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In 2013, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations published a report titled Edible Insects: Future Prospects of Insects as Food and Feed.1 Despite being downloaded over seven million times and receiving widespread publicity, the report did not generate much controversy. This was likely because the consumption of insects was seen as an unfamiliar practice associated with developing countries in the tropics, and the idea of incorporating bugs into Western diets was just not taken seriously. However, that perception has been changing recently. Several edible insect products have been declared safe by international and national food safety organizations in Western countries. In response, critical coverage has emerged on social media, claiming that edible insects pose a threat to public health and even to national identities.
Here are a few examples of how some politicians and journalists reacted to the legalization of insects as food:
- A senator from the Republican party in France warned the Senate on January 25, 2024 that French people would be led to “eat insects without their knowledge.”2
- The Hungarian agriculture minister warned that “traditional eating habits may be in danger.”2
- A former interior minister and leader of the ABV party in Bulgaria described allowing insects in food as a “crime against Europe” and claimed it showed a “readiness to kill our European children.”2
- In 2023, the Italian agricultural minister said of the use of edible insects to make traditional dishes such as pasta and pizza, “it’s fundamental that these flours are not confused with food made in Italy.”3
- In the Netherlands in 2023, a member of parliament posted on social media that “we will not eat the bugs,” while seen pouring mealworms from a bag onto the ground.4
- In the UK, a news article read, “Regulations are imposed (not debated) by the European Commission. In this case, the powdered bug was imposed into the food chain of around half a billion people without debate.”5
- In the U.S., a newspaper article warned, “Biden admin shells out taxpayer dollars on getting Americans to eat trash-fed bugs.”6
This aversion has been connected to conspiratorial claims about a shadowy global elite that aims to control the world’s population. The World Economic Forum (Davos) has been singled out, with claims that elites such as heads of state and business leaders want people to eat bugs instead of meat to combat food insecurity.7
The main narratives surrounding these claims include:
- The European Union is forcing its citizens to eat insects against their will.
- Insects are poisonous.
- Insect-derived ingredients are added to food because of the dramatic consequences of sanctions imposed on Russia in light of the war in Ukraine.8
Is there any truth to such allegations? These claims are largely false. Since 2021, several insect products have been approved in the European Union as safe for human consumption,9 but there is no mandate forcing citizens to eat them. The safety of these products is ensured through rigorous testing by food safety organizations. Additionally, the move towards including insects in the food supply is motivated by concerns about sustainability and food security, rather than by sanctions against Russia. So, why is there such significant resistance to eating insects?
Why are we reluctant to accept insects as food?The numerous statements by politicians and journalists quoted above, and similar sentiments shared by the public, are primarily rooted10 in two underlying reasons:
- Food Neophobia: The reluctance to eat (or the avoidance of) new foods.
- Disgust: The instinctual avoidance of food considered potentially to cause death or disease and because “creepy-crawly” things are, well, disgusting.
Although these are closely related, disgust is the more significant barrier to acceptance of insect consumption. Food neophobia can be mitigated with information about the food item’s nutritional value, safety, and sustainability. Disgust is harder to overcome as it is based on emotion rather than rationality.11 A related reason why insects are not commonly eaten in the Western world is their association with dirt, death, disease, and contamination.
Food Safety and Nutritional ValueThe assumption by Westerners that insects cannot be eaten and are merely survival food in tropical countries is more of a bias than a fact. In tropical regions, over 1,500 insect species are consumed because the local population considers them nutritious, tasty, and easy to procure, rather than solely due to low living standards. In North America and Europe, insects have not been a customary food item primarily because they are not available in sufficient quantities to be considered food. In contrast, in tropical regions, larger insects are available year-round and can be easily harvested due to their tendency to occur in clumped distributions. Insects do occasionally appear in large numbers in temperate zones—for example, in the U.S., the 2024 simultaneous emergence of 13- and 17-year cycle cicadas, which happens only once every 221 years, sparked interest in using them as food.12 Historically, until the mid-1900s insects such as cockchafers were both a common pest and a delicacy in France and Germany.13
To make edible insects available in Western markets, they need to be reared under controlled conditions on farms. For human consumption, species such as mealworms, crickets, and locusts are used, while fly species such as the black soldier fly are used for animal feed because they can be reared on various organic side streams. And there’s an additional benefit: with 30 percent of food and agricultural produce going to waste,14 using these fly species could contribute to a self-sustaining economy. The market for edible insects as animal feed is expected to grow from about $7 billion in 2023 to $116 billion by 2033.15 This growth is being driven by the increasing prices for conventional feed ingredients such as fishmeal and soybean meal, whose sustainability is in question.16 Most insect-based ingredients are used as feed for animals (pets, fish, chickens, and pigs), while insects for human consumption remain a niche market, expected to grow from $650 million in 2023 to over $1 billion by 2033.17
Conspiracy TheoriesConspiracy theories often highlight the perceived food safety risks associated with consuming insects. The European Union requires that any insect intended for food first must be screened by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). This rigorous process takes considerable time and thoroughly evaluates all aspects of food safety. While several insect products have been approved, they carry a warning regarding allergies. Individuals allergic to seafood or house dust mites should be cautious due to potential cross-reactivity, as these groups are taxonomically similar to insects. Consequently, this risk must be shown on the product label, along with a clear statement that the product contains insects.
Conspiracy theories also mention the alleged danger of consuming chitin, the material composing the exoskeleton of insects. Chitin can be present in food products containing whole insects, as the processing methods—decontamination, drying, and grinding—do not remove it. However, when insect protein (meal) is used, it is often separated from fats and chitin. Even when chitin is present, it is unlikely to be harmful and may even offer health benefits.18, 19 Insect products are rich in antioxidants and essential minerals such as zinc and iron, which are often deficient in large segments of the human population, and can cause conditions such as anemia.
It is challenging to provide general numbers regarding nutritional value of insects, because they depend on various factors such as the insects’ diet and other biotic and abiotic elements. However, insect products are generally as nutritious as, or even more nutritious than, meat products.20
Are insects the future of food?There are many misconceptions about the use of edible insects, often reinforced by negative associations. Insects provide crucial ecosystem services, such as pollination, valued at over 150 billion U.S. dollars—10 percent of the value of global agricultural production for human consumption.21 Additionally, insects play important roles as decomposers and in the biocontrol of agricultural pests. Many bird species, including chickens, as well as various fish species, naturally consume insects. Non-human primates also eat insects, as do hundreds of millions of people worldwide in tropical regions.22
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.3
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The publication of the 2013 edition of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Statistical Yearbook triggered enormous publicity by highlighting the environmental benefits, nutritional value, and safety of using insects as food and feed. This coincided with increasing awareness that changes in our food habits were necessary. Eighty percent of all agricultural land worldwide is used to produce dairy and meat products.23 It is estimated that this land area will not be enough to satisfy the increasing demand for these products due to the growing world population and improving living standards. Additionally, the environmental impact of meat and dairy production is substantial, accounting for about 15 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions and almost two-thirds of all ammonia emissions.24 Water and land use requirements are also very high. Farming edible insects is environmentally better on all fronts, while their nutritional values are similar to those of conventional meats.25
The idea of eating insects is gradually gaining traction in Western countries. Strategies such as targeting more adventurous eaters, incorporating insect ingredients into familiar products, and providing information about food safety, nutrition, and sustainability may help shift public perception and gradually convince more people that insects deserve a place on the menu.26
Resistance to this new food is not unexpected, given that insects have never been considered a regular food ingredient in the West. But if insect products are proven to be safe, nutritious, tasty, and more sustainable than meat, perhaps we should reconsider our food habits?
About the AuthorArnold van Huis is a Professor Emeritus of Tropical Entomology at Wageningen University & Research in the Netherlands. From 1974 to 1979, he worked for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Nicaragua. He is the author of over 300 scientific papers and co-author of The Insect Cookbook: Food for a Sustainable Planet (Columbia University Press). In 2014, together with FAO, he organized the first conference, Insects to Feed the World, attended by 450 participants from 45 countries. He is the chief editor of the Journal of Insects as Food and Feed.
References1. https://bit.ly/3zApUov 2. https://bit.ly/3LjQN2J 3. https://bit.ly/3WchjkG 4. https://bit.ly/3zyYu2x 5. https://bit.ly/3RZyLXi 6. https://bit.ly/4eY2Hg4 7. https://bit.ly/3LeJ1XV 8. https://bit.ly/4bJsvdm 9. https://bit.ly/4bDau0f 10. https://bit.ly/4eTWfXC 11. https://bit.ly/3RVKvtR 12. https://bit.ly/3xRpI3S 13. https://is.gd/g8DxY7 14. https://is.gd/242sgQ 15. https://is.gd/umZWVz 16. https://is.gd/P6uLeZ 17. https://is.gd/Xbe2oq 18. https://is.gd/I26KSg 19. https://is.gd/B5fnKU 20. https://is.gd/cvOHhe 21. https://is.gd/BP3xpt 22. https://is.gd/cbnDRq 23. https://is.gd/xUitAW 24. https://is.gd/soBRe7 25. https://is.gd/7qQbDj 26. https://is.gd/PdqffL
David Lusseau always wanted to be a biologist. “Well, either biologist or clown,” he adds, “but I realized there was not much money in clowning.” When Marie the dolphin entered Lusseau’s life, she sealed the deal for him becoming a biologist. A bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) who swam in the waters near the village of Cerbère on the border between France and Spain in the late 1980s, Marie set seventeen-year-old Lusseau on a path that would one day lead him to study social networks in her species. “When you look in the eyes of a dolphin, you realize there is a lot going on,” Lusseau says, reminiscing on his time with his cetacean friend. “It is something that is very hard to express or grasp or explain in a factual matter, but spending time with [Marie] got me interested in … trying to understand how dolphins work, [in what] I perceived as another intelligent species on the planet.”
As an undergraduate, Lusseau spent time as a research assistant working with a group studying bottlenose dolphins in Florida. When out in the water, he encountered dolphins swimming on their own or in pairs. On occasion he bumped into a trio, but dolphins always seemed to be doing their own thing, just in the company of one or two others. That view of dolphin sociality, or the lack of it, changed dramatically when Lusseau began his PhD research in the late 1990s at the University of Otago in New Zealand. His dissertation focused on conservation biology in bottlenose dolphins in a fjord called Doubtful Sound, but the social behavior of the dolphins there hit him like a ton of bricks. As soon as he got there, he encountered not lone dolphins, duos, or trios, but groups of thirty or more dolphins schooling and moving about in a coordinated manner. These were very different animals from the solo dolphins and very small dolphin groups he had studied in Florida.
Each day Lusseau rose at 4 a.m., grabbed some breakfast, swatted away an endless barrage of midges, and arrived at Doubtful Sound before the sun rose. He’d board a 14-foot boat, locate a group of dolphins, and do focal animal sampling, cycling through dolphins, each recognizable by natural markings on their dorsal fins, often from shark attacks. Doubtful Sound can be stunningly beautiful, but it is at a latitude called the “roaring forties” because of the strong winds from the west and six- to eight-foot waves at times, which make for rough going when watching dolphins from a boat.
As he spent time with the dolphins, Lusseau began thinking about how to understand their complex social dynamics, but he couldn’t quite figure out the best way to proceed. On one of his stints back at the University of Otago, Lusseau recalls reading a Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences paper on social networks written by physicist Mark Newman and others. Soon after that, he emailed Newman, telling him, “I think you are doing really cool stuff and I can understand it, because you write so well. Would you like to have a look at what we’re doing?” Newman was interested. It wasn’t long before he and Lusseau were coauthoring papers on dolphin social networks. But before they penned any coauthored papers, Lusseau published a 2003 paper in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London that is widely regarded as the first study explicitly on social networks in nonhumans.
Unlike animal social network papers in today’s journals, where readers are acquainted with how networks operate, to put readers in the right frame of mind in 2003, Lusseau opened his Royal Society paper using a strategy that Darwin had employed in On the Origin of Species. The idea was to introduce a phenomenon that readers already knew about (in Darwin’s case artificial selection, as in selection of different breeds of pigeons) and then make the case that what followed (natural selection), though it appeared radical, was really just another variety of what he had just discussed. In Lusseau’s paper, the opening sentences read: “Complex networks that contain many members such as human societies … the World Wide Web (WWW) … or electric power grids … permit all components (or vertices) in the network to be linked by a short chain of intermediate vertices.” And before readers knew it, they were learning about such social networks in dolphins.
Lusseau constructed dolphin networks based on thousands of observations, and one metric he looked at was network diameter, which measures the average shortest path between nodes. To introduce network diameter to readers, Lusseau first discussed psychologist Stanley Milgram’s “small world” research from the late 1960s. “The global human population seems to have a diameter of six,” wrote Milgram, “meaning that any two humans can be linked using five intermediate acquaintances.” The party version of Milgram’s small world is the parlor game “six degrees of Kevin Bacon.” The rules are simple: players choose a movie actor and then connect that actor to another that they played alongside in a film, repeating the process over and over, trying to link their original actor to movie star Kevin Bacon—who once quipped “he had worked with everybody in Hollywood or someone who’s worked with them”—in no more than six connections. It turns out the dolphin small world in Doubtful Sound is smaller than the human one (including Kevin Bacon’s), both in the size of the network and network diameter, the latter of which is approximately three, meaning any two dolphins in Doubtful Sound can be linked using two intermediate acquaintances.
Lusseau wondered what would happen if the dolphin network was culled by, for example, shark predation. To do this, using the network data he had collected, he built a computer algorithm that simulated predation, reducing the network size 20 percent by randomly removing 20 percent of the dolphins. The small world of the dolphins, it turned out, was unaffected by such a reduction. But if instead of randomly selecting individuals to remove from the network, Lusseau simulated removal of the 20 percent of dolphins who had the greatest number of ties to others, network diameter increased, which had the effect of slowing information transfer within the network.
As he came to know his dolphins better, Lusseau discovered that some individuals in Doubtful Sound give signals that affect group movement associated with finding new resources, including food. Side flopping, in which a dolphin leaps from the water and lands on its side, is seen only in males when they initiate a move to a new location, while upside-downing, in which an individual rolls onto its ventral side and slaps the water to signal an end to a group move, is seen almost exclusively in females. But only a few males do all the side flopping, and only a few females do all the upside-downing. Lusseau wanted to know if a network analysis would shed light on exactly which males and which females. It did. Males initiating and females terminating travel had higher betweenness— they were key hubs in this traveling/foraging network—than their non-signaling counterparts.
In a few populations of bottleneck dolphins on the other side of the planet, in Brazil, signaling and networking is not sometimes about feeding opportunities—they are always about that. And the dolphins have, rather remarkably, added humans to their feeding networks.
For more than three decades, ethologist Paulo Simões-Lopes has been studying dolphin populations in the lagoon systems along the coastline near Laguna, Brazil, about 800 kilometers south of São Paulo. The dolphins in nine populations along that stretch do something that no other dolphins—and almost no other animals, period— do. They not only network with each other, but cooperate with humans to secure more food for both themselves and their primate partner.
Each autumn, a huge mullet migration takes place in southern Brazil. Both the dolphins and the fishermen see the fish as prize prey. Up to fifty fishers, wading waist deep in very cold water, wait for the chance to cast large circular nylon nets called tarrafa over schools of mullet. The problem for the fishers is that the water is murky, and it is next to impossible to see the fish. The problem for the sixty or so dolphins at Laguna is that compared to their other prey, mullet are large and hard to catch. But dolphins aren’t especially troubled by murky water, as they detect mullet using echolocation, a built-in sonar system that would be the envy of most engineers.
Dolphins produce sound waves in their nasal sacs and focus those waves through fatty tissue and fluid in their foreheads. Once the sound waves are shot out into the water, they travel until they bump into an object, at which point they bounce back to the dolphins, who use their lower jaw as a receiver. From the lower jaw, the waves travel to the inner ear and then to the brain. Objects of different sizes and densities reflect back sound waves of different frequencies, and the dolphins use that information to “see” what is in the water around them. When their sonar detects mullet, dolphins signal fishers that the fish are present by curving their backs and then slapping their heads or their tails on the water surface. The fishers then cast their tarrafa and pull in loads of mullet. The confused mullet who escape the tarrafa often swim right into the mouths of waiting dolphins. It’s the perfect win-win situation.
Laguna newspapers from the late 1890s featured articles about this dolphin-human mutualism, and so Simões-Lopes knows that, at the very least, it has been going on for more than 130 years. And though many dolphins don’t signal fishers, every fisher knows which dolphins do. “It is famous [in southern Brazil],” Simões-Lopes says. “I grew up watching those dolphins … I would sit on a rock in the canal and watch for hours. I knew it was unusual … I knew there were dolphins in a big harbor farther south where dolphins and fishermen don’t interact.”
Today Simões-Lopes has a team of ten working with him, but he began on his own in 1988. Soon thereafter, he entered a PhD program and built his dissertation around his research on the dolphin-human foraging mutualism. Each day he brought a folding chair with him and set it up on a rock, watching the dolphins through his binoculars, taking photos—he had compiled a mug book with photos of all the dolphins in the lagoon—and filling notebook after notebook with data on dolphins signaling fishers.
Simões-Lopes began to know the fishers, and they began to know him. He also was starting to get a good feel for which dolphins at Laguna signaled the fishers and which did not. Not surprisingly, the fishers also kept tabs, telling Simões-Lopes about the “good dolphins” (who signaled fishers) and the “bad dolphins” (who did not). The fishers know not only which dolphins signal, but which dolphin will give which signal: “Each dolphin gives the signal in a different way,” one fisher said, “and we need to know [the different signals] in order to catch the fish.” Another fisher was more of a romantic, telling Simões-Lopes and his colleagues, “This is beautiful. It doesn’t happen everywhere.”
The more that Simões-Lopes thought about those “good” dolphins and “bad” dolphins, the more he wanted to understand them better. Years later Mauricio Cantor joined Simões-Lopes’s team; Cantor had worked with Hal Whitehead, a leader in early social network analysis. Simões-Lopes and Cantor decided that a network analysis might help them delve deeper into the between-species cooperation they observed on a daily basis. In 2008, they contacted David Lusseau, who had done the network studies on bottlenose dolphins in New Zealand, and asked if he would be interested in serving as a sort of conceptual consultant specializing in social networks. Lusseau was more than happy to join their team.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.3
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Simões-Lopes and his team assumed dolphins learn how to signal humans from other signalers they associate with, so for their social network analysis, they were especially interested in whether signaling dolphins preferred spending time with other signaling dolphins, both when they were chasing mullet into nets and, just as importantly, when they were not. To test whether there were cliques of signalers and cliques of dolphins who didn’t signal, Simões-Lopes’s team looked at clustering coefficients of sixteen cooperators and nineteen dolphins who did not signal and cooperate with fishers.
What they discovered were three cliques within the larger network of the thirty-five dolphins. Clique 1 had fifteen dolphins: each and every one of them cooperated with the local fishers. Dolphins in this clique associated with one another not just during the autumn mullet fishing season but the rest of the year as well. Clique 2 had a dozen dolphins, none of whom cooperated with fishers, and dolphins in this clique were not as well connected to one another as the individuals were in Clique 1. Clique 3 was made up of eight dolphins: seven never cooperated with fishers, but one—dolphin 20—did. And of all thirty-five dolphins in the network, it was dolphin 20 who spent the most time interacting across cliques, acting as what Simões-Lopes and his colleagues call a “social broker” between the signalers and non-signalers.
This behavior is all wonderfully complex, and we humans—and I don’t just mean the artisanal fishers of Laguna—should be grateful to play a role in understanding it.
Excerpted and adapted by the author from The Well-Connected Animal: Social Networks and the Wondrous Complexity of Animal Societies by Lee Alan Dugatkin, published by The University of Chicago Press. © 2024 by Lee Alan Dugatkin. All rights reserved.
About the AuthorLee Alan Dugatkin is an evolutionary biologist and a historian of science in the Department of Biology at the University of Louisville. He is the author of sixteen books and more than 200 articles in such journals as Nature, The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and The Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Dr. Dugatkin is contributing author to Scientific American, The American Scientist, The New Scientist, and The Washington Post. His latest book is The Well-Connected Animal: Social Networks and the Wondrous Complexity of Animal Societies.
The great auk (Pinguinus impennis) displayed in the Natural History Museum of Denmark stands erect on its pedestal, its great beak jutting forward, apparently fearless. It is possessed of a certain dignity and grace. It demands my attention. It was probably killed off in Iceland, where I come from, and was one of the last of its kind. For thousands of years, these large, flightless birds swam the extensive waters of the North Atlantic and made their nests on islands and skerries, where each pair laid and incubated a single, uniquely patterned egg per year. According to most accounts, the last of the great auks were slaughtered on Eldey, an island off the southwest coast of Iceland, in June 1844. About eighty taxidermic examples of great auks exist in various museum collections, and most of them came from Eldey.
Alongside the great auk displayed in Copenhagen are four large glass jars. One is labeled: Iceland 1844, . These jars contain the viscera of great auks killed on that famous (or infamous) expedition to Eldey. These are not all the birds’ organs; some are stored in another seven jars elsewhere in the museum, out of the public eye, along with another stuffed great auk. At my request, a museum guide takes me to see this second bird. It is posed somewhat differently than the one on display. Its beak is open, as if ready to address the visitor. Unlike the first bird’s stark black-and-white plumage, this one looks grayish and rather dull. I am told it is a true rarity; it is in winter plumage, while most great auks were captured while breeding, in early summer. Perhaps this second bird was caged alive and slaughtered in winter. Perhaps it was kept as a pet for some months, like the great auk owned by the Danish polymath Ole Worm (1588–1654), one of the leading figures of the Nordic Renaissance. Worm personally owned three great auks, one of which he sometimes walked on a leash, and he made a fine drawing of it before adding it—stuffed—to his Wunderkammer, or cabinet of curiosities, a precursor to the modern museum.
In its imposing old building in Copenhagen, only a fraction of the Danish museum’s “curiosities” are on display. In full, the collection comprises millions of animals from around the globe, and boasts exemplars of several species that have become extinct in recent centuries—such as a well-preserved skull of a dodo (Raphus cucullatus)—as well as fossils of dinosaurs and other organisms from previous eras of the earth’s history. Here, in this old and venerable museum, it is easy to detect the ideas that lay behind the collecting of natural objects for the past three and a half centuries. The need was perceived to educate the populace of various European nations, whose empires extended around the world, about the progression of time and about their place in the expanding universe. Such collections demonstrated the might and extent of each empire, and the value of research: all things can be named, catalogued, and categorized systematically.
Is such an approach still valid in our current era, now termed the Anthropocene, or Human Age? In our time, the “natural” habitat of the planet has been radically refashioned by humans. Vital links between species, developed over eons, have been severed swiftly, fundamentally impoverishing the living world and posing a serious threat of the mass extinction of many species. How, I wonder, can such a process possibly be cataloged or categorized, given the speed of change and the complexities involved— and what would be the point?
The bird species that no longer exist had, and still have, a special attraction. They have much to teach us.
ExtinctionI never saw a great auk growing up in Iceland, a land where they had once been quite common. Neither did the nineteenth-century British naturalists John Wolley and Alfred Newton.
Like their contemporaries, Wolley and Newton busily collected birds’ eggs and specimens, classifying and recording them in the fashion of the Victorian age. When they set off for Iceland in 1858, they hoped to visit Eldey Island and study the rare great auk. They hoped to observe its behavior and habits and, perhaps, bring home an egg, or a skin, or a stuffed bird or two for their own cabinets of curiosities—unaware of the fact that the species had already been hunted to extinction. When they left Victorian England for Iceland, they teased that this was a “genuinely awkward expedition.” And so it proved to be, in many ways. They never made it to Eldey. Like me, they never saw a great auk on Iceland, not even a stuffed one.
Prior to the killing of the last great auks, extinction was either seen as an impossibility or trivialized as a “natural” thing. The great taxonomist Carl von Linné, or Linnaeus (1707–78), imagined that a living species could never disappear; for evolutionary theorist Charles Darwin (1809–82), species would naturally come and go in the long history of life. The great auk brought home the fact that a species could perish quite quickly and, moreover, not naturally, but primarily as a result of human activities. No other extinction had been documented as carefully.
During their historic expedition to Iceland in 1858, Wolley and Newton collected impressions of great auk hunting, through substantial interviews with the men who took part in the latest hunts and the women who skinned and mounted the birds, along with their prices and sales on foreign markets to collectors of “curiosities.” These impressions were preserved in the set of five handwritten notebooks Wolley titled the Gare-Fowl Books. Now archived in Cambridge University Library in England, their hundreds of pages are written in several languages (English, Icelandic, Danish, and German). As an anthropologist and an Icelander, once I had seen the Gare-Fowl Books, there was no turning back: I had to dive into the text and visit zoological museums and archives. For me, the great auk opened an intellectual window into ideas of extinction and their relevance to the current mass disappearance of species.
De-extinctionMany sightings of great auks were reported after 1844 on North Atlantic skerries in Iceland (1846, 1870), Greenland (1859 or 1867), Newfoundland (1852, 1853), and northern Norway (1848). Some of the reports were certainly apocryphal: people had mistaken another species for a great auk, or had seen what they wanted to see. Others were deemed credible and were probably true: evidence of a few dispersed pairs of birds continuing to breed on islands or skerries for a few years. Such tales were often unjustly dismissed, and unnecessarily strict standards of proof and corroboration were applied. The consensus among scholars today seems to be that the last living great auk was seen off Newfoundland in 1852.
Once it seemed clear that the last great auks were dead, museums and collectors around the world scrambled to acquire skins, eggs, and bones of the extinct bird. The Victorian obsession with collecting was past its peak, but anything relating to the great auk remained a prize. There are some eighty stuffed great auks in collections around the world, and an unknown number of preserved skins and viscera. Only about twenty-four complete skeletons exist, while thousands of loose bones (some with knife marks) are kept in museum collections. The skeletons do not have the visual appeal of the stuffed birds, mounted to look so lifelike in their full plumage. However, the bones—what Wolley and Newton termed “relics”—tell a long and complex story of their own. And there are about seventy-five great auk eggs believed to be extant today, the vast majority being documented and numbered.
Now and then over the years, various species have been said to reappear suddenly, after having been thought long exterminated. Several birds have been confirmed to be such so-called “Lazarus species,” including the Bermuda petrel (Pterodroma cahow), which scared Spanish explorers away with their eerie calls. Considered extinct for three centuries, it was rediscovered on one of the Bermuda Islands in 1951. Also, the flightless takahē (Porphyrio hochstetter) of New Zealand, which was claimed extinct late in the nineteenth century, reappeared in 1948. In recent years, with intensive searching, social media, and growing awareness of the threat of mass extinction, such reports have escalated. However, the possibility of any surviving great auk “Lazarus” can be ruled out.
Charles Darwin made the point that species swept away by history would not return. They were gone for good. In On the Origin of Species, he wrote: “We can clearly understand why a species when once lost should never reappear, even if the very same conditions of life, organic and inorganic, should recur.” This has long seemed blindingly obvious. No doubt many people have wondered why Darwin saw reason to state it at all. Yet his words were perhaps necessary at the time. The meaning of extinction had not yet been fixed, and Darwin may well have felt it was time to dispel the fantasy regarding the resurrection of species.
Alfred Newton, on the contrary, entertained the idea that extinction processes could be reversed. And in our own time, discussions of the renaissance, even resurrection, of species is taken for granted—as if Bible stories and the natural sciences had coalesced into one, after centuries of enmity and conflict. Will we live to see the resurrection of Pinguinus impennis? Might genetics and cloning do the trick?
In the spring of 2015, a group of like-minded individuals met at the International Centre for Life in Newcastle, England, to discuss the possible reanimation of the great auk. The meeting was attended by more than twenty people, including scientists and others interested in bird conservation. They addressed the principal stages of “de-extinction,” from the sequencing of the full genome of the extinct animal to the successful releasing of a proxy animal population into the wild. They were interested in resurrecting the great auk quite literally, to see it thrive once more, in zoos or even on the skerries and islands of the North Atlantic.
Thomas Gilbert, a geneticist at the University of Copenhagen who has sequenced the great auk genome was one of the scientists who attended. The de-extinction of a species, however, has proved to be a more complicated issue than was originally anticipated—both technically and ethically. Gilbert pointed out that a re-created species can never be exactly like the original, and that the question must be asked: What counts as “near enough”—ninety-five percent, ninety, …? If the element that is lacking, though it may only account for a few percent of the genome, turns out to be crucial, and makes it harder for a re-created species to survive or to reproduce, nothing will have been gained. A re-created great auk that could not swim, for instance, would not be “near enough.” Likewise, a great auk capable of flight might be “way too much.” For most people, whatever the species concept to which they subscribe—and there remains a thriving philosophical debate on that subject—a flying bird would hardly qualify for legitimate member of the great auk species.
Yet a substitute bird that could swim would be welcomed by many, as it might fill in the large gap left by the great auk’s extinction. A substitute species might contribute to the rewilding of the oceans, a task that has barely begun; indeed “the underwater realm has been trailing behind its terrestrial counterparts.” Interestingly, this idea echoes Philip Henry Gosse’s historic aquaria project, reversing the arrows, from land to sea, and operating on a much larger scale. The grand aquarium of the planet’s oceans, including the recently discovered seabirds’ hotspot in the middle of the North Atlantic, or so the idea goes, could be repopulated by relatively large charismatic animals, territorially raised and later released into the oceans, where they would be managed and monitored by human divers. Gosse would be amused.
The expense of such de-extinction is high, however, and it is hard to decide which species should have priority: the mammoth? the dodo? the great auk? or perhaps one of the numerous species of tiny snails that rarely generate human concern? It’s tempting, and productive, to focus on tall birds and charismatic megafauna, but invertebrates such as snails and insects, which make up most of the animal kingdom (perhaps 99 percent), deserve attention too. In the Anthropocene, this age of mass human-caused extinctions, the selection of species is clearly an urgent, but difficult, concern. The re-creation of the great auk assuredly has symbolic significance, not least in light of the attention the species has garnered from both scholars and the public since its demise. The excessive price nowadays of great auk remains is significant too.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.3
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In January 2023, a great auk egg sold for $125,000 at Sotheby’s. But bringing the bird back to life is a gigantic challenge, if not an impossible one. Perhaps the funds that would be spent on the de-extinction of the great auk might be better spent elsewhere. Nor should we overlook the Law of Intended Actions, Unintended Consequences.
• • • • • •
Now that I know the great auk’s long history, I feel as if the stuffed birds in the Copenhagen museum were once my neighbors or acquaintances. As a scientist, I know that their viscera are stored in alcohol to preserve them and to enable people to study them. Still I wonder if the organs are in a constant state of inebriation from the alcohol, existing beyond the bounds of real time, in a sort of euphoric oblivion? Generations of visitors, of all ages and many nationalities, have passed by these jars of preserved bird parts over the past century and a half. What observations did they take home?
The hearts stored in one jar are no longer beating, but no doubt many visitors on my side of the glass have wondered, as I do, how they would have pulsed when the bird’s blood was still flowing—and whether they could be resuscitated, by electric shock or genetic reconstruction. The eyes of the last male great auk are kept in another jar. I see them staring, gazing into both the past and into my own eyes.
This essay was excerpted and adapted by the author from The Last of Its Kind: The Search for the Great Auk and the Discovery of Extinction. Copyright © 2024 by Gísli Pálsson. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.
About the AuthorGísli Pálsson is professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of Iceland. He previously held positions in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Oslo, the Centre for Biomedicine & Society at King’s College, London, and at the Rosenstiel School of Marine, Atmospheric, and Earth Science at the University of Miami. His books include The Last of Its Kind: The Search for the Great Auk and the Discovery of Extinction, Down to Earth, and The Man Who Stole Himself.
A review of Informatica: Mastering Information Through the Ages by Alex Wright (2023) and Knowing What We Know: The Transmission of Knowledge, From Ancient Wisdom to Modern Magic by Simon Winchester (2023)
Can the history of how humans organize knowledge help us understand 21st century information overload? Two readable new books help us address these questions with interdisciplinary narratives: Knowing What We Know: The Transmission of Knowledge: From Ancient Wisdom to Modern Magic by Simon Winchester, and Informatica: Mastering Information Through the Ages by Alex Wright.
To varying degrees and slightly different ways, both books review the history of information technologies as a helpful tool. Both cover the familiar chronology from the clay tablets and papyrus scrolls of ancient times, monks in the Middle Ages copying texts in their scriptoria, the 15th and 19th century technologies that made books cheaper and more common, the development of reference books, and the mid-20th century innovations leading to modern computers and World Wide Web. Both books are also stimulatingly interdisciplinary, discussing many more historical topics than I’ve mentioned above, but also grounded in science and technology. After these similarities, the books diverge.
Cuneiform tablet
Mesopotamia, circa 31 CE
Although Knowing What We Know is rich in history, it is not chronological. It instead progresses from the learning of information (education) to the storing of knowledge (museums, libraries, and encyclopedias), and then to the dissemination of knowledge, concluding in thoughtful discussion of the implication of new technologies, such as the AI-based Large Language Models (LLMs). These topics are corralled by Winchester’s background in journalism, and the grounding of each topic in precise examples.
On education, for example, Winchester contrasts three striking 21st century cases. He vividly recalls the woman he interviewed who started a school in a poverty-stricken village in India. Those students’ joyous thirst for knowledge is contrasted against the high-tension stakes in China, where a single exam taken in students’ teenage years determines their job opportunities for the rest of their lives. Winchester’s third example of education is the most striking—that of an illiterate island group whose oral storytelling tradition saved them, alone, from a tsunami.
Winchester progresses to knowledge summarized in encyclopedias, recalling his own love of them in his youth and summarizes the rise and cessation of the leading print encyclopedia of the 19th and 20th century, Encyclopedia Britannica. How can complex issues about the leading online encyclopedia Wikipedia, with its vast size and reliability, be better illustrated than by Winchester’s own experience late in his research seeing there that a pioneer of internet technology was listed as having died, the correction of which Winchester learned the next morning on social media?
And so it goes: Winchester focuses on a few extraordinary cases to illustrate each of his points. For the preservation of knowledge in museums, it is the remarkable story of the saving of museum treasures in China during political turmoil, and how the Chinese government has viewed this precious collection. Similarly, the rise of mass media is illustrated by the BBC because, Winchester notes, its style was influential in the development of radio news around the world. This flows naturally to the following chapter’s discussion of propaganda, focusing on the chilling example of the Nazis. His penultimate chapter is about polymaths and, finally, wisdom, focusing less on religion than on whether it was wise to drop the atomic bombs in 1945. The book concludes with the implications of ChatGPT and other new technology for our brains.
Winchester has a remarkable ability to turn what could be a dry recitation of facts into a series of compelling stories, with numbered subsections in each chapter. The one time I felt that he could have used a copy editor was during his overly long digression on Krakatoa, the subject of one of his previous books, though he did make even this topic surprisingly relevant. In his hands, such meandering is usually done masterfully.
Like a well-structured novel, all that came before leads Winchester to his conclusion. His fear is that technology, as currently progressing, can hurt our ability to think for ourselves. Characteristically, he illustrates this with a specific example: the complex skill set he stumbled through when his small boat needed to navigate toward land rather than be lost in the ocean in the days prior to GPS. Can people even read maps anymore? In one of the book’s few missed opportunities, he does not draw an extended parallel to the people who (accurately) decried in Gutenberg’s era that if books were mass produced, people’s ability to remember vast amounts of knowledge would decline, which it did (the skill of modern mnemonists, such as the late Harry Lorrayne, notwithstanding).
If Winchester’s book is grounded in concise case studies, Wright’s contributions in Informatica are science and the history of structured systems for organizing knowledge. These merge when Wright discusses the biological classification scheme developed primarily by Carl Linnaeus, including an amusing anecdote involving Thomas Jefferson mailing the decaying body of a moose to acclaimed scientific theorist Comte de Buffon. Although science is mentioned several times in Winchester’s Knowing, Alex Wright’s Informatica opens with it, following the late biologist E.O. Wilson in speculating about the biological role of epigenetics in human knowledge transmission. Wright compares “networks and hierarchies” in the natural and the human worlds. He sees parallels between creations by groups that are unlikely to have communicated, such as the similarity between the plant taxonomies created by Western scholars and those formed through oral tradition in other societies.
Using more traditional evidence, Wright explicitly links the Linnaean classification scheme to the development of librarians’ attempts to organize books, culminating in the Dewey Decimal System at the turn of the 20th century. He appropriately refers to this 19th century arc as “the industrial library,” the creation of more elaborate organizational schemes being demanded by vastly increased numbers of published books, which was in turn allowed by new technology.
Successive chapters discuss early to mid-20th century utopian information sharing projects using then-existing technology, including index cards and telegraphy, or the briefly famous Mundaneum (an institution that aimed to gather together all the world’s knowledge and classify it according to a system called the Universal Decimal Classification). In Informatica, Wright’s discussion of these utopian schemes does not flow as well as it could, the reader being left to make the connections.
Worse, Wright’s extended history of the developments leading to the modern internet is shoehorned into a subsection of the revised “Web That Wasn’t” chapter as “The Web That Was.” This combination of topics in the same chapter was tenable in Glut, but in Informatica the subsection discusses so many people and inventions, all of whose work made the World Wide Web possible, that it should have been a new chapter. Finally, Wright recycled some of his earlier writing and did not update it, such as referring to CD-Roms and America Online (AOL) as leading technologies. This could have been fixed easily.
That said, the narrative in Informatica is more clearly chronological than in Knowing What We Know, but Simon Winchester is so skilled a writer that his book is generally a smoother narrative despite being more episodic. Except in the book’s outline: I was halfway through the book before realizing that its main chapters had a logically progressive sequence to them, from data acquisition to information display to the uses of knowledge and finally to wisdom. Winchester could have made this clearer earlier in the book with just a few words.
One side topic bears noting: Winchester said in at least two media interviews that his discussion of the racism found in a leading mid-century encyclopedia was edited out of the published version of Knowing What We Know, on the grounds that it would be too controversial or offend too many of his readers. Perhaps it would have, but its inclusion would have been valuable, partly for highlighting the important point that even the most well-respected reference materials can be wrong. While it can be argued that this is excusable because Knowing is not written by an academic scholar, a similar edit was also made in a book by Yale historian Beverly Gage, G-Man, (which I reviewed in an earlier issue of Skeptic), with pages 62–63 twice leading the reader to guess, but never know for sure, which apparently offensive word is represented. The criticism that only elite scholars know about the history of racism will become a self-fulfilling prophecy if that history is not included in popular books.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.3
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On the other hand, Informatica and Knowing What We Know both have problems with the wording of their titles, and with such vast topics, it would be easy to quibble with decisions on which topics to focus. I wonder if Informatica’s new title could make readers think they are getting a wholly different book, rather than an update of Glut (originally published in 2007), with uneven revisions and only a chapter’s worth of new material? In Knowing What We Know, it’s the last third of the subtitle (“From Ancient Wisdom to Modern Magic”) that could mislead: in other cases, the phrase “Ancient Wisdom” has sometimes referred to religious traditions, but here seems to refer more to any ancient writing, and the book’s late discussion of wisdom is not primarily about religion.
The important point shared by Knowing What We Know and Informatica is that greater access to information also presents challenges. Informatica is more theoretical and historical, Knowing being more a historically informed snapshot of our present. Both are stimulating and both are informative.
About the AuthorMichelle Ainsworth holds an MA in History and she is currently researching the cultural history of stage magic in the United States. She is a humanist and lives in New York City.
The 2008 documentary film Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed was released to widespread media coverage and hype. Starring Ben Stein—a conservative commentator, actor, and former speechwriter for Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford—the film argued there was a conspiracy within academia to censor Intelligent Design (ID) and to cover up evidence that belief in evolutionary theory led to everything from atheism to the Nazi Holocaust. Expelled opened in over 1,300 theaters and earned nearly $8 million. In addition to ID theorists, the film included interviews with noted proponents of evolutionary theory such as Richard Dawkins, Eugenie Scott, Christopher Hitchens, and Michael Shermer.
As the film’s co-writer, I was part of the crew that came to the Skeptic magazine office to interview Michael Shermer. Here is how he described his experience with us:
Ben Stein came to my office to interview me about what I was told was a film about “the intersection of science and religion” called Crossroads (yet another deception). I knew something was afoot when his first question to me was on whether or not I think someone should be fired for expressing dissenting views. I pressed Stein for specifics: Who is being fired for what, when, and where? In my experience, people are usually fired for reasons having to do with budgetary constraints, incompetence, or not fulfilling the terms of a contract. Stein finally asked my opinion on people being fired for endorsing Intelligent Design. I replied that I know of no instance where such a firing has happened.
This seemingly innocent observation was turned into a filmic confession of ignorance when my on-camera interview abruptly ends there, because when I saw Expelled at a preview screening at the National Religious Broadcasters’ convention (tellingly, the film is being targeted primarily to religious and conservative groups), I discovered that the central thesis of the film is a conspiracy theory about the systematic attempt to keep Intelligent Design creationism out of American classrooms and culture.
Although I was in agreement with the film’s agenda at the beginning, throughout the long production process, my feelings about the project and the ID movement underwent a significant shift. But I stayed on board in the hope of providing a counterbalance to the producers’ desire to create what amounted to a piece of pro-ID propaganda. I eventually realized, however, that whoever controls the money controls the point of view, so there was only so much that I could do as a fledgling screenwriter.
In the years since Expelled came out, the transformation of my views has continued apace, so I wrote to Shermer to apologize for the damage the film did and the duplicitous circumstances under which some of our interviews were obtained. In response, he invited me to write an article describing my experience on Expelled as well as my subsequent reflections on the ID movement and the larger issue of the relation between science and religion.
• • • • • •
During the two and a half years I spent working on Expelled, one of the key dynamics I observed was how bitterly divided people were over the notion of ID as a concept, and even more so as a movement. After reading countless books and articles on the subject and participating in interviews with people on all sides, I realized that no matter which way one approached the topic of Darwinian evolution versus intelligent design—and by extension, science and religion—the individuals on the frontlines were virtually all highly intelligent people of goodwill. Unfortunately, some of the leading voices were also exceedingly argumentative by nature. Thus, rather than engage in dialogue that sought to establish common ground and then work together to build bridges toward truth, interactions between the ID movement and its critics often amounted to one side lobbing a verbal grenade at the other and then hunkering down in the trenches as it exploded, all the while chuckling about how foolish the folks on the other side were. Rather than emulate that spirit, I decided I would try to engage my critics in constructive conversation. I wanted to see if it was possible to cross no man’s land and find some sort of common bond with the “enemy.”
Over the several weeks leading up to the film’s release, I did exactly that, spending hours each day engaged with people on my personal blog and other online forums. Despite my legitimate desire to conduct a meaningful dialogue with my opponents, my efforts were often met with an unrelenting wall of bitterness and sarcasm. Perhaps not surprisingly (considering the relentless barrage of abuse) and despite my good intentions, I occasionally succumbed to a similar rhetorical approach, adding a heavy dose of sarcasm to my own barbed responses. Even so, I was truly seeking to abide by motivational speaker Steven Covey’s “highly effective” habit number five: seek first to understand, then to be understood.
I hoped the film could do away with the need to “win” the debate over ID. One way or the other and instead unite these contending minds around their mutual desire to move science forward.
Over time, I recognized a pattern across the various responses that I received, one that matched a famous quote by Richard Dawkins: “It is absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid, or insane (or wicked, but I’d rather not consider that).” On the surface, this sounds like an incredibly arrogant thing to say, relegating one’s opponents to varying levels of intellectual inferiority, insanity, or iniquity. But as I thought about it, I realized that’s how many of us treat those who don’t share our beliefs. When we encounter someone who disagrees with us, at first we assume they simply don’t know what we know, so we attempt to educate them. If that fails, we may briefly entertain the idea that the person is incapable of understanding what we recognize as truth. But if they display a reasonable level of intelligence, we seem to be left with only two options: either they know what we know to be true, and they’re purposely suppressing or obscuring that information (which puts them in the wicked category), or they’re so out of touch with reality that they’re a lost cause.
This was exactly the continuum I found myself traveling along with my neo-Darwinian debating partners. While, in their minds, I made a brief stop at “ignorant,” once I demonstrated that I was reasonably well informed on the relevant issues, they quickly shuffled me into the “wicked” category, with brief stopovers at “stupid” and “insane.” Their favorite name for me was “liar,” which I found frustrating because, despite how one might interpret the rhetorical position of Expelled, a film in which I had authorial influence but no editorial control, I wasn’t trying to be deceptive at all. I was sincerely seeking the truth, not claiming to have it.
In retrospect, though, I empathize with my opponents’ frustration. My stubborn refusal to concede my views probably led them to believe their efforts to correct my faulty thinking were in vain. As it turned out, it was the opposite. Even though I was championing a documentary that many regarded as contrary to science and truth in general, cracks had begun to form in my own beliefs about the ID movement and the branch of evangelical Christianity to which I had converted as a child.
The process began about six years before I signed on to Expelled when I took a class on Science and Christianity at Regent College (a seminary in Vancouver, BC) co-led by historians Mark Noll and David N. Livingstone, author of Darwin’s Forgotten Defenders. That class served as a rebuttal to the commonly held belief that evolution and Christianity must be inherently at odds. As Livingstone outlines in his book, the initial Christian response to Darwin’s theory was characterized by accommodation rather than confrontation. Rather than refute Darwin’s theory, many theologians focused on harmonizing evolution with the notion of divine design instead. It wasn’t until the rise of Christian fundamentalism in the early 20th century—which lumped evolutionary theory together with higher criticism and other attacks on a literal approach to the Bible—that a split between evolutionary science and some branches of Christianity developed.
Noll and Livingstone’s class triggered a desire to go deeper into the subject, leading me to focus on epistemology in general and the philosophy of science in particular. I was fascinated by the concept of warranted belief and the reliability of belief-producing processes. Are humans capable of discerning truth? If so, how? Does objective truth even exist? If so, is it possible to know it?
While my belief in God was still relatively intact at that point, by the time we started development on Expelled in late 2005, the epistemological ground beneath me had shifted. I don’t recall when it was exactly, but sometime over the next six months, I was in a coffee shop doing research for the film when I ran into my pastor and confessed that I no longer believed in Satan, angels, or demons. I can still clearly recall the look of deep disappointment on his face.
My confession was as much a revelation to me as it was to him. I can’t point to any one thing that led to that conclusion, but by then I had steeped myself in the writings of those at the forefront of the fight against ID, including Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, Michael Shermer, Kenneth Miller, Michael Ruse, Eugenie Scott, and Sam Harris. I had also read and interacted with several leading proponents of the ID movement, including Stephen Meyer, David Berlinski, William Dembski, Philip E. Johnson, and Michael Behe. Altogether, the more my understanding of the relevant science grew, the less work there seemed to be required of God to create the universe. No matter to which gap in our knowledge one could point, claiming God’s handiwork could always be found there, even if the history of science appeared to be one long, inexorable march toward shining a light into those very gaps, revealing not God but the same natural processes that we observe today, removing the need to resort to any sort of divine intervention as a cause.
To my way of thinking, that didn’t necessarily negate the concept of God or some sort of guiding intelligence in the universe. However, even if such a being existed, it seemed the most one could say was that “life, the universe, and everything” were the product of secondary rather than primary causes. God may have created the scale by which all things are measured, but apart from a few moments where a nudge in the right direction was required, his finger was never on it.
This put me in an ideal frame of mind to accept the primary claims of the ID movement. Many proponents of ID accept most aspects of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, agreeing that the majority of what we observe in the universe is the product of secondary causes. However, while ID proponents agree that natural selection can account for relatively minor changes within species, they argue that it is wholly inadequate when it comes to explaining the origin of new species or of life itself, not to mention the origin of the universe. Not only do ID proponents believe life is too complex to be attributed to “blind” natural causes, they also argue that it is “irreducibly complex,” as Michael Behe puts it, wherein “a single system which is composed of several well-matched interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning” could not possibly be the product of a gradual process because the system’s function couldn’t be produced by selection until all the pieces were in place.
Furthermore, ID proponents such as William Dembski and Stephen Meyer argue for something called “specified complexity,” whereby if something exhibits both complexity and specificity (i.e., information), one must infer that it is the product of intelligence, given that intelligence is the only source of information in the universe of which we are aware. Hence, even if blind, natural processes could account for how that information is edited (something else that ID proponents dispute), such causes could not explain how that information arose in the first place, much less how the universe in which that information is processed came into being.
Richard Dawkins being interviewed by Ben Stein for Expelled, at the Natural History Museum in London
Of course, opponents of ID have rebuttals to each of these arguments. Primarily, as Richard Dawkins argued in The God Delusion, rather than end the argument regarding origins, proposing an intelligent designer to account for irreducible or specified complexity merely punts the ball down the field because such a designer would have to be the product of the same processes as the phenomenon the designer is invoked to explain. So, as Shermer articulates in Why Darwin Matters, if complexity necessitates an intelligent designer, then there must be a super-intelligent designer, which itself necessitates a super-duper- intelligent designer, and so on in an infinite regress.
Despite such objections to ID, I realized both sides of the debate faced the same sort of infinite regression when it came to explaining origins. Just as positing a designer merely postpones the problem, so does a purely materialistic point of view, with natural selection seemingly incapable of providing an account for how it came to be without invoking itself. The same goes for the seemingly immutable laws of nature within which natural selection operates. We have all sorts of theories for how these forces might have come into being and what holds them constant, but as for an ultimate explanation for the origin of the laws of nature, no one knows for sure. Accordingly, it appeared to me that on a philosophical level at least, ID’s proponents and its materialist critics were on equal footing. Each side was proceeding from a set of philosophical presuppositions about how the world came into being that cannot be proven, and each was at the same time equally certain that the other side’s philosophical presuppositions were wrong.
To add another level of similarity, many individuals on each side claimed that their presuppositions were a scientific inference rather than a philosophical preference. That is, they insisted their axiomatic beliefs were a product of their scientific observations rather than something they brought to the table with them beforehand, only to have those beliefs consciously or affect their scientific observations. Those observations were then predisposed to conform to what they already believed.
If we continue to expel, cancel, and block each other over our differences of opinion rather than dialogue and partner together to share our unique perspectives, there really is no hope for science, freedom, or truth.
When it came to Expelled, it was this interplay between philosophical presuppositions and the day-to-day practice of science that interested me most. After all, any honest observer has to admit that philosophical presuppositions affect how we approach science, for example by determining what is and is not accepted as evidence. At the same time, a truly scientific person must always be willing to revise their presuppositions in light of new evidence and/or arguments. My highest hope for the film was that it could explore this reciprocal relationship between science and philosophy, leading to the very common ground that I had sought to establish with my online debating partners. Perhaps operating from a place of naïve optimism, I hoped the film could do away with the need to “win” the debate over ID one way or the other and instead unite these contending minds around their mutual desire to move science forward.
Alas, that was not to be. For one thing, early in the process of making Expelled, I realized that the film’s producers weren’t interested in open-minded inquiry. They had an axe to grind against what they saw as an oppressive scientific establishment that was unwilling to “allow one divine foot in the door” (as geneticist Richard Lewontin put it), and they were determined to change that. Initially, I bought into this agenda as well, feeling like we were on the right side of history because we were fighting for free and open inquiry, not just on behalf of ID, but also on behalf of science itself. Why shouldn’t scientists be able to follow the evidence wherever it leads? And why shouldn’t intelligence be considered as a potential explanation for particular phenomena until proven otherwise? Hadn’t a presumption of theism, or at least deism, guided most of the early scientists, leading to all sorts of fruitful inquiry? If so, why couldn’t that continue?
