah command. Similarly, Tosafot comment in Masechet Megilla (31) that no Beracha is recited over the reading of the Tocheha – the sections of the Torah warning of the calamities which Hashem threatens to bring upon the nation for betraying Him. When the Tocheha is read in the synagogue, the Aliya begins several verses before the Tocheha, and ends only after the Tocheha, so that the person receiving the Aliya does not recite a Beracha over these curses. G-d is pained, so-to-speak, by having to issue these warnings, and so it would be inappropriate to recite a Beracha over this section. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if Bet Din had the authority and ability to execute an offender and failed to do so, then they are in violation of this command. He emphasizes that the one who fails to fulfill this command is deserving of punishment, because without a functioning system of justice, people will not be deterred from perpetrating evil, resulting in anarchy. It should be noted that whereas the Sefer Ha’hinuch lists capital punishment as four separate Biblical commands, the Ramban maintained that all four forms of capital punishment are included in a single command. The Ramban cites the command mentioned several times in the Torah, “U’bi’arta Ha’ra Mi’kirbecha” – “You shall eliminate the evil from your midst,” and explains that in his view, this command requires Bet Din to execute those guilty of capital offenses. Of course, this command does not apply nowadays. However, the Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin teaches that when Bet Din does not have the authority to execute offenders, G-d arranges that those deserving of capital punishment will die in a manner resembling the type of execution that they deserve.
In discussing the laws relevant to an Ama Ibri’a (Jewish maidservant), the Torah (Shemot 21:10) commands that if the master marries the maidservant, then “She’ereah Kesutah Ve’onatah Lo Yigra” – he must not deprive her of food, clothing or intimacy. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah here establishes an obligation binding upon every man who marries a woman, to provide her with food, clothing and intimacy. Although the Torah speaks here specifically of the case of a master who marries his maidservant, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this obligation in fact pertains to all marriages. If a master who marries his maidservant bears an obligation to care for her, then certainly, in a regular marriage, the husband is duty-bound to care for his wife’s needs. This command is applicable at all times and in all locations. A husband who knowingly deprives his wife of one of these three privileges despite being able to provide it transgresses this Biblical prohibition. He does not, however, receive Malkut, because Malkut are administered only for an active violation of a Torah prohibition, and this prohibition is violated through inaction, by failing to fulfill one’s obligations. The Gemara brings a debate between Rav and Shemuel as to how Bet Din should act when a wife claims that her husband fails to provide her with food or clothing. Shemuel maintains that “Kofin Oto Le’farnes” – the Bet Din coerces the husband to provide her what she is owed. Rav, however, maintains “Kofin Oto Le’garesh” – Bet Din forces the husband to divorce his wife. The rationale underlying Rav’s position is “En Adam Dar Im Nahash Bi’kfifa Ahat” – a person cannot be expected to live together with a “snake” in its den. If the husband is so neglectful that he refused to give his wife her basic needs, then the wife should not be expected to continue living with him, and therefore, if she so wishes, Bet Din forces the husband to grant her a divorce. The Aharonim (later scholars) debate the question of what happens if the husband is simply unable to provide his wife with food or clothing, such as if he lost his job and has no money, and the wife wants a divorce. According to some opinions, even Rav would agree that the husband is not compelled to divorce, because Rav advanced this view only if the husband was stingy and neglectful, refusing to provide for his wife even though he had the ability to do so. Others, however, maintain that to the contrary, in this case, even Shemuel would agree that the husband is forced to grant a divorce, because he does not have the ability to support her. As for the obligation of Ona (intimacy), a husband who denies his wife her conjugal rights is forced to divorce her. The Gemara explains that the Ona obligation depends on the husband’s profession, as some professions require the husband to spend more time away from home, in which case he is expected to fulfill this obligation less frequently. The Tanna’im debate the question of whether a man can marry a woman on the condition that he will be absolved of these obligations, if the wife accepts the condition. Rabbi Meir maintains that such a betrothal does not take effect, because the man is “Matneh Al Ma She’katub Ba’Torah” – making a condition suspending the obligations imposed by the Torah. Rabbi Yehuda, however, maintains that with regard to the obligations of food and clothing, such a condition can be made. In his view, when it comes to monetary obligations, one is able to make conditions contrary to Torah law if the other party consents. Therefore, if the woman agrees to marry the man on the condition that he will not be responsible to provide her with food with clothing, then the betrothal takes effect. However, if a husband betroths on condition that he is absolved of his obligation to provide conjugal rights, then Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the betrothal does not take effect, as this is not a monetary obligation, and therefore such a condition cannot be made, even if the wife consents. According to all opinions, the wife can waive her rights once the couple is married. If, for example, a woman decides to work and support herself, she can forego on her husband’s responsibility to support her, and the husband then bears no obligation to do so. It should be clarified that these obligations are independent of the obligations to which a husband commits in the Ketuba document which he signs at the time of the wedding. A husband’s responsibility to support his wife constitutes a Torah obligation, whereas the Ketuba is required by force of Rabbinic enactment. In this contract, the husband commits to pay his wife a certain sum if the marriage is dissolved. But his obligation to care for her needs during marriage applies on the level of Torah law. We learn from this Misva the fundamental principle that charity begins at home. While all charity certainly constitutes a Misva, the most important and fundamental obligation of charity is the obligation owed to one’s wife, to care for all her needs. Before one generously gives to charitable causes, he must first ensure that he fulfills his basic obligations at home.
The institution of Ama Ibri’a (the Jewish maidservant), which applied when the law of the Yobel (jubilee year) was binding, allows for a father who fell into financial straits to sell his young daughter as a maidservant. The Torah discusses the laws of the Ama Ibri’a in Parashat Mishpatim, where it commands that the master who purchases the girl is not allowed to then sell her to anybody else. In formulating this command, the Torah (Shemot 21:8) writes, “Le’am Nochri Lo Yimshol Le’mochrah” – that the master may not sell the maidservant to “a foreign nation.” At first glance, this means that the master is not permitted to sell the girl to a non-Jew, but may, if he so wishes, sell her to a fellow Jew. In truth, however, this is not the case. Targum Onkelos translates the phrase “Am Nochri” (“foreign nation”) in this verse as “Gebar Oharan” – “another man,” indicating that the master may not sell the maidservant to anyone. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah uses the term “Le’am nochri” in this context because from the perspective of the maidservant, being sold to another Jew would be as difficult and distressing as being sold to a gentile. After all she has already endured – growing up in a poor family, and then being sold as a servant – being sold to somebody else would be devastating, as though being sold to a non-Jewish man. The prohibition applies both to a maidservant and to a male Jewish servant. A master who purchased either a male or female servant is not allowed to sell him or her to somebody else. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command is intended to teach us “to act with the quality of compassion, which is beloved before Him.” The master is to have compassion on this girl, who was forced by poverty to be sold as a servant, and not sell her a second time. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, interestingly enough, that one who transgresses this prohibition and sells his male or female servant is not liable to Malkut. Even though active violations of Biblical prohibitions are normally punishable with Malkut, this prohibition marks an exception. Some explain that since this violation is committed by receiving money, which occurs passively, without actually performing an action, the violator is not liable to Malkut. Others explain that Malkut is not administered because the sale is ineffective. If the master tries to sell the servant, the Torah negates the transaction, and it does not take effect. Therefore, since, in the end, the master did not actually effect any change, as the sale is null and void from the outset, he is not liable to Malkut. The Gemara establishes that although the master may not sell the girl to somebody else, the father may sell his daughter a second time. Meaning, if the girl is released before the completion of her term of service, and she is still a minor (and thus capable of being sold), the father may sell her a second time. However, if the father of a young girl accepted Kiddushin (betrothal money) on her behalf, and she thus became betrothed to a man, she cannot then be sold as a maidservant after being divorced or widowed. Once a girl has been married, she cannot then be sold as an Ama Ibri’a, even after she is divorced or widowed and returns to her father’s home. The Gemara discusses the situation of an Ama Ibri’a to whom “Yi’ud” was done – meaning, the owner married her – and she is later widowed or divorced. If she is still a minor at the time she is widowed or divorced, can the father then sell her a second time? On the one hand, as we saw, the father is entitled to sell his daughter as a maidservant multiple times. But on the other hand, in this case, she had been married in the interim, albeit not directly by the father, so perhaps the father then loses the right to sell her. The Gemara states that the Halacha in this situation depends on the debate among the Tanna’im regarding the mechanics of “Yi’ud.” In general, betrothal takes place through the transfer of money to the bride, or, in the case of a minor, to her father. When a master marries his maidservant, seemingly, no money has been transferred, thus giving rise to the question of how the betrothal takes effect. The Tanna’im disagreed as to how to answer this question. According to the majority view, the money paid by the master when he purchased the girl from the father retroactively becomes the Kiddushin money once he betroths the girl. Rabbi Yossi Ben Rabbi Yehuda, however, maintains that the master foregoes on some work owed to him by the maidservant, and it is through the value of this work, which the girl in a sense “receives,” that the betrothal takes effect. The Gemara explains that according to the majority view, it turns out that when “Yi’ud” occurs, the father receives Kiddushin money. Therefore, since a father who receives Kiddushin money for his daughter’s betrothal loses his rights to sell her as a maidservant henceforth, the father in this case, too, can no longer sell the girl. According to Rabbi Yossi, however, the father never received Kiddushin money; the girl was betrothed by being relieved of some of her responsibilities to the master. Therefore, if she is then widowed or divorced, the father still has the right to sell her a second time as a maidservant. Many scholars noted that the Rambam appears to issue contradictory rulings in this regard. On the one hand, he follows the majority view, that when “Yi’ud” takes place, the money paid to the father for the purchase becomes the Kiddushin money. However, the Rambam also rules that if the master marries the girl and he then dies or divorces her, the father can sell her a second time – a view which the Gemara ascribes to Rabbi Yossi. The Rambam’s comments are very difficult to explain, and the later scholars discuss at length various possibilities to reconcile his comments with the aforementioned discussion in the Gemara.
The Torah in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:8) speaks of the case of an “Ama Ibri’a” – a Jewish girl whose father, due to dire financial straits, sold her as a maidservant, and it commands “Ve’hefdah,” that she must be given the possibility of being “redeemed.” As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, this means that if, for example, the girl served half her term, and the father is able to pay half the sum for which the master purchased her, the master must accept the money and release the maidservant. The master might be inclined to refuse, preferring to keep the maidservant, and he might feel entitled to interest since the 50 percent he now receives had been unavailable to him throughout the time the girl was working for him. The Torah commands the master to accept the payment and allow the girl to be freed from his service. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that refusing to release the maidservant would constitute “Ro’a Leb” – “evil-heartedness,” adding, “for the Children of Israel, who are princes, and compassionate people, children of compassionate people, it is proper for them to deal kindly with people, especially to those who have served them, even for just one day.” Moreover, it is belittling and denigrating for a Jewish girl to have to remain as a maidservant, and so the moment the father is able to “redeem” her from the master, the master must oblige and release her. This command is directed to the father, as well, obligating him to buy the girl back the moment he has the financial ability to do so. The court would force the father to pay the master to release his daughter once he obtained the necessary funds. The verse in Tehillim (18:31) states, “Imrat Hashem Serufa” (“The word of G-d is pristine.” The Midrash explains this to mean that the words of the Torah have the effect of “Mesaref” – cleansing and purifying a person. By studying and following the Torah’s laws, we “cleanse” and refine our characters. The Misva of the “Ama Ibri’a” is just one of many examples of how the Torah seeks to engender within us feelings of compassion for all people, regardless of their socioeconomic status, and to extend kindness and graciousness to everyone.
The Torah commands in Parashat Mishpatim (Shemot 21:8) that if one purchases an “Ama Ibri’a” – a Jewish girl as a maidservant – then once she reaches halachic adulthood, it is a Misva for him to either marry her, or have her marry his son. The betrothal of the maidservant by the master, either for himself or for his son, is called “Yi’ud,” as opposed to “Kiddushin,” the term used in reference to betrothal generally. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d commanded the master to marry the maidservant or have her marry his son as a measure of kindness and compassion for the girl. A father would sell his daughter as an “Ama Ibri’a” due to financial straits, and thus this girl faces the prospect of being confined to a life of poverty. Out of compassion for the girl, the Torah commands the master to transform her from a lowly maidservant into his or his son’s full-fledged wife, so she can enjoy freedom and dignity. In the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s words, the young woman is elevated from the status of a “Shifha” (maid) to that of a “Giberet” – a woman of a prominence. The Torah has compassion on this girl, whose family was forced to sell her as a maidservant, and arranged that she would be lifted from her dire straits and live in comfort and dignity. This command applies only when the laws regarding servants and maidservants are applicable, meaning, only when the laws of Yobel (the jubilee year) pertain. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if the master refuses to marry the maidservant or to have his son marry her, he is not punished, and Bet Din does not coerce him. However, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, if the master does perform “Yi’ud,” then he is guaranteed to be blessed with righteous offspring in reward for fulfilling the Misva of “Yi’ud.” Normally, when a man betroths a woman, he must perform “Kiddushin” by giving her money or an object of value. The Tanna’im debate the question of how this requirement is met in the case of “Yi’ud,” where the master or his son marries the maidservant without giving her anything. According to the majority of the view among the Tanna’im, the money paid by the master to the maidservant’s father when he first purchased her retroactively becomes the betrothal money when he or his son marries her. Rabbi Yossi Ben Rabbi Yehuda, however, disagrees, and maintains that the betrothal money is given by the master foregoing on work owed to him by the maidservant. Before the marriage, the master foregoes on some work worth at least a “Shava Peruta” (the value of a small coin), the minimum value required for “Kiddushin,” and this constitutes the “Kiddushin” payment. The practical difference between these two views is the question of when precisely the “Yi’ud” must occur. According to the majority opinion, the master can wait until the maidservant has completed all the service owed to him before marrying her or having his son marry her. According to Rabbi Yossi Ben Rabbi Yehuda, however, the betrothal must take place before the girl completes her term of service, when she has at least a “Shava Peruta” of work remaining to perform, as it is through the master’s foregoing on this obligation that the betrothal can take effect. The Misva of “Yi’ud” results in certain restrictions on whom one may purchase as an “Ama Ibri’a.” Since there is a Misva for the master to either marry the maidservant or have his son marry her, one cannot purchase as a maidservant a girl who is forbidden for marriage to both him and his son. Thus, for example, a father cannot sell his daughter as an “Ama Ibri’a” to his son, because siblings may not marry one another. One may, however, sell his daughter as an “Ama Ibri’a” to his father, because the father’s son – the girl’s uncle – is permitted to marry her, as Torah law permits marrying one’s niece.
In the beginning of Parashat Mishpatim (starting from Shemot 21:2), the Torah introduces the law of the Ebed Ibri – the indentured Jewish servant. The Sefer Ha’hinuch lists this law as the 42nd Biblical command, explaining that it incorporates several different provisions. First, it mandates releasing the servant after six years of service, or with the onset of the Yobel (jubilee), even if the Yobel occurs before the end of the six-year term. This law also includes the servant’s ability to buy his freedom if he comes up with the money to pay the value of the service that he still owes the master. Additionally, if the master dies without any sons, the servant goes free, and is not inherited by the deceased’s inheritors. Finally, if the servant wishes to remain after working for six years, the master pierces his ear, and the servant then remains with him until the Yobel. In explaining the underlying basis of this law, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the most valuable of all character traits is kindness and compassion. We, the Jewish Nation, are expected to conduct ourselves according to the highest standards of character, and so the Torah demands that we treat those who are subordinate to us with kindness and compassion. It is by engendering these qualities, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, that we become worthy of blessing. For this reason, the Torah commanded that a master who purchases a servant must treat him with mercy and kindness, releasing him from service on the occasions mentioned above. Moreover, the Gemara teaches in Masechet Kiddushin, “One who purchases an Ebed Ibri is like he purchased a master for himself.” The Torah requires the master to care for all the servant’s needs and treat him like a full-fledged member of the household, to the extent that the master is, in a sense, actually the servant. In fact, the Gemara states that if there is only one food product available, the master must give that product to his servant, rather than keep it for himself. Whereas in other societies slaves were abused and subjected to cruel treatment, the Torah demands treating one’s servant with sensitivity and kindness, like the other members of the household. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this law applies only to males, as women cannot purchase an Ebed Ibri. It applies only in periods when the laws of Yobel apply, and thus one cannot purchase an Ebed Ibri nowadays. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to make a remarkable statement about one who violates these laws, and refuses to release his Ebed Ibri when required by the Torah. Such a person, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, not only violates this command, but also engenders within himself a cruel, heartless character, and even calls his lineage into question. It is the nature of the Jewish nation to act as “Rahamanim Beneh Rahamanim” – “merciful people, children of merciful people,” and thus one who fails to act compassionately in effect testifies about himself that he is not part of the Jewish Nation. A person would be sold as an Ebed Ibri if he stole and was then unable to repay the victim. In such a case, the Bet Din would make an assessment of his value as a servant, and sell him. The money paid by the purchaser would go to the victim. The Gemara establishes that a thief would be sold as an Ebed Ibri only if he was unable to pay the principal, the value that he had stolen. If he had enough money to pay the principal, but did not have enough to pay also the penalty of “Kefel” – double the amount stolen – which the Torah imposes upon a thief, then he would not be sold as an Ebed Ibri. Interestingly, however, the Rambam writes that a thief is sold as an Ebed Ibri only in a situation which requires Kefel. When a person steals from a gentile, or from Hekdesh (the treasury of the Bet Ha’mikdash), although he must obviously repay what he stole, he is not required to pay Kefel. In such situations, the Rambam writes, a thief who is unable to pay the gentile or Hekdesh is not sold as an Ebed Ibri. Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer (1870-1953), in his Eben Ha’azel, explained the logical underlying this rule. He noted that the concept of selling oneself as a servant is unique to theft; no other monetary obligation requires one to sell himself into servitude in order to come up with the money he owes. The law of Ebed Ibri was instituted by the Torah as a penalty to punish a thief. Hence, this law applies only to situations of theft that the Torah deemed severe enough to warrant the penalty of “Kefel,” and not to other situations of theft. As the thief’s sale was instituted as a penalty, it is applicable only in circumstances when the penalty of “Kefel” applies. In conclusion, it is worth noting that the institution of “Ebed Ibri” served as a system for rehabilitating criminals. In today’s world, criminals are imprisoned together with other criminals, which is effective in temporarily removing them from society, but contributes nothing to the criminals’ growth and rehabilitation. The Torah has a thief sold as a servant so he becomes a member of a household, treated with respect and given responsibilities. This has the effect of not only facilitating the victim’s repayment, but also rehabilitating the thief, as he learns to be a law-abiding, productive member of society. And thus, once he is released from service, he will not resume his criminal activities, but will rather be responsible and respectful of other people. The Torah believes in a criminal’s capacity to change, and it established a system whereby this process of growth and recovery can take place effectively.
The Torah commands in Parashat Yitro (Shemot 20:23) not to ascend “Be’ma’alot Al mizbehi” – “upon My altar with stairs.” If a Kohen walks up stairs to reach the top of the altar, as the Torah explains, he will expose private parts of his body as he takes his strides, and this is therefore forbidden. For this reason, there was a ramp leading up to the top of the altar, instead of stairs. The Sefer Ha’hinuch observes that, quite obviously, the stones of the altar will not experience any humiliation of feel disrespected by the Kohen walking up stairs and exposing private parts of his body. Nevertheless, the Torah forbade this to reinforce our sense of reverence for the altar. When a person looks at the altar, and sees that there is a ramp, and not a staircase, he will reflect upon the reason behind this requirement, and recognize the great significance of the altar, that it is so important that we must show it great respect. If stairs were placed alongside the altar, and somebody walked in long strides up the stairs, he has violated this prohibition and is thus liable to Malkut. The Mechilta (here in Parashat Yitro) comments that even when ascending the ramp to the altar, the Kohanim were forbidden from taking large strides, and needed to walk in small steps, placing the toes of one foot near the heels of the one in front of it as they walked. The commentators raise the question of how to reconcile the Mechilta’s comment with the description in Masechet Yoma of how the Kohanim would race up the ramp to the altar. Every morning, a Kohen would perform Terumat Ha’deshen – cleaning the top of the altar – and the Kohanim would race up the ramp, each vying to reach the top first so he could have the privilege of performing this Misva. How were the Kohanim permitted to race up the altar, if, as the Mechilta states, one is required to ascend to the altar in small steps? One answer that has been given is that the prohibition applies only when walking up to the altar constitutes an Aboda – an actual ritual in the Bet Ha’mikdash. For example, after an animal is sacrificed, the Kohen must perform “Holacha” – bringing certain portions of the animal up to the top of the altar. The walking itself is an official stage of the service, and not merely a practical, prerequisite stage. It is only under such circumstances, some have suggested, that the Torah forbids the Kohanim from taking long strides as they make their way up to the top of the altar. In all other instances, however, this is allowed, and thus the Kohanim who ascended to the altar in the hopes of performing the Misva of Terumat Ha’deshen at the top were allowed to run. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, though, clearly did not accept this theory. He writes that even if a woman walks up stairs to the top of the altar, she has transgressed this prohibition – even though women do not perform the Aboda. Necessarily, then, the Sefer Ha’hinuch maintained that this prohibition applies anytime, and not only when the ascent to the altar constitutes an act of Aboda. A much simpler answer is that the Sages disputed this question. The account that appears in the Gemara follows the view that the Torah prohibition is limited to walking in long strides up stairs, whereas the Mechilta reflects a different opinion, extending this prohibition to include even taking long strides up a ramp to the top of the altar.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (20:22), “Lo Tibneh Et’hen Gazit” – that it is forbidden to build the altar in the Bet Ha’mikdash with stones that had been hewn with an instrument. The Sages understood that the Torah here prohibits using a stone that had come in contact with metal, even if a metal object had just touched the stone. A stone that had come in contact with metal is disqualified from being part of the altar in the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the reason underlying this command relates to the altar’s function to bring atonement for our wrongdoing, and thereby restore peace between us and G-d. As this is the role of the altar, it would be inappropriate to build the altar with a stone that had come in contact with metal, which is used to make knives, swords and the like, instruments which destroy and kill. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here reiterates the principle which he emphasizes several times in his work, that our actions have an effect upon our mind and heart. By ensuring that the altar’s stones had not come in contact with metal, we reinforce our awareness of the primary function of the altar – to atone for our sins and restore peace between us and our Creator. Others, including Rabbenu Bahya (Spain, 1255-1340) and Ibn Ezra (Spain, 1089-1167), offer a different explanation for this command. They observe that when stone is hewn, invariably, small pieces of the stone fall off and are discarded. It would be disrespectful to the altar if some pieces of its stones are discarded and allowed to go to waste, and so the Torah insisted that the altar be made only with whole stones, that had not been cut. Ibn Ezra adds that there was a concern that these small pieces of stone would be used to produce idols, which would be terribly disrespectful to the altar. A man or woman who takes a stone that had come in contact with metal, and places it as part of the altar – or even the ramp that leads to the altar – is in violation of this Biblical command and liable to Malkut. In order to avoid a possible violation of this command, the stones for the altar in the Bet Ha’mikdash were taken specifically from either virgin earth, which had never been cultivated, or from the bottom of the sea. Only stones taken from these areas could be determined with certainty to have not previously come in contact with metal, and so these were the stones from which the altar was constructed. The Hatam Sofer (Rav Moshe Sofer, Pressburg, 1762-1839) raised the question of why it was necessary to use specifically stones taken from these areas. Every stone, seemingly, has a Hazaka (presumption) that it had never come in contact with metal, and we should therefore rely on this Hazaka to permit using a stone for the altar until we have a reason to suspect that it had come in contact with metal. Several answers have been suggested. One explanation is that indeed, as far as Torah is concerned, it was not necessary to take a stone from virgin earth or the bottom of the sea. However, the Sages enacted this provision out of respect for the unique sanctity of the altar, requiring using only stones that we know for certain never came in contact with metal. Another answer is that if an ordinary stone would be taken for use in building the altar, two concerns arise – that this stone may have come in contact with metal, and that this stone may have been previously used for some mundane purpose. In either case, the stone is invalid for use in building the altar. Since two possible disqualifications are at stake, only stones which were known with certainty not to have been previously used were taken for the altar. Thirdly, some suggested that this measure was necessary because of the exceptionally grave repercussions of using an invalid stone for the altar. If one of the altar’s stones had come in contact with metal, then the altar is invalid for use, and thus all sacrifices offered on the altar are deemed invalid. This means that if somebody offered a sacrifice as part of his purification process, his process is incomplete, and he retains his status of impurity, but he assumes that he has now attained purity. He will then unknowingly be in violation of the severe prohibition against entering the Bet Ha’mikdash in a state of impurity, and eating hallowed food in a state of impurity. Furthermore, if the altar is invalid, such that the sacrifices offered on it are invalid, then offering sacrifices on the altar on Shabbat ends up being an act of Shabbat desecration. Certain sacrifices are allowed to be offered on Shabbat, but if the offering is invalid, then it is considered to have taken place in violation of Shabbat. Given these risks, it was decided to build the altar only with stones that were known to never have come in contact with metal.
