BICOM Podcast: Recent Episodes
BICOM
This is the official BICOM, the Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre, podcast series bringing you expert views and opinions on a wide range of issues from Israel and the region.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Hagar Chemali about the current situation in Lebanon, including her assessment of the public’s view of Hezbollah. Hagar also shares her perspective on US regional policy and gives her prediction for the US presidential election. Chemali is a former US official, serving in various positions in the Obama administration including as Director for Syria and Lebanon at the National Security Council. She is now the host and creator of an award-winning world news show on YouTube called Oh My World! as well as an adjunct professor at Columbia University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
In this episode, Daniel J. Levy speaks to Dr Nir Boms about the 4th anniversary of the signing of the Abraham Accords. They discuss the state of the Accords, their potential for expansion, as well as current relations with Jordan and Egypt. Boms is a Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University. He is the Chairman of the Syria Research Forum and the Gulf Israel Policy Forum, as well as the coordinator of the TAU Workshop on Israel and the Middle East and the Hiwar Forum for Intra-Regional Dialogue.
In this episode a day ahead of hostage release and ceasefire negotiations resuming in Qatar, Dr Amira Halperin speaks with Professor Uzi Rabi. They discuss the possibility of an Iranian strike on Israel following Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran, as well as American attempts to prevent the outbreak of a catastrophic regional war. He also argues that the terrorists groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, motivated by Iran, are using the democratisation in Western countries to act there, as terrorism pose a threat in the West. Professor Uzi Rabi, Ph.D (Tel Aviv University, 2000) is the Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, a Professor of Middle Eastern History at the Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies, and a senior researcher at the Center for Iranian Studies, all at Tel Aviv University. Formerly, he was the Head of the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University.
The post Episode 236 | Iran’s pending strike on Israel? appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Dr Guy Ziv. They discuss PM Netanyahu’s recent visit to the US, his speech to Congress, and meetings with President Biden, VP Harris, and former President Trump. They also discuss the state of US-Israel ties, and his recent book, Netanyahu vs The Generals: The Battle for Israel’s Future. Dr Guy Ziv is an associate professor in American University’s School of International Service’s US Foreign Policy Programme. His research focuses on foreign policy decision-making, the role of political elites in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and civil-military relations in Israel. He has previously worked for the US State Department and regularly appears across US and Israeli newspapers.
The post Episode 235 | Netanyahu in the US appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Egyptian analyst Haisam Hassanein. They discuss Israeli-Egyptian ties in the context of the operation in Rafah. Haisam also shares his assessment of Egypt’s current relations with Palestinian factions and rivalries with other regional powers. Haisam was born and grew up in Egypt, before moving to the US. He is currently adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies, where he analyses Israel’s relations with Arab states and Muslim countries. Previously, he was a research fellow at the Washington Institute, where he focused on Israel-Egypt relations.
The post Episode 234 | Israel-Egypt relations appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Lt. Col. (res.) Sarit Zehavi about the situation on Israel’s northern border and ongoing attacks by Hezbollah. Sarit describes what escalation along the border looks like for communities affected by Hezbollah’s rocket fire. They also discuss Hezbollah’s presence not just in the south, but across Lebanon and what Israel can do to counter the threat. Sarit is a former IDF intelligence officer and the founder of Alma, an independent research and education centre focussing on Israel’s security challenges on its northern border.
Image credit: Alma
The post Episode 233 | Escalation from Lebanon appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Lt. Col. (res) Jonathan Conricus. They discuss the progress of Israel’s operation in Rafah, South Africa’s case accusing Israel of genocide at the ICJ, and the prospects for a diplomatic resolution in the north. Conricus is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies. He served in the IDF for 24 years, in a variety of roles including as an infantry commander, as liaison to the UN, and finally as the IDF’s international spokesperson.
The post Episode 232 | What’s next in Rafah? appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Jacky Hugi, an expert on Arab affairs, about the state of Hamas and its leadership, the ongoing hostage negotiations, and what coukd come next for Gaza and who would be in charge. Hugi is an Israeli journalist, serving as the Arab affairs editor and host at Galei Tzahal radio and as a columnist at the daily newspaper Maariv.
The post Episode 231 | Understanding Hamas appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Professor Rosa Freedman, an expert in international human rights law. They discuss Israel’s obligations in facilitating aid into Gaza and the current role of NGO’s operating in the Strip. Prof Freedman also explores the politicisation of aid, and the failure of the Red Cross to visit the Israeli hostages since October 7th. Freedman is Professor of Law, Conflict and Global Development at the University of Reading. She is a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Civil Society Advisory Board on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse, a member of the FCDO Steering Committee on the Global Framework, and the Civil Society Workstream Lead on the Prevention Project.
https://mcdn.podbean.com/mf/web/ps8c297gtg63dk35/Sequence_01aetf0.mp3The post Episode 230 | Aid in the Gaza Strip appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Prof. Kobi Michael, an Israeli expert on security affairs and the Palestinian arena. They discuss the performance of the IDF so far, the Israeli security calculus during Ramadan, the internal dynamics within both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and the need for Israel-Palestinian peace to be pursued through a multilateral regional framework. Prof. Michael is a senior researcher at INSS and the Misgav Institute, as well as a visiting professor at the International Centre for Policing and Security University of South Wales. The author of 20 books, he previously served as the deputy director general and head of the Palestinian desk at the Ministry for Strategic Affairs.
The post Episode 229 | Insight into Palestinian Affairs appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Barak Seener about Qatar, its regional policies, and its role post-October 7th. They discuss Qatar’s status as, simultaneously, a major sponsor of extremism and a western security ally. They also consider its role in the hostage negotiations and in the future reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Seener is a Senior Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and the founder of Strategic Intelligentia and the Gulf Futures Forum. He also co-hosts The Geo-Godfather Wars podcast. Previously, Barak was a Global Intelligence Manager at HSBC and the Middle East Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
The post Episode 228 | Understanding Qatar appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Jonathan Paris about the latest US thinking on Israel’s war in Gaza and its regional implications. They discuss the US position on a potential operation in Rafah, President Biden’s push for a two-state solution, and the likely impact of Middle East policy on the next US election. Paris is a London-based analyst, a former Middle East Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and an advisor to the Chertoff Group in Washington.