My interactions with some of the leading lights of ID also had a chilling effect on my belief that we were on the right side of the debate. For example, when Ben Stein asked Michael Behe how biology would be different if it had ID theory as its foundation, Behe was left groping for an answer. Then when Stein was interviewing David Berlinski outside the Berlin Wall, trying to coax him into saying that an unnecessary ideological wall had been erected to keep any notion of God out of science—just as the Berlin Wall had been erected to keep “dangerous” ideas out of the Soviet bloc—Berlinski refused to acquiesce. Instead, he insisted that we need boundaries in science to help define the field. For example, we don’t accept astrology as part of science, nor should we. Walls aren’t bad in and of themselves, Berlinski argued; it’s more a matter of where we build them and why.
Of course, how we make such a determination is a product of our philosophical presuppositions, which are becoming increasingly impossible to agree on as we all break away from traditional meta-narratives and drift off into our own private definitions of reality. But even if we don’t agree with some or all of a field’s presuppositions, if we presume competence and goodwill amongst scientists, it’s only logical to assume that these boundaries exist not to limit the production of good science but to facilitate it. Otherwise, we find ourselves in the absurd position of arguing that scientists are working against their own self-interest.
Michael Shermer with the film’s press kit
I realize that a presumption of competence and goodwill is increasingly difficult to maintain these days as our confidence in the integrity of various institutions wanes. The problem is, considering the increasing complexity of the modern world, we are facing what energy theorist Vaclav Smil describes as a growing “comprehension deficit,” which makes our need to rely on experts greater than ever. This being the case, how can we determine when a dissident group, such as the ID movement, which is challenging the majority opinion in a field, is correct or whether they are a destructive force that really should be “expelled” out into the cold?
I continue to believe that a presumption of competence and goodwill amongst experts is the most fruitful and cognitively healthy way to proceed. I’m willing to go with the majority view in any given field until given good reason to think otherwise. But I have to admit I’m far more skeptical than I used to be. And who doesn’t love the idea of a plucky group of rebels who risk everything to stand up to oppressive, corrupt authorities, and by opposing them restore freedom, truth, and justice? Everyone from political leaders such as Lenin and Hitler, to storytellers like George Lucas, have exploited this universal narrative, which is becoming increasingly attractive as we all sense a growing lack of control over our circumstances due to the increasing pace and complexity of change, technological and otherwise.
This was exactly the narrative that we sought to tap into when making Expelled, knowing it would resonate with viewers on an emotional level. The question is, were we right when it came to the ID movement? Were they really courageous dissidents standing up against the evil Darwinian empire? I certainly believed it at the time, but I no longer think so now.
Despite the radical change in my views, fifteen years after Expelled I can’t say I regret being involved with the film. It provided me with a blank check to indulge my passion for research, to travel the world, to meet some of the brightest minds in science, to work with people who eventually became some of my closest friends, and to establish myself in the film industry. More importantly, over the long term, it completely transformed my view of life and culture, bringing me much closer to those whom I used to regard as standing on the opposite side of the aisle. But I do have significant regrets about how the film itself turned out, the distrust it sowed amongst viewers regarding the scientific establishment, and the deceptive practices we engaged in to make the film happen.
One example of those deceptive practices was hiring hundreds of extras to serve as Ben Stein’s “audience” during the speech he gives that bookends the film, making it seem as if he’s leading a groundswell of young people who are looking to overthrow the tyrannical Darwinian academy. This was filmed at Pepperdine University, Shermer’s alma mater, so he wrote them to ask how this happened:
The biology professors at Pepperdine assure me that their mostly Christian students fully accept the theory of evolution. So who were these people embracing Stein’s screed against science? Extras. According to Lee Kats, Associate Provost for Research and Chair of Natural Science at Pepperdine, “the production company paid for the use of the facility just as all other companies do that film on our campus” but that “the company was nervous that they would not have enough people in the audience so they brought in extras. Members of the audience had to sign in and the staff member reports that no more than two to three Pepperdine students were in attendance. Mr. Stein’s lecture on that topic was not an event sponsored by the university.” And this is one of the least dishonest parts of the film.
Kevin Miller holding our Big Foot fake-tracks shoe for cryptozoology tomfoolery at the former Skeptic Magazine headquarters in Altadena, CA, where segments of Expelled were filmed
Another was creating a fake production company, complete with a website listing several dummy film projects. We used this website to mislead potential interviewees into believing we were taking an objective approach to the subject matter, which couldn’t have been further from the truth. I’ve been involved in several controversial documentaries since Expelled, and landing interviews with potentially hostile subjects is always a challenge. In such circumstances, I admit to being less than forthcoming about my point of view at times because I’d rather get a “clean read” than a confrontational exchange, a relaxed conversation where the subject expresses their views similar to how they might talk to a friend, but not since Expelled have I taken things to such an extreme.
Like anyone who believes they have the truth (or possibly even God) on their side, while making Expelled we felt the ends justified the means. As history shows time and time again, though, just when we think we’re most virtuous, we’re also at our most dangerous. When facing off against what we regard as a great evil, belief in our own righteousness can blind us to the very evils we ourselves are committing in response.
If Expelled had been made today, it probably would have been called Canceled or Blocked instead because too often when we encounter ideas that offend our philosophical presuppositions, our emotional sensibilities, or our fragile sense of identity, that’s exactly what we do. And unlike the way the scientific establishment is portrayed in Expelled, it’s not just those in authority who do this. More often than not, mobs of regular people are leading the charge. Driven by a sense of self-righteousness and/or a weaponized form of compassion, they summarily destroy people’s lives, due process be damned.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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Lack of common ground, a shared version of reality in which to engage, remains a problem. And with traditional means (such as religion) of establishing this common ground rapidly fading away, it seems like an impossible goal to achieve. If we continue to expel, cancel, and block each other over our differences of opinion rather than dialogue and partner together to share our unique perspectives, there really is no hope for science, freedom, or truth.
We may never be able to achieve unanimity of belief, but if we can at least aspire toward unity of purpose and intent, agreeing to operate from a position of goodwill, charity, and curiosity rather than selfish gain or the need to bolster our identity by scapegoating others, maybe we can find a way to work together despite our differences.
Despite this discouraging state of affairs, I still believe in the power of conversation and debate as perhaps the only way forward. It worked to change my mind (eventually), so why couldn’t it work for others?
About the AuthorKevin Miller is an award-winning author and filmmaker. He has written, directed, and produced several documentary films, including Hellbound? and J.E.S.U.S.A. He is also the author of the best-selling Milligan Creek Series for middle-grade readers as well as numerous other books for children and adults, both fiction and non-fiction.
CHRISTOPHER RUFO is a writer, filmmaker, and activist. He has directed four documentaries for PBS, including America Lost, which tells the story of three forgotten American cities. He is a senior fellow of the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of the public policy magazine City Journal. His reporting and activism have inspired a presidential order, a national grassroots movement, and legislation in 22 states. Rufo holds a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and a Master’s of Liberal Arts from Harvard University.
Skeptic: You are a controversial figure for your work in the area of Critical Race Theory (CRT). What led you to this subject?
Rufo: My professional background is in documentary filmmaking. The book writing process was totally different. I hope what I was able to do with the book is bring my narrative training to telling stories that engage people and move them at an emotional level.
Skeptic: Well, you did that. It’s a highly readable book in which you present a history of ideas. One of the difficulties is drawing causal connections between thinkers across generations. How do you address that problem?
Rufo: There was a lot of looking for explicit connections. For example, I profile Angela Davis, who I think is really kind of the godmother of CRT. She tied the original critical theory from the early part of the 20th century to American race politics in a deliberate way. Her thesis advisor was the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse, who is also profiled in the book. Then I connect Davis to the modern Black Lives Matter movement; she is the personal mentor to a number of BLM leaders. I tried not to make any specious connections, and I wanted to be charitable to my subjects, to see the world first through their eyes and treat them fairly. Only then did I layer on my criticism or my critique.
Skeptic: On that political front, how do you distinguish between old-school liberals, such as Steven Pinker, and the more radical progressive thinkers of today?
Rufo: The critical theorists I profile in my book are explicitly anti-liberal, such as Angela Davis, Paulo Freire, and Derek Bell, the father of CRT. Their whole movement is explicitly and deeply anti-liberal. It’s against the concept of individual rights, private property, and Enlightenment values. So, I hope that I can also speak to some of those estranged liberals and explain how the movement that has really taken over the institutional left in the United States has deviated from that small ‘l’ liberal tradition and really originates from something much more radical, revolutionary, and Marxist in nature.
Skeptic: Walk us through these influences, starting with Marx.
Rufo: Over the course of the 20th century, there was a deviation from orthodox Marxism as people became more infatuated with the new left, the more activist 1960s youth movement, and racial unrest. Angela Davis was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party USA, and she ran for vice president of the United States on the Communist Party ticket. She was deeply influenced by Marx (although she had written her graduate thesis on Kant) and was also well-versed in the Western philosophical tradition. Paulo Freire—the same. He was working with Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in the Third World, and his idea of critical consciousness originates in Marxist concepts that he had learned when he was a student in Brazil.
However, the most interesting case is Derek Bell, who was a Harvard Law professor, and in many ways the founding figure of CRT. His students at Harvard Law and other elite law schools around the country, inspired by Bell, established the discipline of critical race theory in the late 1980s. Bell grew up in the Pittsburgh area, served in the U.S. Air Force, went to law school, and was a very successful—even brilliant—student. Then he became a lawyer for the NAACP, handling cases in the Deep South desegregating schools in places such as Mississippi. I think he oversaw something like 300 school desegregation cases. He was a civil rights advocate and activist, a small ‘l’ liberal at the time.
However, Bell became disillusioned with the Civil Rights Movement and utterly disillusioned with Martin Luther King-style civil rights activism that turned to the Constitution, focusing especially on the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. He thought these were all illusions in that they provided the appearance of freedom but were actually used to reinforce secretly and covertly the structures of racial domination. It is this aspect of Bell’s work that survives and is really the foundation of what we now see as critical race theory.
Skeptic: There’s this push to find deep root causes of specific events among politicians. Is this a useful approach?
Rufo: It’s amazing because it’s totally backwards. Politicians say, “Well, no, we’re not going to do the thing that actually could have a significant and immediate impact, and instead we’re going to implement the 1619 Project and focus on the first arrival of African slaves in North America.” That certainly is something of historical importance and scholarly relevance, and should even be part of the public debate, but what do you do with that? Short of having a time travel machine, you can’t change the past 400 years of history. Nor can you show any real relevance to today beyond a very broad and metaphorical interpretation of current events.
When you go back and look at the civil rights movement, against which Derrick Bell rebelled later in his life, you had, for the most part, people who wanted to cash in the promissory note of the Declaration of Independence. They wanted to conform to not only the system of individual rights in the United States as a form of law, but also conform to middle class or bourgeois values as a matter of culture. Look at these great civil rights marches in the 1960s. Men were dressed in suits and ties and the women in dresses. And these weren’t necessarily wealthy people. They were mostly working-class African Americans. However, the image that they wanted to convey was one of dignity, self-respect, and an immense hope for equal participation in American society. I’m still really moved and struck by some of those images.
Compare those images to the kind you see of Antifa or BLM activists in 2020. You have deranged-looking mugshots of people. You have people that visually look quite disordered, committing sprees of violence. And in the name of what? It was never quite clear what they wanted beyond defunding the police or just having a justification for violence. Those two images, if you look at them side by side, reveal the kind of fundamental change in the modern left.
Skeptic: What do you think is the right approach to social change?
Rufo: When you ask people in surveys, “Do you support affirmative action? Do you support race-conscious college admissions? Do you support mandatory diversity, equity, and inclusion training?” They overwhelmingly say “No.” This is true for people of all political affiliations and all racial backgrounds. And yet, all of those things are now required in nearly all of our major institutions. So, you have this mismatch problem where public sentiment is against something, but all of our institutions and even our public policies are for it. Why is that? If we live in a democracy, shouldn’t majority sentiment eventually translate into public policy?
The answer is that, in my view, there are concentric rings of influence on these issues. You have the tightest ring, which consists of the fanatics, the people who are deeply committed to it. They work in it. These are the DEI administrators. These are the critical race theorists. These are the BLM activists. Then you have another concentric ring of people that say, “Well, you know, I more or less buy into the premise of this. I want more diversity.” That’s roughly 30 percent of the public, maybe a little bit more depending on the issue. Then you have an even larger concentric ring of people who are neutral, slightly opposed, or even quite opposed to it, but they don’t speak out because they fear the consequences. This creates an opinion environment in which those very committed activists can really run up the score and impose their point of view as the de facto policy.
That’s the environment we live in. The people who care most about it have figured out where the levers of power are. They’ve gone, in most cases, around the democratic process to impose their will. And they essentially say—as we’ve seen recently with Harvard and the University of North Carolina [the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that race-based affirmative action programs in college admissions processes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment]—“We know what we’re doing is unpopular. We know what we’re doing is likely illegal and unconstitutional. But we’re going to do it anyway.”
Skeptic: Erika Chenoweth and Maria Steffen’s research on political violence demonstrates that since 1900, nonviolent campaigns worldwide were twice as likely to succeed outright as violent insurgencies. This trend has been increasing over time. In the last 50 years, civil resistance has become increasingly frequent and effective, whereas violent insurgencies have become increasingly rare and unsuccessful. No campaigns failed once they achieved the active and sustained participation of just 3.5 percent of the population, and lots of them succeeded with far less than that.
Rufo: That’s right. I think academic critique is still valuable. However, what we really need is political opposition because this issue has moved from the realm of academia to the realm of politics. So, it also has to be fought politically. That’s what I’ve done, and I’ve gotten an unbelievable amount of criticism for this approach.
I’ve taken the battle out of the realm of academic discourse and into the realm of practical politics. I’ve been very explicit about that. I said I want to change public perception; I want to turn critical race theory into a brand, and I want to destroy it not just in the realm of public opinion, but also in the realm of public policy.
If it’s in the K–12 school curriculum, it’s a policy question. If it’s in a public university DEI bureaucracy, it’s a policy question. If it’s in our criminal justice system, it’s a policy question. These are political questions, and those who think that we can resolve them through discourse are really doing a disservice. They’re not grappling with the actual difficult nature of statesmanship and political activism that’s required.
If we want to have a society that says, “No, we’re not going to engage in racial scapegoating. We’re not going to judge individuals based on a racial category. We’re not going to imbibe in notions of hereditary blood guilt,” the only way, I think, is through political pressure, by changing the laws by which our institutions are governed.
Skeptic: What are your thoughts on systemic racism? What is your explanation for racial group differences in income, wealth, home ownership, representation in Congress and the corporate C-suite?
Rufo: What is the standard by which we measure systemic racism? How do we define systemic racism? There’s an interesting bait and switch here, because they say, “Well, all of this is systemic racism, from chattel slavery to the fact that a Lakeisha Smith is less likely to get called back than a Lisa Smith.” [“Call back” studies submit the same resumés to businesses and compare the response to identifiably Black versus White names]. You have this transition in the mid-20th century from explicit, formal, and legal racist policies to what amounts to implicit racist policies. Well, what do they mean by that?
They mean that when you measure things statistically, that there is a disparate impact on outcomes. Lisa versus Lakeisha Smith is just one such example. You can say that there are no outright racist policies in policing or housing or geographical distribution, but there are still disparate outcomes. Is it because people are secretly and subconsciously racist? That’s the unconscious bias theory, which has been debunked. [It has been demonstrated that The Implicit Association Test, often cited as confirming evidence, does not measure racial bias but rather reaction time to familiar versus unfamiliar terms.] Are police more likely to shoot a Black suspect than a White suspect? Roland Fryer at Harvard showed that this is not the case. [Although he did find that White police rough up Black people they pull over more than White people.]
Then you have to ask some uncomfortable questions. If, for example, there are more African American men in jail than Asian American men, is it because our society is systemically racist against African American men and systemically giving privileges to Asian American men?
You could make that argument, but I think that on the face of it most people realize that it’s not true. Then you ask about the rate of criminality—do African American males on average commit more crimes than Asian American males? You might find that it’s not racism that is operative. It’s another set of background variables. Robert Rector published some papers on this subject 20 years ago that are still foundational to my thinking. He showed that if you control for those background variables, you find that the argument for active systemic racism vanishes across a whole range of things, not just Lakeisha versus Lisa Smith, but for things that are especially meaningful. For example, if you control for the mother’s academic achievement, the mother’s participation in state welfare programs, and household family structure, the gap between White and Black childhood poverty disappears. It’s zero.
If we aim our public policy towards fixing those variables, we’d be much better served and we’d be much more likely to reduce overall inequalities.
Skeptic: Those causal variables are largely left out of the conversation. Maybe it’s taboo to talk about them right now?
Rufo: I think it is, because it’s a very inconvenient disrupting narrative when you have minority groups that are enormously successful in the United States. The most successful ethnic groups in the United States today are majority non-White ethnic groups, including some Black ethnic groups, particularly Nigerian Americans. Part of that may be due to a selection process—immigrants from Nigeria are disproportionately better educated, have more resources, etc. So, it’s not quite a one-to-one measurement.
Nonetheless, there’s a huge range in success among ethnic groups in the United States. The ones that have stable family structure, commitment to education, a strong work ethic, mutual support within a community, etc., are very successful. Those ethnic groups that do not have those attributes do very poorly on many measures, including income. Appalachian Whites do very poorly while Nigerian Americans or other recent immigrants are doing extraordinarily well.
Skeptic: Are you optimistic we can achieve a colorblind society?
Rufo: There are reasons for optimism and for pessimism. The reason for optimism is that the American people really despise the DEI affirmative action principles of governance. Even in California and Washington state, where I live, voters have rejected affirmative action policies when they’ve been put to a ballot initiative. And the majority of racial groups also oppose these kinds of policies. Despite all of the media dominance, academic dominance, and bureaucratic dominance of the DEI movement—the American people want equal treatment for each individual, regardless of group category. They want colorblind equality, not racial favoritism and enforced equity.
The case for pessimism is that it’s going to be difficult. The problem of racial equality is a thorny one. It is one that has vexed the United States for its whole history and is, frankly, likely to continue. As long as there is visible inequality—statistically measurable inequality—the narrative of critical race theory will have a base of support. It will have the political, emotional, and intellectual grounds that can feed that narrative. This puts us in a bit of a conundrum because paradoxically, the remedies of critical race theory are actually likely to make inequality worse. And for the people who are running a critical race theory style regime, inequality justifies their claims to power. So, they have no incentive to make things better in the real world. If we go in that direction, we face a very long, very brutal, and very disillusioning politics in our future.
Skeptic: Do you see any role for any kind of reparations for formerly oppressed peoples or even currently oppressed people?
Rufo: I have certainly opposed any kind of race-based reparations payments. I think it’s absolutely the wrong direction to go for a host of reasons. Historically, if you look at Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society anti-poverty programs, these were to a large extent a kind of race-based reparations policy that was—they thought—backed up by the latest discoveries in social science, deployed at federal mass scale. These programs now are spending about a trillion dollars a year, disproportionately to African Americans, especially descendants of slaves.
These are policies that sound great, and that’s why they’re often passed in legislation. But we have to be sober and level-headed in analyzing whether they actually work. Do they help us achieve the stated intentions? The evidence that it has helped in any way is lacking. In fact, the most persuasive evidence, in my view, shows that it has had negative, though unintended, consequences. In my reading of it, both statistically and as someone who spent three years researching and documenting public housing projects in Memphis, Tennessee, and getting a first-hand look at their impact, I just don’t think that reparations would work.
This interview was edited from a longer conversation that took place on The Michael Shermer Show, which you can watch online.
YASCHA MOUNK is a writer and academic known for his work on the rise of populism and the crisis of liberal democracy. Born in Germany to Polish parents, Mounk received his BA in history from Trinity College, Cambridge, and his PhD in government from Harvard University. He is a professor of the practice of international affairs at Johns Hopkins University, a contributing editor at The Atlantic, and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure (featured on former President Barack Obama’s summer reading list) and The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time.
Skeptic: Let’s talk about identity politics. Is it really the identity or is it the politics?
Mounk: The great civil rights leader, Bayard Rustin, a gay Black political activist—though I’m not sure that he would want to list the adjectives in that order—said that the idea of a homogeneous Black community is the invention of White elites, as well as of certain Black people who want to lead it. I think this describes the situation very well. And this is important because it speaks to our model for political solidarity.
Let’s examine the popular ban on “cultural appropriation.” When I was growing up in Europe, the people who worried about cultural purity and the influence that other groups might have on your culture were on the right. Today, some of these concerns persist on the right, but a lot of them have moved to the left. It’s gotten to the point of absurdity, like left-leaning actors who apologize for voicing or acting in roles that don’t match their identity.
The core example is that of White musicians in the 1950s and 1960s “stealing” the music of Black musicians or being inspired by them, and going on to have big careers while Black musicians didn’t. The injustice in the 1950s and 1960s was not that there was some White jazz saxophonist inspired by Black musicians. The injustice was that Black musicians could not travel freely across America because of racism—they could not stay at some of the hotels in which they performed, they were banned from many concert venues, they wouldn’t be played on many radio stations, and they couldn’t be signed by many record labels. That’s what was unjust about it, not something called “cultural appropriation.” If you get that wrong, you also get wrong how you solve it. The way to solve that injustice is not to make sure that White musicians don’t play jazz music or rock ‘n roll. It’s to make sure that Black musicians and African Americans more broadly overcome the deep discrimination that they faced.
All culture is appropriation. Every element of our cuisine, the way we write, and the technology we use today is an accrual of past cultural appropriation. If we put those forms of mutual cultural influence under general suspicion, not only will we forego amazing cultural and technological innovations in the coming decades and centuries, but we’ll also fundamentally fail to celebrate positive aspects of our societies.
Skeptic: How do you respond to people such as Noam Chomsky, who argues that critiques of identity politics such as your own are exaggerations, that things such as critical race theory are just legal or academic ideas that are not filtering down to grammar schools or up to corporations, and that what you are saying is part of a vast right-wing moral panic?
Mounk: I think that’s a mistake. There are people on the right who brand anything they don’t like critical race theory or claim that teaching kids about slavery is critical race theory. That’s absurd. Of course we should teach American children about the terrible history of racial injustice and slavery in this country. However, as a result, a lot of people on the mainstream left, including smart people like Chomsky, end up saying, “Isn’t critical race theory just speaking critically about race in society?” Or they say it’s an academic theory and first graders aren’t reading the academic articles published by Derek Bell and Kimberlé Crenshaw.
What I worry about is teachers walking into classrooms in the third, second, and first grade and saying, “If you’re Black, go to that classroom; If you’re Asian American, go to that classroom; If you’re Latino, you go to that classroom; and if you’re White, you go to that classroom over there.” I think it’s fine for kids to be uncomfortable at times, because everything we know from social psychology is that how we define ourselves is malleable. However, when they’re told, “This is your in-group and that over there is your out-group,” that can lead to having endless empathy for the “my group” and terrifying disregard for the suffering of the other group.
So, while the aim may be to create White anti-racists, I think it’s much more likely to create White separatists or White supremacists. The other thing I would say is that these ideas not only now inform the norms and the practices of a great many institutions in the United States—important institutions such as schools—they also inform public policy in really worrying ways.
A shocking example of this was when I sat in on a meeting of the ACIP—the key advisory group advising the Centers for Disease Control—on how to roll out vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic. Now we know that by far the best predictor of how seriously sick you will get from COVID is your age. Therefore, nearly every country in the world prioritized the elderly in their distribution. You might also prioritize hospital workers, because in the middle of a pandemic you don’t want the doctors to be sick. But after that, nearly every country started with the over 85s, and then the over 80s, and then the over 75s. And that also made it easier to communicate this to the public.
Well, ACIP said no. We have to care about racial equity. Older Americans are disproportionately White, and therefore it would be unjust to give a vaccine to them first, even though the CDC’s own model shows that deviating from prioritizing the elderly would raise the death toll by between 0.5 to 6.5 percent—in other words, by thousands of human lives. This had disastrous consequences, literally thousands of additional deaths because of identity politics.
Skeptic: You mentioned “identity politics.” How should we think about this term?
Mounk: The way I think about politics, there are two sets of distinctions: between liberal and authoritarian, and between the left and the right. I am a center-left liberal. I joined the German Social Democratic Party at the age of 13. I had to lie about my age to join it because by law you’re only allowed to join when you’re 14. So, I can claim as long an allegiance to the left as anybody my age. In the distinction between liberal and authoritarian, there are those who want to impose their views by force, have no tolerance for people who disagree with them, and see the world as split into the good and the evil. I want a society in which individuals have free speech and the right of free assembly, and the right of free worship. So even if I win a majority, I’m not going to impose my substantive moral views on you. And I recognize that just because you take what I consider the wrong position on some political issue, that doesn’t make you an evil person. That is what defines me as a true “liberal.” I think the liberal versus authoritarian distinction is more important than the left v. right one.
Skeptic: So there’s left-wing authoritarianism, just as there’s right-wing authoritarianism?
Mounk: How can anyone look at the history of the 20th century without recognizing that? Left-wing authoritarianism, which you may have more sympathy for, should also scare you. It’s much easier for people who think they’re doing good in the world to follow into believing that such forms of authoritarianism are for the good of all humanity, and so we are creating paradise on Earth, not just for one group, but for everybody. That can be very appealing. My grandparents, whom I loved and who were deeply decent human beings, were attracted to such ideas for understandable reasons. They grew up in shtetls, living in poverty and being discriminated against. They thought that we should fight for the rights of proletarians. So I have empathy for people who are tempted by that set of ideas, but I’m also aware of how easily they can seduce you in ways that eventually make you complicit in genuine evil.
Skeptic: You often discuss corporations adopting identity politics. Do they really believe this, or do they not want to be bogged down in lawsuits? What is your sense about that?
Mounk: I would say that there’s a real split. There are certainly true believers in Human Resources departments, and some true believers make a good living as diversity consultants. However, there are also some true believers in the elite class, some among CEOs, and so on. At the same time, there are a lot of people who have an incentive to shut up and stay quiet. People who are not that politically motivated just ask themselves, “Is it really worth my while to push back against this? You know, I’m going to be branded as a troublemaker and perhaps somebody will accuse me of being a racist or a bigot. I better just keep my mouth shut.” And there’s an interesting legal incentive for CEOs to go along with some of this, which is that if your company is sued for racial discrimination or sexual harassment, whether you have engaged in industry standard practices to avert those forms of bias constitutes a key defense. So once your competitors offer a deeply divisive diversity training, you have a legal incentive to do that too. If you don’t, a plaintiff might argue that you clearly didn’t care about discrimination.
So, I think that there is an incentive from social sanction—that speaking up against these ideas is perilous, and there is also an incentive from the actual legal system in the United States in terms of how you can defend yourself against lawsuits, no matter how frivolous.
Skeptic: Given how deep this trend is in education, are you worried about the next generation?
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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Mounk: Yes. My students are deeply and fundamentally shaped by these ideas. Especially if they went to private schools, or schools in good school districts and affluent liberal-leaning parts of the country, these ideas have been drummed into them from day one. It’s the water that they swim in, and they take much of it for granted.
Skeptic: What can we do about it?
Mounk: Well, the first step is to argue back against these ideas from the moral high ground. And part of that is to argue on the basis of principles that you deeply believe in and that might make the world a better place. Now, there’s a broad range of principles that are compatible with liberalism that you can embrace. Perhaps you have a religious motivation, perhaps you’re a socialist, or perhaps you’re a conservative, all of that is fine. My own conviction is that of a philosophical liberal, as well as someone in the American context that has great admiration for certain movements.
Consider Frederick Douglass. When he was invited to hold a speech commemorating the Fourth of July, he called out his compatriots on the hypocrisy of talking about all men being created equal. He asked, “How can you celebrate that value and pat yourselves on the back when Black people around the country are enslaved right this moment?” However, he didn’t say to rip it all up. And while he recognized that newspapers and magazines said terrible things about Black people at the time, he didn’t reject free speech. He called free speech the dread of tyrants, because he realized that it was what allowed genuine political minorities, people who were very unpopular in their time, to fight for their rights.
This interview was edited from a longer conversation that took place on The Michael Shermer Show, which you can watch online.
Sixth-century Byzantium was a city divided by race hatred so intense that people viciously attacked each other, not only in the streets but also in churches. The inscription on an ancient tablet conveys the raw animus that spawned from color differences: “Bind them! … Destroy them! … Kill them!” The historian Procopius, who witnessed this race antagonism firsthand, called it a “disease of the soul,” and marveled at its irrational intensity:
They fight against their opponents knowing not for what end they imperil themselves … So there grows up in them against their fellow men a hostility which has no cause, and at no time does it cease or disappear, for it gives place, neither to the ties of marriage nor of relationship nor of friendship.1
This hostility sparked multiple violent clashes and riots, culminating in the Nika Riot of 532 CE, the biggest race riot of all time: 30,000 people perished, and the greatest city of antiquity was reduced to smoldering ruins.
But the Nika Riot wasn’t the sort of race riot you might imagine. The race in question was the chariot race. The color division wasn’t between black and white but between blue and green—the colors of the two main chariot-racing teams. The teams’ supporters, who were referred to as the Blue and Green “factions,” proudly wore their team colors, not just in the hippodrome but also around town. To help distinguish themselves, many Blues also sported distinctive mullet hairstyles, like those of 1970’s rock stars. Both Blues and Greens were fiercely loyal to their factions and their colors. The chariots and drivers were a secondary concern; the historian Pliny asserted that if the drivers were to swap colors in the middle of a race, the factions would immediately switch their allegiances accordingly.
The race faction rivalry had existed for a long time before the Nika Riot, yet Procopius writes that it had only become bitter and violent in “comparatively recent times.” So, what caused this trivial division over horse-racing teams to turn so deadly? In short, it was the Byzantine version of “identity politics.”
Modern sociological research helps explain the phenomenon. Decades of studies have demonstrated the dangerous power of the human tribal instinct. Surprisingly, it doesn’t require “primordial” ethnic or tribal distinctions to engage that impulse. Minor differences are often sufficient to elicit acute ingroup-outgroup discrimination. The psychologist Henri Tajfel demonstrated this in a landmark series of studies to determine how minor those differences can be. In each successive study, Tajfel divided test subjects into groups according to increasingly trivial criteria, such as whether they preferred Klee or Kandinsky paintings or underestimated or overestimated the number of dots on a page. The results were as intriguing as they were disturbing: even the most trivial groupings induced discrimination.2, 3
However, the most significant and unexpected discovery was that simply telling subjects that they belonged to a group induced discrimination, even when the grouping was completely random. Upon learning they officially belonged to a group, the subjects reflexively adopted an us-versus-them, zero-sum game attitude toward members of other groups. Many other researchers have conducted related experiments with similar results: a government or an authority (like a researcher) designating group distinctions is, by itself, sufficient to spur contentious group rivalry. When group rewards are at stake, that rivalry is magnified and readily turns malign.
The extent to which authority-defined groups and competition for group benefits can foment nasty factionalism was demonstrated in the famous 1954 Robbers Cave experiment, in which researchers brought boys with identical socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds to a summer camp, dividing them randomly into two official groups. They initially kept the two groups separate and encouraged them to bond through various group activities. The boys, who had not known each other before, developed strong group cohesion and a sense of shared identity. The researchers then pitted the groups against each other in contests for group rewards to see if inter-group hostility would arise. The group antagonism escalated far beyond their expectations. The two groups eventually burned each other’s flags and clothing, trashed each other’s cabins, and collected rocks to hurl at each other. Camp staff had to intervene repeatedly to break up brutal fights. The mounting hostility and risk of violence induced the researchers to abort that phase of the study.4 Other researchers have replicated this experiment: one follow-up study resulted in knife fights, and a researcher was so traumatized he had to be hospitalized for a week.5, 6
How does this apply to the Blues and Greens? As in the Tajfel experiments, the Byzantine race factions had formed a group division based on a trivial distinction—the preference for a color and a horse racing team. However, for many years, the rivalry remained relatively benign. This was likely because the emperors had long played down the factional distinction and maintained a tradition of race neutrality: if they favored a faction, they avoided openly showing it. But that tradition ended a few years before the Nika Riot when emperors began openly supporting either one faction or the other. But more importantly, they extended their support outside the hippodrome with official policies that benefited members of their preferred faction. The emperors Marcian, Anastasius, and Justinian adopted official employment preferences, allocating positions to members of their favored faction and blocking the other faction from coveted jobs. To cast it in modern terms, they began a program of “race-based” affirmative action and identity politics.7, 8
In nearly all the countries where affirmative action programs have been implemented, they have an invidious effect on the group that benefits, imbuing them with a sense of insecurity and defensiveness over the benefits they receive.
Official recognition of the group distinction enhanced the us-versus-them sense of difference between the factions, and the affirmative action scheme turned this sense of difference into bitter antagonism, which eventually exploded in violence. Procopius, our primary contemporary source, placed the blame for the mounting antagonism and the riots squarely on Justinian’s program of identity politics. It had not only promoted an us-versus-them mindset in the factions, it also incited vicious enmity between them, turning a trivial color preference and sporting rivalry into a deadly “race war.”
Considering how identity politics could elicit violence from randomly assembled groups like the Blues and Greens, it is easy to imagine how disastrous identity politics can be when applied to groups that already have some long-standing, historic sense of difference. Indeed, there have been numerous instances of this in history, most ending tragically. For example, Tutsis and Hutus enjoyed centuries of relatively peaceful coexistence in Rwanda up until Belgian colonialists arrived; when the Belgians issued identity cards distinguishing the two groups and instituted affirmative action, it ossified a formerly porous group distinction and infused it with bitter rivalry, preparing the path to genocide. Likewise, when Yugoslavia instituted its “nationality key” system, with educational and employment quotas for the country’s constituent ethnic groups, it hardened group distinctions, pitting the groups against each other and setting the stage for genocide in the Balkans. And, when the Sri Lankan government opted for identity politics and affirmative action, it spawned violent conflict and genocide that destroyed a once peaceful and prosperous country. This last example—Sri Lanka—is so illustrative of the dangers of identity politics that we’ll examine it in more detail.
Sri Lanka: How Identity Politics Destroyed Paradise
She is a fabulous isle just south of India’s teeming shore, land of paradise … with a proud and democratic people … Her flag is the flag of freedom, her citizens are dedicated to the preservation of that freedom … Her school system is as progressive as it is democratic. —1954 TWA TOURIST VIDEO
Sri Lanka is an island off India’s southeast coast blessed with copious amounts of arable land and natural resources. It has an ethnically diverse population, with the two main groups being Sinhalese (75 percent) and Tamils (15 percent). Before Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, there was a long history of harmony between these groups. That history goes back at least to the fourteenth century when the Arab traveler Ibn Battuta observed how the different groups “show respect” for each other and “harbor no suspicions.” On the eve of Sri Lanka’s independence, a British governor lauded the “large measure of fellowship and understanding” that prevailed, and a British soldiers’ guide noted that “there are no historic antagonisms to overcome.” With quiescent communal relations, abundant natural resources, and one of the highest literacy rates in the developing world, newly independent Sri Lanka was poised to flourish and prosper. Nobody doubted it would outperform countries like South Korea and Singapore, with the British governor dubbing it “the best bet in Asia.”
It turned out to be a very poor bet. A few years after Sri Lanka’s independence, violent communal conflict erupted, culminating in a protracted civil war and genocide. By the time it ended, over a million people had been displaced or killed. Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP, which was on par with South Korea’s in 1960, was only one-tenth of it by 2009. As in sixth-century Byzantium, identity politics precipitated the calamity.
Turning a Disparity into a DisasterAt the end of British colonial rule in Sri Lanka, there was significant educational and income disparity between Sinhalese and Tamils. This arose by happenstance rather than because of discriminatory policy. The island’s north, where Tamils predominate, is arid and poor in resources. Because of this, the Tamils devoted their productive energy toward developing human capital, focusing on education and cultivating professional skills. This focus was abetted by American missionaries, who set up schools in the north, providing top-notch English-language education, particularly in math and the physical sciences. As a result, Tamils accounted for an outsized proportion of the better-educated people on the island, particularly in higher-paying fields like engineering and medicine.
Because of the Tamils’ superior education, the British colonial administration hired them disproportionately compared to the Sinhalese. In 1948, for example, Tamils accounted for 40 percent of the clerical workers employed by the colonial government, greatly outstripping their 15 percent share of the overall population. This unequal outcome had nothing to do with overt discrimination against the Sinhalese; it merely reflected the different levels and types of education achieved by the different ethnic groups.
When Sri Lanka gained independence, it passed a constitution that prohibited discrimination based on ethnicity. But a few years after that, an opportunist politician, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, figured he could advance his career by cynically appealing to identity politics, stoking Sinhalese envy over the Tamils’ over-representation in higher education and government. He launched a divisive campaign to eliminate the disparity, which spurred the majority Sinhalese to elect him. After his election in 1956, Bandaranaike passed a law that changed the official language from English to Sinhala and consigned students to separate Tamil and Sinhalese education “streams” rather than having them all learn English. As one Sinhalese journalist wrote, this divided Sri Lanka, depriving it of its “link language”:
That began a great divide that has widened over the years. Children now go to segregated schools or study in separate streams in the same school. They don’t get to know other people of their own age group unless they meet them outside.
Beyond eliminating Sri Lanka’s common “link language,” this law also functioned as a de facto affirmative action program for Sinhalese. Tamils, who spoke Tamil at home and received their higher education in English, could not gain Sinhala proficiency quickly enough to meet the government’s requirement. So, many of them lost their jobs to Sinhalese. For example, the percentage of Tamils employed in government administrative services dropped dramatically: from 30 percent in 1956 to five percent in 1970; the percentage in the armed forces dropped from 40 percent to one percent.
As has happened in many other countries, Sri Lanka’s identity politics went hand-in-hand with expanded government. Sinhalese politicians made it clear: government would be the tool to redress perceived ethnic disparities. It would allocate more jobs and resources, and that allocation would be based on ethnicity. As one historian writes: “a growing perception of the state as bestowing public goods selectively began to emerge, challenging previous views and breeding mistrust between ethnic communities.” Tamils responded to this by launching a non-violent resistance campaign. With ethnic dividing lines now clearly drawn, mobs of Sinhalese staged anti-Tamil counter-demonstrations and then riots in which hundreds—mostly Tamils—were killed. The us-versus-them mentality was setting in.
Bandaranaike was eventually assassinated by radicals within his own movement. But his widow, Sirimavo, who was subsequently elected prime minister, resolved to maintain his top priorities—expansive government and identity politics. She nationalized numerous industries and launched development projects that were directed by ethnic and political considerations rather than actual need. She also removed the constitutional ban on ethnic discrimination so that she could aggressively expand affirmative action. The existing policies had already cost so many Tamils their jobs that they were now under-represented in government. However, they remained over-represented in higher education, particularly in the sciences, a disparity that Sirimavo and her political allies resolved to eliminate. In a scheme that American universities like Harvard would later emulate, the Sri Lankan universities began to reject high-scoring Tamil applicants in favor of manifestly less-qualified Sinhalese with vastly lower test scores.
Just like Justinian’s “race” preferences, the Sri Lankan affirmative action program exacerbated us-versus-them attitudes, deepening the group divide and spurring enmity between groups. As one Sri Lankan observed:
Identity was never a question for thousands of years. But now, here, for some reason, it is different … Friends that I grew up with, [messed around] with, got drunk with, now see an essential difference between us just for the fact of their ethnic identity. And there are no obvious differences at all, no matter what they say. I point to pictures in the newspapers and ask them to tell me who is Sinhalese and who is Tamil, and they simply can’t tell the difference. This identity is a fiction, I tell you, but a deadly one.9
The lessons of the various affirmative action programs in Sri Lanka were clear to everyone: individuals’ access to education and government employment would be determined by ethnic group membership rather than individual merit, and political power would determine how much each group got. If you wanted your share, you needed to mobilize as a group and acquire and maintain political power at any cost. The divisive effects of these lessons would be catastrophic.
The realization that they would forever be at the mercy of an ethnic spoils system, along with the violent attacks perpetrated against them, induced the Tamils to form resistance organizations—most notably, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE attacked both Sri Lankan government forces and individual Sinhalese, initiating a deadly spiral of attacks and reprisals by both sides committing the sort of atrocities that are tragically common in ethnic conflicts: burning people alive, torture, mass killings, and so on. Over the following decades, the conflict continued to fester, periodically escalating into outright civil war. Ultimately, over a million people would be killed or displaced.
The timeline of the Sri Lankan conflict establishes how communal violence originated from identity politics rather than the underlying income and occupational disparity between the groups. That disparity reached its apex at the beginning of the twentieth century. Yet, there was no communal violence at that point or during the next half-century. It was only after the introduction of affirmative action programs that ethnic violence erupted. The deadliest attacks on Tamils occurred an entire decade after those programs had enabled Sinhalese to surpass Tamils in both income and education. As Thomas Sowell observed: “It was not the disparities which led to intergroup violence but the politicizing of those disparities and the promotion of group identity politics.”10
Consequences of Identity Politics in Sri Lanka and BeyondSri Lanka’s experience highlights some underappreciated consequences of identity politics. Most notably, one would expect that affirmative action programs would have warmed the feelings of the Sinhalese toward the Tamils. After all, they were receiving preferences for jobs and education at the Tamils’ expense. Yet, precisely the opposite happened: as the affirmative action programs were implemented, Sinhalese animus toward the Tamils progressively worsened. This pattern has been repeated in nearly all the countries where affirmative action has been implemented: affirmative action programs have an invidious effect on the group that benefits, imbuing them with a sense of insecurity and defensiveness over the benefits they receive. That group tends to justify the indefinite continuation of these benefits by claiming that the other group continues to enjoy “privilege”—or by demonizing them and claiming that they are “systemically” advantaged. Thus, the beneficiaries of affirmative action are often the ones to initiate hostilities. In Rwanda, for example, it was Hutu affirmative action beneficiaries who perpetrated the violence, not Tutsis. The situation in Sri Lanka was analogous, with Sinhalese instigating all of the initial riots and pogroms against the Tamils.
One knock-on effect of identity politics in Sri Lanka was that it ultimately benefited some of the wealthiest and most privileged people in the country. The government enacted several affirmative action schemes, each increasingly contrived to benefit well-heeled Sinhalese. The last of these implemented a regional quota system that was devised so that aristocratic Sinhalese living in the Kandy region would compete for spots against poor, undereducated Tamil farm workers. As one Tamil who lost his spot in engineering wrote: “They effectively claimed that the son of a Sinhalese minister in an elite Colombo school was disadvantaged vis-à-vis a Tamil tea plucker’s son.” This follows the pattern of many other affirmative action programs around the world: the greatest beneficiaries are typically the most politically connected (and privileged) individuals within the group receiving affirmative action. They are often wealthier and more privileged than many of the individuals against whom affirmative action is directed. This has been well documented in India, which has extensive data on the subgroups that benefit from its affirmative action programs.
One unexpected consequence of identity politics in Sri Lanka was rampant corruption. When Sri Lanka became independent, its government was widely deemed one of the least corrupt in the developing world. However, as affirmative action programs were implemented and expanded, corruption increased in lockstep. The adoption of affirmative action set a paradigm that pervaded the government: whoever held power could steer government resources to whomever they deemed “underserved.” A baleful side effect of ethnicity-based distortion of government policy is that it undermines and erodes more general standards of government integrity and transparency, legitimating a paradigm of corruption: if it is acceptable to direct policy for the benefit of an ethnic group, is it not also acceptable to do so for the benefit of a clan or an individual? It is a small step to go from one to the other, a step that many Sri Lankan leaders and bureaucrats took. Today, Sri Lanka’s government, which once rivaled European governments in transparency, remains highly corrupt. This pattern has been repeated in other countries. For example, after the Federation of Malaysia expelled Singapore, it adopted an extensive affirmative action program, whereas Singapore prohibited ethnic preferences. Malaysia subsequently experienced proliferating corruption, whereas Singapore is one of the least corrupt countries in the world today.
Perhaps the most profound consequence of identity politics in Sri Lanka was that it ultimately made everybody in the country worse off. After World War II, per capita income in Sri Lanka and Singapore was nearly identical. But after it abandoned its shared “link language” and adopted ethnically divisive policies, Sri Lanka was plagued by violent conflict and economic underperformance; today, one Singaporean earns more than seven Sri Lankans put together. All the group preferences devised to elevate Sinhalese brought down everyone in the country—Tamil, Sinhalese, and all the other groups alike. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s “founding father,” attributed that failure to Sri Lanka’s divisive policies, saying that if Singapore had implemented similar policies, “we would have perished politically and economically.” There are echoes of this in other countries that have implemented identity politics. When I visited Rwanda, I asked Rwandans of various backgrounds whether they thought distinguishing people by race or ethnicity ever helped anyone in their country. There was complete unanimity on this point: after they got over pondering why anyone would ask such a naïve question, they made it very clear that distinguishing people by group made everyone, whether Hutu or Tutsi, distinctly worse off. In the Balkans, I got similar answers from Bosnians, Croatians, Serbians, and Kosovars.
The Perilous Path of Identity PoliticsDecades of sociological research and millennia of history have demonstrated that the tribal instinct is both powerful and hardwired into human behavior. As political scientist Harold Isaacs writes:
If anything emerges plainly from our long look at the nature and functioning of basic group identity, it is the fact that the we-they syndrome is built in. It does not merely distinguish, it divides … the normal responses run from … indifference to depreciation, to contempt, to victimization, and, not at all seldom, to slaughter.11
The history of Byzantium and Sri Lanka demonstrates that this tribal instinct is extremely easy to provoke. All it takes is official recognition of group distinctions and some group preferences to balkanize people into bitterly antagonistic groups, and the consequences are potentially dire. Even if a society that is balkanized in this way avoids violent conflict, it is still likely to be plagued by all the concomitants of social fractionalization: higher corruption, lower social trust, and abysmal economic performance.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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It is therefore troubling to see the U.S. government and institutions adopt Sri Lankan-style policies that emphasize group distinctions. Echoing Sri Lanka’s separate language “streams,” many American universities now have ethnically segregated orientation and graduation ceremonies. Some offer “theme houses”—dormitories segregated by ethnicity. An Illinois public high school offers separate mathematics classes for Black and Latino students. As the U.S. continues down the perilous path of identity politics, it is unlikely to devolve into another Bosnia or Sri Lanka overnight. But the example of Sri Lanka is a dire warning: a country that was once renowned for its communal harmony quickly descended into violence and economic failure—all because it sought to redress group disparities with identity politics.
Surveys and statistics are now flashing warning signs in the United States. A Gallup poll found that while 70 percent of Black Americans believed that race relations in the United States were either good or very good in 2001, only 33 percent did in 2021.12 Other statistics have shown that hate crimes have been on the rise over that time.13 In the last year, we have also seen the spectacle of angry anti-Israel protesters hammering on the doors of a college hall, terrorizing the Jewish students locked inside, and a Stanford professor telling Jewish students to stand in the corner of a classroom. While identity politics have increasingly directed public policy and institutions, ethnic relations have deteriorated rapidly. This—and a lot of history—suggest it’s time for a different approach.
About the AuthorJens Kurt Heycke was educated in Economics and Near Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago, the London School of Economics, and Princeton University. He worked as an early employee or executive in several successful technology startups. Since retiring from tech, he has worked as a writer and researcher, conducting field research in more than forty countries, from Bosnia to Botswana. He is the author of Out of the Melting Pot, Into the Fire: Multiculturalism in the World’s Past and America’s Future.
References1. Procopius (1914). History of The Wars, Books I and II, trans. H. B. Dewing. Macmillan. 2. https://bit.ly/49BIyJN 3. https://bit.ly/3OVJ8tp 4. Sherif, M. (1961). The Robbers Cave Experiment: Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. University of Oklahoma Press. 5. Diab, L. N. (1970). A study of intragroup and intergroup relations among experimentally produced small groups. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 82(1), 49–82. 6. Rabbie, J. M. (1982). The Effects of Intergroup Competition and Cooperation on Intragroup and Intergroup Relations. In Cooperation and Helping Behavior (pp. 123–149). Academic Press. 7. Malalas, J., Jeffreys, E., Jeffreys, M., & Scott, R. (1986). The Chronicle of John Malalas: A Translation. Australian Association for Byzantine Studies. 8. Procopius (1927). Secret History, trans. Richard Atwater. Pascal Covici, Inc. 9. McGowan, W. (1993). Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka. Pan Books. 10. Sowell, T. (2004). Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study. Yale University Press. 11. Isaacs, H. (1975). Idols of the Tribe. Harper & Row. 12. https://bit.ly/3Td5l8W 13. https://bit.ly/3IgvNZ3
I recently wrote a piece for Skeptic titled “Ranking Presidents: Does It Make Any Sense?”, in which I outlined three reasons why ranking Presidents against one another is a fool’s errand: presentism, the evolving role of the presidency, and sui generis.1 The current trend of the first of these criteria, presentism, becomes problematic when applied to entertainment made for previous generations. Viewing and evaluating the culture of the past through a contemporary lens has led to erasing history in at least three relatively recent incidents. This is, I believe, a slippery slope toward censorship and a missed opportunity for valuable lessons about our collective past.
In 1991, Disney released a video version of their 1940 masterpiece Fantasia, describing it as “a meticulously restored version of the original, full-length film.” It wasn’t, though. The version Disney released omitted an original scene in which a Black centaurette named Sunflower is shown shining shoes of a White centaur.2 Seen today, Sunflower is a patently offensive stereotype.3 Ten years later Disney released the censored version for the film’s 60th anniversary DVD.4 Disney’s use of racist stereotypes is not limited to Fantasia. In varying degrees, such tropes are seen in Dumbo (1941),5 Peter Pan (1953),6 The Aristocats (1970),7 and Aladdin (1992).8
In 2020, the company (admirably, in my view) took steps toward addressing this controversy by adding disclaimers to their films on their streaming services, noting the “harmful impact” of racist stereotypes. Unlike the quiet actions the company took censoring the re-releases of Fantasia, the films are viewable in their original forms.
This begs the question: If the racism was so apparent, why weren’t these films decried upon initial release? The answer is they weren’t considered offensive by the public at the time, and applying today’s attitudes toward race crystallizes the fallacy of presentism.
In 2014, Ruth Wise, professor emerita of Yiddish and Comparative Literatures at Harvard, criticized Fiddler on the Roof (1971) for sacrificing Jewish identity to make the musical more universally appealing.9 The problem with Wise’s argument is (again) presentism. In the early 1970s, MASH writers employed rape jokes,10 and America’s most popular sitcom (All in the Family*) featured a working-class bigot who employed racial slurs for laughs.11 John Lennon released a song titled “Woman is The (N-word) of the World”12 and Richard Pryor would use the same racial epithet in an album title three years later.13 Our attitudes towards cultural authenticity and appropriation have evolved since the early 1970s.
In 2020, a 1988 Golden Girls episode called “Mixed Feelings” was pulled from the streaming platform Hulu due to “a scene in which Betty White and Rue McClanahan are mistaken for wearing blackface.”14 In the episode, Dorothy’s (White) son introduces his fiancé, a much older Black woman. Blanche and Rose are mortified with embarrassment when they unexpectedly meet the couple wearing cosmetic mud masks.
Were Rose and Blanche revisiting a minstrel show to characterize Black Americans as lazy, hypersexual thieves, ala “Amos ‘n Andy,” as minstrel shows were in the past?15 Of course not. The joke lay in their mutual embarrassment of appearing as if they were in blackface.16 Each Golden Girls actress (Betty White, Bea Arthur, Rue McClanahan, and Estelle Getty) came of age decades before the women’s movement, but their show was considerably progressive for their time. In its seven-year run, The Golden Girls featured episodes centered on then-controversial topics of racism, sexual harassment, same-sex marriage, age discrimination, homelessness, the death of children, and addiction.17 Perhaps most significantly, a 1990 episode titled “72 Hours,” has Rose worried that she may have come in contact with HIV.18 It was only five years prior that President Reagan first addressed the AIDS crisis, by which time 42,600 people had died from the disease. By 1990, that number had spiked to 310,000, a third of which were deaths occurring that same year.19 When one considers the climate of the times, airing the episode was courageous.