The Torah in Parashat Yitro (Shemot 20:20) commands, “Lo Ta’asun Iti,” which the Gemara interprets to mean, “Lo Ta’asun Oti” – “Do not make Me,” introducing a prohibition against making an image resembling G-d. As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the only creature in the universe which bears any sort of resemblance to G-d is the human being, which is created “Be’selem Elokim” – in the divine image, in that we are endowed with an intellect. Hence, the command of “Lo Ta’asun Iti” forbids creating an image of a human being. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this is forbidden even if one has no intention whatsoever of worshipping the image, and he makes it purely for decoration. Regardless of the intention or purpose, making such an image is forbidden by Torah law. The reason underlying this prohibition, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is that images of human beings could result in pagan worship, as people might ascribe to these images divine-like powers. This prohibition is applicable at all times and in all places, and to both men and women. It is included under the prohibition of idolatry which is binding even upon gentiles. Surprisingly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who transgresses this prohibition and makes an image of a human being is not liable to Malkut. This is in contrast to the Rambam, who writes that this violation is, in fact, punishable by Malkut. Many later scholars wrestled with the question of why the Sefer Ha’hinuch felt that Malkut are not administered for violations of this command. One theory is that the command of “Lo Ta’asun Iti” might encompass other prohibitions, as well, such that it falls under the category of “Lav She’bi’chlalot” – commands which incorporate several different prohibitions, and which therefore are not punishable by Malkut. The Sages enacted a provision forbidding having such images in one’s possession. The Biblical command forbids only the act of producing such an image, but the Sages legislated that one may not even have in his property an image of this kind which somebody else had made. Some commentators explained that this law was enacted due to the concern that people might suspect the individual of worshipping the image, whereas others understood that the concern is that the person might be suspected of having made the image. We find among the Poskim five exceptions to this Rabbinic provision: 1. The Hatam Sofer (Rav Moshe Sofer of Pressburg, 1762-1839) writes that the Rabbinic decree applies only to keeping such an image in a private place. If one puts it on display in a place where people see it, the prohibition does not apply, because pagans did not generally keep their statues in public places. 2. The Rashba (Rav Shlomo Ben Aderet of Barcelona, 1235-1310) maintains that the prohibition applies only to three-dimensional images, but not to drawings, because the ancient pagans worshipped structures, such as statues, and not drawings on flat surfaces. 3. The Ramban (Rav Moshe Nachmanides, Spain, 1194-1270) makes an exception in the case of an image made in a disrespectful manner, such as an image of a human being on dishes or cups. 4. The Gemara in Masechet Rosh Hashanah establishes that it is forbidden also to have in one’s possession images of the celestial bodies, but nevertheless, Rabban Gamliel had images of the moon. This was permitted because he used them for the purpose of determining which appearances of the new moon warrant the declaration of Rosh Hodesh. The Gemara thus establishes that one may have in his possession an image that is normally forbidden if it is clear that he has it for educational purposes. 5. The Ra’a (Rav Aharon Ha’levi, Spain, 13 th century) famously maintained that this prohibition is limited to complete images. A sculpture of only part of the body, or even of an entire body with a part missing, may be kept in one’s possession, since the pagans worshipped only complete images. Accordingly, many people have the practice when receiving a trophy that features the image of a complete human being to break a small part, and it is then permissible to be kept in one’s possession. Since the Torah prohibition forbids only making such images, and having such an image in one’s possession is forbidden only by force of Rabbinic enactment, one may rely on the lenient position of the Ra’a and keep an incomplete image in his possession.
The final of the Ten Commandments is the prohibition of “Lo Tahmod” – “You shall not covet” (Shemot 20:14). This command forbids desiring somebody’s else’s possession, or even his wife, to the point where he applies pressure until he ultimately obtains the item in question. Even if one paid full price for the item, he violates this prohibition if the owner sold it under duress, due to the pressure that was applied. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that coveting another person’s possession or wife is inherently inappropriate, and also may lead to other transgressions such as theft or even murder. Simply experiencing a desire for somebody else’s possession does not constitute a violation of “Lo Tahmod”; this prohibition is transgressed only if one acts upon his desire by applying pressure on the owner. In the case of desiring somebody’s wife, one violates “Lo Tahmod” by trying to convince the husband to divorce his wife so that he can then marry her. One violates this prohibition regardless of whether he personally badgers the owner to give or sell the item, or if he sends other people to pressure the owner. This prohibition applies only to tangible possessions which the owner loses if he capitulates and sells or gives it due to the pressure applied. It would not apply to sharing knowledge, since the “owner” does not lose his knowledge by sharing it. And thus one who pressures his fellow to teach him some skill or some information is not in violation of “Lo Tahmod.” The Rambam (Hilchot Gezela Va’abeda 1:9) writes that one who violates the prohibition of “Lo Tahmod” is not liable to Malkut, because this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which is violated without performing an action. A famous principle establishes that one who transgresses a Biblical prohibition is liable to Malkut only if the command is violated through an action, and thus, the Rambam writes, Malkut are not administered in the case of a violation of “Lo Tahmod.” The Ra’abad (Rav Avraham Ben David of Posquieres, d. 1198), in his critique of the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, challenges the Rambam’s remark, in light of the Rambam’s own comment in that very same passage, that one does not violate “Lo Tahmod” unless he pressures the owner until he succeeds in obtaining it. Clearly, this prohibition entails a “Ma’aseh” (“action”), as it cannot be violated simply by desiring somebody else’s possession, and instead requires proactively pressuring the owner to sell or give the item. How, then, can the Rambam claim that “Lo Tahmod” falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”? The Maggid Mishneh commentary (by Rav Vidal of Tolosa, Spain, 14 th century) explains the Rambam’s position, asserting that in truth, one violates the prohibition of “Lo Tahmod” by coveting the item in question. Although it is true that one violates this prohibition only if he exerts effort until he obtains this item, this condition is the “Shiur” (“amount”) of coveting that is needed for the prohibition to be violated. Just as one must eat a certain quantity of non-kosher food to be in violation of that prohibition, similarly, one violates “Lo Tahmod” by desiring another person’s possession only if he desires the item to the extent that he ultimately succeeds in obtaining it. Hence, the prohibition is violated through the desire to obtain the object, and obtaining the object is merely the condition that needs to be met for the desire to constitute a violation of “Lo Tahmod.” Although the Ra’abad disputes the Rambam’s classification of “Lo Tahmod” as a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh,” he concurs that one does not receive Malkot for violating this prohibition, for a different reason. He explains that this violation is “Nitan Le’hishabon” – it can be rectified by paying the victim. One who violates “Lo Tahmod” by obtaining somebody else’s possession can “undo” his offense by simply returning the item. There is a rule that one who violates a “Lav Ha’nitan Le’hishabon” is not liable to Malkut, and for this reason, the Ra’abad maintains, one who transgresses “Lo Tahmot” does not receive Malkut. Nevertheless, although both the Rambam and Ra’abad agree that Malkut are generally not administered for violations of this command, there is one case regarding which they would disagree. If a man pressures a husband to divorce his wife so he could marry her, and after his efforts succeed, he then marries her, then according to the Ra’abad, he would, in fact, be liable to Malkut for violating “Lo Tahmod.” Once a divorced woman marries a different man, she may not remarry her first husband, even after the second husband dies or divorces her. Therefore, this is an instance of a violation of “Lo Tahmod” which cannot be rectified, since the violator cannot “return” the wife to her first husband. As such, in the view of the Ra’abad, the violator is liable to Malkut, as this situation does not qualify as a “Lav Ha’nitan Le’hishabon.” According to the Rambam, however, “Lo Tahmod” falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh,” as discussed, and so regardless of whether or not the violation can be rectified, the transgressor is not liable to Malkut.
The ninth of the Ten Commandments is the prohibition of “Lo Ta’aneh Be’re’acha Ed Shaker,” which forbids testifying falsely against one’s fellow in court. This includes both presenting information which one knows is false, and testifying about something which one had heard about but did not actually witness. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that maintaining law and order among the nation requires a functioning legal system, and one who falsely testifies in court undermines the integrity of the system, thereby threatening the stability of our society. Giving false testimony is thus regarded as an especially grievous sin, and for this reason it is included among the Aseret Ha’dibberot which G-d pronounced to our ancestors at Mount Sinai. This command is relevant in all places and in all times. It applies only to men, as women do not serve as witnesses. One who violates this command and testifies falsely in Bet Din is liable to Malkut. This prohibition is one of the exceptional instances where a transgressor can receive Malkut even though he violated a command by simply uttering words, without performing a concrete action. The Torah formulates this command as a prohibition against testifying falsely “Be’re’acha” – “against your friend.” At first glance, this formulation might lead us to conclude that the prohibition applies only when a witness testifies about a fellow Jew, but not when testifying about a gentile. It goes without saying that lying is always wrong, but the question arises as to whether this particular command applies only when one testifies about a fellow Jew, or even when testifying about a non-Jew. The Minhat Hinuch presents two arguments to prove that one violates the prohibition of “Lo Ta’aneh Be’re’acha Ed Shaker” even when testifying falsely about a gentile. Firstly, if we insist on the narrow, literal meaning of the word “Re’acha,” then we must conclude that it is forbidden to falsely testify about one’s friend, but not about somebody who is not his friend – a conclusion which is clearly untenable. Secondly, if this prohibition applies only to false testimony given about a Jew, then Bet Din would never be able to adjudicate a case between a Jew and a gentile, because the witnesses are not bound by this prohibition to testify truthfully. Necessarily, then, the prohibition of “Lo Ta’aneh” is relevant regardless of whether or not the litigant is Jewish. As for the word “Re’acha,” the Minhat Hinuch proposes a novel reading of this term, explaining that it refers to G-d. When somebody testifies falsely, he effectively betrays his most important “friend” – the Almighty Himself. G-d granted us a sacred soul which gives us the unique ability to speak, a quality that sets us fundamentally apart from all other creatures on earth. When we misuse this sacred soul to speak falsehood, this is a betrayal of G-d, and thus the Torah formulates this command as forbidding us from speaking against G-d Himself. The Poskim note that this prohibition is limited to those with the formal, halachic status of “Edim” (witnesses). Certain groups of people – such as relatives of the litigants – are disqualified from serving as witnesses, but if both litigants agree to accept these people’s testimony, then they may testify and Bet Din may rule on the basis of their testimony. In such cases, the person who testifies is not formally considered an “Ed,” since he is disqualified, and therefore the command of “Lo Ta’aneh” does not apply. The Gemara teaches that liars are among the groups of people who will be unworthy of beholding the Shechina (divine presence) in the next world. Clearly, then, speaking dishonestly is forbidden and a morally repugnant practice which we must avoid. However, while lying is always forbidden, the Rabbis addressed the question of whether the command of “Lo Ta’aneh” forbids all kinds of dishonest speech, or refers only to the specific case of giving false testimony. The Samag (Rav Moshe of Coucy, France, 13 th century) writes that the Torah forbids lying in Parashat Mishpatim (23:7), where it commands, “Mi’debar Sheker Tirhak” – “You shall distance yourself from falsehood.” According to this Semag, this is the source of the Biblical prohibition against lying generally (as opposed to the specific case of false testimony), and he lists this as the 117 th command in his listing of the Misvot. Others, however, note that this verse concludes with the prohibition against executing an innocent defendant (“Ve’naki Ve’sadik Al Taharog”), indicating that this verse is directed specifically to judges, and does not refer to general lying. Another possible Biblical source for the prohibition against lying is the command in the Book of Vayikra (19:36), “Hin Sedek Yihyeh Lachem,” which the Sages interpreted as a reference to honesty. The word “Hin” in some languages means “yes,” such that the command “Hin Sedek” means that we must honor our word and fulfill all commitments that we make. Accordingly, this verse might serve as the source for the prohibition against speaking untruthfully.
The eighth of the Ten Commandments is “Lo Tignob” – “You shall not steal.” Many misinterpret this command as introducing the prohibition against stealing money or property, when in truth, this command refers to stealing human beings, meaning, kidnapping. Specifically, it forbids forcefully taking somebody and selling him as a slave. Needless to say, stealing money or property is also forbidden, but the Torah introduces that command in a different context. The command of “Lo Tignob” in the Aseret Ha’dibberot forbids kidnapping. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the reason behind this command is readily obvious, and needs no explanation. The Rikanti (Rav Menahem Rikanti, Italy, 1250-1310) elaborates on the deeper meaning behind this command, explaining that every person is to be free to serve his Creator through the fulfillment of Misvot. One who kidnaps his fellow and sells him as a slave deprives his victim of realizing the purpose for which he was created – to serve G-d – by forcing him into subservience to another human being. This command is binding upon all people, at all times, and in all locations. It is included under the general prohibition of theft which is one of the Seven Noachide Laws, and it is thus binding even upon gentiles. One who kidnaps another person and sells him as a slave is liable to capital punishment, specifically, to Henek (strangulation). The Torah states this explicitly in Parashat Mishpatim (21:16): “And one who steals a person and sells him shall be put to death.” Of course, as we know, the Torah tells a famous story about somebody who was kidnapped and sold as a slave – the story of Yosef, whose brothers sold him to merchants as a slave. Yosef’s brothers were, clearly, righteous men, and it seems difficult to imagine that they transgressed one of the Ten Commandments. Therefore, while clearly the act they committed was wrong, a number of commentators explained that the sale of Yosef did not, at least technically, qualify as a violation of the command of “Lo Tignob.” One possibility is that one violates “Lo Tignob” only if he physically removes a person from his property into the kidnapper’s property. The sale of Yosef occurred in the region of Shechem, which Yaakob Abinu granted to Yosef. As such, the brothers never brought Yosef out of his property, and so the act they committed does not technically qualify as a violation of “Lo Tignob.” Others suggest that one does not violate “Lo Tignob” unless he performs “Hagbeha” – lifting the victim off the ground. Yosef’s brothers dragged him out of the pit when they sold him as a slave, without ever lifting him off the ground, and thus they were not in violation of “Lo Tignob.” Yet another theory emerges from the Midrash’s statement that the brothers decided to sell Yosef based on the precedent of Canaan – Noah’s grandson whom Noah cursed in response to Canaan’s disrespectful conduct when Noah became intoxicated. Noah placed a curse upon Canaan that he should be a slave because of his wrongdoing, and Yosef’s brothers reasoned that just as Canaan became a slave because of his misconduct, Yosef, too, should be condemned to slavery because of his bringing negative reports about them to their father. If so, then one could argue that the brothers already considered Yosef a slave by virtue of his wrongdoing, such that they did not, technically speaking, turn him into a slave. Furthermore, some commentators understand the text of the sale of Yosef (Bereshit 37:28) to mean that it was the Midyanim, and not the brothers, who actually pulled Yosef out of the pit and sold him to the Yishmaelite merchants. According to this understanding, then the brothers were clearly not in violation of the prohibition of “Lo Tignob.”
The seventh of the Ten Commandments is the command of “Lo Tin’af” – adultery, which forbids having relations with a married woman (Shemot 20:13). The Sefer Ha’hinuch presents several different reasons for this prohibition. First, he explains, G-d wants every type of creature to reproduce together with a member of its species, rather than breeding with a creature of a different kind. This extends to the family unit, as well, requiring people to reproduce only with their spouse. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, G-d wanted to ensure that everybody knows with certainty who his or her father is, and for this reason, it is forbidden to cohabit with a woman who is married to a different man. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives several reasons why it is important to know who one’s father is, including the simple fact that this is necessary in order to fulfill the command of Kibbud Ab – respecting one’s father. Moreover, if one does not know who his father is, he might end up marrying his sister, or another relative whom he is forbidden to marry. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, adultery constitutes a form of theft, in that the adulterer in a sense “steals” his fellow’s wife. And, adultery often leads to murder, as the husband might likely learn about the adulterous relationship and seek to take revenge against the adulterer. Needless to say, this prohibition applies at all times, and in all locations. It is included among the Seven Noachide Laws, which are binding even upon gentiles. As a general rule, when a man has relations with a married woman, both are liable to Henek (strangulation) if witnesses were present and the perpetrators were warned. If, however, the woman was not fully married, but was rather a “Na’ara Ha’me’orasa” – a girl who was betrothed, then they are both liable to a more severe form of capital punishment – Sekila (stoning). If the “Na’ara Ha’me’orasa” was the daughter of a Kohen, then she is liable to Serefa (burning). Different explanations have been given for why the punishment is more severe in the case of a betrothed girl. Intuitively, we would have assumed that relations with a fully married woman is a more grievous violation than relations with a girl who is only betrothed and had not yet begun marital life. Nevertheless, the punishment in the case of a betrothed girl is more severe. One explanation is that when one has a relationship with a married woman, he is concerned that the husband might find out, and this fear diminishes somewhat from the enjoyment of the sinful experience. In the case of a betrothed girl, however, the adulterer commits the act without any fear, as she is not even married yet, and thus his forbidden enjoyment is complete. This makes the sin more grievous, and hence the couple is liable to more severe punishment. There is considerable discussion among the scholars concerning the case of a man who does not die, but rather ascends to the heavens and enters Gan Eden alive – something which happened on rare occasions in earlier generations. Eliyahu Ha’nabi, for example, did not die, but rather ascended to the heavens without dying, and became an angel. Another example of Hanoch, Noah’s great-grandfather, who was taken from this world to Gan Eden alive. Likewise, the great Talmudic sage Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi was brought to Gan Eden alive. The question arises as to whether the wife of such a man may remarry. Normally, of course, a married woman becomes permissible for other men once her husband dies. In this case, however, the husband never died, but on the other hand, the husband is no longer in this world. Rav Elhanan Wasserman (1874-1941) writes that this question depends on the conceptual question of whether the reality of the husband’s absence from this world suffices to render the woman permissible for other men to marry, or whether it is specially the husband’s death that allows the woman to be allowed to marry another man. Is a married woman forbidden for other men because she has a husband, or is she forbidden until the husband either gives her a Get or dies? Some scholars suggest drawing proof to the latter position from the Gemara’s discussion in Masechet Kiddushin (13). The Gemara there raises the question as to the source of the law permitting a wife to remarry after her husband’s death. Initially, the Gemara proposes explaining that since it is the husband who makes the woman forbidden for other men, by betrothing her, it stands to reason that once he is no longer alive, she is allowed to marry another man. However, the Gemara then dismisses this rationale, noting that even after the husband’s death, the wife may not marry his relatives, which shows that even once the husband dies, the effects of his betrothal remain. It does not necessarily follow, then, that the husband’s death automatically dissolves the effects of his betrothal with respect to the wife’s status vis-à-vis other men. The Gemara concludes by noting an association drawn by the Torah between a husband’s death and the giving of a Get. Just as giving a Get has the effect of rendering the women permissible for other men, likewise, the husband’s death results in the woman becoming permissible for other men. This conclusion appears to indicate that a wife becomes permissible only with the husband’s death. The death itself functions just like a Get, allowing the wife to marry another man, and it is thus the death, and not merely the husband’s absence, which renders her permissible. Seemingly, then, the wife of a man who was taken to Gan Eden alive would not be allowed to remarry. On the other hand, the Rama (Rav Moshe Isserles, Cracow, 1530-1572), in his Darkeh Moshe (E.H. 17), notes that the Torah formulates the prohibition of adultery as a prohibition against relations with “Eshet Re’ehu” – “one’s fellow’s wife.” This phrase implies that only “Eshet Re’ehu” – the wife of a fellow human being – is forbidden, but not the wife of angel, such that the wife of somebody who ascended to the heavens alive should be permitted to marry another man. A similar question arises in situations of men who died and were then brought back to life. For example, the Gemara in Masechet Megilla tells the famous story of Rabbi Zera, who was killed by his colleague one Purim, and was then revived. Some Rabbis addressed the question of whether Rabbi Zera needed to marry his wife anew, since his death may have dissolved the marriage, thus necessitating a new Kiddushin (betrothal). Likewise, tradition teaches that at the time of Matan Torah, Beneh Yisrael’s souls departed as a result of the sound of G-d’s voice, and they were then revived, giving rise to the question of whether they needed to get married again after their lives were restored.
