Iranologie.com: Recent Episodes
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The question of Shahnama of Ferdowsi as a historical text has been a persistent one since the invention of Shahnama studies as a modern discipline (arguably by Theodor Nöldeke’s monumental das iranische Nationalepos). While many insist on the importance of the person of Ferdowsi as a historian himself, the general consensus of most Shahnama scholars, particularly the Iranian ones, is that the sources of the Shahnama were in fact written and that Ferdowsi was basing his poem on a recorded and prepared text (see here for a discussion by Dick Davis, as well as the opposite views of Olga Davidson and Mahmood Omidsalar, the latter of which reflects a common take among Iranian scholars of the Shahnama).
The main concentration, of course, is on the general historical framework of the Shahnama, what I call an Orientalist-imposed tripartite the division of the Shahnama. This is basically divided alongside the dynastic divisions, with the Pishdadi dynasty from Gayumarth to Zab representing the Mythological section, the Kayanids from Kay Qubad to Daray-e Darayan representing the Epic section, and the short section on the Arsacids and the much longer section on the Sasanians being deemed Historical. This division was first proposed by Nöldeke and is almost canonical in Shahnama studies. I disagree with this division strongly, as I believe that much like the similar narratives in many other Islamic sources, for Ferdowsi himself, and his sources, all three (four?) dynasties were historical indeed. I will, however, not dwell on it much here as that would require a whole different essay.
I have suggested elsewhere that Ferdowsi’s role as a historian is really most significant when it comes to local history of East Iran/Khurasan, essentially the geographical space in which he was active. This geography also is also intertwined with the historical space that Ferdowsi occupied, namely the Samanid-Ghaznavid transition, as Ghazzal Dabiri has already pointed out. But we seem to ignore most of this local historical and geographical context because of interest in the larger “universal” history of pre-Islamic Iran which is indeed the focus of Ferdowsi.
In fact, a feature of Persian historiography as a while is this focus on geography, concentrating on local and regional history and gazing at the larger “universal” history – the Iranian National History as Ehsan Yarshater puts it – from the point of view of the local. This geographical gaze of pre-Mongol Persian historiography is not something that I have seen pointed out too often, even in works such as Julie Scott Meisami’s Persian Historiography. Despite concentration on the question of “Why Write History in Persian?”, considering the relation between Persian and power in the Samanid, Ghaznavid, and Seljuq courts, the geographical aspect seems not to be of much concern when looking for whens and whys of Persian historiography. This is probably because historiography per se is supposed to have a clear indication of political power and claim to universality.
What is thus neglected is taking note of regional historiographies, written often by anonymous authors (eg Tarikh-e Sistan) where the geographical space becomes the main actor. Apart from Tarikh-e Sistan, the Farsnama of Ibn Balkhi is an excellent example of this. But this even pre-dates writing in Persian, as the original – and now lost – Arabic versions of the History of Bukhara and the History of Qom demonstrate. One could argue that the Iranian tradition of historiography was itself largely regional and started as an expression of regional histories. I have made this argument for the case of the Sasanian section of the history of al-Tabari as well and shall expand on it later. But this can even be seen in the historical segments of Middle Persian texts.
So, I think Ferdowsi too should be seen as a local historiographer. The location of Tous, Ferdowsi’s native city, at the heart of Samanid and Ghaznavid Khurasan, makes this quite natural, although today’s political borders render it a peripheral town on the extreme north-east of Iran. As mentioned before, Ferdowsi’s information about certain local events, including the Battle of Bukhara between the Western Turk and the Hephthalite forces, is unparalleled and not repeated elsewhere. Farzin Ghaffouri’s work on the sources of the Shahnama for the reign of Khosrow I Anusheruwan also points out this local aspect.
the Iranian political powers in the 10th century (source: wikipedia)An example of this, which might be worth mentioning, is the entire historiography of Rostam. The possible historical origins of Rostam have occupied the pages of many books and journals (see here for ADH Bivar’s famous, and quite influential, take). But Ferdowsi himself, or at least in a verse attributed to him, says that “Rostam was a hero in Sistan/I am the one who made him the hero of stories” (my loose translation). So, for Ferdowsi, Rostam was a real hero from Sistan, made into an almost mythological character in Ferdowsi’s tale. Of course, Ferdowsi did not make up Rostam, nor was the man unknown as is obvious from his mural from Panjikent hundreds of years before Ferdowsi.
Details of the Rostam mural from Panjikent (now at the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia)He also was well known in the late Sasanian period, as we can see from the name of Rostam-e Farrokhzad, the Sasanian general who commanded the Sasanian forces against the Muslim troops of Sa’ad b. abi-Waqqas at the Battle of Qadisiyya. The name is also a common one among the post-Sasanian rulers of the region of Padishkhwargar (the southern Caspian coast), including the Bavandid and Qarinvand ispahbeds of Tabarestan, as well as various Daylamite warlords.
So Ferdowsi’s statement about Rostam being a “hero in Sistan” seems to be an interesting case of history moving toward mythology. The association of Rostam with Sistan and Zawulistan obviously pre-dates Ferdowsi, as is shown, again, by the Panjikent mural. It was already pointed out by Frantz Grenet that the head of Rostam in the mural looks very much like the portrait of the Alkhan kings of S. Hindukush and Gandhara region such as Khingila. I discussed this further in the epilogue of my book and posited that this might in fact reflect the contemporary politics of the Seventh century, when the mural was produced. This means that the artist of the mural in fact associated Zabulistan with its contemporary rulers, the issuing authorities of the Alkhan-Nezak crossover coins (see Klaus Vondrovec’s volumes for a deep discussion of these), and thus modelled Rostam on these kings.
Silver drahm of king Khingila of the AlkhanAn Alkhan-Nezak Crossover coinSo, for the artist of the Panjikent mural, as well as for Ferdowsi, Rostam indeed was a Zabulistani/Sistani hero (explanation here: Sistan and Zabulistan are often juxtaposed and presumed to be the same in the Shahnama). So, Ferdowsi’s inclusion of the stories of Rostam across most of the earlier parts of the Shahnama – indeed he straddles both the so-called Mythological and Epic sections – is in fact his own historiographical contribution. This weaving of the stories of the hero of Sistan/Zabulistan (see Saghi Gazerani’s work on this, although I disagree with many of her takes) is thus a way of “localising” history by Ferdowsi. Alongside other tales such as the Western Turk vs. Hephthalites war or the story of Wahram Chobin (perhaps relying on the same local work that Bal’ami had used earlier), these accounts bring a particularly regional flavour to Ferdowsi’s historiography. This, in my opinion, renders him indeed a historian – at least as much as Bal’ami was one beside being a translator of al-Tabari – who can also be credited with authorship, although not the sort of historian that was imagined before.
اخیراً چندین بار در ترجمههای مختلف فارسی از تحقیقات تاریخی به زبانهای اروپایی، دیدهام که اسم شهرهای منطقه را به صورت انگلیسی یا مخلوطی از انگلیسی و لاتین مینویسند (پالمیرا، برای مثال). طبیعتاً، این شهرها اسامی محلیای دارند و داشتهاند که از ریشههای مختلف اکدی، آرامی، فارسی، ارمنی، فینیقی، عبری، و عربی آمده و اکثراً از طریق عربی و فارسی، در زبان فارسینو حفظ شده و در متون ادبی و تاریخی دوران میانه هم آمدهاند. فهرستهای کاملی از اینها را در کتابهای مختلف جغرافیایی نو میشود یافت. اما در اینجا، چون به هرحال اینترنت بیشتر و بیشتر منبع تحقیق است برای بسیاری، فهرست مختصری از اسمهایی که دیدهام بیشترین سؤتفاهم را بوجود میاورند، مینویسم. این فهرست را سعی میکنم تکمیل کنم. تکیه هم بیشتر به مناطق تاریخی هزاره اول میلادی است.
در منطقه عراق و سوریه/شام:
Nisibis: نصببین
Daras: درا
Singara: سنجار
Karkha d-bet Slok: کرکوک (کرخه بیت سلوک)
Kaskar: کسکر
Edessa: الرها
Antioch: انطاکیه
Mypherkat: میافارقین
Emesa: حمص
Carrhae : حرّان
Aleppo: حلب
Callinicum: الرقه
Palmyra: تدمر
Dura-Europos: دورا
Petra: البترا/رقمو
Amida: آمد
Al-Hira:الحیره (یا «شهرهرت»)
Hatra: حترا
Militene: ملاطیه
Marqas/Maras: مرعش
Tripolis: طرابلس
Tyre: صور
Sidon: صیدا
Acre: عکا
Tiberias: طبریه
Misikhe: شادشاپور/انبار
Paikuli: پایقلی
Arbela: اربیل
Qinnasrin: قنسرین
Caucasus/East Anatolia
Dvin: دبیل
Yerevan: ایروان
Kars: قارص
Arsamosata: ارشمشاد
Manzikert: ملازگرد
Trepezus/Trebizond: طرابوزان
Tigranocerta: تیگرانکرد/دیاربکر
Karin/Theodosiopolis: کارین/ارزروم
Cesarea: قیصریه
Caucasian Albania: اران
Caucasian Iberia: گرجستان
Tbilisi: تفلیس
Narkala: نارقلعه
Siwnik: سیسکان
Vagharshapat: بلاشاباد
Partaw: بردعه
Lazica: لازستان
Archaeopolis: گوجی
Bathys: باطوم
Her: خوی
Cepha: حصن کیفا
It is well-known that after the death of Yazdgerd III, the last Sasanian Shahanshah (king of kings) in 651, an attempt was made by his sons Peroz and Wahram to recover at least a part of his empire with the help of the Chinese.[1] These attempts, however, were not successful and finally resulted in the withdrawal of the remnants of the Sasanians royal family to the Tang’s newly built capital of Chang’an 長安, where Peroz died in 678/679. He was buried in the mausoleum of Gaozong of the Tang and an inscription naming him king of Persia 波斯王 and Commander of Persia 波斯都督 was included on a nearby pedestal. Before his death, Peroz had managed to secure the permission to build a temple for the exiled Persian community in China, although we aren’t quite sure of this was a Zoroastrian, Manichaean, or Christian temple.