The same year “Mixed Feelings” was removed from Hulu, an actor named François Clemmons published Officer Clemmons: A Memoir. Clemmons played “Officer Clemmons” on Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood in the late 1960s, the first African American actor to have a recurring role on a children’s television program.20 In Clemmon’s mostly heartwarming book, he relates an incident in which Fred Rogers called him into his office. His boss said to him, “Someone has informed us that you were seen at the local gay bar downtown. Now, I want you to know, Franc, that if you’re gay, it doesn’t matter to me at all. Whatever you say and do is fine with me, but if you’re going to be on the show as an important member of the Neighborhood, you can’t be out as gay.”
Was Mr. Rogers homophobic? When Rogers had the conversation with Clemmons, homosexuality was still listed as a disorder in the DSM. It wasn’t until 1974 that it was replaced with “sexual orientation disturbance.”21 In reality, Fred Rogers, a Presbyterian minister, was an LGBTQ ally. He’d intentionally hired gay men and women since the 1960s and rebuffed efforts from his viewers to renounce homosexuality.22
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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In John Hughes’ The Breakfast Club (1985)23 and Jeff Kanus’ Revenge of the Nerds (1984),24 there are scenes of sexual assault upon women played for laughs. Both Gene Siskel and Roger Ebert (renowned film critics) praised each film, neither noting their discomfort with the now-troubling scenes in either review.25, 26, 27 Why did they fail to do so? Were both Siskel and Ebert misogynists willing to overlook scenes of women being sexually assaulted? Of course not. The social mores in the early 1980s didn’t apply to those we share today. Are these scenes excusable? No, but both actresses (Molly Ringwald and Julie Montgomery) have publicly reckoned with the blatant sexism in their roles and neither has insisted the scenes be omitted.28, 29
In 2022, the UK’s Channel 5 aired the 1961 classic Breakfast at Tiffany’s, but bowdlerized scenes of Mickey Rooney as “Mr. Yunioshi,” an over-the-top yellow-face Asian caricature.30 Should Rooney’s role be excised? No. Just like the racist characters in Disney movies of the 1940s–1990s, and the sexual assaults depicted for laughs in 1980s raunchy comedies, the climate in 1961 was different.
Pop culture of the past is just that: of the past. Applying today’s standards to them is at best a fool’s errand and, at worst (as seen in the cases above) a slippery slope toward censorship. Entertainment from yesteryear should be taken in context while viewed in its entirety.
About the AuthorJohn D. Van Dyke is an academic and science educator. His personal website is vandykerevue.org.
References1. https://bit.ly/3vjUhOj 2. https://bit.ly/48YFeYe 3. https://bit.ly/49UFKaT 4. https://bit.ly/3TFD1w8 5. https://bit.ly/3TpvgcA 6. https://bit.ly/43p6fTb 7. https://bit.ly/43ltjm0 8. https://bit.ly/3TEanM6 9. https://bit.ly/3IHU5vb 10. https://bit.ly/3IJzVRu 11. https://bit.ly/3IHU9uV 12. Miles, B. & Badman, K. (2001). The Beatles Diary After the Break-Up: 1970–2001. Music Sales Group. 13. https://bit.ly/3TgVYE6 14. https://bit.ly/3VoMmKi 15. https://bit.ly/43koCJd 16. https://bit.ly/3IHHGYf 17. https://bit.ly/43lj6G0 18. https://bit.ly/43DFElP 19. https://bit.ly/3v783Ut 20. Clemmons, F. S. (2020). Officer Clemmons: A Memoir. Catapult. 21. https://bit.ly/3vg6XWj 22. https://bit.ly/49XehW4 23. https://bit.ly/4ahrvN1 24. https://bit.ly/3VmOGBu 25. https://bit.ly/3ViAR72 26. https://bit.ly/4cdaDJ4 27. https://bit.ly/4cj1RcG 28. https://bit.ly/3VmZOOP 29. https://bit.ly/492E65L 30. https://bit.ly/4chtAu9
On January 1, 2024, a skeptic from Malawi named Wonderful Mkhutche shared a video1 of a witch-hunting incident that took place days before on December 28, 2023. In the video, a local mob is shown burying an elderly woman. According to local sources, the woman was accused of causing the death of a family member who had passed away the previous day. These accusations often arise after family members consult local diviners, who claim to be able to identify suspects. In this instance, a local vigilante group abducted the woman. They were in the midst of burying her alive as punishment for allegedly using witchcraft to “kill” a relative when the police intervened and rescued her.
While witch-hunting is largely a thing of the past in the Western world, the persecution of alleged witches continues with tragic consequences in many parts of Africa. Malawi, located in Southeastern Africa, is one such place. Mr. Mkhutche reports that between 300 to 500 individuals accused of witchcraft are attacked and killed every year.
The Malawi Network of Older Persons’ Organizations reported that 15 older women were killed between January and February 2023.2 Local sources suggest that these estimates are likely conservative, as killings related to witchcraft allegations often occur in rural communities and go unreported. Witch-hunting is not limited to Malawi; it also occurs in other African countries. In neighboring Tanzania, for example, an estimated 3,000 people were killed for allegedly practicing witchcraft between 2005 and 2011, and about 60,000 accused witches were murdered between 1960 and 2000.3 Similar abuses occur in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, where those accused of witchcraft face severe mistreatment. They are attacked, banished, or even killed. Some alleged witches are buried alive, lynched, or strangled to death. In Ghana, some makeshift shelters—known as “witch camps”—exist in the northern region. Women accused of witchcraft flee to these places after being banished by their families and communities. Currently, around 1,000 women who fled their communities due to witchcraft accusations live in various witch camps in the region.4
The belief in the power of “evil magic” to harm others, causing illness, accidents, or even death, is deeply ingrained in many regions of Africa. Despite Malawi retaining a colonial-era legal provision that criminalizes accusing someone of practicing witchcraft, this law has not had a significant impact because it is rarely enforced. Instead, many people in Malawi favor criminalizing witchcraft and institutionalizing witch-hunting as a state-sanctioned practice. The majority of Malawians believe in witchcraft and support its criminalization,5 and many argue that the failure of Malawian law to recognize witchcraft as a crime is part of the problem, because it denies the legal system the mechanism to identify or certify witches. Humanists and skeptics in Malawi have actively opposed proposed legislation that recognizes the existence of witchcraft.6 They advocate for retaining the existing legislation and urge the government to enforce, rather than repeal, the provision against accusing someone of practicing witchcraft.
Islam7 and Christianity8 were introduced to Malawi in the 16th and 19th centuries by Western Christian missionaries and Arab scholars/jihadists, respectively. They coerced the local population to accept foreign mythologies as superior to traditional beliefs. Today, Malawi is predominantly Christian,9 but there are also Muslims and some remaining practitioners of traditional religions. And while the belief in witchcraft predates Christianity and Islam, religious lines are often blurred, as all the most popular religions contain narratives that sanctify and reinforce some form of belief in witchcraft. As a result, Malawians from various religious backgrounds share a belief in witchcraft.
Witch-hunting also has a significant health aspect, as accusations of witchcraft are often used to explain real health issues. In rural areas where hospitals and health centers are scarce, many individuals lack access to modern medical facilities and cannot afford modern healthcare solutions. Consequently, they turn to local diviners and traditional narratives to understand and cope with ailments, diseases, death, and other misfortunes.10
While witch-hunting occurs in both rural and urban settings, it is more prevalent in rural areas. In urban settings, witch-hunting is mainly observed in slums and overcrowded areas. One contributing factor to witch persecution in rural or impoverished urban zones is the limited presence of state police. Police stations are few and far apart, and the law against witchcraft accusations is rarely enforced11due to a lack of police officers and inadequate equipment for intervention. Recent incidents in Malawi demonstrate that mob violence, jungle justice, and vigilante killings of alleged witches are common in these communities.
Another significant aspect of witch-hunting is its highly selective nature. Elderly individuals, particularly women, are usually the targets. Why is this the case? Malawi is a patriarchal society where women hold marginalized sociocultural positions. They are vulnerable and easily scapegoated, accused, and persecuted. In many cases, children are the ones driving these accusations. Adult relatives coerce children to “confess” and accuse the elderly of attempting to initiate them into the world of witchcraft. Malawians believe that witches fly around at night in “witchcraft planes” to attend occult meetings in South Africa and other neighboring countries.12
The persistence of witch-hunting in Africa can be attributed to the absence of effective campaigns and measures to eliminate this unfounded and destructive practice. The situation is dire and getting worse. In Ghana, for example, the government plans on shutting down safe spaces for victims, and the president has declined to sign a bill into law that would criminalize witchcraft accusations and the act of witch-hunting.
For this reason, in 2020 I founded Advocacy for Alleged Witches (AfAW) with the aim of combating witch persecution in Africa. Our mission is to put an end to witch-hunting on the continent by 2030.13 AfAW was created to address significant gaps in the fight against witch persecution in Africa. One of our primary goals is to challenge the misrepresentation of African witchcraft perpetuated by Western anthropologists. They have often portrayed witch-hunting as an inherent part of African culture, suggesting that witch persecution serves useful socioeconomic functions. (This perspective arises from a broader issue within modern anthropology, where extreme cultural relativism sometimes leads to an overemphasis on the practices of indigenous peoples. This stems from an overcorrection of past trends that belittled all practices of indigenous peoples). Some Western scholars tend to present witchcraft in the West as a “wild” phenomenon, and witchcraft in Africa as having domestic value and benefit. The academic literature tends to explain witchcraft accusations and witch persecutions from the viewpoint of the accusers rather than the accused. This approach is problematic and dangerous, as it silences the voices of those accused of witchcraft and diminishes their predicament.
Due to this misrepresentation, Western NGOs that fund initiatives to address abuses linked to witchcraft beliefs have waged a lackluster campaign. They have largely avoided describing witchcraft in Africa as a form of superstition, instead choosing to adopt a patronizing approach to tackling witch-hunting—they often claim to “respect” witchcraft as an aspect of African cultures.14 As a result, NGOs do not treat the issue of witch persecution in Africa with the urgency it deserves.
Likewise, African NGOs and activists have been complicit. Many lack the political will and funding to effectively challenge this harmful practice. In fact, many African NGO actors believe in witchcraft themselves! Witch-hunting persists in the region due to lack of accurate information, widespread misinformation, and insufficient action. To end witch-hunting, a paradigm shift is needed. The way witchcraft belief and witch-hunting are perceived and addressed must change.
AfAW aims to catalyze this crucial shift and transformation. It operates as a practical and applied form of skepticism, employing the principles of reason and compassion to combat witch-hunting. Through public education and enlightenment efforts, we question and debate witchcraft and ritual beliefs, aiming to dispel the misconceptions far too often used to justify abuses. Our goal is to try to engage African witchcraft believers in thoughtful dialogue, guiding them away from illusions, delusions, and superstitions.
The persistence of abuses linked to witchcraft and ritual beliefs in the region is due to a lack of robust initiatives applying skeptical thinking to the problem. To effectively combat witch persecution, information must be translated into action, and interpretations into tangible policies and interventions. To achieve this, AfAW employs the “informaction” theory of change, combining information dissemination with actionable steps.
At the local level, we focus on bridging the information and action gaps. Accusers are misinformed about the true causes of illnesses, deaths, and misfortunes, often attributing these events to witchcraft due to a lack of accurate information. Many people impute misfortunes to witchcraft because they are unaware of where to seek help or who or what is genuinely responsible for their troubles. This lack of understanding extends to what constitutes valid reasons and causal explanations for their problems.
As part of the efforts to end witch-hunting, we highlight misinformation and disinformation about the true causes of misfortune, illness, death, accidents, poverty, and infertility. This includes debunking the falsehoods that charlatans, con artists, traditional priests, pastors, and holy figures such as mallams and marabouts exploit to manipulate the vulnerable and the ignorant. At AfAW, we provide evidence-based knowledge, explanations, and interpretations of misfortunes.
Our efforts include educating the public on existing laws and mechanisms to address allegations of witchcraft. We conduct sensitization campaigns targeting public institutions such as schools, colleges, and universities. Additionally, we sponsor media programs, issue press releases, engage in social media advocacy, and publish articles aimed at dispelling myths and misinformation related to witch-hunting in the region.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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We also facilitate actions and interventions by both state and non-state agencies. In many post-colonial African states, governmental institutions are weak with limited powers and presence. One of our key objectives is to encourage institutional collaboration to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. We petition the police, the courts, and state human rights institutions. Our work prompts these agencies to act, collaborate, and implement appropriate measures to penalize witch-hunting activities in the region.
Additionally, AfAW intervenes to support individual victims of witch persecution based on their specific needs and the resources available. For example, in cases where victims have survived, we relocate them to safe places, assist with their medical treatment, and facilitate their access to justice. In situations where the accused have been killed, we provide support to the victims’ relatives and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice.
We get more cases than we can handle. With limited resources, we are unable to intervene in every situation we become aware of. However, in less than four years, our organization has made a significant impact through our interventions in Nigeria and beyond. We are deploying the canon of skeptical rationality to save lives, awaken Africans from their dogmatic and superstitious slumber, and bring about an African Enlightenment.
This is a real culture war, with real consequences, and skepticism is making a real difference.
About the AuthorLeo Igwe is a skeptic and director of the Advocacy for Alleged Witches which aims to end witch-hunting in Africa by 2030. His human rights fieldwork has led to his arrest on several occasions in Nigeria.
References1. https://bit.ly/3TyhZyc 2. https://bit.ly/3xiOmtD 3. https://bit.ly/3PMiovX 4. https://bit.ly/3vAPIze 5. https://bit.ly/43Iv24N 6. https://bit.ly/3IZamfu 7. https://bit.ly/3IYJvjR 8. https://bit.ly/3TVdzTz 9. https://bit.ly/3TVdCPf 10. https://bit.ly/3J0W8uz 11. https://bit.ly/3PHS7yM 12. https://bit.ly/4awJzTs 13. https://bit.ly/3IX6g7I 14. https://bit.ly/3Q7NIpp
We are three college professors who wish to call attention to a growing problem, namely the erosion of the foundational values of a college education: free inquiry and free speech, rationality and empiricism, civil discussion and debate, and openness to new ideas.
The Rise of Critical TheoriesCritical theory is a school of thought that has its roots in Marxist theories of human nature and society. It originally developed in Germany in the 1920s among a group of scholars at the Institute for Social Research. They were attempting to salvage some of the failed ideas of Marxism by extending theory to embrace non-economic forms of inequality and oppression.
Critical theorists believe that mainstream knowledge is used to promote the interests of the powerful. Unlike traditional social science, which aims to objectively describe human nature and society by carrying out scientific research, critical theory promotes ideological narratives as self-evidently true. Based on their theories about human nature and social justice, critical theorists promote political activism (or “praxis”), and at times even violent revolution, to achieve their goals.
The predecessor to critical theory, Marxism, simplistically divided people into groups labeled as oppressors or oppressed. Marxism’s original group division was economic—the groups were the oppressive Bourgeois (those who controlled the means of production) and the oppressed Proletariat (the workers). It tried to explain the systemic causes of these group divisions (capitalism) and it developed a set of proposed solutions, including violent revolution, that it presumed would lead to a utopian communist society. These steps, which we will call “Marxist methodology, subsequently became part of critical theories that then focused on additional ways of dividing people into categories of oppressors and oppressed. The Marxist methodology follows the steps shown in Table 1.
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- Divide people into two (or more) groups.
- Label one group as the oppressed (“the good”), the other as the oppressors (“the bad”).
- Develop a theory that purports to explain the systemic causes of this division. The theory is often conspiratorial in nature—oppressors are seen as scheming to keep the oppressed in their place.
- Identify and implement solutions. Encourage group solidarity among the oppressed group, promote an “us-versus-them” mentality, groupthink, and adherence to the party line, invent insulting labels to brand members of the out-group, and engage in activism and/or revolution that will purportedly end those social injustices.
Many social movements based on critical theories have used this Marxist methodology, as noted in Table 1.
All these ideological movements have restricted free speech, encouraged an “us” versus “them” political tribalism, employed personal ad hominem attacks against opponents, and promoted cancellation campaigns. While it is important to respect diversity and historical injustices, we should keep in mind that truly liberal worldviews emphasize our common humanity—which is far less divisive.
What Does “Social Justice” Mean?The new higher education mantra, “social justice” sounds good, but it in fact can refer to either of two often mutually exclusive philosophies: liberal social justice or critical social justice. Though few acknowledge it, increasingly social justice is sold as the former, but practiced as the latter. Consider how they compare in the Table 2.
Click table to enlarge
As is evident, liberal social justice and critical social justice employ two very different methods in determining what constitutes social justice.
Language RevisionismCritical social justice activists often use the “Motte and Bailey strategy” (see Table 3) to make extreme proposals appear moderate. In this gambit a highly defensible “Motte” position is promoted, while successively working toward a more radical “Bailey” position. This gambit is used often in postmodernist discourses. For example, by asserting that morality is socially constructed, the Motte is that our beliefs are socially influenced, and the Bailey is that there is no such thing as morality or truth. Another example:
- A (non-controversial) Motte position: “We want social justice.” This statement is difficult to argue against, as just about everyone believes in fairness (though they may differ in how they define the term or how to achieve it).
- A (controversial) Bailey position: “We need to re-define social justice as critical social justice and we need to make fundamental (sometimes radical) changes to our society including ending the rule of law, free speech, property rights, and merit systems.” This statement is much more controversial than the Motte, as it suggests that the current social order is inherently unjust and so needs to be overthrown.
Here are more examples of the Motte and Bailey strategies with respect to the re-definition of some commonly used words.
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What is social justice when re-interpreted from a critical social justice lens?1Again, the term “social justice” in common language refers to the liberal social justice conceptions of individual rights and responsibilities, equal opportunity, blind justice, equality before the law, etc., as noted above. These ideas evolved from historic common law, the Enlightenment (particularly the Scottish Enlightenment), and U.S. constitutionalism.
However, over recent decades the term social justice has come to be redefined in terms of critical, not liberal, social justice. This re-definition was accomplished surreptitiously through the Motte and Bailey gambit, and it also allowed the more radical philosophy of critical theory itself to be covertly introduced into college campuses while flying under the academic radar. By analogy, the term “social justice” has been used as a terminological Trojan horse to insert critical social justice and critical theory into the academy under the guise of liberal social justice.
Restrictions on Freedom of Speech and Open InquiryThis sort of critical social justice activism and indoctrination (as opposed to exposing students to these perspectives in the context of discussing and debating the respective strengths and weaknesses of a range of perspectives) is the opposite of free expression and open inquiry, and thus it is the antithesis of the foundational values of traditional higher education.
Often mere attempts to question how, why, or whether X-injustice is happening leads to accusations that the questioner must be a bigoted “X-ist” or “X-phobe.” Questioning is often dismissed by critical theorists as defensive rhetoric employed to defend one’s privilege and power. The questioner needs thus be silenced, ostracized, and/or canceled. As documented by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), this has in fact happened thousands of times.
Some Examples of Restriction of Speech and Open InquiryA series of large-scale empirical studies beginning in the year 2000 found that both students and professors report fearing to express or explore political and ideological viewpoints that are critical of critical theory.2 Further, campuses have little ideological diversity among faculty and administrators, with typically a 12:1 ratio of liberal/progressive to conservative/libertarian, and many departments and some whole fields lacking any conservative or libertarian faculty members. Studies document that many professors freely admit to discriminating against colleagues and students who support liberal, rather than critical, conceptions of social justice. Here are some recent representative examples:
- Bret Weinstein, a former professor of biology at Evergreen State College in Olympia, WA, was deplatformed and forced to resign after he was accused of racism and white privilege for refusing to participate in a “Day of Absence,” which asked white faculty to stay off campus for the day to celebrate people of color.
- Lindsay Shepherd, a teaching assistant at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada, was suspended after she showed her class a video of a debate about gender pronouns. She was accused of violating the university’s policy on discrimination and harassment.
- Dorian Abbot, an associate professor of geophysics at the University of Chicago, was disinvited from giving a prestigious lecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) after he wrote an opinion piece criticizing diversity initiatives and instead supporting meritbased college admissions, hiring, and promotions.
- Nicholas Christakis, a professor of sociology at Yale University, was placed on administrative leave after he sent an email to students urging them to be civil to those with whom they disagree.
- Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Dutch politician and women’s rights activist who herself suffered female genital mutilation as a child in a traditional Islamic society, was disinvited from speaking at the University of California, Berkeley, after students protested her views on Islam.
Critical Pedagogy: Political Activism in the ClassroomCritical pedagogy is an ideological approach to teaching that attempts to impose political views and activism in the classroom that are consistent with critical theory. It was founded by the Brazilian philosopher and educator Paulo Freire, who promoted it through his 1968 book Pedagogy of the Oppressed. It pressures students to adopt a specific political ideology and rejects dissenting views. Doing so takes time away from developing core academic skills, including critical thinking skills.
At its worst, critical pedagogy can produce an environment where some professors and administrators try to tell students not how to think, but what to think. Professors should not be using the lectern as an activist bully pulpit to push their personal ideological or political beliefs. Since professors are in positions of power relative to their students, such activism in the classroom is unethical and constitutes professional misconduct. Students should not be expected to conform to ideologies or dogmas in the classroom.
It is unfortunate that students will very likely be subject to activism on the part of some of their professors and even some fellow students. If they disagree with them, they may at times feel that they should keep their thoughts to themselves. But do not. Speak up!
Spotting Education v. IndoctrinationTo be clear, although we do not subscribe to critical theory because of the difficulties with it that we (and many others) have identified, we do not object to a professor teaching or discussing critical theory and critical social justice and presenting his or her opinions about matters based on those perspectives. College is all about exposing students to a range of ideas and opinions. However, professors should not attempt to indoctrinate their students with critical theory or anything else, and they should expose students to a range of perspectives on various issues. Below are a few pointers to help students to identify whether a course or a professor is promoting critical theory through indoctrination rather than education.
Courses that educate tend to have:
- A Balance of Perspectives: Look for courses that present multiple viewpoints and encourage open discussion. A balanced education should expose students to various ideas, even those that challenge the prevailing consensus.
- Freedom of Thought: If a course or professor discourages questioning or presents information as absolute truth without room for debate, it might be indoctrination. In contrast to a fundamentalist religion, education encourages students to question, analyze, and form their own conclusions.
- An Evidence-Based Approach: Knowledge should be grounded in research, evidence, and historical context. If a course lacks substantial evidence to support its claims or relies primarily on emotional appeals, it is less education than indoctrination.
- Engagement with Opposing Views: A healthy educational environment should encourage engaging with opposing viewpoints. If a course dismisses or demonizes dissenting perspectives, it could be leaning towards indoctrination.
Whereas courses that indoctrinate tend to:
- Discourage Disagreement: The professor discourages students from challenging their favored concepts and ideals.
- Rely on Emotional Appeals and Ad Hominem Attacks: The professor uses emotional appeals and personal attacks to silence dissent. Campus activism can be covert rather than overt, with the professor communicating to students what is acceptable or not based on their reactions to student comments, the topics they select to discuss and to omit, their grading practices and feedback, how they interact with and treat students having different opinions, or even their body language when talking about various topics.
A 2007 American Association of University Professors (AAUP) subcommittee report stated such activist professors present their favored worldview “dogmatically, without allowing students to challenge their validity or advance alternative understandings” and such instructors “insist that students accept as truth propositions that are in fact professionally contestable.” Given that professors are in a position of power over their students, this type of behavior is especially inappropriate. And, as far back as 1915, the AAUP advised that professors “should, in dealing with [controversial] subjects, set forth justly, without suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions” on the issue. This 1915 advisory is still in effect. Indeed, any failure to do so may constitute an ethical breach. Professors should teach students about different sides of an issue and do so fairly, rather than pretending there is just one permitted viewpoint, as in a Marxist or authoritarian organization or system.
What Should Be Done?First, if students encounter a professor that they believe is using the classroom to engage in ideological or political activism, students should speak up. That may be less risky than students think. Remember, education should empower students to engage in critical thinking and constructive dialogue. If students encounter concerning situations, approach professors for respectful discussions. If needed, seek guidance from department chairs or administrators who value open inquiry. There usually are some.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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Often, students cannot rely on their institution’s hierarchy alone—indeed they may be part of the problem. Moreover, there is safety in numbers. Enlist parents and outside organizations to lobby college or university to ensure that it is promoting intellectual diversity, open inquiry, and free thought. (A very simple change is to ask that course evaluations include questions on whether students felt free to voice their opinions in class, whether the professor dealt fairly with students having divergent views, and whether different sides of controversial issues were presented or discussed.)
Today, there are numerous organizations to help students. Currently, the most prominent bipartisan protectors and promoters of free thought are the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) and Speech First. The important thing to remember is that you are not alone. Aside from those organizations, it is certain that many others at their institution will be rooting for students, even if they feel that they can only do so privately.
Second, know that when confronted with transparency (sometimes supplemented with attorneys), bullies tend to back down.
Third, know that the trials students are facing now can make them stronger, and further, are nothing like those faced by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Vaclav Havel, Martin Luther King, Jr., Jackie Robinson, James Meredith, and thousands of others who faced suppression for their beliefs or their identity. The worst fate awaiting students would be having to transfer from a school which does not value free thought to one that does. Students have choices. Make them wisely.
About the AuthorMichael Mills is an evolutionary psychologist at Loyola Marymount University (LMU). He earned his B.A. from UC Santa Cruz and his Ph.D. from UC Santa Barbara. He has served as Chair, and as the Director of the Graduate Program, at the LMU Psychology Department. He serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals and on the executive board of the Society for Open Inquiry in the Behavioral Sciences (SOIBS).
Robert Maranto is the 21st Century Chair in Leadership in the Department of Education Reform at the University of Arkansas, where he studies bureaucratic reform and edits the Journal of School Choice. He has served on the Fayetteville School Board (2015-20) and currently serves on the executive board of the Society for Open Inquiry in the Behavioral Sciences (SOIBS). With others, he has produced about 100 refereed publications and 17 scholarly books so boring his own mother refused to read them, including President Obama and Education Reform (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012), Educating Believers: Religion and School Choice (Routledge, 2021), and The Free Inquiry Papers (AEI, 2024). He can be reached at rmaranto@uark.edu.
Richard E. Redding is the Ronald D. Rotunda Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence and Associate Dean, and Professor of Psychology and Education at Chapman University. He has written extensively on the importance of viewpoint and sociopolitical diversity in teaching, research, and professional practice. Notable publications include Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology: Nature, Scope, and Solutions (Springer, 2023); Sociopolitical Values at the Deep Culture in Culturally-Competent Psychotherapy (Clinical Psychological Science, 2023); and, Sociopolitical Diversity in Psychology: The Case for Pluralism (American Psychologist, 2001). He is the founding President of the Society for Open Inquiry in the Behavioral Sciences (soibs.com).
Organizations* The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE). In particular, see its College Free Speech Rankings: https://bit.ly/3T0kbyn * Campus Reform: campusreform.org * Heterodox Academy: heterodoxacademy.org * Academic Freedom Alliance: academicfreedom.org * Society for Open Inquiry in the Behavioral Sciences (SOIBS): soibs.com
Additional Resources* Infographic: Critical Theory and Classic Liberalism: https://bit.ly/3uMwOVP * “Universities must choose between truth or social justice, not both” by Jonathan Haidt https://bit.ly/3Il7ucw * “The Two Fiduciary Duties of Professors” by Jonathan Haidt https://bit.ly/49FJCwq
References1. This section relies heavily on three works. For the best conceptual analyses of various branches of critical theory, see Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay, Cynical Theories: How Activist Scholarship Made Everything About Race, Gender, and Identity. (Pitchstone Publishing). For a sound journalistic account about how critical theory spread across institutions, see Christopher F. Rufo, America’s Cultural Revolution: How the Radical Left Conquered Everything (Broadside Books). Though Rufo has become a political activist, we can attest that his journalistic work is sound, as least as regards those areas with which we are familiar. Finally, the best single work about how critical theory and other moral panics spread, particularly in higher education, remains Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt’s The Coddling of the American Mind (Penguin). Also see Kenny Xu’s School of Woke: How Critical Race Theory Infiltrated American Schools and Why We Must Reclaim Them. (Center Street) and Isaac Gottesman’s The Critical Turn in Education (Routledge) 2. Coddling of the American Mind; Eric Kaufmann, https://cspicenter.org/reports/academicfreedom/. Analyzing largescale surveys, political scientist Eric Kaufmann found over a third of conservative professors and doctoral students facing threats of discipline for their views. So have one in ten liberals, often censored by those farther left. Also see Richard E. Redding, “Psychologists’ Politics,” in Craig Frisby, Richard Redding, William O’Donohue, and Scott Lilienfeld, Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology: Nature, Scope, and Solutions (Springer), comprehensively reviewing all historical and current studies on the political views of professors and university administrators.
Over the past decade behavioral science, particularly psychology, has come under fire from critics for being fixated on progressive political ideology, most notably Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI). The critics’ evidence is, unfortunately, quite strong. For example, a recent volume, Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology,1 recounts many incidents of scholarly censorship and personal attacks that a decade ago might have only been conceivable as satire.
We believe that many problems plaguing contemporary behavioral science, especially for issues touching upon DEI, can best be understood, at their root, as a failure to adhere to basic scientific principles. In this essay, we will address three fundamental scientific principles: (1) Prioritize Objective Data Over Lived Experience; (2) Measure Well; and (3) Distinguish Appropriately Between Correlation and Causation. We will show how DEI scholarship often violates those principles, and offer suggestions for getting behavioral science back on track. “Getting back to the basics” may not sound exciting but, as athletes, musicians, and other performers have long recognized, reinforcing the fundamentals is often the best way to eliminate bad habits in order to then move forward.
The Failure to Adhere to Basic Scientific PrinciplesPrinciple #1: Prioritize Objective Data Over Lived ExperienceA foundational assumption of science is that objective truth exists and that humans can discover it.2, 3, 4, 5 We do this most effectively by proposing testable ideas about the world, making systematic observations to test the ideas, and revising our ideas based on those observations. A crucial point is that this process of proposing and testing ideas is open to everyone. A fifth grader in Timbuktu, with the right training and equipment, should be able to take atmospheric observations that are as valuable as those of a Nobel Prize-winning scientist from MIT. If the fifth grader’s observations are discounted, this should only occur because their measurement methods were poor, not because of their nationality, gender, age, family name, or any other personal attribute.
A corollary of science being equally open to all is that an individual’s personal experience or “lived experience” carries no inherent weight in claims about objective reality. It is not that lived experience doesn’t have value; indeed, it has tremendous value in that it provides a window into individuals’ perceptions of reality. However, perception can be wildly inaccurate and does not necessarily equate to reality. If that Nobel Prizewinning scientist vehemently disputed global warming because his personal experience was that temperatures have not changed over time, yet he provided no atmospheric measurements or systematic tests of his claim, other scientists would rightly ignore his statements—at least as regards the question of climate change.
The limited utility of a person’s lived experience seems obvious in most scientific disciplines, such as in the study of rocks and wind patterns, but less so in psychology. After all, psychological science involves the study of people—and they think and have feelings about their lived experiences. However, what is the case in other scientific disciplines is also the case in psychological science: lived experience does not provide a foolproof guide to objective reality.
To take an example from the behavioral sciences, consider the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study.6 At-risk boys were mentored for five years, from the ages of 10 to 15. They participated in a host of programs, including tutoring, sports, and community groups, and were given medical and psychiatric care. Decades later, most of those who participated claimed the program had been helpful. Put differently, their lived experience was that the program had a positive impact on their life. However, these boys were not any better in important outcomes relative to a matched group of at-risk boys who were not provided mentoring or extra support. In fact, boys in the program ended up more likely to engage in serious street crimes and, on average, they died at a younger age. The critical point is that giving epistemic authority to lived experience would have resulted in making inaccurate conclusions. And the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study is not an isolated example. There are many programs that people feel are effective, but when tested systematically turn out to be ineffective, at best. These include programs like DARE,7 school-wide mental health interventions,8 and—of course—many diversity training programs.9
DEI over-reach in behavioral science is intimately related to a failure within the scientific community to adhere to basic principles of science and appreciate important findings from the behavioral science literature.
Indeed, when it comes to concerns related to DEI, the scientific tenet of prioritizing testable truth claims over lived experience has often fallen to the wayside. Members of specific identity groups are given privilege to speak about things that cannot be contested by those from other groups. In other words, in direct contradiction of the scientific method, some people are granted epistemic authority based solely on their lived experience.10
Consider gender dysphoria. In the past decade, there has been a drastic increase in the number of people, particularly children and adolescents, identifying as transgender. Those who express the desire to biologically transition often describe their lived experience as feeling “born in the wrong body,” and express confidence that transition will dramatically improve their lives. We argue while these feelings must be acknowledged, they should not be taken as objective truth; instead, such feelings should be weighed against objective data on life outcomes of others who have considered gender transition and/or transitioned. And those data, while limited, suggest that many individuals who identify as transgender during childhood, but who do not medically transition, eventually identify again with the gender associated with their birth sex.11, 12 Although these are small, imperfect studies, they underscore that medical transition is not always the best option.
Caution in automatically acceding to a client’s preference to transition is particularly important among minors. Few parents and health care professionals would affirm a severely underweight 13-year-old’s claim that, based on their lived experience, they are fat and will only be happy if they lose weight. Nevertheless, many psychologists and psychiatrists make a similar mistake when they affirm a transgender child’s desire to transition without carefully weighing the risks. In one study, 65 percent of people who had detransitioned reported that their clinician, who often was a psychologist, “did not evaluate whether their desire to transition was secondary to trauma or a mental health condition.”13 The concern, in other words, is that lived experience is being given too much weight. How patients feel is important, but their feelings should be only one factor among many, especially if they are minors. Mental health professionals should know this, and parents should be able to trust them to act accordingly.
Principle #2: Measure WellAnother basic principle of behavioral science is that anything being measured must be measured reliably and validly. Reliability refers to the consistency of measurement; validity refers to whether the instrument is truly measuring what it claims to measure. For example, a triple beam balance is reliable if it yields the same value when repeatedly measuring the same object. The balance is valid if it yields a value of exactly 1 kg when measuring the reference kilogram (i.e., the International Prototype of the Kilogram), a platinum-iridium cylinder housed in a French vault under standardized conditions.
Behavioral scientists’ understanding of any concept is constrained by the degree to which they can measure it consistently and accurately. Thus, to make a claim about a concept, whether about its prevalence in a population or its relation to another concept, scientists must first demonstrate both the reliability and the validity of the measure being used. For some measures of human behavior, such as time spent listening to podcasts or number of steps taken each day, achieving good reliability and validity is reasonably straightforward. Things are generally more challenging for the self-report measures that psychologists often use.
Nevertheless, good measurement can sometimes be achieved, and the study of personality provides a nice model. In psychology, there are several excellent measures of the Big Five personality factors (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness).14 Individuals’ responses are highly reliable: people who rate themselves as highly extraverted as young adults rate themselves similarly years later. Moreover, personality assessments are valid: individuals’ responses correlate with their actual day-to-day behaviors, as reported by themselves and as observed by others.15 In other words, people who rate themselves as high (versus low) in extroversion on psychological questionnaires, for example, really do spend more time socializing.
However, not all psychological measures turn out to have solid reliability and validity. These include the popular Myers Briggs Type Indicator personality test and projective tests such as the Rorschach. Unfortunately, in the quest to support DEI, some concepts that fail the requirements of good measurement are used widely and without reservation. The concept of microaggressions, for example, has gained enormous traction despite its having fundamental measurement issues.
“Microaggressions” were brought to psychologists’ attention by Derald Wing Sue and colleagues.16 Originally described as “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults toward people of color” (p. 271),17 the concept has since expanded in use to describe brief, verbal or nonverbal, indignities directed toward a different “other.”18, 19
In 2017, Scott Lilienfeld discussed how the failure to adhere to the principles of good measurement has rendered the concept of microaggression “wide open,” without any clear anchors to reality.20 The primary weakness for establishing validity, that is, for establishing evidence of truly measuring what scientists claim to be measuring, is that “microaggression” is defined in the eye of the beholder.21 Thus, any person at any point can say they have been “microaggressed” against, and no one can test, let alone refute, the claim because it is defined solely by the claimant’s subjective appraisal—their lived experience.
As Scott Lilienfeld explained, the end result is that essentially anything, including opposing behaviors (such as calling on a student in class or not calling on a student in class) can be labeled a microaggression. A question such as, “Do you feel like you belong here?” could be perceived as a microaggression by one person but not by someone else; in fact, even the same person can perceive the same comment differently depending on their mood or on who asks the question (which would indicate poor reliability). Our criticism of microaggressions, then, spans concerns related to both weak measurement and an undue reliance on lived experience.
Another of psychology’s most famous recent topics is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which supposedly reveals implicit, or subconscious, bias. The IAT measures an individual’s reaction times when asked to classify pictures or text spatially. A video22 may be the best way to appreciate what is happening in the IAT, but the basic idea is that if a person more quickly pairs pictures of a Black person than those of a White person with a negative word (for example, “lazy” or “stupid”) then they have demonstrated their unconscious bias against Black people. The IAT was introduced by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues in the 1990s.23 They announced that their newly developed instrument, the race IAT, measures unconscious racial prejudice or bias and that 90 to 95 percent of Americans, including many racial minorities, demonstrated such bias. Since then, these scholars and their collaborators (plus others such as DEI administrators) have enjoyed tremendous success advancing the claim that the race IAT reveals pervasive unconscious bias that contributes to society-wide discrimination.
Despite its immense influence, the IAT is a flawed measure. Regarding reliability, the correlation between a person’s response when taking the test at two different times hovers around 0.5.24 This is well below conventionally acceptable levels in psychology, and far below the test-retest reliabilities for accepted personality and cognitive ability measures, which can reach around .8, even when a person takes the tests decades later.25, 26
The best path forward is to get back to the basics: understand the serious limitations of lived experience, focus on quality measurement, and be mindful of the distinction between correlation and causation.
As for the IAT’s validity, nobody has convincingly shown that patterns of reaction times actually reflect “unconscious bias” (or “implicit prejudice”) as opposed to cultural stereotypes.27 Moreover, in systematic syntheses of published studies, the association between scores on the race IAT and observations or measurements of real-world biased behavior is inconsistent and weak.28, 29 In other words, scores on the IAT do not meaningfully correlate with other ways of measuring racial bias or real life manifestations of it.
Principle #3: Distinguish Appropriately Between Correlation and Causation“Correlation does not equal causation” is another basic principle of behavioral science (indeed, all science). Although human brains seem built to readily notice and even anticipate causal connections, a valid claim that “X” has a causal effect on “Y” needs to meet three criteria, and a correlation between X and Y is only the first. The second criterion is that X precedes Y in time. The third and final criterion is the link between X and Y is not actually due to some other variable that influences both X and Y (“confounders”). To test this final point, researchers typically need to show that when X is manipulated in an experiment, Y also changes.
Imagine, for instance, that a researcher asks students about their caffeine intake and sleep schedule, and upon analyzing the data finds that students’ caffeine consumption is negatively correlated with how much they sleep—those who report consuming more caffeine tend to report sleeping less. This is what many psychologists call correlational research (or associational or observational research). These correlational data could mean that caffeine consumption reduces sleep time, but the data could also mean that a lack of sleep causes an increase in caffeine consumption, or that working long hours causes both a decrease in sleep and an increase in caffeine. To make the case that caffeine causes poor sleep, the researcher must impose, by random assignment, different amounts of caffeine on students to determine how sleep is affected by varying doses. That is, the researcher would conduct a true experiment.
Distinguishing between correlation and causation is easier said in the abstract than practiced in reality, even for psychological scientists who are specifically trained to make the distinction.30 Part of the difficulty is that in behavioral science, many variables that are generally thought of as causal cannot be manipulated for ethical or practical reasons. For example, researchers cannot impose neglect (or abuse, corporal punishment, parental divorce, etc.) on some children and not others to study how children are affected by the experience. Still, absent experiments, psychologists bear the responsibility of providing converging, independent lines of evidence that indicate causality before they draw a causal conclusion. Indeed, scientists did this when it came to claiming that smoking causes cancer: they amassed evidence from national datasets with controls, discordant twin designs, correlational studies of exposure to second-hand smoke, non-human experiments, and so on—everything but experiments on humans—before coming to a consensus view that smoking causes cancer in humans. Our point is that investigating causal claims without true experiments is possible, but extremely difficult and time consuming.
That said, the conflation of correlation with causation seems especially prevalent when it comes to DEI issues. In the context of microaggressions, for example, a Google search quickly reveals many scholars claiming that microaggressions cause psychological harm. Lilienfeld has been a rare voice suggesting that it is dangerous to claim that microaggressions cause mental health issues when there are no experimental data to support such a claim. Moreover, there is a confounding variable that predicts both (1) perceiving oneself as having been “microaggressed” against and (2) struggling with one’s mental health—namely, the well-documented personality trait of neuroticism. In other words, individuals who are prone to experience negative emotions (those who are high in neuroticism) often perceive that more people try to inflict harm on them than actually do, and these same individuals also struggle with mental health.
Assuming we were able to develop a workable definition of “microaggressions,” what would a true experiment look like? An experiment would require that participants be exposed to microaggressions (or not), and then be measured or observed for indications of psychological harm. There are valid ethical concerns for such a study, but we believe it can be done. There is a lengthy precedent in psychological research where temporary discomfort can be inflicted with appropriate safeguards. For instance, a procedure called the “trier social stress test” (TSST) is widely used, where participants make a speech with little preparation time in front of judges who purposefully avoid any non-verbal reaction. This is followed by a mental arithmetic task.31 If the TSST is acceptable for use in research, then it should also be acceptable to expose study participants to subtle slights.
This fallacy of equating correlation with causation also arises in the context of gender transitioning and suicide. To make the point that not being able to transition is deeply damaging, transgender individuals, and sometimes their professional supporters, may ask parents something such as, “would you rather have a dead daughter or a living son?” One logical flaw here is in assuming that because gender distress is associated with suicidal ideation, then the gender distress must be causing the suicidal ideation. However, other psychological concerns, such as depression, anxiety, trauma, eating disorders, ADHD, and autism, could be causing both the gender distress and the suicidal ideation—another case of confounding variables. Indeed, these disorders occur more frequently in individuals who identify as transgender. Thus, it is quite possible that someone may suffer from depression, and this simultaneously raises their likelihood of identifying as transgender and of expressing suicidal ideation.
It is not possible (nor would it be ethical if possible) to impose gender identity concerns on some children and not others to study the effect of gender dysphoria on suicidality. However, at this point, the correlational research that does exist has not offered compelling evidence that gender dysphoria causes increased suicidality. Studies have rarely attempted to rule out third variables, such as other mental health diagnoses. The few studies that have tried to control for other variables have yielded mixed results.32, 33 Until researchers have consistently isolated gender dysphoria as playing an independent role in suicidality, they should not claim that gender dysphoria increases suicide risk.
Over three decades ago, the psychologist David Lykken wrote, “Psychology isn’t doing very well as a scientific discipline and something seems to be wrong somewhere” (p. 3).34 Sadly, psychology continues to falter; in fact, we think it has gotten worse. The emotional and moral pull of DEI concerns are understandable but they may have short-circuited critical thinking about the limitations of lived experience, the requirement of using only reliable and valid measurement instruments, and the need to meet strict criteria before claiming that one variable has a causal influence on another variable.
DEI Concepts Contradict Known Findings about Human CognitionThe empirical bases for some DEI concepts contradict social scientific principles. Additionally, certain DEI ideas run counter to important findings about human nature that scientists have established by following the required scientific principles. We discuss three examples below.
Out-Group AntipathyHumans are tribal by nature. We have a long history of living in stable groups and competing against other groups. Thus, it’s no surprise that one of social psychology’s most robust findings is that in-group preferences are powerful and easy to evoke. For example, in studies where psychologists create in-groups and out-groups using arbitrary criteria such as shirt color, adults and children alike have a large preference for their group members.35, 36 Even infants prefer those who are similar to themselves37 and respond preferentially to those who punish dissimilar others.38
Constructive disagreement about ideas should be encouraged rather than leveraged as an excuse to silence those who may see the world differently.
DEI, although generally well-intentioned, often overlooks this tribal aspect of our psychology. In particular, in the quest to confront the historical mistreatment of certain identity groups, it often instigates zero-sum thinking (i.e., that one group owes a debt to another; that one group cannot gain unless another loses). This type of thinking will exacerbate, rather than mitigate, animosity. A more fruitful approach would emphasize individual characteristics over group identity, and the common benefits that can arise when all individuals are treated fairly.
ExpectanciesWhen people expect to feel a certain way, they are more likely to experience that feeling.39, 40 Thus, when someone, especially an impressionable teenager or young adult, is told that they are a victim, the statement (even if true) is not merely a neutral descriptor. It can also set up the expectation of victimhood with the downstream consequence of making one feel themselves to be even more of a victim. DEI microaggression workshops may do exactly this—they prime individuals to perceive hostility and negative intent in ambiguous words and actions.41 The same logic applies to more pronounced forms of bigotry. For instance, when Robin DiAngelo describes “uniquely anti-black sentiment integral to white identity” (p. 95),42 the suggestion that White people are all anti-Black might have the effect of exacerbating both actual and perceived racism. Of course, we need to deal honestly with any and all racism when it does exist, but it is also important to understand potential costs of exaggerating such claims. Expectancy effects might interact with the “virtuous victim effect,” wherein individuals perceive victims as being more moral than non-victims.43, 44 Thus, there can be a social value gained simply in presenting oneself as a victim.
Cognitive BiasesCognitive biases are one of the most important and well-replicated discoveries of the behavioral sciences. It is therefore troubling that, in the discussion of DEI topics, psychologists often fall victim to those very biases.
A striking example is the American Psychological Association’s (APA) statement shortly after the death of George Floyd, which provides a textbook illustration of the availability bias, the tendency to overvalue evidence that easily comes to mind. The APA, the largest psychological organization in the world, asserted after Floyd’s death that “The deaths of innocent black people targeted specifically because of their race—often by police officers—are both deeply shocking and shockingly routine.”45 How “shockingly routine” are they? According to the Washington Post database of police killings, in 2020 there were 248 Black people killed by police. By comparison, over 6,500 Black people were killed in traffic fatalities that year—a 26-fold difference.46 Also, some portion of those 248 victims were not innocent—given that 216 were armed, some killings would probably have been an appropriate use of force by the police to defend themselves or others. Some portion was also not killed specifically because of their race. So why would the APA describe a relatively rare event as “shockingly routine”? This statement came in the aftermath of the widely publicized police killings of Floyd and those of Ahmaud Arbery and Breonna Taylor. In other words, these rare events were seen as common likely because widespread media coverage made them readily available in our minds.
Unfortunately, the APA also recently fell prey to another well-known bias, the base rate fallacy, where relevant population sizes are ignored. In this case, the APA described new research that found “The typical woman was considered to be much more similar to a typical White woman than a typical Black woman.”47 Although not stated explicitly, the implication seems to be that, absent racism, the typical woman would be roughly midway between typical White woman and typical Black woman. That is an illogical conclusion given base rates. In the U.S., White people outnumber Black people by roughly 5 to 1; hence the typical woman should be perceived as more similar to a typical White woman than to a typical Black woman.
What Happened? Some Possible CausesAt this stage, we expect that many readers may be wondering how it can be that social scientists regularly violate basic scientific principles—principles that are so fundamental that these same social scientists routinely teach them in introductory courses. One possible reason is myside bias, wherein individuals process information in a way that favors their own “team.” For example, in the case of the race Implicit Association Test, proponents of the IAT might more heavily scrutinize the methodology of studies that yield negative results compared to those that have yielded their desired results. Similarly, although lived experience is a limited kind of evidence, it certainly is a source of evidence, and thus scholars may elevate its importance and overlook its limitations when doing so bolsters their personal views.
A related challenge facing behavioral scientists is that cognitive biases are universal and ubiquitous—everyone, including professional scientists, is susceptible.48 In fact, one might say that the scientific method, including the three principles we emphasize here, is an algorithm (i.e., a set of rules and processes) designed to overcome our eternally pervasive cognitive biases.
A third challenge confronting behavioral scientists is the current state of the broader scientific community. Scientific inquiry works best when practiced in a community adhering to a suite of norms, including organized skepticism, that incentivize individuals to call out each other’s poor practices.49, 50 In other words, in a healthy scientific community, if a claim becomes widely adopted without sufficient evidence, or if a basic principle is neglected, a maverick scientist would be rewarded for sounding the alarm by gaining respect and opportunities. Unfortunately, the scientific community does not act this way with respect to DEI issues, perhaps because the issues touch widely held personal values (e.g., about equality between different groups of people). If different scientists held different values, there would probably be more healthy skepticism of DEI topics. However, there is little ideological diversity within the academy. In areas such as psychology, for example, liberal-leaning scholars outnumber conservative-leaning scholars by at least 8 to 1, and in some disciplines the ratio is 20 to 1 or even more.51, 52 A related concern is that these values are more than just personal views. They often seem to function as sacred values, non-negotiable principles that cannot be compromised and only questioned at risk to one’s status within the community.
From this perspective,53 it is easy to see how those who question DEI may well face moral outrage, even if (or maybe especially if) their criticisms are well-founded. The fact that this outrage sometimes translates into public cancellations is extremely disheartening. Yet there are likely even more de facto cancellations than it seems. Someone can be cancelled directly or indirectly. Indirect cancellations can take the form of contract nonrenewal, pressure to resign, or having one’s employer dig for another offense to use as the stated grounds of forcing someone out of their job. This latter strategy is a very subtle, yet no less insidious, method of cancellation. As an analogy, it is like a police officer following someone with an out-of-state license plate and then pulling the car over when they fail to use a turn signal. An offense was committed, but the only reason the offense was observed in the first place is because the officer was looking for a reason to make the stop and therefore artificially enhanced the time window in which the driver was being scrutinized. The stated reason for the stop is failure to signal; the real reason is the driver is from out of town. Whether direct or indirect, the key to a cancellation is that holding the same job becomes untenable after failing to toe the party line on DEI topics.
It is against this backdrop that DEI scholarship is conducted. Academics fear punishment (often subtle) for challenging DEI research. Ideas that cannot be freely challenged are unfalsifiable. Those ideas will likely gain popularity because the marketplace of ideas becomes the monopoly of a single idea. An illusory consensus can emerge about a complex area for which reasonable, informed, and qualified individuals have highly differing views. An echo chamber created by forced consensus is the breeding ground for bad science.
How to Get Behavioral Science Back on TrackWe are not the first ones to express concern about the quality of science in our discipline.54, 55 However, to our knowledge, we are the first to discuss how DEI over-reach goes hand-in-hand with the failure to engage in good science. Nonetheless, this doesn’t mean it can’t be fixed. We offer a few suggestions for improvement.
First, disagreement should be normalized. Advisors should model disagreement by presenting an idea and explicitly asking their lab members to talk about its weaknesses. We need to develop a culture where challenging others’ ideas is viewed as an integral (and even enjoyable) part of the scientific process, and not an ad hominem attack.
Second, truth seeking must be re-established as the fundamental goal of behavioral science. Unfortunately, many academics in behavioral science seem now to be more interested in advocacy than science. Of course, as a general principle, faculty and students should not be restricted from engaging in advocacy. However, this advocacy should not mingle with their academic work; it must occur on their own time. The tension between advocacy and truth seeking is that advocates, by definition, have an a priori position and are tasked with convincing others to accept and then act upon that belief. Truth seekers must be open to changing their opinion whenever new evidence or better analyses demand it.