The sixth of the Ten Commandments is the command of “Lo Tirsach,” the prohibition against murder (Shemot 20:12). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that G-d created the world with the intention that it should be inhabited and developed, and thus taking human life is contrary to G-d’s will for the world. By the same token, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, those who destroy the world through their evil conduct specifically should be killed, as their death is actually beneficial for the world’s development. Needless to say, the prohibition against murder applies at all times and in all places, and it is binding upon both men and women. This prohibition is included among the Seven Noachide Laws, which are binding upon even gentiles. Murder constitutes a capital offense, and thus one who intentionally takes the life of another person in the presence of witnesses, after he had been warned, is liable to execution – specifically, Sayif (killing by the sword). One who accidentally murders must flee to an Ir Miklat (city of refuge), which is a separate Misva and will be discussed in a different context. G-d warns in the Book of Bereshit (9:5), “Ve’ach Et Dimchem Le’nafshotechem Edrosh” (literally, “But I shall make a reckoning for your blood, for your souls”). The Gemara in Masechet Baba Kama (91) interprets this verse to mean that G-d will hold people accountable for their own blood – meaning, those who take their own lives will be punished in the afterlife. Normally, when a person dies, his death brings atonement for his misdeeds (the Rambam famously writes that some sins can be atoned for only through death), but if one takes his own life, then his death does not achieve atonement. In fact, the Hatam Sofer (Rav Moshe Sofer, Pressburg, 1762-1839) writes that such a person incurs even greater guilt by taking his own life. What’s more, the Tiferet Yisrael (commentary to the Mishna by Rav Yisrael Lifshitz, 1782-1860), in Masechet Sanhedrin (10:12), cites those who say that one who takes his own life forfeits his share in the world to come. However, while it is clear that suicide is strictly forbidden, the Aharonim debate the question of whether it is forbidden by force of the command of “Lo Tirsah,” or constitutes a separate prohibition. The Sages inferred that suicide is forbidden from the aforementioned verse in Bereshit (“Ve’ach Et Dimchem Le’nafshotechem Edrosh”), but it is unclear whether this verse reveals that suicide is regarded as murder, or if it introduces a separate prohibition of suicide. The Pesikta Rabbati (24) comments that the phrase “Lo Tirsah” implies also “Lo Titrasach” – “Do not allow yourself to be killed.” According to this Midrashic source, it seems, the prohibition of “Lo Tirsah” itself includes not only taking the life of another person, but also taking one’s own life. By contrast, the Minhat Hinuch contends that “Lo Tirsah,” at its core, is a command relating to our interpersonal obligations, our responsibilities towards our fellowman. Necessarily, then, it forbids only taking the life of others, and not taking one’s own life, and the prohibition against suicide constitutes a separate law. The Minhat Hinuch applies this theory to explain an otherwise perplexing comment of the Rambam. In Hilchot Rose’ah (2:2), the Rambam writes that one who kills himself “sheds blood and is guilty of the sin of murder,” adding that such a person “is liable to death at the hands of G-d, but is not liable to execution by the court.” Later scholars raised the question of why the Rambam found it necessary to state that a person who commits suicide is not liable to execution by Bet Din. Quite obviously, Bet Din cannot put to death somebody who is already dead. The Minhat Hinuch suggests an ingenious explanation, noting the principle of “Kim Leh Be’de’rabba Mineh” – that if one incurs a financial obligation at the time he commits a capital offense, he is exempt from the financial obligation. For example, if a person damages property in the course of murdering somebody, he does not have to compensate for the damage, since he is liable to execution because of that act. The Minhat Hinuch thus suggests that the Rambam’s remark is relevant to the case of a person who damaged property in the course of committing suicide. The Rambam informs us that suicide is a separate prohibition from murder, and thus this individual has not committed a capital offense that would absolve him from the obligation to compensate for the damage caused. As such, the compensation must be paid from his estate. Others suggest that the Rambam’s remark is relevant to the case of a person who does not kill himself, but makes himself a Terefa – terminally ill. According to many Poskim, damaging somebody’s health to the point where he becomes a Terefa is Halachically regarded as murder. As such, we might have assumed that if one did this to himself, he would be guilty of murder and thus liable to execution. The Rambam therefore clarified that suicide stands separate and apart from murder, such that Bet Din would not execute somebody who made himself a Terefa. We find in the Talmud and Midrashim a number of stories of lifelong sinners who ultimately repented, and then took their own lives to earn atonement. These stories have led some to maintain that suicide might, at least under certain, extraordinary circumstances, be allowed for the purpose of earning Kappara (atonement). It would seem that this would depend on the question discussed above, as to whether suicide is considered murder. If suicide is included under the prohibition of “Lo Tirsah,” then just as one obviously is not permitted to kill another person even if his intent is for that person to achieve atonement, then one may not kill himself for this purpose, either. If, however, suicide constitutes a separate prohibition, then it is possible, at least in principle, that some exceptions might apply. A number of Rabbis have noted that a person can be guilty of a form of suicide even without actually killing himself. If a person wastes time, then he is, in a certain sense, shortening his life. He takes a part of his life which could be used productively and instead wastes it on vanity and meaningless activities. He thereby destroys part of his life, and is thus considered as having committed a form of suicide. This prohibition, then, is relevant not only with regard to actual suicide, but also with respect to the need to treat every moment of life as a precious commodity which must be used properly.
The fifth of the Ten Commandments is “Kabed Et Abicha Ve’et Imecha” – the obligation to honor one’s father and mother (Shemot 20:12). The Sefer H’hinuch defines this Misva as a command to show one’s parents respect and to assist them with all their needs. He explains that this command is rooted in the concept of “Hakarat Ha’tob” – gratitude, as it is appropriate to express gratitude to one’s parents for bringing him into the world and for exerting immense efforts to care for him and raise him. The enormous debt of gratitude that a child owes to his parents is expressed through the obligation to respect them and to help them in any way he can. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that expressing gratitude to one’s parents will accustom him to feeling gratitude generally, and this will lead him to a profound sense of gratitude to G-d for creating him and for providing him with all his needs. This deep-seated sense of gratitude to G-d will, in turn, motivate a person to serve Him properly. This Misva applies to both men and women. However, if a married woman faces a conflict between her husband’s wishes and her parents’ wishes, then her husband’s wishes take precedence. The Torah in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:3) commands, “Each man shall revere his mother and his father,” seemingly directing this command specifically to men. The Sages understood this formulation as alluding to an exception to a woman’s obligation of honoring parents, namely, that she does not respect her parents’ wishes when they conflict with her husband’s wishes. Nevertheless, the Sefer Hasidim (Rabbenu Yehuda Ha’hasid, Germany, late 12 th -early 13 th century) writes that it is proper for a husband to forego his own honor for the sake of his in-laws’ honor, and to yield to their wishes when they conflict with his own. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who fails to respect his parents is deserving of severe punishment, because by failing to respect his parents, he shows a lack of gratitude to G-d, as well. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, in times when Bet Din has the authority to enforce compliance with the Misvot, Bet Din could coerce a person to respect his parents. The Minhat Hinuch questions this statement, noting the principle established by the Gemara (Hulin 110b) that Bet Din does not enforce compliance with Misvot whose reward is explicated in the Torah. In the Aseret Ha’dibberot, the Torah explicitly states that honoring parents is rewarded with long life (“Lema’an Ya’arichun Yamecha”), and it thus follows that Bet Din cannot coerce a person to respect his parents. Some explain that although Bet Din cannot employ coercive measures to enforce compliance with this Misva, it can subject the person to humiliation for his failure to respect his parents in order to motivate him to obey this command. The Misva of honoring parents is among the Misvot listed by the Mishna in the beginning of Masechet Bikkurim – which we read each morning – that offer rewards both in this world and the next. The Mishna writes that a person “consumes the fruits” of these Misvot in this world, while “the principal remains intact for him in the next world.” The Gemara teaches in Masechet Kiddushin that one must respect his parents both during their lifetime and after their passing. After a parent passes on, the child is obligated to respect their memory by reciting kaddish , performing special Misvot in their merit, and fulfilling their wishes. The Zohar teaches that every week, after Shabbat, the “Neshama Yetera” (“extra soul”) which each person receives on Shabbat returns to the heavens, and it is asked whether the person gained some new Torah insight over Shabbat, or accepted a new religious commitment. When the soul reports what was learned or gained over Shabbat, an announcement is made in the heavens, “Look what the child of so-and-so said” – and at that moment, the soul of the deceased parent is congratulated on the child’s achievement. A special crown is then put on the parent’s head, and the parent’s soul is elevated to greater heights in Gan Eden. Thus, a meaningful way to respect a parent after his or her death is to learn something new or make a new commitment on Shabbat. The Hid”a (Rav Haim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) comments that this might explain why the Torah, in Parashat Kedoshim, juxtaposes the obligation to respect parents with the obligation to observe Shabbat: “Each man shall revere his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot” – because one of the important ways one respects his deceased parent is by utilizing Shabbat as an opportunity for Torah learning and spiritual growth.
In the fourth of the Aseret Ha’diberot, we are commanded, “Lo Ta’aseh Kol Melacha” (Shemot 20:10) – to refrain from “Melacha” (“work”) on Shabbat. We are required to personally refrain from “Melacha,” as well as to ensure that our servants, animals and children also refrain from “Melacha.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva is intended to reinforce our belief in “Hiddush Ha’olam” – the notion that G-d created the world. There were philosophers, such as Aristotle, who acknowledged G-d’s existence, but believed that just as G-d always existed, the world also always existed. In order for us to strongly affirm our rejection of this belief, and continually reinforce our faith in creation, the Torah commanded us to rest on the seventh day, commemorating the world’s creation in six days. The belief in creation is a critical tenet of faith, as it is only because we believe that G-d created the world that we believe that G-d exerts absolute control over the world and can suspend the laws of nature. The Torah therefore commanded us to rest on the seventh day, to remind ourselves that G-d created the world in six days. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, we refrain from work on Shabbat to commemorate the Exodus from Egypt. When our ancestors were enslaved in Egypt, they were forced to work every day, and were denied the freedom to rest. By observing a day of rest on Shabbat, we commemorate the miraculous Exodus which brought our ancestors the freedom to rest from work. These two reasons for Shabbat observance are expressed in the two versions of the Aseret Ha’diberot. In Parashat Yitro, the Torah explains that we must observe Shabbat to commemorate the world’s creation, whereas in Parashat Va’et’hanan, the Torah writes that we must observe Shabbat in order to remember the Exodus. This command applies in all time periods and in all places, and is binding upon both males and females. Intentionally transgressing this prohibition is punishable by Sekila (stoning), and one who unintentionally violates this command must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). The Gemara in Masechet Shabbat (97b) establishes that there are thirty-nine Melachot – types of activity – which are forbidden on Shabbat. This is derived from two different sources. First, when Moshe speaks to the people about Shabbat observance in Parashat Vayakhel (35:1), he introduces the command by saying, “Eleh Ha’debarim Asher Siva Hashem” – “These are the things which G-d commanded.” The word “Eleh” in Gematria equals 36, and the word “Debarim” (“things”) implies a minimum of two. The additional emphasis of “HA’debarim” (“THE things”) alludes to an additional Melacha, for a total of 39. Secondly, the word “Melacha” appears in its various forms a total of thirty-nine times in the Torah, indicating that there are thirty-nine categories of Melacha. Only four of the thirty-nine Melachot are mentioned explicitly in the Torah. One is “Hosa’a” – carrying an object from one domain to another. We read that when Beneh Yisrael donated materials toward the construction of the Mishkan, Moshe was informed that too many materials were donated, and so he announced, “Al Ya’asu Od Melacha Li’trumat Ha’kodesh” – “they shall not do more work for the donation to the Sanctuary” (Shemot 36:6). The people were bringing materials from their homes to the Levite camp, and Moshe refers to this activity – carrying the materials from one domain to another – as a “Melacha,” thus establishing that carrying from one domain to another qualifies as a “Melacha” and is thus forbidden on Shabbat. The reason why this Melacha is explicitly mentioned in the Torah is because, as Tosafot write in the beginning of Masechet Shabbat, this prohibition is a “Melacha Geru’a” – an “inferior” type of work. People intuitively find it difficult to understand why simply carrying an item from one domain to another, without changing it in any way, qualifies as a “Melacha.” Moreover, they cannot understand why carrying a heavy burden within one’s home up and down stairs for hours is, technically, permissible on Shabbat, whereas walking outside with a peanut is forbidden. For this reason, Tosafot write, the tractate of the Talmud that deals with the laws of Shabbat – Masechet Shabbat – begins with the laws of Hosa’a, and indeed, this Melacha receives more attention in the Talmud than any other of the thirty-nine Melachot. (In fact, there is even a separate Masechet – Masechet Erubin – which is devoted almost entirely to this prohibition.) Since people intuitively do not regard Hosa’a as a Melacha, it requires greater emphasis, and this is why the Torah found it necessary to explicitly present this particular prohibition. Another Melacha which is specified in the Torah is “Hab’ara” – kindling a flame, which the Torah singles out in Parashat Vayakhel (Shemot 35:3). There is a famous debate among the Tanna’im as to why this Melacha was singled out. Rabbi Yossi maintained “Hab’ara Le’lav Yasat” – the Torah singled out this prohibition to “downgrade” it, so-to-speak, to the level of an ordinary prohibition. As mentioned earlier, performing any of the Melachot on Shabbat constitutes a capital offense. According to Rabbi Yossi, the Torah singled out “Hab’ara” to mark it as an exception, such that one who kindles a flame on Shabbat is liable to Malkut, and not to capital punishment. Rabbi Natan disagrees, and maintains that “Hab’ara” is no different from the other thirty-eight Melachot. In his view, the Torah specified this prohibition “Le’halek” – to indicate the each of the thirty-nine Melachot stands alone as an independent prohibition, such that one who violates several Melachot is guilty of multiple transgressions. Finally, the Torah in Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 34:21) commands, “Be’harish U’ba’kasir Tishbot” – that we must refrain from plowing and harvesting. According to Rabbi Akiba, this verse refers to the prohibitions of the Shemita year, and has nothing at all to do with Shabbat, but Rabbi Yishmael disagrees, and maintains that the Torah here specifies the Melachot of plowing and harvesting which are forbidden on Shabbat. Rabbi Yishmael explains that the Torah specifies this prohibition to indicate that only agricultural activity performed for one’s own purposes is forbidden on Shabbat, as opposed to such activity done for a sacred purpose. This excludes the harvesting of the Omer – the first grain in the spring, which is offered as a sacrifice in the Bet Ha’mikdash – which may be performed on Shabbat. All the other Melachot are derived from activities which were performed during the construction of the Mishkan, or as part of the operations in the Mishkan.
We are commanded in the fourth of the Aseret Ha’diberot (Shemot 20:8), “Zachor Et Yom Ha’Shabbat Le’kadesho” – “Remember the day of Shabbat, to regard it as sacred.” The Gemara understood the command of “Zachor” (“Remember”) as requiring not just cognitively remembering Shabbat, but verbally declaring its unique stature of sanctity both when it begins and when it ends. This command, then, is the source of the obligation to recite Kiddush when Shabbat begins and Habdala when Shabbat ends. In explaining the reason behind this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch returns to the principle which he had previously developed, that our hearts and minds are impacted by our actions. He writes that the Torah commanded us to declare the sanctity of Shabbat because this will enhance our appreciation of the great importance of this day. The observance of Shabbat commemorates G-d’s having created the world in six days, thereby affirming the belief in a Creator, that G-d brought the entire universe into existence. The singular importance of this belief necessitates not only observing Shabbat, but making a verbal proclamation when it begins and ends to emphasize for ourselves the significance of this occasion. For this same reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, our Sages instituted that these recitations should be made over a cup of wine – because this ensures that the recitation will leave a stronger impression. Wine is a unique beverage, as it satiates and also brings joy, and so we recite Kiddush specifically over a cup of wine to make this recitation more dramatic and impactful. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes the Gemara’s ruling that if one prefers bread over wine, he should recite Kiddush over bread, instead of wine. The reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, is because for such a person, reciting Kiddush over bread will be more impactful than reciting Kiddush over wine. (Habdala, however, cannot be recited over bread, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that at the end of Shabbat, most people do not have much of an appetite, as they had enjoyed the robust Shabbat meals, and therefore reciting Habdala over wine is more impactful than reciting it over bread.) The Sefer Ha’hinuch applies this theory to explain several Halachot pertaining to Kiddush, such as the requirement to recite Kiddush and Habdala over a Rebi’it of wine, rinsing the cup before Kiddush, and the prohibition against eating or drinking before Kiddush or Habdala. These Halachot are all geared towards impressing upon us the unique importance of Shabbat. Although this Misva applies only at particular times, and women are generally exempt from Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama (timebound affirmative commands), women are included in the Misva of Kiddush. The Gemara in Masechet Berachot establishes that the obligation of “Zachor Et Yom Ha’Shabbat” is linked to the command of “Shamor Et Yom Ha’Shabbat,” which forbids performing Melacha (forbidden activity) on Shabbat. Thus, since women are bound by the prohibitions of Shabbat (just as they are bound by all Torah prohibitions), they are similarly bound by the command of Kiddush. The Kiddush we recite on Shabbat day – commonly referred to as “Kiddusha Rabba” – was instituted by the Sages, and is not included in the Torah obligation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Sages instituted this recitation in order to distinguish the Shabbat meal from our weekday meals. The Rambam was of the opinion that one should drink wine at Se’uda Shelishit, as well. Although this is not generally practiced, it is preferable to include wine at Se’uda Shelishit. I recall once eating Se’uda Shelishit together with Hacham Shlomo Amar Shelit”a, Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, and he made a point of requesting wine so he could satisfy this opinion of the Rambam. A number of Poskim addressed the question of why we do not fulfill the Torah obligation of Kiddush by reciting Arbit on Friday night. After all, the Sefer Ha’hinuch defines the Kiddush obligation as requiring verbally declaring the special quality and greatness of Shabbat, which is precisely what we do in the text of the Amida prayer recited on Friday night. Seemingly, then, this recitation should suffice to fulfill the Torah obligation of Kiddush. Four different reasons have been given to explain why reciting the Friday night Amida prayer does not suffice to fulfill this Misva. The Minhat Hinuch explains based on the famous rule of “Misvot Serichot Kavana” – that one fulfills a Misva only if he has mind when performing the action that he intends to fulfill the obligation. Quite obviously, when we recite Arbit on Friday night, we have no intention to fulfill the Misva of Kiddush, and so this recitation does not satisfy the Kiddush obligation. The Minhat Hinuch then goes even further, claiming that even according to the view that “Misvot En Serichot Kavana” – one fulfills a Misva even if he does not have the Misva in mind when performing the action – we do not fulfill the Misva of Kiddush through the recitation of Arbit. According to this view, one can fulfill a Misva even if he had no specific intention for the Misva, but even this view agrees that one cannot fulfill the Misva if he has a different Misva in mind when performing the action. When we recite Arbit on Friday night, we do so to fulfill the Misva of prayer, and therefore, since we specifically have a different Misva in mind, all views agree that we do not at the same time fulfill the Misva of Kiddush. Others explain based on the Gemara’s remark that we must make mention of the Exodus from Egypt as part of our recitation of Kiddush. Since the text of the Friday night Amida makes no mention of the Exodus, it does not suffice to fulfill the obligation of Kiddush. Finally, some Rabbis asserted that once the Sages instituted that the Misva of Kiddush should be fulfilled over a cup of wine, this is how the Misva must be fulfilled, and we cannot fulfill this Misva – even on the level of Torah law – in any other way.
The third of the Ten Commandments is the prohibition, “Lo Tisa Et Shem Hashem Elokecha La’shav” – “You may not bear the Name of G-d in vain” (Shemot 20:7). The Gemara understands this command as forbidding several different kinds of false or meaningless oaths uttered in G-d’s Name. One is swearing about something which is obviously untrue, such as swearing that a rock is a piece of gold. The second example is an oath about something which is obviously true, such as swearing that a rock is a rock. Thirdly, it is prohibited to swear that one will not fulfil a Misva, such as swearing that one will not wear Tefillin. Since we are all bound by the commitment declared by our ancestors at the time the Torah was given, such an oath is meaningless, and thus forbidden. The fourth kind of forbidden oath is a vow to do something which is impossible, such as if one swears he will not sleep for three days, or that he will not eat for seven days. Likewise, this prohibition requires that if somebody swears in G-d’s Name to do something, or to refrain from doing something, then he must fulfill his vow, as otherwise it will have been uttered falsely. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that these oaths are forbidden because they constitute a grave disparagement of G-d’s Name. We may invoke G-d’s Name only for meaningful and important purposes, and one who invokes His Name for a meaningless or false oath disrespects it. Moreover, when one invokes G-d’s Name when swearing to do something, he does so in order to lend greater credence to his words. The person in effect says that just as G-d is permanent and everlasting, and He exists forever, his word is likewise permanently binding. By extension, if one violates his oath, then he shows that just as his word is not permanent, G-d is likewise not permanent, Heaven forbid. It thus turns out that if one swears by G-d’s Name and then violates the oath, he has spoken heresy, by indicating that G-d is impermanent like his word. In discussing this command, the Sefer Ha’hinuch makes a grammatical observation, noting that the Hebrew verb for “swear” – “Nishba” – is always used in the Nif’al construction. The usual construction would yield “Shaba,” but the word instead is formulated “Nishba,” in the “Nif’al” form. This form is normally used for a passive verb, which describes something being done to a person, as opposed to an action which a person performs. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the “Nif’al” form is used for this verb because we are influenced by the words we speak. When a person swears, he is affected by the oath, and is motivated and driven to fulfill his world, and therefore the passive “Nif’al” construction is used in reference to a person who takes an oath. The Gemara in Masechet Temura establishes that one who violates this command is liable to Malkut, despite the fact that he did not commit an action. According to one view, speech does not qualify as a Halachic “Ma’aseh” (“action”), in which case prohibitions violated through speech should fall under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – prohibitions transgressed without committing an action, for which one is not liable to Malkut. Nevertheless, the Gemara teaches, the prohibition of “Lo Tisa” marks an exception to this rule, due to its unique gravity, and one who swears in G-d’s Name falsely or meaninglessly is, indeed, liable to Malkut even though he did not commit an action. Rav Yehonatan Eibshutz (1690-1764), in his work Urim Ve’tumim, addresses the question of whether one violates this prohibition if he makes a false oath in writing. Does this prohibition forbid swearing falsely only verbally, or does it include even written oaths? Rav Eibshutz proves from the Gemara that a written oath does not fall under this prohibition. The Gemara resorts to a textual inference from a verse to establish that one is liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition even though no action has been committed. Rav Eibshutz notes that if it is possible to transgress this prohibition through writing, which is, quite clearly, a “Ma’aseh,” then this prohibition would fall under the category of “Lav She’yesh Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition violated through an action. Hence, there would be no need for the Gemara to resort to a textual inference, as it would be clear that one is liable to Malkut for violating this command. Indeed, as the Minhat Hinuch notes, the Maggid Mishneh (commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah by Rav Vidal of Tolosa, Spain, 14 th century) famously stated that according to the Rambam, if a prohibition can be violated through an action, then one is liable to Malkut even if he violates it without committing an action. Hence, the fact that the Gemara speaks of the prohibition of “Lo Tisa” as a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” proves that this prohibition cannot be violated by writing. The Poskim debate the question of whether one violates this prohibition by reciting a Beracha She’ena Sericha – an unnecessary Beracha, such as if one recites a Beracha over a drink during a meal after having recited “Ha’mosi.” Once one recites “Ha’mosi” over bread, this Beracha covers most foods and drinks he enjoys during the meal, and thus reciting a Beracha over a food or drink during the meal is an unnecessary Beracha. As opposed to a Beracha Le’batala – which is recited entirely in vain – this Beracha is recited meaningfully, but it is unnecessary. Some Poskim maintained that reciting such a Beracha does not violate “Lo Tisa” because it does not disrespect G-d, whereas others argued that since the Beracha is not necessary, it indeed transgresses this prohibition. Some people make the mistake of trying to substantiate their words by saying something to the effect of, “I swear to G-d.” Such a remark is inappropriate, as one invokes G-d’s Name disrespectfully, in a context where it is not warranted.