Map of the Tang Empire at the height of its power in the early 8th centuryStatues at the tomb of the Gaozong emperor of the TangBefore meeting his end, Peroz had put up a fight against the invading forces of the nascent Islamic caliphate and keep at least an illusion of ruling his father’s territories. Specifically, following Yazdgerd’s death in 651 in Marw (Merv), Peroz had set up a minor kingdom in a city that the Chinese call Jiling 疾陵, which is usually thought to be the city of Zrang/Zaranj in Sistan.[2] Considering that Sistan was not really invaded until the caliphate of Mu’awiyya (661-663), we can imagine that it was the conquest of Sistan that drove Peroz out of Sistan and to Tukharistan around 663. This would also support Daryaee’s suggestion that all of those Yazdgerd year 20 coin issues were in fact minted in Sistan, presumably in the 10 years of so when he ruled after his father there.[3]
The Conquests of early IslamOn the other hand, Peroz’s appearance in Chang’an happens between 673 and 674[4], meaning that he had spent the previous decade or more in the west. Based on Chinese sources (which might very well be exaggerations), he ruled in Tukharistan, under Chinese auspices, trying to recover his kingdom. Presumably, it is after his arrival in Chang’an that his son, Narseh 涅涅师, was raised to the throne in his stead by the Chinese general in Tukharistan. But Narseh too, after a 20 year struggle, could not recover any territories and returned to China in 708-709 and died in Chang’an. Now, apart from the year 20 issues of Yazdgerd III that we can assume were continually re-issued by Peroz, we have very little evidence of coins from either Peroz or Narseh, while we can only assume that some should have existed as coinage was firmly established in this region both as a sign of authority and for means of circulation. However, no certain coins can be attributed to either authorities, leaving us puzzled.
If we don’t consider the claims of Tang chroniclers as pure fabrication, we should then look at the selection of coins that we do have and consider that they might in fact contain some coins that can be attributed to either Peroz or Narseh, or both. Somehow, these coins have escaped the attention of the scholars somehow, mainly in any clear indication of the name of either authority. The issue is that the inscriptions on the coins of East Iran are written in a maddening variety of scripts, ranging from cursive Bactrian to Pahlavi, Brahmi, and Arabic. A few coins have clearly legible inscriptions, and given the frustrating ambiguities of both the Pahlavi and the Bactrian scripts, all sorts of readings can be proposed. To make things even more complicated, the coins in the region were often issued based on established prototypes, thus coins of the previous authorities – many of them originally based in Sasanian issues of the fourth and fifth centuries. So, it is not too much of a surprise if a coin does not immediately jump out or can be attributed to an authority otherwise known from the pages of standard historical narratives.[5]
The available array of coins from the Hindukush region in the post-Sasanian period is quite bewildering, with many local authorities issuing silver and copper/bronze coins. Many of these coins, for example those of the iltäbär, or Zhulad Gozgan belong to authorities whom we know from historical sources. Others, such as Tegin Khurasan Shah and his son Phrom Kesar, are mainly known from their coins but are entering the gaze of history through discovery of newer sources such as inscriptions.[6] Others such as “Spur Martan Shah,” or “Sero” or “the Bactrian Yabghu” are completely unknown and still waiting identification. So, I would like to venture into a group of these, namely the last named Yabghu, to find some coins that might be connected to Peroz and his son Narseh, the last claimants to the Sasanian throne in the East.
Silver drachm of Zhu(n)lad Gozgan, “Garigo Shaho”The Yabghu of Balkh/Bactrians
The ultimate source, in English, for the coins that I like to consider here is the monumental two volumes produced by the Austrian numismatist, Klaus Vondrovec, who I can also call a friend and a mentor.[7] In these volumes, Klaus has done a magnificent job of studying the coins from east Iran from the end of the Kushano-Sasanian period to the complete control of the area by the Muslims in the eighth century. His meticulousness has rendered a wonderful resource, detailing typologies, iconographies, and inscriptions of each coin, and providing his own innovative groupings and analysis, mainly based on the previous work by Robert Göbl, but furthering the study of these coins manifold.
Section 9 of Klaus’ work is devoted to the coins produced under the suzerainty of the Western Turk (Gök Türk) Empire, originally founded on the second half of the sixth century and continuing until the late 7th/early 8th century when it was destroyed and temporarily merged into the Tang Empire of China. It was in fact the Chinese advances westwards to destroy the Western Turk that brought them into contact with the Islamic caliphate, resulting in the cataclysmic Battle of Talas that checked both the western ambitions of the Chinese and the eastern expansion of the Caliphate.[8]
The late Sasanian and the Western Turk empiresThe early coins of this period are the continuation of what Klaus, following a suggestion by Göbl, has called the “Alkhan-Nezak Crossover” series. These are the coins of the period before the Western Turk take over of the Hindu-Kush region and show elements of both the Nezak Shah group (rulers of Kabulistan and Zabulistan), as well as those of the Alkhan group (a group of “Iranian Huns” who had gone over to conquer northern India in the fifth and sixth centuries).[9] By Klaus’ estimation, a part of the Alkhans had returned to the region of Kabul and Zabul and somehow integrated into the Nezak Shahs, and merging their distinctive coinage style with that of the Nezak Shahs, establishing their own Alkhan-Nezak Crossover group.
Silber drahm of an Alkhan kingA coin of Nezak ShahAn Alkhan-Nezak Crossover coinThe first authority that Klaus Vondrovec assigns to the Western Turk period is an authority on whose coins inscriptions in Bactria and Brahmi render his name as Sri Shahi (a mix of Indian and Iranian titles: “the Perfect/respected King”). This is respectively written as σριο þαυιο (with spurious Bactrian final -o) in Bactrian and as śrī ṣāhi in Brahmi on two different sets of coins which share the same iconography and typology. On the Nezak and Alkhan-Nezak Cross over coins, the name of the authority, Nezak Shah, was written in the Pahlavi script as nycky’ MLK’.[10]** But in these coins, the Sri Shahi inscription has replaced the Pahlavi legend. The dual languages, one showing influences from the northern slopes of the Hindukush, historical Bactria and Tukharistan, and the other from the southern side, Kabul and Gandhara, is interesting and might suggest that Sri Shahi, whoever that he was, had influence over a wide range of area on both sides of the Hindukush, possibly making him a sub-king of the Western Turk, or an independent ruler – if the second half of the seventh century date that Vondrovec gives him is correct.
Coin of Sri ShahiAnother type of coin that Vondrovec mentions bears a Pahlavi legend on it that reads ybgw bhlk’n, so the Yabghu of Bactrians/Balkh.[11] This title would indicate the authority of the issuer in Balkh and Tukharistan, to the north of the Hindukush. However, Klaus reads a reverse legend on the coins as z’wlst(’n) and speculates that these coins might gave been issued in the area of Zabulistan, to the south of the Hindukush. There is an analogy that is suggested here in comparison with the coins of another authority called “Pangul” (who I have suggested is the same person as Amir Banji mentioned by Minhaj Seraj) who seems to call himself both a ruler in Balkh, while issuing coins with the mint signature of Rakhvad (al-Rukhaj) in the area of modern Lashkar Gah in Afghanistan. I am not sure if this can be entertained though, and have a really hard time reading the inscription there as z’wlst the way Vondrovec does. But aside from the mint, the iconography of two of the coin types is interesting and worth looking into.
Specifically, these are Klaus’ types 265 and 266, both showing a beardless man (Vondrovec p. 528). Klaus suggests that these might be a reference to the teenage Ardashir III who ruled the Sasanian empire for a bit more than a year in 628-629/630 and whose coins show a beardless man. But I don’t quite understand why Ardashir III coins should be reissued, with a whole new iconography added, after his death and much later, in the area of Balkh, where he never held any authority. The beardless bust showing an immature person though, that I understand and support!
Yabghu of Balkh, type 265, possible authority Narseh (Pahl. nrsyh’) with the mint name of hrwp (Hariw? Herat?), year 10?So, who could this beardless man be? My suggestion here is that this is Narseh, the son of Peroz, who has been left in charge of the Tang Command of Persia after his father’s move to Chang’an. We have no idea of Peroz’ age. Presumably his father, Yazdgerd III, was a teenager himself when he was installed in the throne in 632. We might assume that Peroz was born after this, say 635 to have a round number, and when he died in 678/79, he was about 43-44, a respectable age to die in the 7th century, although quite early. Narseh could have been born quite early and be in his early to mid-twenties, or if we assume a later birth (say while his father was “securely” ruling in Sistan in the 650’s and early 660’s), he would be a teenager indeed. So, the young bust for him would be quite appropriate.
The two types that show the beardless man bear a very elaborate crown. This crown carries the wings on the crown of Yazdgerd III, the father of Peroz, but also has a buffalo’s head on top of an elongated “pedestal”. These buffalo heads were first introduced by the Nezah Shahs and seem to be their invention, so their appearance on these coins say something about the “local” nature of these issues. While they are very Sasanian in style and bear a Pahlavi legend, they also add a local flavour (and thus authority and circulation) by adding a local piece of iconography. The single border reverse also means that these coins are pre-687 (the shared terminus post quem by which Vondrovec dates the relative date of the later coins) and belong to a period before the introduction of Arab-Sasanian coin types to this region. On some of these issues, I read the legends n(?)rsyh’ in Pahlavi, a name that could clearly point to the identity of the authority as Narseh, the son of Peroz.