The post Episode 227 | US Middle East Policy appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Dr Elai Rettig about the Gaza Strip’s water and energy supply. Rettig explains how much of Strip’s energy supply Israel was responsible for providing prior to October 7th, the importance of fuel to the water supply, and Hamas’s neglect of the Strip’s infrastructure and its own people’s welfare. Rettig is Assistant Professor at Bar Ilan University and the head of the energy division at the Begin Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies.
BICOM Podcast – TRANSCRIPT
Richard Pater (RP): Last time we spoke, it was full of optimism. Israel had just granted permission for the Palestinians to begin to explore offshore natural gas and we focused on regional connectivity, with the idea of a regional electricity grid and supporting Israeli green energy solutions that would be a benefit for the whole region. Perhaps we’ll come back to that later on in the conversation. But to start with, you can help us make some order and to clarify and explain what existed up until the 6th of October in terms of the supply of electricity, water and fuel into Gaza.
Elai Rettig (ER): The situation in Gaza before October 7th was that 50 percent of Gaza’s electricity came directly from Israel, through 10 electricity grid lines. 50 percent – that’s about 120 megawatts, which is not a lot for 2.2 million people, but that’s 50 percent of Gaza’s electricity. So, the day after the war started, when Israel said that it’s cutting off electricity to Gaza, that was 50 percent. The rest of the 50 percent is locally produced within Gaza. 25 percent is from one power station that runs on diesel fuel. It needs around 17,000 litres of diesel per hour to generate around 65 megawatts, and the rest of the electricity comes from widespread private initiatives.
Basically, Gaza’s population that can afford it have either built or bought a small-scale diesel generator and put it in their backyard or in their basements. Hospitals have diesel powered generators in their basements. Water desalination plants, factories, bakeries – they all have these small-scale diesel generators. And one of the largest penetrations of off grid solar panels in the world. So, during the day, 25 percent of Gaza’s electricity is generated from solar panels, and when the sun sets, then the diesel power generators come into play. And that means that when Israel cuts off electricity to Gaza, then, that’s just 50 percent. The rest is locally produced.
But it depends mainly on the diesel supply, because solar panels are nice, but they only work for around a third of the day. The rest needs diesel. And so, when Israel also – three days into the war – decided that it’s also cutting off diesel supply into Gaza, then it was just a matter of time until electricity runs out completely, other than during the day when the solar panels are off. There are also some batteries, but those batteries work for another hour or two, not much more than that.
RP: And can you tell us about the water supply as well, and how much of that is reliant on Israel?
ER: So that’s where things get complicated because Gaza is not reliant on Israel for water, but it is reliant on Israel for electricity and diesel to get that water flowing. Because on a regular day, only 10 percent of Gaza’s water comes from Israel, 90 percent is locally produced. Either from groundwater, aquifers or water desalination plants. The problem, however, in Gaza – which makes everything so complicated – is that the groundwater in Gaza is not fit to drink. It is very salty, because a lot of sea water has gone into it, and it is contaminated with sewage. That has to do with how the Gazans are producing water. There’s a lot of overproduction. Pretty much any person in Gaza that can afford it and has the means, has drilled his own well in the backyard to get water outside, because they don’t trust Hamas infrastructure. Hamas infrastructure is pretty much non-existent and so everybody just drills wells and they’re not properly drilled. They’re not properly sealed and so seawater gets into them. When there’s rain, then sewage starts flowing into it and the groundwater is contaminated. It’s not fit for human consumption, which means that the groundwater needs to go through water treatment facilities. So, Gaza’s water is either underground water that goes through water treatment facilities or its seawater that goes through big desalination plants.
The problem with both these solutions is that they are very energy intensive. They need electricity from the grid in order to get the water flowing. This is where things get complicated because Israel gives 50 percent of Gaza’s electricity. The rest is from the diesel power plant and the rest is from the small-scale diesel generators and the and the solar panels. But that’s not enough to keep the water desalination plants working for 24 hours in the water treatment facilities. And that complicates the whole map, because there’s a question of: is Israel allowed to cut off electricity to the Gaza population during war time? What does the international humanitarian law say about it?
Now, according to international humanitarian law, when you are either an occupying force or during war time, you are allowed to cut off electricity and cut off fuel supply as a war time measure, as a temporary tactical wartime measure, to blind your enemy, to create pressure on your enemy while you’re attacking. You are not required to supply that. What you are required to supply according to law is either the provision, or to allow the provision by others of water, food and medicine. You cannot dry out the population from water. Without electricity and fuel, Gaza’s population doesn’t have water, and that means, according to international law, Israel has to give the Gazan population some kind of means to generate that water. Either electricity or the diesel itself so it can generate its own electricity.
That is why, before October 7th, Israel was supplying the electricity for free. So, 50 percent of Gaza’s electricity is coming from Israel and Gaza didn’t pay for it. Hamas doesn’t pay the Israeli government. On paper, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank was supposed to be paying for the electricity that Israel gave Gaza. But they are unwilling to because the Palestinian Authority is not willing to give money to Hamas, so the result was just debt that was accumulated and after every few years Israel just forgave the debt. The current debt is 2 billion shekels, which is around half a billion U.S. dollars, and Israel just kept supplying it because it didn’t have the option of just cutting it out because that would cause Gaza’s population to run out of water.
And so, Israel is stuck in a place where, tactically, it does make sense to cut off electricity and diesel to an area where you are currently attacking. The main issue with diesel is that it’s dual use. Unlike water, food, or medicine, diesel can be used as a wartime measure as a weapon, either to manufacture rockets or to power the underground tunnels or the underground city, I should say, of Hamas which uses also small-scale diesel generators to generate oxygen and to ventilate the tunnels. And so the tactical idea for the IDF was “let’s dry out Hamas from diesel. If Hamas doesn’t get any diesel and any electricity from outside, it will eventually have to come out of the tunnels because it will run out of air.”
