Let's Get Philosophical: Critical Reflections on Conspiracy Theory Theory: Recent Episodes
Kurtis Hagen
This podcast includes summaries of my work on the philosophy of conspiracy theory, which includes critiques of academic efforts to justify the summary dismissal of conspiracy theories. I defend a "particularist" position, according to which each particular conspiracy theory ought to be judged on it own particular merits and faults. This view is defended by many of the most well-published philosophers on this topic: David Coady, Charles Pigden, M Dentith, Lee Basham, Brian Keeley, and Juha Räikkä, as well as myself, Kurtis Hagen.
Part 2 of a 2-part podcast series, based on the article: "Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems" (Argumenta 2018), by Kurtis Hagen
https://www.argumenta.org/article/conspiracy-theorists-monological-belief-systems-special-issue/
ABSTRACT of Article: Recent scholarship has claimed to show that conspiracy theorists are prone to simultaneously believe mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as believe entirely made up conspiracy theories. The authors of those studies suggest that this supports the notion that conspiracy theories operate within “monological belief systems”, in which conspiracy theorists find support for conspiratorial beliefs in other conspiratorial beliefs, or in related generalizations, rather than in evidence directly relevant to the conspiracy in question. In this article, I argue that all of that is either wrong or at least misleading.
This podcast episode is a modified portion of an article entitled, “Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems,” published in an open-access online academic philosophy journal called Argumenta, in 2018, by Kurtis Hagen. This podcast episode focuses on the claim that conspiracy theorists believe obviously mutually inconsistent theories and also the notion that they readily believe competely made up theories.
https://www.argumenta.org/article/conspiracy-theorists-monological-belief-systems-special-issue/
ABSTRACT of article:
Recent scholarship has claimed to show that conspiracy theorists are prone to simultaneously believe mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as believe entirely made up conspiracy theories. The authors of those studies suggest that this supports the notion that conspiracy theories operate within “monological belief systems”, in which conspiracy theorists find support for conspiratorial beliefs in other conspiratorial beliefs, or in related generalizations, rather than in evidence directly relevant to the conspiracy in question. In this article, I argue that all of that is either wrong or at least misleading.
This podcast episode is a modified excerpt from the Appendix, “9/11 and Epistemic Authorities,” taken from the book Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique, published in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen. This excerpt focuses on the reliability of the National Institute of Standards and Technology regarding the destruction of the Twin Towers and Building 7 of the World Trade Center on 9/11 2001.
This podcast episode is the third part of a three-part series on the reliability of the media regarding conspiracy theories. It is mostly an excerpt from the Appendix, “9/11 and Epistemic Authorities,” taken from the book Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique, published in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen.
This is the second part of a three-part series on the reliability of the media regarding conspiracy theories. This episode is based on material taken from an article entitled, “Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?” published in the journal Episteme in 2020, by Kurtis Hagen, which is a response to an article by philosopher Keith Harris. The discussion of the media’s reliability is somewhat tangential to the main argument of the article, having been included there in order to address the concerns of a reviewer who seemed to share Harris’s optimistic view. In this podcast version, some of the material from the article’s footnotes are integrated into the presentation for richer detail.
The abstract of the article from which this material is taken reads as follows:
ABSTRACT: In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And, (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response, I have argued that, like other generalist critiques of conspiracy theories, the arguments offered by Harris do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence.
This podcast episode is the first of a three-part series on the reliability of the media regarding conspiracy theories. This episode is based on material taken from an article entitled, “Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?” published in the journal Episteme in 2020, by Kurtis Hagen, which is a response to an article by philosopher Keith Harris. While discussion of the media’s reliability is tangential to the main argument of the article, it was included there in order to address the concerns of a reviewer who seemed to share Harris’s optimistic view.
Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic? (Episteme 2020)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.19
ABSTRACT: In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And, (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response, I have argued that, like other generalist critiques of conspiracy theories, the arguments offered by Harris do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence.
This is a modified portion of an article entitled, “Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?” published in the journal Episteme in 2020, by Kurtis Hagen. That article is a response to a set of critiques of conspiracy theorizing put forward by philosopher Keith Harris. This podcast episode focuses on just one of those critiques. Namely, Harris argues that conspiracy theorizing problematically relies on a probabilistic version of a formal argument structure known as “modus tollens.” Hagen argues that Harris's critique fails to show that there is anything epistemically problematic in conspiracy theorizing.
Article on which this episode is based:
"Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?" (Episteme, 2020) DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.19
ABSTRACT: In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And, (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response, I have argued that, like other generalist critiques of conspiracy theories, the arguments offered by Harris do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence.