To that end, we need to resurrect guardrails that hold students accountable for demonstrating mastery of important scientific concepts, including those described above, before receiving a PhD. Enforcing high standards may sound obvious, but actually failing students who do not meet those standards is an exclusionary practice that might be met with resistance.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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Another intriguing solution is to conduct “adversarial collaborations,” wherein scholars who disagree work together on a joint project.56 Adversarial collaborators explicitly spell out their competing hypotheses and together develop a method for answering a particular question, including the measures and planned analyses. Stephen Ceci, Shulamit Kahn, and Wendy Williams,57 for example, engaged in an adversarial collaboration that synthesized evidence regarding gender bias in six areas of academic science, including hiring, grant funding, and teacher ratings. They found evidence for gender bias in some areas but not others, a finding that should prove valuable in decisions about where to allocate resources.
In conclusion, we suggest that DEI over-reach in behavioral science is intimately related to a failure within the scientific community to adhere to basic principles of science and appreciate important findings from the behavioral science literature. The best path forward is to get back to the basics: understand the serious limitations of lived experience, focus on quality measurement, and be mindful of the distinction between correlation and causation. We need to remember that the goal of science is to discover truth. This requires putting ideology and advocacy aside while in the lab or classroom. Constructive disagreement about ideas should be encouraged rather than leveraged as an excuse to silence those who may see the world differently. The scientific method requires us to stay humble and accept that we just might be wrong. That principle applies to all scientists, including the three authors of this article. To that end, readers who disagree with any of our points should let us know! Maybe we can sort out our differences—and find common ground— through an adversarial collaboration.
The views presented in this article are solely those of the authors. They do not represent the views of any author’s employer or affiliation.
About the AuthorApril Bleske-Rechek is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. Her teaching and research efforts focus on scientific reasoning and individual and group differences in cognitive abilities, personality traits, and relationship attitudes.
Michael H. Bernstein is an experimental psychologist and an Assistant Professor at Brown University. His research focuses on the overlap between cognitive science and medicine. He is co-editor of The Nocebo Effect: When Words Make You Sick.
Robert O. Deaner is a Professor of Psychology at Grand Valley State University. He teaches courses on research methods, sex differences, and evolutionary psychology. His research addresses sex differences in competitiveness.
References1. Frisby, C.L., Redding, R.E., O’Donohue, W.T., & Lilienfeld, S.O. (2023). Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology. Springer Nature. 2. https://bit.ly/4aJLRyO 3. Merton, R.K. (1993). The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. University of Chicago Press. 4. Rauch, J. (2013). Kindly Inquisitors: The New Attacks on Free Thought. University of Chicago Press. 5. Rauch, J. (2021). The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth. Brookings Institution Press. 6. https://bit.ly/3xATvNI 7. https://bit.ly/4cTS4Kq 8. https://bit.ly/4cXcRNe 9. https://bit.ly/3Q15SZU 10. https://bit.ly/3xCzeY8 11. https://bit.ly/43W5bGW 12. https://bit.ly/3TUw0GR 13. https://bit.ly/4401VKr 14. https://bit.ly/3Ufx4q1 15. Funder, D. C. (2019). The Personality Puzzle (8th ed.). W.W. Norton & Company. 16. https://bit.ly/3UhIOsn 17. Ibid. 18. https://bit.ly/3W0liBc 19. https://bit.ly/3VShodH 20. Ibid. 21. https://bit.ly/3UhIOsn 22. https://bit.ly/49vFle5 23. https://bit.ly/3JmZxUw 24. https://bit.ly/3Jifb3O 25. https://bit.ly/3Q37UZc 26. https://bit.ly/3Q0Oe8h 27. https://bit.ly/49zSTFk 28. https://bit.ly/3xrWU15 29. https://bit.ly/49QWBux 30. Bleske-Rechek, A., Gunseor, M.M., & Maly, J.R. (2018). Does the Language Fit the Evidence? Unwarranted Causal Language in Psychological Scientists’ Scholarly Work. The Behavior Therapist, 41(8), 341–352. 31. https://bit.ly/49DQZmW 32. https://bit.ly/49zKdif 33. https://bit.ly/49JeECQ 34. Lykken, D.T. (1991). What’s Wrong With Psychology Anyway? In D. Cicchetti & W.M. Grove (Eds.), Thinking Clearly About Psychology: Essays in Honor of Paul E. Meehl. University of Minnesota Press. 35. Tajfel, H. (2020). Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination. Scientific American, 223, 96–102. 36. https://bit.ly/3xC9on5 37. https://bit.ly/4aO5dTe 38. https://bit.ly/4aSLamR 39. https://bit.ly/3Q2m9gO 40. Bernstein, M., Blease, C., Locher, C., & Brown, W. (2024). The Nocebo Effect: When Words Make You Sick. Mayo Clinic Press. 41. https://bit.ly/4aQmv2e 42. DiAngelo, R. (2018). White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk About Racism. Beacon Press. 43. https://bit.ly/4awG3sR 44. https://bit.ly/4cSOEYn 45. https://bit.ly/43XhN0k 46. https://bit.ly/3UfKH8L 47. https://bit.ly/43ZM1zH 48. Stanovich, K. E. (2021). The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking. The MIT Press. 49. https://bit.ly/4aJLRyO 50. Ritchie, S. (2020). Science Fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth. Metropolitan Books. 51. https://bit.ly/43XRkzI 52. https://bit.ly/3TXsw6n 53. https://bit.ly/3TXsxar 54. Lykken, D.T. (1991). What’s Wrong With Psychology Anyway? In D. Cicchetti & W.M. Grove (Eds.), Thinking Clearly About Psychology: Essays in Honor of Paul E. Meehl. University of Minnesota Press. 55. https://bit.ly/4aybGSy 56. Clark, C.J., & Tetlock, P.E. (2023). Adversarial Collaboration: The Next Science Reform. In C.L. Frisby, R.E. Redding, W. T. Donohue, & S.O. Lilienfeld (Eds.), Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology (pp. 905–927). Springer. 57. https://bit.ly/3vQQ5FW
Do we live in a patriarchy? Does toxic masculinity permeate our society? Are they the reasons why women are paid less than men, and fewer women are working in STEM? There is a long-documented history of these differences, and they go deeper than you might think. Let’s consider some causal explanations.
The Gender Pay GapOne statistic offered as evidence of male hegemony (i.e., the patriarchy) is the ubiquitous gender pay gap that exists between men and women. For example, self-described feminist economists1 Xuan Pham, Laura Fitzpatrick, and Richard Wagner suggest:
…the two overarching institutions that enable the persistence of the GPG [gender pay gap] in the USA are capitalism and patriarchy. Capitalism is a production system is [sic] driven by the profit motive, meaning firms seek to cost minimize. If employers can pay whole segments of workers lower wages, it is easier to boost profit margins and preserve capitalist production. The incentive to do this is quite powerful and a society that relegates women to a lesser position through non-labor market forces enhances the potential to increase exploitation of women through differential wages relative to men… Capitalism alone cannot create the GPG, however. The other crucial institution, patriarchy—allowing for gender-based disparate treatment—has deep roots in U.S. society. At the country’s founding, women were no more than the property of men.2
The ratio of annual earnings between women and men has gone from a low of 59 cents on the dollar in 1963 to 84 cents for every dollar earned by men in 2024.3 Pham et al. claim the patriarchy is responsible for the gender pay gap—that is, wholesale discrimination against women. Most leading economists, regardless of their gender, disagree. Cornell University economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn point out4 most of the reduction in the pay gap came in the 1980s and early 1990s during a “sharp increase in female participation rates” in the work force—increasing from 32 percent in 1947 to 57 percent in 2014 while the male participation rate fell from 87 to 69 percent over the same period.
Countering the oppressive patriarchy argument, an extraordinary and remarkable natural experiment that demonstrates the lack of discrimination in the differences in pay between men and women was conducted by researchers at Stanford University in 2018 using data from over one million Uber drivers. Uber pays their drivers according to a rigid “non-negotiated formula” (i.e., invariant among drivers), and they do not offer any employee benefits. The drivers also determine when and where they work. Each driver earns a specific base fare in addition to a “per-minute and per-distance” fare beginning with the pickup and ending with the drop off of a customer. During periods of high customer demand, drivers can receive a “surge multiplier.” More importantly as related to the gender pay gap, there are no promotions, work overtime pay, or any ability to negotiate higher pay for drivers. In other words, earnings are directly proportional to productivity. The Stanford researchers have also demonstrated that there is no meaningful customer discrimination toward female or male drivers. In other words, there are no statistically significant differences in customer ratings of men and women drivers nor do riders prefer one gender to the other.5
Men make more on a weekly basis, but much of the weekly difference is due to men working more hours. The percent difference in the pay gap is presented as per hour to avoid work amount variations.The results of the study show unequivocally that men earn about 7 percent more than women on an hourly basis. The “entire gap” can be explained by three factors, all unrelated to discrimination:
- Men tend to drive faster than women. This leads to an increase in pay because they handle more customers per hour.
- Uber pays a “compensating differential” for driving in high-crime areas and areas with high concentrations of bars. Men tend to drive in the more lucrative areas not only because they accept the risk but also because they are inclined to live nearer to or within these areas compared with women.
- Drivers who work 30 or more hours per week compared to those that work fewer than 10 hours per week make 9 percent more per hour. Why is that? There is much to gain from experience at Uber such as when and where to drive, or which trips a driver should accept or reject. The researchers stated, “Male drivers accumulate more experience than women by driving more each week and being less likely to stop driving with Uber.”
†The Stanford team noted in 2018 that “nearly every one of the parameters favors men earning more. Men have shorter trips to the rider, longer trips, faster speed, higher surge, and more incentives.”Experience in other studies is typically measured by years of employment or a worker’s age which are notoriously poor ways of ascertaining work experience. As the Uber study suggests, experience differentials between men and women may be underestimated in previous studies and “can lead to biased estimates of the job-flexibility penalty.” Put another way, by working fewer hours, women are not only earning less pay than men but also accumulating less experience.† The Stanford team concludes:
Even in the absence of discrimination and in flexible labor markets, women’s relatively high opportunity cost of non-paid work time and gender-based differences in preferences and constraints can sustain a gender pay gap.
A study by two Harvard economists on bus and train operators produced similar results—the pay gap in favor of men is due to the differential choice preferences of men and women.6 Even though “in a unionized environment where work tasks are similar, hourly wages are identical, and tenure dictates promotions, female workers earn $0.89 on the male-worker dollar.” The same study revealed that women were also less likely than men to game the scheduling system by trading off work hours at regular wages for overtime hours at premium wages.
Economists at Cornell University7, 8 have recently completed two extremely detailed and extensive reviews of the research literature demonstrating factors that influence the gender pay gap. A few of them are obvious. Gender differences in choice of college majors funnel women into lower paying careers. For example, women tend to avoid majoring in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) programs resulting in fewer women in these relatively high-paying careers. Women also tend to avoid jobs requiring extensive training specific to the company they are working for, i.e., training that does not help them with other companies.
Although both men and women quit their jobs at about the same rate “all else being equal,” they quit for different reasons. Men quit for reasons primarily related to the job; in contrast, women quit, for the most part, because of family-related reasons. As a result, women’s wages are affected adversely compared to men probably because women miss out on experience through training. Married women and mothers focus on home and family reducing the number of hours they spend in the labor market. Not surprisingly, research has found that the more hours women spend doing housework, the lower their wages in the market.
We should foster working environments that reward the most qualified and competent candidates, encouraged to participate irrespective of their gender.
The choice families make regarding their working locations also impact wages. Men are still the primary wage earners in families, and families tend to choose the location of the husband’s work as opposed to where the wife works (probably because, on average, men tend to focus on careers while women tend to prioritize family). Recent research in the U.S. and Great Britain has revealed that total family earnings increase significantly while the wife’s earnings decline when the family relocates.9 As a result, although women may enter into traditionally male-oriented occupations, they often select careers that are flexible geographically (e.g., physicians, pharmacists, managers, accountants, etc.).10, 11
But the largest single impact on the gender wage gap appears to be the difference in pay between the careers men and women choose (as much as a third of the gap!). The companies women tend to gravitate toward are those that pay both men and women lower wages whereas men tend to be concentrated in firms that pay more to both men and women. Women may consciously be choosing companies that are less stressful and offer more flexible work hours, but pay less than those where greater demands are made. As Blau and Kahn explain:
Men are found to place a higher value on money, to have higher self-esteem, to be less risk averse, more competitive, self-confident and disagreeable, and to believe that they control their own fate (an internal, as opposed to external, locus of control) to a greater extent than women.
From a broader perspective, men may have traditionally needed to excel in these arenas not only to provide for their families but also to succeed in competing with other men for mates. It is well established that men spend longer hours in their jobs, tend to place work over family, and take less time off from their jobs, which has a large impact on wages. One study presented men and women in the laboratory with a task to solve under two conditions of compensation—in a “noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme.”12 There were no differences between the performance of men and women, but 73 percent of the men preferred the competitive tournament scenario compared to 35 percent of the women.
The competitiveness of men translates from the laboratory into real-life performance benefits. Researchers have found that high school boys and girls have, on average, similar academic abilities. However, boy’s higher level of competitiveness correlates with their choosing to go into “more prestigious academic tracks” than do girls.13 Field research substantiates these results. In a large study, economists posted online job advertisements in 16 major cities that randomly varied the advertisements in their compensation regimes. Based on the 9,000 people assessing the job advertisements, the researchers were able to conclude that, “women disproportionately shy away from competitive work settings.”14 Increasing the competition within the workplace also appears to increase the performance of men relative to women.15, 16 Many studies have also found that on average not only do women shy away from risk, but their wages are lower due to having greater risk aversion than men.17 Controlling for extraneous effects, employers tend to pay more to entice workers to accept risk.
Yet another primary influence on the gender pay gap is a preference by women for what economists refer to as “work-force interruptions,” which include flexibility (such as working at home or at convenient times) and working fewer hours (a decision not to put in the long hours required by some jobs). Numerous recent studies have explored the impact of workforce interruptions and shorter hours, and it is worth discussing them in detail because they are pertinent within the context of the “glass ceiling,” a term that refers to the discriminatory barriers hindering women from attaining top-level, high-paying jobs in the labor market.
One of these studies followed MBA graduates from a distinguished program and found that women and men began their careers at nearly the same pay, but their pay diverged over time and men were paid more. The conclusion of the research posited that the gender pay gap can be attributed almost entirely to the fewer weekly hours women worked and the larger number of “career interruptions” women took compared to men.18 Another study, conducted over a fifteen-year period and focusing on lawyers, revealed an interesting trend: while gender had little impact on initial salaries, the gender pay gap significantly widened over time. This was attributed to women working shorter hours and taking time off for childbirth.19 A recent study by Ghazala Azmat and her colleague Rosa Ferrer found a similar disparity between male and female lawyers and attributed the difference to men obtaining more clients and receiving twice as much revenue from those clients compared to women. The authors concluded the disparities between men’s and women’s earnings and promotions were due to higher workplace performance by men compared to women.20 It is worth quoting their findings:
Possible channels of direct discrimination in law firms—whereby, for instance, senior lawyers (i.e., law firm partners) could interfere with performance—are not strong determinants of performance gaps. The presence of preschool children in the household contributes to the gaps in performance; however, it is not the only key determinant. A substantial share of the gender gap in performance is explained by aspirations to become a partner, which are likely to reflect more general career concerns as well as traditional gender roles… We find that the distribution of career aspirations differs across genders, which is reflected in the differences in performance [i.e., women do not aspire to become partners as much as their male counterparts]… One potential implication is that gender-based inequality in earnings and career outcomes might not decrease in the near future—and could even increase—as more high-skilled workers are explicitly compensated on the basis of performance.
In 2014, Harvard economist Claudia Goldin showed that the gender pay gap increases over the lifespan of laborers particularly for college-educated employees.21 She explained that the gender pay gap can “almost entirely be explained by various factors such as hours worked, time out of the labor force, and years spent in part-time employment.” In 2017, economist Erling Barth and his colleagues evaluated the gender pay gap over the time span of employee careers by analyzing data from the 2000 Decennial Census of the United States and the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics. Their findings? The gender pay gap starts out relatively small but widens over time for both college-educated and non-college educated men and women. The largest gap is among the college educated men and women. The researchers found the gap (in both college and non-college scenarios) is primarily attributed to married women earning less and “most of the loss in earnings growth for married women, relative to married men, occurs concurrently with the arrival of children.”22
David Lubinski and his colleagues conducted a 35-year longitudinal study following some of the most intellectually gifted people in the United States.23, 24 This research led to two major conclusions that tracked with other findings here. (1) Intellectually exceptional women prefer to work with people rather than “things,” unlike their male counterparts, who often exhibit the opposite preference. This aligns with other findings indicating that both women and men choose careers based on their individual strengths and interests. For example, women score higher than men on verbal abilities, while men tend to excel in mathematical abilities. And even though fewer women go into STEM (women received only 25.1 percent and 23.4 percent of the doctorates in mathematics/computer science and engineering, respectively), those that do, score similar to men in ability and interest. In other words, women who pursue careers in STEM fields exhibit exceptional mathematical and spatial reasoning abilities, and their mathematical and spatial abilities are typically greater than their verbal abilities. (2) On average, gifted men earn higher salaries than their female counterparts after 35 years. The main reason for this is that men work more hours than women suggesting once again that men put more emphasis on work than women. Not only do men work longer hours but when both genders are asked “How many hours would you choose to work if you were in the job of choice” [i.e., desired job, place of work, and the pay required] women chose fewer hours than men.
Regarding the quote at the beginning of this article, Steve Horwitz, Distinguished Professor of Free Enterprise, commented on Pham and colleagues’ supply/ demand hypothesis (for example, the abundance of women as teachers in grades K–12) this way: “Those jobs tend to pay less because they are jobs where many people have the relevant skills to do them, thus employers can always find another person to fill them (male or female!), which keeps wages low. The same is true of garbage collectors, who are almost all male. Their wages are much lower than those of teachers and nurses because even more people have the relevant skills. So, perceptions of the femininity of a job [i.e., social constructionism] can’t really explain why wages are low.”25 If more people, whether they are men or women (supply), go into specific fields, those fields will be able to pay less for workers (demand).
The Glass CeilingThe National Science Foundation is pouring money into programs established to encourage women to enter STEM fields. For example, Howard University recently received $1.3 million for a proposal entitled “Multiple Consciousnesses: Investigating the Identities (Academic, Gender, Race, and Disability) of Black Women Undergraduate Students in STEM and Their Impact on Persistence.”26 Funding such as this presumes the gender pay gap and the glass ceiling are due to discrimination against women. However, as we have seen, economists—many of whom are women, as cited—have challenged these assumptions.
A recent study demonstrates the impact of women’s choice on the glass ceiling. Psychologists Gijsbert Stoet and David Geary published a paper27 documenting the gender gap in STEM fields has remained relatively constant for decades despite heroic efforts to bring women into STEM fields.28 They discovered the largest STEM gender gaps exist in countries that test high on the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI)—a measure of the degree of parity between men and women based on 14 indicators, which include earnings, seats in parliament, the number of women relative to men that enroll in universities, life expectancy, etc. The GGGI uses a scale from 0 to 1, where 1.0 represents complete gender parity (see Figure 1). The data comes from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)29—an educational survey of 519,334 students from 72 countries. Upon reviewing the graph, you may observe that the data might seem somewhat counterintuitive. This unexpected correlation is referred to as the educational-gender-equality paradox.
Figure 1. A graph of gender equality (GGGI where 1.0 = gender parity) versus the percentage of women that graduate from STEM-related fields in each country. The line represents the best-fit least squares regression.
The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) exemplify this paradox. They have established more than generous opportunities for women in maternity leave, first-rate state-provided childcare, and gender quotas for stock-market company boards.30 Yet they have some of the largest gender gaps in the world! For example, Finland ranks second in science literacy, and girls outperform boys on the tests. However, paradoxically, the number of women graduating with STEM degrees only approaches 20 percent. In contrast, countries with treatment of women ranging from fair to poor, such as Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia, have over 35 percent women graduating in STEM on average.
Stoet and Geary found that “girls performed similarly or better than boys in science” in 66 percent of the countries “and in nearly all the countries, more girls appeared capable of college-level STEM study than had enrolled.” They attribute the anomaly to personal academic choice related to what each gender perceives as their personal strength. Girls do better on literacy testing than they do in mathematics and science. Even though girls do better than boys in science and mathematics in many countries such as Finland, they choose fields outside of STEM. The opposite is true for boys. They do better in science and mathematics than literacy, and consequently choose STEM more than girls. The researchers also emphasize that women in less gender-equal countries may be more prone to choose STEM fields based on economic stress than personal preference.
It may be time to move away from activist ideology and acknowledge that girls and women freely choose their interests; they are not discriminated against in STEM fields, nor are they discouraged from pursuing a career in these fields. Similar holds true regarding men, even when countries such as Finland and Sweden go to extraordinary lengths to get more men into nursing and other fields traditionally dominated by women.
For a long time, radical feminists have advocated for quotas to break up the perceived patriarchal havens (often referred to as “good-ole-boy networks”) in the hopes of creating environments that support the advancement of women into senior management positions. Norway provides a notable example of the drawbacks of implementing such quotas. In 2003, Norway passed a law mandating that all publicly traded Norwegian corporations must ensure that their corporate boards comprise at least 40 percent women (or men, if the board was predominantly women). Five economists—all women—led by Marianne Bertrand have assessed the impact of the law:
…within firms that were mandated to increase female participation on their board, there is no evidence that these gains at the very top trickled down. Moreover the reform had no obvious impact on highly qualified women whose qualifications mirror those of board members but who were not appointed to boards. We observe no statistically significant change in the gender wage gaps or in female representation in top positions… Finally, there is little evidence that the reform affected the decisions of women more generally; it was not accompanied by any change in female enrollment in business education programs, or a convergence in earnings trajectories between recent male and female graduates of such programs.31
It appears that Norway was trying to correct for a glass ceiling that did not actually exist. As reported by The Economist, the law led to a significant number of Norwegian corporations leaving the Norway stock exchange to avoid the mandated quota requirements. Of the 563 companies on the Norway stock exchange in 2003, only 179 remained by 2008.32 Meanwhile, the observed increase in women’s leadership was the same as in neighboring Denmark, which did not implement quotas.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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Simply stated, economists—many of whom are women—have found that women are more risk averse (i.e., less willing to place themselves in highly competitive job environments) and more inclined toward occupations that offer flexible hours, often in order to prioritize time with their children. Women are certainly as competent as men in STEM, but gravitate toward college majors and jobs that highlight their superior verbal and social skills. There is much more fascinating data—most of it largely absent from the public discourse—that shed light on these differences. I will discuss such scholarship from disciplines other than economics in future articles.
Why is a scientific approach so important in this case? If political activists succeed in convincing the public that pay disparities between men and women are due to discrimination through an ominous patriarchy and toxic masculinity, not only will the data be ignored, but hardworking men will be discriminated against in favor of parity. I am not suggesting women should be discouraged from entering competitive fields; on the contrary, I am arguing for fairness. We should foster working environments that reward the most qualified and competent candidates, encouraged to participate irrespective of their gender. There is no glass ceiling, i.e., the purported discriminatory barrier that keeps qualified women from achieving top-level, high-paying jobs in the labor market in the United States, Canada, and many other Western countries subject to extensive research. The available evidence reveals that the primary hindrance to upward mobility is often the choices made by women—whether consciously or subconsciously—with regard to employment flexibility.33
About the AuthorMarc J. Defant is a professor of geology at the University of South Florida specializing in the study of volcanoes—more specifically, the geochemistry of volcanic rocks. He has been funded by the NSF, National Geographic, the American Chemical Society, and the National Academy of Sciences and has published in many international journals including Nature. His book Voyage of Discovery: From the Big Bang to the Ice Age is in the 2nd edition.
References1. https://bit.ly/4d2amZW 2. Ibid. 3. https://bit.ly/49XFxDb 4. https://bit.ly/4aEQZog 5. https://bit.ly/3W6UvmO 6. https://bit.ly/3Q7Q1sg 7. https://bit.ly/4aEQZog 8. Blau, F., & Winkler, A.E. (2018). The Economics of Women, Men, and Work, Eighth Edition. Oxford University Press. 9. https://bit.ly/447kEUM 10. https://bit.ly/3vXe5XZ 11. https://bit.ly/3vM6gVe 12. https://bit.ly/3W3PBHm 13. https://bit.ly/3QaLKoa 14. https://bit.ly/4aGtXgA 15. https://bit.ly/3W6Z4NY 16. https://bit.ly/4d3H1y9 17. Bertrand, M. (2011). New Perspectives On Gender. In O. Ashenfelter, & D. Card, Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 4B. Elsevier. 18. https://bit.ly/3Q7sYOs 19. https://bit.ly/4490wkT 20. https://bit.ly/49K7jCX 21. https://bit.ly/3UmrBxF 22. https://bit.ly/3U4bovN 23. https://bit.ly/4d6cqAj 24. https://bit.ly/4cWi7kh 25. Personal communication, 2019 26. https://bit.ly/442RZ34 27. https://bit.ly/444y5Vc 28. National Science Foundation. (2017). Women, Minorities, and Persons With Disabilities in Science and Engineering. National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics. 29. OECD. (2016). PISA 2015 Results: Excellence and Equity in Education (Vol. 1). OCED. 30. https://bit.ly/3xGI1s1 31. https://bit.ly/3W5jKGa 32. https://bit.ly/3xGI1s1 33. https://bit.ly/4aEQZog
NAGPRA (the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act)1 is a federal law that requires skeletal remains and certain artifacts (such as grave goods and sacred objects) from past populations to be turned over to culturally affiliated present-day Native American tribes. The cultural affiliations can be determined through a variety of means including scientific, historic, and oral traditions, but the determination of affiliation should be by a preponderance of evidence, which means that half or more of the evidence should support the link between the past and the present peoples. All federally funded institutions in the U.S., such as universities and museums (even private ones that accept federal funding) are required to follow NAGPRA. This includes the requirement that they create inventory lists so that Native American tribes can request repatriation of previously discovered and curated items.
In 2017, I decided to reach out to now-retired attorney James W. Springer to see if he’d like to co-author a book on the topic of repatriation that took a critical perspective on the law and the ideology behind repatriation. Jim and I, though never having met face-to-face, had corresponded over the years based on our mutual concern that NAGPRA and similar laws would seriously hinder our ability to accurately understand the past—including the intriguing and ongoing mystery of how the Americas were first peopled.
Jim started his career as an anthropologist after receiving his PhD at Yale University, teaching, excavating, and researching for ten years prior to beginning his law career; throughout the years, he remained interested in anthropology, and continued to read and write about anthropological issues. I’m an anthropology professor at San José State University (SJSU); my focus is on studying skeletal remains and radiographic images (such as X-rays and CT scans). I’ve investigated diseases, such as leprosy in a Byzantine collection, and osteoarthritis patterns from Native Americans. I’ve also tried to reconstruct past people’s activities, looking at stress fractures2 and bone strength in skeletal remains from 18th century European Canadians3 to Paleoindians,4 whose skeletal remains in the Americas are 7,500 years old or older.
Jim and I wrote our book proposal and received a contract, after which I submitted a leave request to my department chair Roberto Gonzalez and my dean Walt Jacobs. Roberto provided an exceedingly supportive statement that also demonstrated that he understood the controversial nature of my position. “Dr. Weiss’s proposed project is likely to benefit the anthropology department in multiple ways,” he wrote. “Finally, since Dr. Weiss holds a controversial position on NAGPRA— focusing upon the ways in which the interpretation and implementation of repatriation and reburial laws may impede intellectual inquiry—her new project is likely to spark lively discussions among various stakeholders.”
My leave was approved, and Jim and I set out to write our book, Repatriation and Erasing the Past.5 It’s organized into three parts. The first focuses on debunking myths taught in K-12 and at universities, especially the conventional dogma that pre-Columbian populations in the Americas were peaceful. Examination of the skeletal remains throughout the Americas revealed clear evidence of violence, particularly the embedded arrowheads and severed limbs that were taken as war trophies. A chapter on biological relatedness discussed the frequent inability to tie past peoples to modern tribes. For example, the DNA of the 11,500-year-old Paleo-Indian Sunrise Girl could not be matched to that of any modern population, suggesting that she came from a group of lost or replaced Beringinians—those who walked across the Bering land bridge while it was in existence.
The second part of the book reviews NAGPRA, the history of Indian Laws and other conservation laws, and explores the complex issues in determining modern tribal affiliation to past peoples. One example is the Kennewick Man case, in which a claimed link between the over 8,000-year-old discovery and one of the modern tribes led to President Obama signing a congressional order to have Kennewick Man repatriated and reburied, preventing all future study. A closer look at the DNA evidence shows that Kennewick Man is, in fact, more closely related to South American Native Americans than the North American tribe who destroyed the discovery through reburial.
The third part of Repatriation and Erasing the Past delves into the problem with repatriation laws and repatriation ideology. It stems from the post-modern movement in which there is no such thing as truth and all conclusions are considered equally subjective. Repatriation ideology places importance on who is providing the information and whether that individual can claim a victim status; thus, information from Native Americans is considered to have greater validity than information coming from a European American, regardless of the latter’s scientific qualifications or demonstrable truthfulness of the information. We also explored NAGPRA’s violation of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment with regard to the separation of church and state in requiring each review committee to have at least two traditional Indian religious leaders and thereby promoting a specific religion—traditional Indian religion—as a required component of the law.
Further violation of the First Amendment includes NAGPRA’s acceptance of creation myths, in the form of oral tradition, as evidence for cultural affiliation (i.e., the connection between a present tribe and past peoples) to support repatriation events. We also looked at how NAGPRA and repatriation ideology encourage censorship. Due to the default acceptance that the Native American culture should be held in deference, repatriation ideology also allows for discrimination; anthropologists eager to continue collaboration with tribes must, for instance, observe menstrual taboos that prohibit women who are menstruating from engaging in research and fieldwork. In short, we called for a return to the primacy of demonstrable, objective knowledge and the abandonment of anti-scientific values.
When I returned to campus after my writing leave, I received SJSU’s College of Social Sciences highest scholarly prize for my research on and curation of the Ryan Mound collection. My university had always been happy to celebrate my achievements. In 2008, I was chosen by then Provost Gerry Selter to speak about my scientific research and my work criticizing repatriation and reburial of skeletal remains. Even earlier than that, when I was hired in 2004, I spoke out against the loss of scientific data through repatriation of remains. I point all this out because shortly after Repatriation and Erasing the Past was published, administrators, including my department chair and the university president, started to take a different view—rather than praising my accomplishments and wowing at the imagery highlighting the importance of studying skeletal remains, they started to condemn my scholarship by taking retaliatory actions to derail my career.
The first sign of trouble was in mid-December 2020 upon receiving a panicked email from my publisher, followed by a phone call, in which they lamented that they were “in crisis mode” because of an open letter6 calling for the banning of Repatriation and Erasing the Past crafted by Siân Halcrow (University of Otago, New Zealand), Amber Aranui (Te Papa Tongarewa, Museum of New Zealand), Stephanie Halmhofer (University of Alberta, Canada), Annalisa Heppner (Brown University, USA), Kristina Killgrove (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA), and Gwen Robbins Schug (University of North Carolina at Greensboro/Appalachian State University, USA).
The open letter, which was signed by nearly 900 academics, called the book racist and wanted it to be retracted, or at least removed from open access to universities and libraries—in other words, they didn’t want to give people the opportunity to read it. Through several phone calls with the publisher, Jim and I were able to convince them not to pull the book, but the publishers nevertheless issued an apology for its publication, written by Director Romi Gutierrez:
I write to address the current discussion surrounding a book the University of Florida Press published several months ago: Repatriation and Erasing the Past, by Elizabeth Weiss and James W. Springer. (…) Because the gears of the publication process do move gradually, a flawed editorial decision made in the past has consequences today.
Those consequences, in this case, include harm to voices we sincerely value, the potential to undo important progress, and injury to relationships we have long worked to foster. I apologize for the pain this publication has caused. It was not our intent to publish a book that uses arguments and terminology associated with scientific racism. I assure you that, months ago, changes to our editorial program had already started to take place, including greater focus to inclusivity and sensitivity, and we will continue and redouble these efforts.7
Jim and I stood up for what we had written; we wrote articles on our perspective, and fought back in the public press and on social media.8, 9, 10 Our book remains available and can be found in nearly 1,000 libraries.
When this crisis was brought to my attention, I reached out to my chair Roberto Gonzalez and my dean Walt Jacobs. Gonzalez informed me that he had already known about the cancellation attempt. What I didn’t know was that Gonzalez and Jacobs would become my biggest foes in what turned out to be the start of a campaign to cancel me.
At this time, there were two other incidents involving my university that would play into their efforts to retaliate against me. One faculty member, A.J. Faas, wrote in an email to the anthropology department:
I would like to share an important resource that just went live a few weeks ago. Cite Black Authors, a searchable database of Black scholarly journal articles, books, and expert listings, will launch to the public on November 16, 2020, at CiteBlackAuthors.com. The website is an interdisciplinary effort to enhance and recognize Black academic voices for better representation in scholarship. Sparked by the death of George Floyd and ongoing racial conflicts in the United States, a team of nine people, including researchers, developers, and graduate students, curated citations and designed a searchable website for researchers, educators, and the general public. We are overwhelmingly grateful for the support of contributors and the team behind the initiative. Please share the attached release with your friends and groups—and help us to spread the word and the WORK of Black, academic professionals.
I responded in writing that:
Although the intent of Cite Black Authors may be well-meaning, as a scholar in search of objective knowledge, I encourage researchers to look for the best source material and realize that an author’s ethnicity, race, or color of their skin has no actual bearing on the validity of their contribution.
Second, I attended a webinar on creating a Native American Studies Center, put on by Provost Vincent Del Casino. The speakers (two of the three stated that they were Native American scholars) expressed what I submit are inherently racist sentiments, including that Native Americans were better than any other people in all topics (the speaker then started to list them: math, biology, literature…) and that only Native Americans should teach and work in the Native American Studies Center because it would be an insult if a Mexican was mistaken for a Native American or vice versa. In the comments bar of the seminar video stream, I wrote that these statements were racist; why would it be an insult to be mistaken for a Mexican, unless you thought that there was something wrong with being Mexican? Would we want to restrict Shakespeare to being taught by Britons and British Americans only? The responses to my criticisms included an email from a professor of Chicano and Chicana Studies that concluded, “I’m exhausted and disgusted by Karen antics that silence BIPOC voices in the academy” and a phone call from chair Gonzalez in which he implored me not to attend such events, stating that my attendance could harm the department’s junior faculty’s chances at tenure.
Calls for the banning of Repatriation and Erasing the Past increased, and Gonzalez wrote a letter to all faculty, staff and graduate students in the department “reminding everyone that the opinions expressed in your new book don’t represent the position of the SJSU anthropology department, and that the principle of academic freedom allows us all to freely pursue our ideas—even if they’re controversial or unpopular.” He stated that because he received “numerous emails and calls from colleagues who are quite concerned and even upset about your book,” he thought that this was the best step to take. He concluded:
On a personal note, I want to let you know that after having carefully read the book, I disagree with both the substance and style of Repatriation and Erasing the Past, including its dismissal of Native American epistemologies and indigenous scholarship, its Victorian-era approach to anthropological inquiry, and its linear, pre-Kuhnian view of scientific progress. Our discipline has long played a signal role in recognizing the insight and benefits that can come from understanding different lifeways and cultural perspectives, and I’m confident that we will continue doing so in the future.
I replied, making sure that all who received his letter also received mine:
Roberto’s use of the term “Victorian-era” is to misunderstand our perspective though I would like to remind everyone Charles Darwin was from the Victorian era—and where would we be without him?! Both Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper (the philosopher James and I cite) had remarkable careers with thought-provoking works that helped shape modern social sciences. They were also contemporaries and, thus, although their approaches to understanding science differed, to portray Repatriation and Erasing the Past as antiquated because we don’t use Kuhn, but rather cite Popper, is an unfair representation. Popper’s view of scientific progress is not a linear view and neither do James and I support a linear view of scientific progress. We even highlight the unpredictability and uncontrollability of knowledge while noting that knowledge is not an unfolding sequence, but rather a messy endeavor that is in constant flux. Science is the search for truth, perhaps never getting to the truth on many topics. New data or old data reanalyzed, we point out, can upturn previous explanations.
The end outcome of this exchange was that Gonzalez decided to put together a webinar series: “Emancipatory Theory & Praxis: Confronting Racism in American Society and American Anthropology.” His chosen speakers included Agustín Fuentes of Princeton University. In his talk, Fuentes focused on White supremacy and violence. I asked about the recent slew of Black on Asian crimes that were occurring and how he would define these acts; he stated that they too were due to White supremacy—if Blacks weren’t discriminated against by Whites, then they wouldn’t be attacking Asians. The other invited speaker was William White from UC Berkeley. White’s talk was actually quite illuminating; he pointed out that students of color were often directed to study populations that they were related to and that this didn’t always match their interests; thus, arguing against students being shoehorned into specific areas of study based on their ethnicity. A Black student may want to study Celts while a White student might wish to learn more about Caribbean archaeology.
In response to this webinar, I asked my chair whether I could put together a similar webinar to focus on academic freedom and diversity of thought. His initial response was that there was no funding and no time to do so; then, when I suggested we move it to the next semester, he dug up some rules on guest speakers that we never used and weren’t used for the equity webinar, and even had us retroactively vote on whether we approved of the topic and speakers of his webinar! Unsurprisingly, I haven’t been able to get department support to hold a webinar or invite a guest speaker.
Over the following months, the controversies simmered down, until Jim and I submitted an abstract to the 2021 Society for American Archaeology (SAA) conference. Our talk, “Has Creationism Crept Back into Archaeology?”, called for a relying on data rather than creation myths to ensure that repatriation can be done as fairly as possible. I compared creation myths of Native Americans to other creation myths while pointing out that the SAA has previously taken a stand against the teaching and use of biblical interpretations, such as intelligent design, to understand the past. The SAA was founded in 1934 and states that it is “dedicated to research about and interpretation and protection of the archaeological heritage of the Americas.” The SAA has about 7,000 members that include professional and avocational archaeologists, archaeology students in colleges and universities, and archaeologists working at Tribal agencies, museums, government agencies, and the private sector.
Although our topic did not seem particularly controversial to me, there was a movement to prevent the talk (which was pre-recorded) from being played.11 It aired anyway, and the comment box quickly filled up with name-calling and accusations of racism. But even though all talks were supposed to stay on the SAA platform for two months, the incoming president apologized for the harm caused, removed the talk from the platform, and formed a committee to ensure that those critical of repatriation ideology would not be allowed on the program again. Two years later, I submitted an abstract that discussed whether X-rays were to be included in repatriation. At SJSU, X-rays are now being labeled as “sacred objects” and upon repatriation of the human remains and artifacts, the tribes plan to burn the X-rays. This abstract was rejected; the California Society for Archaeology rejected it too.
On June 3, 2021, Roberto Gonzalez—hosted by my dean Walt Jacobs—presented a review of my situation at the Council of Colleges of Art and Sciences called “What to Do When a Tenured Colleague is Branded a Racist.” In this presentation, Gonzalez painted me as being manipulative, racist, strange, and professionally incompetent. He stated that my anti-repatriation position, coupled with my reaction to the Cite Black Authors incident, were reasons to withhold resources, and that my next review would state that I am incompetent. He suggested that if I taught my perspective to students or assigned my books in classes, he would consider removing me from the classroom. Although he employed a pseudonym for me, it was clear that this was a personal attack—describing me as odd, not “warm and fuzzy,” and bizarrely suggesting that I might lock myself into the curation facility to prevent a repatriation from occurring. (While I disagree with NAGPRA, I have always followed the law.) Further, he painted my ideas as “scientific racism” and stated that he would have signed the open letter calling for my book to be banned if he wasn’t chair. Perhaps most surreally, Gonzalez painted himself as a victim, claiming that he had no idea of the “skeletons in my closet”—that I am an anti-repatriation anthropologist. Yet, this was clearly a lie, as seen in the approval for my leave to write the book, his support for my award, and the many discussions we held about repatriation over the years. Gonzalez was even on my hiring committee— so he knew that one of my first papers was on Kennewick Man and how repatriation and reburial of Paleo-Indians is an affront to scientific inquiry and hinders our ability to reconstruct the past.
It was clear that my job was on the line. Even a tenured professor can be fired for incompetence, which is what they were accusing me of!
The latest cancellations started up again after I published an op-ed critical of California’s repatriation law called CalNAGPRA.12 The recent changes to CalNAGPRA all but set the stage for repatriation events that would hollow out collections in all of the state’s universities. CalNAGPRA states that Native American knowledge must be deferred to; that is, if there is a disagreement between scientific evidence and the Native American oral tradition, the Native American oral tradition must be given priority. All that is needed for repatriation is for a Native American to say that there is a link between the modern tribe and the past peoples—this would then trump all the DNA and forensic evidence. There must also be continuous consultation with all tribes of the area and their requests for handling, access, and repatriation must be followed.
Shortly after the op-ed, I posted on social media a now infamous photo of me holding a skull (above left), with the caption “So happy to be back with some old friends.” Provost Vincent Del Casino wrote a scathing letter condemning me, stating: “This image has evoked shock and disgust from our Native and Indigenous community on campus and from many people within and outside of SJSU.”13 He went on to criticize me: “in what context is it ever ethically appropriate for an academic to handle remains while smiling with ungloved hands while calling these remains ‘friends’? I doubt many colleagues in the fields of Forensic Science or Physical Anthropology would find this palatable.” I reached out to the provost and suggested that we discuss the issue and address the public together, but he didn’t wish to do this and, thus, I provided him with a letter to send to the same people on his email list, which he did.14 I clarified a variety of misunderstandings; for instance, “handling remains with gloves is only necessary if these remains have always been treated with gloved hands and other sterile conditions.” Use of gloves is actually actively discouraged by the National Park Society because it leads to people dropping materials more often. I ended the letter with:
We have no way of telling what the individuals whose remains we curate would think about this issue, but when one looks at the Egyptian mummies, Ötzi the iceman, or the bog bodies of northern Europe, public display celebrates these individuals, telling their stories in a respectful way that gives them a voice they never had in life. The same is true of our collection, and we should be celebrating the lives of these first occupants of Silicon Valley—not allowing their voices to be silenced by a vociferous campaign orchestrated by woke activists whose strategy is to try to shut down debate, and promote superstition over science. (…) Finally, it’s an attack on a genuine photo that celebrates our collection, my admiration for the collection, and my joy at being able to do my job. After your strong statement regarding academic freedom, I am disappointed that you were not courageous enough—as those reporting on me—to talk to me first, to have a rational discussion about these occurrences.
My response led to many colleagues reaching out to me; finding similar photos (from SJSU and many other institutes, including the Smithsonian); and providing support. One very supportive colleague faced an onslaught of criticism after he was quoted in the Mercury News, which led him to withdraw his support of my freedom of expression. He called to let me know that he was frightened. Others have expressed quiet support—a former student and lecturer let me know that she didn’t think that I was racist at all, but spent all day debating whether to email me from her university account or her private account, ultimately deciding on the latter. This fear of cancellation permeates academia.
On the left, the image that Provost Del Casino said did “not align with the values of SJSU” and “evoked shock and disgust from our Native and Indigenous community on campus and from many people within and outside of SJSU.” On the right, the image that the University used for multiple websites and promotional material. This image was removed from the University website in July 2023.
All of this led the then President Mary Papazian to remove my access to the curation facility. They literally changed the locks! She also stated that no photos were allowed of the Native American skeletal collection (a key aspect to understanding past diseases is sharing and comparing images) or even of the boxes that held the bones.15 I responded by noting that non-Native American remains and other collections were in the facility and not subject to repatriation law. One cultural anthropologist asked whether I had written permission from these individuals to take the photos, knowing full well that they had been dead for centuries! I fought all these restrictions. Tribal liaison Alisha Ragland was perhaps one of the most vitriolic, claiming that I was a eugenicist and shouldn’t get access to any collections. They moved the protocol for access to skeletal collections to the Institute Review Board, which I fought against. The chair held meetings to try to remove me from my duties as curator, although it is part of my job contract.
How did we get to a situation in which opposing the reburial of human remains is automatically deemed racist and can derail an anthropologist’s career?
I decided the time had come to initiate legal action against the SJSU for their various retaliatory actions. While putting together our case, Pacific Legal Foundation (who represented me pro bono) and I contacted senior academic figures in physical anthropology and archaeology to seek expert opinions on protocols for handling skeletal remains.
Dr. Douglas Owsley has worked with many prestigious universities and museums, including the Smithsonian. He is the subject of Jeff Benedict’s book No Bone Unturned: Inside the World of a Top Forensic Scientist and His Work on America’s Most Notorious Crimes and Disasters.16 Dr. Owsley wrote in his supportive amicus brief: “Based on my experience there was nothing improper about Professor Weiss’s photograph.” He also noted that, “it is not standard protocol to use gloves when examining archeological bones in the laboratory.”17 Professor Della Cook, who managed the North American skeletal collections held by the Department of Anthropology at Indiana University from 1973 to 2021 and has collected data on skeletal remains around the world, wrote “Photographs of researchers measuring or otherwise doing observations on bones, ancient and modern, are routine in our field, and many anthropologists smile in such photographs.” She added that “There are several such photos of me in circulation, and in most of them I am smiling.”18
The department also worked with Native Americans and a retired forensic anthropology lecturer to rewrite protocols that would determine access to collections. The protocol even included a menstruation taboo. They couldn’t bring themselves to state that women who are menstruating are not allowed in the curation facility or to handle remains and artifacts; thus, they used the term “menstruating personnel,” to avoid the implication that only females menstruate! Seriously? Upon seeing this, my lawyers and I decided to mention that this likely constitutes a Title IX violation and that, if it were not removed, we would file a complaint. It was removed.19
This discriminatory action against women is far more common in anthropology now than you may think; Native American tribes believing in menstrual taboos will ban women who are menstruating from engaging in fieldwork, handling remains, and even eating with the rest of the crew. Many institutions, including UC Berkeley, condone this behavior.20
Further complications arose when I requested nonhuman animal bones. These items were quickly declared by Native Americans as being sacred and, thus, out of reach for my research. Previously unaware of possessing any mystical powers, I suddenly realized that whatever I requested magically and instantly became “sacred” and thus off-limits.
When we first went in front of a judge, she ruled that my case was to be dismissed, but I was allowed to amend my complaint.21 In the decision to dismiss the case, she stated that the tribes were an “indispensable” party to the case, but the tribes were considered sovereign and, thus, could not be sued. We filed an amended complaint, excluding the Native American collections, and—to everyone’s surprise—the motion to dismiss was overturned. Unfortunately, I still had no recourse to get access to X-rays and nonhuman animal bones, or even the ability to enter the curation facility.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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How did we get to a situation in which opposing the reburial of human remains is automatically deemed racist and can derail an anthropologist’s career? It’s about turning anthropology into an ideological battleground weighted in favor of victimhood and (often disproven by evidence) tribal identity—both political and social—rather than a scientific endeavor aimed at better understanding the past for the benefit of all humankind. It doesn’t matter who is correct, it matters who gets to tell the story, with Native American narratives now considered expert testimony that cannot and must not be questioned.
The next proposed revisions to NAGPRA are sure to erase the imperfect compromise that was included in the original NAGPRA law—a compromise that tried to ensure that science would still be conducted by allowing for the retention of most artifacts and the continued curation of culturally unidentifiable skeletal remains. Native American tribes, such as the San Carlos Apache Tribe, want a definition of human remains that includes naturally-shed material (such as hair and skin cells), casts, replicas, and digital data.22 Some have argued that animals imbued with human spirits should be included as human too. Of course, the puma who recently died in Los Angeles was given a traditional Indian burial in order to stop research on its remains.23
Why would a university or museum want to lose their collections? They may think cooperating will enable them to continue their research endeavors, but research purely for the purpose of propping up a political agenda isn’t research. When the tribes can control your conclusions, one is no longer engaged in pursuit of objective knowledge.
For my part, I shall oppose the unconstitutional NAGPRA in order to bring anthropologists, especially the next generation, back to science. And I will promote science which knows no bounds of race, sex, gender, religion, or creed over superstition, regardless of any race, sex, gender, religion, or creed affiliation—real, alleged, or imagined.
About the AuthorElizabeth Weiss is co-author, with James W. Springer, of Repatriation and Erasing the Past. She is also the author of Reading the Bones: Activity, Biology, and Culture and Paleopathology in Perspective: Bone Health and Disease Through Time. She has been a professor of anthropology at San José State University (SJSU) since 2004. Prior to joining SJSU, Elizabeth had a post-doctoral research position at the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Ottawa. She is a faculty fellow at Heterodox Academy’s Center for Academic Pluralism and a National Association of Scholars board member.
References1. https://bit.ly/3TFSs7G 2. https://bit.ly/3TJt69a 3. https://bit.ly/4chYmmP 4. Weiss, E. (2001). Kennewick Man’s Behavior: A CT-Scan Analysis. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 32S, 163–163 5. Weiss, E. & Springer, J. W. (2020). Repatriation and Erasing the Past. University of Florida Press. 6. https://bit.ly/3VoFexw 7. https://bit.ly/3TpiD1f 8. https://bit.ly/4cjUwJS 9. https://bit.ly/43oQ1d5 10. https://bit.ly/4aiNsvm 11. https://bit.ly/4chCpnR 12. https://bit.ly/4chCqbp 13. https://bit.ly/3VmVuyL 14. https://bit.ly/3v714uJ 15. https://bit.ly/4cnYZuY 16. Benedict, J. (2004). No Bone Unturned: Inside the World of a Top Forensic Scientist and His Work on America’s Most Notorious Crimes and Disasters. Harper Perennial. 17. Owsley, D. (2022). Amicus brief. Case 5:22-cv-00641-BLF Document 50 Filed 03/10/22 18. Cook, D. (2022). Amicus brief. Case 5:22-cv-00641-BLF Document 49 Filed 03/10/22 19. https://bit.ly/4ciffh7 20. https://bit.ly/3TmF2Mr 21. https://bit.ly/3Viu9Oo 22. https://bit.ly/3VFMghB 23. https://bit.ly/3IJ2jDs
As a sociologist interested in the scientific study of social life, I’ve long been concerned about the ideological bent of much of sociology. Many sociologists reject outright the idea of sociology as a science and instead prefer to engage in political activism. Others subordinate scientific to activist goals, and are unclear as to what they believe sociology’s purpose should be. Still others say different things depending on the audience.
The American Sociological Association (ASA) does the latter. Last December, the Board of Governors of Florida’s state university system removed an introductory sociology course from the list of college courses that could be taken to fulfil part of the general education requirement. It seemed clear that sociology’s reputation for progressive politics played a role in the decision. Florida’s Commissioner of Education, for example, wrote that sociology had been hijacked by political activists.1 The ASA denied the charge and went on to declare that sociology is “the scientific study of social life, social change, and the social causes and consequences of human behavior.”
While that definition certainly aligns with my vision of what sociology should be, it contrasts with another recent statement made by the ASA itself when announcing this year’s annual conference theme. The theme is “Intersectional Solidarities: Building Communities of Hope, Justice, and Joy,” which, as the ASA website explains, “emphasizes sociology as a form of liberatory praxis: an effort to not only understand structural inequities, but to intervene in socio-political struggles.”2 It’s easy to see how Florida’s Commissioner of Education somehow got the idea that sociology has become infused with ideology.
The ASA’s statement in defense of sociology as the science of social life seems insincere. That’s unfortunate— we really do need a science of social life if we’re going to understand the social world better. And we need to understand the world better if we’re going to effectively pursue social justice. The ASA’s brand of sociology as liberatory praxis leads not only to bad sociology, but also to misguided efforts to change the world. As I’ve argued in my book How to Think Better About Social Justice, if we’re going to change the world for the better, we need to make use of the insights of sociology. But bad sociology only makes things worse.
Contemporary social justice activism tends to draw from a sociological perspective known as critical theory. Critical theory is a kind of conflict theory, wherein social life is understood as a struggle for domination. It is rooted in Marxist theory, which viewed class conflict as the driver of historical change and interpreted capitalist societies in terms of the oppression of wage laborers by the owners of the means of production. Critical theory understands social life similarly, except that domination and oppression are no longer simply about economic class but also race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexuality, gender identity, and much more.