The second of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5) includes the prohibition, “Lo Ta’ovdem,” which forbids worshipping foreign deities. This prohibition differs from the preceding command – “Lo Tishtahaveh Lahem” (“Do not bow to them”) – which forbids performing certain rituals before a statue that express reverence and submission, such as bowing and sacrificing. The prohibition of “Lo Ta’ovdem,” by contrast, forbids worshipping a foreign deity in the accepted mode of worship for that deity, even in a manner that would otherwise be considered disrespectful or irreverent. The classic example is the worship of Pe’or, an ancient pagan deity whose followers served it by defecating on it. If a person defecates on a statue of Pe’or, then even if his intention is to degrade the statue, nevertheless, he is in violation of the command of “Lo Ta’ovdem.” Another example is Markulis, a statue which was worshipped by throwing stones. If somebody throws a stone at this statue, he violates the command of “Lo Ta’ovdem” even if he intended to express disdain. A third example is Kemosh, a god which was worshipped by pulling one’s hair out before it. One who does this violates “Lo Ta’ovdem” even if his intention was to offend the idol. As idolatry is included in the Sheba Misvot Beneh Noah (seven Noachide Laws), this prohibition is binding even upon gentiles. Furthermore, idolatry is one of the transgressions which one must avoid even at the threat of death. One must refuse to worship a foreign deity even if he would be killed as a result. Likewise, the Gemara in Pesahim (25) addresses the case of a gravely ill patient suffering from a condition whose cure requires worshipping an idol. The Gemara rules that this patient may not worship the idol, even if he will otherwise die from his illness. One who violates this command intentionally is liable to capital punishment, and one who does so unintentionally (meaning, he was unaware that such an act is forbidden) must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). The Poskim address the question of whether one is liable to punishment, or required to bring a sacrifice, if he makes a verbal declaration, such as “Eli Ata” – “You are my god,” without performing any action. Does a verbal declaration qualify as a “Ma’aseh” (action) for which one would be liable to punishment, or required to bring a sacrifice if this is done unintentionally? The Gemara establishes that “Akimat Sefatayim” – moving one’s lips to articulate – is treated by Halacha as a “Ma’aseh.” The Poskim raise the question of why, if this is the case, the prohibition of Giduf – blaspheming G-d – is considered a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh,” a violation which does not entail an action, and for which one is therefore not liable to punishment. Why is blaspheming not considered a “Ma’aseh,” if it is done through “Akimat Sefatayim”? The Maharam Shick (Hungary, 1807-1879) explains that blaspheming is treated as a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” because it does not necessarily require “Akimat Sefatayim.” Certain letters, he explains, can be vocalized without moving one’s lips at all (such as vowel sounds), and uttering these sounds therefore does not qualify as a Halachic “Ma’aseh.” Hence, if somebody blasphemes G-d, and a person who hears him makes a sound without moving his lips that expresses his agreement with the blasphemy, that second person has violated the prohibition of blasphemy without having performed an action. The Maharam Shick thus explains that since this prohibition can be transgressed without a “Ma’aseh,” it is considered a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” even if one transgresses in the usual fashion, by moving his lips. By the same token, the Maharam Shick writes, if somebody serves an Aboda Zara verbally, by declaring his acceptance of the foreign deity, this would fall under the category of a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh.” Since this could be done without moving one’s lips, we treat this prohibition as a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” even in a case where one declares allegiance to the deity by moving his lips. Therefore, one who does so would not be liable to punishment or be required to be a Hatat, even though he has, quite obviously, transgressed a grave violation.
The Torah commands in the second of the Aseret Ha’diberot (Shemot 20:5), “Lo Tishtahaveh Lahem” – that it is forbidden to bow to any foreign deity. Although the Torah speaks specifically about bowing, the Gemara teaches that there are four rituals which may not be performed before an idol, regardless of whether one intends to serve the idol, or whether this is the normal way of serving this particular idol. These four rituals are: bowing, slaughtering an animal as a sacrifice, placing an offering (such as sacrificial meat, or incense) before the idol, and pouring a libation. These actions are all included in the prohibition against serving a foreign deity, and are applicable to all foreign deities. This prohibition, of course, is binding upon both men and women, and upon gentiles, as idol worship is one of the seven Noachide Laws to which all mankind is bound. Needless to say, this command is not dependent on any time or place. One who performs one of these rituals in knowing violation of the Biblical command is liable to Kareit (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation), and if witnesses saw him commit the act after they had issued a warning, he is liable to execution by the Bet Din. If one violates this prohibition unintentionally (such as if he was unaware that this act was forbidden), then he is obligated to bring a Hatat (sin-offering). The Sages enacted that one may not bow before an idol even if he has no intention to do so. For example, if a person dropped something in front of an idol, he may not bow down to pick it up, as this gives the appearance of bowing to the idol. Another example is leaning down to remove a thorn from one’s foot. This, too, may not be done in the presence of an idol. Even though one has no intention at all to bow to the idol, this is forbidden because it appears as though he bows to the idol. This Halacha underlies the famous, tragic story of Hanna and her seven sons. The king ordered each of the sons to bow before a statue, and they all refused, for which they were executed. When the youngest came before the king, and the king realized that he would not agree to bow, the king threw his ring in front of the statue and asked the child to pick it up. The child refused – in accordance with the Halacha that bowing before an idol is forbidden even if one’s intention is not to bow to the idol. The Terumat Ha’deshen (Rav Yisrael Isserlein, 1390-1460) raises the question of whether it is permissible to bow out of respect to a person who wears an idol around his neck. He writes this case might be different from that of bending down to pick something up or remove a thorn in front of an idol, because in those situations, onlookers will naturally assume that the person bows to the idol. Since one does not normally bow in front of an idol to pick up something from the ground, or remove a thorn, doing so very much appears like bowing to the idol. But in societies where bowing out of respect to people is common, bowing to a person wearing an idol around his neck would not be misunderstood as bowing to the idol, as onlookers would realize that the bowing was done out of respect to the person. Perhaps, then, this should be permissible. Proofs have suggested for both sides of this question. One proof is brought from the fact that Mordechai risked his life by refusing to bow to Haman. Haman had declared himself a deity, but Halacha permits bowing to a prominent person even though he had declared himself a divine being, as it is clear that one bows not as a sign of worship, but out of respect for the person’s position of distinction. This gives rise to the question of why Mordechai refused to bow before Haman. The Terumat Ha’deshen answers based on the Midrash’s comment that Haman wore an idol around his neck. Although Mordechai was allowed to bow before Haman himself, he was not permitted to bow before the idol the Haman wore. The story of Mordechai, then, would seem to prove that one may not bow before a person who is wearing an idol. Some suggested bringing a counterproof from the story of Abraham Abinu and the three angels that he welcomed. The Midrash tells that these angels were disguised as nomads belonging to a certain pagan sect that worshipped the dust on their feet. Nevertheless, although Abraham mistakenly thought that these angels were pagans who worshipped the dust on their feet, the Torah relates that Abraham bowed to them when he greeted them. This would seem to prove that to the contrary, it is permissible to bow before somebody wearing an object of idolatry. (Although the story of Abraham and the angels took place before Matan Torah, this story is nevertheless relevant to our discussion, because the prohibition against bowing to an idol, as mentioned, is among the Noachide Laws issued in Noah’s time.) This question has not been conclusively resolved, and the Poskim were thus inclined to rule stringently, given the uniquely grievous nature of the sin of Aboda Zara. It should be noted that this question is not really relevant nowadays, when in any event it is not customary to bow as a sign of respect. Moreover, the cross worn by Christians is not worshipped, and so it is not halachically considered an Aboda Zara. As such, according to all opinions, it would be permissible to bow out of respect to somebody wearing a cross.
The term “Aseret Ha’diberot” is normally translated as “the Ten Commandments,” but this translation is imprecise, as at least one of the ten “Diberot” actually contains more than a single commandment. The “Aseret Ha’diberot” are actually ten pronouncements spoken by G-d to our ancestors at Mount Sinai, which together contain more than ten Misvot. This observation is made as an introduction to the 27 th Biblical command listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch – the prohibition of “Lo Ta’aseh Lecha Pesel Ve’chol Temuna” (Shemot 20:4), which forbids making an article of idol worship. This prohibition is the second of several commands incorporated in the second of the “Aseret Ha’diberot,” and stands separate and apart from the prohibition against believing in foreign deities, and from the prohibition against worshipping foreign deities. Making a statue for the purpose of idol worship itself constitutes a Biblical prohibition. This prohibition, quite obviously, is binding upon both men and women, and is applicable at all times and in all places. It is binding even upon gentiles, as it falls under the general category of Aboda Zara (idol worship), which is one of the seven Noachide Laws. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who makes an article of idol worship, but does not worship it, is liable to Malkut. Worshipping an idol is a capital offense which is punishable by death, but making the idol is punishable with Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch cites the surprising ruling of the Rambam that even one who instructs another person to create an idol violates this command and is liable to Malkut. Even though all the person did was speak to somebody and give the instruction to make an idol, he is in violation of this prohibition and receives Malkut. Later writers – including the Sefer Ha’hinuch himself – raise several questions regarding the Rambam’s ruling. One difficulty is that prohibitions violated through speech, without performing an action, fall under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – prohibitions which do not involve an action, and are thus not punishable with Malkut. There is a fundamental principle that Bet Din does not administer punishment for the violation of a Biblical prohibition that is violated without an action. How, then, can the Rambam rule that one who instructs another to make an idol receives Malkut? One answer given is that a command to perform an action is regarded as a Halachic “Ma’aseh” (action). Although speech is normally not regarded as a “Ma’aseh” with respect to liability to Malkut, an exception is made in the case of an instruction to commit a forbidden act. Since this speech directly results in an action, such a violation qualifies as a “Lav She’yesh Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which involves an action. Others suggest that since this prohibition can be violated through an action – by making an idol – it is considered a “Lav She’yesh Bo Ma’aseh” which is punishable with Malkut even if one happens to violate it without performing an action. According to this view, the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” includes only those prohibitions which cannot be violated through an action. If a prohibition can be violated through an action, then violators are liable to Malkut even if they transgress without performing an action. The simplest answer, however, as some Aharonim explain, is that the Rambam made an exception in regard to this prohibition because of the singular severity of Aboda Zara. Although normally one does not receive Malkut for violating a prohibition without performing an action, this rule does not apply to instructing somebody to create an idol, because idol-worship undermines the entire foundation of our religion. Aboda Zara is an especially grievous sin which is treated more severely than other prohibitions, such that even verbally instructing somebody to make an idol is punishable with Malkut. This principle can be used also to answer a different question that has been raised regarding the Rambam’s position – that it appears to violate the famous rule of “En Shaliah Li’dbar Abera” (literally, “there is no agent for a sinful act”). If somebody instructs another person to perform a forbidden act, then the person who committed the act, and not the one who sent him, is considered the guilty party who is liable to punishment. The concept underlying this rule is “Dibreh Ha’rab Ve’dbreh Ha’talmid, Dibreh Mi Shomin” – if one receives instructions from both the master and the master’s disciple, he is expected to obey the master. If G-d forbids performing a certain action, then one who is instructed by another person to perform that act is expected to ignore the instruction and obey G-d’s command. Therefore, a forbidden act performed at the behest of another person is attributable solely to the one who performed the action, and not to the person who gave the instruction. The person who performed the act is not considered the agent of the person who sent him if he was sent to perform a sinful act. How, then, could the Rambam rule that one who instructs somebody to make an idol is in violation of the prohibition against making idols? In light of what we have seen, the answer is clear. Aboda Zara, due to its singular level of severity, is not subject to leniencies which are applied to other prohibitions. Therefore, whereas normally people are not held responsible for sins committed by another person at their behest, in the case of making an idol, even one who gives the instruction is in violation of this command.
The second of the Ten Commandments is the prohibition, “Lo Yiheyeh Lecha Elohim Aherim Al Panai” – “You shall not have other gods besides Me.” This command forbids believing in a force that is independent of Hashem. A separate prohibition forbids actively serving other deities; this command forbids even the thought that some person, thing, or force can act independently of G-d. Even if a person believes that G-d created everything in the universe, he violates this prohibition if he attributes to anything divine power, regarding it as capable of acting outside G-d’s control and authority. Needless to say, this prohibition is binding upon both men and women, at all times. It is also binding upon gentiles, as idolatrous beliefs are included among the Seven Noachide Laws which apply to all people, both Jew and gentile. As this prohibition is not violated through an action, Bet Din does not punish one who transgresses this command. However, violators are liable to “Mita Bi’ydeh Shamayim” – death at the hand of G-d. At first glance, it might seem that this command is not so relevant to us today, when the civilized world has, by and large, renounced paganism, and we are not influenced by pagan beliefs as our ancestors were. In truth, however, the Poskim address potential contemporary violations of this command, specifically, when people try to invoke other forces to have their wishes granted. This issue has been discussed in the context of the widespread practice to pray at the gravesites of Sadikim. Of course, this practice is well documented in Torah sources. It dates back to Kaleb Ben Yefuneh, one of the twelve spies, who went to pray at the graves of our patriarchs and matriarchs in Hevron, begging for assistance in resisting the pressure of the other spies, who conspired to convince Beneh Yisrael not to enter the land. Clearly, praying to G-d at a righteous person’s gravesite is permissible and something very valuable. Nevertheless, when praying at the grave of a Sadik, one must ensure not to pray to the Sadik himself and ask him to provide what he needs. As great as the Sadikim are, they are human beings and do not have any divine powers. One who prays to the Sadik with the belief that the Sadik has the power to grant him his wishes is in violation of the command of “Lo Yiheyeh Lecha Elohim Aherim Al Panai.” The Rabbis give different explanations for the practice of praying at the graves of the Sadikim. The Maharil (Rav Yaakov Moelin, Germany, d. 1427) writes that the burial site of a Sadik has sanctity, and this sanctity makes the prayers recited there more readily accepted. Another approach, mentioned by the Lebush (Rav Mordechai Yoffe, 1530-1612), in Siman 579, is that the merit of the Sadik uplifts the prayers recited at the gravesite, making them more effective. The Ran (Rabbenu Nissom of Gerona, Spain, 1320-1380), in one of his published Derashot (8), explains that the Shefa (heavenly bounty of goodness) comes into the world from the heavens via the righteous Sadikim – even those who have already passed away. Therefore, when we visit a Sadik, we access the “pipeline” through which blessing comes into the world. Others explain that when we go to the gravesite of a Sadik and speak about our troubles and hardships, the soul of the Sadik experiences pain, hearing of the difficulties faced by fellow Jews. Hashem therefore intervenes and removes the hardship for the sake of the Sadik, to alleviate his anguish. The Maharal of Prague (Rav Yehuda Loew, 1520-1609) offers a much different explanation. He writes that the Jewish People constitute a single entity, like one human body, with different members of the nation functioning as different organs of the body. The righteous, of course, function as the “brain” of the nation. Therefore, when we pray at the grave of a Sadik, we are simply motivating ourselves to pray. Since the Sadik is part of the same entity, this is like we are speaking to our arms or our legs to work harder. This is not a prayer to a separate entity, but rather an attempt to motivate and strengthen ourselves. In any event, one must ensure that he does not appeal to the Sadik directly to solve the problem or provide his need, as this would constitute an idolatrous belief. Some Poskim went even further, and ruled that it is forbidden to ask the soul of the Sadik to intercede on one’s behalf before G-d. The accepted opinion, however, permits such a petition, as the supplicant does not believe in the independent power of the Sadik, but rather relies on him to bring his prayers before G-d, the exclusive Ruler over the world. It is also forbidden to pray to angels with the belief that they are independently capable of fulfilling our requests, even if one believes that the angels have been created by G-d. For this reason, some maintained that we should omit any mention of angels in our prayer service. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that this prohibition includes reading literature about foreign religion, as this leads a person to ponder idolatrous beliefs.