Having said that, the tactical idea has a huge price to it, because if you’re drying out Hamas, you’re also drying out the entire population from diesel, which means that the hospitals aren’t getting electricity, and the water desalination plants aren’t getting electricity. And even if the water desalination plants are generating water, that water needs to get to the population somehow. There are no pipelines because they are either hit during the air strikes or Hamas itself dug out that those water pipelines in order to make rockets out of them. Which means that in order to get the water to the population, you need trucks. And the trucks also run on diesel. So, if you’re not supplying diesel to the Gaza Strip, you’re creating a huge humanitarian issue.
Now that is an acceptable price, if this is a very short-term tactic. If you say within a month, Hamas will dry out of diesel and it will have to come out of the tunnels, then that’s a price worth paying, that the Gaza population can survive a month without the electricity if we bring it water from outside. The issue is we do not know how much diesel Hamas has in storage. The assumptions are that likely they have prepared for the October 7th attacks a long time in advance and that they have stored at least one million litres of diesel underground, which is presumably supposed to last for at least four, five, or maybe six months in advance. Cutting off the Gaza’s population from diesel electricity for six months? That’s not sustainable. The cost that you’re creating, both for humanitarian purposes but also for diplomatic issues. The diplomatic pressure that Israel is under is proving to completely outweigh the tactical benefits of trying to choke out Hamas. And that’s the dilemma that Israel faces. Do we continue to cut off electricity and diesel from the from Gaza in order to choke out Hamas, but the price is that the Gaza population is not getting enough water? And so, you need to find some kind of balance to get the tactical advantage, but also to prevent the humanitarian disaster that it might create in the long run.
RP: In terms of the water supply, 10 percent of which comes from Israel: we understand there’s one pipeline to the north and one pipeline to the south. I think the Israeli Government announced that the northern one was being cut off when they wanted to move the population at the beginning of the conflict, to incentivise them to go south. But the southern pipeline was still running. A, is that correct? And B, can the can the capacity of that be expanded to help alleviate the specific water issue? Or is it just not enough?
ER: It’s true that the pipeline that goes south is still operational, but as you said, there’s a limit to the capacity that the water can transfer. And even if you get the water into Gaza, it has nowhere to flow into. This is a current active war zone and to rely on permanent infrastructure is not something that is sustainable in a war zone because the pipelines are not there inside of Gaza. They are damaged. There’s no one to send to repair them. So, when it comes to a war zone, to populations continuously moving for operational needs. to one million people from the north going down and joining the million people from the south, you have to be very dynamic, and you cannot rely on permanent water pipelines or anything of that sort because you need to move the food, medicine and water along with the population. And so, in order to get water into Gaza, it is not enough to just have an active pipeline or an active desalination plant. You also need a lot of trucks with a lot of diesel in order to move everything along and you need a basic road etc., and if a road gets damaged then you need to fix it.
So why am I saying all of this? Because you have a situation where you have two narratives, and they seem as if they’re contradictory. You have the narrative of the international community, UN, and UNRWA, that’s saying Gaza does not have diesel. Gaza does not have enough water. Gaza does not have enough medicine and food. And you have the Israeli narrative that’s saying yes, they do; they have a lot of diesel, they have a lot of food, they have a lot of water. And the truth is somewhere in the middle, that both of the sides are right. It’s not that there’s not enough food or medicine or water coming into Gaza, it’s that it’s very hard to get it to the actual population because of the lack of infrastructure. Because of all of the damage that was sustained and because people are moving around. And of course because Hamas is hijacking some of those resources. So, the main issue is logistical more than anything else. It’s not that Israel is preventing from things going in. It’s that once they are in, it’s very hard to properly disseminate them among 2 million people that are continuously moving.
It’s very hard to keep track of who got the rations of food and who did not, who stored them, who stole them, who are actually Hamas agents that are wearing civilian clothes and just took a truck and escaped with it. It’s very hard to keep track of it and that’s where things get much more complicated. And when you are at the IDF and you say, okay I need to allow some diesel to come into the Gaza Strip because otherwise they don’t have electricity for the water desalination plants or for the hospitals, then I need to allow some diesel to come in. But I also need to make sure that Hamas is not hijacking those trucks.
So, the compromise was that the IDF has been allowing two diesel trucks to enter Gaza every single day over the past two months. Two diesel trucks is around 60,000 litres of diesel. And that is enough to generate enough water in the desalination plants and in the major water treatment facilities in the south. Again, when I say ‘enough’ I mean they can generate enough water for two million people. Getting that water to the actual two million people that are scattered and moving, that’s another thing. But that’s enough diesel. And the idea is that if you just allow two trucks a day, then you can monitor what’s going on with them. You can see exactly which hospitals they’re supplying to and which water desalination plants they’re supplying to. And you also have the intel that tells you, with UNRWA and the Red Cross, that this specific hospital has a diesel generator, and it needs this amount of litres of diesel to work for every single day.
So right now, we need diesel for a week. That’s, let’s say, 25,000 litres of diesel. So, the IDF makes sure that the truck gets to the hospital and gives it 25,000 litres of diesel. If after three days the hospital says we’ve run out of diesel, then that means that Hamas came later and took the diesel out of the generator. If after a week it says we ran out of electricity, then the IDF knows, yes, all of the diesel that we gave was used for the purpose that it says, and we can bring it another truck. Currently, that’s the only way of doing it, because again, you’re dealing with an organisation that has embedded itself within the population and is constantly hijacking the resources that is being given. So, you need to somehow kind of balance between those necessities.
RP: Back on the electricity, you mentioned that the 50 percent is supplied from Israel. What’s the current status of that supply? Just like in previous rounds of conflict, the rockets fired out of Gaza have often hit those electricity pylons and damaged their own supply of the electricity. I’m presuming it’s similar here, so what’s the status now? Have they been repaired? Has that been restored or is that also kind of a political question for the Israeli side?