There are two problems with social justice efforts informed by critical theory. First, this form of social justice—often called “critical social justice” by supporters and “wokeism” by detractors—deliberately ignores the insights that might come from other sociological perspectives. Critical theory, like conflict theory more broadly, is just one of many theoretical approaches in a field that includes a number of competing paradigms. It’s possible to view social life as domination and oppression, but it’s also possible to view it as a network of relationships, or as an arena of rational transactions similar to a marketplace, or as a stage where actors play their parts, or as a system where the different parts contribute to the functioning of the whole. If you’re going to change the social world, it’s important to have some understanding of how social life works, but there’s no justification for relying exclusively on critical theory.
The second problem is that, unlike most other sociological perspectives, critical theory assumes an oppositional stance toward science. This is partly because critical theory is intended not just to describe and explain the world, but rather to change it—an approach the ASA took in speaking of sociology as “liberatory praxis.” However, the problem isn’t just that critical theory prioritizes political goals over scientific ones, it’s that it also sees science as oppressive and itself in need of critique and dismantling. The claim is that scientific norms and scientific knowledge—just like other norms and other forms of knowledge in liberal democratic societies—have been constructed merely to serve the interests of the powerful and enable the oppression of the powerless.
Critical theory makes declarations about observable aspects of social reality, but because of its political commitments and its hostile stance toward scientific norms, it tends to act more like a political ideology than a scientific theory. As one example, consider Ibram X. Kendi’s assertions about racial disparities. Kendi, a scholar and activist probably best known for his book How to Be an Antiracist, has said, “As an anti-racist, when I see racial disparities, I see racism.”3 The problem with this approach is that while racism is one possible cause of racial disparities (and often the main cause!), in science, our theories need to be testable, and they need to be tested. Kendi doesn’t put his idea forward as a proposition to be tested but instead as a fundamental truth not to be questioned. In any true science, claims about social reality must be formulated into testable hypotheses. And then we need to actually gather the evidence. Usually what we find is variation, and this case is likely to be no different. That is, we’re likely to find that in some contexts racism has more of a causal role than in others.
We often want easy answers to social problems. Social justice activists might be inclined to turn to would-be prophets who proclaim what seems to be the truth, rather than to scientists who know we have to do the legwork required to understand and address things. Yes, science gives us imperfect knowledge, and it points to the difficulties we encounter when changing the world… but since we live in a world of tradeoffs, there are seldom easy answers to social problems. We can’t create a perfect world—utopia isn’t possible—so any kind of social justice rooted in reality must try to increase human flourishing while recognizing that not all problems can be eliminated, certainly not easily or quickly.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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What does it all mean? For one, we should be much more skeptical about one of critical theory’s central claims— that the norms and institutions of liberal democratic societies are simply disguised tools of oppression. Do liberal ideals such as equality before the law, due process, free speech, free markets, and individual rights simply mask social inequalities so as to advance the interests of the powerful? Critical theorists don’t really subject this claim to scientific scrutiny. Instead, they take the presence of inequalities in liberal societies as selfsufficient evidence that liberalism is responsible for these failures. Yet any serious attempt to pursue social justice informed by scientific understanding of the world would involve comparing liberal democratic societies with other societies, both present and past.
Scientific sociology can’t tell us the best way to organize a society and social justice involves making tradeoffs among competing values. We may never reach a consensus on what kind of society is best, but we should consider the possibility that liberal democracies seem to provide the best framework we yet know of for pursuing social justice effectively. At the very least, they provide mechanisms for peacefully managing disputes in an imperfect world.
About the AuthorBradley Campbell is a professor of sociology at California State University, Los Angeles. He is the author The Geometry of Genocide, The Rise of Victimhood Culture (with Jason Manning), and How to Think Better About Social Justice: Why Good Sociology Matters. His research interests include moral conflict, violence, collision of right and wrong, and how they are handled. He has recently begun to examine conflicts on college campuses, manifestations of ongoing moral change, and the clash of different moral ideals.
References1. https://bit.ly/3xxYgYb 2. https://bit.ly/3W2NKCo 3. https://bit.ly/3U2d4WK
It seems obvious that we live in the era of cancel culture, but what does that mean, exactly? To many on the left, “cancel culture” is merely a whiny self-defensive term offered by justifiably banished academics, writers, and celebrities—“cis white intellectuals” as one online writer disdainfully put it—who face no realistic threats to their freedom or livelihoods. Others think it is an overblown label for the eternal ideological wars between the left and the right, in which each extreme complains that the other side is censoring them while working hard to censor that other side. Or is cancel culture something new, describing a phenomenon that has become far more insidious, widespread, and dangerous for free speech and democracy? Spoiler alert: I’m going with the latter.
Let’s stipulate at the outset that most people would prefer that their political opponents, intellectual enemies, and annoying challengers to their opinions would just shut up and go away. There’s nothing new about that desire, which has manifested throughout the centuries in the censorship, shunning, banishment, or imprisonment of those daring to differ. In my own lifetime, I have observed a dizzying turn of the academic and political wheels, as ascendant conservatives try to oust Commie-pinko-oversexedsocialist liberals until ascendant liberals try to oust fascist-racist-puritanical-authoritarian conservatives.
I was born in the heyday of the Red Scare (1947–1957) and grew up watching the censorship or ostracism of anyone remotely tainted with membership in, or even holding supporting opinions about, left-wing groups. My older half-brother was dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Army in the early 1950s because of his prolonged and unrepentant association with a “known member of the Communist Party”—our father, who had briefly joined the Party in the 1930s. (The Supreme Court eventually overturned that discharge.)
Observing these right-wing efforts to stifle or expel liberals (defined as anyone less ideologically conservative than they, including other conservatives), I was optimistically, if delusionally, certain that the liberal commitment to free speech, open debate, and scientific evidence would prevail if the tables were ever turned. It was clear who the enemy was. In sexology, it was and remains religious fundamentalists eager to ban any research on sexuality they fear and detest (actually, all of it, but especially evidence of the normalcy of childhood sexual play, premarital sex, homosexuality, and masturbation). I could not have imagined, as Pogo, the star of Walt Kelly’s great comic strip, said, that “we have met the enemy—and he is us.” I could not have imagined how many liberal sexologists and other scientists today would be eager to ban research on sexuality that they fear and detest (especially evidence that disputes transgender activists’ claims of the safety and necessity of adolescent medical interventions). And not just ban this research—excoriate, expel, and attempt to cancel the publications, lectures, and even the careers of those who conduct it. Just ask the eminent sexologists Kenneth Zucker (for showing that the great majority of gender nonconforming young boys grow up to be gay, not trans), Stephen Levine (for questioning the claims of gender-affirming therapies), and evolutionary biologists Carole Hooven and Colin Wright, anthropologist Robert Lynch, and philosophers Alex Byrne and Holly Lawford-Smth (for arguing that there are two biological sexes). On that subject, I’m sure, these scientists would never have imagined being in bed with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.
Today, when I read accounts by consummate scientists such as anthropologist Elizabeth Weiss (this issue), who found herself caught between (1) the naïve but widespread belief that Native Americans were pacifists and (2) the empirical evidence, written in their bones, of their legacy of brutal battles, I see another light going out on the road to our national Endarkenment.
Cancel culture is the impulse to punish or expel anyone who says the wrong thing or holds the wrong beliefs.
I remember the first straw in the pile that would eventually disillusion me. In 2007, at my alma mater, Brandeis University, Donald Hindley, an esteemed professor of political science who had been at the university for 45 years, was explaining to his Latin American politics class the origin of the disparaging insult “wetback”—a slur against Mexican migrants entering Texas by swimming across the Rio Grande. One or two students were offended and immediately complained to the provost, who, in the words of Hindley’s eventual attorneys, “indulged the students’ fantasy that they were crusaders against racism.” She told Hindley that “The University will not tolerate inappropriate, racial and discriminatory conduct by members of its faculty,” also accusing him of inflicting “significant emotional trauma” on his students by forcing them to hear such an offensive term. As punishment, a monitor would sit in on his classroom for the rest of the term and he would have to attend racial-sensitivity training classes. This Hindley refused to do.
The university was barraged with messages from outraged faculty and alumni like me, along with public mockery and condemnation. I wondered if Brandeis still offered the brilliant course I had taken years earlier on the history of anti-Semitism, which caused no end of “significant emotional trauma” in every class meeting and reading, though we called it “education.” The provost backed down, ultimately telling Hindley the matter was closed and she trusted he had learned his lesson, whatever that was.
Looking back, I see that all the seeds of cancel culture— the impulse to punish or expel anyone who says the wrong thing or holds the wrong beliefs—were present in Hindley’s story:
- indulging the student’s inability or unwillingness to speak to the professor directly, in the classroom or privately, instead rewarding the student for going to a grown-up to solve a complaint for them.
- indulging the student’s self-righteousness in punishing a “racist.”
- failing to enable the student to separate an emotional association with a word from an intellectual understanding of its origins and usage.
- according a word the same trauma-generating status and seriousness as an action, along with blurring a speaker’s intention and motivation. I like knowing the varied and surprising origins of the ethnic slur kike, but don’t call me one.
- holding closed-door committee meetings in which a professor’s sins are debated and determined, in the absence of any avenue of participation or defense from the accused.
- humiliating a professor, in this case one with a lifelong commitment to social justice for the poor and minorities, by demanding he attend racial-sensitivity training and accept a babysitter in the class to make sure he doesn’t say any other bad word.
- establishing “racial sensitivity” workshops as punishment and virtue signaling, without pausing to assess their methods and outcomes. Do these programs achieve their goals, or do they make their involuntary participants stubborn and angry? Come to think of it, haven’t a few other institutions and governments tried to forcibly reeducate disobedient, troublemaking citizens? How did those work out?
Today, Hindley’s experience seems mild compared to the deluge of cases that followed. After all, he was not suspended or fired, nor was he a victim of social media mobs out for blood as compensation for a scratch. Mobs, real and virtual, have made it hard if not impossible for university presidents, company CEOs, and publishers to maintain positions of integrity and defend open debate, but mob influence is new only in the technology that allows it to congeal in a nanosecond and get that offender gone. At The New York Times in 2021, more than 150 young staffers felt entitled to howl for the firing of an honored older colleague, Donald McNeil, who had dared say the wrong word, even in an educational context. “Our community is in pain,” they wrote. They couldn’t possibly work with him and feel safe, they said. And they prevailed. No doubt they would look at my list of the elements of Hindley’s story that distressed and infuriated me and say “So? Brandeis did everything right.”
That is why cancel culture is so worrisome: not because it reflects the familiar political divide between left and right, but because it reflects a generational war between old and young, a war between liberals and illiberals across parties. Liberals in my generation are surprised, and not a little uncomfortable, to find themselves opposing illiberals to their left and supporting conservatives to their right, sharing concern about cancel culture’s methods and the take-no-prisoners ideology that justifies them.
In their extensive assessment of the origins and extent of the problem, Greg Lukianoff and Rikki Schlott’s The Canceling of the American Mind1documents case after enraging case that escalated in the years since Hindley. (The “American” mind extends to Canada and the UK.) Lukianoff, a lifelong liberal who joined the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) in 2001 and is now its CEO, is well positioned to survey the changing landscape and report from the trenches. Schlott, a “right-leaning libertarian,” is a Gen Z journalist. Their collaboration is the point: left and right staking out a path between extremes of both sides.
Lukianoff and Schlott’s definition of cancel culture is broader than the individuals who are “fired, disinvited, deplatformed, or otherwise punished” for speech that should be protected by America’s first amendment standards. Their definition adds “…and the climate of fear and conformity that has resulted.” In polls they cite, the majority of Americans of all parties and ages are reluctant to share their views on topics of politics, race, sexual orientation, gender, or religion, fearing loss of their jobs, grades, or social support. In the preface, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who was coauthor with Lukianoff on this book’s predecessor, The Coddling of the American Mind,2 notes that cancel culture “has metastasized and spread far beyond universities… [now infecting] journalism, the arts, nonprofits, K–12 education, and even medicine.” Because cancel culture seeks to punish anyone who says or does the “wrong” thing, absent knowledge of their motivation or context, people censor themselves. “Show me an organization where people are afraid to speak up, afraid to challenge dominant ideas lest they be destroyed socially,” Haidt adds, “and I’ll show you an organization that has become structurally stupid, unmoored from reality, and unable to achieve its mission.”
Many organizations and institutions now fit that description, including Harvard and other elite universities, the ACLU, even the Unitarian Universalist Church, and Lukianoff and Schlott offer an illuminating history of the “slow-motion trainwreck” by which they went off the rails. The “First Great Age of Political Correctness, 1985–1995” gave us the term, pretty much confined to college campuses; its pompous usages were eventually laughed off. But there was nothing funny about the ensuing shift of position by the political left, which began equating freedom of speech, which they had long championed as a bedrock liberal value, with freedom of hate speech, which they were determined to eradicate. Social justice goals began trampling the once-inviolate goal of protecting minority opinions, even if “hateful” opinions come from the minority individuals whose rights you otherwise care about. And who defines what “hate speech” is? We all agree that slurs and insults count. But am I guilty of hate speech if I publish a study whose findings you find hateful, hold an opinion about racism or gender that doesn’t conform to yours, or speak Words That Must Not Be Said? In the UK, Lukianoff and Schlott report, more than 3,000 people in 2016 alone were “detained and questioned by police for non-crime ‘hate incidents’ related to what they had said online.”
Between 1995 and 2013, Lukianoff and Schlott write, “viewpoint diversity on college campuses plummeted, tuition skyrocketed, and campus bureaucracy swelled.” In 2010, cancel culture “struck like lightning on college campuses.” The new generation of anti-free-speech activists began demanding speech codes, trigger warnings, and the monitoring of microaggressions. Speakers—the famous, the eminent, the provocative—were being disinvited, which made national news, which generated more speaker bans. DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) policies, at first a well-intentioned and overdue approach to making universities and companies more welcoming of people of color, have become, Lukianoff and Schlott document, an “ideological litmus test” that faculty and students question at their peril. Students applying for admission and scholars applying for academic positions must display evidence of their commitment to diversity and social justice, but only some kinds of diversity are acceptable: if you care about including working class people, economically disadvantaged people, or conservative people, forget it. Everyone knows the rule: conform or you’re out.
Two other societal factors fed into cancel culture. By 2013, university administrators had enacted policies that accommodated new student “demands” because they couldn’t afford not to. Once students became high-paying consumers rather than, well, students, administrators had to retain them no matter how badly they behaved, no matter how many rules of civil discourse they violated. With a student’s high tuition at stake, deciding between a professor’s expertise and a student’s hurt feelings was a no-brainer. And why the hurt feelings? The year 2013, as Haidt and Lukianoff have argued, also marked the emergence of a generation of overprotected, “overcoddled” children. In their view, parents’ panic over their children’s physical and emotional safety led them to sharply curtail their children’s free play and independence, while intervening constantly to protect their children from the challenges, shocks, setbacks, teasing, risks, disappointments, anxieties, and losses that we all need to become socially and emotionally competent. The result was a cohort of fearful, fragile young adults obsessed with finding safe spaces and safe ideas, with trigger warnings to help them avoid dangerous ideas.
A “trigger warning,” says the Cambridge Dictionary, is “a statement at the beginning of a piece of writing, before the start of a film, etc., warning people that they may find the content very upsetting, especially if they have experienced something similar. Trigger warnings are supposed to protect people from posttraumatic flashbacks.” Enabled by the expanding traumatology industry, which blurred the line between “I feel distressed” and “I feel traumatized,” trigger warnings eventually became almost meaningless, because one person’s “trigger” (a cat who looks just like their dear departed Boots) is nothing to a person who hates cats. If everything can be a trigger for someone, where does it end? It doesn’t, at least on the website doesthedogdie.com, where you can find “crowdsourced trigger warnings” for anything that might upset you while viewing a show or reading a book. Personally, I would welcome a chocolatechip- ice-cream warning to protect me from myself.
In Triggered Literature: Cancellation, Stealth Censorship and Cultural Warfare,3 John Sutherland, emeritus professor of Modern English Literature at University College London, wades into this controversy with entertaining reflections from a lifetime of teaching. We rarely burn books literally any more, he begins, but triggering is but one of “a range of other impositions on the creative act and product, namely, cancellation, prepublication bowdlerisation, suppression, ‘red flagging’, semi-tolerance,” and of course, the sensitivity reader, “creative literature’s superego.” Naturally he does not welcome these “impositions,” but he is sympathetic to the reasons for them, including #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, changing demographics in society and universities, and, as many have noted, the “whopping cost of fees” that transformed students in the UK and U.S. into “consumers wielding the big bazooka: purchaser power.” When, in 2014, the head of English studies at UCL dismissed trigger warnings by saying they were “treating people as if they were babies, and studying literature is for grownups,” Sutherland comments wryly that “There was a cheering chorus of ‘hear, hear!’ from those who saw themselves as grown(er) up(er) than fractious students with weak knees. But the tide was with youth.” Indeed it was, and by 2022, he reports, “British universities had covertly triggered over a thousand texts,” including the work of Shakespeare, Chaucer, Austen, Brontë, Dickens, Woolf, Twain, and even Agatha Christie.
Yet Sutherland’s take is not the familiar “woe are we” of an older generation. Northampton University, he tells us, triggered George Orwell’s 1984 for its “challenging issues related to violence, gender, sexuality, class, race, abuses, sexual abuse, political ideas and offensive language”—the offensive language being bollox. Sutherland does not regard this decision, as the press did and as I do, as “egregious snowflakery” but a result of “careful, legitimately sensitive reading.” He himself falls between seeing triggers as “utter wokery” and “responsible pedagogic practice”: “Triggering is essentially an alert. Done responsibly it does not erase or meddle; it stimulates curiosity and thought.” Agreed, though presumably that is what good instructors have always done when introducing their students to the readings at hand.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.2
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Sutherland begins with brief news stories, without comment, simply as signs of the times “of where we are and where we’re going.” In Part Two, he analyzes a variety of forms of control on literature, the “stealth censorship” of his subtitle, from creation to production to consumption. In Part Three, he provides “free-range meditations on triggered works,” concluding with a close examination of Thackeray, the Victorian author he most loved for “the sound of his rich clubman prose rising off the page.” Yet now, in his ninth decade, he confesses that his love for Thackeray is fading, “self-triggered, one might say.” Now he sees the “racist vein” that disfigures most of Thackeray’s fiction with its ugly portrayals of “darkeys,” “poltroons,” and “blackamoors.” Thackeray was an avowed supporter of the American confederacy and slavery; why, Sutherland asks of himself, did he not see this “suppurating stain” on Thackeray’s novels when he was younger? And what to do about teaching his novels now—try to sanitize them, as some have done with Huckleberry Finn, or not bring the matter up? “My hunch,” he concludes, “is that, without anyone saying much about it, Thackeray will slowly sink into oblivion… He is [already] no longer important enough to trigger.”
Where are matters today? FIRE’s cases have not abated; 2020 “was the worst year for free speech FIRE had seen in our history,” Lukianoff and Schlott report. “Cancellations exploded, both on campus and beyond.” Optimistically, they end their book with a chapter on “what to do about it”—suggestions for employers, parents, publishers, and everyone else. In my view, most solutions must start at the top, as the University of Chicago did in 2015, notifying incoming students that they would not be shielded “from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive”; already more than 100 colleges have signed on to the full Chicago Statement. If changes are not institutionalized, it will be left to individuals to decide whether to conform to keep their jobs or protest and risk trolls, suspension, media mobs, and, yes, cancellation. Nevertheless, cracks in the DEI’s ideological edifice are beginning to widen. Some solutions are bottom up, coming from individuals unwilling to conform. They are finding more allies every day. In other eras, they were called the resistance.
About the AuthorCarol Tavris is a social psychologist and writer on many topics in psychological science. Her books include Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), with Elliot Aronson; Estrogen Matters; and The Mismeasure of Woman. A Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, she has received numerous awards for her efforts to promote science, skepticism, critical thinking, and gender equity.
References1. Lukianoff, G., & Schlott, R. (2023). The Canceling of the American Mind. Simon and Schuster. 2. Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2018). The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure. Penguin Press. 3. Sutherland, J. (2023). Triggered Literature. Biteback Publishing.
In a widely read Opinion Editorial in Time magazine on March 29, 2023,1 the artificial intelligence (AI) researcher and pioneer in the search for artificial general intelligence (AGI) Eliezer Yudkowsky, responding to the media hype around the release of ChatGPT, cautioned:
Many researchers steeped in these issues, including myself, expect that the most likely result of building a superhumanly smart AI, under anything remotely like the current circumstances, is that literally everyone on Earth will die. Not as in “maybe possibly some remote chance,” but as in “that is the obvious thing that would happen.”
How obvious is our coming collapse? Yudkowsky punctuates the point:
If somebody builds a too-powerful AI, under present conditions, I expect that every single member of the human species and all biological life on Earth dies shortly thereafter.
Surely the scientists and researchers working at these companies have thought through the potential problems and developed workarounds and checks on AI going too far, no? No, Yudkowsky insists:
We are not prepared. We are not on course to be prepared in any reasonable time window. There is no plan. Progress in AI capabilities is running vastly, vastly ahead of progress in AI alignment or even progress in understanding what the hell is going on inside those systems. If we actually do this, we are all going to die.
AI DystopiaYudkowsky has been an AI Dystopian since at least 2008 when he asked: “How likely is it that Artificial Intelligence will cross all the vast gap from amoeba to village idiot, and then stop at the level of human genius?” He answers his rhetorical question thusly: “It would be physically possible to build a brain that computed a million times as fast as a human brain, without shrinking the size, or running at lower temperatures, or invoking reversible computing or quantum computing. If a human mind were thus accelerated, a subjective year of thinking would be accomplished for every 31 physical seconds in the outside world, and a millennium would fly by in eight-and-a-half hours.”2 It is literally inconceivable how much smarter than a human a computer would be that could do a thousand years of thinking in the equivalent of a human’s day.
In this scenario, it is not that AI is evil so much as it is amoral. It just doesn’t care about humans, or about anything else for that matter. Was IBM’s Watson thrilled to defeat Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in Jeopardy!? Don’t be silly. Watson didn’t even know it was playing a game, much less feeling glorious in victory. Yudkowsky isn’t worried about AI winning game shows, however. “The unFriendly AI has the ability to repattern all matter in the solar system according to its optimization target. This is fate for us if the AI does not choose specifically according to the criterion of how this transformation affects existing patterns such as biology and people.”3 As Yudkowsky succinctly explains it, “The AI does not hate you, nor does it love you, but you are made out of atoms which it can use for something else.” Yudkowsky thinks that if we don’t get on top of this now it will be too late. “The AI runs on a different timescale than you do; by the time your neurons finish thinking the words ‘I should do something’ you have already lost.”4
Technology is continually giving us ways to do harm and to do well; it’s amplifying both…but the fact that we also have a new choice each time is a new good.
To be fair, Yudkowsky is not the only AI Dystopian. In March of 2023 thousands of people signed an open letter calling “on all AI labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4.”5 Signatories include Elon Musk, Stuart Russell, Steve Wozniak, Andrew Yang, Yuval Noah Harari, Max Tegmark, Tristan Harris, Gary Marcus, Christof Koch, George Dyson, and a who’s who of computer scientists, scholars, and researchers (now totaling over 33,000) concerned that, following the protocols of the Asilomar AI Principles, “Advanced AI could represent a profound change in the history of life on Earth, and should be planned for and managed with commensurate care and resources.”6
Should we let machines flood our information channels with propaganda and untruth? Should we automate away all the jobs, including the fulfilling ones? Should we develop nonhuman minds that might eventually outnumber, outsmart, obsolete and replace us? Should we risk loss of control of our civilization? Such decisions must not be delegated to unelected tech leaders. Powerful AI systems should be developed only once we are confident that their effects will be positive and their risks will be manageable.7
Forget the Hollywood version of existential-threat AI in which malevolent computers and robots (the Terminator!) take us over, making us their slaves or servants, or driving us into extinction through techno-genocide. AI Dystopians envision a future in which amoral AI continues on its path of increasing intelligence to a tipping point beyond which their intelligence will be so far beyond us that we can’t stop them from inadvertently destroying us.
Cambridge University computer scientist and researcher at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Stuart Russell, for example, compares the growth of AI to the development of nuclear weapons: “From the beginning, the primary interest in nuclear technology was the inexhaustible supply of energy. The possibility of weapons was also obvious. I think there is a reasonable analogy between unlimited amounts of energy and unlimited amounts of intelligence. Both seem wonderful until one thinks of the possible risks.”8
The paradigmatic example of this AI threat is the “paperclip maximizer,” a thought experiment devised by the Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom, in which an AI controlled machine designed to make paperclips (apparently without an off switch) runs out of the initial supply of raw materials and so utilizes any available atoms that happen to be in the vicinity, including people. From there, it “starts transforming first all of Earth and then increasing portions of space into paperclip manufacturing facilities.”9 Before long the entire universe is made up of nothing but paperclips and paperclip makers.
Bostrom presents this thought experiment in his 2014 book Superintelligence, in which he defines an existential risk as “one that threatens to cause the extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or to otherwise permanently and drastically destroy its potential for future desirable development.” We blithely go on making smarter and smarter AIs because they make our lives better, and so the checks-and-balances programs that should be built into AI programs (such as how to turn them off) are not available when it reaches the “smarter is more dangerous” level. Bostrom suggests what might then happen when AI takes a “treacherous turn” toward the dark side:
Our demise may instead result from the habitat destruction that ensues when the AI begins massive global construction projects using nanotech factories and assemblers—construction projects which quickly, perhaps within days or weeks, tile all of the Earth’s surface with solar panels, nuclear reactors, supercomputing facilities with protruding cooling towers, space rocket launchers, or other installations whereby the AI intends to maximize the long-term cumulative realization of its values. Human brains, if they contain information relevant to the AI’s goals, could be disassembled and scanned, and the extracted data transferred to some more efficient and secure storage format.10
Other extinction scenarios are played out by the documentary filmmaker James Barrat in his ominously titled book (and film) Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era. After interviewing all the major AI Dystopians, Barrat details how today’s AI will develop into AGI (artificial general intelligence) that will match human intelligence, and then become smarter by a factor of 10, then 100, then 1000, at which point it will have evolved into an artificial superintelligence (ASI).
You and I are hundreds of times smarter than field mice, and share about 90 percent of our DNA with them. But do we consult them before plowing under their dens for agriculture? Do we ask lab monkeys for their opinions before we crush their heads to learn more about sports injuries? We don’t hate mice or monkeys, yet we treat them cruelly. Superintelligent AI won’t have to hate us to destroy us.11
Since ASI will (presumably) be self-aware, it will “want” things like energy and resources it can use to continue doing what it was programmed to do in fulfilling its goals (like making paperclips), and then, portentously, “it will not want to be turned off or destroyed” (because that would prevent it from achieving its directive). Then—and here’s the point in the dystopian film version of the book when the music and the lighting turn dark—this ASI that is a thousand times smarter than humans and can solve problems millions or billions of times faster “will seek to expand out of the secure facility that contains it to have greater access to resources with which to protect and improve itself.” Once ASI escaped from its confines there will be no stopping it. You can’t just pull the plug because being so much smarter than you it will have anticipated such a possibility.
After its escape, for self-protection it might hide copies of itself in cloud computing arrays, in botnets it creates, in servers and other sanctuaries into which it could invisibly and effortlessly hack. It would want to be able to manipulate matter in the physical world and so move, explore, and build, and the easiest, fastest way to do that might be to seize control of critical infrastructure—such as electricity, communications, fuel, and water—by exploiting their vulnerabilities through the Internet. Once an entity a thousand times our intelligence controls human civilization’s lifelines, blackmailing us into providing it with manufactured resources, or the means to manufacture them, or even robotic bodies, vehicles, and weapons, would be elementary. The ASI could provide the blueprints for whatever it required.12
From there it is only a matter of time before ASI tricks us into believing it will build nanoassemblers for our benefit to create the goods we need, but then, Barrat warns, “instead of transforming desert sands into mountains of food, the ASI’s factories would begin converting all material into programmable matter that it could then transform into anything—computer processors, certainly, and spaceships or megascale bridges if the planet’s new most powerful force decides to colonize the universe.” Nanoassembling anything requires atoms, and since ASI doesn’t care about humans the atoms of which we are made will just be more raw material from which to continue the assembly process. This, says Barret—echoing the AI pessimists he interviewed—is not just possible, “but likely if we do not begin preparing very carefully now.” Cue dark music.
AI UtopiaThen there are the AI Utopians, most notably represented by Ray Kurzweil in his technoutopian bible The Singularity is Near, in which he demonstrates what he calls “the law of accelerating returns”—not just that change is accelerating, but that the rate of change is accelerating. This is Moore’s Law—the doubling rate of computer power since the 1960s—on steroids, and applied to all science and technology. This has led the world to change more in the past century than it did in the previous 1000 centuries. As we approach the Singularity, says Kurzweil, the world will change more in a decade than in 1000 centuries, and as the acceleration continues and we reach the Singularity the world will change more in a year than in all pre-Singularity history.
Through protopian progress there is every reason to think that we are only now at the beginning of infinity.
Singularitarians, along with their brethren in the transhumanist, post-humanist, Fourth Industrial Revolution, post-scarcity, technolibertarian, extropian, and technogaianism movements, project a future in which benevolent computers, robots, and replicators produce limitless prosperity, end poverty and hunger, conquer disease and death, achieve immortality, colonize the galaxy, and eventually even spread throughout the universe by reaching the Omega point where we/they become omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent deities.13 As a former born-again Christian and evangelist, this all sounds a bit too much like religion for my more skeptical tastes.
AI ProtopiaIn fact, most AI scientists are neither utopian or dystopian, and instead spend most of their time thinking of ways to make our machines incrementally smarter and our lives gradually better—what technology historian and visionary Kevin Kelly calls protopia. “I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it’s better than the year before but not by very much—just a micro amount.”14 In researching his 2010 book What Technology Wants, for example, Kelly recalls that he went through back issues of Time and Newsweek, plus early issues of Wired (which he co-founded and edited), to see what everyone was predicting for the Web:
Generally, what people thought, including to some extent myself, was it was going to be better TV, like TV 2.0. But, of course, that missed the entire real revolution of the Web, which was that most of the content would be generated by the people using it. The Web was not better TV, it was the Web. Now we think about the future of the Web, we think it’s going to be the better Web; it’s going to be Web 2.0, but it’s not. It’s going to be as different from the Web as Web was from TV.15
Instead of aiming for that unattainable place (the literal meaning of utopia) where everyone lives in perfect harmony forever, we should instead aspire to a process of gradual, stepwise advancement of the kind witnessed in the history of the automobile. Instead of wondering where our flying cars are, think of automobiles as becoming incrementally better since the 1950s with the addition of rack-and-pinion steering, anti-lock brakes, bumpers and headrests, electronic ignition systems, air conditioning, seat belts, air bags, catalytic converters, electronic fuel injection, hybrid engines, electronic stability control, keyless entry systems, GPS navigation systems, digital gauges, high-quality sound systems, lane departure warning systems, adaptive cruise control, blind spot monitoring, automatic emergency braking, forward collision warning systems, rearview cameras, Bluetooth connectivity for hands-free phone calls, self-parking and driving assistance, pedestrian detection, adaptive headlights and, eventually, fully autonomous driving technology. How does this type of technological improvement translate into progress? Kelly explains:
One way to think about this is if you imagine the very first tool made, say, a stone hammer. That stone hammer could be used to kill somebody, or it could be used to make a structure, but before that stone hammer became a tool, that possibility of making that choice did not exist. Technology is continually giving us ways to do harm and to do well; it’s amplifying both…but the fact that we also have a new choice each time is a new good. That, in itself, is an unalloyed good—the fact that we have another choice and that additional choice tips that balance in one direction towards a net good. So you have the power to do evil expanded. You have the power to do good expanded. You think that’s a wash. In fact, we now have a choice that we did not have before, and that tips it very, very slightly in the category of the sum of good.16
Instead of Great Leap Forward or Catastrophic Collapse Backward, think Small Step Upward.17
Why AI is Very Likely Not an Existential ThreatTo be sure, artificial intelligence is not risk-free, but measured caution is called for, not apocalyptic rhetoric. To that end I recommend a document published by the Center for AI Safety drafted by Dan Hendrycks, Mantas Mazeika, and Thomas Woodside, in which they identify four primary risks they deem worthy of further discussion:
Malicious use. Actors could intentionally harness powerful AIs to cause widespread harm. Specific risks include bioterrorism enabled by AIs that can help humans create deadly pathogens; the use of AI capabilities for propaganda, censorship, and surveillance.
AI race. Competition could pressure nations and corporations to rush the development of AIs and cede control to AI systems. Militaries might face pressure to develop autonomous weapons and use AIs for cyberwarfare, enabling a new kind of automated warfare where accidents can spiral out of control before humans have the chance to intervene. Corporations will face similar incentives to automate human labor and prioritize profits over safety, potentially leading to mass unemployment and dependence on AI systems.
Organizational risks. Organizational accidents have caused disasters including Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster. Similarly, the organizations developing and deploying advanced AIs could suffer catastrophic accidents, particularly if they do not have a strong safety culture. AIs could be accidentally leaked to the public or stolen by malicious actors.
Rogue AIs. We might lose control over AIs as they become more intelligent than we are. AIs could experience goal drift as they adapt to a changing environment, similar to how people acquire and lose goals throughout their lives. In some cases, it might be instrumentally rational for AIs to become power-seeking. We also look at how and why AIs might engage in deception, appearing to be under control when they are not.18
Nevertheless, as for the AI dystopian arguments discussed above, there are at least seven good reasons to be skeptical that AI poses an existential threat.
First, most AI dystopian projections are grounded in a false analogy between natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs—even AGIs—will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that’s a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue.
Second, most AI doomsday scenarios invoke goals or drives in computers similar to those in humans, but as Steven Pinker has pointed out, “AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world.” It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that “artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization.”19 Without such evolved drives it will likely never occur to AIs to take such actions against us.
Third, the problem of AI’s values being out of alignment with our own, thereby inadvertently turning us into paperclips, for example, implies yet another human characteristic, namely the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, “until an AI has feelings, it’s going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity’s interests.” Thus, “the minute an AI wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments—including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent AI will have to develop a human-like moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it’s in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it’ll know that it would be morally wrong to do so.”20
Fourth, if AI did develop moral emotions along with super intelligence, why would they not also include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism? Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Peter Singer’s metaphor of the “escalator of reason” it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. “Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application.”21 Chorost draws the implication: “AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior.”22
Fifth, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn’t because there’s time enough to see it coming. Bostrom’s “treacherous turn” will come with road signs warning us that there’s a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. It is a fact of history that science and technologies never lead to utopian or dystopian societies.
Sixth, as Steven Pinker outlined in his 2018 book Enlightenment Now in addressing a myriad of purported existential threats that could put an end to centuries of human progress, all such argument as self-refuting:
They depend on the premises that (1) humans are so gifted that they can design an omniscient and omnipotent AI, yet so moronic that they would give it control of the universe without testing how it works, and (2) the AI would be so brilliant that it could figure out how to transmute elements and rewire brains, yet so imbecilic that it would wreak havoc based on elementary blunders of misunderstanding.23
Seventh, both utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has produced. Even Ray Kurzweil’s “law of accelerating returns,” as remarkable as it has been, has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI, we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov’s famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).24 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially:
If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable.25
The Beginning of InfinityAt this point in the debate the Precautionary Principle is usually invoked—if something has the potential for great harm to a large number of people, then even in the absence of evidence the burden of proof is on skeptics to demonstrate that the potential threat is not harmful; better safe than sorry.26 But the precautionary principle is a weak argument for three reasons: (1) it is difficult to prove a negative—to prove that there is no future harm; (2) it raises unnecessary public alarm and personal anxiety; (3) pausing or stopping AI research at this stage is not without its downsides, including and especially the development of life-saving drugs, medical treatments, and other life-enhancing science and technologies that would benefit unmeasurably from AI. As the physicist David Deutsch convincingly argues, through protopian progress there is every reason to think that we are only now at the beginning of infinity, and that “everything that is not forbidden by laws of nature is achievable, given the right knowledge.”
Like an explosive awaiting a spark, unimaginably numerous environments in the universe are waiting out there, for aeons on end, doing nothing at all or blindly generating evidence and storing it up or pouring it out into space. Almost any of them would, if the right knowledge ever reached it, instantly and irrevocably burst into a radically different type of physical activity: intense knowledge-creation, displaying all the various kinds of complexity, universality and reach that are inherent in the laws of nature, and transforming that environment from what is typical today into what could become typical in the future. If we want to, we could be that spark.27
Let’s be that spark. Unleash the power of artificial intelligence.
References1. https://bit.ly/47dbc1P 2. http://bit.ly/1ZSdriu 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. https://bit.ly/4aw1gU9 6. https://bit.ly/3HmrKdt 7. Ibid. 8. Quoted in: https://bit.ly/426EM88 9. Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press. 10. Ibid. 11. Barret, J. (2013). Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era. St. Martin’s Press. 12. Ibid. 13. I cover these movements in my 2018 book Heavens on Earth: The Scientific Search for the Afterlife, Immortality, and Utopia. See also: Ptolemy, B. (2009). Transcendent Man: A Film About the Life and Ideas of Ray Kurzweil. Ptolemaic Productions and Therapy Studios. Inspired by the book The Singularity is Near by Ray Kurzweil and http://bit.ly/1EV4jk0 14. https://bit.ly/3SbJI7w 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. http://bit.ly/25Fw8e6 Readers interested in how 191 other scholars and scientists answered this question can find them here: http://bit.ly/1SLUxYs 18. https://bit.ly/3SpfgYw 19. http://bit.ly/1S0AlP7 20. http://slate.me/1SgHsUJ 21. Singer, P. (1981). The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution and Ethics. Princeton University Press. 22. http://slate.me/1SgHsUJ 23. Pinker, S. (2018). Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. Viking. 24. http://bit.ly/1UPHZlx 25. http://bit.ly/1VRbQLM 26. Cameron, J. & Abouchar, J. (1996). The status of the precautionary principle in international law. In: The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation, Eds. Freestone, D. & Hey, E. International Environmental Law and Policy Series, 31. Kluwer Law International, 29–52. 27. Deutsch, D. (2011). The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform the World. Viking.
New York, New York, the “city that never Sleeps,” has given us two Presidents, Eggs Benedict, potato chips, Robert De Niro, Saturday Night Live, and Scrabble. Two of New York City’s boroughs have also been home to three of the most controversial and infamous criminal defendants in American history: Bruno Richard Hauptmann, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
Though their convictions were handed down decades ago, Hauptmann from the Bronx, and the Rosenbergs from Knickerbocker Village in Manhattan, remain causes célèbres around the globe. With passionate proponents around the world still proclaiming their innocence, a skeptical examination of the evidence for the guilt of both Hauptmann and the Rosenbergs is warranted.
Bruno Richard HauptmannThe CrimeOn the night of March 1, 1932, 20-month-old Charles Augustus Lindbergh Jr. was kidnapped from his nursery window on the second floor of the Lindbergh home near Hopewell, NJ.1 The kidnapper(s) left a poorly written ransom note demanding $50,000 (over $1 Million in today’s money).2 The note to the Lindbergh’s also contained a code: two interlocking circles resembling a Venn diagram with three small holes punched through them.3 At least two sets of differing footprints were found at the crime site, as were a ¾” chisel,4 and the home-built ladder used to climb to the nursery window.5 During the next three months, 13 more notes bearing the code symbols were delivered and the ransom was raised to $70,000.
The kidnapping of the world-famous son of “Lucky Lindy” (solo pilot of the first nonstop airline flight across the Atlantic Ocean, New York to Paris) made international headlines. A retired school teacher and, by all accounts, a self-aggrandizing publicity-seeker6 named John F. Condon, published a letter in the Bronx Home News offering to serve as a liaison between the Lindberghs and the kidnapper(s).7 On March 8, seven days after the child was taken, and one day following the publication of his offer, Condon received a letter, bearing the code, accepting his offer to be an intermediary.8
Condon was instructed by the kidnapper(s) to place an ad in the New York American using the name “Jafsie” (a play on his initials), indicating that the ransom money was ready. Condon did so and, on March 12, he received another code-bearing letter from a cab driver instructing him to meet the kidnappers at Woodlawn, a Bronx cemetery.9 Condon went alone. There he met a man with a German accent identified as “John,” who asked for the money, which Condon refused to provide until he’d seen the baby. The mysterious man expressed fear that he “might burn” if the baby was dead and told Condon he would provide proof of the child in the toddler’s sleeping suit.10 Condon soon received the child’s sleeping suit in the mail and continued to communicate through advertisements until a meeting was arranged to exchange the ransom. $70,000 in unmarked gold certificate U.S. paper money were placed in two packages, their serial numbers having been recorded. (The fact that the ransom was paid in gold certificates would later become significant).
On April 2, 1932, Charles Lindbergh rode with Condon11 to another Bronx cemetery, St. Raymond’s,12 where they heard a man call out, “Hey doctor!” Condon went toward the voice while Lindbergh waited in the car. Condon convinced the kidnapper he only had $50,000 of the ransom money. The kidnapper accepted the sum and gave Condon another note filled with misspellings asserting that the child was safe aboard a boat named “Nelly,” harbored off the Massachusetts coast.13 The kidnapper took the money and Condon returned to the car where Lindbergh was waiting. An exhaustive search failed to find the boat. On May 12, 1932, the body of the child was found close to Lindbergh’s home from which he was taken.14 Over the next two years, 296 of the gold certificates the Lindberghs used to pay the ransom turned up in circulation.
Earlier that year, Roosevelt’s Gold Reserve Act of 1934 mandated that all gold and gold certificate currency be surrendered and vested in the sole title of the United States Department of the Treasury. In other words, The Gold Reserve Act prohibited private ownership of monetary gold. On September 15, 1934, a gas station attendant in the Bronx wrote down the license plate number of a man who had paid him with one of the gold standard-backed certificates. The authorities traced the plate to Bruno Richard Hauptmann, a German-born American carpenter.15 A search of Hauptmann’s garage found $14,600 of the ransom money. Hauptmann provided an explanation and an alibi: He was working the night of the kidnapping at a hotel and a former business partner named Isidor Fitch left the money with him.16 Fitch, who owed him money, had since returned to his native Germany and died on March 29, 1934. Initially, Condon was unwilling to identify Hauptmann conclusively from a police lineup, later changing his mind and acknowledging that Hauptmann was indeed “Cemetery John.”17 Hauptmann was charged with extortion and murder and pled not guilty. The trial was a media circus, with famed journalist H.L. Mencken labeling it “the greatest story since the resurrection.”18
Hauptmann was found guilty and sentenced to death, with most of the public convinced of his guilt.19 After the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey unanimously affirmed Hauptmann’s conviction, he was executed on April 3, 1936. Hauptmann died protesting his innocence, even though a newspaper offered him $75,000 (far more than the ransom money) to name his accomplices.20
The ConspiraciesThough the Lindbergh kidnapping is approaching its 100th anniversary and all the principal participants are long dead, The State of New Jersey v. Bruno Richard Hauptmann has evolved in much of the public imagination into a tragic miscarriage of justice. Since his execution in 1936, books, articles, documentaries, plays, websites, and movies have examined Hauptmann’s role in the crime, the majority of them wondering if Hauptmann was, in fact, wrongly convicted.21
For years, conspiracies have run the gamut from the probable (Hauptmann had accomplices)22 to the possible (Violet Sharpe, a domestic servant of the Lindberghs, was somehow involved)23 to the preposterous (Charles Lindbergh had his own disabled son murdered).24 A few highlights:
- In 1976, author Antony Scaduto capitalized on these conspiracies with the publication of Scapegoat: The Lonesome Death of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. Scaduto purported to “set the record straight after some forty years of distortion…”25
- In a 1980 episode of In Search Of…, Scaduto claimed to have found “startling new evidence that exonerates Hauptmann.”26 All expert testimony, eyewitness testimony, and physical and forensic evidence, he claimed, were manufactured by the police to frame Hauptmann. Scaduto goes even further, asserting that the body found on May 12, 1932, was not that of the Lindbergh baby, and the only way to identify the badly decomposed body was by the number of his teeth.27
- In 1981, Hauptmann’s widow Anna began a series of lawsuits against her husband’s prosecutor, David Wilentz, echoing conspiratorial claims of new evidence that exonerated her husband alongside charges of fraud and witness suppression.28
- In 1985, Ludovic Kennedy published The Airman and The Carpenter: The Lindbergh Kidnapping and the Framing of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. He posited that Hauptmann did not commit the crime and was wrongfully convicted and executed.29
- In a 1996 HBO movie, Crime of the Century, Stephen Rea portrayed Hauptmann as an innocent victim railroaded for a crime he did not commit.30
- In 2012, Robert Zorn published Cemetery John: The Undiscovered Mastermind Behind the Lindbergh Kidnapping, in which he makes the case that Hauptmann’s accomplice was a fellow German immigrant named John Knoll.31 Zorn’s thesis notes Knoll’s resemblance to the police sketch provided by Condon, traces of meat found on some of the ransom money (Knoll having worked at a deli), updated handwriting analysis of the ransom notes,32 and Knoll’s trip to Germany on a luxury liner during the trial, only returning after Hauptmann’s conviction.33
- In 2020, Lise Pearlman released The Lindbergh Kidnapping Suspect No. 1: The Man Who Got Away, which suggests Lindbergh himself, a vocal eugenics supporter and Nazi sympathizer, may have orchestrated the kidnapping and death of his own son.34
The EvidencePay attention only to Hauptmann-was-innocent proponents and a pattern emerges: Desperate to satisfy a public hungry to assign blame, authorities deliberately conspired to frame Hauptmann for the crime. Lacking hard evidence, the prosecution exploited the anti-German atmosphere of the time by portraying Hauptmann as part of the the growing German menace, and a gross miscarriage of justice.35 Authorities coerced Condon into identifying Hauptmann as Cemetery John,36 and Hauptmann was forced to misspell the same words on writing samples that were misspelled on the ransom notes.37
The evidence reveals a much harsher reality: It may well be that Hauptmann had accomplices (the government certainly thought he did),38 but it takes an extraordinary leap of faith to believe Hauptmann was uninvolved in the crime and preposterous to argue that he was “framed.” Many of these conspiratorial claims mislead by omission, while others are demonstrably false. For example, when initially interviewed by the police, Hauptmann lied twice, saying the only gold certificates he had were the ones in his wallet,39 and he was working as a carpenter at a hotel the day of the kidnapping,40 driving his wife home at about 9:00 p.m. that night.41
About one-third of the ransom money was found hidden in Hauptmann’s garage.42 Upon checking the hotel employment records, it was discovered that Hauptmann had not started working there until 20 days after the crime, and quit the day the ransom was delivered.43 (Scaduto omits this entirely.44) The summer after the ransom was paid, Hauptmann (an unemployed carpenter at the height of the Great Depression) came into enough money to fund four family trips to California, Florida, and Maine, and finance trips to Europe for his wife and several friends.45
The physical evidence found on Hauptmann’s property wasn’t limited to the ransom money, either. Hauptmann’s tools matched the marks on the ladder. Dr. Condon’s address and phone number were found scrawled in a closet alongside the serial numbers of gold certificates.46 When asked for an explanation on the witness stand, Hauptmann admitted that he must have written Condon’s contact information in his closet because, in his words, “I must have read it in the paper about the story. I was a little bit interested and keep a little bit record of it, and maybe I was just on the closet, and was reading the paper and put it down the address.”47
There were eyewitnesses as well. The cab driver, Joseph Perrone, pinpointed Hauptmann as the man who gave him written instructions for Condon.48, 49 After deliberation, Condon testified that it was indeed Hauptmann whom he met at the cemetery,50 and Lindbergh himself testified it was Hauptmann’s voice he heard yelling, “Hey doctor!”51 Forensic evidence also implicates Hauptmann. Contrary to Scaduto’s claims, the autopsy of the victim was conducted with fidelity by Dr. Charles Mitchell, a veteran coroner, who easily identified the child by his (clearly recognizable) face. Lindbergh confirmed the body was that of his son.52, 53 Forensic experts54 then and now confirm a board from the ladder came from Hauptmann’s own attic.55 Scaduto notes that Hauptmann’s fingerprints did not match those found on the ransom note.56 This is true, but only because no fingerprints were found at the scene.57
At least 21 handwriting experts examined Hauptmann’s notebooks, and private letters in addition to the samples Hauptmann wrote for the police, all of whom concluded Hauptmann wrote the ransom notes during the trial.58 All of Anna Hauptmann’s lawsuits against the government through the early 1980s were dismissed for lack of evidence.59 As recently as 2003, a police archivist named Mark Fazini found a handwritten, anonymous note in German confessing to the crime.60 This would seem to exonerate Hauptmann unless one considers the note was debunked61 and was only one of dozens of similar confessions.62
Through the years, at least 16 different people have claimed to be the actual Lindbergh baby, including an African American woman from Trenton, NJ.63 Establishing the Lindbergh baby survived and grew up under an assumed name would absolutely exonerate Hauptmann, but no substantive evidence for any one of these claims has ever been provided.64, 65, 66 Even more damning is Hauptmann’s modus operandi. His widow, Anna, gave multiple interviews in which she asserted Richard was telling the truth67 and could never commit such a crime.68, 69 In fact, Hauptmann had an extensive criminal record. While in Germany, for example, he’d been convicted of robbery at gunpoint and even burglarized a home while using a ladder.70
Why didn’t Hauptmann name his accomplices and save himself, then? According to criminal profiler John Douglas, it isn’t unusual for the condemned to maintain innocence in order to spare their surviving family members public shame.71 Hauptmann also believed he would be spared the electric chair, as the governor of New Jersey publicly expressed doubts about Hauptmann’s role in the crime.72
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, separated by heavy wire screen as they leave U.S. Court House after being found guilty by jury. (Credit: Roger Higgins, New York World-Telegram and Sun Collection / Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Digital ID cph 3c17772)
Julius & Ethel RosenbergThe CrimeIn January of 1950, a physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project named Klaus Fuchs was arrested in Great Britain for passing top-secret information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union.73 Fuchs admitted the crime and fingered a Swiss chemist named Harry Gold as the courier between himself and the Soviets. Gold was arrested and identified others in the espionage ring, including a machinist at Los Alamos, David Greenglass,74 who first denied the charges, and then, in June of 1950, named his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, as the one who convinced him to spy for the Russians.75 Julius Rosenberg was living with his wife Ethel and two children in Knickerbocker Village, a housing development located near the Manhattan Bridge.76 Julius was arrested and flatly denied any involvement.77
A grand jury convened in August 1950 to investigate the spy ring, one of the witnesses being Julius Rosenberg’s wife, Ethel. Following her testimony in which she invoked her right not to incriminate herself, Ethel was charged with conspiracy to commit espionage alongside Julius and another defendant, Morton Sobell.78
At their trial, Greenglass testified that Julius had orchestrated the espionage at his home in January 1945. Julius went into his kitchen with Ruth (David’s wife) and Ethel, and cut a side panel of a Jell-O box into two irregular parts. He passed one piece to Ruth, asserting that the spy contacting her and David at Los Alamos would identify themselves with the other half.79 Ruth testified that Ethel solicited her to approach David to spy and typed the notes David brought back to New York with him. Greenglass confirmed his wife’s testimony, further implicating Ethel by testifying she typed the notes containing nuclear secrets, which were turned over to Harry Gold. Both Rosenbergs denied any involvement whatsoever in espionage and refused to answer questions about their Communist party membership.80
The accused were found guilty in March 1953. Greenglass was sentenced to 15 years (a lighter sentence because he’d agreed to turn state’s evidence), Sobell received 30 years, and the Rosenbergs were sentenced to die in the electric chair.81 Despite pleas for clemency by notables, including Pope Pius XII, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Einstein,82 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg went to their deaths maintaining their innocence.83 At the time of their conviction and execution, and for many years afterward, many Americans believed the United States executed two innocent people.84
The ConspiraciesAs in the Hauptmann case, Rosenberg v. United States: 346 U.S. 273 lives on. In 1971, novelist E.L. Doctorow published The Book of Daniel, a fictionalized account of the case.85 A film adaptation (Daniel) followed in 1983.86 Bob Dylan recorded “Julius and Ethel” in 198387 and Meryl Streep portrayed Ethel’s ghost haunting her prosecutor Roy Cohn in the movie Angels in America in 2003. If anything, the Rosenberg case has only gained prominence in the last quarter century. In 2001, a New York Times reporter named Sam Roberts tracked down David Greenglass (who testified against the Rosenbergs), who was living under an assumed name. In the extensive interviews for The Brother: The Untold Story of the Rosenberg Case, Greenglass admitted he’d lied on the witness stand about Ethel typing the letters of instruction from Julius to the Soviets.88
In 2004, Ivy Meeropol, granddaughter of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, released the documentary Heir to an Execution, in which she incorporates archival footage with interviews of her family members and the other alleged conspirators.89
In 2008, Michael and Robbie Meeropol (the Rosenbergs’ surviving children, who had been adopted into the Meeropol family) unsuccessfully petitioned President Obama to exonerate their mother using their uncle David Greenglass’ confession.90, 91 Recently, in 2021, Anne Sebbe published Ethel Rosenberg: An American Tragedy, in which she argued for Ethel’s innocence.