A related type, 265A, using the same iconography but showing an older, bearded man, in silver and copper drachms. In addition to being bearded, the bust on the reverse is also wearing a crown with a crescent and a star in the front, something that had become associated with the outside margins on the coins of Khosrow II where they appear in four cardinal points. In front of the bust on some of the coins, a Pahlavi inscription can be read, an I provisionally and with much uncertainty propose the reading of kd(y) bwhl(‘)n for it, possibly to be read as Kay Wahram, although the spelling would be significantly different than the normal spelling of Wahram as wlhl’n, so I have great reservations about it. as One thing that unites all these coins, aside from the iconography, is the presence of “tamga S 61”, a sign consisting of a half circle with another sign, resembling an open V with wings. These tamgas appear in the same places that a crescent and a star would appear on the coins of Khosrow II, on the outside margins of the obverse, except one example of it occurring on the reverse as well of the type 265A, variant 3. Coins of type 265A also carry a mint year of 15, although it is not specified based on which calendar. The coins also mainly carry the mint name of LHW, localising them in Rakhwad/Al-Rukhaj, in Sistan. We can only assume that this is a reference to the regnal year of the authority it depicts. I would attribute this related type as either issued by Narseh himself when he was older, or possibly belonging to Peroz, issued before he had to leave for China.
Yabghu of Balkh, type 265A, possibly with Pahl. kd(y) bwhl(‘)n (Kay Wahram?) on the reverse, mint LHW(d)? (Rukkhaj?)The question remains as why the names of the authorities cannot be found on the coin. In my opinion, there are two answers to be given here. One is that these Yabghus, bearing a title that we known from the Hephthalite period onwards, were actually governors of Peroz and Narseh, ruling over some of the dudufus 都督府 of the Tang Persian (Anxi) Protectorate 安西都護府, and thus issuing coins using their title and the position. Alternatively, these are Peroz and Narseh themselves, but that living under Tang suzerainty, they only mention their position as Yabghus of Balkh, on their coins. However, the extension of their power to the southern Hindukush, observed from the spread of the coinage circulation to Zabulistan – much like Sri Shahi – is an indication of their wider influence beyond Balkh, perhaps even expressing their claim to Sistan, from which Peroz had escaped to Balkh.
The administrative divisions of the Tang Empire in the west
[1] Quite a few studies of these, some with more care than others, have been published. The sources are still most easily available in Chavannes, Edouard. 1903. Documents Sur Le Toukiue (Turcs) Occidentaux. St. Petersburg: Commissionnaires de l’Académie Impériale des Sciences. Daffina’s short, but monumental work remains one of the best studies of this, Daffinà, Paolo. 1983. “La Persia Sassanide Secondo Le Fonti Cinesi.” Rivista Degli Studi Orientali 57: 121–70. A discussion of all these plus newer observations is Compareti, Matteo. 2003. “The Last Sasanians in China.” Eurasian Studies 2 (2): 197–213.
[2] Comparetti 2003, 206. However, see Hamidreza Pashazanous, Ehsan Afkande, “the Last Sasanians in Eastern Iran and China” Anabasis 5 (2014), 139-153 for an argument against this, rather putting Jiling in Tukharistan.
[3] Daryaee, Touraj. 2006. “Yazdgerd III’s Last Year: Coinage and the History of Sistan at the End of Late Antiquity.” Iranistik: Deutschsprachige Zeitschrift Fur Iranistische Studien 5 (1 & 2): 21–29.
[4] Comparetti 2003, 207
[5] For an example of this, see my article identifying certain coins from the area of western Tukharistan as belonging to characters said to be the ancestors of the Amirs of Ghur by the famous 13th century historian, Minhaj Siraj Jowzjani in his Tabaqat-e Nasseri: K. Rezakhani. 2020. “Pangul and Bunji, Zhulad and Fulad: a Note on the Genealogy of the Shanasbid Amirs of Ghur.” In Dinars and Dirhams: Festschrift in Honor of Michael L. Bates, edited by Touraj Daryaee, Judith A. Lerner, and Virginie Rey, 219–30. Irvine: Jordan Center for Persian Studies and Culture.
[6] For the newest example of this, see Nicholas Sims-Williams. 2020. “The Bactrian Inscription of Jaghori: A Preliminary Reading.” Bulletin of the Asia Institute 30.
[7] Klaus Vondrovec. 2014. Coinage of the Iranian Huns and Their Successors from Bactria to Gandhara (4th to 8th Century CE). Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
[8] For a general review, see Denis Sinor. 1990. “The Establishment and Dissolution of the Türk Empire.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, I:285–316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[9] For these, see another excellent work produced by another brilliant Austrian scholar, Matthias Pfisterer, 2013. Hunnen in Indien. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
[10] The reading of this inscription, previously read as Napki Malka and long known as that, is one of the more exciting stories of ancient studies. See J. Harmatta. 1969. Late Bactrian Inscriptions, Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 17, 408, and Richard N. Frye, “Napki Malka and the Kushano-Sasanians,” in Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and History: Studies in Honor of George C. Miles, ed. Dikran K. Kouymjian (Beirut, 1974), 115–22.
[11] There is some debate as to read this as Bactrians or Balkh (see Vondrovec p. 527 and other places). I prefer to consider this “that of Balkh” (in analogy to Ērān) and don’t get too worried if this is a reference to the people or the land.
Why do technology companies take something that is good and perfectly serviceable and make it more complicated and less user friendly, all in the name of being modern and “cool”? The wordpress classical editor was a familiar editor with everything one needed. If you had worked with any text editor, you could easily use it and it came naturally. Yes, I understand that it was not perfect for “visual” creators who might need to create “new” and “unique” layouts to do their work, but it surely was possible to ADD those features (or actually just to take away the unnecessary restrictions that prevented the creation of such layouts) while leaving the core idea of writing intact? Here, it feels like I am writing on an empty screen with no access to anything, having to go back and do anything I need, including making words bold or into italics. Worse yet, there is no way to edit the title of a post, or in my case, change the direction of it when I want to write in Persian! Why is this done? How is it that in this world of increased globalisation and cross-cultural contacts, we are going BACK to the time when everything was just for the English speaking tech-bros?
Also, wth is a featured image and why do I need it?
(This is a guest post by Sara Mashayekh who can be contacted at saramashayekh (at) ucsb.edu)
I. Introduction**
During the recent protests in Iran, a song called Barāyé by the singer/songwriter Shervin Hajipour became famous among the protesters both outside and inside Iran. The title, Barāyé, means “because of” or “for the sake of” in Persian and it is the word that starts every verse of the song. The song was composed during the early days of the 2022 uprising and very soon became the anthem of the movement.[1] It was first posted by the singer himself on his Instagram page and quickly went viral. Since then, it has gained international fame and is a potential nominee for a Grammy Awards 2023 in the category “Best Song for Social Change.”[2] Several non-Iranian artists have already used the song for their artistic projects in order to express their support for the Iranian protesters.[3] The song is regularly sung by the protesters inside and outside Iran and the lyrics of it have been turned into slogans of protest and are either chanted or written on banners and walls of public buildings inside Iran. Aside from becoming the anthem of this ongoing movement, and perhaps the reason why it did in the first place, this song is extremely reflective of the Iranian society at the present and of this movement. If someone wants to learn about the current uprising in Iran, why it started, and what is the general atmosphere of this movement, this song can be their best guide for how it truly mirrors the Iran of today[4], its problems, the demands of its people, and their aspirations.
As reflective as this song is of the ongoing uprising inside Iran, the simple fact that it is sung in Persian immediately makes it inaccessible to numerous people wishing to understand both the song and the protests. The lyrics have not been properly translated by a professional translator, but amateur translations are often posted on various social media platforms and website, starting with the subtitles on the video originally uploaded by the singer himself. The major issue, however, is that language is not the only barrier when it comes to this song. One could understand the Persian lyrics and still not completely understand what the song’s spirit and content is about. There is so much context in every line of this song and not until it is clearly unpacked, can the reader understand the message of it. I myself, as a translator of academic and non-academic works between Persian and English, have been fascinated by the multifaceted meaning of the words in the lyrics and how they are used in the song, as well as in the Tweets from which they were originally taken (on which, see below). Additionally, as a PhD Student of theatre & performance studies regularly working with complicated medieval and modern texts, I am used to dissecting words and unpacking their meanings, particularly in an artistic setting. I think such unpacking of the lyrics of Barāyé can help us all, both as observers and as those genuinely caring about the situation in Iran, to see the situation from the viewpoint of the people whose grievances this song reflects. In the following, I will try a line-by-line translation & commentary of the lyrics of this song, providing secondary meanings and their context after each line.
Before starting with the lyrics, however, some general information about the events that resulted in the composition of this song is necessary. On 16th of September 2022, a 22-year-old Iranian woman named Mahsa “Jina” Amini, died in the Kasra hospital in Tehran, Iran[5] under suspicious circumstances. Born and raised in the city of Saqqez in the Kurdistan province of Iran[6], Mahsa was visiting Tehran with her brother when the religious morality police, called Gašt-e Eršād “Guidance Patrol”[7] arrested her for not wearing her hijab correctly. Less than two hours later she was rushed to the hospital already in a coma and died the next day. The Law Enforcement Force of Iran claim that while in police custody, she suffered a heart attack, collapsed, and fell into a coma.[8] However, eyewitnesses, including women who were detained with Amini, said she was beaten, and that she died as a result of police brutality.[9] Images of her in the hospital bed and the video footage of her while in police custody quickly went viral and as early as 24 hours after her death, protests had erupted in various locations in Iran, including the capital city Tehran where she was arrested, as well as her home province of Kurdistan.[10] As the protest were going on in Iran, a challenge was proposed by several Persian speaking Twitter users from around the world. The challenge was to write a few lines, only as long as a tweet can be, about why Iranians are protesting and what wrongs this regime has done to the people of Iran and to the country. The users answered this challenge by tweeting about a variety of issues and problems they were facing as a result of regime policies or what they believe the government is responsible for. As the challenge started with the interrogative čerā “why,” the responding tweets all started with the Persian word barā-yé “for the sake of” or “because of.” For more than 48 hours, an overwhelming number of Persian speakers on Twitter were writing tweets starting with barāyé and listing all that they believed is wrong with Iran today, their grievances, all that the Iranian society is suffering from, and all the crimes committed by the Iranian government.