ER: So, on the first day of the war, the electricity was cut from Gaza not because Israel cut the electricity from Gaza, but because Hamas rockets hit the electricity grid. It hit all the power lines, which happens all the time. Every time that Hamas fires rockets into Israel, it hits the power grid because the power grid goes through the Israeli communities around Gaza Strip before they get into Gaza. So, when Hamas tries to bomb the Israeli communities around Gaza, it inevitably hits some of the power grids and power lines. What happens then is that the Israeli electricity company comes in and, at its own expense, fixes the power lines, and Gaza gets its electricity back, which is an absurd situation. But again, it’s because of international humanitarian law where they need the electricity for the water and Hamas knows that it knows it can sabotage the electricity grid and Israel will come and fix it for free. The issue with that is the longer this happens, the more resilient the population becomes. Because the population of Gaza has learned not to rely on the on the National Grid, the main electricity grid in Gaza. Even on a good day before the war started, the average person in Gaza would receive around four to eight hours a day of continuous electricity. Eight hours on a really good day, but usually four hours on average every single day from the main electricity grid. Because of all of these power cuts and the dilapidated infrastructure that has never been fixed by Hamas. Israel fixes the grid around Gaza, but whenever a Hamas fires rockets – a third of those rockets hit within Gaza and they fall short of their target – they ruin the electricity grid inside of Gaza and Hamas doesn’t fix that.
Every time foreign aid comes in, either by the EU, US or UNVP, it is provided to Hamas in order to fix the power lines, but Hamas takes the money and does something else with it. It doesn’t bother fixing the power grid unless the UN does it or some kind of foreign aid workers come and fix the grid for them. Hamas just doesn’t operate as a sovereign. It doesn’t care about the infrastructure so long as it has its own small scale diesel generators. And so, the reality of all of that is that the average person in Gaza has learned not to rely on the on the grid, so they bought their own solutions.
Whoever could afford it bought their own small scale diesel generators and put it in their backyard, or they bought solar panels. And it’s all private initiatives or initiatives paid by the UNVP, or the EU or the US, trying to circumvent Hamas. Hamas doesn’t care if someone in Gaza builds a solar panel on their house. They just come, they take a tax, and they leave and that’s it. So, what happens is that you have a lot of these ‘entrepreneurs’. You have people in Gaza that buy three or four diesel generators, put it in their backyard and then sell electricity to their neighbours. Same thing with the solar panels. Same thing with the wells – someone drilling the wells and he’s selling the water to his neighbours. And all of that means that it’s very hard to kind of understand what the current situation is in Gaza, because a lot of it is off grid and a lot of it is off the books because the Gaza population itself does it independently from Hamas. It doesn’t count on Hamas for anything.
In the past seventeen years, Hamas didn’t build a single major infrastructure project in Gaza. Any water desalination plant, any water treatment facility, any major road, any major electricity grid that you’re seeing in Gaza that has been built in the past seventeen years was built by foreign aid workers with foreign aid money. Mostly Western money, not Gulf state money or Qatari money. Qatari money goes in the form of hard currency to Hamas members, and then it just disappears. Whereas US, UN and EU money doesn’t come as money, it comes as projects, as infrastructure. So, they come, and they build the infrastructure but Hamas itself doesn’t care, it just taxes it and doesn’t maintain it. And so even when the war started and Israel cut off electricity and diesel, you still saw hospitals running for months and you still saw entire areas south of Gaza still having electricity and still running the bakeries etc., because they are all off grid. They all stored diesel for a while. That’s where things get complicated because at the end of the day, Israel needs to differentiate in some way between Hamas and the population. The population lives independently from Hamas. Hamas has stored its own diesel. Hamas generates electricity for itself, and the population generates electricity for itself, and you need to find a way to get the supplies to the population while still denying it from Hamas to kind of meet your tactical operational needs, which is to dry out the tunnels.
RP: Can I take you back to just another thing you mentioned earlier about the fact that the 50 percent of electricity supply basically comes at the cost of the Israeli electricity company or does that get passed on also to the Israeli taxpayers? Does the Israeli electricity company take the hit on that or the government? This has been the situation that you said for close to seventeen years. What’s the rationale of the Israeli Government to perpetuate that situation?
ER: It’s a good question. Yes, the Israeli electricity company takes the hit. The Israeli electricity company (IRC) is a national company. It provides electricity for free to 2.2 million people in Gaza, and it provides, almost for free, to another 3 million people in the West Bank. In the West Bank, they do pay, but also very late. This is not just an Israeli problem. The Palestinian Authority also has a very hard time billing its own Palestinian population because there’s a lot of electricity theft going on from neighbours, etc. And it hurts. The IRC is under heavy debt because it’s expected to provide electricity for free for political reasons, and to fix these things. Why has the Israeli Government – all of the Israeli governments, not just this one, ‘the most right-wing Israeli government in its history’ – why is it allowing it?
First, because of the complicated political issue and humanitarian issue of having to supply electricity to the population even though they have their own sovereign and even though there is a government there with Hamas. But the government doesn’t care about its population. At least, it doesn’t build any infrastructure for them and it’s not finding any solution for them. So, if you cut off the electricity, then you are to blame, and the international community blames Israel and not Hamas for what’s going on in Gaza. The second is that Israel has been trying to fix it. In fact, if it wasn’t for the current attack that Hamas initiated on October 7th, there were a bunch of really positive large scale infrastructure projects which were already approved and in the pipelines that were about to happen in Gaza. And the reason Israel still did that despite the issue with Gaza is that at the end of the day, the Israeli Government believed – the Netanyahu government and the ones before that – that Hamas wants to govern, that Hamas cares about its population. And the belief was that yes, it has its rhetoric and its very antisemitic charter etc., but it’s all rhetoric. At the end of the day, it has 2.2 million people to take care of, and if we improve the economy in Gaza, if we build more infrastructure in Gaza, if we build a port or an airport in Gaza, then eventually that will calm down the issue and Hamas will basically turn into what the PLO has turned into. The PLO was also considered a terrorist organisation and now it’s considered a moderate government in the West Bank and the assumption was that Hamas will also transform into a moderate government if we give it what it wants.