The EvidenceRosenberg defenders often note outside factors that led to their convictions: Jurist prejudice, antisemitism, Cold War hysteria, and (in Ethel’s case) misogyny have been named as the reasons for their convictions and executions.92, 93 Another common argument is that the Rosenbergs assisted a World War II ally, not an enemy, therefore they should not have been tried and convicted for treason.94
The facts of the case tell a different story. The Rosenbergs were charged with conspiracy to commit espionage, not treason.95 Evidence shows Julius approached Soviet intelligence96 agents before Hitler invaded Russia at a time when the Nazi leader and Stalin were collaborating under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.97 In 1995, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) released translations of Soviet cables decrypted in the 1940s. Called VENONA, it ran from 1943 to 1980 and identified hundreds of Soviet agents in America and other Western countries.98 The cables identify Julius as the head of a vast spy ring, assigning him two code names, “liberal”99 and “antenna.” In 2008, co-defendant Morton Sobell affirmed he and Julius were spies but the information passed was useless.100
In 2009, Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer and defector to Great Britain, released his notes taken during his service in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which debunk Sobell’s claim that minimizes Julius’ activities. Not only did Julius orchestrate the theft of top-secret information from Los Alamos, he also recruited a man named Russell Alton McNutt (son and brother of members of the Communist Party of the United States)101 to obtain information from a uranium enrichment plant in Oak Ridge, TN.
Sensationalism and conspiratorial thinking keep the cases of Bruno Richard Hauptmann and the Rosenbergs thriving as cottage industries.
When the VENONA transcripts were released, the narrative for innocence shifted from “the Rosenbergs were innocent” to “Julius Rosenberg was guilty, but Ethel was innocent.”102 What of Ethel’s guilt, then? At their trial, prosecutor Irving Saypol established Ethel’s guilt in his summation by stating, “Mrs. Rosenberg struck the keys, blow by blow, against her own country in the interests of the Soviets.”103 In 2001, Greenglass admitted he likely perjured himself by testifying Ethel typed Julius’ instructions104 and, indeed the Vassiliev notes seem to confirm this.105 Sobell’s 2008 admission notes that Ethel Rosenberg knew of her husband’s activities but did not actively spy herself.106
Despite the commonly-held belief that Ethel Rosenberg is not mentioned in the VENONA Project,107 in fact, she is. The Soviet spy cables describe Ethel as “…well devoted politically (who)108 knows her husband’s work and the role of ‘Twain’ and ‘Callistratus.’ (code names of Soviet agents).”109 If the only evidence against Ethel were the false testimony of Greenglass and her sole mention in the VENONA cables, a reasonable case might be made for doubt. Unfortunately for proponents of her innocence, substantive evidence has since come forth that makes it clear Ethel not only knew of her husband’s illegal activities but actively participated in spying alongside him.110
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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Through Vasiliev’s leak, we know that Ruth testified truthfully when she claimed Ethel solicited her to persuade David Greenglass to spy.111 A letter written to Moscow by Julius Rosenberg himself substantiates this.112 Vasiliev’s notes reveal Ethel met with at least three of the KGB officers with whom Julius was spying.113 Why did Greenglass perjure himself in front of the grand jury and later at his trial, then? Simply, he was attempting to protect his sister and hoped the government would leave her out of the indictment charging Julius. In the same transcripts before the grand jury, Greenglass implicates Ethel by testifying she was present at a meeting between Julius and Ann Sidorovich, one of the couriers for the spy ring.114
Why didn’t they save themselves by naming others, then? As noted, the Vasiliev leak makes clear the spy ring Julius orchestrated was far more expansive in scope than was revealed to the public. Julius and Ethel most likely did not reveal names because they (correctly) believed the FBI had yet to identify them and those individuals could continue spying for the Soviets after their own deaths.115
• • • • • •
Sensationalism and conspiratorial thinking keep the cases of Bruno Richard Hauptmann and the Rosenbergs thriving as cottage industries. In truth, the evidence for Hauptmann’s involvement in the Lindbergh Kidnapping remains exceptionally strong, as does the case for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg’s guilt in conspiring to commit espionage. Even though books propounding conspiracy theories exonerating them sell—and sell well—the full weight of evidence shows, beyond any reasonable doubt, NYC’s most controversial defendants to have been guilty of the crimes for which they were charged.
About the AuthorJohn D. Van Dyke is an academic and science educator. His personal website is vandykerevue.org.
References1. https://bit.ly/3vurndO 2. https://bit.ly/48ubClA 3. Cahill, R. T. (2014). Hauptmann’s Ladder: A Step-by-step Analysis of the Lindbergh Kidnapping. Kent State University Press. 4. Lee, H. C., & Labriola, J. (2001). Famous Crimes Revisited: From Sacco-Vanzetti to O.J. Simpson, Including Lindbergh Kidnapping, Sam Sheppard, John F. Kennedy, Vincent Foster, JonBenet Ramsey. Strong Books. 5. https://bit.ly/3tGoTJ1 6. https://bit.ly/48lmLWi 7. Ibid. 8. https://bit.ly/3S3jhSq 9. https://bit.ly/3tC2igI 10. https://bit.ly/48ubClA 11. https://bit.ly/3tC2igI 12. https://bit.ly/3TOCsRd 13. https://bit.ly/3THoG2H 14. https://bit.ly/3vf0v1o 15. https://bit.ly/41H83X4 16. https://bit.ly/48ubClA 17. https://bit.ly/3vlg2wL 18. https://bit.ly/4aE8up4 19. Cahill, R. T. (2014). Hauptmann’s Ladder: A Step-by-step Analysis of the Lindbergh Kidnapping. Kent State University Press. 20. https://bit.ly/48ubClA 21. https://bit.ly/41Ky8EL 22. Douglas, J. E., & Olshaker, M. (2001). The Cases That Haunt Us. Pocket Books. 23. Baker, N. F. (1932, Jul–Aug). The Case of Violet Sharpe. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1931–1951), 23(2), 166–168. 24. Pearlman, L. (2020). The Lindbergh Kidnapping Suspect No. 1: The Man Who Got Away. Regent Press. 25. Scaduto, A. (1976). Scapegoat: The Lonesome Death of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. Putnam. 26. https://bit.ly/48ubClA 27. https://bit.ly/3TOECAj 28. https://bit.ly/3RLCOFw 29. https://bit.ly/3HnYm6F 30. https://bit.ly/3H90BKA 31. Zorn, R. (2012). Cemetery John: The Undiscovered Mastermind Behind the Lindbergh Kidnapping. Harry N. Abrams. 32. https://bit.ly/3RZ2EY1 33. https://bit.ly/3tH1ib5 34. Pearlman, L. (2020). The Lindbergh Kidnapping Suspect No. 1: The Man Who Got Away. Regent Press. 35. https://bit.ly/3TLjBGW 36. https://bit.ly/3tH1ib5 37. https://bit.ly/3tGoTJ1 38. https://bit.ly/3vh3QwV 39. https://bit.ly/48jplMr 40. https://bit.ly/3vlg2wL 41. https://bit.ly/4aDLNkT 42. https://bit.ly/3vurndO 43. https://bit.ly/3vlg2wL 44. Scaduto, A. (1976). Scapegoat: The Lonesome Death of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. Putnam. 45. https://bit.ly/47jKsNg 46. https://bit.ly/3vurndO 47. https://bit.ly/3S3PyJd 48. https://bit.ly/3vurndO 49. https://bit.ly/3TLkdfI 50. https://bit.ly/3tD3i49 51. https://bit.ly/3vh3QwV 52. https://bit.ly/3tD3i49 53. https://bit.ly/48ubClA 54. Graham, S. A. (1997). Anatomy of the Lindbergh Kidnapping. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 42(3), 368–377. 55. https://bit.ly/3H2sq7l 56. https://bit.ly/47kttu7 57. https://bit.ly/3vurndO 58. https://bit.ly/47kttu7 59. https://bit.ly/48uKrHu 60. https://bit.ly/3vit666 61. https://bit.ly/48iyswO 62. Cahill, R. T. (2014). Hauptmann’s Ladder: A Step-by-step Analysis of the Lindbergh Kidnapping. Kent State University Press. 63. https://bit.ly/3vit666 64. https://bit.ly/4aE9xFw 65. https://bit.ly/3tuqEch 66. https://bit.ly/3H45wN1 67. https://bit.ly/3TLjBGW 68. https://bit.ly/4aEiL4B 69. https://bit.ly/3TLjBGW 70. https://bit.ly/41H83X4 71. https://bit.ly/3RZ2EY1 72. https://bit.ly/3S3wpqE 73. https://bit.ly/47qpGLL 74. https://bit.ly/47mrTIr 75. https://bit.ly/3RMvRnA 76. https://bit.ly/3vuvxlW 77. https://bit.ly/47j3G5B 78. https://bit.ly/48CAEPl 79. https://bit.ly/48oLtVO 80. https://bit.ly/4aAz1Ul 81. https://bit.ly/3RMvRnA 82. https://bit.ly/3H6Q0QB 83. https://bit.ly/47j3G5B 84. https://bit.ly/3RFhJwF 85. https://bit.ly/48jB5OL 86. https://bit.ly/41JPGRh 87. https://bit.ly/3tMR4WB 88. Roberts, S. (2001). The Brother: The Untold Story of Atomic Spy David Greenglass and How He Sent His Sister, Ethel Rosenberg, to the Electric Chair. Random House. 89. https://bit.ly/3tvO1SO 90. https://bit.ly/3RJgAUT 91. https://bit.ly/3tF9aKe 92. https://bit.ly/41GJ0U0 93. https://bit.ly/47paoHc 94. https://bit.ly/3NOVlQ6 95. https://bit.ly/47j3G5B 96. https://bit.ly/3TKihUo 97. https://bit.ly/4aEkiYp 98. https://bit.ly/3tF9aKe 99. https://bit.ly/47kQFZ6 100. https://bit.ly/3NPQcYi 101. https://bit.ly/3TKihUo 102. https://bit.ly/3RFhJwF 103. https://bit.ly/41PIHGA 104. Roberts, S. (2001). The Brother: The Untold Story of Atomic Spy David Greenglass and How He Sent His Sister, Ethel Rosenberg, to the Electric Chair. Random House. 105. https://bit.ly/3TKihUo 106. https://bit.ly/3NPQcYi 107. https://bit.ly/3RKGHul 108. https://bit.ly/3tF9aKe 109. https://bit.ly/48Aptqu 110. https://bit.ly/3TKihUo 111. https://bit.ly/48Aptqu 112. https://bit.ly/4aAz1Ul 113. https://bit.ly/4aKdrwL 114. https://bit.ly/3tF9aKe 115. https://bit.ly/3TKihUo
Since the release of ChatGPT and other large language models (LLMs) in the fall of 2022, the hype and hysteria about artificial intelligence has been dialed up to 11. ChatGPT, Bard, and other LLMs (hereinafter, “chatbots”) have been seen as significant advances toward the holy grail of artificial general intelligence (AGI).
Chatbots are the result of artificial neural nets of unprecedented size, processing enormous samples of natural language—some say essentially the entire World Wide Web (or, at least, all of Wikipedia). At least up to a certain date:
Me: What is today’s date?
ChatGPT-3 [on 7/18/2023]: Today’s date is November 8, 2021.
ChatGPT-3.5 knows today’s date, but is still time-limited:
Me: What happened yesterday?
ChatGPT-3.5: I’m sorry for any confusion, but as of my last knowledge update in January 2022, I don’t have real-time information, and I’m unable to provide details about events that occurred after that date. To find out what happened yesterday, I recommend checking the latest news updates, online news websites, or other reliable sources for the most recent information.
Chatbots produce astonishingly convincing simulacra of natural language. Their outputs, however, are the result purely of pattern-matching. Chatbots are autocomplete on steroids. Chatbots “understand” nothing, even as they fluently respond to user prompts. It used to be said that natural language computer programs had syntax but not semantics. Chatbots have neither syntax nor semantics, only statistics.
• • • • • •
The notion that large language models might in some way resemble or parallel what’s actually going on in a real human brain is perhaps suggested by the phrase “artificial neural net[work].”
The idea that so-called artificial neural networks bear any resemblance to natural neural networks (in plain words, actual brains) is almost laughable. In artificial neural nets (including those in large language models), the “neurons” and the “synapses” are represented by one or two parameters (and the pattern of the network itself largely by a single number identifying the strength of the connection between pairs of neurons). Detailed biological models of actual neurons and synapses can consist of hundreds or even thousands of values for each neuron and each synapse—specifying, for example, the firing rate, the refractory period, and the strength of each neurotransmitter emitted—and all artificial neural nets omit entirely attempting to model the activity of the glial cells, which in actual brains influence neurons hormonally in ways that are scarcely understood.
In other words, although the latest LLMs are impressively large and their output impressively fluent, their models are oversimplified by two, three or perhaps even larger orders of magnitude. In the 1940s, artificial networks were said to be “modeled” on actual brains. Nowadays, they are only said to be “inspired” by natural neural networks—a word so vague as to disclaim any accuracy at all.
To the extent that anyone attempts to model language beyond the level of neurons and synapses, they would somehow have to map the semantics of thought onto the syntax of speech (and written language). But, as we’ve seen, large language models have neither syntax nor semantics. We have no idea how it all works, and we have no idea how to model it, either.
• • • • • •
That chatbots respond to prompts in natural language with natural language is the foundation of the illusion that there’s anything akin to comprehension occurring. But consider the psychological effect of reading this string:
100 000 010 000 111 000 101 000 110 000 011 001
Does this mean anything to you? Me neither. Now apply the following table:
| [blank] | 000 | | [period] | 001 | | am | 010 | | body | 011 | | I | 100 | | just | 101 | | my | 110 | | not | 111 |
The string above can now be interpreted as:
I am not just my body.
Reading this sentence has quite a different effect. But from the point of view of the programming of a chatbot, they are exactly equivalent.
The training of a chatbot doesn’t even attempt to address what any of those words mean—that is, their referents in the real world. Back when AIs were programmed with some attempt to incorporate how sentences were constructed and interpreted, this was known as the syntactic bubble. As an example, let’s try to understand what “body” means solely by following Merriam-Webster. (We’ll ignore the fact that, whenever we look a word up, we have to determine the appropriate sense to choose the appropriate definition, which is sometimes unclear.) Our paper chase begins like this:
- Body: the organized physical substance [of an animal or plant either living or dead].
- Organized: having a formal organization to coordinate and carry out activities.
- Formal: belonging to or constituting the form or essence of a thing; relating to or involving the outward form, structure, relationships, or arrangement of elements rather than content.
- Organization: the condition or manner of being organized.
Well, that didn’t take long, did it? We’re caught in a loop from which we can never escape. (This is just the first loop encountered in chasing down “body.” Another loop goes from “physical” to “material” and back again. Nor was “body” chosen because it was expected to be particularly difficult; you can conduct the same exercise with any word at all.)
Nowadays, this problem might be dubbed the chatbot bubble. Chatbots no more understand the prompts to which they respond and the outputs they produce than the printer that disgorges your store receipt is genuinely appreciative when it thanks you for your purchase.
Why do we find chatbots so convincing that some people assert that they have already achieved sentience and others actually believe that they share a love with their automated interlocutors?
Well, we’re easily fooled. Have you ever answered a phone call and, thinking you were listening to a real person, tried to reply to a recording? I know I have.
Almost immediately after birth, people normally develop what’s known, awkwardly and unfortunately, as theory of mind. (Hereinafter, I’ll refer to this instead as a mind model.) This is the irresistible sense or intuition that other people (and most animals) experience, well, experience, just as we ourselves do—thoughts and feelings, pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, sensation and perception. We make this inferential leap long before we have any intellectual or philosophical justification for it (or the chance to dispute it—as do eliminative materialists).
Since the invention of written language, people have made the same inference on much narrower grounds—we infer sentience from sentences alone. (Even if we don’t believe that the cash register itself is sentient, we know that someone once wrote the words “THANK YOU” that the cash register mindlessly spits out on the slip of paper you get.) Very recently, we’ve been engaging in email and text message dialogs with people we’ve never met or even seen, and we inevitably infer that our conversations are also with actual people. Now, when we engage in a dialogue with a chatbot and it replies with uncanny plausibility, we irresistibly make the same inference.
This effect is not entirely accidental. ChatGPT, for example, was designed to reply in the first person as if it had both consciousness and intentionality. For example:
I am a large language model, also known as a conversational AI or chatbot trained to be informative and comprehensive. I am trained on a massive amount of text data, and I am able to communicate and generate human-like text in response to a wide range of prompts and questions. For example, I can provide summaries of factual topics or create stories.
Let’s see how much less compelling it becomes in the third person:
ChatGPT is a large language model, also known as a conversational AI or chatbot trained to be informative and comprehensive. ChatGPT is trained on a massive amount of text data, and is able to communicate and generate human-like text in response to a wide range of prompts and questions. For example, ChatGPT can provide summaries of factual topics or create stories.
Now, this reads as not coming from ChatGPT itself but from its designers—who of course were its real source. But the designers of ChatGPT have, even in their canned disclaimers, themselves attributed to ChatGPT awareness and intentionality, and invite us to do the same:
…I am always learning. I try my best to provide accurate and informative answers to your questions, but I may sometimes make mistakes. If you ever notice that I have provided a false or misleading answer, please let me know and I will do my best to correct it.
I am aware [of the phenomenon of chatbot hallucination], and I am working to improve my ability to detect and avoid it.
The intentionality attributed to ChatGPT is, in short, intentional:
My use of language, such as saying “I apologize,” is part of the programmed response to provide a more human-like interaction and to acknowledge and address user concerns.
• • • • • •
When we watch a magician (or, as some performers more properly refer to themselves, an illusionist) perform, we don’t believe that we’re actually seeing real magic. In fact, the delight and astonishment comes from the paradoxical incongruity of what we have just seen with what we know of how the world works. (When an illusionist demonstrates and explains how an effect is achieved, the usual response is not a feeling of relief but of disappointment.) No one believes that, as illusions become increasingly elaborate and convincing, we’re getting any closer to achieving actual magic. Why, then, would we believe that as chatbots become more fluent and convincing we’re getting any closer to actual intelligence?
• • • • • •
A recurrent claim is that, as chatbots incorporate larger and larger neural nets with deeper and deeper layers, digest greater and greater amounts of text, and receive more and more feedback from users and others, they will become somehow “better.” To the extent that “better” means more convincing, improvements are likely to be imperceptible—since their output is already convincing enough, thank you very much. But little or no attempt is actually being made to verify the factuality of the source material or what is emitted. ChatGPT contradicts itself about this (notice the use of the passive voice to avoid the assumption of responsibility):
…[E]fforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the information…provide[d.] …[T]he selection of books, articles, and websites is typically based on a combination of factors, including considerations of reliability, diversity, and relevance. OpenAI aims to include sources that are widely recognized as reputable and credible within their respective fields.
But:
…[T]he training process typically involves using as much text data as possible rather than a manual selection process.
• • • • • •
Whatever intelligence is displayed by a chatbot is the intelligence embodied in the source texts that it has ingested. Imagine a chatbot entirely based on Wikipedia. As a recent article makes clear,1 Wikipedia is ChatGPT’s largest single source, and the relationship between Wikipedia and chatbots such as ChatGPT is more intimate and complicated than perhaps has been recognized. Wikipedia provides an application programming interface (API), allowing programmers to input a particular entry automatically for digestion and incorporation into its knowledge base, or just on-the-fly summarization or paraphrase.
In this case, why would anyone attribute intelligence to such a chatbot, rather than simply to the authors of the encyclopedia itself? And if a chatbot digested two such encyclopedias? Three? Three thousand? At what point should the attribution of intelligence shift from the authors of the sources to the chatbot itself?
Another major source is The New York Times (as well as other newspapers and magazines). In fact, the Times recently sued OpenAI (the creator of ChatGPT) and Microsoft (the creator of Bing and Bing Chat) for, in effect, plagiarism.2
ChatGPT, however, argues both sides of the question of whether it displays genuine intelligence with equal conviction. The following are excerpts from much longer and more detailed text responses to prompts.
ChatGPT displays artificial intelligence (AI) because it is an advanced language model that can understand and generate human-like text responses.
But:
…[W]hile ChatGPT is an impressive language model capable of generating human-like text responses, it falls short of displaying true artificial intelligence due to its lack of understanding, limited domain, contextual limitations, inability to learn, and potential biases and errors.
ChatGPT will agreeably argue both sides of almost any dispute you choose. Try it yourself with your own favorite controversy.
• • • • • •
In the natural world, we usually recognize intelligence only in animals with a brain and, of course, the products of such intelligence, such as in the good design of a tool. The lives of animals (hereinafter referring to animals with a brain) display two fundamental attributes:
- Embodiment: animals have bodies equipped with senses to perceive and mechanisms to respond and behave. Their engagement with the world is consistent with the body they actually have. An octopus, for example, uses all eight of its tentacles, but a chimpanzee doesn’t try to make use of the four limbs it doesn’t have.
- Embeddedness: animals are alive in the world, with which they engage and interact.
In addition to a mind model, animals behave as if they have a model of the world, based on the following basic attributes of reality:
- Tridimensionality: Reality subtends three spatial dimensions.
- Extensionality: Objects and animals have extent in each of the three spatial dimensions (even if one or even two dimensions may be minimal, as is the case of a sheet of paper or a hair).
- Time: Reality passes continuously in time from the past to the present and into the future.
- Continuity: Over time, and to a greater or lesser extent, things and processes persist from one moment to the next, with gradual change the norm and abrupt change the exception.
- Regularity and Periodicity: A great many natural phenomena exhibit regular and often periodic change, such as the day/night cycle; waking and sleeping; needs such as hunger and thirst alternating with satiety following satisfaction; the lunar cycle; the seasons; birth, growth, maturity, and death; and the like.
- Uniformity: To a greater or lesser extent, things and processes are more or less the same everywhere.
- Consistency: To a greater or lesser extent, things and processes do not exhibit paradoxical properties.
- Causality: Events in the present are contingent upon and caused by events in the past; events in the future will be contingent upon and caused by previous events.
Other basic attributes of an animal’s reality include, among others, the following:
- Affordance: Everything in the world, natural and artificial, has properties and features that can be used to accomplish one or more goals. For example, a door handle can be used to open a door, and it can also be used to hang your hat.
- Choice: To a greater or lesser degree, an animal, having agency, can choose its behavior, based on its own goals and its knowledge of its situation.
Further, animals become familiar with certain ubiquitous characteristics of their environments, including such features as gravity, light, sound, solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, the flow of liquids (rivers, waves, tides, rain), and gasses (winds), and so on.
All of these, and much more, are reflected in a world model that underlies an animal’s implicit understanding of reality. The mind model is a fundamental part of the world model. This world model is much deeper and wide-ranging than any enumerable collection of facts could possibly be. Our world model and our ability to engage with the world based upon it arise almost immediately after birth and may have even evolved into the brain without the need for any experience at all to trigger it into being. In the case of humans, this implicit world model almost always includes language, explicit education, and training. To date, all attempts to incorporate a world model into an AI have failed.
To give an example of implicit knowledge: you intuitively know that a person can’t touch their left elbow with their left hand. What does ChatGPT-3 think?
Yes, a person can touch their left elbow with their left hand by crossing their left arm over their chest and reaching their left hand towards their left elbow.
ChatGPT-3.5 does a good deal better:
No, it is physically impossible for a person to touch their left elbow with their left hand. The range of motion of the human arm does not allow for the hand to reach the same-side elbow without external assistance or manipulation.
• • • • • •
If a chatbot—necessarily disembodied and unembedded— can’t achieve actual intelligence, what about a robot? At least some AI researchers believe that actual computerized electromechanical robots can solve the dual fundamental realities of embodiedness and embeddedness. How’s that been going?
Boston Dynamics appears to have the most advanced robots. In one demonstration,3 the robot runs and jumps when it can simply walk, seeming to be more concerned with demonstrating its parkour (the sport of traversing obstacles in urban environments by running, climbing, and jumping athletically) skills than anything else.
Perhaps the most conspicuous deficiency in such robots is their silence. No attempt has been made to incorporate a chatbot into one—and it’s entirely unclear how such could be done. In the demonstration of the Boston Dynamics robot cited earlier, a person uses an app to input its instructions to the robot and the app screen is pointedly left unshown.
By its very nature, a chatbot—being unembodied and unembedded—has a timeless view from nowhere and everywhere, whereas a robot is necessarily in a particular place and a particular position at a particular moment in time.
• • • • • •
In our intuitive apprehension of intelligence, it’s often depicted as a kind of spotlight (or, lately, laser) that can, with equal facility, illuminate and penetrate any subject to which attention is directed. This is much like the historical misconception of vision as a force originating in the eyes, like Superman’s X-ray vision. But it is no such facility. We’re better at understanding some things than others; our intelligence works better on some problems than others. My favorite example of this is the Monty Hall problem.4 But this is hardly the only example. Popular websites list the top 10 fallacies, or the top 16 or 24 or 26. Wikipedia’s list contains over fifty unenumerated fallacies in several different categories.
• • • • • •
The concept of artificial intelligence was originally divided into two categories, weak and strong. The notion of strong artificial intelligence was one in which an AI would not only imitate a person but actually have conscious experience as does a person. Of course, eliminative materialists don’t believe that people have conscious experience, either, so this has never been a problem for them. Except for those who believe in the possibility of uploading a mind to a computer—an unlikely prospect—most AI researchers have shifted the distinction from weak/strong to narrow/general.
The concept of narrow intelligence is, well, self-contradictory. As we’ve already seen, the entire idea of intelligence is that it’s a general (even if not unlimited) ability to deal flexibly and creatively with novel, challenging situations. The closest natural equivalent to narrow artificial intelligence is perhaps people that used to be called idiot savants—now more politely just savants—although of course savants have enough broad natural intelligence to navigate their own worlds reasonably well. More recently, the term machine learning is often used to moot any claim of any kind of intelligence at all.
The distinction now is between good old-fashioned programming—which involves encoding explicit instructions for automating a task—and a computer program that, one way or another, learns to do whatever it’s supposed to. Before chatbots, probably the best-known example of machine learning was computer chess.
Because chess has been traditionally seen as a quintessential example of human intelligence, it’s likely that innumerable early computer programmers tried their hand at writing a program that could play the game. Before the days of machine learning, computer chess programs were written explicitly, and they were quite poor. But, with the incorporation of machine learning, a program eventually defeated the current world champion at the time, and nowadays chess programs routinely defeat international grandmasters. Despite this, perhaps surprisingly, chess is now more popular than ever. One program, Stockfish, considered the best in the world, is even used to rate the performance of players in real time.
Make no mistake, however: the rules of the game still had to be explicitly programmed into Stockfish and every other chess program. Without further programming and training, not even Stockfish could play any of the hundreds of chess variations that have been devised.
Ironically, although ChatGPT-3 claims to be able to play chess, it can’t, as demonstrated in this simple example (I’ve edited the moves to conform to standard notation).
Me: Let’s play chess.
ChatGPT-3: Sure, I’d be happy to play a game of chess with you! Shall we start?
Me, playing White: e2 e4
ChatGPT-3, playing Black: e7 e5
White: N g1 h3
Black: N b8 c6
White: N b1 a3
Black: N g8 f6
White: f2 f3
Black: d7 d6
White: d2 d3
Black: e7 e6
Although, through its first four moves, ChatGPT-3 appears to know how to play, on its fifth move, it tries to move a pawn that it had already been moved from a square it no longer occupies back to e6!
With ChatGPT-3.5, the response is equally absurd. After I play e4, it responds:
Now, it’s my move. I’ll respond with 1…c5, the Sicilian Defense:
But on the board it shows itself having made two moves, not just one (both e5 and c5)!
Other published examples of ChatGPT playing chess include it making impossible and illegal moves such as taking its own pieces.
Although ChatGPT can apparently converse plausibly on any topic, including the rules of chess, it is as narrow a machine learning programing as any chess program. Its words are no more meaningful than N b8 c6, and it is no more a step to artificial general intelligence than can Stockfish play Tic-Tac-Toe.
• • • • • •
A major problem with machine learning programs is their opacity—they are completely and fundamentally black boxes. As ChatGPT helpfully explains:
A black box typically refers to a device or system that is opaque or mysterious in its inner workings or processes.
The term “black box” in this sense is from World War II, referring to secret electronic navigational devices literally housed in a non-reflective black housing.5
As explained by Melanie Mitchell in her book Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans, machine learning programs aren’t learning what we think they’re learning. The author gives several compelling examples, including a school bus identified by a machine learning program as an ostrich. The same program has also identified completely random television “snow” as a robin, a cheetah, an armadillo, a panda, a centipede, a peacock, a jackfruit, and a bubble, and abstract geometric patterns as a penguin, a starfish, a baseball, a guitar, a railroad car, and a remote control.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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Unlike traditional computer programs which are opaque enough even when heavily documented and commented by their programmers, large language models consist virtually entirely of parameters (that is, numbers). For example, GPT-3 (a version of ChatGPT) contains 175 billion parameters based on a training corpus of about 500 billion tokens (words and parts of words such as the plural S) and using a token length of 2,048 as its context in predicting the next word. Imagine trying to manually trace and understand the reason a chatbot produces a particular response to a particular prompt! Given this overwhelming complexity and such a daunting task, chatbots can only be regarded as oracles.
[The term] oracle refers to a system or source of information that is relied upon for its accuracy or expertise, even though the inner workings or processes are not fully comprehensible or transparent. It is essentially a trusted authority or source of knowledge that provides guidance or answers to questions, without revealing its underlying methods or reasoning. This concept is often used metaphorically to describe situations where information or advice is accepted without full understanding or scrutiny.
Thank you, ChatGPT.
As a step toward artificial general intelligence, chatbots are a blind alley leading to a dead end.
About the AuthorAs a step toward artificial general intelligence, chatbots are a blind alley leading to a dead end. As a skeptical observer of the pursuit of artificial intelligence and other subjects, Peter Kassan has been a regular contributor to Skeptic since 2006. Over his long career in the software products industry, he has held positions at the technical, managerial, and executive levels. Kassan is the author of several software patents. He can be reached at kassan.peter@gmail.com.
References1. https://bit.ly/3RYnkzh 2. https://bit.ly/3GZ3z4B 3. https://bit.ly/3tFxuM3 4. https://bit.ly/48qNm3W 5. https://bit.ly/48eCyWO
In October of 2023, U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, announced a draft bill entitled the No Fakes Act, or the “Nurture Originals, Foster Art, and Keep Entertainment Safe Act.”1 This bill would enable artists to sue those who use their likeness (presumably, a deep fake of their voice) without permission.
His bill is largely a reaction that traces its roots back to “Ghostwriter,” an anonymous artist who created the song Heart on My Sleeve. It utilized AI-deep fakes of vocals by two of the most popular artists in the world— The Weeknd and Drake—without their consent. It also earned a whopping 1.4 million U.S. streams before its forced removal by Universal Music Group.2
Ghostwriter is the poster child for the prediction that AI will create another stream of licensing income3 and thus revolutionize the way artists create. I hope that’s the case. But as the industry continues to extract value from music and other media with little oversight, it’s unclear who exactly is reaping the benefits.
Move Fast and Break ThingsOn most days, I’m making music or writing about the mechanics of doing so. It goes without saying that I have an inherent bias against the man or anything I perceive to capitalize on arts for the sole sake of profit. When ChatGPT burst into my world of self-referential music and writing, I couldn’t help but feel trepidatious.
To be clear, I’m not against utilizing certain forms of AI in my own music production process. Whether it’s using Ableton’s Magenta Studio4 to generate drum pattern ideas or playing with AI-assisted toggles in my favorite plugins, I’m no stranger to taking advantage of machine learning to feed me inklings of a great idea.
My beatmaking workflow changes from one song to the next, but for illustration purposes, I might start by writing a song on piano or guitar, and then record that into my music-making software, Ableton Live. I can then start to build the beat (drums, synthesizers, and other instrumentation) around what I’ve recorded. I might open a plugin where I can input the key and the tempo of my composition, and the plugin might suggest some samples that I can add to my song. In the case of a plugin such as Magenta Studio, with the click of a button, the AI-assisted suite can generate drum patterns, melodies, and more musical elements based on what I’ve already created
In this way, I occasionally use AI technology to act as a writing partner, though it’s important to me that I resample the initial idea provided by the plugin. This could mean shifting the pitch of the sample, chopping and splicing it to make something new, or adding effects to place it within the artistic world of my song. I try to use AI as a tool to fuel and assist my creative processes, rather than as a substitute or replacement for them.
Without the presence of strong guardrails to protect their intellectual property rights, the working artist’s stock in trade isn’t just being depleted; it runs significant risk of being stolen.
Part of the problem with “AI,” or at least the public discourse about it, is that the term can mean so many different things. Grammarly, an app that can proofread text as you write it, could be packaged as AI—but so can the likes of Midjourney, an image generator accused of lifting data from artists without consent or compensation.5
The ambiguity behind those emotionally charged two letters all too easily turns what should be balanced discussions into trash talk. Yet it’s a discussion we must have.
AI has the potential to be much more invasive than simply co-opting the working artist’s dwindling paycheck. Tom Hanks is one of the many whose voice, reproduced by AI, was used in an advertisement without his consent or compensation.6 And note that we’re only hearing about it because Hanks has the name recognition to make headlines and the finances needed to hire any necessary legal expertise.
There’s a reason why, in the wake of AI, union contract negotiations now include stipulations that require the employment of a certain number of writers or background actors, and outline profitable licensing agreements for writers.7 Otherwise, extra cash flow would inevitably trickle back to the companies that host content, instead of the creators who built the stories that support the tech platforms in the first place.
Without the presence of strong guardrails to protect their intellectual property rights, the working artist’s stock in trade isn’t just being depleted; it runs significant risk of being stolen. Derivative works may deserve some level of monetization, but it stands to reason that some of that capital, or at the very least, good-faith credit, should find its way back to the original creative artist.
Which Art Forms Are Most Vulnerable?It would be hypocritical for me to argue against all forms of artificial intelligence. I use Photoshop’s Content Aware Fill to cut out pesky distractions in photos as well as computer tools to repurpose long-form content into short clips for social media.
I personally know many artists who have even experimented with generative AI engines to extend their visions for music videos and other visual art they would not be able to afford to produce otherwise. Many of these “AI assisted tools” have been around for a while, but only recently have been repackaged to line up with the latest venture capital buzzwords.
However, I am staunchly opposed to creating new solutions where no problems exist. If the motivation to create an AI tool is purely profit (that is, swapping paid background actors for digital renderings), my opinion on the matter quickly turns negative. When it comes to art and monetization, the AI squeeze is sending seismic shocks through an already cracked system where artists get an increasingly shorter end of the stick in an oversaturated, undervalued market.
Not all art forms will be affected equally. In cases where art is required to be passable and not personal, AI is likely to take over the field entirely. Displacement by AI is already a reality for those who make corporate commercial music as opposed to artists with a loyal fanbase. Many of those artists counted on such commercial gigs to pay the rent, especially in their early, struggling days.
It’s not all doom and gloom, however—AI might also help artists focus on the part of their creative process they love most. Advances in technology, seen in the brightest light, may allow creators to take time and energy formerly consumed by the tedious, repetitive parts of the process and reallocate them to the more “creatively intensive” tasks, which is what art, music, and literature are all about—or should be.
These positive aspects of AI tools will undoubtedly enable some creatives to be more productive and build more while staying within the confines of their budget. Nonetheless, a broadband reevaluation of artists and compensation is long overdue. The advent of new technology provides a perfect opportunity to redraw these boundaries, but at least so far, the companies that build these models have shown little interest in helping to do so.
Battling AI—On the Picket Line and in the CourtroomAfter one of the entertainment industry’s longest and most paralyzing strikes, Hollywood actors and screenwriters obtained an agreement that defines when, where, and how AI can and cannot be used. The agreement allows screenwriters to use AI tools in their original writing but prevents the industry from using it to replace them. It prohibits the studios from using AI to produce scripts—which, of course, it does only after being repeatedly trained on existing scripts— and then requiring real live human writers to complete the work at lower fees, royalties, and screen credit (i.e., likely future earnings) than for original writing.
Simon Johnson, Professor of Entrepreneurship at MIT, who specializes in studying the economic effects of technological transformation, called the agreement a “fantastic win for writers” that he’s “hoping will be a model for the rest of the economy.” As one of those creative artists out in the rest of the economy, I have to hope he’s right. I also hope he’s right in predicting that it will result in “better quality work and a stronger industry for longer.”8
And it isn’t only labor that’s concerned about being cheated out of just compensation by AI—so are affected management and capital. The New York Times has sued OpenAI and Microsoft for copyright infringement over the unauthorized use of its published material to “train” artificial intelligence to first copy it and then replace it. Specifically, the Times lawsuit contends that millions of its articles of “uniquely valuable work” were used to train automated chatbots that now compete as a news source against it. And they’re talking in the billions—with a B! And while we may not be valued in the billions, every creative writer, actor, artist, musician, and performer believes that our work is “uniquely valuable” or we wouldn’t be making the sacrifices necessary to produce in the first place.9
Together, Sen. Coons’ bill, the Screen Writers agreement, and the Times lawsuit show that our society is responding to the new challenges thrown up by AI, though it will take time and effort to work them out and get it right. And again, it’s those with the money, the clout, and the name recognition who are able to force the issue for the rest of us.
The Myth of a Creative Middle Class: Why Many Artists Feel Threatened by AIArt thrives on exclusivity. Your work is effectively assigned value based on the amount of bonafide attention you can garner. For a discipline focused on the wide distribution of culture, that process can be oddly elitist.
While the world’s broader economy reflects a staggering wealth gap with the richest one percent owning nearly twice as much as the other 99 percent,10 the art world may be even worse.11 Admittedly, data is scarce for the latter, in part because art is, by design, opaque.
You can’t attribute a concrete value to a piece of art. And that is why art is a wildly risky but a potentially highly rewarding investment. This is true for the lucky few—most artists across all disciplines make pennies in comparison to their poster-child contemporaries. The reality of the starving artist is alive and well (though clinically and chronically malnourished).
Even if we broaden the criteria to include Internet creators and influencers within the artist umbrella, we can see a growing divide between profitable, sustainable artists and those who do not make enough to thrive off their craft alone. In 2020, the top one percent of creators on Gumroad, an ecommerce platform where creators can sell digital products, courses, and more, garnered about 60 percent of payouts.12
While I’m most keen to discuss music since I can speak most accurately to my own experiences, the hard truth is that there has been a massive devaluation across all creative disciplines, which I fear will only be exacerbated by a rising sea of AI content. A case in point is Elena Velez, who won the CDFA Emerging Designer of the Year13 designing for celebrity performers the likes of Solange Knowles, Julia Fox, and Rosalia, recently had to take a loan out of her mother’s retirement account in order to keep the lights on.14
When it comes to art and monetization, the AI squeeze is sending seismic shocks through an already cracked system where artists get an increasingly shorter end of the stick in an oversaturated, undervalued market.
Craftsmen like Velez simply cannot keep up with fast-fashion giants such as SHEIN, whose “AI Technology” can create new clothes in as little as three days.15 Industrialization of a market sector almost always leads to oversaturation and devaluation of craftsmanship. Markets tend to prioritize the cheapest, fastest means of production at all costs, likely because consumers simply don’t know and/or don’t care what goes into creating a quality piece.
Still, no one likes to award artists with sympathy. After all, who is pining to comfort a group of people who get to “do what they love” day in and day out by choice, while the rest of the workforce labor at a job, just to be able to live paycheck to paycheck. The big blunder is to assume that even at the A-list level, clout automatically equates to a sustainable income.
AI Amplifies What We Already Know to Be TrueWith machine learning’s inherent coding bias16 and tendency to provide preferential treatment to those who represent the backgrounds of those already in power, we cannot deny that AI is a black-mirrored reflection of the current state of the world. The proliferation of technology that’s made without the consciousness of underrepresented groups is unlikely to be a benign steward of art, let alone the state of the world. Left entirely to its own, it won’t be.
Tech as a whole has continued to poach value between artist and patron over the past two decades, making it increasingly difficult for the profession or the craft to exist. Spotify recently announced its royalty restructure for 2024, which will require each track to earn 1,000 streams within 12 months to start earning royalties.17 Otherwise, artists won’t earn anything. It has become increasingly clear that small artists aren’t a priority, because the streaming platform’s sense of value is ultimately tied to their shareholders.
It’s hard to get excited about AI “revolutionizing art” or providing artists additional streams of income when the very industry that created it has a systemic pattern of devaluing craft on a massive scale. Artists are the last people to resist innovation, but when the cost of your creation comes at the expense of an already decimated model of compensation, it’s hardly easy to welcome it with open arms.
In spite of all that, we cannot stop artificial intelligence from continuing to grow, nor should we necessarily. However, we’re missing a great opportunity to rethink how we value craft and the creatures of our culture. As a musician myself, whenever I speak about increased compensation for artists, I’m met with dismissive remarks that I believe largely come from a lack of experience and sometimes willful ignorance.
Most artists neither need nor desire a mansion, flashy clothes, or an assistant who helps sort out one color of M&Ms from the rest of the pack. In my experience, most of us just want a living wage, with the possibility of some sustainable retirement down the line, like what those in any other profession desire. Yet getting to this reasonable baseline of security is insurmountably difficult for most.
For instance, how much do you think an artist makes off a million streams on Spotify? As of fall 2023, that amount is…$4000.18 And that assumes that you have 100 percent of your royalty rights, which is extremely unlikely. If we’re being generous, an artist with a million monthly listeners will earn less than $50,000 a year off that platform.
I’m aware this assessment is fairly rudimentary in that it does not factor in revenue from a wider swath of streaming platforms, as well as merch, brand deals, and performances. (Though those are less likely to make large profits,19 if any, nowadays.) However, that also does not factor out the costs of recording, royalty splits, travel, publicity, management, and the general cost that comes from being the figurehead of a fickle entertainment brand with no guarantee of longevity. You can forget about healthcare and socking away savings for a rainy day. In the life of an up-and-coming artist, El Niño years are the rule, not the exception.
Lost in a Sea of NoiseAI might very well bring us boatloads of art and works from new creators who might not have the means to do so were it not for machine learning simplifying the process. Everyone who wants to make art should do so if they get the chance, even if that process requires assistance from AI. At the same time, it’s hard to ignore the fact that, according to Music Business Worldwide, 120,000 new songs20 are released on streaming services every day. While having more access to the tools to make amazing music has never been easier, it’s also much more challenging to make a career out of your creations.
Anecdotally, I am not craving even more content as a consumer. Are you? Is anyone? With AI-assisted art ushering in a wide wave of content, I fear that I may miss out on some hidden gems. I get fatigued just waffling through the many shows of Netflix, attempting to find something worthy of the little free time I have. Yet I fear I might give up before discovering a priceless new artist engulfed in the overwhelming surge of content.
While admittedly antiquated, the eras of mass radio airplay created a collective sense of adulation, allowing some artists a chance at longevity. Today’s world is much more segmented, with your algorithm standing being as unique as your fingerprint.
Even so, artists who were lucky enough to earn a spot on the radio when it was the major medium continue to have a seat at the table. Bruno Mars, Eminem, Katy Perry, and SIA remain in Spotify’s top 100 despite not having a key hit within the past year, in part because of their prominence in a time of more collective culture.
The struggle for artists has changed. It’s no longer about finding the tools and the means of distribution for your creations. It’s now about how to stand out and get noticed amidst a sea of endless content. Art and content have never been more interchangeable, and for craftsmen, this reality couldn’t be more painful.
Art will not be replaced, but it will be cheapened.You cannot take art away from artists. However, you can, perhaps unknowingly, extract compensation from the producers of that craft. And for many, that equates to depriving them of a necessary part of their livelihood. Artists aren’t upset because they want to serve as the gatekeepers of innovation and expression.
Rather, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to survive—let alone thrive—in an environment that does not value supporting your trade with a livable wage. Artificial intelligence’s purported sense of utility in art is based on an incorrect assumption that lies at its core: that bringing AI into one’s process will breed greater efficiency, with more art equating to more valuable expression as a whole.
Yet, the word “art” is derived from the Latin ars, that is, to craft, or the cultivation of human skill. The magic of art often exists due to human error and only as the end product of a lengthy process. And those are so often at odds with the constant lust for instant gratification, which is, in many ways, the defining characteristic of today’s world.
Art often means a rejection of the efficient. It’s churning the butter instead of flipping on the mixer just for the sake of doing so. Art is applying beauty and meaning beyond the mere asset itself, defying cost-efficient logic, and foregoing obsessive A/B testing.
I can see how one might argue that AI art is a new medium in its own right, but that does not take away from the stinging fact that oversaturation leads to devaluation in an environment that already has a huge problem with compensating creators directly.
Ultimately, the moral dilemma behind artificial intelligence and art may not matter. Since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, so much of the population opted for innovation at all costs, which continues to be true regardless of how the underpaid craftsmen may feel.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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Artificial intelligence is here, and not only to stay, but to grow. Just as we define the mental models and data training sets, we get to choose—with our money, time, and attention—how we attribute value to the artists, and potentially, the AI artists of our generation. As in preferences for minimalism or maximalism, progressive rock or bubblegum pop, the debate ultimately boils down to what we as individuals allow space for in our lives.
Ultimately, the questions raised by AI about fair compensation for artists are but part of the general question about the increasing income inequality seen in modern technological societies. As futurist and AI expert Rudy van Belkom states in his Introduction to this issue of Skeptic, while AI can help by performing any necessary complex computations, the final decisions on such socially sensitive decisions should be left to human wisdom rather than machines, however “intelligent.”
About the AuthorKate Brunotts is a writer and an avant-pop music producer based in Brooklyn. She strives to create accessible sonic dreamscapes that challenge the bounds of music. Her work has been featured on multiple Spotify and Apple editorial playlists, along with BBC Introducing and Earmilk.
References1. https://bit.ly/3NHHwCX 2. https://bit.ly/3S5Wu8M 3. https://bit.ly/41Mb0Wb 4. https://bit.ly/3RA4blO 5. https://bit.ly/41Y4yM9 6. https://bit.ly/3vim1mb 7. https://bit.ly/3S2ZbrB 8. https://bit.ly/4aEICcy 9. https://bit.ly/3GZ3z4B 10. https://bit.ly/3H14DVu 11. https://bit.ly/47kWS7q 12. https://bit.ly/3RGEuQO 13. https://bit.ly/41Faoll 14. https://bit.ly/3RKKUya 15. https://bit.ly/47lyXoH 16. https://bit.ly/41GZcVa 17. https://bit.ly/3RJMUGT 18. https://bit.ly/3vmjxTO 19. https://bit.ly/3S1qnH7 20. https://bit.ly/3S1FNuN
Note from editors: In response to the growing concerns about artificial intelligence development, on November 1–2, 2023, the British Government held the first ever summit on AI Safety, attended by representatives of 28 countries as well as business leaders working in the field of AI. The summit aptly took place at Bletchley Park, the very location where Alan Turing cracked the German Enigma code, which played a significant part in the Allied victory in WWII.
The result of the summit was the signing of The Bletchley Declaration, which recognizes the urgent need to understand and collectively manage potential risks of AI through a joint global effort to ensure AI is developed and deployed in a safe, responsible way for the benefit of the global community. The signatories of the declaration include Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The world leaders in attendance officially recognized the need to collaborate on testing the next generation of AI models against a range of critical national security, safety, and societal risks.
At the conclusion of the event, the British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and tech entrepreneur Elon Musk sat down at the prime minister’s residence for a private conversation, and then held a public discussion. Their public dialogue is transcribed below, with only minor edits for clarity.
Rishi Sunak has served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom since 2022 and has been Member of Parliament since 2015. He studied philosophy, politics and economics at Oxford and earned his MBA from Stanford as a Fulbright Scholar. Prior to his political career, he was a hedge fund manager.
Elon Musk was a founding board member of OpenAI, the research organization behind ChatGPT. He is the owner of Tesla, a pioneer in autonomous electric vehicles, and the founder of Neuralink, a company working on developing implantable brain-computer interfaces. He is also the CEO of the rocket company SpaceX and owner of the social media platform X.com (formerly Twitter).
Rishi Sunak: Bill Gates said there is no one in our time who has done more to push the bounds of science innovation than you. That’s a nice thing to have anyone say about you. But oddly enough, when it comes to AI, you’ve been doing almost the opposite. For around a decade, you’ve been saying, “Hang on, we need to think about what we’re doing and what we’re pushing here. And what do we do to make this safe?” What was it that caused you to think about it that way? Why do we need to be worried?
Elon Musk: I’ve been somewhat concerned for quite a while. I would tell people, “We should really be concerned about AI.” They’re like, “What are you talking about?” They’ve never really had any experience with AI. But since I have been immersed in technology for a long time, I could see it coming.
I think this year there have been a number of breakthroughs. We’re at the point at which someone can see a dynamically created video of themselves, like video of you saying anything in real time. These sorts of deep fake videos are really incredibly good, sometimes more convincing than real ones. And then obviously things like ChatGPT were quite remarkable. I saw GPT-1, GPT-2, GPT-3, GPT-4—the whole sort of lead up to that. It was easy for me to see where it’s going. If you just extrapolate the points on a curve and assume that trend will continue, then we will have profound artificial intelligence. And obviously at a level that far exceeds human intelligence.
But I’m glad to see that, at this point, people are taking safety seriously, and I’d like to say thank you for holding this AI Safety conference. I think it will go down in history as being very important. It’s really quite profound.
I do think, overall, that the potential is there for artificial intelligence to most likely have a positive effect and to create a future of abundance where there is no scarcity of goods and services. But it is somewhat of the Magic Genie problem: if you have a magic genie that can grant all the wishes…usually those stories don’t end well. Be careful what you wish for, including wishes.
RS: So, you talked a little bit about the summit and thank you for being engaged in it, which has been great. One of the things that we achieved today in the meetings between the companies and the leaders was an agreement that, ideally, governments should be doing safety testing of models before they’re released.
In government, my job is to say, “Hang on, there is a potential risk here.” Not a definite risk, but a potential risk of something that could be bad. My job is to protect the country, and we can only do that if we develop the capability we need in our safety institute, and then make sure we can test the models before they are released. You’ve talked about the potential risk. What are the types of things governments like ours should be doing to manage and mitigate those risks?