This is a modified portion of an article titled “Mencius and Xunzi on the Legitimate Use of Offensive Force: A Pacifistic Critique of Recent Just War Interpretations,” which was published in the journal Philosophy Compass, in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen. A more complete argument can be found in the middle four chapters of Hagen’s book Lead Them with Virtue: A Confucian Alternative to War, published in 2021, by Lexington Books.
This summary focuses on Xinzhong Yao’s pacifistic interpretation of Mencius and Xunzi as well as the concept of “just war pacifism.” It argues that there is strong textual evidence supporting a pacifistic interpretation of Mencius and Xunzi, and that this pacifistic position is not naive.
This "bonus" episode does not address conspiracy theories, at least not directly. Rather, it addresses the early Confucian perspective on war. Note however that there is a close connection between war and conspiracy theory. Many political conspiracy theories allege that provocations for war have been manufactured, or that the authorities are lying about the justification. Other conspiracy theories allege that an assassinated leader was killed, at least in part, due to his anti-war (or at least insufficiently hawkish) stance. Still others allege the rigging of elections that have implications for war.
This is a modified portion of an article titled “Do Conspiracies Tend to Fail? Philosophical Reflections on a Poorly Supported Academic Meme,” which was published in the journal Episteme, in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen. This is part two of a two-part series, this part focusing on an article by David Grimes entitled, “On the Viability of Conspiratorial Beliefs.”
Abstract of the article: Critics of conspiracy theories often charge that such theories are implausible because conspiracies of the kind they allege tend to fail. Thus, according to these critics, conspiracy theories that have been around for a while would have been, in all likelihood, already exposed if they had been real. So, they reason, they probably are not. In this article, I maintain that the arguments in support of this view are unconvincing. I do so by examining a list of four sources recently cited in support of the claim that conspiracies tend to fail. I pay special attention to two of these sources, an article by Brian Keeley, and, especially, an article by David Grimes, which is perhaps the single “best” article in support of the idea that conspiracies tend to fail. That is, it offers the most explicit and elaborate attempt to establish this view. Further, that article has garnered significant (uncritical) attention in the mainstream press. I argue that Grimes’s argument does not succeed, that the common assertion that conspiracies tend to fail remains poorly supported, and that there are good reasons to think that at least some types of conspiracies do not tend to fail.
This two-part series is a modified reading of parts of an article titled, “Do Conspiracies Tend to Fail? Philosophical Reflections on a Poorly Supported Academic Meme,” which was published in the journal Episteme, in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen.
Abstract of the article: Critics of conspiracy theories often charge that such theories are implausible because conspiracies of the kind they allege tend to fail. Thus, according to these critics, conspiracy theories that have been around for a while would have been, in all likelihood, already exposed if they had been real. So, they reason, they probably are not. In this article, I maintain that the arguments in support of this view are unconvincing. I do so by examining a list of four sources recently cited in support of the claim that conspiracies tend to fail. I pay special attention to two of these sources, an article by Brian Keeley, and, especially, an article by David Grimes, which is perhaps the single “best” article in support of the idea that conspiracies tend to fail. That is, it offers the most explicit and elaborate attempt to establish this view. Further, that article has garnered significant (uncritical) attention in the mainstream press. I argue that Grimes’s argument does not succeed, that the common assertion that conspiracies tend to fail remains poorly supported, and that there are good reasons to think that at least some types of conspiracies do not tend to fail.
This is an abbreviated, and slightly modified, reading of the article, “Are ‘Conspiracy Theories’ So Unlikely to be True? A Critique of Quassim Cassam’s Concept of ‘Conspiracy Theories’,” published in the journal Social Epistemology in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen.
ABSTRACT: The philosopher Quassim Cassam has described a concept called “Conspiracy Theories” (capitalized) that includes several “special features” that distinguish such theories from other theories positing conspiracies. Conspiracy Theories, he argues, are unlikely to be true. Indeed, he implies that they are, as a class of ideas, so unlikely to be true that we are justified in responding to them by criticizing the ideology they are (presumed to be) associated with, rather than engaging them solely on their individual epistemic merits. This article argues that Cassam’s “special features” are ambiguous. Under some interpretations, they are not epistemically problematic. Under other interpretations, they do not fairly describe many of the theories Cassam treats as examples of Conspiracy Theories. In the end, there seems to be no interpretation of these features that would justify the inference that theories Cassam treats as Conspiracy Theories, including JFK Conspiracy Theories, can be reasonably dismissed on account of having these features.