A lot of these tweets were initially about universal issues, and they don’t need much explanation and don’t have a specific context either. These are tweets such as “because of all the political prisoners,” “for the sake of liberty,” “for the sake of justice,” “because of all the students who were expelled from university for having unacceptable political leanings,” or “for the sake of women,” which are self explanatory and easy to understand. Then, it started becoming a little more specific and about one particular cases, instead of just abstract concepts such as liberty or justice. As tweets were being posted, they started addressing more than just political grievances and shifted to social issues including issues that have become problematic in Iran because of mismanagement and corruption. Issues such as animal rights, environmental issue, refugee rights, gay and lesbian rights, quickly found their way into the tweet pool. Some example of these are “because of this polluted air,” “because of the trees that are dying,” “for the Afghan (refugee) kids.” The tweets were indeed becoming more poignant and specific and starting to resonate with an even larger audience.
The 25 years old Shervin Hajipour who had already become famous among Iranians following his participation in the Iranian talent show Asr-e Jadid (New Era) chose 29 tweets out of millions of tweets that were posted online and turned them into the lyrics of his song. After composing the accompanying music, he sang his song in his room and posted it on his Instagram page. The song was viewed 40 million times in his Instagram page alone. A few days later, on September 29th, he was briefly arrested[11] and released later on October 4th, 2022[12]. He was forced to delete his Instagram post, but by that time, the video clip had been downloaded, shared many times, and gone viral already.[13]
II. Baraye**
- For dancing in the street
This is the very first line of this song and it is very reflective of the yearning that the Iranian people, especially younger Iranians, have for a normal life and for being able to do something as simple as dancing in the street.[14] Public dancing is forbidden in Iran, especially for women.[15] Under certain circumstances, men have been given permission to perform ethnic dances during cultural festivals or to mark certain occasions. However, western style dances are strictly forbidden in public spaces, and are not shown in films or TV programs either. The law regarding this issue is vague since the act of dancing itself is not illegal, for men or women, but since 1979 Islamic Revolution, public dancing has been labeled as an indecent act and thus it is punishable by law.[16]
2. Because of the fear we feel when we kiss
This line too talks about an activity, kissing, which, similar to dancing, is not considered suitable for the public sphere. Kissing, even between legally married heterosexual couples, is not considered an appropriate activity outside of one’s private sphere. Similar to dancing, there is no law preventing a couple, especially a married couple, from kissing, be it in public or private. However, again similar to dancing, due to the label of indecency, such an act can be considered a crime.[17]
3. Because of our sisters, mine, and yours
This line has been one of the most quoted lines of this song, understandably since women’s rights is the most important force behind the current movement. The uprising started with the death of a young woman and the way her dress was conceived by the morality police as inappropriate in Iran. Even if we entertain the office police claim that her death was an accident, her arrest in the first place is itself a testament to the lack of bodily autonomy for women in Iran and the existence of gender apartheid. Women don’t have bodily autonomy and are not allowed to dress the way they please in public.[18] This line is basically saying: “for our sisters, who are suffering every day.”
4. For wanting to change these rutted minds
Most of the oppressive laws and practices in Iran are caused by dogmatic views on the part of the politicians, who are often presenting these dogmas as part of their reading of an orthodox Islam. All attempts at reforming the existing laws, in order to make them less oppressive for women and religious minorities, have been blocked by conservatives who are armed with an unshakable faith in their vision regarding acceptable vs. unacceptable.[19]
However, there might be another layer at work here, and that is specifically the context of male chauvinism. While the first image which comes to mind after reading this tweet is that of an uncompromising person guided by Islamic religious dogma, and it is presented as such by the politicians themselves, there might be another layer at work here. The original tweet was tweeted on September 24th as a response to another tweet which talks about the villainization of female survivors of rape, sexual assault, and harassment.[20] Considering this fact, “the rutted minds” might not necessarily be a reference to religious conservatism but to male chauvinism at large.
5. Because of the shame of poverty
This line is a shorter version of the original tweet by user Bahar which goes as follows: “for that father whose back is broken under the weight of his problems and is ashamed of his poverty in front of his family.”[21] While poverty is a universal issue, both the original tweet and Hajipour’s edited use of it refer directly to the government mismanagement of the economy in creating these levels of poverty (also see below on “garbage scavenger kid”). The fact is that there has been an unprecedented rise in the poverty rate during the past few years in Iran, [22] despite the rising prices and other economic benefits that the Iranian populace believes the government has mismanaged through corruption and other forms of incompetence.[23]
6. For longing to have an ordinary life
This is possibly the most important line of this song. This line captures the essence of the song and the movement that Iranians want to live their lives in peace without having to worry about being arrested or worse, for the way they dress, the way they behave, etc. While civil disobedience and challenging the existing laws have been a method of resistance and protests throughout history and all around the world, the demands of the Iranian protesters are considered basic rights in most of the rest of the world. If all their demands are met, what they will end up with is a society that would only look simply normal as far as most people in the world are concerned. Therefore, “longing to have an ordinary life” is really the most important message here, not only of this song but the movement as well.
7. For the garbage scavenging kid and her dreams
There are probably very few of us that would not be moved by the site of a poor person, particularly a child, trying to find food to eat in the rubbish bins. This is sadly a sight familiar in many big cities, and some may argue is a part of modern life and economy, or in Iran’s case, an outcome of an unofficial recycling mafia employing children and undocumented labor force. However, in Iran, this is a relatively new phenomenon related to large scale migrations to big cities in the past few decades and the destitute it has created. Underage workers who live and work in these terrible conditions are often abused in variety of ways by their employers as well as random criminals.[24]
8. Because of this dictatorial economy
This line is one of the many lines in this song that is difficult to accurately translate. The original tweet by Reza Shoohani says: “for planned pricing, for the administration interfering in economy. For nonsense phrases such as ‘Islamic Economy’ and ‘Resistance Economy.’”[25] The line used by Hajipour uses the phrase eghtesad-e-dastoori which is usually translated as “planned economy” but some translators believe that “dictatorial economy” is a more accurate translation as it better reflects the intended meaning. While planned economy exists in many societies and countries, in Iran the restrictions imposed on economic actors are often influenced by the government’s dogmatic views and religious conservatism, hence the reference to ‘Islamic Economy’ in the original tweet. This line connects in meaning with the earlier line about poverty. Part of the reason for the poverty, mentioned in the fifth line of the song, is this problematic economic doctrine adopted and enforced by the Iranian government and again, attributed to a sort of orthodox Islamic conduct.
9. Because of this polluted air
Air pollution is a major issue in Iran. The capital city, Tehran, is one of the most polluted cities in the world with cold seasons being the worst.[26] In 2021 Iran was ranked 24th most polluted country among 118 countries listed.[27] Environmental changes have played a role in the worsening quality of the air in Iran but government policies such as “lack of regulations on [supply of] standard diesel,”[28] has been seen as one of the main reasons behind the unacceptable air quality in Tehran and in many other cities all over Iran.
10. Because of the dying trees of the Vali Asr street
The tree lined Vali Asr street of Tehran is the longest street in Iran which connects Tehran railway station in the south of the city to the northernmost part of the city, Tajrish Square.[29] Built during the reign of the first Pahlavi King, and originally named Pahlavi Street, the street, and its iconic chinar trees, is often seen as one of the symbols of Tehran. In recent years, however, due to mismanagement and perhaps deliberate sabotage, many of the trees in Vali Asr Street started dying and were cut down by the municipality.[30]
11. Because of the cheetah cub Pirooz who might go extinct
Pirooz, meaning Victor, is the name of the Asiatic cheetah cub born in a facility in Iran as part of the program aiming to preserve endangered species. His mother was rescued from wildlife traffickers and was taken to a facility where she eventually mated with a male cheetah and gave birth to three cubs.[31] Only one, Pirooz, has survived and he is still too young to be left on his own. Since today the Asiatic cheetahs can only be found in Iran, they used to live all over central Asia and Middle East,[32] their survival has become a national issue. Members of the Iranian national soccer team wore a jersey with the image of the Asiatic cheetah to the 2014 and 2018 soccer world cups.[33]
12. Because of the innocent stray dogs
In Iran similar to many other countries, stray dogs are collected and taken off of the streets, usually to shelters. In 2021, however, a report was published that due to shelters being overcrowded or because of a cut in the budget, several shelters were forced to kill the dogs that were housed there. Reports of municipality agents shooting and killing dogs in a shelter was reported by the Iranian media.[34] Animal rights activists and regular citizens were enraged and demanded answers.[35] Activists are also worried that these type of mass slaughters might be repeated in the future.[36] While animal abuse and mistreatment is a problem in Iran when it comes to a variety of animals and not just dogs, dogs are uniquely problematic and therefore attract more attention. According to some Islamic traditions, dogs are considered impure. While keeping dogs, mostly for protection, has always been common in Iran’s rural areas, dogs were not common in the cities until 20th century.[37] People keeping dogs as pets in their houses in Tehran and other big cities in Iran is often seen as a phenomena resulting from westernization and secularization that happened in Iran during the 20th century.[38] There are no official ban on dogs, but there has been occasional clashes between dog owners and the police.[39] Religious dogma is once again seen as the reason behind the crackdown on dogs which is why dogs are referred to as “forbidden” in this song.
13. Because of our non-stop tears
The original tweet, tweeted by Khanoomeh Anonymous[40]is slightly different from the line recited here. The original tweet says: “Because of our non-stop tears during these nights” clearly the tweet is talking about the current uprising, people being anxious, mourning those protesters who have been killed, and worried about those who have been arrested and are in jail. The tears are related to a particular issue, the 2022 uprising. By omitting the last part of this phrase, during these nights, Hajipour has given a new meaning to this line. In his song, the tears are not related to a specific event and can be in response to any, or all, of the problems that are mentioned in this song.