And so, I’ve heard a lot of talk about how what Hamas did on October 7th was because of economic hardship. That doesn’t make sense because during this year, if it wouldn’t have attacked, the situation in Gaza would have been immensely better next year because there were at least four major projects that were about to start next year with negotiations, with the approval of Hamas. One of them was to develop the Gaza marine field, which is what we talked about in the last podcast where I was so optimistic.
There’s a there’s a tiny gas field offshore of Gaza. It’s very small, it doesn’t make a lot of economic sense to develop it. But it makes a lot of political sense to develop it. If the gas goes to Gaza to help it become more independent from Israel, because Israel doesn’t want to keep giving free electricity to the Gaza Strip. So, if it can get someone to come and develop the field and get gas to Gaza, then Gaza can become more independent. The plan was approved in June 2023. It was approved with Egypt. The idea was that Egypt will develop the Gaza marine offshore gas field. It will buy some of the gas to fund the project and the rest of the gas will go to Gaza to generate its own electricity. For that you also need a gas power plant, which Gaza currently doesn’t have. It only has one small diesel generator that can do 65 megawatts. So, another project was called the ‘Gas for Gaza’ project. Under that project, which was already approved by the Quartet, the US and the UK, together with Israel, were to build a very large gas power plant inside of Gaza that can generate 650 megawatts – ten times what the current generator can do, which is more than the entire demand of the Gazan population currently and which would really have upgraded the infrastructure. That was already approved, and the idea was that the gas power plant would be supplied by the Gaza marine and Gaza would become more independent.
Another project was to connect Gaza with the West Bank with infrastructure so that they can supply one another; Gaza can supply desalinated water to the West Bank and the West Bank can generate electricity and supply to Gaza. And the fourth project was to build a seaport technically not in Gaza, but in Egypt in el-Arish, right next to Gaza. Then, de facto, it will be Gaza’s seaport and then Gaza can start importing its own merchandise. It will be checked by the Egyptian authority, but all of that was going to really upgrade the quality of life in Gaza. And all of that went down the drain when Hamas did what it did. So, if you come into this conflict with economic peace theories, they all collapsed with the October 7th attacks because if the idea is that at the end of the day, through economic development and through improving the lives of the population, you can deescalate a war, Hamas did the exact opposite. Hamas for the past two years has been agreeing to many economic projects initiated by Israel and Egypt and the countries around it, and apparently it was just lulling us along. It was preparing an attack and the cost of it is immense to its own population. But apparently it was never the desire for Hamas to govern the population. It has always seen itself as a resistance force, as a liberation force, which is temporarily in Gaza, but has absolutely no intent to actually govern Gaza. And Israel had a had a very rude wake-up call in that sense.
RP: You described at the moment the kind of the scenario of the two trucks of fuel that go in on a daily basis that goes specifically to circumvent Hamas, to the specific water dissemination and the and the hospitals. What was the supply of the fuel prior to October 7th, and what was the role that Qatar, who gave the $30 million that was divided as I understand, as a third going to the poorest families in a cash payment, a third to the civil servants and a third was also for this diesel supply. So, what was that capacity and where does that stand kind of going forward?
ER: So, on a regular day again, it’s hard to give an accurate estimate because a lot of it is off grid. A lot of it is just private initiatives buying diesel under the radar of Hamas, and Gaza’s population that doesn’t want to get taxed and things like that. But according to UNRWA estimates, the Gazan population needs around 130,000 litres of diesel every single day to meet the bare minimum. That was the kind of basic consumption in Gaza, 130,000 litres. So, if you bring 2 trucks into Gaza every single day, that’s half. But if we’re talking about war time measures, then the diesel is just for water desalination and the hospitals, then then half is enough. But again, it’s a logistical problem.
And so, 130,000 litres? Most of it came from Israel. Most of it came from oil that was refined in the oil refineries in Haifa and then given to Gaza, and again, who paid for it? Sometimes it was foreign aid. Sometimes Israel just took the beating, Sometimes it was Qatar. Sometimes it was Egypt that sold the diesel to Gaza, but when Egypt did that it did that at a very high price. Egypt was profiting from it and Qatar was paying the bill. So, Qatar was paying salaries to Hamas senior members, it was paying for diesel, and it was trying to create kind of economic relief to the lower social stratosphere in Gaza, which has been completely neglected by Hamas authorities, which again are not really authorities. They’re more like a gang in control of the Gaza Strip that’s taxing people, or they get hurt by them. So, it’s like a criminal gang in control of the area. It’s not really supplying anything that you would expect from a government.
When you think about what the role of the governor or a government is to provide basic utilities, it’s to provide education. Hamas doesn’t provide education. It’s UNRWA that runs the schools in Gaza. It’s not providing electricity. Israel is providing electricity, and the rest is coming from private generators that were bought with US, UN and EU aid. Water: all the water desalination facilities are, again, foreign aid. Health: all of the hospitals are run by others. You have the Indonesian hospital; the Qatari hospital and the hospitals are run by foreign aid. Hamas doesn’t do anything other than just tax people and have the monopoly over the means of violence. So, these foreign aid groups, whether they are UN or Qatar etc., some of the money would go straight to Hamas to appease them and the rest of the money would go to the population, into the infrastructure. Because if you give the money directly to the infrastructure, Hamas will just take it. So, you need to pay a bribe to Hamas to get them to approve an infrastructure project that is meant for the population.
So, you can criticise Qatar and say it’s not okay that Qatar funded Hamas, but Israel also did that. We also gave money to Hamas and the US also gave money to Hamas, and the EU also, because that was the only way to help the population. If you didn’t pay Hamas, Hamas just said no to anything. Israel wanted to develop the gas field for the benefit of the Gazan people and Hamas kept saying no until somehow, through Egypt, Israel managed to bring money to Hamas.
So, the main impediment for the wellbeing of the Gazan population until now was Hamas. And when you’re looking at the future and asking me if I’m optimistic regarding the future, then again it really depends on what the future is. But in the future in which, let’s say, Hamas no longer has effective control over Gaza (I won’t say eliminated – it’s very hard to eliminate an idea or an ideology, but let’s say the Hamas group no longer has effective control in Gaza and someone else is governing the area) then these projects, all of these things that went down the drain, all of these things that you had to wait for years to do anything in Gaza will be accelerated.