The Ten Commandments begin with the pronouncement, “I am Hashem your G-d who has taken you from the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage” (Shemot 20:2). According to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, this verse establishes the obligation to believe in the existence of one G-d. In truth, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the belief in the existence of a single Divine Being constitutes just one of several aspects of this Misva. This Misva obligates us to believe also that G-d created everything in existence, and that He has always existed and always will exist. Additionally, the Torah commands us to believe that G-d is the One “who has taken you from the land of Egypt” – that all the miracles of the Exodus were not accidental, but were rather wrought by G-d. And thus this Misva includes the belief in Hashgaha – providence, that G-d governs and controls everything in the world. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this Misva requires us to belief that G-d has no physical properties, and that He is perfect, without any deficiencies. The Sefer Ha’hinuch describes this Misva as “Yesod Ha’dat” – “the foundation of the religion,” such that one who denies this belief is considered a heretic and has no share in the merits and rewards that the Jewish Nation receive. Moreover, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, one must be willing to surrender his life rather than renounce this belief. If gentiles order a Jew at the threat of death to deny any of these principles of our faith, one must refuse and forfeit his life for this belief. This Misva, of course, is binding upon both men and women, and is applicable at all times. It is a “Misva Temidit” – a Misva that is binding upon us constantly, at every moment of every day. Throughout our lives, we are bidden to believe in the existence of one G-d and the other beliefs mentioned above. Although the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch count this command as one of the Torah’s 613 Misvot, a number of other Rishonim disagreed. These include the Behag (Ba’al Halachot Gedolot – Rav Shimon Kayara, 9 th century) and Rav Saadia Gaon (882-942), both of whom omit this command from their listings of the Misvot. The Ramban (Rav Moshe Nahmanides, Spain, 1194-1270), in his critique of the Rambam’s listing of the Misvot, supports the Behag’s view, explaining that the belief in G-d is not a Misva, but rather a prerequisite to the Misvot. The Misvot are the laws issued by the King, the Ramban writes, and they are directed only to those who acknowledge the King’s existence and His authority to issue commands. Therefore, in the view of these Rishonim, we cannot regard belief in G-d as a Misva, because the very concept of a Misva, a binding command, presupposed the belief in a Supreme Being to whose authority we are bound. According to this opinion, the belief in G-d precedes the Misvot, and thus cannot be counted as one of the Misvot. And, as many have noted, G-d did not formulate a command to believe in Him. “I am Hashem your G-d who has taken you from the land of Egypt” is a statement of fact, not a command. Therefore, these Rishonim maintain, while this belief is, of course, critically important, and forms the basis and foundation of all Jewish belief, it should not be counted as one of the Torah’s 613 Misvot. According to the Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, belief in Hashem indeed constitutes a Misva, which means that every time we contemplate in our minds G-d existence, we are credited with the fulfillment of a Biblical command. A number of writers addressed the question of why no Beracha is recited over the fulfillment of this Misva. Just as we recite a Misva before performing other Misvot, why did the Sages not similarly ordain that we recite a Beracha before thinking about the existence of G-d? Four answers have been given to answer this question. The Or Zarua (Rav Yishak of Vienna, 1200-1270) explained that the purpose of reciting a Beracha before performing a Misva is to express “Habibut” – our love and affection for the Misva. As such, a Beracha is recited only when performing a Misva which applies at certain times. For example, we recite a Beracha before putting on a Tallit and before putting on Tefillin, because these are Misvot which are observed only during the day, and not during the nighttime. We recite a Beracha to express that we’ve been anticipating and looking forward to the opportunity to perform the Misva. Therefore, a Beracha is not recited on a Misva which applies at all times, such as the Misva of believing in G-d. Secondly, the Rashba (Rav Shlomo Ben Aderet of Barcelona, 1235-1310), in one of his responsa, writes that Berachot are recited only before observing a Misva which requires an action or verbalizing a text. The Rabbis did not institute the recitation of a Beracha before a Misva which is observed in one’s mind, such as the Misva to believe in G-d. A third approach has been suggested on the basis of a comment of the Abudarham (Spain, d. 1300) regarding the Misva of Keri’a Shema. He writes that no Beracha is recited over the Misva of reading Shema because the Shema recitation itself is like a Beracha. The proclamation of “Shema Yisrael Hashem Elokenu Hashem Ehad” essentially expresses the same theme as a Beracha – that G-d is the Ruler over the world. As such, it would be superfluous to recite a Beracha over the Misva of Shema. This line of reasoning could easily be applied also the Misva of belief. A Beracha over this Misva would be redundant, because the Misva requires affirming precisely that which we declare in a Beracha. Finally, this question might be answered in light of a remark of the Sefer Ha’hinuch about the Misva of faith. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this Misva has no limit; we are to constantly strive to advance in our Emuna (faith) and bring it to greater heights. Of course, we must all fulfill the basic obligation of acknowledging the existence of a Supreme Being, but there are countless different levels of belief, and we are to always strive for higher levels of Emuna. It is for this reason, perhaps, that no Misva is recited on the Misva of faith – because by definition, we never completely fulfill this Misva, which requires us to constantly strive to develop our Emuna further. This Misva may perhaps be compared to the Misva of Kibbud Ab Va’em – honoring parents – which is similarly limitless. There is no limit to how much one can respect his parents, and we are to constantly strive to do more to show them honor. Just as no Beracha is recited on the Misva of honoring parents, it might be suggested that for the same reason, no Beracha is recited on the Misva of Emuna, which is not limited in scope and requires us to always endeavor to do more.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (16:29), “Al Yeseh Ish Mi’mekomo Ba’yom Ha’shebi’i” – “A man shall not leave from his place on the seventh day.” This verse establishes a prohibition forbidding walking beyond a certain distance on Shabbat, a prohibition known as “Tehum Shabbat” (literally, “the boundary of Shabbat”). The Torah prohibition of “Tehum Shabbat” forbids walking a distance of three Parsa’ot beyond the boundary of one’s city. One may walk as much as he wants within the city; the prohibition forbids walking three Parsa’ot beyond the city. A Parsa is four Mil, and each Mil is 2,000 Amot, such that the prohibited distance is 24,000 Amot. An Ama is generally defined as approximately two feet, and thus the forbidden distance amounts to close to 50,000 feet, or around ten miles. The Sages, however, enacted a prohibition against walking even just 2,000 Amot – or about 4,000 feet – outside one’s city, which is even less than one mile. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade walking a long distance on Shabbat in order for us to remember that G-d created the world in six days and rested on the seventh day. It is entirely permissible, and even appropriate, to take leisurely walks on Shabbat, as these are restful and enjoyable. Walking 24,000 Amot, however, is already not a leisurely walk, but a tiring journey, which is not restful, and so the Torah forbade walking such a distance. This prohibition applies in all places, in all historical periods, and to both and women. In most cities and neighborhoods, this prohibition is usually not so relevant, as it is highly unlikely that a person would walk beyond the city or town. This command does become relevant, however, in the country, where it is certainly possible that one may wish to walk on Shabbat out in the open. One must ensure not to walk more than 2,000 Amot on Shabbat while out in the country. Importantly, walking beyond the prescribed limit on Shabbat is not included among the thirty-nine Melachot (categories of forbidden activity) of Shabbat. Although the Torah forbade walking this distance, doing so does not qualify as a “Melacha,” because there is no constructive work involved. As such, this prohibition differs from the other Shabbat prohibitions in several respects. First, the punishment for violating “Tehum Shabbat” is Malkut (lashes), whereas the willful violation of one of the Melachot constitutes a capital offense, punishable by death. (It should be noted that even if one walks just 2,000 Amot beyond the city, violating only the Rabbinic extension of the Torah prohibition, he receives Malkut as punishment for transgressing the Rabbis’ edict.) Another difference is noted by the Rashba (Rav Shlomo Ben Aderet of Barcelona, Spain, 1235-1310), in his commentary to Masechet Yebamot (6), citing his Rabbi. One who performs one of the Melachot of Shabbat has transgressed not only the prohibition against Shabbat desecration, but also the Misvat Aseh (affirmative command) to rest on Shabbat. The Torah commands, “U’ba’yom Ha’shebi’i Tishbot” – that we must rest on the seventh day, and thus one who performs a Melacha transgresses both the prohibition against working on Shabbat and the commandment to rest on this day. The Rashba’s Rabbi asserted that violating the command of “Tehum Shabbat” does not violate the Misvat Aseh of “Tishbot.” Since no Melacha has been performed, the violator is not considered to have transgressed the command to abstain from work. The Rashba notes that this affects the situation of a non-Jew who refrains from Melacha on Shabbat, except that he walks beyond the permitted distance. The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin teaches, “Goy She’Shabat Hayab Mita” – a gentile who rests on Shabbat is liable to the death penalty, because Shabbat is given uniquely and especially to the Jewish People. (As we recite in the Amida prayer on Shabbat morning, “Ve’lo Netato Hashem Elokenu Le’goyeh Ha’arasot…Ve’gam Bi’mnuhato Lo Yishkenu Arelim” – Shabbat is given exclusively to Am Yisrael.) In order not to violate this prohibition, a gentile needs simply to perform any of the Melachot at any point over the course of Shabbat. The Rashba writes that since walking beyond the “Tehum Shabbat” does not violate the command of “Tishbot,” if a gentile did not perform any Melacha over the course of Shabbat, then even if he walked beyond “Tehum Shabbat,” he is considered a “Goy She’shabat” – a gentile who “rested” on Shabbat, because walking beyond “Tehum Shabbat” does not constitute a Melacha. As such, he would be punishable for having rested on Shabbat, even though he walked beyond the boundary of “Tehum Shabbat.” The Peri Megadim (Rav Yosef Teomim, 1727-1792) raises the question of whether one who flagrantly violates the prohibition of “Tehum Shabbat” attains the Halachic status of “Mumar” (apostate), like other Shabbat violators. Normally, those who publicly desecrate Shabbat have the status of “Mumar” which is relevant for several different Halachot. The Peri Megadim wonders whether this applies also to one who observes all the Shabbat restrictions except for the prohibition of “Tehum Shabbat,” which he publicly transgresses. Perhaps, since “Tehum Shabbat” is not considered a Melacha, such a violator would not attain the status of “Mumar.” The Peri Megadim writes that it seems more reasonable to say that even this violation suffices for a person to be given the status of “Mumar.” This prohibition demonstrates how all our activities – even walking – must assume a different nature and character on Shabbat. In fact, this prohibition is so significant that Rut, when she expressed to Naomi her commitment to the Jewish faith, proclaimed, “…wherever you go, I shall go” (Rut 1:16), and the Sages understood this as a declaration of Rut’s commitment to observe the law of “Tehum Shabbat.” This Halacha is especially fundamental, in showing us the way we are to conduct ourselves on Shabbat. Everything we do on Shabbat – including an act as simple as walking – must be different and special, reflecting the unique sanctity of this day.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (13:13) that if one’s donkey’s firstborn is a male, then the owner must redeem the firstborn donkey by giving a sheep to a Kohen. However, the Torah stipulates that if one chooses not to redeem the donkey, then he must perform “Arifa” – meaning, he must kill the donkey, and he may then not derive any benefit from the animal. He may not sell the carcass, or make any use of any part of it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Halacha, forbidding the owner from deriving benefit from the carcass, serves as a penalty, of sorts. Since the owner did not do what he was supposed to do – namely, give the Kohen a sheep in exchange for rights to the donkey – he is penalized by having to kill the donkey and then being denied the opportunity to derive benefit from the carcass. The Ra’abad (Rav Abraham ben David of Posquières, France d. 1198) advanced the controversial view that Arifa is not to be considered a Misva. To the contrary, he writes, one who performs Arifa instead of redeeming his firstborn donkey has committed a sin, and is guilty of denying the Kohen what is owed to him, by insisting on killing the donkey instead of giving the Kohen a sheep. The Rambam and Sefer Ha’hinuch clearly disagree, as they list Arifat Peter Hamor (killing the firstborn donkey) as one of the Misvot Aseh (Biblical affirmative commands). Moreover, the Mishna (Bechorot 13) states, “Misvat Pediya Kodemet Le’misvat Arifa” – “The Misva of redeeming” is preferred over “the Misva of Arifa.” This formulation clearly indicates that Arifa is to be considered a Misva – albeit a less preferred Misva – thus calling into question the Ra’abad’s surprising opinion. The Radbaz (Rav David Ben Zimra, Egypt, 1479-1573) goes so far as to say that even if a Kohen approaches the donkey’s owner and asks for a sheep for the redemption of the donkey, and the owner stubbornly refuses, the owner still performs a Misva by then killing the donkey. The Mishna in Masechet Kiddushin (56) addresses the unusual case of a person who wishes to betroth a woman with a Peter Hamor (firstborn donkey). Such a betrothal, the Mishna rules, is ineffective. The Gemara (57) explains that if Arifa had been performed, and the groom wishes to betroth the bride with the carcass, then the Kiddushin (betrothal) is ineffective because the carcass has no value. As mentioned earlier, no benefit may be derived from the carcass after Arifa, and the carcass therefore has no legal worth. Kiddushin requires giving the bride an object of value, and so it follows that one cannot betroth a woman with the carcass of a Peter Hamor after Arifa. If, however, the Peter Hamor is still alive, having been neither redeemed nor killed, then, the Gemara states, the Kiddushin might be effective, depending on the relative values of the donkey and the sheep. Upon receiving the donkey, the woman must now redeem it by giving a Kohen a sheep. Thus, if the market prices are such that a sheep costs less than a donkey, then the woman is considered as having received an object of value, and the betrothal is valid. If, however, market prices are such that a sheep is worth more than a donkey, then the woman does not benefit at all by receiving the donkey, and the betrothal is therefore ineffective. As mentioned in our discussion of the 22 nd Misvat Aseh (redeeming a firstborn donkey), the reason given for this Misva is that the redemption of the donkey symbolizes the miracle that occurred on the night of the Exodus. The ancient Egyptians are compared to donkeys, as the verse states (Yehezkel 23:20), “Asher Besar Hamorim Besaram” (“whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys”), whereas Beneh Yisrael are compared to a sheep – “Seh Pezura Yisrael” (“Israel are scattered sheep” – Yirmiyahu 50:17). By exchanging a donkey for a sheep, we commemorate the time when the firstborn of Beneh Yisrael were rescued from the plague of the firstborn in Egypt. The redemption of the donkey through a sheep symbolizes G-d’s redemption of Beneh Yisrael from the Egyptians, that He “exchanged” the firstborn of Beneh Yisrael for the firstborn of the Egyptians.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (13:13), “Ve’chol Peter Hamor Tifdeh Be’seh” – that every firstborn donkey must be “redeemed” by giving a sheep. This means that if a person owns a female donkey, and its firstborn is male, then the owner must give a sheep to a Kohen, in exchange for which he receives rights to keep his firstborn donkey. The donkey is then considered the property of its owner, and the sheep becomes the property of the Kohen. Both the donkey and the sheep are Hulin – regular animals, that have not been consecrated – and thus they may be used for any purpose the respective owners wish. This obligation of Pidyon Peter Hamor (redeeming the firstborn donkey) rests only upon a Yisrael; a Kohen or Levi who has a firstborn male donkey is not obligated to redeem it. The donkey must be redeemed regardless of whether the owner is a man or a woman. This command applies at all times, even nowadays, when we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash. If the donkey’s owner does not own a sheep, he may redeem the donkey by paying a Kohen the value of a sheep. The Gemara in Masechet Bechorot (11) teaches that a generous owner pays a Kohen a Sela; a stingy owner pays just three Zuzim; and an average owner pays a half-Sela. The redemption must be paid within thirty days of the donkey’s birth. This Misva marks the only instance where a non-kosher animal is given a special status. The firstborn males of kosher species are considered sacred and are brought as a sacrifice, but firstborn non-kosher animals have no special designation, the lone exception being the donkey. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that a sheep is paid for the redemption of a donkey to commemoration the great miracle of Yesi’at Misrayim (the Exodus from Egypt), when G-d killed the firstborn Egyptians. Furthermore, Beneh Yisrael are compared to sheep, whereas Egypt is compared to a donkey, and thus a sheep is exchanged for a donkey to show that G-d took Beneh Yisrael out of Egypt to be His treasured nation. As we will see, the Torah commands that one who does not wish to pay a sheep for the redemption of his donkey is required to kill the donkey. The Minhat Hinuch clarifies that although the Torah offers this option, nevertheless, redeeming the donkey is preferable to killing it, and thus one who chooses the second option, and kills the donkey instead of redeeming it, is guilty of neglecting the Misva of Pidyon Peter Hamor. However, the Minhat Hinuch adds, Bet Din would not coerce a person to redeem the donkey instead of killing it. When Bet Din has the authority to enforce Torah law, it would use coercive measures to force people to fulfill the Torah’s commands. In this instance, however, since the Torah offers the option of killing the donkey instead of redeeming it, Bet Din cannot force the donkey’s owner to redeem it, even though this is what he is supposed to do. The Minhat Hinuch draws a comparison to the Misva of Yibum – the obligation to marry one’s deceased brother’s wife if the brother had died without offspring. The Torah offers the option of performing the Halisa ritual in place of Yibum, though the obligation is to marry the widow – just as a firstborn donkey’s owner is obligated to redeem the animal instead of killing it. Since the Torah presented this option, Bet Din is not authorized to coerce the brother to marry the widow instead of performing Halisa, even though he is obligated to marry her. (Nowadays, Halisa is always performed in such a case, for reasons which lie beyond the scope of our discussion.)
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (13:8), “You shall tell your son on that day…” – introducing the obligation to relate the story of Yesi’at Misrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) on the first night of Pesach, the 15 th of Nissan. Although the Torah states simply that one should speak of the Exodus “on that day,” without specifying which day, the Rabbis understood that this refers to the first night of Pesach, when we have an obligation to eat Masa. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah obligation of Sippur Yesi’at Misrayim (telling the story of the Exodus) does not require reciting a particular text. One can fulfill the Torah obligation by speaking of the Exodus in the way that suits him, giving praise to G-d for the great miracles He performed to release our ancestors from bondage in Egypt. Although the Torah formulates this Misva as a command to tell the story of the Exodus “Le’vincha” – “to your son,” this obligation is not limited to telling the story to one’s children. If one does not have children to whom to tell the story, he must tell it to somebody, and even to himself, if he is alone. Sippur Yesi’at Misrayim must be done verbally; one does not fulfill the obligation by thinking about the Exodus in his mind. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the heart is stirred by the words we speak, and so the Torah requires us to verbally speak about the Exodus in order to arouse our hearts. In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Torah introduced numerous obligations for the purpose of ensuring we remember the Exodus from Egypt, and he explains that this is done because of the special theological importance of this event. He writes that Yesi’at Misrayim is “a great foundation and strong pillar for our Torah and our faith.” The miracles which G-d performed demonstrate His unlimited power over the natural world, which itself proves that He created the universe, for only the One who created the universe can exercise unlimited control over it. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that our preserving the memory of this event in effect silences the heretics who deny that G-d created the world. Yesi’at Misrayim also confirms our belief in Hashgaha – divine providence, that G-d watches over the world and governs all events, both those which transpire on a national level, as well as the experiences of individuals. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to present an overview of the Seder, how it should be conducted according to his opinion. Interestingly, he maintains that in addition to the hand washing which is performed before Karpas and before eating the Masa, one should wash before each time he recites a Beracha, though no Beracha is recited on this washing. It is also interesting to note that in his view, one recites a Beracha over the hand washing before Karpas, as opposed to our practice, which is not to recite a Beracha over this washing. He writes that after one eats Marror, he recites the Beracha of “Boreh Nefashot,” which covers both the Marror and the Karpas which one ate earlier. The Sefer Ha’hinuch follows the view that the Beracha of “Boreh Peri Ha’gefen” is recited only twice at the Seder – before drinking the first cup (Kiddush), and before reciting the third cup (immediately following Birkat Ha’mazon). This is the practice that we follow. He also discusses in this context the well-known Halacha that one may not eat or drink anything after eating the Afikoman, except water and the final two of the four cups of wine. The Sefer Ha’hinuch emphasizes that this obligation applies to both men and women, and at all times, even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the Pesach sacrifice cannot be offered.
The twentieth commandment in the Torah is the prohibition presented in the Book of Shemot (13:7), “Ve’lo Yera’eh Lecha Hametz Ve’lo Yera’eh Lecha Se’or,” which forbids having in one’s possession during Pesach either Hametz (leavened products) or Se’or (a leavening agent). One who has either of these two products in his possession at any point during Pesach is in violation of this Biblical prohibition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that this prohibition is punishable by Malkut (lashes) if it is violated through an action. There is a famous principle that one who transgresses a Biblical prohibition is liable to Malkut only if he violates the command by performing a concrete action, whereas one who transgresses a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which does not involve a concrete action – is not liable to Malkut. Therefore, if a person had Hametz in his possession before Pesach, and he failed to eliminate it before Pesach, thus violating this prohibition through inaction – by neglecting to destroy or remove the Hametz before Pesach – he is not liable to Malkut. However, if somebody went out and acquired Hametz on Pesach, or turned flour into Hametz on Pesach, then since he transgressed this prohibition through a concrete action, he is liable to Malkut. The Kessef Mishneh (commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah by Maran Rav Yosef Karo, 1488-1575) makes a famous comment (Hilchot Hametz U’masa 1:3) asserting that according to the Rambam, the prohibition of “Lo Yera’eh” is violated only if the Hametz is visible. Since the command “Lo Yera’eh” literally means that Hametz “shall not be seen” in one’s property, the Rambam maintained that if one has Hametz stored in a concealed location, such as if it is buried underground, he does not transgress the prohibition of “Lo Yera’eh.” He has violated the related prohibition of “Lo Yimaseh,” which means that Hametz should not be present in the home, but he has not transgressed the command of “Lo Yera’eh.” Interestingly, the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327), in Masechet Pesahim (1:9), disagreed, and maintained that the command “Lo Yera’eh” should not be taken so literally as to be limited to visible Hametz. He explains that any Hametz which is present in one’s possession, and thus could potentially be seen, suffices for one to violate this command. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question of whether the Kessef Mishneh’s theory would apply also to a blind person. Conceivably, if the command of “Lo Yera’eh” is to be taken literally, as forbidding the sight of Hametz, then it would be limited to those capable of seeing it, and a blind person with Hametz in his possession would not be in violation of this command. On the other hand, one might argue that since the Hametz itself is visible, and can be seen by others, the blind person who has it in his possession is in violation of “Lo Yera’eh.” (This assumes, of course, that blind individuals are bound by the Torah’s commands, which is a topic for a separate discussion.) The Minhat Hinuch leaves this question unresolved.
The Torah famously commands in the Book of Shemot (13:3), “Ve’lo Ye’achel Hametz” (“and leaven shall not be eaten”), establishing a Biblical prohibition against eating Hametz during the seven days of Pesach. This prohibition, of course, applies even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, in all locations, and to both men and women. One who ate a Ke’zayit of Hametz on Pesach knowingly violating this prohibition is liable to the severe punishment of Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish People). If this was done unintentionally, then, in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, the violator would be required to offer a Hatat (sin-offering). One who eats Hametz on Pesach has likely also violated the affirmative command of “Tashbitu Se’or Mi’batechem,” which requires eliminating all Hametz from one’s home on the 14 th of Nissan. If so, then he would be required to offer an Ola sacrifice, as well, in order to atone for the neglect of this Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). As we discussed earlier, in our discussion of Misva #12 (“Kol Mahmeset Lo Tochelu”), this prohibition serves to commemorate the haste with which our ancestors were driven from Egypt at the time of the Exodus. They did not have time to prepare proper food provisions, and ended up baking unleavened bread, and so we commemorate this miracle by refraining from all leavened products during this holiday which celebrates Yesi’at Misrayim.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (13:2), “Kadesh Li Kol Bechor, Peter Kol Rehem Bi’Bneh Yisrael” – “Consecrate for Me every firstborn, the first issue of every womb among Beneh Yisrael.” This command requires us to declare as sacred the male firstborn of every kosher Behema (domesticated animal), as well as every male firstborn donkey. At the birth, the owner must proclaim, “Hareh Zeh Kadosh” – “This is hereby sacred,” and then give the newborn animal to a Kohen. The Kohen must then offer the animal as a sacrifice, and after the blood is sprinkled and the fats are offered on the altar, the Kohen must eat the meat in Jerusalem. If the animal has a blemish that disqualifies it as a sacrifice, then the Kohen may eat the animal wherever he wishes, and may also share it with whomever he wishes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the purpose of this Misva is to remind us that everything belongs to G-d, and that everything we own has been given to us by Him in His infinite grace and kindness. When a person works very hard and invests a great deal of effort tending to his animal, hoping that it will reproduce so he could profit from it, and then, when it finally gives birth, he gives that animal to G-d, he is shown that he does not really own anything. The firstborn animal, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is especially precious to the farmer, and so giving it to G-d leaves a very strong impression upon him, teaching him that even when he exerts effort and works hard, he is not entitled to anything, and it is Hashem who gives every person all that he has. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, this Misva reminds us of the miracle that occurred on the night of the Exodus, when G-d delivered a plague upon Egypt, killing the firstborn people and animals, but did not kill any firstborns among Beneh Yisrael. The Sefer Ha’hinuch advances the view that this Misva applies at all times, even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the Kohen is unable to bring the firstborn animal as a sacrifice. The Torah obligation, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, applies only in Eretz Yisrael, but the Rabbis enacted that it should be observed also in the Diaspora. Both men and women are included in this obligation, and thus a woman who owns an animal must give its male firstborn to a Kohen. Unlike the obligation to redeem a human firstborn, which is not binding upon Kohanim, the obligation to consecrate firstborn animals applies even to Kohanim. Thus, a Kohen who owns an animal that delivers a male firstborn must offer the firstborn as a sacrifice, and then partake of its meat in Jerusalem. The Rambam rules in Hilchot Bikkurim (1:10) that the firstborn animal must be given to a Kohen, and not to a Kohenet (daughter of a Kohen). Therefore, if a Kohenet has an animal that gives birth to a male firstborn, she must give it to a male Kohen, and cannot fulfill the Misva by offering it as a sacrifice herself.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (12:48), “Ve’chol Arel Lo Yochal Bo” – an uncircumcised male is forbidden from eating the meat of the Korban Pesach. If a Jewish male is not circumcised, even if this is due to the fact that two of his brothers died as a result of Berit Mila, indicating a hereditary medical condition that makes circumcision dangerous, nevertheless, he may not partake of the Korban Pesach. Although a person in this situation is not required to undergo circumcision, given the life-threatening danger, he is included in the prohibition of “Ve’chol Arel Lo Yochal Bo.” The Korban Pesach celebrates the miracle of the Exodus, the time when Beneh Yisrael left their status as slaves to Pharaoh and became the servants of G-d, and so only those who have undergone Berit Mila, bearing the symbol of this status of servitude, may partake of the sacrifice. A male who is not circumcised and eats a Ke’zayit of the Korban Pesach is liable to Malkut (lashes). The Gemara in Masechet Pesahim (120) states that although an Arel (uncircumcised male) does not eat the Korban Pesach, he does eat the other two foods required on the night of Pesach – Masa and Marror. The Torah emphasizes that an Arel may not partake “Bo” – of the Korban Pesach, indicating that he does partake of Masa and Marror. It seems difficult to understand, at first glance, why an Arel would be required to eat Marror, which is required on the level of Torah law only in conjunction with the Korban Pesach. Unlike the Torah obligation of Masa, which applies independently of the Misva of Korban Pesach, the Torah obligation to eat Marror applies only when one eats the Korban Pesach. And thus nowadays, when we do not have the Bet Ha’mikdash and cannot offer the Korban Pesach, the requirement to eat Marror applies only Mi’de’rabbanan – on the level of Rabbinic enactment. We might wonder, then, why the Gemara inferred from the verse that an Arel, who does not eat the Korban Pesach, is nevertheless required to eat Marror. Indeed, the Meiri (Rav Menachem Meiri, France, 1249-1310) writes that the word “Marror” was added only “Agab Gerara” (“incidentally”), and the Gemara did not really mean that an Arel is obligation to eat Marror on Pesach. The Rambam, however, writes explicitly that an Arel is obligated to eat both Masa and Marror, even though the Misva of Marror is linked to the Misva of Korban Pesach. Seemingly, we must explain that the Rambam speaks of the Rabbinic requirement to eat Marror even when the Korban Pesach is not eaten. Just as the Sages enacted a requirement to eat Marror nowadays, when we cannot offer the Korban Pesach, they similarly enacted a requirement for an Arel to eat Marror even though he may not partake of the Korban Pesach. This prohibition applies also to the Arel’s father. If a child is at least eight days old, and his father did not circumcise him or have him circumcised by somebody else, then the father may not partake of the Korban Pesach. This applies only if the child reached his eighth day and was healthy enough to be circumcised. If Pesach is celebrated before the eighth day, or if the child is medically unfit for circumcision, then the father may partake of the Korban Pesach. The Minhat Hinuch, in discussing this Misva, addresses the unusual case of an “Androginus,” a person who has both male and female organs, and whom Halacha thus treats as a “Safek Zachar, Safek Nekeba” – a person whose halachic gender cannot be determined. Seemingly, if one’s child is an “Androginus” who has not undergone circumcision, then the father would not be permitted to eat the Korban Pesach, as it is possible that his child is an uncircumcised male, thus forbidding him from partaking of the meat. Given the possibility that an “Androginus” is considered a male, in which case an uncircumcised “Androginus” is an Arel, we would apply the rule of “Safek De’orayta Le’humra” – that one must act stringently in situations of uncertainty when a Torah law is concerned. As the consumption of the Korban Pesach by the father of an Arel constitutes a Torah violation, the father in this case would, at first glance, be required to act stringently and not partake of the sacrificial meat. However, the Minhat Hinuch reasons that in truth, it would seem that the father specifically should participate in the Korban Pesach in such a case. He explains that according to the Rambam, the rule of “Safek De’orayta Le’humra” applies only on the level of Rabbinic enactment. On the level of Torah law, one may act leniently in situations of doubt; the requirement to act stringently was enacted by the Sages. As such, the Minhat Hinuch reasons, it would seem that we would not apply this rule in our case, where acting stringently means not participating in the Korban Pesach, which is an especially strict obligation. Failing to fulfill this Misva is punishable by Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation), and so it stands to reason that the rule of “Safek De’orayta Le’humra” is overridden by the obligation of Korban Pesach, such that the father of an uncircumcised “Androginus” should partake of the Korban Pesach. In conclusion, some have noted the significance of the fact that this command marks the 17 th Misva in the Torah, as there exists a connection between this number – 17 – and Berit Mila. The Torah tells (Shemot 2:2) that after Moshe was born, his mother saw “Ki Tob Hu” – “that he was good.” The Gemara (Sota 12a) explains the word “Tob” (“good”) to mean that Moshe was born circumcised. The word “Tob” in Gematria equals 17, and it is thus quite appropriate that the 17 th command of the Torah involves Berit Mila, as the number 17, the Gematria of “Tob,” is associated with circumcision.