14. For the image of this moment repeating again
This line is perhaps the most complex line of this song and one which is impossible to understand without further explanations. This line sung by Hajipour is a modified version of the original tweet tweeted by the user known as Gorg-e-Wall Street which goes as follows: “for the yearning you placed in a father’s heart to repeat this moment.”[41] The text is accompanied with a picture of the Iranian activist Hamed Esmaeilion and his young daughter, Reera Esmaeilion, sitting together and reading newspapers. Nine years old Reera Esmaeilion and her mother, Parisa Eghbalian, were killed when Iran’s Revolutionary Guards mistakenly shot down a Boeing 737-800 operated by Ukrainian International Airlines, headed from Tehran to Kyiv, on January 8th 2020. Since the tragic accident, Hamed Esmaeilion has devoted his life to finding justice for the victims of flight 752, has organized numerous events, and as the result has become a household name among Iranians both outside and inside Iran.
15. For the sake of a laughing face
This line looks rather simple and easy to understand. The singer is wishing for laughter and happiness. once again, however, the original tweet tells us that there is a deeper layer here. Similar to few other lines in this song, this line is also a shortened version of the original tweet. The original tweet, tweeted by Sachli says: “for the day when our profile pictures are our own images with smiles on our lips.”[42] This is clearly a reference to the fact that a lot of underground activists and citizen journalists inside Iran use pseudonyms for their Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram accounts , and do not post a real picture of themselves, in order to protect themselves against government agents who monitor the social media sites.
16. Because of the students, for the future
This is one of most universal lines of this song and it doesn’t need much explanation. For the future, for the future of the students. It is helpful perhaps to remember that the word for student in Persian, Danesh Amooz,[43] is exclusively used for K-12 students. University students are never referred to as Danesh Amooz. Therefore, this line is talking about minors and not adult. The following phrase, for the future, emphasizes the concern for the minors that the first phrase highlights.
17. Because of this mandatory paradise
This line is an unveiled reference to the fact that the religious establishment in Iran often justifies the restrictions it imposes on Iranian citizens, women in particular, by saying that they are preventing sinful behavior and are creating an ideal society that resembles paradise. When in 2014 Hassan Rouhani, then president of Iran who had reformist views, argued that the government is not responsible for preventing people from committing sin, and should not be in the business of sending people, forcefully, to paradise, he was attacked by conservative officials including several members of the parliament who argued that the main purpose of an Islamic government is to guide people, if necessary by force, toward paradise.[44]
18. Because of imprisoned experts (elites)
The Persian word used in this phrase, Nokhbeh, is often translated as elite. However, in this case the imprisoned Nokhbeh is a reference to science experts, in all areas of science[45] but especially social sciences such as history,[46] sociology, and political science, having been arrested and sent to jail. Majority of these experts were/are scholars who wrote articles or published books criticizing the system of government in Iran, or the idea of an Islamic State, and were arrested and sentenced to prison. [47] prominent lawyers, especially those concerned with human rights are also among the experts who have been jailed by the Iranian government; the most famous example being the prize-winning human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. [48]
19. Because of the Afghan (refugee) kids
According to the Iranian government, about 780,000 refugees from Afghanistan currently live in Iran but the number of undocumented Afghan refugees is likely far greater.[49] Undocumented individuals face a series of problems such as lack of access to universal healthcare. This line, however, is specifically talking about Afghan kids which is its own complicated issue in Iran. The flow of refugees from Afghanistan to Iran is not a new phenomenon. It originally started with the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. As the result, for more than 40 years, children have been born in Iran to Afghan parents and, because of Iran’s immigration and naturalization laws, are not considered Iranian citizens.[50]
20. For this list that goes on and on
“For this list that goes on and on,” likely the best translation of the Persian line which is sung at 1:27 of this song.[51] However, it is not the literal translation of it. The literal translation is as follows: “because of all these ‘because of’ that are not redundant.” This line is clearly referring to the fact that for days Iranian Twitter Users were posting tweets starting with “baraye” but none of the tweets were redundant. The list of “baraye” is long and never ending because there are so many problems that Iran and Iranians are suffering from.
21. Because of all the meaningless (and hostile) slogans
Once again, what we hear in the song is different from the original tweet which inspired it. The original tweet by user Hesam.eth, goes as follows: “for all the slogans of death that the students were forced to chant.”[52] Both the original tweet and the modified version of it, which appears in the song, are talking about the common practice of having K-12 students chant slogans approved by the government as part of their daily routine at school. Some of the most famous and often used slogans were “death to USA” and “death to Israel.”[53]
22. For the rubbles of these feeble houses
At first glance, this line sounds like a symbolic reference to the collapsing authority of the government in Iran. It is likely that Hajipour is trying to play with words here and is perhaps making a reference to the shaky position of the Iranian government. The original tweet, however, is making a more literal reference to actual feeble houses collapsing and the rubbles that are generated as the result. “for all the feeble houses that you built which collapsed on people’s heads during the past 40 years” is the tweet which was tweeted by Elham Nadaf.[54] At the bottom of her post she has the hashtag #metropol which is a reference to a 10-story building which collapsed on May 23, 2022 in the city of Abadan in southwestern province of Khuzestan.[55]
Aside from metropole, building safety has been a controversial issue in Iran during the past few decades. Many of the major cities in Iran, Tehran included, are located on earthquake fault lines. Government corruption, however, has resulted in construction companies not being required to adhere to standard safety measures that would ensure less destruction and loss of life in case of an earthquake.[56]
23. For the sake of having peace of mind
This line is very much connected to the earlier one which talks about longing for an ordinary life, and also to what is mentioned a few lines down about insomnia and tranquilizers.[57] Peace of mind which comes with having an ordinary life, not having to worry about every aspect of life, from economy to environment to human rights, is a right denied to the Iranian people.
24. For the rising sun after a long-lasting night
This line in the song matches the original tweet almost word by word. This line is clearly talking about the symbolic victory of light over darkness (good over evil) and is saying that the aims of, or one of reasons behind, the current uprising is to defeat darkness with light. The dichotomy of light and darkness exists in many cultures around the world, but it has a very important place in Iranian culture and has a unique celebration dedicated to it. The longest night of the year, the winter solstice, is an important celebration in Iran, called Shab-e-Yalda, meant to celebrate the victory of sun, rising after the longest night of the year, over darkness.[58]
25. Because of the tranquilizers, because of insomnia
As mentioned above, this line is connected to what is implied in the earlier line “For the sake of having peace of mind.” In the absence of an ordinary life, people have lost their peace of mind and have to deal with psychological problems and insomnia.
26. For man, homeland, prosperity
The slogan “for man, homeland, prosperity” was developed as a companion to the original slogan of this movement, “woman, life, freedom”[59] during the early days of 2022 uprising. It received mixed feedback, for although some people saw it as a good companion for “woman, life, freedom” others argued that it will take the focus aways from women who are the center of this uprising. Arguments were also made regarding the patriarchal nature of this slogan which is something that this movement is fighting against.[60] Nonetheless, the slogan has continued to appear alongside “women, life, freedom” as one of the slogans of this uprising.
27. Because of the girl who wished she was a boy
As a result of gender apartheid, women in Iran are prevented from participating in certain activities and prevented from entering certain locations. One of the most controversial examples of this is the unofficial ban, until very recently, on women entering stadiums to watch male athletes compete.[61] As the result, many Iranian women have expressed their wish of having been born boys instead of girls and there are cases of women disguising themselves as men in order to avoid the mandatory hijab or other oppressive gender rules.[62]
28. For woman, life, freedom.
This slogan very quickly, less than 24 hours after Mahsa’s death, became the main slogan of the protesters all over Iran and outside Iran. Zan, Zendegi, Azadi, has its roots in a Kurdish slogan Zhan, Zhian, Azadi, which became popular in the late 20th century through the advocacy of leaders such as Abdullah Öcalan[63] not just in the Kurdish areas of Iranian but in all regions of the greater Kurdistan.
29. Because of Freedom
Although a lot of problems highlighted in this song have to do with mismanagement and corruption on part of the government, just as many issues, if not more, highlighted in this song are the result of restrictions and limitations that are imposed on people in the name of religion or national interest. Therefore, “because of freedom” is in many ways the main reason why Iranians are protesting and as a mirror reflecting the current uprising, it makes perfect sense for this song to end by repeating “because of freedom” (Baraye Azadi) three times.
III. Barāyé as a Unique Revolutionary Song**
What catches one’s eye regarding these lyrics is that unlike the majority of the other revolutionary songs, especially those composed previously in Iran itself, this song is not about fighting, bravery, defeating the enemy, sacrificing one’s life for the cause, etc. Baraye is about everyday life; it is as it says, about longing for an ordinary and prosperous life. It talks about environmental problems, animals that are going extinct, trees that are dying, refugee rights, and psychological concerns, alongside freedom, liberty, and prosperity. In order to clearly demonstrate how different this song is from other popular revolutionary songs in Iran, especially those still known from the 1979 Revolution, it might be useful to take a quick look at one of these other revolutionary songs.
The song we are going to consider is called Bé Lāleyé Dar Khūn Khofté “To the Tulip Lying in Blood” and was made right after the 1979 Revolution. It became very popular and is always broadcasted by TV and radio stations, in schools and universities, in order to commemorate the 1979 revolution during its 10 days of anniversary celebration from February 1st to February 11th each year. The first few lines of the song are as follows:
We swear by the bloody tulip[64]
The martyr who has sacrificed his life
To his last scream, to his mother’s tears
To the moment he died, to his ripped heart,
To you, you martyr lying in your own blood
We swear that to our last breath, we will continue your path[65]
This song is all about death. It is glorifying death, idealizing the one who has already died and encourages everybody else to follow his path to their death. It is not talking about a good day which will come when we are all free, it talks instead about a day when we will die for the cause, because that is what we should do! A few lines down it says:
To our fellow warriors, who are suffering but are faithful.