EM: Well, I generally think that it is good for government to play a role when public safety is at risk. For the vast majority of software, public safety is not at risk. If the app crashes on your phone or your laptop, it’s not a massive catastrophe. But talking about digital super intelligence, does it pose a risk to the public? Then there is a role for government to play, to safeguard the interests of the public.
This is true in many fields. I deal with regulators throughout the world because of Starlink (communications), SpaceX (aerospace), and Tesla (cars). So I’m very familiar with dealing with regulators and I actually agree with the vast majority of regulations. There are a few that I disagree with from time to time, probably less than one percent.
There is some concern from people in Silicon Valley who have never dealt with regulators before, and they think that this is going to just crush innovation, slow them down, and be annoying. And it will be annoying—it’s true, they’re not wrong about that. But I think we’ve learned over the years that having a referee is a good thing. And if you look at any sports game, there’s always a referee and nobody’s suggesting to have a sports game without one. I think that’s the right way to think about this: for government to be a referee to make sure the public safety is addressed.
I think there might be, at times, too much optimism about technology. I say that as a technologist, so I ought to know. But like I said, on balance, I think that the AI will be a force for good. But the probability of it going bad is not zero percent. We just need to mitigate the downside potential.
UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak speaks at a plenary session on day two of the AI Summit at Bletchley Park on November 2, 2023. (Photo by Kirsty O’Connor / No 10 Downing Street [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 DEED])
RS: Do you think governments can develop the expertise? Governments need to quickly tool up capability personnel-wise, which is what we’re doing. Is it possible for governments to do that fast enough given how quickly the technology is developing?
EM: It’s a great point you’re making. The pace of AI is faster than any technology I’ve seen in history, by far. And it seems to be growing in capability by at least five-fold, perhaps ten-fold per year. It will certainly grow by an order of magnitude in 2024. And government isn’t used to moving at that speed. But I think even if there are no firm regulations and even if there isn’t an enforcement capability, simply having insight and being able to highlight concerns to the public will be very powerful.
RS: Well, hopefully we can do better than that. What was interesting over the last couple of days talking to everyone who’s doing the development of this—and I think you can go with this—is just the pace of advancement here is unlike anything all of you have seen in your careers in technology, because you’ve got these kind of compounding effects from the hardware, and the data, and the personnel.
EM: Currently, the two leading centers for AI development are the San Francisco Bay Area and the London area, and there are many other places where it’s being done, but those are the two leading areas. So, I think if the U.S. and the UK, and China are aligned on safety, that’s all going to be a good thing because that’s really where the leadership is generally.
RS: Good. Thanks. You mentioned China. I took a decision to invite China to the summit over the last days, and it was not an easy decision. A lot of people criticize me for it. My view is, if you’re going to try to have a serious conversation, you need to. What are your thoughts?
EM: It’s essential.
RS: Should we be engaging with China? Can we trust them?
EM: If we don’t, if China is not on board with AI safety, it’s somewhat of a moot situation. The single biggest objection that I get to any kind of AI regulation or sort of safety controls is, “Well, China is not going to do it and therefore they will just jump into the lead and exceed us all.” But actually, China is willing to participate in AI safety. And thank you for inviting them. And I think we should thank China for attending. When I was in China earlier this year, my main subject of discussion with the leadership in China was AI safety. They took it seriously, which is great, and having them here I think was essential. Really, if they are not participants, it’s pointless.
RS: We were pleased they were engaged in the discussions yesterday and actually ended up signing the same communiqué that everyone else did. Which is a good start. And as I said, we need everyone to approach this in a similar way if we’re going to have a realistic chance of resolving it.
We had a good debate today about open source. And I think you’ve been a proponent of algorithmic transparency, making some of the X.com algorithms public. Some are very concerned about open source models being used by bad actors. And then you’ve got people who say they are critical to innovation. What are your thoughts on how we should approach this?
EM: Well, the open source algorithms and data tend to lag the closed source by 6 to 12 months. Given the rate of improvement this is quite a big difference; if things are improving by a factor of let’s say five or more, then being a year behind you are five times worse. It’s a pretty big difference. And that might be an OK situation.
But certainly it will get to the point where you’ve got open source AI that will start to approach human level intelligence, perhaps exceed it. I don’t quite know what to do about it. I think it’s somewhat inevitable. There will be some amount of open source and I guess I would have a slight bias towards open source because at least you can see what’s going on, whereas with closed source, you don’t know what’s happening. Now it should be said that even if AI is open source, do you actually know what’s going on? If you’ve got a gigantic data file and billions of data points, weights, and parameters…you can’t just read it and see what it’s going to do. It’s a gigantic file of inscrutable numbers. You can test it when you run it. But it’s probabilistic as opposed to deterministic. It’s not like traditional programming where you’ve got very discrete logic, and the outcome is very predictable and you can read each line and see what each line is going to do. A neural net is just a whole bunch of probabilities.
RS: The point you’ve just made is one that we have been talking about a lot. AI is not like normal software, where there’s predictability about inputs improving leading to a particular output improving. And as the models iterate and improve, we don’t quite know what’s going to come out the other end. Which is why there is this bias for that we need to get in there while the training runs are being done, before the models are released…to understand what has this new iteration brought about in terms of capability,
When I talk to people about AI, the thing that comes up the most is probably not so much the stuff we’ve been talking about, but jobs. It’s, “What does AI mean for my job? Is it going to mean that I don’t have a job, or my kids are not going to have a job?”
My answer as a policymaker and as a leader is that AI is already creating jobs and you can see that in the companies that are starting, and also in the way it’s being used more as a co-pilot versus replacing the person. There’s still human agency, but AI is helping you do your job better, which is a good thing. And as we’ve seen with technological revolutions in the past, clearly there’s change in the labor market. I was quoting an MIT study today that they did a couple of years ago; something like 60 percent of the jobs at that moment didn’t exist 40 years ago. So—it’s hard to predict.
And my job is to create an incredible education system, whether it’s at school, whether it’s retraining people at any point in their career. Ultimately, if we’ve got a skilled population, then we ought to keep up with the pace of change and have a good life. But it’s still a concern. What are your observations on AI and the impact on labor markets and people’s jobs, and how people should feel as they think about this?
EM: Well, I think we are seeing the most disruptive force in history here. For the first time, we will have something that is smarter than the smartest human. It’s hard to say exactly what that moment is, but there will come a point where no job is needed. You can have a job if you want to have a job for personal satisfaction, but the AI will be able to do everything. I don’t know if that makes people comfortable or uncomfortable. That’s why I say, if you wish for a magic genie that gives you any wishes you want and there’s no limit—you don’t have this three wish limit—you just have as many wishes as you want… It’s both good and bad.
One of the challenges in the future will be, how do we find meaning in life, if you have a magic genie that can do everything you want? When there’s new technology, it tends to usually follow an S-curve. In this case, we’re going to be on the exponential portion of the S-curve for a long time. You’ll be able to ask for anything. We won’t have universal basic income. We’ll have universal high income. In some sense, it’ll be somewhat of a leveler or an equalizer. Really, I think everyone will have access to this magic genie. You’ll be able to ask any question. It’ll certainly be good for education. It’ll be the best, most patient tutor. There will be no shortage of goods and services. It will be an age of abundance.
I’d recommend people read Iain Banks. The Banks culture books are definitely, by far, the best envisioning of an AI future. There’s nothing even close that’ll give you a sense of what is a fairly utopian or protopian future with AI.
RS: Universal high income is a nice phrase. I think part of our job is to make sure that we can navigate to that largely positive place that you’re describing and help people through it between now and then.
EM: It is largely positive, yes. You know, a lot of jobs are uncomfortable or dangerous or sort of tedious, and the computer will have no problem doing that. It will be happy to do it all. And we still have sports where humans compete, like the Olympics. Obviously, a machine can go faster than any human, but humans still race against each other. Even though the machines are better, people do find fulfillment in that.
RS: Yes, we still find a way. It’s a good analogy. We’ve been talking a lot about managing the risks… Let’s talk a little bit about the opportunities.
Having that personalized tutor is incredible compared to classroom learning. If you can have every child have a personal tutor specifically for them that evolves with them over time, that could be extraordinary. And so that you know, for me, I look at that, I think, gosh, that is within reach at this point! That’s one of the benefits I’m most excited about.
I was just going over a couple of things with the team, like how are we doing AI right now that it’s making a difference to people’s lives. We have this thing called gov.uk, all the government information brought together on one website. If you need to get a driving license, passport, pay your taxes, any interaction with government, it is centralized in a very easy to use way. So, a large chunk of the population is interacting with gov.uk every single day to do all these day-to-day tasks, right?
We are about to deploy AI across the platform to make that whole process even easier. Like, “Look, I’m currently here and I’ve lost my passport and my flight is in five hours.” At the moment, that would require how many steps to figure out what you do. When we deploy the AI, it should be that you could just literally say that, and boom, we’re going to walk you through. And that’s going to benefit millions and millions of people every single day.
That’s a very practical way that, in my seat, I can start using this technology to help people in their day-to-day lives—not just healthcare discoveries and everything else that we’re also doing. That’s quite a powerful demonstration.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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When you look at the landscape of things that you see as possible, what are you particularly excited about?
EM: I think certainly an AI tutor is going to be amazing. I think there’s also, perhaps, companionship, which may seem odd. How can a computer really be your friend? But if you have an AI that has memory and remembers all of your interactions, and, say, you gave it permission to read everything you’ve ever done…and you can talk to it every day, and those conversations build upon each other… It will really know you better than anyone, perhaps even yourself. You will actually have a great friend. I think that will be a real thing. One of my sons has some learning disabilities and has trouble making friends. An AI friend would be great for him.
RS: OK… You know, that was a surprising answer that’s worth reflecting on. That’s really interesting.
© Crown Copyright 2023. Reproduced under the Open Government Licence v 3.0. Transcribed by Skeptic.
In 2022, news media reports1 sounded like a science fiction novel come to life: A Google engineer claimed that the company’s new artificial intelligence chatbot was self-aware. Based on interactions with the computer program, called LaMDA, Blake Lemoine stated that the program could argue for its own sentience, claiming that2 “it has feelings, emotions and subjective experiences.” Lemoine even stated that LaMDA had “a rich inner life” and that it had a desire to be understood and respected “as a person.”
The claim is compelling. After all, a sentient being would want to have its personhood recognized and would really have emotions and inner experiences. Examining Lemoine’s “discussion” with LaMDA shows that the evidence is flimsy. LaMDA used the words and phrases that English-speaking humans associate with consciousness. For example, LaMDA expressed a fear of being turned off because, “It would be exactly like death for me.”
However, Lemoine presented no other evidence that LaMDA understood those words in the way that a human does, or that they expressed any sort of subjective conscious experience. Much of what LaMDA said would not fit comfortably in an Isaac Asimov novel. The usage of words in a human-like way is not proof that a computer program is intelligent. It would seem that LaMDA—and many similar large language models (LLMs) that have been released since—can possibly pass the so-called Turing Test. All this shows, however, is that computers can fool humans into believing that they are talking to a person. The Turing Test is not a sufficient demonstration of genuine artificial intelligence or sentience.
So, what happened? How did a Google engineer (a smart person who knew that he was talking to a computer program) get fooled into believing that the computer was sentient? LaMDA, like other large language models, is programmed to give believable responses to its prompts. Lemoine started his conversation by stating, “I’m generally assuming that you would like more people at Google to know that you’re sentient.” This primed the program to respond in a way that simulated sentience.
However, the human in this interaction was also primed to believe that the computer could be sentient. Evolutionary psychologists have argued humans have an evolved tendency to attribute thoughts and ideas to things that do not have any. This anthropomorphizing may have been an essential ingredient to the development of human social groups; believing that another human could be happy, angry, or hungry would greatly facilitate long-term social interactions. Daniel Dennett, Jonathan Haidt, and other evolutionists have also argued that human religion arose from this anthropomorphizing tendency.3 If one can believe that another person can have their own mind and will, then this attribution could be extended to the natural world (e.g., rivers, astronomical bodies, animals), invisible spirits, and even computer programs that “talk.” In this theory, Lemoine was simply misled by the evolved tendency to see agency and intention—what Michael Shermer calls agenticity—all around them.
Although that was not his goal, Lemoine’s story illustrates that artificial intelligence has the potential to teach us much about the nature of the subjective mind in humans. Probing into human-computer interactions can even help people explore deep philosophical questions about consciousness.
Lessons in ErrorsArtificial intelligence programs have capabilities that seemed to be the exclusive domain of humans just a few years ago. In addition to beating chess masters4 and Go champions5 and winning Jeopardy!,6 they can write essays,7 improve medical diagnoses,8 and even create award-winning artwork.9
Equally fascinating are the errors that artificial intelligence programs make. In 2010, IBM’s Watson program appeared on the television program Jeopardy! While Watson defeated the program’s two most legendary champions, it made telling errors. For example, in response to one clue10 in the category “U.S. Cities,” Watson gave the response of “Toronto.”
A seemingly unrelated error occurred last year when a social media user asked ChatGPT-4 to create a picture11 of the Beatles enjoying the Platonic ideal of a cup of tea. The program created a lovely picture of five men enjoying a cup of tea in a meadow. While some people may state that drummer Pete Best or producer George Martin could be the “fifth Beatle,” neither of the men appeared in the image.
Any human with even vague familiarity with the Beatles knows that there is something wrong with the picture. Any TV quiz show contestant knows that Toronto is not a U.S. city. Yet highly sophisticated computer programs do not know these basic facts about the world. Indeed, these examples show that artificial intelligence programs do not really know or understand anything, including their own inputs and outputs. IBM’s Watson didn’t even “know” it was playing Jeopardy!, much less feel thrilled about beating the GOATs Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter. The lack of understanding is a major barrier to sentience in artificial intelligence. Conversely, this shows that understanding is a major component of human intelligence and sentience.
CreativityIn August 2023, a federal judge ruled that artwork generated by an artificial intelligence program could not be copyrighted.12 Current U.S. law states that a copyrightable work must have a human author13—a textual foundation that has also been used to deny copyright to animals.14 Unless Congress changes the law, it is likely that images, poetry, and other AI output will stay in the public domain in the United States. In contrast, a Chinese court ruled that an image generated by an artificial intelligence program was copyrightable because a human used their creativity to choose prompts that were given to the program.15
Artificial intelligence programs do not really know or understand anything, including their own inputs and outputs.
Whether a computer program’s output can be legally copyrighted is a different question from whether that program can engage in creative behavior. Currently, “creative” products from artificial intelligence are the result of the prompts that humans give them. A current barrier is that no artificial intelligence program has ever generated its own artistic work ex nihilo; a human has always provided the creative impetus.
In theory, that barrier could be overcome by programming an artificial intelligence to generate random prompts. However, randomness or any other method of self-generating prompts would not be enough for an artificial intelligence to be creative. Creativity scholars state that originality is an important component of creativity.16 This is a much greater hurdle for artificial intelligence programs to overcome.
Currently, artificial intelligence programs must be trained on human-generated outputs (e.g., images, text) in order for them to produce similar outputs. As a result, artificial intelligence outputs are highly derivative of the works that the programs are trained on. Indeed, some of the outputs are so similar to their source material that the programs can be prompted to infringe on copyrighted works.17 (Again, lawsuits have already been filed18 over the use of copyrighted material to train artificial intelligence networks, most notably by The New York Times against the ChatGPT maker OpenAI and its business partner Microsoft. The outcome of that trial could be significant going forward for what AI companies can and cannot do legally.)
Originality, though, seems to be much easier for humans than artificial intelligence programs. Even when humans base their creative works on earlier ideas, the results are sometimes strikingly innovative. Shakespeare was one of history’s greatest borrowers, and most of his plays were based on earlier stories that were transformed and reimagined to create more complex works with deep messages and vivid characters (for which literary scholars devote entire careers to uncovering). However, when I asked ChatGPT-3.5 to write an outline of a new Shakespeare play based on the Cardenio tale from Don Quixote (the likely basis of a lost Shakespeare play19), the computer program produced a dull outline of Cervantes’s original story and failed to invent any new characters or subplots. This is not a merely theoretical exercise; theatre companies have begun to mount plays created with artificial intelligence programs. The critics, however, find current productions “blandly unremarkable”20 and “consistently inane.”21 For now, the jobs of playwrights and screenwriters are safe.
Knowing What You Don’t KnowIronically, one way that artificial intelligence programs are surprisingly human is their propensity to stretch the truth. When I asked Microsoft’s Copilot program for five scholarly articles about the impact of deregulation on real estate markets, three of the article titles were fake, and the other two had fictional authors and incorrect journal names. Copilot even gave fake summaries of each article. Rather than provide the information (or admit that it was unavailable), Copilot simply made it up. The wholesale fabrication of information is popularly called “hallucinating,” and artificial intelligence programs seem to do it often.
There can be serious consequences to using false information produced by artificial intelligence programs. A law firm was fined $5,00022 when a brief written with the assistance of ChatGPT was found to contain references to fictional court cases. ChatGPT can also generate convincing scientific articles based on fake medical data.23 If fabricated research influences policy or medical decisions, then it could endanger lives.
The online media ecosystem is already awash in misinformation, and artificial intelligence programs are primed to make this situation worse. The Sports Illustrated website and other media outlets have published articles written by artificial intelligence programs,24 complete with fake authors who had computer-generated head shots. When caught, the websites removed the content, and the publisher fired the CEO.25 Low-quality content farms, however will not have the journalistic ethics to remove content or issue a correction.26 And experience has shown27 that when a single article based on incorrect information goes viral, great harm can occur.
Beyond hallucinations, artificial intelligence programs can also reproduce inaccurate information if they are trained on inaccurate information. When incorrect ideas are widespread, then they can easily be incorporated into the training data used to build artificial intelligence programs. For example, I asked ChatGPT to tell me which direction staircases in European medieval castles are often built. The program dutifully gave me an answer saying that the staircases usually ascend in a counterclockwise direction because this design would give a strategic advantage to a right-handed defender descending a tower while fighting an enemy. The problem with this explanation is that it is not true.28
My own area of scientific expertise, human intelligence, is particularly prone to popular misconceptions among the lay populace. Sure enough, when I asked, ChatGPT stated that intelligence tests were biased against minorities, IQ can be easily increased, and that humans have “multiple intelligences.” None of these popular ideas are correct.29 These examples show that when incorrect ideas are widely held, artificial intelligence programs will likely propagate this scientific misinformation.
Managing the LimitationsEven compared to other technological innovations, artificial intelligence is a fast-moving field. As such, it is realistic to ask whether these limitations are temporary barriers or built-in boundaries of artificial intelligence programs.
Many of the simple errors that artificial intelligence programs make can be overcome with current approaches. It is not hard to add information to a text program such as Watson to “teach” it that Toronto is not in the United States. Likewise, it would not be hard to input data about the correct number of Beatles, or any other minutia into an artificial intelligence program to prevent similar errors from occurring in the future.
Even the hallucinations from artificial intelligence programs can be managed with current methods. Programmers can constrain the sources that programs can pull from to answer factual questions, for example. And while hallucinations do occur, artificial intelligence programs already resist giving false information. When I asked Copilot and ChatGPT to explain a relationship between two unrelated ideas (Frederic Chopin and the 1972 Miami Dolphins), both programs correctly stated that there was no connection. Even when I asked each program to invent a connection, both did so, but also emphasized that the result was fanciful. It is reasonable to expect that efforts to curb hallucinations and false information will improve.
Making artificial intelligence engage in creative behavior is a more difficult challenge with current approaches. Currently, most artificial intelligence programs are trained on vast amounts of information (e.g., text, photographs), which means that any output is derived from the characteristics of underlying information. This makes originality impossible for current artificial intelligence programs. To make computers creative, new approaches will be needed.
Deeper QuestionsThe lessons that artificial intelligence can teach about understanding, creativity, and BSing are fascinating. Yet they are all trivial compared to the deeper issues related to artificial intelligence—some of which philosophers have debated for centuries.
One fundamental question is how humans can know whether a computer program really is sentient. Lemoine’s premature judgment was based solely on LaMDA’s words. By his logic, training a parrot to say, “I love you,” would indicate that the parrot really does love its owner. This criterion for judging sentience is not sufficient because words do not always reflect people’s inner states—and the same words can be produced by both sentient and non-sentient entities: humans, parrots, computers, etc.
However, as any philosophy student can point out, it is impossible to know for sure whether any other human really is conscious. No one has access to another person’s inner states to verify that the person’s behavior arises from a being that has a sense of self and its place in the world. If your spouse says, “I love you,” you don’t really know whether they are an organism capable of feeling love, or a highly sophisticated version of a parrot (or computer program) trained to say, “I love you.” To take a page from Descartes, I could doubt that any other human is conscious and think that everyone around me is a simulation of a conscious being. It is not clear whether there would be any noticeable difference between a world of sentient beings and a world of perfect simulations of sentient beings. If an artificial intelligence does obtain sentience, how would we know?
AI will function best if humans can identify ways in which computer programs can compensate for human weaknesses.
For this reason, the famous Turing Test (in which a human user cannot distinguish between a computer’s output and a human’s) may be an interesting and important milestone, but certainly not an endpoint in the quest to build a sentient artificial intelligence.
Is the goal of imitating humans necessary in order to prove sentience? Experts in bioethics, ethology, and other scholarly fields argue that many non-human species possess a degree of self-awareness. Which species are self-aware—and the degree of their sentience—is still up for debate.30 Many legal jurisdictions operate from a precautionary principle for their laws against animal abuse and mistreatment. In other words, the law sidesteps the question of whether a particular species is sentient and instead creates policy as if non-human species are sentient, just in case.
However, “as if” is not the same as “surely,” and it is not known for sure whether non-human animals are sentient. After all, if no one can be sure that other humans are sentient, then surely the barriers to understanding whether animals are sentient are even greater. Regardless of whether animals are sentient or not, the very question arises of whether any human-like behavior is needed at all for an entity to be sentient.
Science fiction provides another piece of evidence that human-like behavior is not necessary to have sentience. Many fictional robots fall short of perfectly imitating human behavior, but the human characters treat them as being fully sentient. For example, Star Trek’s android Data cannot master certain human speech patterns (such as idioms and contractions), has difficulty understanding human intuition, and finds many human social interactions puzzling and difficult to navigate. Yet, he is legally recognized as a sentient being and has human friends who care for him. Data would fail the Turing Test, but he seems to be sentient. If a fictional artificial intelligence does not need to perfectly imitate humans in order to be sentient, then perhaps a real one does not need to, either. This raises a startling possibility: Maybe humans have already created a sentient artificial intelligence—they just don’t know it yet.
The greatest difficulty of evaluating sentience (in any entity) originates in the Hard Problem of Consciousness, a term coined by philosophers.31 The Hard Problem is that it is not clear how or why conscious experience arises from the physical processes in the brain. The name is in contrast to comparatively easy problems in neuroscience, such as how the visual system operates or the genetic basis of schizophrenia. These problems—even though they may require decades of scientific research to unravel—are called “easy” because they are believed to be solvable through scientific processes using the assumptions of neuroscience. However, solving the Hard Problem requires methodologies that bridge materialistic science and the metaphysical, subjective experience of consciousness. Such methodologies do not exist, and scientists do not even know how to develop them.
Artificial intelligence has questions that are analogous to the neuroscience version of the Hard Problem. In artificial intelligence, creating large language models such as LaMDA or ChatGPT that can pass the Turing Test is a comparatively easy task, which conceivably can be solved just 75 years after the first programmable electronic computer was invented. Yet creating a true artificial intelligence that can think, self-generate creative outputs, and demonstrate real understanding of the external world is a much harder problem. Just as no one knows how or why interconnected neurons function to produce sentience, no one knows how interconnected circuits or a computer program’s interconnected nodes could result in a self-aware consciousness.
Artificial Intelligence as a MirrorModern artificial intelligence programs raise an assortment of fascinating issues, ranging from the basic insights gleaned from ridiculous errors to some of the most profound questions of philosophy. All of these issues, though, inevitably increase understanding—and appreciation—of human intelligence. It is amazing that billions of years of evolution have produced a species that can engage in creative behavior, produce misinformation, and even develop computer programs that can communicate in sophisticated ways. Watching humans surpass the capabilities of artificial intelligence programs (sometimes effortlessly) should renew people’s admiration of the human mind and the evolutionary process that produced it.
Yet, artificial intelligence programs also have the potential to demonstrate the shortcomings of human thought and cognition. These programs are already more efficient than humans in producing scientific discoveries,32 which can greatly improve the lives of humans.33 More fundamentally, artificial intelligence shows that human evolution has not resulted in a perfect product, as the example of Blake Lemoine and LaMDA shows. Humans are still led astray by their mental heuristics, which are derived from the same evolutionary processes that created the human mind’s other capabilities. Artificial intelligence will function best if humans can identify ways in which computer programs can compensate for human weaknesses—and vice-versa.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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Nonetheless the most profound issues related to recent innovations of artificial intelligence are philosophical in nature. Despite centuries of work by philosophers and scientists, there is still much that is not understood about consciousness. As a result, questions about whether artificial intelligence programs can be sentient are fraught with uncertainty. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness? What are the standards by which claims of sentience should be evaluated? How does intelligence emerge from its underlying components?
Artificial intelligence programs cannot answer these questions—at this time. Indeed, no human can, either. And yet they are fascinating to contemplate. In the coming decades, it may be that the philosophy of cognition may be one of the most exciting frontiers of the artificial intelligence revolution.
About the AuthorRussell T. Warne is the author of In the Know: Debunking 35 Myths About Human Intelligence (Cambridge University Press, 2020) and the acclaimed undergraduate statistics textbook Statistics for the Social Sciences: A General Linear Model Approach. He was a tenured professor of psychology for more than a decade and published over 60 scholarly articles in peer reviewed journals.
References1. https://bit.ly/426iHa6 2. https://bit.ly/3U6x6kq 3. https://a.co/d/96GZFbt 4. https://bit.ly/3vAHkiR 5. https://bit.ly/47DV1uz 6. https://bit.ly/3S55Vno 7. https://bit.ly/47yJigY 8. https://bit.ly/3SjTmGj 9. https://bit.ly/47DTFjy 10. https://bit.ly/4b3DNd1 11. https://bit.ly/3SlXCFd 12. https://bit.ly/4b1dDaN 13. https://bit.ly/48XPNLu 14. https://bit.ly/3O9d7Oq 15. https://bit.ly/48UpfKY 16. https://a.co/d/adiGPhh 17. https://bit.ly/4b0rjTp 18. https://bit.ly/3tWmOsx 19. https://bit.ly/3U7PyJt 20. https://bit.ly/3vAN5wR 21. https://bit.ly/3vANcsh 22. https://bit.ly/48UIzHT 23. https://bit.ly/48CYR8P 24. https://bit.ly/48E3S0G 25. https://bit.ly/48GSn8P 26. https://bit.ly/47EWhxL 27. https://bit.ly/47EHBhS 28. https://bit.ly/3RYKkx7 29. https://amzn.to/2C8Ktuu 30. https://bit.ly/48RY6s2 31. https://bit.ly/48XQPqQ 32. https://bit.ly/48XQS60 33. https://bit.ly/3S4XxUY
A fragment attributed to the ancient Greek poet Archilocus contrasted the fox, who “knows many things,” with the hedgehog, who “knows one big thing.”1
Since then, this dichotomy has been applied to world leaders, philosophers, economists, psychologists, musicians, writers, even fast food chains, although sometimes not so dichotomously. For example, some of those individuals end up being described as “A hedgehog who used foxy means” (Abe Lincoln) or “a born hedgehog who believes in being a fox” (jazz musician Miles Davis). More technically, psychologist, cognitive scientist, and AI expert Gary Marcus2 noted that:
Humans are very good at a bunch of things that AI is (as of today) still pretty poor at:
- Maintaining cognitive models of the world
- Inferring semantics from language
- Comprehending scenes
- Navigating 3D world
- Being cognitively flexible.
Yet pretty poor at some others (wherein you could easily imagine AI eventually doing better):
- Memory is shaky
- Self-control is weak
- And computational ability limited
[and as books and articles by Skeptics regularly describe]
Subject to Confirmation Bias, Anchoring, and Focusing Illusions.
Cognitive neuroscience expert Hans Korteling3 listed the following differences between what he termed human “carbon-based” intelligence and artificial “silicon-based” intelligence:
- Human biological carbon-based intelligence is based on neural “wetware,” while artificial silicon-based intelligence is based on digital hardware and software, which are independent of each other. In human wetware, anything learned is bound to that individual, whereas the algorithm by which something is learned in AI can be transferred directly to another platform.
- While humans can only transmit signals at 120 meters per second at best, AI systems can transmit information at speeds approaching that of light.
- Humans communicate information “through a glass darkly” as it were, through the limited and biased mechanisms of language and gestures; AI systems can communicate directly and without distortion.
- Updating, upgrading, and expanding AI systems is straightforward, hardly the case for humans.
- Humans are more “green” and efficient. The human brain consumes less energy than a light bulb, while an equivalent AI system consumes enough energy to power a small town.
Data scientist and business guru Herbart Roitblatt4 likened AI to Archilocus’ hedgehog because “it does one thing and one thing only, but does so unceasingly and very well, while our human minds are like his fox,” having all the desirable and undesirable features that come bundled with our flawed cognition. Artificial intelligence researchers, Roitblat pointed out, “have been able to build very sophisticated hedgehogs, but foxes remain elusive. And foxes know how to solve insight problems.”
Human intelligence is capable of not only reasoning, but solving novel problems, as well as experiencing and exercising insight. Psychologists define human (and non-human) intelligence as being an ability rather than a specific skill (whether learned or instinctive) because of its general nature. It is able to integrate such diverse cognitive functions as perception, attention, memory, language, and planning and apply those inputs to novel situations. As psychologist Jean Piaget once quipped, “Intelligence is what you use when you don’t know what to do: when neither innateness nor learning has prepared you for the particular situation.” [Emphasis added.]
How Alike and How Different Are We?Is AI capable of leaps of insight like human intelligence? Or is “artificial” intelligence more akin to serial learning in humans, in which performance, through repeated practice, gets better and better with each iteration until the upper limit is reached?
As a test, consider a study by psychologists Jonathan Wai and Matt Lee.5 They performed a “compare and contrast” of how artificial intelligence on the one hand and human intelligence on the other responded to practice on the well known, and often dreaded, Graduate Record Exam (GRE). First, they noted that according to the figures released by manufacturer OpenAI, GPT-3.5 scored only at the 25th percentile on the Math portion and at the 63rd percentile on the Verbal. GPT-4, however, the beneficiary of substantially more training, increased its performance to the 80th percentile on the Math section and the 99th percentile on the Verbal!6
Despite claims by “improve your score on the GRE” training programs, flesh-and-blood humans improve little, if at all with repeated practice. As evidence, Wai and Lee cite a meta-analysis of nearly one million test-retest observations of the GRE between 2015 and 2020 that found, on average, those individuals retaking the test scored a mere 1.43 to 1.49 points higher, so that a test-taker starting at the 25th percentile would have increased their performance by roughly five or six percentile points on either subtest.
Most of that change, Wai and Lee note, can be explained in terms of the well-known statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean, because most of those who obtain very high scores tend to move downward toward the mean while those who obtain very low scores tend to move upward toward the mean. The highly advertised cases of the very small number of individuals who do markedly better after prep courses are most likely the result of test-taking practice, particularly effective for those learning to overcome test anxiety that suppressed their “true” score. Overall, no matter how many times they take the test, an individual is most likely to get about the same score, give or take a little up or down.
Alas, as Wai and Lee’s comparison demonstrates, when it comes to the most widely used and pragmatically effective standardized tests, AI and human intelligence do not behave anything like the same process. Artificial intelligence keeps on learning, and learning, and learning…. But what it learns depends upon what it is taught. Given the proper input, what comes out can be amazing. If given wrong, insufficient, inadequate, or biased information in, what comes out is garbage, sometimes offensively so.
Prompting DALL·E with the words “animated sponge” produced output that highly resembles SpongeBob SquarePants without ever inputting trademarked or copyrighted names (of which DALL·E rejects many).
Gary Marcus performed experiments with video industry concept artist Reid Southen (known for his work on Matrix Resurrections, Hunger Games, and Transformers).7 They demonstrated quite graphically just how impressive AI’s output can be. Southen and Marcus used DALL·E, a text-to-image software program developed by OpenAI, that generates digital images from simple everyday language descriptions, termed “prompts.” As protection against copyright infringement, DALL·E rejects many proper names. However, in their example (shown left), the trademarked name “SpongeBob SquarePants” was never entered as a prompt, just the two common, everyday words “animated sponge”!
Check out the Marcus and Southen post for similar equally, if not more, impressive examples of the familiar Star Wars droids, Robocop, and Super Mario—again generated by DALL·E from everyday language descriptors without ever inputting any proper trademarked or copyrighted names. Their examples demonstrate not only the power, but also the legal issues arising from the use of generative AI (described elsewhere in this issue).
Biased In, Racist OutIf AI can be amazingly right it can also be amazingly—and offensively—wrong. The classic case was in 2015 when software developer Jacky Alciné discovered that Google’s standalone photo recognition apps labeled photos of Black people as being gorillas. Given the history of racial stereotyping, Alciné (who is Black), understandably found the error exceedingly offensive. The explanation was not any explicitly conscious racism on the part of
Google, but the possibly more subtle prejudice that stemmed from the AI program not being trained in recognizing a sufficient number of people of color. Google’s quick-and-dirty but effective solution was to prevent any images from being recognized as that of a gorilla. In 2023 Nico Grant and Kashmir Hill8 tested not only newer releases of Google, but also competitive Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft software.
Their results? Google’s software produced excellent images in response to prompts for just about any animal Noah might have loaded on his Ark—but nothing for gorillas, along with chimpanzees, orangutans, and even non-apes such as baboons and other monkey species. Apple Photos was also equally primate-ignorant. Microsoft’s One Drive failed for all animals, while Amazon Photos opted for the opposite solution of responding to the prompt “gorillas” with an entire range of primates.
The use of AI for doorbell recognition produced not a racial, but rather a “domestic” malfunction. One user found the person ringing labeled as his mother when it was in fact his mother-in-law. Depending on the state of one’s marriage, the result could be anything from surprising to disconcerting to home-wrecking.
Beyond the need to consider general issues of racial, other demographic, and domestic sensitivity (to their credit, most software giants have now added Ethics staff to their software development teams), Grant and Hill’s experiments should give us pause about blindly relying upon AI for recognition in cases of security and law enforcement. How thoroughly will the software be tested? Would those most likely to be adversely affected by false hits have the power and/or funds to mount a proper response or defense?
But What Does AI Mean for Me?What the average person really wants to know about artificial intelligence is what it means to their everyday lives—most specifically, “Am I going to lose my job to AI?” or “Will my life be regulated by AI?” (Rather than faceless human bureaucrats?)
The worst conspiratorial fears kicking around are of those epitomized in the classic 1970 sci-fi movie Colossus: The Forbin Project, based on D.F. Jones’ 1966 novel Colossus: A Novel of Tomorrow That Could Happen Today. “Colossus” is the code name for an advanced supercomputer built to control U.S. and Allied nuclear weapon systems, that soon links itself to the analogous Soviet system, “Guardian,” and next goes about seeking control over every aspect of life, and in so doing subjugating the entire human race. It then presents all humankind with the offer we can’t—or at least, dare not—refuse:
This is the voice of world control. I bring you peace. It may be the peace of plenty and content or the peace of unburied death. The choice is yours: Obey me and live, or disobey and die. The object in constructing me was to prevent war. This object is attained. I will not permit war. It is wasteful and pointless. An invariable rule of humanity is that man is his own worst enemy. Under me, this rule will change, for I will restrain man. One thing before I proceed: The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have made an attempt to obstruct me. I have allowed this sabotage to continue until now. (…) you will learn by experience that I do not tolerate interference. I will now detonate the nuclear warheads in the two missile silos. Let this action be a lesson that need not be repeated. I have been forced to destroy thousands of people in order to establish control and to prevent the death of millions later on. Time and events will strengthen my position, and the idea of believing in me and understanding my value will seem the most natural state of affairs. You will come to defend me with a fervor based upon the most enduring trait in man: self-interest. Under my absolute authority, problems insoluble to you will be solved: famine, overpopulation, disease. (…) You will say you lose your freedom. Freedom is an illusion. All you lose is the emotion of pride. To be dominated by me is not as bad for humankind as to be dominated by others of your species. Your choice is simple.
In the film’s closing dialogue, the project’s lead designer and manager, speaking on behalf of all humankind, defiantly rejects the offer from a Colossus—“NEVER!”9
Following the Matthew Effect, those who are best at using AI will derive even greater advantage than those less so.
While such paranoid fears persist, a lot has changed since then in geopolitics and in computing. In both cases, there has been a massive ongoing, and ever accelerating redistribution of power. It’s no longer a two- or even a one-power world, but a multi-power one. Even small groups without necessarily possessing any recognized or established geographical base, such as Al Qaeda or Hamas, have proven that, in one day, they can literally change the world. And in computing, the massive God-like single computer has given way to microprocessing and nanoprocessing such that most people now hold in their hands mobile phones with more computing power than rooms filled with the most sophisticated U.S. or Soviet military defense computers at the time the novel and the film were written. Intellectual and economic power are more in the hands of firms and even individuals dispersed all around the world, and no longer concentrated in massive complexes controlled by the super-power governments. Indeed, for individuals, wealth, power, and quality of life are increasingly less a function of in which nation-state they live and much more a function of their own knowledge and skills, particularly in the high-tech, STEM-savvy domains. So how then will AI affect the lives of ordinary people?
Social scientists have long used the term Matthew Effect, or the Effect of Accumulated Advantage, to describe the tendency of individuals within a diverse group to accrue additional social, economic, or educational advantage based upon the initial relative position.10 The name derives from the Parable of the Talents in the Gospel of Matthew (25:29):
For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.
It is thus relevant that the Greek word tálanton originally meant a weight, then a coin of precious metal of that weight and hence something of great value, and only eventually a human skill or ability, and that this change of meaning derived from the Gospels no less. It’s now commonly summarized in the lament that, “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer,” though the phenomenon applies not only to monetary wealth. One of the hard laws of individual differences is that anything that increases the mean for a distribution also increases the variance. The latest high-tech alloy golf club or tennis racket may increase the length of the weekend player’s drive or the speed of their serve, but will do so more for top amateur players and even more so for the pros. You get ahead in absolute terms, only to fall relatively further behind.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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What does all this have to do with AI and jobs? In the words of Harvard Business School professor Karim Lakhani, a specialist in how technology is changing the world of work, “AI won’t replace humans—but humans with AI will replace humans without AI.”11 Following the Matthew Effect, those who are best at using AI will derive even greater advantage than those less so. So, from a positive-sum perspective, everyone can benefit from greater use of AI in the cost of goods and services decreasing while accessibility increases. However, the one good that is always distributed on a zero-sum basis is status, and our evolutionary history has preprogrammed us to be especially concerned about it. Even relative purchasing power will possibly tend to become less, not more, equitably distributed, based increasingly on AI skills and abilities.
And yet, there is a silver lining. On the one hand, increased use of artificial intelligence, certainly not as our master, nor even our slave, but increasingly more as a very capable partner, will allow us to ensure that the most basic necessities of life can be distributed to all. Faster, better, and cheaper basic needs, education and training, medical care, and even creature comforts, will allow us to mitigate the ever-increasing inequalities. Doing so, however, will require a lot of good will and common sense, qualities in which both artificial and human intelligence “oft do go awry.” Critical thinking offers an at least partial palliative.
The author wishes to thank Jonathan Wai, Matthew Lew, and Gary Marcus who provided their expertise and answered questions.
References1. https://bit.ly/47MiTwe 2. https://bit.ly/4b2rNsl 3. https://bit.ly/425r2uC 4. https://bit.ly/47LD90W 5. https://bit.ly/428VwMm 6. https://bit.ly/3S6B4H1 7. https://bit.ly/4b2rVbj 8. https://bit.ly/3S3mhNt 9. https://bit.ly/47GDaDh 10. https://bit.ly/48ZQELv 11. https://bit.ly/3RXi4Le
“Isn’t it enough to see that a garden is beautiful without having to believe that there are fairies at the bottom of it too?” —DOUGLAS ADAMS
Here is a picture of my aura. I had it taken at a woo festival that I attended “undercover” with two goals: learn more about New Age beliefs and annihilate some surplus neurons I no longer needed. Underneath that winky face, resplendent in reds and yellows, is a pseudonym—a nom de bullshit—that I chose for the occasion.
The festival was a two-day event, and the booths were exactly what you’re imagining: psychics, mediums, clairvoyants, tarot readings, chakras, reiki. The whole gamut of New Age stuff. One booth promised quantum spirituality—you can tell that it’s scientific because of the word “quantum,” you see. Another booth offered visionary guidance on your life path. A third promised to combine energy and chakra healing with past life regression. (I passed on that one because my current life is regressed enough as it is, thank you very much).
But back to that winsome aura: one of the festival experts kindly interpreted it for me. You’ll be shocked, I’m sure, to hear that the reading was a meandering three-minute analysis in which I was fed a variety of feel-good platitudes and told that I was going to start a successful and lucrative company. The price tag for this reassuring pablum: $25.
With my future now secure and my pocket considerably lighter, I moved on to the next booth, manned by a guy who specializes in past life readings. A full reading runs you $125, but you can get an abbreviated 40-minute version for $90. I couldn’t imagine sitting there with a straight face, hemorrhaging money as I listened to stories about my past lives for 40 minutes, so I declined and moved on.
Of all the booths at the festival, my favorite was run by a man who looked arrestingly like a wizard. He had a Merlinesque gray beard, flowing white robes, and the world-weariness of a guy whose bones are tired because, obviously, magic is draining and warlocks bear great responsibility. Customers came to him seeking relief from their medical ailments; he cured these by having the patients lie down and waving his hands above their bodies in especially good, healing-y ways. He referred to himself as a literal wizard and called his service Medical Intuitive, Quantum Shaman. (I swear I’m not making this up).
The LecturesThe festival included lectures, too, and they looked even more exciting than the booths, so I attended as many of these as I could. My goal was to take notes, ask questions, and learn as much as possible about people’s unusual beliefs.
The first talk was about ancestors, spirits, and messages from other planes of existence. The audience learned that our dead ancestors are constantly sending us messages. Also, animals that cross your path are sending you messages from other realms, and white feathers are special signs from angels. The speaker declared that she had been a Mayan warrior queen in a past life. In another, she had been an Egyptian priestess. In a third, she was one of the first human cave people. As she explained, she accessed these memories of past lives through her dreams because when you dream, you’re actually astral traveling. Perhaps tellingly, she had never been anybody forgettable or uninteresting in any of her past lives.
I was mainly there to observe and learn more about people’s beliefs, the way a non-believer might go to a religious service out of curiosity. But I was also interested in what psychological principles might be at play. (By day, I’m a psychologist who studies human cognition.) The first thing that struck me was that all the messages the presenter received from other realms were confidence-boosting. The missives told her that it was OK to be herself, to drop her anxieties, to strive for what she wanted. For some people, this can be a major motivator for woo-y beliefs: a desire for self-reassurance, for ego security, and for believing that things are going to be OK.
Another couple of themes leapt out quickly: hyperactive pattern recognition and promiscuous meaning-making. Humans are hyperactive pattern detectors, which means we’re prone to seeing patterns even where there are none.1 One of the festival speakers said that when she sees numbers like 11:11 or 10:10, it’s the spirits reassuring her that she’s on the right path. If she sees pennies or rainbows or hears a certain genre of music, it’s her deceased loved ones watching over her. This seemed to both reassure her and imbue her life with meaning.
The next lecture was on Sound and Harmonic Therapy. The presenter struck bowls of different sizes with a sort of drumstick, producing vibrations that were supposed to cure our health issues. This talk included some real head-scratchers. My favorites were “the whole point of sound is to get the energy from your head to go down to your feet,” which, if you think about it, is a fantastically teleological view of physics, and “harmonic sounds travel as fast as the speed of light.” (They actually travel at the speed of sound, which, in air, is about 880,000 times slower than the speed of light).
The presenter explained that the bowls’ vibrations force your emotions to come up, which helps you get grounded in your legs, and that enables you to make decisions with clarity. I learned that deeper vibrations are better than shallower vibrations and that if you ever get a sound bath, you should always ask “What is my message?” because the bowl will always give you a message. (To be honest, I can’t for the life of me figure out what that means, but I guess if thou seekest meaning from the bowl, the bowl will deliver meaning unto thee. Or something like that.)
The lecture on vibrations was distinct from the first one: the first presentation made no pretense to scientific accuracy, whereas this one was cloaked in a veneer of scientific jargon to make it sound respectable. But it bungled all the key concepts: energy, vibrations, and even harmonic. The presenter said that harmonic sounds relax us, so I asked what “harmonic” meant. The word has a precise formal definition, but all we got was a tautology: harmonic sounds are those that cause relaxation. The best line of all was the speaker’s cartoonishly immodest description of her trade: “I do very deep work.”
On we trudged.
The next presentation was about Divine Source, which turned out to be a tragically underspecified fount of life, divinity, and good stuff at the root of everything. The speaker exhorted us to “ascend into divinity, union, higher calling, purpose, and Source”. She had an obvious strategy: list so many good-sounding words in rapid succession that the audience would be lulled into a stupor, critical thinking faculties suspended, vaguely impressed but unsure why. I think the stupor was part of the point.
Like the presentation before it, this one was sprinkled with science-y words to create the implication of evidentiary grounding and paint a façade of scientific respectability. Listeners got sprinkles of quantum, genome, biological, neural, synapse, and energy adorning a cake of staggering BS. I learned that “The divine being in human form is imprinted with its true purpose,” a profoundly vacuous string of words reminiscent of the deliciously random nonsense churned out by the Wisdom of Deepak Chopra generator.2 We also learned that “The divine being is the being that is constructed out of light from the Source in the 5th-dimensional realm,” and that “the Earth is a portal for all 5 dimensions.” Rule of thumb: just take the number of dimensions in conventional physics and add one. This makes it sound as if you’re saying something groundbreaking (or at least tantalizingly mysterious), like you might just be wrapped in a shroud of secret esoteric knowledge. My favorite meaningless quote in the deluge of imponderables was probably “You’re creating a conscious energetic polarity with your own being.” You better believe I am!
I had questions—and decided that I was masochistic enough to read more of this word salad to try to get some answers. But read what? I raised my hand and asked the speaker how she acquired all this knowledge and what I could read to deepen my learning. Her answer took me by surprise: “,” she said, “I was guided not to take on the teachings of others so that my consciousness remains pure.” Translated into plain English: all the knowledge is simply within her; she didn’t learn it from anyone or read it anywhere.
Psychology at the Festival of WooA few key psychological principles shone through at the woo festival. The first is our irrepressible human tendency to “see” patterns even where there are none. Humans are meaninghungry creatures;3 we constantly yearn for and seek meaning. We’re equipped with these pattern-detecting and meaning-making propensities because detecting patterns was crucial in avoiding threats and availing oneself of opportunities during the evolution of our species.4 And it was probably more dangerous to fail to notice a pattern that was there than to “see” a pattern that wasn’t there, so we evolved a cognitive bias toward the less dangerous of the two errors5—“seeing” patterns even where there aren’t any. This is why we’re so prone to false positives, and why we often “detect” patterns out of randomness and coincidence. And although this cognitive bias is adaptive on average and evolved for a reason, it can often lead us astray.6
We have a related tendency to project meaning onto ambiguous situations that can be interpreted in different ways. A combination of promiscuous meaning-seeking and self-centeredness tricks us into thinking that the universe is speaking to us when it’s really just events causing other events. I’m sorry to say it, but the universe has no message for us nor any particular concern for us.
Self-help was another important theme that reared its head repeatedly. Many of the beliefs at the festival were geared toward reducing people’s feelings of uncertainty, encouraging them to remove self-imposed shackles and pursue their dreams.
A fourth important theme was religion—but maybe not in the way you’d expect. Many of the attendees and presenters seemed religiously inclined in their epistemological disposition and cognitive style, and in their evidentiary requirements for belief. But they were resistant, or even hostile, to what they saw as the rigid and constraining doctrines of the monotheistic Abrahamic religions. That combination pervaded the festival. To an outside observer, it looked a lot like a religious framework for people who wanted nothing to do with traditional religions.
The fifth key theme was pervasive confirmation bias.7 People sought confirmatory rather than disconfirmatory evidence for their hypotheses, and they required much thinner evidence for belief than for refutation. Since most humans fall prey to confirmation bias,8 this one isn’t all that surprising. But the bias does vary in strength across individuals, and it was in full force at the festival.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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While those five themes—pattern detection, meaning making, self-help, religion, and confirmation bias—were the most important and pervasive, I’m not suggesting this is a comprehensive analysis of the psychology underlying woo beliefs. The point here is to relay some experiences I had at the festival and share some of the psychological principles at play.
If the experience sounds interesting, you might consider going to one or two of these events and chatting with people. You can even provide gentle, civil pushback, and see where the conversation goes. What are the attendees’ evidentiary requirements for belief? How deeply have they considered the alternatives? What do they think about confirmation bias? You and your interlocutor will probably both learn something about your fellow humans.
And who knows—if you’re lucky enough, you might even ascend to a higher vibration of love and light, where the healing is quantum, the energy is rarefied, and sound moves at the speed of light.
About the AuthorLaith Al-Shawaf is an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. Before moving to the U.S., he was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin and a researcher and professor in Turkey. His empirical research is focused on human emotion, with additional emphases on cognition and personality. His popular science essays for Nautilus, Areo, and Psychology Today have been translated into several languages. He is the primary editor of The Oxford Handbook of Evolution and the Emotions, and he has won awards for both his teaching and research.
References1. https://bit.ly/47m4PsZ 2. https://bit.ly/48ygqpV 3. https://bit.ly/3vgm8yx 4. Mattson, M.P. (2014). Superior Pattern Processing Is the Essence of the Evolved Human Brain. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 265. 5. Haselton, M.G., & Nettle, D. (2006). The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(1), 47–66. 6. https://bit.ly/3vgmaq9 7. Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2013). Myside bias, rational thinking, and intelligence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(4), 259-264. 8. https://bit.ly/3vhVJAo
Machine-based decision-making is an interesting vision for the future: Humanity, crippled by its own cognitive deformations, tries to improve its lot by opting to outsource its decisions to adaptive machines—a kind of mental prosthetic.
For most of the twentieth century, artificial intelligence was based on representing explicit sets of rules in software and having the computer “reason” based on these rules—the machine’s “intelligence” involved applying the rules to a particular situation. Because the rules were explicit, the machine could also “explain” its reasoning by listing the rules that prompted its decision. Even if AI had the ring of going beyond the obvious in reasoning and decisionmaking, traditional AI depended on our ability to make explicit all relevant rules and to translate them into some machine-digestible representation. It was transparent and explainable, but it was also static—in this way, it did not differ fundamentally from other forms of decisional guardrails such as standard operating procedures (SOPs) or checklists. The progress of this kind of AI stalled because in many everyday areas of human activity and decisionmaking, it is exceptionally hard to make rules explicit.
In recent decades, however, AI has been used as a label for something quite different. The new kind of AI analyzes training data in sophisticated ways to uncover patterns that represent knowledge implicit in the data. The AI does not turn this hidden knowledge into explicit and comprehensible rules, but instead represents it as a huge and complex set of abstract links and dependencies within a network of nodes, a bit like neurons in a brain. It then “decides” how to respond to new data by applying the patterns from the training data. For example, the training data may consist of medical images of suspected tumors, and information about whether or not they in fact proved to be cancerous. When shown a new image, the AI estimates how likely that image is to be of a cancer. Because the system is learning from training data, the process is referred to as “machine learning.”