The Torah commands in regard to the Korban Pesach, “Ve’esem Lo Tishberu Bo” (Shemot 12:46) – that it is forbidden to break a bone of the sacrifice. As long as the sacrifice is Tahor (pure), and has not been exposed to Tum’a (halachic impurity), it is forbidden to break any of the bones, and one who does transgresses this prohibition and is liable to Malkut (lashes). The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of this Misva has become one of the most famous passages in this work, as therein he establishes a fundamental principle regarding the Torah’s commands and religious life generally. He begins by explaining the reason for this command, writing that people of stature would not break the bones while eating meat. This would be done by paupers, who would not often obtain meat, and when they did, they made a point of eating every tiny morsel, and even breaking the bones to ingest the marrow. Pesach celebrates the miraculous Exodus from Egypt, when we rose to the exalted stature of “royalty,” becoming G-d’s special nation. As such, we must conduct ourselves in a regal manner, and the Torah therefore forbade breaking the bones of the sacrifice which celebrates this event. Eating the Korban Pesach in a manner resembling noblemen and dignitaries will implant within our minds and hearts a sense of our nation’s unique stature, and so the Torah required eating the sacrifice the way wealthy noblemen would eat their meals. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to address the question that he anticipates being asked by his son – for whom this book was written – upon reading of all the Torah’s commands which have this same purpose, to emphasize the theme of royalty on Pesach. (Previously, the Sefer Ha’hinuch had explained that commands such as the requirement to specifically roast the meat of the Korban Pesach, and the prohibition against bringing its meat to a second location, are intended to impress upon us our regal stature.) Why, one might ask, was it necessary for the Torah to issue a whole series of commands to achieve the single purpose of emphasizing our royal stature as G-d’s special nation? Why wouldn’t just one command suffice? The Sefer Ha’hinuch famously answers this question by formulating the counterintuitive principle that people are affected by their actions. We generally assume that our feelings and motivations dictate our actions, determining how we conduct ourselves. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, writes that to the contrary, we mold our beings through the actions we perform. Repeatedly acting a certain way has a conditioning effect, bringing about a fundamental change in a person’s being. The Sefer Ha’hinuch formulates this principle by writing, “Ahareh Ha’peulot Nimshachim Ha’lebabot” – “The hearts are drawn after the actions.” This concept is developed also by the Ramhal (Rav Moshe Haim Luzzatto, 1707-1746), in his famous work Mesilat Yesharim. He writes, “Ha’tenu’ah Ha’hisonit Me’oreret Et Ha’penimit” – “the external action awakens the internal.” The way we act has a profound impact upon our beings. The Sefer Ha’hinuch proceeds to present two opposite examples of how this concept works. First, he writes, a sinful person can change by involving himself in Torah and Misvot, even if he does so insincerely, not for the sake of G-d. The Misva acts that he performs will affect his soul and eventually lead to positive change. Conversely, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, even a completely righteous person faces the risk of spiritual decline if he involves himself in what the Sefer Ha’hinuch calls “Debarim Shel Dofi” – meaningless or wasteful activities. No matter how great a Sadik a person is, inappropriate conduct will impact his soul and cause him to drastically fall from his state of piety. On this basis, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains the Gemara’s famous statement cited in the name of Rabbi Hananya Ben Akashya: “The Almighty wished to bring merit to Israel, and He therefore made for them an abundance of Torah and Misvot.” The conventional reading of this statement is that G-d gave us countless opportunities to earn merit by giving us a great deal of Torah to study and many Misvot to perform. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, explains differently. He writes that G-d gave us a vast amount of Torah and Misvot so that they will have an effect on our souls and elevate us. Indeed, by early in the morning, we have already performed Netilat Yadayim, recited the morning Berachot, put on Tallit and Tefillin, recited Shema, prayed, given charity, and studied Torah. We have so many Misvot to perform each day because this is how we develop our souls. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this also explains the Gemara’s comment elsewhere, that anyone who has a Mezuzah on his doorpost, Sisit on his garment, and Tefillin on his head “is guaranteed not to sin.” These Misvot have an effect on a person such that he will conduct himself properly. People often say that they are waiting to feel inspired, to be motivated, to experience a certain “fire” within them, and they will then involve themselves in Torah and Misvot. The Sefer Ha’hinuch here teaches us that this is incorrect. We become inspired and motivated by performing the actions when we as yet do not feel inspired or motivated. The actions gradually but profoundly affect our souls and bring us the motivation to continue and perform even more Misvot.
The Torah commands amidst its discussion of the Pesach sacrifice in the Book of Shemot (12:46), “Lo Tosi Min Ha’bayit Min Ha’basar Husa” – that Beneh Yisrael were not allowed to bring any meat of the Korban Pesach outside their homes on the night of the Exodus from Egypt. This verse establishes a prohibition against bringing meat of the Pesach sacrifice away from the original place where it is eaten. One who brings meat of the Korban Pesach away from its original location has transgressed this Biblical command, and is liable to Malkut (lashes). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that at the time of the Exodus, we rose from the status of lowly slaves to the status of royalty, as we became the treasured nation of G-d, King of the world. As such, the Korban Pesach, which commemorates this miraculous event, must be eaten in a regal manner. Members of the aristocracy, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, would eat their large, festive meals in a single location, in a large group, without moving or sending any food elsewhere. Ordinary people, however, did not usually enjoy robust meals, and so when they did, it was a special event, and they would send some food portions to other people. The Korban Pesach celebrates the royal status to which we ascended at the time of the Exodus from Egypt, and so the Torah required that it be eaten the way wealthy aristocrats ate their meals, and forbade sending any portion of the sacrifice away from the place where the feast is taking place. The Torah issues this command with the verb “Tosi,” which resembles the term “Hosa’a” used in reference to the prohibition against carrying from one domain to another on Shabbat. Therefore, as in the case of carrying on Shabbat, this prohibition is transgressed only if the violator performs both an “Akira” and “Hanaha” – meaning, he picks up the meat in its current location, and brings it to a new location and then puts it down. However, unlike on Shabbat, when the violation requires carrying an item from one domain to another, the prohibition against moving the Pesach sacrifice is violated even within a single domain. If a person brings meat of the sacrifice from one place in a home to another place in the same home, he has transgressed the prohibition even though he never brought the meat outside the building. This prohibition applies only on the night of the 15 th of Nissan, when the meat of the Korban Pesach is to be eaten; it does not apply in the afternoon of the 14 th , before the meat may be eaten. Additionally, this prohibition does not apply to Pesach Sheni, when one who was unable to offer the sacrifice on the 14 th of Nissan does so one month later, on the 14 th of Iyar. This is the ruling of the Rambam, in Hilchot Korban Pesach (10:15). The Minhat Hinuch notes that this prohibition applies only to meat of the Pesach sacrifice which is fit for consumption, and not to meat which has become forbidden for consumption. For this reason, the prohibition does not apply once somebody had violated the prohibition and moved the Korban Pesch from its original location. Once it had been moved, it is no longer permissible, and thus one who moves it to a third location does not violate this prohibition.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (12:45), “Toshab Ve’sachir Lo Yochal Bo,” introducing a prohibition against feeding the meat of the Korban Pesach to a “Toshab” (literally, “resident”) or a “Sachir” (literally, “employee”). The Sefer Ha’hinuch, based on the Rambam, explains that “Toshab” refers to a non-Jew who has renounced foreign worship but has not converted to Judaism, and a “Sachir” is a gentile in the process of conversion, who has undergone circumcision but has yet to immerse in a Mikveh. Although such people are not full-fledged gentiles – as a “Toshab” has renounced idolatry, and a “Sachir” has begun the conversion process – nevertheless, they may not be fed the hallowed meat of the Korban Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Pesach sacrifice commemorates our freedom from Egyptian bondage, whereupon we entered into a special covenant with G-d. As such, only those who are full members of Am Yisrael and are thus included in this special covenant should be permitted to partake of this sacrifice. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who gives a “Toshab” or “Sachir” meat from the Korban Pesach to eat is in violation of this command. However, he is not liable to Malkut (lashes), as this command falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which is not violated through an action. Since it is the “Toshab” or “Sachir” who eats the meat, the Jew who hands him the food is not considered to have performed a forbidden act for which he would be liable to Malkut. Conceivably, one who places meat of the Korban Pesach directly into the throat of the “Sachir” or “Toshab” would be liable to Malkut, as he has performed an action. However, this would depend on the question discussed by the Aharonim regarding the definition of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh.” One possibility is that each violation is assessed on its own, and anytime one violates a Biblical prohibition by performing an action, he is liable to Malkut. If so, then, indeed, one who places food in the mouth of a “Sachir” or “Toshab” would be liable to Malkut. Others, however, maintain that if a prohibition can be violated through inaction, then one is never liable to Malkut for violating that prohibition, even if this is done through an action. According to this view, one can never be liable to Malkut for feeding meat of the Korban Pesach to a “Sachir” or “Toshab.” In our discussion of the prohibition against feeding the Korban Pesach to a “Meshumad” (Jew who has renounced Jewish faith), we encountered the question as to whether the “Meshumad” himself would be liable to Malkut for eating the meat of the sacrifice. As we saw, the Rambam maintained that he is not liable, and the explanation given is that the Torah’s commands are directed only to those who accept its authority, as opposed to a “Meshumad,” who has rejected the Torah altogether. The Minhat Hinuch, as we discussed, questioned this explanation, arguing that the “Meshumad” remains a Jew and remains bound by Torah law irrespective of his renunciation of Jewish faith. When it comes to a “Sachir” or “Toshab,” we might assume that the gentile who is fed the Korban Pesach certainly cannot be said to be in violation of this command, because he is not even Jewish. Non-Jews are bound only by the Seven Noachide Laws, which do not include a prohibition against eating the Korban Pesach. It would thus seem clear that a “Sachir” and “Toshab” cannot be said to violate Torah law by partaking of the Korban Pesach. Surprisingly, however, the Samag (Sefer Misvot Gadol, by Rav Moshe of Coucy, France, 13 th century) writes that a “Toshab” or “Sachir” who eats the Korban Pesach is, in fact, guilty of violating Torah law. The Samag contends that although this command is not included among the Seven Noachide Laws, nevertheless, there are several commands which are relevant to non-Jews beyond these seven Misvot. The Minhat Hinuch suggests drawing proof to the Samag’s view from the famous story told in Masechet Pesahim (3b) of a non-Jew who would disguise as a Jew each year on Pesach, travel to Jerusalem, and receive a portion of the Korban Pesach. When he was discovered, the Jewish authorities put him to death. The fact that he was punished for this offense would appear to prove that non-Jews are in violation of this command if they partake of the Korban Pesach. Regardless, the Rambam, the Sefer Ha’hinuch, and other Rishonim maintained that this command is directed only to Jews, and a “Sachir” or “Toshab” who is fed the sacrifice is not in violation of this prohibition.
Amidst its discussion of the laws of the Korban Pesach, the Torah commands, “Kol Ben Nechar Lo Yochal Bo” (Shemot 12:43), which literally means, “No foreigner may partake of it.” At first glance, it appears that the Torah here forbids gentiles from eating the meat of the Pesach sacrifice. However, tradition teaches that the term “Ben Nechar” (“foreigner”) in this verse refers to one “She’nitnakeru Ma’asav Le’abib She’ba’shamayim” – “whose actions became foreign to his Father in heaven.” Meaning, this refers to a “Meshumad” – somebody who became like a gentile by renouncing Jewish faith and embracing foreign worship. The Torah forbids allowing such a person to participate in the eating of the Korban Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the entire purpose of the Exodus from Egypt – the miraculous event which the Korban Pesach commemorates – was for Am Yisrael to “come under the wings of the Shechina,” to commit themselves to the belief in Hashem and to the observance of His laws. Naturally, then, the Torah forbids a person who represents the antithesis of this commitment to participate in the Korban Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch’s comments bring to mind the passage of the Haggadah which instructs us how to respond to the wicked son, who ridicules the observance of Pesach, shouting with contempt, “What is this ritual for you?!” The Haggadah tells us to strongly reject this ridicule, and to tell this son that if he had been alive at the time of the Exodus, he would not have been redeemed from Egypt, because he refuses to commit himself to Hashem’s laws. By the same token, a person who has turned his back on Jewish faith may not participate in the Korban Pesach, which celebrates the special commitment we made at the time of the Exodus, a commitment which he has rejected. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who violates this prohibition and gives a portion of the Korban Pesach to a “Mashumad” is not liable to Malkut (lashes), because the forbidden action was done by the “Meshumad” who ate the meat, and not by the Jew who gave him the meat. One is liable to Malkut only for violating a “Lav She’yesh Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition transgressed through the performance of a concrete action, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that facilitating the consumption of the Korban Pesach by a “Meshumad” does not involve a concrete action. The Minhat Hinuch explains that even after one hands the meat to the “Meshumad,” the “Meshumad” could decide not to eat the meat. As such, handing him the meat does not qualify as an act of Torah violation for which one would be liable to Malkut. However, the Minhat Hinuch writes, it would stand to reason that if one placed the meat of the sacrifice directly into the mouth of the “Meshumad,” this would qualify as a “Lav She’yesh Bo Ma’aseh,” since the “Meshumad” cannot then make the decision not to eat the meat, and thus, seemingly, the person who fed him would be liable to Malkut. The Rambam (Hilchot Korban Pesach, chapter 9) rules that this prohibition is violated only by the person who feeds the “Meshumad,” and not by the “Meshumad” himself. Rav Yosef Karo (author of the Shulhan Aruch, 1488-1575), in his Kessef Mishneh commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, explains the Rambam’s comment by noting that there is no purpose served in directing a command to somebody who rejects Torah altogether. The “Meshumad” has renounced Judaism, and so he cannot be said to be in violation of a particular command, as he does not even acknowledge the authority of the command. The Torah addresses those who accept its authority, and so a “Meshumad,” who fundamentally rejects all of Jewish religion, cannot be described as transgressing a specific Misva. The Minhat Hinuch questions this explanation, noting that even though the “Meshumad” does not accept the Torah’s authority, nevertheless, he is clearly in violation of every command which he transgresses. Moreover, the Minhat Hinuch adds, even if we accept the Kessef Mishneh’s premise, this command is relevant to the “Meshumad” in that if he then repents and recommits himself to the Torah, he would be liable to Malkut for having partaken of the Korban Pesach as a “Meshumad.” Once he performs Teshuba and accepts the authority of the Bet Din, they would be required to administer Malkut (assuming there are witnesses who saw him eat the sacrifice, and he was warned), because repentance does not absolve a violator from punishment by Bet Din. Therefore, the Minhat Hinuch contends, there seems to be no reason for the prohibition not to apply also to the “Meshumad,” who commits a forbidden act by eating the meat of the sacrifice, for which he would be liable to Malkut later. The Minhat Hinuch speculates that the Rambam must have seen some earlier source stating that the prohibition is directed only to the one who feeds the “Meshumad,” because logically, there does not seem to be any reason why the “Meshumad” would not violate the prohibition by eating the sacrificial meat. If a “Meshumad” repents before partaking of the meat, the Minhat Hinuch writes, then the prohibition has not been violated, because, quite simply, he is no longer a “Meshumad,” and is considered a regular Jew. The Minhat Hinuch notes, however, that there is a separate prohibition against partaking of the meat of a Korban Pesach for which one had not previously registered. The Torah requires “Minui” – formally joining a group for the Korban Pesach, and it is forbidden to eat the meat of a Korban Pesach without having registered for that sacrifice before the time when the Korban Pesach is to be offered. Therefore, if a “Meshumad” repents after this time, then although he is no longer a “Meshumad,” he nevertheless may not eat the meat of any Korban Pesach because he had not registered ahead of time.