To our fellow warriors who are tired but brave and are willing to sacrifice their lives,
We swear that we shall continue your path[66]
Here, clearly dying for the cause, for an ideology, is perceived as the right thing to do. In comparison, Baraye is all about life. It is not encouraging anyone to fight to the death, seek martyrdom, or even fight at all physically. It is not idealizing and glorifying death or any type of physical violence. It is about life and, as it says on line 6, it is about “longing to have an ordinary life.” Baraye is not about any ideology other than life itself and even freedom which is mentioned multiple times in this song is a very tangible kind of freedom, not an abstract one. It is the freedom to dance, freedom to kiss your lover in public, freedom to make personal choices away from government interference. It is clearly reflecting the movement that started as a backlash against mandatory hijab. People want to be free to wear what they want to wear, to have bodily autonomy and to choose their own way of life. By citing specific, and yet common, problems that Iranians face in today’s Iran, this song has effectively captured the collective trauma that the Iranian nation is suffering.
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Malekzadeh, Shervin. “’Death to America’ Day: How Iran Trained Its Young to Protest.” Time, 4, Nov. 2009. https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1934584,00.html
Marples, Megan. “Rare Triplet Asiatic Cheetah Cubs Mark an Important First for the Species.” CNN, 11, May. 2022. www.cnn.com/2022/05/11/world/asiatic-cheetah-cubs-born-in-captivity-scn/index.html
Rogg, Inga. “Who Was Mahsa Amini, the Woman Whose Death Sparked Recent Protests in Iran?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29, Sept. 2022. http://www.nzz.ch/english/who-was-mahsa-amini-the-face-of-mass-protests-in-iran-ld.1704917
Sinaee, Maryam. “New Bill Aims To Ban Dogs As Pets In Homes And Streets In Iran.” Iran International, 21, Nov. 2021. www.iranintl.com/en/20211121244024
Wright, Robin. “Iran’s Protests Are the First Counter-Revolution Led by Women.” The New Yorker, 9 Oct. 2022. http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/irans-protests-are-the-first-counterrevolution-led-by-women
Zarghami, Mohammad and Golnaz Esfandiari “Iranians Protest State’s Brutal Killing Of Stray Dogs.” Radio Free Europe, 20, Aug. 2019. www.rferl.org/a/iran-dogs-killing-strays/30119463.html
“Agha Tehrani: Why Did We Have a Revolution?”Asr-e-Iran, 27, Jun. 2014. www.asriran.com/fa/news/342794
“Air quality in Iran.” IQAir, 5, Dec. 2022. www.iqair.com/iran
“Iran” Consortium for Street Children, Nov.2020. www.streetchildren.org/legal-atlas/map/iran/
“Iranian Singer Accused Of Spreading Anti-Government Propaganda” Radio Free Europe, 11, Oct. 2022. www.rferl.org/a/iran-singer-hajipour-charged/32075550.html
“Iran to Close Schools in Tehran Over of High Air Pollution” U.S. News, 22,Nov. 2022. www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2022-11-22/iran-to-close-schools-in-tehran-over-of-high-air-pollution
“Iran Plans to Make Diesel Standards Mandatory.” Financial Tribune, 6, Jan. 2018. https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/79404/iran-plans-to-make-diesel-standards-mandatory
“Iran Sentences Eight Environmental Activists On Charges Of Spying For U.S.” Radio Free Europe, 18, Feb.2020. www.rferl.org/a/iran-sentences-eight-environmental-activists-for-allegedly-spying-for-u-s-/30441439.html
“Iranian Dissident Spared Death Sentence.” Aljazeera, 20, July.2004. www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/7/20/iranian-dissident-spared-death-sentence
“I Risked Everything to Dance in Iran” BBC News, 11, July, 2018. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44777677
“Khamenei Doctor Sought to Forge Mahsa Amini’s Records” Iran International, 25 Sept.2022. www.iranintl.com/en/202209256799
“No cheetah on Iran Kit in 2022 World Cup.” Tehran Times, 9, Nov. 2022. www.tehrantimes.com/news/478495/No-cheetah-on-Iran-kit-in-2022-World-Cup
“Poverty Rate in Iran ‘Doubled’ in Three Years” Iran wire, 2, Nov. 2021. https://iranwire.com/en/features/70683/
“Poverty runs rampant in Iran due to state mismanagement and corruption” Iran HRM, 17, Oct.2021. https://iran-hrm.com/2021/10/17/poverty-iran-rampant-due-to-state-corruption
“Refugees in Iran.” UNHCR, 5, Dec. 2022. https://www.unhcr.org/ir/refugees-in-iran/
“The death toll from the collapse of an Iranian building two weeks ago has risen to 41 after three more bodies were found, local authorities said Monday.” France24, 6, Jun. 2022. www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220606-death-toll-from-iran-building-collapse-rises-to-41
“Tehran’s Disappearing Trees.” Guardian, 9, Oct. 2013. www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/gallery/2013/oct/09/iran-tehran-chenar-trees-vali-asr
“This Year’s Grammys Will Recognize a New Merit Award” Morning Edition. NPR, 7 Nov. 2022. www.npr.org/2022/11/07/1134513941/this-years-grammys-will-recognize-a-new-category-best-song-for-social-change
“Vali-e Asr Street” UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 5, Jan. 2022. https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/6387/
Tweets
Reza Shoohani@Rezashoohani. “برای قیمت گذاری دستوری, برای دخالت دولت تو اقتصاد, برای کسشعر اقتصاد اسلامی،اقتصاد مقاومتی” Twitter, Sep 24, 2022. https://twitter.com/rezashoohani/status/1573789286704480263?s=20&t=C3uRP0VTSWBkb_m1OF8PPQ
Hesam.eth “ برای تمامی شعارهای مرگ بر که دانشآموزان رو مجبور کردید بدن و تهش با گلوله ساچمهای و جنگی به سرکوب همون “ بچهها دست زدید. Twitter, Sep 27, 2022.https://mobile.twitter.com/TheDemoVersion/status/1574715761792208896
ایران@amihs_es. “برای تغییر مغز های پوسیده.” Twitter, Sep 24, 2022, https://mobile.twitter.com/amihs_es/status/1573595534916558849
Video
مناظره کامل غلامحسین کرباسچی و عبدالله گنجی و کوشکی شبکه خبر, YouTube, Uploaded by Heshi TV, 23, Sept. 2022. https://youtu.be/QVBTs2VMNDM
Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
1979 Iranian Revolution Anthem: “To the Tulip in the Dormant Blood”, YouTube, Uploaded by
AntiPhariseesMelissa, 6, Dec.2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpQg6MFBNDM
Notes
[1] Omid Khazani and Sarah Parvini. “How ‘Baraye,’ A Song About Iran’s Protests, Became an Anthem For Women, Freedom And An Ordinary Life.” Los Angeles Times, 12 Oct. 2022. www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-10-12/la-fg-how-baraye-a-song-about-irans-protests-became-an-anthem
[2]“This Year’s Grammys Will Recognize a New Merit Award” Morning Edition. NPR, 7 Nov. 2022. www.npr.org/2022/11/07/1134513941/this-years-grammys-will-recognize-a-new-category-best-song-for-social-change
[3] The Rock band Coldplay covering this song, with the Iranian actress Golshifteh Farahani as the singer, is likely the most famous case of an internationally recognized artist covering this song. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJb3uc1D1D8
[4] Nahid Siamdoust, “Why Is Iran’s Regime So Afraid of This Song?” Foreign Policy, OCTOBER 26, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/26/baraye-music-threatens-iran-regime/
[5] Alistair Bunkall. “Mahsa Amini Was ‘Tortured and Insulted’ Before Death in Police Custody in Iran” Sky news, 26 Sept. 2022. https://news.sky.com/story/mahsa-amini-was-tortured-and-insulted-before-she-died-in-police-custody-in-iran-her-cousin-says-12705226
[6] Inga Rogg. “Who Was Mahsa Amini, the Woman Whose Death Sparked Recent Protests in Iran?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29, Sept. 2022.www.nzz.ch/english/who-was-mahsa-amini-the-face-of-mass-protests-in-iran-ld.1704917
[7] Gasht-e-ershad in Persian
[8] “Exclusive: Khamenei Doctor Sought to Forge Mahsa Amini’s Records” Iran International, 25 Sept.2022. www.iranintl.com/en/202209256799
[9] Bunkall, 2002.
[10] Rhoda Kwan and Bianca Britton. “Protests Spread in Iran After Woman Dies in Custody of Morality Police.” NBC News, 20,Sept. 2022. www.nbcnews.com/news/world/protests-iran-mahsa-amini-woman-dies-morality-police-custody-rcna46807
[11] “Iranian Singer Accused Of Spreading Anti-Government Propaganda” Radio Free Europe, 11, Oct. 2022. www.rferl.org/a/iran-singer-hajipour-charged/32075550.html
[12] Amidi, Feranak. “Hashtags, a Viral Song and Memes Empower Iran’s Protesters” BBC News, 2, Nov. 2022. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63456599
[13] Ibid
[14] This line is perhaps prophetic for the recent jailing of a couple in Iran for the “crime” of dancing in the street. Matteo Bubalo and Khosrow Kalbasi Isfahani, “Iran dancing couple given 10-year jail sentence, “ BBC News, 31 January 2023: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64470506.
[15] Bajoghli, Narges. “’Woman, Life, Freedom’ Iran’s Protests are a Rebellion for Bodily Autonomu” Vanity fair, 29, Sept. 2022. www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/09/mahsa-amini-irans-protests-rebellion-bodily-autonomy
[16] “I Risked Everything to Dance in Iran” BBC News, 11, July, 2018. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44777677
[17]Cohen, Dudi. “Iran Forbids Public Displays of Affection” Ynet News, 22, Oct. 2007. www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3462586,00.html
[18] Narges Bajoghli, “Women, Life, Freedom” 20 Sept. 2022 (see note 14).