So, in the day after the war, if Hamas is not in control of Gaza, then all of these projects like ‘Gas for Gaza’, connecting Gaza to the West Bank with infrastructure, building a port in el-Arish and developing the Gaza Marine will happen in a much more accelerated way than if Hamas were to still be in control. So, it’s weird to say it right now because you’re looking at what’s going on in Gaza and it doesn’t seem like there’s a there’s an optimistic kind of way to get out of it. But I’m very optimistic that in five years from now, I know it’s weird to say, but life in Gaza would be better because you would have much better infrastructure. You would have countries coming in and building the infrastructure that they want and not just the ones that Hamas has been approving to tax more. At the end of the day, the end of Hamas and Gaza is good news for the population itself. Of course, there’s a huge price to pay for it, and I’m not diminishing that, but I am optimistic regarding the future of that.
The post Episode 226 | Gaza’s water and energy appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Inbal Nissim-Louvton, an expert on Yemen. They discuss the Houthis’ foundation and their emergence as a social and political power. Inbal presents their ideological roots and gives her assessment on the current political environment in Yemen. She also relates to the Houthis’ regional role and their connections to Iran and the Palestinians. Inbal Nissim-Louvton teaches at the Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies at the Open University in Israel and is a Research Associate at the Forum for Regional Thinking.
The post Episode 225 | Who are the Houthis? appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Lt. Col. (res.) Sarit Zehavi about the situation on Israel’s northern border. They talk about how it feels for families to live under Hezbollah missile fire, the prospects of a diplomatic solution, and Hezbollah and Iran’s strategic calculations. Sarit is a former IDF intelligence officer and the founder of Alma, an independent research and education centre focussing on Israel’s security challenges on its northern border.
The post Episode 224 | Hezbollah and Israel’s northern border appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Shalom Lipner. Two months into the war, they discuss the military campaigns in the south and the north as well as the diplomatic front and Israel – US relations. They also speculate on the day after for the Palestinians and inside Israel. Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, and a former veteran of the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, serving seven consecutive Israeli prime ministers over 25 years.
The post Episode 223 | The Military and Diplomatic Timetables appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Mohammad Darawshe, a leading expert on Jewish-Arab relations. He spoke of the heroic sacrifice made by his cousin Awad on October 7th. They also discuss the high level of national Israeli identification amongst Arab-Israelis since the Hamas massacre, and the future prospects for coexistence. Darawshe is Director of Planning, Equality and Shared Society at Givat Haviva Educational Centre, and a fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute. He previously served as a city council member in his hometown Iksal and served as a member of The National Committee which drafted Israel’s Coexistence Education policy. He was previously Co-Director of The Abraham Fund Initiatives.
The post Episode 222 | The Arab-Israeli experience since October 7th appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Behnam Ben Taleblu about Iranian regional aggression. They discuss the structure of Iran’s proxy network, the extent of Iranian knowledge of Hamas’s plans for October 7th, and the effectiveness of the Biden Administration’s Iran policy. Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies where he focuses on Iranian security and political issues. A native Farsi speaker, he has testified before the US Congress and Canadian Parliament.
The post Episode 221 | Iranian Regional Aggression appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Dr Najat AlSaied, a Saudi academic based in the Emirates, who gives her perspective on the normalisation deal. She explores Saudi considerations – distinct from those of the Abraham Accord countries, views on normalisation amongst the Saudi public, the role and motivations of the Biden Administration, and the […]
The post Episode 215 | Israel-Saudi Normalisation? A View From The Gulf appeared first on BICOM.
In the second part of this two-part episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman continues his discussion with renowned Israeli legal scholar Professor Yuval Shany. They address the legal factors in the exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from military conscription; the question of prime ministerial conflict of interest; and whether Israel has reached a “constitutional moment”. Professor Shany is the Chair in […]
The post Episode 214 | Judicial Reform – What Comes Next? (Part Two) appeared first on BICOM.
In the first part of this two-part episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to renowned Israeli legal scholar Professor Yuval Shany. They discuss the Supreme Court’s upcoming deliberations on the legislation annulling reasonability; the significance of basic laws; the impact of reservists’ protests on Israel’s military preparedness and the role of a citizen army in a democracy. […]
The post Episode 213 | Judicial Reform – What Comes Next? (Part One) appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Dr Elai Rettig about energy issues in Israel and the wider Middle East. Rettig explains how Israel’s reliance on energy sources influenced its foreign and defence policy and how the discovery of natural gas has changed that paradigm. They also explore the energy policy dilemmas of Israel’s allies, […]
The post Episode 212 Israel’s energy strategy and regional co-operation appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speak to Iranian democracy campaigner Vahid Beheshti. They discuss Beheshti’s campaign to have the UK government proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). They also cover the IRGC’s record of global terror – including its multiple assassination attempts of British nationals – and the fundamental weakness of the Iranian regime […]
The post Episode 211 | London protest against Iran appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Lt. Col. (res) Jonathan Conricus about Israel’s recently concluded operation in Jenin. They assess the operation’s achievements and consider its likely impact on wider West Bank security. They also discuss the current threats from Lebanon and Syria. Conricus served in the IDF for 24 years, in a variety of […]
The post Episode 210 | Assessing Operation House and Garden appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Ksenia Svetlova about developments in Russia and a variety of regional security issues. They discuss Yevgeny Prigozhin’s recent aborted coup attempt against President Putin and US calls for Israel to share its missile defence technology with Ukraine. On the Middle East they address prospects of an Israeli-Saudi normalisation […]
The post Episode 209 | Russia-Ukraine, and Israel’s regional ties appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Yiftach Golov, one of the leaders of the protest movement against the Israeli government’s proposed judicial reforms. They discuss the basis of the movement’s objection to the reforms and its tactics and future direction. Golov served in an IDF Special Forces unit and is currently completing his […]
The post Episode 208 | Inside the Protest Movement appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Oren Kessler, author, journalist, and political analyst. They discuss Kessler’s new book, Palestine 1936: The Great Revolt and the Roots of the Middle East Conflict, and the ways in which the Revolt continues to inform both the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic and the direction of Palestinian politics and terrorism today. […]
The post Episode 207 | The Great Arab Revolt and its Modern Legacy appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Tal Shalev, political correspondent at Walla News, about the latest political developments in Israel. They discuss the internal dynamics within the coalition and their achievements in securing concessions in the recently passed budget. They also explore the government’s chances of passing a new Draft Bill reaffirming ultra-Orthodox exclusion from the military draft; and the prospects of the ongoing negotiations over judicial reform achieving a successful compromise.