The 12 th Biblical command is the prohibition of “Kol Mahmeset Lo Tochelu” (Shemot 12:20), which the Rambam understood as a prohibition against eating foods which contain Hametz. The Torah forbids not only eating Hametz directly, but also eating non-Hametz foods with which Hametz had been mixed. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this command to reinforce our commemoration of the miraculous events of the Exodus, when our ancestors were rushed out of Egypt before their dough had a chance to rise, such that they were compelled to eat unleavened bread. We refrain not only from leavened products, but also from mixtures which contain non-leavened products. The Rambam understood that the Torah distinguishes between eating Hametz and eating food into which Hametz had been mixed. One who eats a Ke’zayit of actual Hametz is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation), whereas, in the Rambam’s view, one who eats food containing Hametz who liable to Malkut (lashes). Specifically, one is liable to punishment if he eats from a mixture which contains Hametz in a proportion of “Ke’zayit Bi’chdeh Achilat Paress” – meaning, one Ke’zayit of Hametz for every “Achilat Paress” (the amount of food one can eat in a period of about 4-9 minutes; the precise definition of “Achilat Paress” is subject to debate). If the Hametz comprises less than this amount of the mixture, then one who partakes of the mixture violates an “Issur De’Rabbanan” (Rabbinic prohibition), as opposed to a Torah prohibition. The Ramban disputes the Rambam’s position. In his view, if a mixture contains Hametz in a proportion of “Ke’zayit Bi’chdeh Achilat Paress,” then eating this mixture is no different from eating Hametz directly. According to the Ramban, there is no separate prohibition forbidding eating this mixture, because a mixture containing this amount of Hametz is no different from actual Hametz, and one who eats this mixture is liable to Karet just like one who eats actual Hametz. The Minhat Hinuch observes that the Rambam distinguishes between eating a mixture containing Hametz and eating actual Hametz also with respect to the time when the prohibition applies. In his introduction to the laws of Hametz on Pesach, the Rambam lists the various Biblical commands that apply to this area of Halacha. He mentions the prohibition against eating Hametz on Ereb Pesach; the prohibition against eating Hametz throughout Pesach; the requirement to eliminate the Hametz from one’s property on Ereb Pesach; and the prohibition against “eating a mixture of Hametz throughout the seven days.” Significantly, the Rambam specifies that eating non-Hametz food which is mixed with Hametz is forbidden (on the level of Torah law) only during the seven days of Pesach, and not on Erev Pesach. It seems that in his view, although the Torah forbids eating Hametz already from midday on Ereb Pesach, it forbids eating Hametz in a mixture only during Pesach itself. On Ereb Pesach, this is forbidden Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment, as opposed to Torah law. Thus, according to the Rambam, a mixture containing Hametz differs from Hametz itself both in terms of the punishment, and also in terms of the timing, as mixtures become forbidden by Torah law only with the onset of Pesach, and not on Ereb Pesach.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (12:19), “Shib’at Yamim Se’or Lo Yimaseh Be’batechem” – “Leaven shall not be present in your homes for seven days,” establishing the prohibition against having Hametz in one’s possession during Pesach. This prohibition commemorates the miraculous events of the Exodus from Egypt, when Beneh Yisrael were rushed out of Egypt and needed to leave so quickly that their dough did not have time to rise before their departure, resulting in their baking Masa. We refrain from leavened products during Pesach in commemoration of our ancestors’ hasty departure from Egypt. This prohibition applies to both and women, and is binding in all places and at all times. The command of “Lo Yimaseh” is a classic example of a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which one violates through inaction, and not by performing a forbidden action. One who leaves Hametz in his home without eliminating it before Pesach is in violation of this prohibition, and thus has committed a violation through inaction – by failing to do what he needed to do. Therefore, such a person would not be liable to Malkut (lashes), because Malkut are not administered in the case of a “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh.” However, as the Minhat Hinuch writes, there are two instances where one violates this prohibition through an action – by making leavened dough on Pesach, or by purchasing Hametz during Pesach. If one performs either of these actions on Pesach, he has actively transgressed the command of “Lo Yimaseh” and would thus be liable to Malkut. The Minhat Hinuch raises the question of whether one would be liable to Malkut if he purchases from a gentile Hametz for which he is already in violation of “Lo Yimaseh.” Whereas this prohibition is normally transgressed by owning Hametz on Pesach, it is possible to transgress this prohibition without owning Hametz, if one accepted responsibility for a gentile’s Hametz. This can happen in a case where a gentile gave someone Hametz to guard, or if someone received Hametz from a gentile as collateral for a loan. In these situations, the Jew does not own the Hametz, but he nevertheless transgresses the prohibition of “Lo Yimaseh” by virtue of the fact that he has in his possession on Pesach Hametz for which he had accepted responsibility. The Minhat Hinuch addresses the case of one who violated the prohibition in this fashion, by having in his possession a gentile’s Hametz for which he accepted responsibility, and then proceeded to purchase the Hametz from the gentile during Pesach. Would this individual now be liable to Malkut, as he had performed an act of acquiring Hametz on Pesach? On the one hand, we might assume that since he has performed an act of purchasing Hametz on Pesach, he is liable to Malkut. But on the other hand, one might argue that since this person had already violated “Lo Yimaseh” by having this Hametz in his possession, he has already transgressed the prohibition through inaction, and thus his act of purchasing the Hametz is of no consequence. It is possible that this question hinges on the issue of whether the prohibition of “Lo Yimaseh” is a recurring prohibition, which one transgresses every moment he has Hametz in his possession, or is violated just once, the first moment during Pesach when the Hametz is in a person’s possession. If it is a recurring violation, then it would seem that the moment one purchases the gentile’s Hametz in his possession, he is now guilty of violating “Lo Yimaseh” through an action. If, however, the prohibition is violated just once, the moment the Hametz is in one’s possession on Pesach, then it would seem that once the person has violated this prohibition passively, he cannot then transform the violation into one involving an action. In any event, the Minhat Hinuch writes that he is inclined to say that once a person has violated “Lo Yimaseh” by having a gentile’s Hametz in his possession, he would not be liable to “Malkut” by then purchasing the Hametz from the gentile.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (12:18), “Ba’ereb Tochelu Masot” – “In the evening, you shall eat Masot,” introducing the obligation to eat Masa on the night of the 15 th of Nissan (the first night of Pesach). One fulfills this Misva only with Masa baked from one of the five principal grains. The reason behind this Misva, of course, is to recall how our ancestors were rushed out of Egypt after having been held there as slaves for over two centuries. The miraculous redemption unfolded so quickly that they did not have time to prepare adequate provisions, and so they baked unleavened Masa, and we commemorate the speed of the redemption by eating Masa. This obligation applies even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Although the Pesach sacrifice is not offered in the absence of the Bet Ha’mikdash, the Torah obligation to eat Masa nevertheless remains binding. The obligation to eat Masa applies even to women, despite the fact that it falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands which apply only at certain times (as one is obligated to eat Masa only on the night of the 15 th of Nissan). The Gemara establishes that women are included in the obligation of Masa based on the verse in the Book of Debarim (16:3) which mentions both the prohibition against eating Hametz and the Misva to eat Masa. That these two commands are mentioned in the same verse indicates that everyone bound by the prohibition of Hametz is included in the obligation of Masa. Therefore, since women are included in all Misvot Lo Ta’aseh (prohibitions), they are included also in the obligation of Masa. Tosafot (in Masechet Megilla) raise the question of why the Gemara needed to resort to this inference to establish women’s obligation to eat Masa. The Gemara elsewhere states that women are required to hear the Megilla reading because “Af Hen Hayu Be’oto Ha’nes” – “they, too, were included in the miracle.” Haman’s decree of annihilation threatened both men and women, and thus both the men and the women were saved by the Purim miracle. As such, both men and women must commemorate the miracle through the reading of the Megilla. By the same token, it would seem, as both the men and the women were miraculously delivered from Egyptian bondage, they should both be obligated to eat Masa to commemorate this miracle. Seemingly, then, even without a comparison between the prohibition of Hametz and the obligation of Masa, we would have known that women are included in the obligation of Masa. Why, then, did the Gemara need to infer this Halacha from the verse? Tosafot answer that the rule of “Af Hen Hayu Be’oto Ha’nes” establishes a requirement only Mi’de’rabbanan – by force of Rabbinic enactment. When it comes to eating Masa, women are required to eat Masa on Pesach on the level of Torah obligation, as the Gemara derives from the verse. One cannot fulfill the Misva of Masa by eating Masa which is forbidden for consumption, such as Masa produced from Tebel – grain which has yet to be tithed, and is thus forbidden. Since Halacha forbids eating this food, one cannot use it to fulfill a Misva. The Minhat Hinuch writes that an exception is the case of a patient suffering from a life-threatening illness who urgently requires food, and the only food available is Masa made from forbidden grain. This conclusion is based on the Shulhan Aruch’s discussion (Orah Haim 196) regarding the recitation of a Beracha over forbidden food. The Shulhan Aruch writes that one who eats forbidden food may not recite a Beracha, because if he would, “En Zeh Mebarech Ela Mena’etz” – “he is not blessing [G-d], but rather blaspheming [G-d].” One cannot be credited with a Misva, pronouncing a blessing to G-d, if He does so in the context of a sin. However, the Shulhan Aruch rules that if one eats forbidden food in a case of Piku’ah Nefesh (concern for human life), where eating this food is necessary to prevent a threat to life, then the patient does, in fact, recite a Beracha. By the same token, the Minhat Hinuch writes, a patient in such a situation on the night of the 15 th of Nissan would fulfill the obligation of Masa with Masa made from forbidden grain. Since Halacha allows him to eat this Masa, he fulfills his Misva with this Masa, as well.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (12:15), “Ach Ba’yom Ha’rishon Tashbitu Se’or Mi’batechem” – that we must eliminate Hametz from our homes “on the first day” of the festival of Pesach. While this command at first seems to require eliminating Hametz from our homes only on the first day of Pesach, the 15 th of Nissan, the Gemara (Pesahim 5) explains that in truth, it means that the Hametz must be eliminated by the onset of the first day of Pesach, and thus this is required already on the 14 th of Nissan, Ereb Pesach. This Misva, of course, like the other commands relevant to Pesach, are observed for the purpose of commemorating the great miracles that G-d performed for our ancestors at the time of the Exodus from Egypt. This command applies in all places, and even after the destruction of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It is binding upon both men and women. One who does not eliminate Hametz from his home on the 14 th of Nissan is in violation of a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). If he leaves the Hametz in his home during Pesach, he violates as well the Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Torah prohibition) of “Se’or Lo Yimaseh Be’batechem” – that Hametz may not be present in one’s home during Pesach. Although Misvot Lo Ta’aseh (Torah prohibitions) are generally punishable with Malkut (lashes), one is not liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition, because it entails no action, and one is liable to Malkut only for violating a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh that is transgressed by committing an action. The Minhat Hinuch, in discussing the command of “Tashbitu,” notes that this Misva might perhaps be treated differently than other Misvot Aseh. He cites the discussion of the Ran (Rabbenu Nissim of Gerona, Spain, 1320-1380) in Masechet Yoma (4 in the Rif) regarding the case of an ill patient who is in life-threatening condition on Shabbat and urgently requires food. Needless to say, Pikuah Nefesh (saving a human life) overrides Torah law, and it would thus be permissible to cook food for this patient, despite the prohibition against cooking on Shabbat. The Ran writes that even if readymade non-kosher food is available, it is preferable to cook kosher food for this patient. He explains that the transgression of cooking on Shabbat is violated through just one action, whereas the prohibition against eating non-kosher food is violated through each and every act of eating. Therefore, it is preferable to violate once the severe transgression of Shabbat desecration, even though it is punishable by death, rather than have the patient repeatedly violate the less severe prohibition of eating non-kosher food. According to the Ran, repeatedly violating a lower-level prohibition is treated by Halacha with greater severity than a one-time violation of a higher-level prohibition. By the same token, the Minhat Hinuch posits, one might argue that the Misvat Aseh of eliminating Hametz, which one violates at every moment he allows the Hametz to remain in his home, should be considered a stricter command than other Misvot Aseh, which one violates only at one moment. For example, the moment Rosh Hashanah ends, one who did not hear the Shofar blowing has transgressed the Misva at that moment. In the case of “Tashbitu,” however, one transgresses the Misva repeatedly, every moment the Hametz is present in the home. The Minhat Hinuch proposes two practical applications of this theory. First, it will affect the question of how much an expense one must incur in order to fulfill this Misva. Generally, Halacha requires one to spend even all his money if necessary to avoid violating a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, but requires spending only up to one-fifth of one’s assets for the sake of fulfilling a Misvat Aseh (Shulhan Aruch, Orah Haim 656). When it comes to the Misvat Aseh of “Tashbitu,” however, one might argue that since this Misva is violated every moment it is not performed, its status is that of a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, and thus one would be required to spend any amount of money necessary for the sake of eliminating the Hametz from his home. Secondly, as the Rambam famously discusses in Hilchot Teshuba, one atones for neglecting a Misvat Aseh simply by performing Teshuba (repentance), whereas atoning for violating a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh requires both repentance and the experience of Yom Kippur. In this respect, too, we might assume that the Misva of “Tashbitu” is treated like a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, and is thus not atoned through repentance alone. The Minhat Hinuch writes that this theory is a “He’ara Nechona” (“correct observation”), though he remains inconclusive, stating that this point requires further study and analysis.
Besides the Misva to offer the Korban Pesach during the afternoon of the 14 th of Nissan, there is also a separate obligation to eat the meat of the sacrifice that night, the night of the 15 th . This Misva is introduced by the Torah in Sefer Shemot (12:8), where it commands, “Ve’achelu Et Ha’basar Ba’layla Ha’zeh” – “They shall eat the meat on this night.” This Misva, of course, like the other commands relevant to the Pesach celebration, serves to commemorate and remind us of the great miracles which G-d performed for our ancestors at the time of the Exodus from Egypt. Both men and women are included in the obligation to partake of the meat of the Korban Pesach. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in discussing this Misva, establishes a principle which, as he emphasizes, is relevant to all Misvot Aseh (affirmative commands) – that Bet Din, when it has the authority and ability to do so, uses coercive measures to enforce compliance with this command. If a person refused to perform a Misvat Aseh, then Bet Din would use its authority to force that individual to fulfill the Misva in question. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, in listing the Torah’s 613 commands, follows the Rambam’s view, that eating the meat of the Korban Pesach comprises a separate Misva, independent of the Misva to offer the sacrifice in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Interestingly, when it comes to other sacrifices, the Rambam lists the slaughtering of the sacrifice and the consumption of the sacrificial meat as a single Misva. It is only with regard to the Korban Pesach that the Rambam makes a distinction, listing the offering of the sacrifice as one Misva, and the consumption of its meat as a separate Misva. Different approaches have been taken to explain why the Rambam singled out the Korban Pesach in this regard. Some explain that since the sacrifice must be offered on the 14 th of Nissan, and the meat must be eaten that night, the 15 th of Nissan, these obligations are listed as two separate Misvot, as they are to observed on two different calendar dates. Others, however, explain this distinction as stemming from a fundamental difference between the consumption of the Korban Pesach and the consumption of other sacrifices. Rav Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk (Lithuania, 1853-1918) asserted that when it comes to other sacrifices, the obligation is defined not as a requirement to eat the sacrifice, but rather as a requirement that the sacrifice be eaten. The person who offered the sacrifice bears no personal obligation to eat; the obligation is only that the meat be eaten. When it comes to the Korban Pesach, by contrast, there is also a personal obligation to eat the sacrifice’s meat. Rav Chaim maintained that the Korban Pesach has a dual nature: like all sacrifices, there is a Misva for the meat to be eaten, and there is also an additional requirement on the “Gabra” (individual) to eat the meat. On this basis, Rav Chaim explained the view of Rabbi Elazar Ben Azarya that one must eat the Korban Pesach by Hasot (Halachic midnight) on the night of the 15 th of Nissan. Generally, Torah law allows sacrifices to be eaten throughout the night, until morning. In principle, Rav Chaim said, this applies to the Korban Pesach, as well. However, the additional component of this sacrifice – the personal obligation to eat its meat – requires partaking of the meat before Hasot. The practical ramification of this duality, Rav Chaim taught, is that if a person, for whatever reason, did not eat the Korban Pesach before Hasot, then even according to Rabbi Elazar Ben Azarya, he should do so after Hasot. Although he can no longer fulfill the special Misva of eating the Korban Pesach (according to the view of Rabbi Elazar Ben Azarya), he can still fulfill the Misva of eating the meat of a sacrifice, which applies throughout the night. Likewise, Rav Chaim said that if a person is frail and cannot eat a Ke’zayit of meat, he should eat whatever small quantity of the sacrifice that he can. Although he cannot fulfill the obligation to eat the Korban Pesach, because “eating” requires the consumption of at least a Ke’zayit, nevertheless, the generic requirement, that sacrificial meat should be eaten, can be fulfilled through the consumption of any amount, and thus this person should eat as much as he could, even though he cannot eat a Ke’zayit. This explains why the Rambam listed the consumption of the Korban Pesach as a separate Misva. When it comes to all other sacrifices, the Misva to offer the sacrifice includes an obligation that the sacrifice be eaten. The Korban Pesach, however, features an additional requirement incumbent upon the individual to eat the Korban, and thus the Rambam lists the consumption of the sacrifice as a separate Misva. Another expression of the uniqueness of the consumption of the Korban Pesach is the Halacha disqualifying a sacrifice if the meat became Tameh (impure). Generally speaking, if the meat becomes Tameh before the sacrificial blood is sprinkled on the altar, then the sacrifice nevertheless remains valid, and the blood is sprinkled. In the case of the Korban Pesach, however, if the meat becomes Tameh and thus forbidden for consumption, the sacrifice is invalid and the blood is not sprinkled on the altar. Given the special obligation to eat the meat of the Korban Pesach, the sacrifice is invalidated in a situation where the meat becomes unfit for consumption.
The Torah commands in the Book of Shemot (12:9), “Al Tochelu Mimenu Na U’bashel Mebushal Ba’mayim” – that one may not eat the meat of the Korban Pesah when it is in a state of “Na,” or if it had been boiled in water (or any other liquid). The word “Na” is commonly translated as “raw,” but in truth, it means “not fully roasted.” If one eats the meat of the Korban Pesach when it is completely raw, he fails to fulfill the affirmative command to eat the meat roasted, but he does not violate the prohibition against eating it “Na,” because “Na” refers to meat which has begun to be roasted over fire but has not yet been fully roasted. More specifically, “Na” refers to meat which has yet to be roasted to the point of “Ma’achal Ben Derusai” – the point at which it is just barely edible. Once the meat of the Korban Pesach has reached the minimum level of edibility, it is no longer considered “Na,” and thus it may be eaten. Both sides of the meat must be roasted until the point of “Ma’achal Ben Derusai” for the meat to be permissible for consumption (just as on Shabbat, one who cooks meat is not in violation of Shabbat unless both sides reach the level of “Ma’achal Ben Derusai”). Like all the Misvot relevant to the Korban Pesach, this Misva applies to both men and women. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the reason behind the Misva is that as we celebrate our nation’s Exodus from Egypt, we should conduct ourselves as distinguished noblemen. In ancient times, the masses, who could not afford to eat large quantities of meat, would boil their meat, even though roasted meat tastes better, because roasting causes the meat to contract, whereas boiling has the effect of expanding it. Only the wealthy aristocracy, who could afford large quantities of meat, would roast their meat to enjoy the enhanced taste, because it did not matter to them that the meat contracted over the process of roasting. On Pesach, as we celebrate our freedom from bondage, we are to conduct ourselves in a regal manner, and so the Torah forbids eating the meat of the Korban Pesach in a state other than fully roasted. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, meat can be prepared more swiftly by roasting than by boiling. Thus, roasting the meat of the Korban Pesach serves to commemorate the “Hipazon” – the haste with which Beneh Yisrael left Egypt, when they needed to prepare the meat of the sacrifice in the quickest way possible. The Rambam, in his listing of the Misvot, includes under this prohibition both eating meat of the Korban Pesach which is not fully roasted, and meat of the Korban Pesach which was boiled. The Ramban, however, disagrees with this classification, and lists two separate prohibitions: one forbidding eating meat of the Korban Pesach which has not been fully roasted, and another forbidding eating meat of the Korban Pesach which had been boiled. Therefore, if one ate both kinds of meat – a piece which is not fully roasted, and a piece which had been boiled – then according to the Rambam, he is liable to just a single set of Malkut (lashes), whereas according to the Ramban, he is liable to two sets of Malkut. An interesting question arises according to the Ramban in the case of meat of the Korban Pesach which was partially roasted, and, before it reached the point of “Ma’achal Ben Derusai,” it was taken off the fire and then boiled in water. If one would then eat this meat, would he be in violation of both prohibitions, or only a single prohibition? Of course, this question does not arise according to the Rambam, who in any event includes both partially roasted meat and boiled meat under a single prohibition. But according to the Ramban, who maintains that these constitute two separate prohibitions, for how many violations would one be liable if he partakes of meat of the Korban Pesach which was both partially roasted and boiled in water? At first glance, we would apply to this case the rule of “En Issur Hal Al Issur” (literally, “a prohibition cannot descend upon a [different] prohibition”) – that once something is forbidden by force of one prohibition, it cannot then become subject to another prohibition. Seemingly, once the meat becomes forbidden because it is partially roasted, it cannot then also become subject to a separate prohibition when it is boiled, and thus one who eats this meat would be liable for just a single violation – eating partially roasted meat. The Minhat Hinuch, however, notes that the rule of “En Issur Hal Al Issur” is not applicable to this case, because Halacha makes an exception in a situation of “Issur Mosif” – where the second prohibition is more inclusive than the first. If the second prohibition expands the prohibition beyond the parameters of the first prohibition, then the object in question indeed becomes subject to both prohibitions. In the case under discussion, boiling the meat has the effect of rendering it permanently forbidden. Partially roasted meat, while currently prohibited for consumption, can become permissible if it is left to continue roasting on the fire. But once it is boiled in water, its prohibited status becomes permanent. Since the second prohibition contributes an additional element to the meat’s prohibited status, it takes effect, and the meat should thus become forbidden by force of both prohibitions – the prohibition against eating partially roasted meat of the Korban Pesach, and the prohibition against eating boiled meat of the Korban Pesach. On the other hand, the Minhat Hinuch writes, one might argue that boiling the partially roasted meat has the effect of erasing the meat’s prior history, so-to-speak, such that it is no longer considered to have been partially roasted. If so, then even according to the Ramban, a person who eats this meat would be liable for only a single violation – eating boiled meat of the Korban Pesach. The Minhat Hinuch leaves this question unresolved.
In its discussion of the laws of the Korban Pesach in the Book of Shemot (12:10), the Torah commands, “Ve’lo Totiru Mimenu Ad Boker,” forbidding one to leave over meat of the Korban Pesach until morning. Meat which was left over must be burned. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Korban Pesach celebrates not merely our nation’s deliverance from slavery, but also our attaining a stature of “Malchut U’gdula” – “royalty and prestige.” We must therefore conduct ourselves with regard to this sacrifice like members of nobility. Wealthy people do not normally leave food over for the next day; they eat heartily, enjoying everything that was prepared today, and discard any leftovers, confident that they will have fresh food prepared the following day. Thus, the Torah commanded us to eat the Pesach sacrifice like wealthy noblemen, not leaving anything over, and destroying any meat which is not eaten. Whereas most Misvot Lo Ta’aseh (Torah prohibitions) are punishable with Malkut (lashes), this prohibition falls into the exceptional category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – a violation which can be “corrected.” As mentioned, the Torah commands that if one violated this prohibition and left meat of the sacrifice over, the leftover meat must be burned. There is a principle that this kind of prohibition, for which the Torah prescribes a “solution” if it is violated, is not punishable with Malkut. Therefore, one does not receive Malkut for leaving over meat of the Korban Pesach. The Peri Megadim (Rav Yosef Teomim, 1727-1793) raises an interesting question regarding the status of women vis-à-vis this prohibition, in light of the fact that this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh.” The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (35) establishes the rule that all Misvot Lo Ta’aseh apply equally to both men and women. Whereas certain Misvot Aseh (affirmative commands) apply only to men, Misvot Lo Ta’aseh apply also to women. The Gemara infers this rule from a verse in the Book of Bamidbar (5:6) which addresses a situation where “Ish O Isha Ki Ya’asu Mi’kol Hatot Ha’adam” – “a man or woman commits any of the sins a person can commit.” The Torah here equates men and women with regard to sins, thus indicating that they are both included in Misvot Lo Ta’aseh. The Gemara’s formulation in establishing this rule is, “Hishva Ha’katub Isha Le’ish Le’chol Onashim She’ba’Torah” – “The text equates women and men, with regard to all punishments in the Torah.” Rashi explains that this refers to Misvot Lo Ta’aseh, which are punishable with Malkut. This formulation, the Peri Megadim observes, appears to suggest that women are included only in those Misvot Lo Ta’aseh which are punishable. When it comes, however, to the exceptional categories, such as “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh,” for which violators are not liable to Malkut, we should perhaps assume that such prohibitions do not apply to women. And yet, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes explicitly that women are included in the prohibition against leaving over the meat of the Korban Pesach – despite its being a “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh.” The Minhat Hinuch addresses this question at length, and his analysis lies beyond the scope of our discussion. There is also another interesting question that arises with regard to the status of women vis-à-vis this Misva. The command to burn leftover meat of the Korban Pesach would seem to fall under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands that apply only at certain times, as it applies only the morning after the sacrifice is offered. As a rule, women are exempt from “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama,” and thus, it stands to reason that women are not bound by the Misva to burn leftover meat of the Korban Pesach. The Minhat Hinuch observes that if so, then as far as women are concerned, the prohibition against leaving over meat of the sacrifice does not fall under the category of “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh” – because for them, there is no Misva to “correct” the violation if meat was left over. Seemingly, then, we should conclude that if a woman left over meat of the Korban Pesach, she should be liable to Malkut, because she violated a prohibition which for her is not considered a “Lav Ha’nitak La’aseh.” Once again, the Minhat Hinuch’s analysis lies beyond the scope of our discussion.