[19] Soon after Mahsa Amini’s death the former mayor of Tehran and a member of reformist party, Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, appeared in a TV discussion centered around Amini’s death. While Karbaschi tried to argue pragmatically about the problems of having a morality police patrolling the streets and stressed that the majority of Iranian, male and female, are against the existence of such an institution, the other guest, Sadeq Kooshki, simply rejected his argument by saying that God has decided about this issue, Hijab, and it is God’s law which is being enforced!
مناظره کامل غلامحسین کرباسچی و عبدالله گنجی و کوشکی شبکه خبر, YouTube, Uploaded by Heshi TV, 23, Sept. 2022. https://youtu.be/QVBTs2VMNDM
[20] ایران@amihs_es. “برای تغییر مغز های پوسیده.” Twitter, Sep 24, 2022, https://mobile.twitter.com/amihs_es/status/1573595534916558849
[21] The original tweet is not available anymore, but it appears on the 0:30 of Baraye video on YouTube. Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
[22]“Poverty Rate in Iran ‘Doubled’ in Three Years” Iran wire, 2, Nov. 2021. https://iranwire.com/en/features/70683/
[23] “Poverty runs rampant in Iran due to state mismanagement and corruption” Iran HRM, 17, Oct.2021. https://iran-hrm.com/2021/10/17/poverty-iran-rampant-due-to-state-corruption
[24] Ghajar, Aida. “The Unseen Tragedy of Iran’s Scavenger Children” Iran wire, 13, July. 2022. http://iranwire.com/en/economy/105664-the-unseen-tragedy-of-irans-scavenger-children/
[25] Reza Shoohani@Rezashoohani. “برای قیمت گذاری دستوری, برای دخالت دولت تو اقتصاد, برای کسشعر اقتصاد اسلامی،اقتصاد مقاومتی” Twitter, Sep 24, 2022. https://twitter.com/rezashoohani/status/1573789286704480263?s=20&t=C3uRP0VTSWBkb_m1OF8PPQ
[26] “Iran to Close Schools in Tehran Over of High Air Pollution” U.S. News, 22,Nov. 2022. www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2022-11-22/iran-to-close-schools-in-tehran-over-of-high-air-pollution
[27] “Air quality in Iran.” IQAir, 5, Dec. 2022. www.iqair.com/iran
[28] “Iran Plans to Make Diesel Standards Mandatory.” Financial Tribune, 6, Jan. 2018. https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/79404/iran-plans-to-make-diesel-standards-mandatory
[29] “Vali-e Asr Street” UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 5, Jan. 2022. https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/6387/
[30]“Tehran’s Disappearing Trees.” Guardian, 9, Oct. 2013. www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/gallery/2013/oct/09/iran-tehran-chenar-trees-vali-asr
[31] Marples, Megan. “Rare Triplet Asiatic Cheetah Cubs Mark an Important First for the Species.” CNN, 11, May. 2022. www.cnn.com/2022/05/11/world/asiatic-cheetah-cubs-born-in-captivity-scn/index.html
[32] ibid
[33] “No cheetah on Iran Kit in 2022 World Cup.” Tehran Times, 9, Nov. 2022. www.tehrantimes.com/news/478495/No-cheetah-on-Iran-kit-in-2022-World-Cup
[34] Jaffari, Hamid. “Cruel Shooting and Killing of 1600 Dogs in Iran.” Medium.com, 27, July. 2022. https://medium.com/petness/cruel-shooting-and-killing-of-1600-dogs-in-iran-141fcddf05f6
[35] Zarghami, Mohammad and Golnaz Esfandiari “Iranians Protest State’s Brutal Killing Of Stray Dogs.” Radio Free Europe, 20, Aug. 2019. www.rferl.org/a/iran-dogs-killing-strays/30119463.html
[36] Jaffari, 2022.
[37] Sinaee, Maryam. “New Bill Aims To Ban Dogs As Pets In Homes And Streets In Iran.” Iran International, 21, Nov. 2021. www.iranintl.com/en/20211121244024
[38] Hamedani, Ali. “The country Where Having a Pet Could Soon Land You in Jail.” BBC, 19, July. 2022. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62205744
[39] Ibid
[40] I was unable to find the original tweet, but the screen shot of it appears in 1:01 of Shervin Hajipour’s video. Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
[41] I was unable to find the original tweet, but the screen shot of it appears in 1:03 of Shervin Hajipour’s video. Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
[42] I was unable to find the original tweet, but the screen shot of it appears in 1:07 of Shervin Hajipour’s video. Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
[43] The literal translation of Danesh Amooz is “knowledge learner.”
[44]“Agha Tehrani: Why Did We Have a Revolution?” Asr-e-Iran, 27, Jun. 2014. www.asriran.com/fa/news/342794
[45] A number of environmental experts have also been arrested and sentence to prison on charges of acting against national security. “Iran Sentences Eight Environmental Activists On Charges Of Spying For U.S.” Radio Free Europe, 18, Feb.2020. www.rferl.org/a/iran-sentences-eight-environmental-activists-for-allegedly-spying-for-u-s-/30441439.html
[46] Historian and university professor Hashem Aghajari was originally sentence to death but after a retrial he was sentenced to five years in jail. “Iranian Dissident Spared Death Sentence.” Aljazeera, 20, July.2004. www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/7/20/iranian-dissident-spared-death-sentence
[47] Ibid
[48] Ebadi, Shirin. “Nasrin Sotoudeh” Time, 15, Sept. 2021. https://time.com/collection/100-most-influential-people-2021/6096096/nasrin-sotoudeh/
[49] “Refugees in Iran.” UNHCR, 5, Dec. 2022. https://www.unhcr.org/ir/refugees-in-iran/
[50] “Iran” Consortium for Street Children, Nov.2020. www.streetchildren.org/legal-atlas/map/iran/
[51] Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
[52] Hesam.eth “ برای تمامی شعارهای مرگ بر که دانشآموزان رو مجبور کردید بدن و تهش با گلوله ساچمهای و جنگی به سرکوب همون “ بچهها دست زدید. Twitter, Sep 27, 2022.https://mobile.twitter.com/TheDemoVersion/status/1574715761792208896
[53] Malekzadeh, Shervin. “’Death to America’ Day: How Iran Trained Its Young to Protest.” Time, 4, Nov. 2009. https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1934584,00.html
[54] I was unable to find the original tweet, but the screen shot of it appears in 1:32 of Shervin Hajipour’s video. Shervin Hajipour – Baraye (full version with English lyrics), YouTube, Uploaded by Speedy5310, 5, Oct.2022. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0th9_v-BbUI
[55] “The death toll from the collapse of an Iranian building two weeks ago has risen to 41 after three more bodies were found, local authorities said Monday.” France24, 6, Jun. 2022. www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220606-death-toll-from-iran-building-collapse-rises-to-41
[56] Erdbrink, Thomas. “Iranians Are Outraged Over Shoddy Construction in Earthquake Zone” The New York Times, 15, Nov. 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/middleeast/iran-earthquake-construction-corruption.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
[57] Line 25
[58] Deravian, Naz.“Welcoming Brighter Days on Yalda With Pomegranates” The New York Times, 6 Dec. 2021. www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/dining/yalda-winter-solstice-pomegranate.html
[59] This slogan will be discussed in detail further down.
[60] Hosseinzadeh, Rahman. “Bury This Patriarchal Slogan!” Akhbar-e-Rooz, 5, Nov. 2022. www.akhbar-rooz.com/177849/1401/08/14/
[61] Girls disguising themselves as boys in order to be able to enter the famous Azadi stadium to watch soccer matches was the subject of the movie, Offside, directed by Jafar Panahi.
[62] Carr, Nathan. “Iranian Woman Disguises Herself as a Man to Sneak into Football Match” BBC, 26, May. 2016. www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-36372687
[63] Neven, Brecht and Marlene Schäfers “Jineology: from women’s struggles to social liberation” Roar, 25, Nov.2017. https://roarmag.org/essays/jineology-kurdish-women-movement/
[64] In Revolutionary imagery, tulip is a symbol of martyrdom.
[65] 1979 Iranian Revolution Anthem: “To the Tulip in the Dormant Blood”, YouTube, Uploaded by
AntiPhariseesMelissa, 6, Dec.2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpQg6MFBNDM
[66] Ibid
I’ve been too overwhelmed by Zimbabwe to write much, although I planned to write a travelogue of it. I’ve actually been very bad in writing travelogues, as I find them essentialist, pretentious observations of a visitor on a place they have little familiarity with. Most travelogues, particularly those about the places one visits for the first time, in fact become an exercise in reflecting one’s cultural biases on the new circumstances, or actively – and painstakingly – avoiding doing so.
Having said all this, here is a quick recap. We arrived here after a few days in South Africa. We spent those few days at a Safari lodge & didn’t spend much time in cities (we had been made afraid of Jo’burg enough!). So we used SA (ZA?) mostly as a stopover. The objective was to visit our friends who’ve recently moved for work reasons to Zimbabwe.
So from the beginning, our exposure to Zim (popular nickname, more prevalent among the White Zimbabweans) was from within a sort of bubble. Our friends are worldly, culturally sensitive, & environmentally conscious (naturally!), but still, we have been in a bubble. A USD spending, best-restaurant-in-Harare dining, pool-side wine sipping “global elite” who can afford to ignore the inconveniences of 4-hours a day electric by using generators & solar batteries. We are living the high-life. Not the highest-life though, as gigantic estates, expensive cars, luxurious golf clubs, and “it don’ matter if you’re Black or White” local elite, wearing Gucci & sucking on Dubai-inspired shisha, make it obvious.