The post Episode 206 | Budget, Draft Bill, and Judicial Reform: A Political Update appeared first on BICOM.
In this podcast, Richard Pater, Director of BICOM speaks to Brigadier general (Res.) Assaf Orion, Senior Researcher at the INSS and Director of The Diane & Guilford Glazer Israel-China Policy Center. They discuss the recent conflict between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), assess Operation Shield and Arrow’s success in degrading PIJ’s terror capabilities, explore Hamas’s role, and look at the performance of Iron Dome in intercepting PIJ rockets. After two decades in command positions in military intelligence, in his final posting as a Brigadier General, Orion served as the head of the Strategic Division of the IDF General Staff’s Planning Directorate, responsible for strategy and policy planning.
The post Episode 205 | Operation Shield and Arrow appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Professor Efraim Inbar, President of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. They discuss what the Ramadan period showed us about Israel’s current security challenges, the state of its deterrence, and the level of Iranian influence in the region. They also consider Israeli relations with Saudi Arabia, the US, and, in the light of Foreign Minister Eli Cohen’s recent visits, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Professor Inbar is an expert on Israeli strategic doctrine, US Middle East policy, and Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. He was the founding director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University.
The post Episode 204 | Post Ramadan regional update appeared first on BICOM.
In this live podcast, Richard Pater, Director of BICOM speaks to Ehud Yaari, the veteran Middle East commentator for Israel’s Channel 12 News. They discussed the latest regional dynamics including Iran and Saudi Arabia’s recent positioning. Yaari also shares his view on the current situation in the West Bank and domestic Israeli politics. Ehud Yaari has been a Middle East commentator for Israeli television since 1975. Among his numerous awards for journalism are the Israeli Press Editors-in-Chief prize for coverage of the peace process with Egypt, the Sokolov Prize for coverage of the Lebanon War, and the Israel Broadcasting Award for coverage of the Gulf War.
The post Episode 203 | Ehud Yaari appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Sir John Jenkins. Sir John was British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from June 2012 to January 2015. He previously served as the ambassador to Libya, Iraq, and Syria, and as the British Consul General in Jerusalem. They discuss the recent China-brokered normalisation deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, its implications for Israel and for Chinese and US regional influence respectively, as well as what we might expect to see next from Iran’s nuclear programme and its support for its regional proxies.
The post Episode 202 | The Iran-Saudi deal and the Middle East appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Sarit Zehavi, a Lt. Col. in the IDF reserves who specialises in intelligence and holds an MA in Middle East Studies from Ben-Gurion University. She is the founder and CEO of ALMA, an organisation specialising in research and analysis of Israel’s security challenges on the northern border. In this episode, they discuss the state of Hezbollah and the recent attack it may be linked to inside Israel, politics in Lebanon and the current threat the organisation poses.
The post Episode 201 | Understanding Hezbollah appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, BICOM Director Richard Pater talks to Dr Michael Milshtein, an expert on the Palestinian Arena and the Head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel-Aviv University. He serves as a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at IDC Herzliya
In this 200th episode of the BICOM podcast, they discuss the growing terror attacks on Israel, what the run-up to Ramadan may look like, the future of the West Bank and how to prevent future friction between Settlers and Palestinians, as seen in Hawara this week.
The post Episode 200 | Violence in the West Bank appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Benham Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) where he focuses on Iranian security and political issues. They discuss the current state of Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran’s links with Russia, and where the US and the EU stand on Iran.
Leveraging his subject-matter expertise and native Farsi skills, Behnam has closely tracked a wide range of Iran-related topics including nuclear non-proliferation, ballistic missiles, sanctions, the IRGC and internal Iranian politics. Benham recently produced a monograph on Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
The post Episode 199 | The State of Iran appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackman, Research Associate at BICOM speaks to Professor Amichai Cohen senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute. They explore details of the proposed reforms, how Israel’s system compares internationally and what to expect next. Cohen also comments on the distinction between populist and conservative potential reforms, and on the relationship between the judiciary and security policy. Prof Cohen is also a member of the Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College. His research deals with constitutional and international law, and he’s the author of the book: The Wars of the High Court.
The post Episode 198 | Understanding Judicial Reform appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Jack Omer-Jackaman, BICOM Research Associate speaks to Professor Jonathan Rynhold, head of the department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University. Rynhold’s research focuses on US-Israeli relations, Israeli foreign policy and the role of political culture in foreign policy. They discuss the internal dynamics of the coalition government, the state of proposed judicial reforms, and look at the current strength of the relationship between Israel and the US.
The post Episode 197 | What does Israel’s political future look like? appeared first on BICOM.
In this live episode, Richard Pater speaks to Tal Shalev, political correspondent at Walla News, about the new coalition government and the political challenges facing Israel. They discussed the proposed judicial reform, balancing the religious -secular status quo and future relations with the Palestinian Authority. This briefing was recorded live with questions by the audience, facilitated by BICOM’s Communications Associate Kira Lewis.
The post Episode 196 | The New Government’s Agenda appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode BICOM Director Richard Pater speaks to Jonathan Paris about the current state of US and Israeli policy concerning Iran and Russia. In a wide-ranging conversation they discuss the geopolitical implications of both Tehran’s nuclear programme and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Jonathan is a London-based analyst, a former Middle East Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a senior adviser to the Chertoff Group.
