Aristotle: Selected Texts (Greek): Recent Episodes

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After these subjects we must make a fresh start and say that the things having to do with character that are to be avoided are of three forms: vice, lack of self-control, and beastliness. Τhe contraries of two of these are clear, since we call the one virtue and the other self-control. Where the contrary of beastliness is concerned, it would most fit the case to speak of a virtue that is beyond us, one of a heroic or even a divine sort—as when Homer has made Priam say that Hector was exceptionally good: ‘nor did he seem the son of a mortal man, but rather, one of a god.’ So if, as they say, human beings become gods because of an excess of virtue, it is clear that the state opposed to the type that is beast-like will be of this sort. And just as there is in fact neither vice nor virtue of a wild beast, neither is there of a god. But his state is more honorable than virtue, while that of a wild beast is of a different kind than vice. (NE VII.1 1145a15-27)

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ᾽ ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ᾽ ἄν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ <τοῦ> Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίανμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός, “οὐδὲ ἐῴκει ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.” ὥστ᾽ εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἄν είη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ᾽ ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἣ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἣ δ᾽ ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας.

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Perceiving, then, is like bare announcing and understanding [cf. Charles, saying alone or thinking], but when [the perceived object] is pleasant (ἡδύ) or painful, [the soul/the perceptual soul], as it were affirming or denying, pursues or avoids. In fact, to feel pleasant (τὸ ἥδεσθαι) or pain [cf. Charles, to be pleasurably and painfully affected] is to be active with regard to the perceptual mean in relation to what is good, or bad, as such. Both aversion and desire as active are the same, and the desiring part and the aversive part are not distinct either from one another or from the perceptual one, although the being for them is distinct. To the understanding soul, however, appearances are like perceptions. And when it affirms or denies good or bad, it avoids or pursues. That is why the soul never undersands without appearance. (DA III.7 431a8-17. cf. Met. Θ.10 1051b24-25; NE VI.2 1139a21-22. for the perceptual mean, see DA II.11 424a1-9; 423b27, 424a28)

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή.

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Wish is for the end, as we said, but it seems to some people to be for the good, whereas to others it seems to be for the apparent good. For those who say that the object of wish is the good, it follows that when someone who does not choose correctly wishes for something, what he wishes for is not an object of wish at all (for if it is an object of wish, it will also be a good thing, but, if it turns out that way, it was a bad one.) For those, on the other hand, who say that the proper object of wish is the apparent good, it follows that noting is by nature a proper object of wish, but what seems good to each person is so, with different things—even contrary ones, if it turns out that way—appearing so to different ones. Supposing, then, that these results do not satisfy us; should we say that without qualification and in truth the object of wish is the good, but to each person it is the apparent good?(NE III.4 1113a15-23)

Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν [τὸ] βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ᾽, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;

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The object of deliberation

Do people deliberate about everything, and is everything a proper object of deliberation or are there some things about which there is no deliberation? And presumably we should call ‘a object of deliberation’ not what a silly sort of person or a manman would deliberate about but what a person with understanding would. (NE III.3 1112a18-21)

Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ᾽ ἴσως βουλευτὸν οὐκ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ᾽ ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων.

The objects of deliberation are up to us

We do deliberate, though, about things that are up to us and doable in action, and these in fact are the remaining ones. For the causes of things seem to be nature, necessity, luck, and, furthermore, understanding and everything that comes about through a human being. Among human beings, however, each group deliberate about what is doable in action through themselves. (NE III.3 1112a30-34)

βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι᾽ αὑτῶν πρακτῶν.

The object of deliberation is not the end

We deliberate not about ends, though, but about the things that further ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether to cure or an orator about whether to persuade or a politician about whether to produce good government, nor do any of the rest deliebrate about their end. Rather, they take the end for granted and investigate in what way and through which things it will come about. (NE III.3 1112b11-16)

βουλευόμεθα δ᾽ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι.

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This is an audio recording of a talk about Aristotle's account of Justice by nature and justice by convention. The talk was given by me on 24th, May, 2022 at a graduate seminar Aristotle on natural slavery and its legacy run by Prof. Karen Margrethe Nielsen, at the faculty of philosophy, Oxford.

Questions:

1. How can political justice be natural, beyond what is justice by legal, on the grounds that political justice requires those who are in a relation of justice must also be subject to law?
2. What’s the distinction between justice by nature and justice by law and convention?
3. Does Aristotle take a normative view about natural political justice?
4. If he does, what is the root of naturalness of political justice?

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This is my spoken English practice episode, in which I am paraphrasing the content that I have been shadowing in the past ten days from an eposiode entitled 'how to overcome FOMO,' made by NPR's Life Kit podcast.

FOMO

• basic concept
• an illustration of FOMO
• kinds of FOMO

• Mechanism

  • historical origin: ancient human

    • life and death

      • Physiological cause

    • Amygdala: a part of the brain that processes the emotion of fear

• Psychological phenomena

  • Comparison
  • Anxiety
  • Fear of missing out

• FOMO in parenting

  • children and parents
  • education
  • manner

• Good side of FOMO overcoming bad effect of FOMO

  • aiming at happiness
  • the goal in life

• Overcome bad effect of FOMO

  • focus on present
  • feel your emotions
  • slow down

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In this episode I read Aristotle's text from Metaphysics H.3 1043b32-1044a2, in which he makes an analogy between number and substance. They seem to have a common feature that when one thing, X, is added to or subtracted from, it is no longer the same thing.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι, εἴπερ εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τινες λέγουσι μονάδων· ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἀριθμός τις· διαιρετός τε γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἄπειροι οἱ λόγοι), καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δὲ τοιοῦτον. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν, οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερος, κἂν τοὐλάχιστον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἢ προτεθῇ, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος.

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On this episode I read the text from Aristotle's Metaphysics H.3 1043b23-32, where he raises the question whether the what it is is definable. His answer to this question will be given in the rest of Book H.

ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾽ οἷον καττίτερος· ὥστ᾽ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ· ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ αὔτη πρώτων, οὐκέτι, εἴπερ τὶ κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν.

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On this episode I am reading the text in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle articulates what kind of pleasure is specifically related to temperance and intemperance.

περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ᾽ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ᾽ εἰσίν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι᾽ ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ᾽ ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄντρωποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ᾗ ζῷα.

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On this episode I read Aristotle's discussion of the kind of pleasure that is concerned with temperance.

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας. οὺ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὺδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δ᾽ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἁπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἤ λύπην τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἤ ἄναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι᾽ὀσφρήσεως, τάς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσωδίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν ἤ μὴ πάσχειν.