What we’ve seen has been a mixture of the global diaspora (businessmen, Aid workers, diplos, lost souls), local elite, White Africans (some who fought other Whites to bring freedom & are local heroes), and odd foreigners from all around finding this a last frontier. There is a feeling that everything is possible, and it truly seems to be the case, for those who have the guts – & the stomach – for it.
But we have also “seen” – passed by, chatted, bought wooden animal carvings from – the locals. Poor, anxious, round-eyed, but extremely decent & honourable locals. The integrity of the people is humbling, and their sharp minds, and almost unbelievably quick wit. No one begs you in the bazaar (two begging boys were odd & gave up after one “no”) & the man with torn up pants & no shoes offering hand carved statues treats his work like an artist.
Talking & joking is quite easy. We visited the city centre (the “CBD”) once, and it looks very American. It could be a city centre of any American city in a poorer state (it reminded me of Louisville, KN), except the pothole-ful roads. Driving is a bit of a challenge, although everyone is very courteous & no one speeds or gets mad. In general, the Shona people seem averse to getting angry: haven’t seen anyone shouting & everyone is smiling wide. Everyone speaks English, sometimes too perfectly, so no communication, comment, joke, or snark is lost on people. People are remarkably happy, despite all sorts of basic infrastructural problems and obvious poverty. The local money is nonexistent and dollar reigns supreme. The roadside fruits and car parts market (!) had people trading in Zimbabwean dollars (only one of the three or four local real and virtual currencies), but I had to ask at the local chic supermarket to be given the change for USD 1$ in local money (176 Z$ for which I was casually given 180…).
Enough of people perhaps, because nature is the wonder here. Harare is like a big botanical garden, from the odd South American jacaranda lined trees to Acacias and palms and banana trees (oh the bananas!) to roses and waterlilies. Come to think of it, writing about the nature requires another blog. So I will do that later. For now, wow!
In most works of modern scholarship concerned with the Sasanian-Byzantine relations in the 6th & 7th centuries, the issue of “tributes” is treated as hyperbole. Basically, claims by the Sasanians, reflected in later narratives like al-Tabari or Shahnama, that the Byzantines paid tributes to the Sasanians are dismissed as exaggerations and “about face” statements, almost the way the Chinese empires claimed to have extracted tribute from everyone! The actual instances of payment, available in abundance in Byzantine sources (Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite, Procopius, Malalas, John of Epiphania, and Menander Protector) are usually considered to be payments either for the mutual defense of both empires on the Caucasus front (the so-called Alan Gate or the Caspian Gate), or as temporary pay offs to keep Sasanians at bay. This second mode contributes to the image of the Sasanians as a predatory entity on the periphery of the Roman world, barely any more sophisticated than pirates and brigands, that needed to be “appeased” and controlled. The persistence of this attitude, often taking Byzantine sources and their use of “Barbarians” for the Sasanians at face value, also signals a certain Eurocentrism/Roman-centrism prevalent in many studies of the ancient world.
The basic assumption behind this is that the sophistication of the Roman/Byzantine administration, including their war-machine, is indisputable and beyond doubt. It is taken for granted that the Roman state undertook all its actions with an eye toward proper strategic approach. In contrast, Roman opponents, be it Germanic tribes beyond the Danube or the Sasanian Empire, were but disorganised polities only few stages removed from raiding parties, with essentially a predatory style of warfare aimed at extracting resources from the Roman state. In this way, the continued references to Roman payments, even on regular, annual basis as mentioned in accounts of Procopius, Menander, or Evagrius, are treated as temporary payments to appease the Sasanians, not regular tributes that created a particular type of relationship between the two empires. This contributes to our lack of attention to the structure of the Sasanian state and the persistent assumption of its simplicity, extending from its administration and military to its economic and social policies – the latter being treated as essentially non-existent, or at most, haphazard in nature and practice.
This is why one sometimes finds references to Roman raiding, in a demonstrably predatory manner, so fascinating. Byzantine sources naturally attempt to present these as part of a larger strategy, something that modern scholars (I don’t want to name names, but just any modern edition of a Primary source) are happy to follow and oblige. But quite often, the fact that these actions are not directed by a greater strategy and are simply actions of greedy regional actors becomes too obvious to ignore. What would then happen if we view these actions through not the view point of imperial decisions makers in Constantinople or Ctesiphon, but from the vantage point of local actors in the frontier zone?
Consider the account of the Byzantine campaign of 573. The event is labelled by many Byzantine scholars as the “failure of the Byzantines to take Nisbis,” betraying an assumption that the events were centrally planned and directed and part of a larger strategy. But the event, given by all sources (Evagrius, Theophylact Simocatta, etc) is very clearly a haphazard, and ill conceived, raid! The story goes that Marcian, appointed by Justin as commander to Dara, basically attacks Nisbis willy nilly, without even having surveyed the field. Initially, his troops go out to take captives and pillage and return to Dara (Chr. 1234, 65). The attack then alarms the Marzban of Nisbis (26 km from Dara) who manages to drive the Byzantine troops back to Dara, presumably through negotiation but without any payments, which shows the former’s position vis-a-vis Marcian and Dara. The subsequent Byzantine raid against Nisibis is so badly done that “the Persians did not think it necessary to close the gates and mocked the Roman army quite disgracefully” for having worked themselves into an embarrassing situation. The result is so humiliating that Marcian is relieved of his post by Justin who sends Acacius Archelaus with an order to replace Marcian while the former is still in the enemy territory!
Of course, the entire thing ends up in a disaster. The unprovoked raid and invasion attempt seems to have annoyed Khosrow I so much that he launches a counterattack. Initially he seems to have crossed the Euphrates at Circesium and threatened Apamean (John Epiph. 4), but quickly turned his attention to Dara itself. He seems to have quite easily captured the fortress, a bone of contention between the two empires since 502, and removed it as a threat to his territories, while extracting 200 centenaria of gold. Khosrow then wonders “God will seek from you all the blood which has been shed; when you possessed all this gold, why did you not give one hundredth of it to me, and I would have left you?”! The loss of Dara of course famously drove Justin to madness and in fact ended his rule.
So, an ill advised raid, undertaken by an inexperienced general, results in the loss of an important frontier fortress for the Byzantines in 573. This loss strengthens the Sasanian position on the NW frontier and probably serves as an indication of the weakness of the Byzantine forces in the region. This is what is eventually exploited by the Sasanians in a large scale invasion of the Byzantine east in the seventh century and the loss of Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt to the combined forces of Khosrow II.
Modern remains of Dara
Years ago, in 2003, when I was an MSc student at the LSE doing global history, I wrote a Persian article about issues of identity in modern Iran. There I argued that the increasing association of the identity marker of “Persian” with the nation-state identity of Iranian, influenced by a certain late Qajar/Early Pahlavi reading of ancient history, is one of the leading causes of the ethnic disenfranchisement and conflicts we witness today in Iran. This article was badly misunderstood (I was young and did not have the words) and misused (several websites cut it down to half its size, took the footnotes out, and published the parts they thought helps their cause). I decided that instead of trying to remove the article from all those website, I am going to put a PDF only version of it on my website, so people can read and judge it themselves. I still agree with a great part of it, but there are parts that I would completely redo and rewrite. I will do this in English if I were doing it now, but let it be as it is. So, here it is, for the posterity!
Here are a couple of new maps I made. As usual, they are free to use for not-for-profit use, but for anything else, including physical printing, you’d need to email me at khodadad-at-ucla-dot-edu and ask for written permission!
A new article on the Kingdom of Hormuz, the medieval state that dominated the trade in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman region between the 11th-17th century, is now added. Check it out (improvements, incl. maps, following).
I just uploaded the first episode of a special short-series on the Fall of the Sasanian Empire. This episode is in Persian because I feel like this is a conversation that needs to happen in the Persephone world. I might repeat it in English too. But for now, here is a link for direct download. […]
مستزاد مجلس چهارم، شعری است از محمدرضا میرزاده عشقی، شاعر معروف دوره مشروطه، که نمایندگان دوره چهارم مجلس شورای ملی (تیر 1300 تا خرداد 1302) و اولین مجلس بعد از کودتای اسفند 1299، را هجو می کند. چون مستزاد شامل اطلاعات و ارجاعات تاریخی جالبی است، در اینجا آن را با نوشته ها و توضیحاتی […]
Nasserreddin Shah (or Nasser al-Din Shah), the fourth king of the Qajar dynasty, ruled Iran for almost all of the second half of the 19th century (1848-1896). Both his life, and his death as the result of an assassination, were dramatic episodes in Iranian history. History has judged him unkindly for the most part, although […]
So, In my quest for making maps of late antique West and Central Asia which are surprisingly not available already, I have created a few that I am posting here. Hopefully they will be useful. Please make sure that you credit me if you use these maps and email me if you need high resolution […]
آشنایی بسیاری از ما، بخصوص شهروندان کشور ایران امروز، با تاریخ ایران شرقی قبل از اسلام بسیار کم و برمبنای ملغمه ای از داستان های شاهنامه ای، تاریخ نگاری عامه پسندانه، و تلاش های تاریخ دوستان غیرحرفه ای برای ارتباط «داستان»ها با «تاریخ» است. شاید شناخته شده ترین این تلاش ها، سعی در شناسایی «تورانیان» […]
I am blogging from an airplane, on my phone’s blogging app. Isn’t technology wonde… I mean awful! This is also the day that the British Parliament, after two years of dragging the world around so to figure out how they can best preserve their privileges and pretend they still have an empire, tell is that […]
In the story of Ardashir’s conquest of Pārs/Persis, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty starts his career from Darabgird. Al-Tabari mentions that Ardashir reached the position of the Argbed of Darabgird following the death of his mentor, Tiri, a eunuch who was appointed by Gozihr[1] the Bazrangid as the Argbed of Darabgird. Although the rest […]
For many years I had a weblog, mostly in Persian, where I wrote my random thoughts, notes, and just observations. It has mostly disappeared from the face of the web, and this is my attempt at recreating it. I will try to post regularly, in Persian and English and get back to the habit of […]