The post Episode 195 | Between Russia and Iran appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, BICOM Research Associate Jack Omer-Jackaman speaks to Calev Ben Dor about his recent Fathom essay ‘Politically homeless’: Yamina voters tell their story. Calev assesses the impact on November’s election results of former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s stepping back from politics, the inter-communal violence of May 2021, the presence of Mansour Abbas in the previous government, and the rise of Religious Zionism. Calev Ben Dor is Senior Research Associate at BICOM and Deputy Editor of Fathom.
The post Episode 194 | The National Religious Vote appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater discusses judicial reform with Professor Suzie Navot. Prof. Navot explains the background of Israel’s legal system, its uniqueness among other parliamentary democracies and the significance of potentially implementing an override clause. Suzie Navot is Vice President at the Israeli Democracy Institute. She is a Professor of Constitutional Law, her areas of expertise include constitutional law, law of institutions, parliamentary law and comparative constitutional law.
The post Episode 193 | Judicial Reform appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, BICOM Director Richard Pater speaks with Carrie Keller-Lynn, a political and legal correspondent at the Times of Israel. They discuss the election results, breaking down what happened by party, and what could be next for the new government. Originally from the US, Carrie attended Stanford Law School and also holds a degree […]
The post Episode 192 | Chewing Over the Election Results appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speak to Jacky Hugi, the Arab affairs analyst of Israeli Army Radio and a columnist for the Maariv newspaper. Jacky gives his assessment of the Israel – Lebanon maritime agreement and the role Hezbollah plays in domestic Lebanese politics. They also discuss the ongoing violence in the West Bank. Jacky […]
The post Episode 191| Agreement in the Med, friction in the West Bank appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks with Israel’s former Ambassador to the UK Mark Regev about his experience meeting the Queen. Ambassador Regev also shares his views on King Charles’s relationship with Israel and the strength of the bilateral relationship under Prime Minister Truss. He also offers his latest assessment on Iran, the Abraham Accords […]
The post Episode 190: King & Charles Israel appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode Richard Pater speaks to Orna Mizrahi, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. With the US negotiator’s imminent return to the region, they discuss the prospects of Israel and Lebanon reaching an understanding over their maritime border. Orna also shares her assessment of the current threat posed by […]
The post Episode 189 | The Israel – Lebanon maritime border appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode Richard Pater and Dr Assaf Shapira, director of the Political Reform Programme at the Israel Democracy Institute, discuss the primary system in Israel. They talk about why parties chose to elect their candidates through different systems and what benefits parties such as the Likud and Labour gain from using the closed primary […]
The post Episode 188 | How parties elect their leaders in Israel appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Najat Al-Saied, an adjunct Professor at American University in the Emirates, to gain a Gulf perspective on US President Biden’s recent trip to the Middle East. Richard and Najat discuss the UAE’s strategy vis-a-vis Iran and how the Gulf views the Iranian threat. They also discuss why the […]
The post Episode 187 | Biden’s visit to the Middle East: A View from the Gulf appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Samuel Nurding speaks to Ambassador (Ret.) Daniel C. Kurtzer on what the Biden administration hopes to achieve from its upcoming trip to the Middle East. Ambassador Kurtzer also lays out a possible Israel-Saudi roadmap for normalisation and examines whether a Middle East NATO is plausible.
The post Episode 186 | Necessity or strategic shift? Biden prepares for trip to Middle East appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Richard Pater speaks to Dr Assaf Shapira, director of the Political Reform Programme at the Israel Democracy Institute. They discuss the latest developments in Israel to dissolve the Knesset. They also discuss options of electoral reform and based on Dr. Shapira’s research, makes suggestions that lawmakers could enact to make the […]
The post Episode 185 | What happens after the Knesset dissolves itself? appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Samuel Nurding speaks with Gabriel Mitchell, an expert on Israel’s energy policy, about the new Israel-EU gas deal. They discuss the potential benefits of the deal for the Israeli-EU and Israeli-Egyptian relationship, as well as any potential blowback from Russia. Gabriel also speaks about the latest developments between Israel and Lebanon […]
The post Episode 184 | Pipelines vs. Interconnectors: Israel and the EU energy relationship appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, BICOM Director Richard Pater speaks to Dr Michael Milshtein, a colonel (res.) in the Israel Defense Forces and former head of the Department for Palestinians Affairs in the IDF Intelligence Unit. They discuss the latest threats posed by Hamas. Michael talks about the recent appointment of Hussein al-Sheikh as secretary-General of […]
The post Episode 183 | Understanding decision-making in the Palestinian arenas appeared first on BICOM.
In this episode, Sam Nurding speaks to military and security analyst Yaakov Lappin. They discuss the causes and fallout to the Jerusalem Police’s intervention at last week’s funeral procession for Shireen Abu Aqla. Lappin explains why, unlike last year, tensions on the Gaza border have not flared up (yet), as well as the latest reported […]
The post Episode 182 | Understanding the security context around Shireen Abu Aqla’s death appeared first on BICOM.
Richard Pater speaks to Dr Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran at the Institute for Nation Security Studies in Tel Aviv. They discuss the extent of Iran’s influence on the recent wave of terror attacks in Israel. They also examine Iran’s involvement in destabilising activity across the region. Dr Zimmt outlines the latest development surrounding […]
The post Episode 181 | Iran’s regional and nuclear activity appeared first on BICOM.
Richard Pater speaks to Natan Sachs, the director of the Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution. They discuss the latest developments in the JCPOA nuclear negotiations, whether a deal will actually be signed and the differences between the Netanyahu and Bennett-Lapid governments approach to relations with the United States, especially over the […]
The post Episode 180 | An assessment of US-Israel relations appeared first on BICOM.
In this Easter/Pesach special, BICOM’s Richard Pater and Samuel Nurding discuss the current political and security situation in Israel. They talk about whether the government will survive Idit Silman’s resignation, why MKs Aymen Odeh and Bezalel Smotrich are coming under heavy criticism, and explain the government’s Ramadan policy regarding the West Bank and Gaza. Listen […]
The post Easter/Pesach 2022 Special | Political and security tension ahead of Easter appeared first on BICOM.