The Misva of Kiddush Ha’hodesh requires the leading Sages to declare new months on either the 30 th or 31 st day of the previous month, based upon the testimony of two witnesses who saw the new moon. The source of this Misva is G-d’s command to Moshe and Aharon in Egypt before the Exodus, “Ha’hodesh Ha’zeh Lachem Rosh Hodashim” – “This month is for you the first of the months” (Shemot 12:2). As the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, this verse is understood to mean that when the new moon is sighted, the new month is to be declared. Bet Din interrogates the witnesses, and then proclaims, “Mekudash” – that this day is Rosh Hodesh, the first day of the new month. The Sefer Ha’hinuch clarifies that this Misva also includes the obligation of “Ibur Shana” – the declaration of a leap year when it becomes necessary to adjust the calendar. As opposed to the solar calendar, which is based upon Earth’s 365-day revolution around the sun, the Jewish calendar follows a lunar-based system, with months being determined based on the moon’s revolution around Earth. However, twelve revolutions of the moon take only 354 days – 11 days fewer than Earth’s revolution around the sun, which means that the Jewish year is 11 days shorter than the solar year. The Torah requires ensuring that Pesach is observed in the springtime (“Shamor Et Hodesh Ha’abib Ve’asita Pesach” – Debarim 16:1), and Sukkot is called “Hag Ha’asif” – the festival of the completion of the harvest (Shemot 34:22) and must be celebrated at the time of the gathering of the harvested produce (Debarim 16:13). Therefore, it becomes necessary to occasionally adjust the Jewish calendar to keep it in sync with the solar calendar. This is done by the addition of an entire month – a second Adar – every two or three years. (The Jewish calendar differs in this respect from the system used by the Moslems, which is based solely on the lunar cycle, and which results in Ramadan, for example, falling at all different times of the year.) This obligation of “Ibur Shana,” to add a month to ensure that the holidays fall in their appropriate seasons, is included in the obligation of Kiddush Ha’hodesh. As mentioned, the command of “Ha’hodesh Ha’zeh Lachem” was directed to Moshe and Aharon, the nation’s spiritual leaders at that time. The Rabbis deduced on this basis that the Misva of Kiddush Ha’hodesh is charged upon the leaders of the generation, the foremost scholars who have received Semicha – formal ordination from a Rabbi who himself received ordination and is part of the chain dating back to Moshe Rabbenu. A Rabbi can perform this Misva only in Eretz Yisrael. However, if he received Semicha in Eretz Yisrael and then moved to the Diaspora, he can nevertheless perform this Misva if he is recognized as the greatest Rabbi in the world in his time. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that a qualified Rabbi who, for whatever reason, refrains from involving himself in Kiddush Ha’hodesh is liable to severe punishment, because he causes the holidays to be observed in the wrong time. Today, we no longer have “Semuchim” – Rabbis with formal Semicha, because the chain of Semicha was broken many centuries ago. The Gemara explains that Hillel, a grandson of Rabbi Yehuda Ha’nasi, established the Jewish calendar for centuries into the future, and he effectively “declared” all the new months henceforth. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that all the new months and leap years were arranged by Hillel’s system until the time when Eliyahu Ha’nabi will arrive. Once Mashiah comes, we will return to the original system of witnesses testifying to the sighting of the new moon, and the declaration of new months based on their testimony. In the Book of Vayikra (23:4), the Torah says about the holidays, “Tikre’u Otam Be’mo’adam” – “you shall declare them at their times.” The Gemara notes that the word “Otam” (“them”) in this verse is written without the letter “Vav,” such that it may be read as “Atem” – “you.” This word, the Gemara establishes, indicates that the Rabbis’ declaration of the new month is binding even if it was mistaken, and even if they intentionally declared Rosh Hodesh on the wrong day. Remarkably, G-d empowered the Rabbis to such an extent that the days on which the holidays fall according to their pronouncements are considered sacred – even if they made a mistake, and even if they made an intentional mistake. The question arises as to whether this principle applies also to the declaration of leap years. If the Rabbis declared an extra month when this was not warranted, is their declaration binding? The Noda Bi’yehuda (Rav Yehezkel Landau of Prague, 1713-1793), in his Talmud commentary (called “Selah” – “Siyun Le’nefesh Haya”), writes that this principle does not apply to the declaration of leap years. He notes the story told of King Hizkiyahu, who once declared a leap year on the 30 th of Adar, after that day had already been declared the first of Nissan, such that it was already too late to add a second Adar. The Sages of his time disapproved of this declaration, and Hizkiyahu regretted his mistake and begged G-d for forgiveness. This appears to demonstrate that mistaken declarations of a leap year are not binding. However, the Minhat Hinuch cites a passage from the Midrash (Torat Kohanim) stating explicitly that if the Rabbis pronounced a leap year when a leap year was not required, their declaration is binding – in direct contradistinction to the Noda Bi’yehuda’s conclusion. As for the story of Hizkiyahu, the Minhat Hinuch writes that this situation involved not a mistaken declaration of a leap year, but a declaration made after the time when this is allowed. The Minhat Hinuch explains that although the mistaken declarations of new months and leap years are binding, this applies only if the declarations followed the basic framework of the calendar system. For example, if the Rabbis declared Rosh Hodesh on the 15 th of the month, or even on the 28 th of the month, their declaration is entirely meaningless. It is only if they declared the 29 th day Rosh Hodesh instead of the 30 th , or the 30 th instead of the 29 th , that their mistaken pronouncement is binding. Likewise, in the case of the declaration of a leap year, the declaration is binding only if it was done at the appropriate time. If it was unnecessary, it is nevertheless binding, because the process was done according to the accepted system. Hizkiyahu declared a leap year after the final time when this is allowed, once the month of Nissan was declared to have begun, and thus his pronouncement was not valid.
The first of the Torah’s 613 Misvot is Periya Ve’riba – the obligation to procreate. The source for this Misva is G-d’s command to Adam and Hava right when they were first created, “Peru U’rbu” – “be fruitful and multiply” (Bereshit 1:28). The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes about this command, “Ve’hi Misva Gedola” – this is an especially important Misva, because it in a sense encompasses all Misvot in the Torah, as the children one produces will, please G-d, fulfill all the Misvot. The Misvot are intended not for angels, but rather for human beings, and so by reproducing, we ensure the continued observance of the Torah. Implicit in the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion is the assumption that this Misva requires not merely producing children, but also educating them to become Torah-observant adults. The Sefer Ha’hinuch adds that this Misva applies at all times and in all locations. The obligation is incumbent upon only men; women do not bear an obligation to produce children. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that those who neglect this Misva are liable to severe punishment. An interesting question arises as to whether one fulfills this Misva if he begets a Mamzer (illegitimate child). This can happen in two different situations – when a Ger (Halachic convert) marries a Mamzeret, a permissible union, the products of which are Mamzerim; and when one engages in relations with somebody with whom relations are forbidden and carry the punishment of Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation). This includes situations such as incest and adultery. Interestingly enough, the Talmud Yerushalmi indicates that even in the latter case, where a person begot a child through a strictly forbidden relationship, he fulfills the Misva of Periya Be’ribya. The Bet Yosef (commentary to the Tur by Maran, Rav Yosef Karo, author of the Shulhan Aruch) cites this position in the name of the Ritba (Rav Yom Tob of Seville, Spain, c. 1260-c. 1320). At first glance, we might wonder how this position can be reconciled with the famous principle of “Misva Ha’ba’a Ba’abera,” which disqualifies a Misva performed via a transgression. How can one be considered to have fulfilled a Misva by performing an act which constitutes a violation of one of the most severe Torah prohibitions? The Minhat Hinuch (Rav Yosef Babad, 1801-1874) answers that the rule of “Misva Ha’ba’a Ba’abera” applies only when the performance of a Misva and the violation of a sin occur simultaneously. The classic case is when a person picks up somebody else’s Etrog to steal it, intending at the same time to fulfill the Misva of the four species on Sukkot. The thief does not fulfill the Misva, because the Misva act was also an act of sin. If, however, a Misva was facilitated through a forbidden act which preceded it, the Misva has nevertheless been fulfilled. In the case of Periya Ve’ribya, the Minhat Hinuch explains, the Misva is fulfilled not through the act of intercourse, but rather when the child is born. The relationship facilitates the Misva, but is not the Misva act itself. Therefore, one who has an incestuous or adulterous relationship which produces a Mamzer nevertheless fulfills the Misva of procreation, since the forbidden act which facilitated the Misva occurred before the fulfillment of the Misva. This principle also affects a different question – when one should have in mind to fulfill the Misva of Periya Ve’ribya. Halacha follows the view that “Misvot Serichot Kavana” – one must have in mind to fulfill the Misva when the Misva act is performed. According to the theory advanced by the Minhat Hinuch, one does not need to have in mind to fulfill the Misva of Periya Ve’ribya during marital relations, because the Misva is fulfilled not at that time, but rather later, when the child is born. Hence, when one’s child is born (specifically, the first boy and first girl, as the accepted view is that one fulfills the Misva by begetting one son and one daughter), he should have in mind at that time that he fulfills the Misva of Periya Ve’ribya. However, the Shulhan Aruch writes (Eben Ha’ezer 1), “One is obligated to marry a woman in order to procreate.” This formulation suggests that the Misva of Periya Ve’ribya is fulfilled at the time when one marries, as this is the way one procreates. For this reason, when the Minhat Hinuch served as Mesader Kiddushin, officiating at a wedding, he would instruct the groom under the Hupa to have in mind that he fulfills the Misva of Periya Ve’ribya, in order to satisfy the view implied by the Shulhan Aruch.
The command of Gid Ha’nashe forbids eating the sciatic nerve of an animal. The source of this prohibition is the story of Yaakob Abinu’s wrestle with an angel, during which he sustained an injury to this part of the thigh. The Torah writes that in commemoration of this incident, “Lo Yochelu Beneh Yisrael Et Gid Ha’nashe” – the Jewish People abstain from the Gid Ha’nashe. This verse is understood as not merely stating a historical fact, but rather establishing a prohibition against eating this part of an animal. The Sefer Ha’hinuch (listen to audio recording for precise citation) offers a beautiful explanation for the underlying reason of this Misva. He writes that this command serves as a source of encouragement and reassurance during our struggles and hardships in our state of exile. We are reminded that Esav’s angel – the Satan – set out to kill Yaakob Abinu and all his descendants, but, although the Satan succeeded in inflicting considerable pain in Yaakov, it failed to destroy him, and, in fact, Yaakob’s injury soon healed. Likewise, Yaakob’s descendants – the Jewish Nation – will suffer a great deal of pain and affliction at the hands of “Esav,” the enemy nations, over the course of our exile. But like our ancestor, we will ultimately emerge victorious, and all our wounds will be healed. By abstaining from the Gid Ha’nashe, we are reminded of Yaakob’s struggle with the angel and his ultimate triumph, and we are thus reassured that our long, bitter exile will eventually end with the coming of Mashiah and the healing of all our wounds. This prohibition applies at all times and in all locations, and, like all Torah prohibitions, is binding upon both men and women. The Gemara establishes the principle of “En Be’gidin Be’noten Ta’am” – that the Gid Ha’nashe does not have a taste. Halachically speaking, the Gid Ha’nashe is not considered food that has a flavor. The practical ramification of this principle is a case where the Gid Ha’nashe fell into kosher food, and one then removed it. Normally, if a piece of non-kosher food mixed with kosher food, then even after the piece of non-kosher food is removed, the remaining food may not be eaten, because it contains the flavor of the non-kosher food. It is only if the non-kosher food comprised one-sixtieth or less of the mixture that the food is permissible, as in such a low proportion, the non-kosher food does not impart any taste. Otherwise, the food is forbidden by virtue of the taste of non-kosher food which it had absorbed. However, due to the principle of “En Be’gidin Be’noten Ta’am,” this does not apply to the Gid Ha’nashe. If a Gid Ha’nashe mixes with kosher food and is then removed, the remaining food is permissible for consumption. Since the Gid Ha’nashe has no Halachic “taste” which it could impart into the food with which it mixes, the food may be eaten once the Gid Ha’nashe is removed. The Minhat Hinuch adds another ramification of the principle of “En Be’gidin Be’noten Ta’am.” The Rambam, in Hilchot Teshuba, delineates the process of atonement for the various different categories of sin. For a violation of an ordinary Torah prohibition (as opposed to those which carry capital punishment), atonement requires repentance and the experience of Yom Kippur. Seemingly, then, one who knowingly eats a Gid Ha’nashe achieves atonement through these two stages – by repenting, and experiencing Yom Kippur. (It is clear that accidentally eating a Gid Ha’nashe is atoned for through repentance alone; nothing more is needed to atone for an unintentional transgression.) However, the Minhat Hinuch draws our attention to the Rambam’s comments in Hilchot Yesodeh Ha’Torah, where he writes that if one commits a sinful act not due to a craving or temptation, but rather for the purpose of defying G-d, then this constitutes a Hilul Hashem (defamation of G-d’s Name). Even if one committed such an act in private, he has perpetrated a Hilul Hashem because he performed a forbidden action specifically for the sake of defiance. Accordingly, the Minhat Hinuch writes, once the Gemara has established that a Gid Ha’nashe has no taste, one who knowingly eats a Gid Ha’nashe is guilty of committing a Hilul Hashem. Since he experiences no enjoyment from the consumption of the Gid Ha’nashe, this act is done for the sake of defying G-d, and thus qualifies as a Hilul Hashem. And in Hilchot Teshuba, the Rambam writes that a sin involving a Hilul Hashem is not atoned through repentance and Yom Kippur; this requires also punishment and death. Hence, the Minhat Hinuch concludes, one who intentionally eats a Gid Ha’nashe does not achieve atonement until after he repents, experiences Yom Kippur, suffers affliction and passes away, Heaven forbid. However, the Minhat Hinuch qualifies this conclusion by stating that it applies only when somebody eats a Gid Ha’nashe for the second time. The first time one eats a Gid Ha’nashe, he likely does not realize that this part of the animal is tasteless, and so we may assume that his intention was not to defy G-d. It is only once one had already eaten the Gid Ha’nashe and realized it has no taste, and then ate a Gid Ha’nashe on another occasion, that he has created a Hilul Hashem.
The Torah introduces the Misva of Berit Mila in two contexts. First, in the Book of Bereshit (17:10), G-d commands Abraham Abinu and his descendants, “Himol Lachem Kol Zachar” – that every male must undergo circumcision. Secondly, the Torah instructs in the Book of Vayikra (12:3), “U’ba’yom Ha’shemini Yimol Besar Orlato” – “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva consists of two components – the removal of the actual foreskin, and “Peri’a” – the removal of the thin membrane underneath the foreskin, to expose the flesh. Explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two approaches. First, he writes, the Berit Mila serves as a physical symbol on the Jew’s body, a distinguishing feature which sets us apart from other peoples. Secondly, the Misva of Berit Mila shows that we were not born perfect, that we need to work to elevate ourselves. The act of circumcision needed to “perfect” the body represents the need to work towards “perfecting” our souls through the performance of Misvot. Just as our bodies are naturally defective, our inner beings, too, are naturally defective and we must constantly strive to improve and elevate ourselves. The Misva of Berit Mila applies at all times, and in all locations. It is binding only upon men; a mother is not obligated to circumcise her son or see to it that he is circumcised, as this obligation falls solely upon the father. This Misva is one of only two affirmative commands which carry a punishment of “Karet” (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation) for those who neglect them (the other being the Pesach sacrifice). If one purposefully refused to undergo circumcision, and died without having a Berit Mila, then he is punished with Karet. This refers only to a person whose father did not circumcise him or have him circumcised, and then he grew up and refused to undergo the procedure. A father is not liable to Karet for failing to have his son circumcised. The Minhat Hinuch poses a fundamental question regarding the nature of an adult’s obligation to undergo Berit Mila. If, for whatever reason, a boy was not circumcised before he reached the age of Halachic adulthood – thirteen – then does the obligation of Berit Mila now transfer from his father to him, or does it remain upon the father? Do we view the child as personally responsible for his Berit Mila, or does the father continue to bear this obligation even after the son turns thirteen and is considered a Halachic adult? This question, as the Minhat Hinuch discusses, will yield several practical ramifications. First, if somebody “steals” another person’s Misva, by stepping in to perform a Misva which his fellow was to have performed, then he must compensate his fellow ten Zehubim (gold coins) for the lost Misva opportunity. Therefore, we need to establish whether an adult’s obligation to be circumcised is his obligation or the father’s, in order to determine which of them would be considered “stealing” the Misva by performing it instead of the one on whom the obligation rests. Secondly, this question will affect the recitation of the Beracha of “Le’hachniso Bi’brito Shel Abraham Abinu,” which a father normally recites at his son’s Berit Mila. If the father retains his obligation even after the son becomes a Bar-Misva, then the father recites this Beracha even if the Berit is performed after that point. If, however, the obligation is transferred to the son once he reaches the age of thirteen, then the father does not recite the Beracha if the Berit is performed after the child reaches this age. Finally, this question will determine who must incur the expense of the Berit Mila. If a Mohel must be paid to circumcise the son, then if the father continues to bear the obligation even after the child’s Bar Misva, then he must pay for the Berit, whereas if it becomes the child’s obligation, then the father bears no more responsibility than any other Jew to ensure that the child receives a Berit. The Minhat Hinuch suggests proving that the Misva remains the father’s obligation, from the discussion of Tosafot in Masechet Kiddushin. The Gemara infers from a verse that women are not obligated to circumcise their sons, and Tosafot raise the question of why a textual inference is necessary. After all, the Misva of Berit Mila takes effect only once the child becomes eight days old, and so this Misva falls under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama” – affirmative commands that apply only at specific times. As a general rule, women are exempt from such Misvot, and it thus seems unnecessary for the Gemara to cite a Biblical source for women’s exemption from this Misva. Tosafot answer that once the eighth day arrives, the Misva of Berit Mila applies at all times, and therefore, it does not fall under the category of “Misvot Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama.” The Minhat Hinuch notes that Tosafot’s answer appears to work on the assumption that the father’s obligation applies forever, and does not end when the child reaches the age of thirteen. After all, if the father’s obligation does end when the child becomes a Bar Misva, then Berit Mila would be considered a “time-bound” obligation, as it applies only for thirteen years. Apparently, the obligation of Berit Mila remains incumbent upon the father as long as he and his son are alive, and it does not transfer to the son when the son reaches the age of thirteen.
The Misva to offer the Korban Pesach on the 14 th of Nissan in the afternoon is introduced in the Book of Shemot (12:6), where the Torah says, “Ve’shahatu Oto Kol Adat Yisrael Ben Ha’arbayim” – “The entire congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon.” The sacrifice must be a male, one-year-old sheep, and the Misva requires the slaughtering of the animal and the subsequent procedures, culminating with the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. After the sacrifice, those who had “registered” for the sacrifice join together and eat the meat. The meat of the Korban Pesach is to be eaten “Al Ha’soba” – in a state of satiation, after one has eaten a meal. The concept underlying this Misva, of course, is to commemorate the great miracles which G-d performed for our ancestors at the time of the Exodus from Egypt. This command applies to both men and women, and only during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Misva of Korban Pesach is unique in that it is an affirmative command for which one is liable to Karet (eternal excision from the Jewish Nation) if he or she purposely neglects the Misva. The only other affirmative command that is punishable with Karet is Berit Mila. Generally, if one unintentionally violates a Torah law that is punishable with Karet when it is violated intentionally, he must bring a Hatat (sin-offering). The Misva of Korban Pesach is one of only three commands which carry the punishment of Karet for intentional violations, but does not require a Hatat when it is violated unintentionally. The other two are Berit Mila and blaspheming G-d. Therefore, one who mistakenly failed to bring the Korban Pesach is not required to offer a Hatat. Tosafot, in Masechet Rosh Hashanah (4), write that one who fails to offer the Korban Pesach is guilty not only of neglecting the affirmative command of Korban Pesach, but also of violating the prohibition of “Lo Te’aher,” which forbids delaying an obligatory sacrifice (Debarim 23:22). If one pledged to offer a sacrifice, he violates the prohibition of “Lo Te’aher” once three Regalim (pilgrimage holidays – Pesach, Shabuot, Sukkot) have passed without his offering the sacrifice. In the case of Korban Pesach, Tosafot write, one violates this prohibition as soon as the time for the sacrifice passes and the person has not offered the sacrifice. Tosafot’s remarks might be relevant with regard to the question of how large a financial expense one must incur for the sake of offering the Korban Pesach. The Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 656) writes that although one must spend all his money if necessary to avoid transgressing a Torah violation, one is not required to spend more than one-fifth of his assets for the sake of performing a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). The Magen Abraham (Rav Abraham Gombiner, 1633-1683) raises the question of how much one would be required to spend for the sake of performing the Misva of Berit Mila. On the one hand, Berit Mila is a Misvat Aseh, which requires spending only up to one-fifth of one’s assets; but on the other hand, Berit Mila is exceptional – as mentioned earlier – in that it carries the severe punishment of Karet. Perhaps, this unique status of severity places Berit Mila in the category of Misvot Lo Ta’aseh (Torah prohibitions), such that it requires spending all of one’s assets if necessary for the performance of the Misva. This question posed by the Magen Abraham would, seemingly, apply also to the Misva of Korban Pesach, as it, too, is an exceptional Misvat Aseh that carries the punishment of Karet. However, in light of Tosafot’s comments, it would appear that one must, in fact, spend all his money if necessary to perform the Misva. Since neglecting the obligation of Korban Pesah violates the prohibition of “Lo Te’aher,” we must, at first glance, conclude that irrespective of the Magen Abraham’s question concerning Berit Mila, the Misva of Korban Pesah requires spending all of one’s money if necessary to fulfill the obligation. The Minhat Hinuch, however, dismisses this argument. He shows that in truth, the determining factor regarding the amount one must spend is not whether the law is a Misvat Asei or a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh, but rather whether the law is violated through a forbidden action, or by neglecting to perform an obligatory action. One must spend all his money if necessary to avoid committing an action forbidden by Torah law, but one must spend only up to one-fifth of his assets to perform an action required by the Torah. Therefore, the fact that neglecting to offer the Korban Pesach violates “Lo Te’aher” is immaterial, because we deal here not with one who performs a forbidden action, but rather with one who fails to perform an obligatory action. As such, the question of whether must spend all his assets or only up to one-fifth of his assets to offer the Korban Pesach will depend on the question posed by the Magen Abraham regarding Berit Mila. May we soon be privileged to see the rebuilding of the Bet Ha’mikdash so we may all once again offer the Korban Pesach.