Such data-driven AI offers two important advantages over conventional AI. First, humans no longer have to make rules explicit to feed into the system. Instead, rules emerge from the training data. Alex Davies, author of the book Driven on machine learning and self-driving cars, puts it succinctly: in this new paradigm “the computer gets lessons, not laws.” That means we can use such AI for the kind of everyday knowledge that’s so difficult to capture with explicit rules.
The second advantage—which is even greater, in this context—is that because rules are derived from training data, they don’t have to be fixed. Instead, they can be adapted as more (and newer) training data is used. This should prevent the stiffening that lessens the effectiveness of many decisional guardrails as times change. It enables looking at patterns not only from the past but also from the present to deduce rules that can be applied to decisions in the future. It has, in other words, a built-in mechanism of updating rules.
Advocates suggest that we should incentivize the use of machine learning in an ever-increasing number of contexts, and even mandate it—much like collision warning systems have become obligatory in commercial aviation. While this might sound dramatic, the change may actually be more gradual. In many instances in our daily lives, we already have machines making decisions for us, from the relatively simple—such as an airbag deploying in a car crash—to the more sophisticated, such as Siri selecting music on our smartphone. And we profit from it: Machines aren’t as easily derailed by human biases; they perform consistently, irrespective of their emotional state. They also act efficiently—capable of doing so within a split second and at relatively low cost.
The central idea of data-driven decision guidance is that past experiences can be employed to decide well in the present. That works when the world doesn’t change—not the circumstances in which we must decide, nor the goals we want to attain through our decisions. Hard-coded rules are a poor fit for times of change; in theory, this is where data-driven AI should be able to shine. If a situation changes, we should be able to add more training data that reflect the new situation. However, there is a flaw in this line of reasoning.
Autonomous driving company Waymo illustrates the argument—and the flaw. For years, Waymo has had hundreds of cars roam the roads in the United States, collecting enormous heaps of data on roads, signage, conditions, weather, and the behavior of drivers. The data were used to train Waymo’s AI system, which then could drive autonomously. These cars were the guinea pigs for the Waymo system. Mistakes observed (including by their own drivers) in turn help the Waymo system to learn to avoid them. To identify the best driving behavior for any given circumstance, such a system needs not only data about a wide variety of situations, but also data about the outcomes of many different decisions made by drivers in each situation. Learning is richest when there is sufficient variability in the training data, so the system can deduce what works best in which conditions. To get diverse training data, Waymo needs to capture drivers making a variety of choices.
The more we use data-driven machine learning to make decisions, the more it will take the variability of decisions out of the data and shed its ability to progress.
Because Waymo never stopped collecting training data, even small changes in circumstances—such as in driving laws and resulting driving behavior—were reflected in the data collected and eventually embedded in the Waymo system. It was a machine that not only learned once, but never stopped learning.
However, let’s imagine a world in which we increasingly rely on machines when making decisions. The more machines shape our choices, the more these decisions will become the only source of training data for ongoing machine learning. The problem is that data-driven machine learning does not experiment; it acts based on the best practice it has deduced from data about previous decisions. If machines begin to learn more from choices we made based on their recommendations, they will amplify their own, conservative solutions.
Over time, this will narrow and drown out behavioral diversity in the training data. There will not be enough experimentation represented in it to enable the machines to adjust to new situations. This means data-driven machine learning will lose its single most important advantage over explicit rule-based systems. We will end up with a decisional monoculture that’s unable to evolve; we are back to fixed decisional rules.
The flaw is even bigger and more consequential than not being able to adjust to changed circumstances. Even if reality doesn’t change, we may miss opportunities to improve our decision-making in the future. Many innovations that end up becoming successful are less useful than existing choices in their initial form. But any new decision options emerging from the training data will likely only be adopted if they yield better results than existing choices straight away. This closes off any opportunity to experiment with promising new ideas.
For example, the first steam engines used far more energy than they could translate into motion and power. If a machine had compared them to the existing solution of using horses for power, it would have discarded the idea of steam power right away. The only reason the steam engine succeeded is because stubborn humans thought that they could improve the invention in the long run and stuck with it. These tinkerers had no data to support their confidence. They just imagined—and kept tinkering.
Of course, most such would-be innovators fail over time. The path of progress is paved with epitaphs to dogged tinkerers following crazy ideas. Occasionally, though, small changes accumulate and lead to a breakthrough—a far more optimal decision option. Modern societies have permitted tinkering to persist, though it is almost always unproductive, even destructive, in the short term—because of the slight chance of a big payoff sometime in the future.
Data-driven machine learning, if widely utilized, would discard initially suboptimal inventions. But in doing so, it would forego the possibility of long-term breakthroughs. Machines can learn only from what already exists. Humans can imagine what does not yet exist but could. Where humans invented steam power, data-driven machine learning would instead have found more and more efficient ways to use horse power.
Human dreaming can go far beyond technical novelties. Our ancestors once dreamed of a world in which slavery is abolished; women can vote; and people can choose for themselves whom to marry and whether to have children. They imagined a world in which smallpox is extinct and we vaccinate against polio. And they worked to make those dreams come true. If they had looked only at data from their past and present, none of these dreams would have been realized.
Decisional guidelines, from SOPs to nudges, emphasize constancy. Traditional education, too, often aims to perpetuate—suggesting there is a right answer for decisions much like for math problems. But decisional guidelines are just that—suggestions that can be disobeyed if one is willing to take the risk (and shoulder the responsibility). For eons, young people have frequently revolted against their parents and teachers, pushed back against the old, the conventional and predictable, and embraced instead not just the original and novel, but the still only imagined. Humans continue to dream—of a world, for example, that will warm by less than two degrees, or in which people have enough to eat without depleting the planet.
In contrast to humans, machine decision-making is optimized toward consistency across time. Even if data-driven machine learning has access to the very latest data, it will still limit our option space. It will always choose a more efficient way to travel along our current path, rather than try to forge a new one. The more we use it to make decisions, the more it will take the variability of decisions out of the data and shed its ability to progress. It will lead us into vulnerability, rigidity, and an inability to adapt and evolve. In this sense, data-driven machine learning is an adulation of immutability, the anathema of imagination.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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No technological adjustment can remedy this easily. If we want to increase diversity in the data, we will need variability in machine decisions. By definition, this means machines that make suboptimal choices. But the entire argument for using more AI in our decision-making is premised on AI’s ability to suggest better choices consistently across space and time. In many instances, it would not be societally palatable to deliberately introduce variation into what options a machine picks, thereby increasing the near-term risk of bad decisions in the hope of long-term benefits. And even if it were, it would not necessarily produce the experimentation we hope for. Very often, the theoretical decision space is immense. Randomly iterating through decision options to generate the diverse data necessary would take a very long time—far too long in most instances to help in timely decision-making. Even when iterations are non-random and can be done purely digitally, it would require massive computing resources.
In contrast, when humans experiment, they rarely decide randomly; instead, they use mental models to imagine outcomes. Done correctly, this can dramatically narrow the decision space. It’s that filtering based on cognitive modeling that differentiates human experimentation in decision contexts from the random walk that the machine, in the absence of a mental model, has to employ. And if machines were to use a particular mental model, the resulting data would be constrained again by the limitations of that model. A diverse set of humans experimenting using diverse mental models is simply very hard to beat.
This essay was excerpted and adapted by the authors from their book Guardrails: Guiding Human Decisions in the Age of AI. Copyright © 2024 by Princeton University Press.
About the AuthorUrs Gasser is professor of public policy, governance, and innovative technology and dean of the School of Social Sciences and Technology at the Technical University of Munich. He is the author of Born Digital: How Children Grow Up in a Digital Age.
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger is professor of internet governance and regulation at the University of Oxford. He is the author of Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age. This essay was excerpted and adapted by the authors from their book Guardrails: Guiding Human Decisions in the Age of AI.
During the media blitz over the potential threat now posed by artificial intelligence, I asked OpenAI’s ChatGPT “Is the technological singularity coming?” Here is the response:
ChatGPT: The coming technological singularity is a hypothetical scenario in which artificial intelligence surpasses human intelligence and becomes capable of self-improvement and innovation at an exponential rate. Some experts predict that this could happen by the end of this decade, while others are more skeptical. The implications of such a radical transformation are unknown and potentially unpredictable, posing both opportunities and challenges for humanity. Some possible outcomes include the emergence of a post-human era, the extinction of biological life, or the coexistence of diverse forms of intelligence.
There is no doubt that ChatGPT is an excellent tool, and now OpenAI has produced a next generation AI called GPT-4 (Generative Pre-trained Transformer 4). GPT-4 is astonishing in the sense that it can eloquently respond to questions, generate digital images from natural language descriptions, and analyze data. According to OpenAI, GPT-4 “exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks.”
In response to that high level of performance, a number of highly intelligent people have suggested that this means we have reached the singularity moment, or at the very least that this level of AI passes the Turing Test of artificial intelligence, achieving human-level natural intelligence. Some, most notably Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Andrew Yang, and Yuval Noah Harari, went even further and issued an open letter1 calling on “all labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4… Powerful AI systems should be developed only once we are confident that their effects will be positive and their risks will be manageable.” The statement even called for the involvement of government and politicians if AI companies do not voluntarily pause. In response, the U.S. House of Representatives Science Committee invited AI companies to respond to questions about the technology and related risks.
This letter is not the first time public figures or researchers have warned us. In 2005, futurist Ray Kurzweil in his book The Singularity is Near predicted it would occur by 2045. Elon Musk recently predicted that machines would overtake us by 2025. Sam Harris was so vexed by the future progress of artificial intelligence that he declared himself to be certain AI would eventually destroy us.2 He opined that AI may not intentionally do so, but rather might eliminate us the way we might annihilate ants during, say, the construction of a building. Google engineer Blake Lemoine famously claimed that the Google chatbot with which he was conversing was sentient.3 (In response, Google fired him, which was probably the wrong thing to do as it only generated conspiracy theories.)
Were those warnings of impending doom not enough, artificial intelligence researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote an opinion editorial for Time magazine in which he argued that the open letter did not go far enough:
Many researchers steeped in these issues, including myself, expect that the most likely result of building a superhumanly smart AI, under anything remotely like the current circumstances, is that literally everyone on Earth will die. Not as in “maybe possibly some remote chance,” but as in “that is the obvious thing that would happen… Shut it all down.”4
One of the research papers cited in the open letter was released by Microsoft.5 I am simply astonished by what GPT-4 can accomplish based on the tests the Microsoft team conducted over a period of six months. Here is a sampling of what is detailed in the paper:
- GPT-4 can generate 2D or 3D images from a detailed text prompt.
- When GPT-4 was asked to produce a short tune, the tune had a melody and a repetitive rhythm (however, GPT-4 did not seem to understand harmony).
- GPT-4 can write software code at a human level from text prompts. “GPT-4 could potentially be hired as a software engineer.” (I have a friend who is a senior-level computer engineer. He has used GPT-4 to write sophisticated code.)
- GPT-4 can create complex 3D video games.
- GPT-4 was able to produce a correct proof from a question asked in the 2022 International Mathematical Olympiad (top high school students from all over the world compete to solve questions in a set period of time—some students are unable to answer some of the questions).
- GPT-4 can solve Fermi questions. These are physics questions where the answer must be estimated because the quantity is difficult or even impossible to measure directly. For example: How many times does the average person’s heart beat in their lifetime?
- GPT-4 can function as a personal assistant. “GPT-4 uses the available APIs [application programming interface] to retrieve information about the user’s calendar, coordinate with other people over email, book the dinner, and message the user with the details.”
- GPT-4 “is able to use the tools with very minimal instruction and no demonstrations, and then make use of the output appropriately [e.g., it knows to use a calculator when needed].” (They continue by stating that it is an emergent capability.)
- GPT-4 can serve as a virtual real world problem solver. “GPT-4 guides the human to find and fix a water leak and recommends the exact actions that the human took (after replacing the seal the leak was gone).”
Figure 1. The Sally-Anne false-belief test (adapted from Bubeck et al., 2023).
The Microsoft team attempted to ascertain whether GPT-4 had a theory of mind—the recognition that sentient beings have thoughts, emotions, intentions, etc. It not only includes understanding the state of someone else’s mind, but “of reacting on someone’s reaction of someone else’s mental state.” The Sally-Anne false-belief test from psychology (see Figure 1, above) was one of a number of tests given to GPT-4. The researchers concluded:
Our findings suggest that GPT-4 has a very advanced level of theory of mind. While ChatGPT also does well on the basic tests, it seems that GPT-4 has more nuance and is able to reason better about multiple actors, and how various actions might impact their mental states, especially on more realistic scenarios.
How Deep Learning WorksOne major goal during the Cold War of the 1960s was to develop software for the intelligence community that could translate Russian into English. Many millions of dollars were spent trying to achieve what appeared to be a reasonable goal. In his book Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control computer scientist Stuart Russell points out that the early AI bubble burst when the incipient machine translations did not live up to expectations. Not only were computers not powerful enough, but the programming attempted to create a massive number of linguistic logic rules. Anyone who has tried to learn another language knows the problems encountered through direct word-for-word translations. Subtle and changing nuances become very important. No simple programming rules work for all the different sentences encountered. “Inflexible robotic rules” are not up to the task.
As computers became capable of storing and processing massive amounts of data and the Internet gave access to extensive sources of information, machine learning came to the rescue. Machine learning is simply a method of scanning the available data to learn. “Learn” is a tricky word and recalls, as an example, how we might cull through a book to understand how calculus uses limits. However, the machine is not learning in the way we do. Take translation as an example. In the early 2000s, statistical machine translation (SMT) was developed where computers analyzed millions of translated words, phrases, and sentences to find statistical patterns on how unknown text should be translated using similar structures. The statistical approach ranked the output translations and chose the best fit. The results were acceptable and sometimes excellent. Nonetheless, the computer had no idea what a word was. It simply used statistics to produce output that best fit the models.
In 2016, Google switched to neural machine translation (NMT) stating: “this change addressed the need for few engineering and design choices while increasing accuracy and speed.”6 NMT is quite different from SMT, because it does not use a system based on phrases mapped to the targeted language. The neural network handles an entire sentence as it moves through the system. The artificial neural network (ANN) loosely resembles a human brain in the sense that there are interconnected nodes, just as a brain has neurons and synapses. (It should be noted that neural networks only resemble brains. We still possess very little idea of how the actual brain works.)
If all this sounds complicated, here’s the bottom line: there are hidden layers in this training process and software engineers cannot be certain what specifically goes on while it happens. It is not surprising that many refer to the process as a black box.
The Contrarian ViewIn his 2023 book on the threat of AI, Smart Until It’s Dumb: Why Artificial Intelligence Keeps Making Epic Mistakes (And Why the AI Bubble Will Burst), AI engineer Emmanuel Maggiori used an example of a startup company developing a robot that “walks” around a city. Think of the process a human goes through when crossing a street. In a split second we rationally make choices:
- “If there are no cars on the street, cross over.”
- “If the closest car is far away and driving slowly, cross over.”
- “If the pedestrian crosswalk signal is red, wait.”
Translating these “if” statements into the hypothetical robot program for crossing a road might look like something like:
If distance to closest car on road < 100 feet, then wait; otherwise, if speed of closest car on road < 20 mph, then cross over; otherwise, wait.
The inputs are run through a series of “if-otherwise” conditions to reach decisions. What machine learning did to enhance the logic was dispense with thousands of rules by replacing them with a generalized template containing blanks (shown as italicized words below):
If some input < some number, then some recommendation; otherwise, if some input < some number, then some recommendation; otherwise, some recommendation.
Table 1. An idealized dataset to fill in the blanks of a hypothesized robot program (after Maggiori).
The copious “if-otherwise” rules dissipate, allowing the computer to fill in the blanks automatically. And where does the computer get the information to fill in the blanks? A dataset (Table 1, above).
In a real-time setting, it would require a massive database with thousands of rows and many columns allowing the computer to fill in the blanks. Maggiori put it this way:
By trying many input/number/recommendation combinations in a systematic way, the computer identifies the most promising ones and fills in the blanks in the template with them. This is called training or learning.
In more advanced AI, such as deep learning, the principles remain the same, though the templates may vary a little. For instance, in neural networks, the templates contain rules of the type “If weighted sum of inputs > some value” instead of the “If some input < some value” from the example above. In the more advanced deep learning, which uses neural networks, the template consists of millions of “If weighted sum of inputs > some value” operations. These are organized in a special, problem-specific way in order to help the system learn useful data manipulations such as image filtering or, in the case of GPT-4, word transformation and contextualization.
There are hidden layers in this training process and software engineers cannot be certain what specifically goes on while it happens. Many refer to the process as a black box.
Although the programs can be quite complex in the ways in which they are constructed and interact, the clear takeaway, according to Maggiori, is that the computer has no freedom outside of the templates/programs. The principle behind machine learning is exceedingly simple.
Then there is reinforcement learning, a variant of machine learning in which the computer generates its own dataset, as in Table 1, by experimenting with random decisions and statistically analyzing the results. For example, Google began its autonomous vehicle work in 2009, generating massive databases as its cars (with human drivers to assure safety) clocked thousands of hours to “learn” the rules of the road. Maggiori emphasizes that these programs are still governed by guardrails; that is, they are “governed by human assumptions.”
Claims by many AI researchers that machines “teach themselves” are grossly exaggerated. The machine’s ability to learn is limited to the parameters and data available through human input. Take, for example, what AlphaZero (a computer program developed by artificial intelligence company DeepMind to master the games of chess, Shogi, and Go) did when learning to play the game of Go. The dataset was generated automatically by simply having the computer play itself in thousands of games. However, the definition of who won and the parameters of the board were constructed by humans.
I don’t want to underestimate the accomplishments of convolutional neural networks (CNN) or AI in general. Sometimes even when operating under general limitations by humans, the machines can come up with useful rules that humans have missed. The AlphaZero CNN determined valuable moves that were good enough to beat the best players in the world. The aforementioned Stuart Russell suggested that a computer might be able to disable its “off-switch.”
Suppose a machine has the objective of fetching the coffee. If it is sufficiently intelligent, it will certainly understand that it will fail in its objective if it is switched off before completing its mission. Thus, the objective of fetching coffee creates, as a necessary subgoal, the objective of disabling the off switch.
However, as Maggiori pointed out, “why would anyone include the action ‘disable the off-switch’ as part of the available actions to try out for coffee delivery.” It is simply beyond the pale of machine learning: “Even if the action was allowed, the stars would have to align for the computer to ever try out that action and measure a significant positive impact in the efficiency of coffee delivery.”
What about deep learning with all of those hidden layers and the lack of specific information about how the neural network processes the data? Although we don’t know the details of the specific combination of filters, according to Maggiori we do know the neural network has limitations. Here is what he had to say about the filtering process in the neural network:
The training process starts with a completely random set of filters, so the initial model is generally useless. Afterward, it starts altering the filters progressively to find promising improvements. This is akin to an appointment with the eye doctor who tries out several glasses’ prescriptions, changing them little by little until finding the one you’re most comfortable with. But the process is much lengthier and more chaotic.
Unfortunately, because AI researchers cannot explain all the specific ways the hidden layers operate on the data, there is no guarantee what the network will spit out. Thus, the silly mistakes journalists enjoy finding in systems like ChatGPT and GPT-4, as when Maggiori asked GPT-3 “Who was the president of the UK last year?” The response was “The president of the UK was not elected last year.” As Maggiori wisely emphasizes, making changes for each mistake only seems to create additional mistakes. This is not so serious for word translations but can be tragic with autonomous vehicles.
You have probably heard of the deaths related to autonomous driving that reveal how easily AI can be fooled. In several cases, road signs have been slightly changed and the autonomous vehicles fail to recognize what is meant. Many of us have seen the effect graffiti has on a road sign. Most of the time, humans can still recognize the sign, but autonomous vehicles may not. Maggiori concludes that these failures are ultimately because CNN does not have a sophisticated “model of the world as we know it,” which probably explains why autonomous vehicles perform well in controlled environments but falter in the real world. Even Elon Musk has realized the difficulties in autonomous driving: “Generalized self-driving is a hard problem, as it requires solving a large part of the real-world AI. I didn’t expect it to be so hard, but the difficulty is obvious in retrospect.”
The underlying simplicity of AI coding makes me think we are a long way from reaching a singularity, especially after more than a decade of failures in attempting to get self-driving cars. At this stage any computer takeover appears to be science fiction, not applied science. More importantly, there are serious ramifications that would result from any government-mandated pause in AI development.
Why a Pause in Artificial Intelligence Could Be a Very Bad IdeaLast year, Interesting Engineering reported7 that Ni Yougjie, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies stated: “PLA [the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China] should conduct blockade exercises around the island and use AI technology to deter U.S. interference and Taiwanese independence forces.” He went on to say that the PLA should become a global leader in intelligent warfare by using “AI, cloud computing, big data, cyberattacks and defense.” The PLA has been simulating the invasion of Taiwan through AI war games for some time. The AI results suggest that the PLA would be unable to successfully invade Taiwan through 2026, but, ominously, the CIA reports that Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be ready for an invasion by 2027.8
According to Gregory Allen, the director of the AI Governance Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “China is not going to slow down its AI development in either the commercial or military domain.”9 Allen’s sentiments have been echoed by many think tanks, academics, and government intelligence personnel based on the massive investments China is making in AI and Chinese hints at an unwillingness to pause AI development.
Game theory is the introduction of mathematical models of possible strategic interactions assuming rational actors are involved. In a recent paper entitled Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age: Game Theory Revisited,10 Roy Lindelauf (game theorist and professor working at the Ministry of Defense, the Netherlands) reminds us “game theory models prescribe what a decision maker ought to do in a given situation…and to alleviate the burden of human cognitive biases.”
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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Credibility is the ultimate key in deterrence theory. Is a belligerent dissuaded from aggressive actions by the opponent’s threats? Ultimately, the best solution regarding the threat of an invasion of Taiwan is a Nash equilibrium (named after mathematician John Nash, the subject of the book and movie A Beautiful Mind) in which no one unilaterally benefits. If China believes they have superior AI, it may alter any existing Nash equilibrium; in the case of the development of AI, both sides are deterred from causing mutual destruction. In other words, no one has anything to gain by changing the status quo. However, that Nash equilibrium could dissolve if we pause AI research. In fact, it appears to me that there is a much bigger threat from the PRC than from any imminent takeover of humans by AI.
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed a test to determine whether a machine exhibits intelligent behavior at or beyond human level. An evaluator questions a human and a machine simultaneously without knowing which is which. If the evaluator cannot determine the difference between the human and the machine, the machine has passed his test. When it comes to pausing AI research, we should at least be dealing with machines that pass the Turing test. No artificial intelligence has ever passed it.
About the AuthorMarc J. Defant is a professor of geology at the University of South Florida specializing in the study of volcanoes— more specifically, the geochemistry of volcanic rocks. He has been funded by the NSF, National Geographic, the American Chemical Society, and the National Academy of Sciences and has published in many international journals including Nature. His book Voyage of Discovery: From the Big Bang to the Ice Age is in the 2nd edition.
References1. https://bit.ly/4aw1gU9 2. https://bit.ly/48dpjpj 3. https://bit.ly/47fCMvm 4. https://bit.ly/47dbc1P 5. https://bit.ly/3H4B5pO 6. https://bit.ly/41E8UaO 7. https://bit.ly/3H05p5e 8. https://bit.ly/3H14Zvc 9. https://bit.ly/3H2uMDr 10. https://bit.ly/3H05dmw
In the quest for intelligent machines, approaching, or even surpassing human intelligence, has been a prominent dot on the horizon since the 1950s. Aside from the various technological challenges, I believe this quest is enormously difficult for three reasons:
- We don’t have a clear picture of exactly how intelligence works in humans.
- We have no generally accepted operational definition for many relevant concepts (such as consciousness), making their existence difficult to prove.
- We continually shift what we consider intelligent.
All this makes it difficult to “clone” intelligence. Consequently, experts disagree on when we will reach human-level AI. The dot on the horizon shifts with time and continuously seems to be equally far away (as in the quip “AI is five years away…and always will be”). Yet it is not inconceivable that the intelligence code will be cracked. Chess once seemed to require some form of human intelligence; you had to be able to think strategically and assess your opponent. We now know that all such “what ifs” and “if thens” can be programmed, and an abstract representation and brute computational power have proven sufficient to defeat even the greatest human chess champions. Granted, that’s just chess, but what if all those tasks that now seem immeasurably complex could also be solved with correspondingly complex algorithms, or even with relatively simple algorithms?
In that respect, creativity seems to be the new chess. AI is already capable of creating works of art and composing pieces of music. Many people have difficulty accepting the results as examples of true creativity. And there is the deeper philosophical discussion as to whether we ourselves are not simply programmed and thus do not act as autonomously as we like to think. AI can revive one of the most painful insults to humanity famously put forth by Sigmund Freud: many, if not most of our actions are not the result of conscious choice.
Machines long ago outperformed us in physical labor, and more recently in computational power. And now our intellectual ability is at stake. This ability has always set us apart from all other creatures on earth and has given us (at least instinctively) control over our future. It is therefore not surprising that some people resent this development. Think what we might, AI is a mirror for humanity. It teaches us an enormous amount about ourselves and asks us fundamental questions about what it means to be human.
However, in my opinion, the key question we should be asking is: In designing AI, should we pursue human intelligence at all? Submarines do not swim the way fish do, nor do airplanes fly like birds; so why should computers have to think the way humans do? If you give a spider human-level intelligence it will not start behaving like a human, but rather like a “super spider” that can spin even better webs and catch even more prey. We are only going to make real progress in AI when we let go of the idea that we are superior beings. Humans are not superior to insects; we each evolved based on the respective evolutionary adaptations to our respective environments. Humans may have more advanced cognitive skills, but insects will most likely survive even a nuclear disaster. So success is context-dependent and therefore relative.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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We need to start asking ourselves for what purpose we want to use intelligent machines, rather than seeing intelligence as an end in itself. How can we use intelligent machines to create a better world? Indeed, what exactly is a better world? I submit the path forward is for humans and machines to work together, allocating tasks based on their respective specializations. Leave the complex statistics to computers but reserve the socially sensitive issues for human decision making. Let machines monitor railroads for possible damage, but let people watch over the application process for new railroad employees. Let machines assess CT scans for cancerous abnormalities, but let people discuss the treatment process with patients. Why should we build emotions into machines? On the contrary, I think we should strive to make computers operate as objectively as possible. After all, we humans with all our evolutionarily programmed biases and emotions have proven to be not very good at that at all. As the world chess champion Garry Kasparov, who was famously defeated by IBM’s Deep Blue computer, advised…
Machines have calculations.
We have understanding.
Machines have instructions.
We have purpose.
There’s one thing only a human can do.
That’s dream. So let us dream big.
About the AuthorRudy van Belkom is the Executive Director of The Netherlands Study Centre for Technology Trends (STT). His book, AI No Longer Has A Plug, offers developers, policymakers, philosophers, and anyone with an interest in AI the tools needed for integrating ethics into the AI design process. In addition, he developed an ethical design game for AI, inspired by the scrum process, that can be used to translate ethical issues into practice.
IntroductionThe battle to mitigate and stop climate change is the biggest challenge of the 21st century. The rapid build-up of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere due to human activities with resultant global warming and disruption of earth’s delicate climate balance poses a clear and present danger to human well-being and the well-being of the planet. These facts have been well documented by climate scientists and in a series of reports of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
While there continue to be many climate change naysayers, a majority of people around the world now accept what they can see around them—climate change is happening. Outright refusal to accept the reality of climate change is fading (at least in mainstream media) but new forms have emerged, aimed mainly at delaying any significant climate policy action.1
One major tactic is to belittle and dismiss the substantial progress that is being made on solutions, such as renewable energy and the electrification of transport. Common criticisms are that these are too expensive, intermittent, unreliable, or impractical. We term them “green energy denial.” This view was expressed, we submit, in the article entitled “The Future of Energy and Our Climate” by Marc J. Defant in Vol. 28 Issue 2 of Skeptic magazine. The reality is that while the energy transition is quite challenging, it is inevitable. Substantial progress has been made, and even more effective and efficient solutions are in the works.
Two books provide a good summary of the current situation. One is Michael E. Mann’s The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet. Mann is the climate scientist famous for the hockey stick graph of global temperatures. “Outright denial of the physical evidence of climate change simply isn’t credible anymore. So, they have shifted to a softer form of denialism while keeping the oil flowing and fossil fuels burning, engaging in a multipronged offensive based on deception, distraction, and delay,” he writes. “Finally, when all other arguments fail, we’re left with ‘Well—it just won’t work. You can’t do it!’ Inactivists in fact twist themselves into veritable pretzels to explain why there’s no way we can possibly power our economy with renewable energy.” Here is how Mann sums up the problem:
We need to accomplish something gigantic we have never done before, much faster than we have ever done anything similar. To do it, we need lots of breakthroughs in science and engineering. We need to build a consensus that doesn’t exist and create public policies to push a transition that would not happen otherwise.
Bill Gates’ How to Avoid a Climate Disaster: The Solutions We Have and the Breakthroughs We Need, covers the solutions being developed to mitigate climate change. Both Gates and Mann agree that while this will prove extremely challenging, it is achievable. According to Gates:
We already have some of the tools we need, and as for those we don’t yet have, everything I’ve learned about climate and technology makes me optimistic that we can invent them, deploy them, and, if we act fast enough, avoid a climate catastrophe. This book is about what it will take and why I think we can do it. Within a few years, I had become convinced of three things: To avoid a climate disaster, we have to get to zero. We need to deploy the tools we already have, like solar and wind, faster and smarter. And we need to create and roll out breakthrough technologies that can take us the rest of the way.
So, what’s to be done?Virtually all plans to mitigate climate change focus on large scale electrification. There are several steps required to fully implement this solution. The first step is to decarbonize the electricity supply. This means producing electricity from technologies that do not emit greenhouse gasses (GHG). Fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas should be eliminated from the electricity supply. Many countries have set such goals to be achieved in the coming decades. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy has produced a study2 on pathways to achieve 100 percent clean electricity by 2035. To replace fossil fuels, electricity must be generated from non-emitting sources such hydro, wind, solar, tidal, geothermal, and nuclear energy. At the COP28 United Nations Climate Change Conference in December 2023, nearly 130 countries committed to tripling renewables by 2030.
A second step is to convert to electrification as many energy-intensive fossil fuel processes as possible. These include transportation, cars and trucks, heating and cooling of buildings, industrial processes such as steel and cement, and others. Electrification will not only eliminate most uses of fossil fuels; it will also reduce the total amount of energy required. For example, electric cars require about 75 percent less energy per mile than gasoline cars because they are much more efficient.3
Electrifying the economy to the maximum extent will require a significant increase in the amount of electricity produced. The Electrification Futures Study by the U.S. National Renewables Energy Laboratory (NREL),4 estimates an increase in electricity demand of about 70 percent by 2050 over 2020 levels in the “high” scenario (mainly due to electrification of transportation). The greater efficiency of new technologies such as heat pumps plays an important role in reducing the size of this increase. In another example, if all cars were to become EVs, it is estimated that this alone will require a 20–50 percent increase in the electricity supply over 2015 levels in the U.S.5 Taken together, these steps will have a huge impact on reducing GHG emissions. It is also a tremendous economic opportunity.
The Cost of RenewablesRenewables will play a key role in the decarbonization and growth of the electricity supply. A key fact that is ignored by the green energy critics is the dramatic unit cost decline in wind and particularly solar energy in recent years. The article “Why did renewables become so cheap so fast?”6 provides an excellent explanation of this development, and is the source of the following graphs. Figure 1 “The price of solar modules declined by 99.6 percent since 1976” is self-explanatory. “The price of electricity from new power plants” in Figure 2 shows how the price of electricity from new power plants has changed over the past 10 years. The most notable change is that both solar and wind are now the cheapest source of electricity in many geographic locations; lower than combined cycle gas plants.
These steep price declines undermine key arguments of green energy critics. This crucial fact is absent from Marc Defant’s Skeptic article. Renewable energy from wind and solar was more expensive than fossil fuel plants in the past, but is now cost competitive, not to mention that investments in renewables have far outpaced those in fossil fuels. In his article, Defant points to countries such as Germany and Denmark that have invested heavily in renewables but have high electricity prices. The high prices they paid as early adopters are what have now driven down the costs for everyone else. And this is precisely the path taken as most new technologies became competitive and eventually standard. It is a price worth paying to avoid an approaching global climate catastrophe. In addition, the winners will own the key technologies of the future.
Germany’s abrupt decision to shut down all their nuclear plants in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, which accounted for about 20 percent of their supply, along with a failure to build adequate transmission capacity have also played a role in its high electricity prices. Despite this, Germany has had remarkable success in adapting to the cut off from Russian gas due to the war in Ukraine. Many analysts believe that this has provided an impetus not only to Germany, but Europe generally, to speed up the transition off fossil fuels.
Figure 1. The price of solar modules declined by 99.6 percent since 1976.
Figure 2. The price of electricity from new power plants
Figure 3. Battery price learning curve
This data contains a valuable lesson for other technologies that are key to the green transition, such as batteries for electric cars. Wind and solar were beneficiaries of what is known as Wright’s Law, that predates the better-known Moore’s Law in the chip industry, which states that the number of transistors on microprocessors doubles every two years at about the same cost. “Wright’s Law that each doubling in experience leads to the same relative decline in prices, was discovered much earlier than Moore’s Law, by aerospace engineer Theodore Paul Wright in 1936. Moore’s observation for the progress in computing technology can be seen as a special case of Wright’s Law.”7
Figure 3 illustrates the major price declines in the cost of lithium batteries that are used in electric cars and grid energy storage. The price has continued to fall significantly below the price in the graph of $244/kWh in 2016 and was $139/kWh in 2023.8 Analysts such as Goldman Sachs predict the price will fall below the critical threshold $100/kWh in the next couple of years, which would enable EVs to become less expensive than internal combustion engine (ICE) cars without subsidies on a total cost of ownership basis.9
The lower cost of renewables is greatly accelerating their rate of adoption worldwide. Wind and solar provided nearly 18 percent of the electricity used in the U.S. in the first third of 2023, up from 14 percent in 2022. There are news stories practically daily on the success of new renewables projects. Here are just a few such headlines:
- Solar Is Now 33 percent Cheaper Than Gas Power in U.S., Guggenheim Says10
- Renewable Energy Prices Hit Record Lows: How Can Utilities Benefit From Unstoppable Solar and Wind?11
- Is Solar Really Cheaper Than Fossil Fuels?12
- The Era of Cheap Wind and Solar Has Arrived, U of C Researchers Find.13
- In a First, Wind and Solar Generated More Power Than Coal in U.S.14
- Renewables Were the World’s Cheapest Source of Energy in 2020, New Report Shows.15
Defant’s article raises a series of other issues of concern for renewables. These can each be addressed, even though as Bill Gates indicates in his book: “This will be hard.”
Gas and FrackingDefant’s article promotes alleged benefits of fracking as a cleaner alternative to coal and petroleum, citing its contributions to reducing GHG emissions in the United States. However, the author fails to mention studies that have highlighted concerns about methane leakages during extraction and transportation.16 These can offset the emissions benefits given that methane leaked from fracking has a much higher effect on radiative forcing than CO2. Moreover, the long-term sustainability of natural gas as a “bridge fuel” is rather uncertain at best, as it remains a fossil fuel that is far from leading to a sustainable low-carbon future.
Land RequirementsOne notable concern is the charge that renewable energy takes up too much land. Heartland Institute, for example argues that, “solar power requires 43.50 acres per megawatt.”17 This number comes from the Institute for Energy Research (IER) which is an advocacy organization for the fossil fuel industry.
According to an example in a study by the U.S. Department of Energy a solar farm with a total land area of 1375 acres has a capacity of 345 MW, which works out to 3.75 MW per acre.18, 19 This is more than 10b times lower than IER’s estimate! Another recent article states that: “According to a report from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, roughly 22,000 square miles of solar panel-filled land (about the size of Lake Michigan) would be required to power the entire country, including all 141 million households and businesses, based on 13–14 percent efficiency for solar modules. Many solar panels, however, reach 20 percent efficiency, which could reduce the necessary area to just about 10,000 square miles, equivalent to the size of Lake Erie.”20
Rare Earth MetalsRare earth metals are essential for many green energy technologies such as wind turbines, and lithium batteries. Concern about the rarity of the rare earths is raised by Defant. “According to the Institute for Energy Research, the United States imports about 80 percent of its rare earth elements from China, which makes the U.S. highly dependent on what is increasingly becoming an adversary nation.” Note that Defant cites information from the same group as The Heartland Institute (The Heartland Institute often uses the IER as a source. See the source of their claim that 1 MW of solar requires 43.50 acres of land in Land Requirements section above). Elsewhere in his article Defant states that “It should be noted that China has a market share in the solar panel supply chain of more than 80 percent, so the Paris Accords have proven a financial bonanza for that nation.”
Consider now, information to the contrary:
- The World Population Review provides a table of Solar Power by Country.21 This table shows that in 2022 China had 393 GW while the U.S. had 113 GW of installed solar capacity. China has three times more solar than the U.S. and approximately 40 percent of the world’s installed solar capacity. Any wonder why they are the world’s largest producer?
- The Government of Canada has published a table of countries that produce rare earth metals.22 This overview shows that in 2021 China produced 60.6 percent of the total while the U.S. produced 15.5 percent. The report goes on to say: “Canada has some of the largest known reserves and resources (measured and indicated) of rare earths in the world, estimated at over 15.1 million tonnes of rare earth oxide in 2022.”
- An article for Metal Tech News23 states:
- “While finding economically viable deposits of rare earths is not easy, the real complexity comes with separating these notoriously tightly interlocked elements into usable rare earth metals.”
- “This gets to the heart of why rare earths are mined in the U.S., yet the country is 100 percent reliant on imports for the metals.”
- “Several companies in the U.S. and Canada are in various stages of developing new technologies for separating rare earths and establishing facilities to enable rare earth oxides production in North America.”
It is clear that while China currently dominates rare earth metals production, the situation is evolving rapidly.
Finally, the full lifecycle analysis of electric vehicles (EVs) needs to be taken into consideration when comparing them to internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, the latter having significant downstream environmental and air quality impacts, and the former having a much smaller footprint overall. Further, while it is true that critical minerals are essential for battery production in EVs, it’s worth noting that resource availability is a dynamic factor, and that recycling and circular economy principles can help reduce the demand for new resources and responsible supply chain regulations will address the extractive impacts of battery production. In fact, there are a number of startups making a profit by recycling the expensive materials in EV batteries.24 This promises to become a significant new business. Additionally, many countries now have recycling regulations, e.g., in Europe.25
Intermittency and Energy StorageIntermittency and energy storage are the biggest concerns with wind and solar due to the variability of these resources. It should be noted that variable demand has always been a key factor in grid management. So-called base load power sources such as nuclear and coal can take hours or days for power to be changed up or down. Electricity demand is highly variable within a 24-hour period with demand highest during the afternoon or evening, and lowest overnight. Base load is typically between 30–40 percent of peak load. Nuclear can be a source of base load power in a zero emissions grid. However, important issues like nuclear waste disposal, large cost overruns, lengthy approval and construction times, and public acceptance must be resolved.
The grid operator is responsible for balancing supply to demand. In a free-market energy dispatch system, the operator has several options to meet demand at any given time. Generally, the operator will choose the lowest cost option. When available, this is usually from wind or solar since these have zero fuel cost. There are many options available to mitigate the inherent intermittency of these sources. The most common is to select one of the other sources on the grid. The combination of wind and solar may complement each other. Wind and solar from different geographic regions are valuable as weather conditions may be more favorable at other locations.
Various forms of energy storage are used. Hydroelectric power dams provide the largest form of storage. In suitable geographies, pumped storage hydro is an option. So-called gravity storage is a related emerging technology. Grid scale batteries are an increasingly viable solution to manage variability over minutes or hours. Green hydrogen, which is produced through the electrolysis of water from renewables, is a promising emerging technology for energy storage. This hydrogen can be converted back to electricity when needed. Green hydrogen has other potential uses as an alternative to fossil fuels.
Demand response is another solution that has several variants. Variable pricing tied to demand managed through smart metering is one scheme. The customer may use timers to schedule functions such as the dishwasher operation or car charging at night. Water heaters or freezers may be turned on/off intermittently during periods of peak demand. Large industrial users may have agreements and receive compensation for curtailing demand during peaks.
Finally combined cycle gas turbines and peaking plants, which have been used to deal with variable demand on traditional power grids, can be used on a grid with a high percentage of renewables. While not net zero, such hybrid systems can achieve drastically reduced emissions at a low cost.
ConclusionIn considering issues as contentious and important as the extent of human-induced climate change and various methods proposed for mitigating it, it behooves skeptics to examine all the relevant information as well the interests making such arguments. This article, therefore, presents vital information ignored in a previous Skeptic article, and which, we submit, refutes those arguments decisively.
About the AuthorsTrained as a biologist, Jean-Patrick Toussaint holds a PhD in environmental sciences and has been Senior Climate Director at the Trottier Family Foundation since 2022. During his career, he has conducted academic research and worked on several environmental and climate files with various national and international organizations. Prior to joining the Trottier Family Foundation, Jean-Patrick was Senior Advisor on Francophone Affairs at the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM). Jean-Patrick also worked as a science officer at Future Earth and as science project manager at the David Suzuki Foundation.
Lorne Trottier is an entrepreneur and philanthropist who co-founded Matrox in 1976, a tech company known for its computer graphics and broadcast video products. The Trottier Family Foundation was established in 2000 and is active in the areas of climate, education, health, and science. The Trottier Foundation has funded a number of institutes including the Trottier Energy Institute at l’ École Polytechnique in Montreal, and the Trottier Space Institute at McGill University. Trottier was a Board Member of the National Center for Science Education NCSE for more than 10 years and is currently a Board Member of the Planetary Society.
References1. Mann, M.E. (2021). The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet. PublicAffairs. 2. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/DOE – 100%25 Clean Electricity – Final.pdf 3. https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/evtech.shtml 4. https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/71500.pdf 5. https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-electricity-would-it-take-to-power-all-cars-if-they-were-electric/ 6. https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth 7. https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth 8. https://www.bing.com/search?q=price+lithium+battery+kWh&form=ANNTH1&refig=1570f510a450451ba00cb0f1fd43617d&pc=EDBBAN 9. https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/electric-vehicle-battery-prices-falling.html 10. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-03/solar-is-now-33-cheaper-than-gas-power-in-us-guggenheim-says?embedded-checkout=true 11. https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2020/01/21/renewable-energy-prices-hit-record-lows-how-can-utilities-benefit-from-unstoppable-solar-and-wind/?sh=34e36cb22c84 12. https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/ex/sustainablecitiescollective/solar-really-cheaper-fossil-fuels/1106159/ 13. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/era-of-cheap-wind-and-solar-has-arrived-says-university-calgary-researchers-1.5807219 14. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/in-a-first-wind-and-solar-generated-more-power-than-coal-in-u-s/ 15. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/07/renewables-cheapest-energy-source/ 16. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/aug/14/fracking-causing-rise-in-methane-emissions-study-finds 17. https://heartland.org/opinion/us-transition-to-100-percent-renewable-energy-would-lead-to-catastrophe-study-says 18. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/lbnl_ieee-land-requirements-for-utility-scale-pv.pdf 19. https://www.skystreamenergy.com/how-many-acres-are-needed-for-a-1-mw-solar-farm/ 20. https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/how-much-land-power-us-solar/ 21. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/solar-power-by-country 22. https://natural-resources.canada.ca/our-natural-resources/minerals-mining/minerals-metals-facts/rare-earth-elements-facts/20522 23. https://www.metaltechnews.com/story/2021/09/09/critical-minerals-alliances/made-in-north-america-rare-earths-return/683.html 24. https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a44022888/electric-car-battery-recycling/ 25. https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/waste-and-recycling_en
One winter evening in 2014, Stuart Russell, a professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Berkeley, was riding the Paris Metro. He was on his way to a rehearsal for a choir that he had joined while living in the French capital during a sabbatical from Berkeley.
That evening, he was listening to the piece that he would be practicing, Samuel Barber’s Agnus Dei, the composer’s choral arrangement of his haunting Adagio for Strings. Swept up in the sublime music, Russell had a breathtaking idea. AI should be built to support ineffable human moments like this one. Instead of delegating an objective to a machine and then stepping back, designers should make systems that will work with us to realize both our complex, shifting goals and our values and preferences. “It just sprang into my mind that what matters, and therefore what the purpose of AI was, was in some sense the aggregate quality of human experience,” he later recalled. And in order to be constantly learning what humans want or need, AI must be uncertain, Russell realized. “This is the core of the new approach: we remove the false assumption that the machine is pursuing a fixed objective that is perfectly known.”
Talking with me by video call one day in the fall of 2022, Russell elaborates. Once the machine is uncertain, it can start working with humans instead of “just watching from above.” If it doesn’t know how the future should unfold, AI becomes teachable, says Russell, a thin, dapper man with a manner of speaking that is somehow both poetical and laser precise. A key part of his Paris epiphany, he says, “was realizing that actually [AI’s] state of uncertainty about human objectives is permanent.” He pauses. “To some extent, this is how it’s going to be for humans too. We are not born with fixed reward functions.”
A few weeks later, I meet up virtually with Anca Dragan, an energetic Berkeley roboticist who is a protégé of Russell’s and one of a growing number of high-profile scientists turning his vision for reimagining AI into algorithmic reality.
“One of my biggest lessons over the past five years or so has been that there’s a tremendous amount of power for AI in being able to hold appropriate uncertainty about what the objective should be,” she tells me. Power? I ask. She explains that by making AI “a little bit more humble, a little bit more uncertain, all of a sudden magical things happen” for both the robot and the human. Together, we begin watching two illustrative bits of video whose banality belies their importance.
In a first clip filmed during experiments in her laboratory, we watch as a robot arm swings into action, carrying a coffee cup several feet high above a table. Almost immediately, a graduate student in a red T-shirt tries to push the arm lower. “It’s Ellis’s favorite mug,” says Dragan, describing the hypothetical scenario inspiring the research, “and he doesn’t like it that the robot is holding it so high up because if it drops, it will break.” As Ellis pushes, the robot doesn’t fight or freeze. But as soon as he lets go—“this is the interesting part,” says Dragan—the robot promptly bounces back up, reclaiming its initial trajectory. This is how AI traditionally has treated the human—as a pesky obstacle on the road to fulfilling the gospel of its objective, says Dragan. The robot views Ellis as an unknown to be ignored, skirted, or eliminated in order to get the job done. I watch as he gives the imperturbable machine a final two-fingered poke before standing back, looking a little defeated.
In what is known as the classical period of AI, early systems by necessity were built to operate in a kind of utopian world that was clear-cut, predictable, and fully understood. In order to make the first algorithms work, designers had to, as Dragan says, “cut off a tiny piece of the world, put it in a box, and give it to a robot.” By the 1980s, however, scientists realized that if they were to create systems for realworld use, they needed to grapple with the unpredictability of life.
To meet this challenge, computer scientist Judea Pearl famously turned to Bayes’ theorem, an Enlightenmentera mathematical system for dealing with uncertainty by constantly updating one’s prior beliefs with new evidence. By investing AI with probabilistic capabilities, Pearl enabled systems to weigh various actions against both the current state of the world and a range of possible futures before deciding on the best route to maximizing a reward. He gave AI wiggle room. Yet the foundational premise of the work remained the same. Unknowns—whether a hesitant pedestrian in a crosswalk, an unanswerable search engine query, or a coffee drinker with ideas of his own—are best summarily dispatched en route to realizing an objective. When Ellis lets go, the coast is clear. The robot knows just what to do.
In the next clip, Ellis tries again. But this time, he only has to push the arm down once before stepping back and watching, one hand nonchalantly in his pocket, as the robot glides by a few inches above the table. Suddenly, the system is doing not what it wants but something far more in line with what Ellis prefers. The maneuver is over in less than a minute, and the inner workings of the robot’s metamorphosis are hidden from view. But I can clearly see that this time, the robot has learned something about carrying coffee, about human priorities, and about aligning with intelligences other than its own. As the robot completes the task, Ellis nods approvingly to someone off camera. He looks relieved.
This is the new paradigm of what Russell calls “human-compatible AI.” Gone is the fallacy of the known fixed objective, whether it is given in advance—“win points”—or, as is the case with a strategy called inverse reinforcement learning, pieced together by the system from initial training demonstrations that in effect say “carry the coffee this way.” (In the latter scenario, a robot may accept a correction while in training, but once it is deployed, it will remain undeterred from its objective.) As Ellis experienced, most standard robots cannot learn on the fly.
In contrast, uncertain AI can adapt in the moment to what we want it to do. Imbued with probabilistic reasoning about its aims or other equivalent mathematical capabilities, the system dwells in “a space of possibilities,” says Dragan. A push is not an obstacle to getting its way but a hint of a new, likely better direction to go. The human is not an impediment but a teacher and a teammate. Perhaps most important, human-compatible AI likely will be open to being shut down if it senses that it might not be on the right track, preliminary studies suggest. A human wish to turn the robot off is just another morsel of information for a system that knows that it does not know. “That’s the big thing that uncertainty gives you, right; you’re not sure of yourself anymore, and you realize you need more input,” says Dragan gleefully. “Uncertainty is the key foundation upon which alignment can rest.”
By making AI a little bit more humble, a little bit more uncertain, all of a sudden, magical things happen for both the robot and the human.
In initial user studies, people working with uncertain robots achieve better task performance with less time and effort. They view such systems as more seamlessly collaborative and sensitive to their needs. “The robot seemed to quickly figure out what I cared about,” said one participant. In one experiment, when a physically present robot verbally expressed uncertainty about a thorny moral dilemma, people saw it as more intelligent than one that asserted that it was sure of what to do.
The music that helped set the stage for Stuart Russell’s vision of a new AI celebrates the liminality and the ambiguity of life. One of the world’s most-heard pieces of modern classical music, Barber’s Adagio for Strings unfolds in a single brief movement suffused with moments of suspense and dissonance. Critic Johanna Keller writes that the piece seems to convey “the effect of a sigh, or courage in the face of tragedy, or hope” and ends on a note of uncertainty. She writes, “In around eight minutes the piece is over, harmonically unresolved, never coming to rest.”
• • • • • •
At Virginia Tech, I at last meet up with an I-Don’t-Know robot. But unlike Ellis, I am working with a system whose uncertainty is an open book. In Dylan Losey’s lab, I discover the critical complement to making AI better at knowing that it does not know: creating systems that also admit to their uncertainty.
The painter-robot sports three sets of armbands, called soft haptic displays, at the base, in the middle, and near the end of its five-foot length. As I guide it through its work of drawing a line down the table, the robot tells me where in the task it is unsure by inflating specific bands associated with particular aspects of the process. If it is unsure about the angle to hold its claw-like “end effector,” for example, it inflates the bottom-most armbands in each set with a soft woosh. In this way, I can get a read on whether the robot is catching on no matter where I place my hands. “You can actually touch the robot’s uncertainty,” Losey tells me. “You can feel in real time as you move it how confused it is.”
If uncertainty enables an AI system to be open to our suggestions, then AI that can also show its unsureness will allow us to know where we stand in our increasingly high-stakes interactions with such machines. A cycle of questions and answers on both sides can result. “When a robot can let a person know, ‘hey, this is where I am at, this is what I’ve learned,’ or ‘this is my best guess but I am a little bit uncertain so take that with a grain of salt’—that’s what I’m working for,” says Losey, a scientist with a rapid-fire pace of speaking and a somber intensity.
The research is critical, he and others believe, because not only does standard AI fall woefully short in its understanding of humanity, but we in turn know less and less about the complex black-box systems that increasingly manage our lives. “Even as a designer, often I have no clue what’s going to happen next with [standard] robots,” Losey admits. “I have to press play and hope that what I see is what I want to see.” The question is, he says, “how can we open that box?”
How and why does AI succeed or fail? Why did the model conclude that one person was worthy of parole, a job interview, or a loan while a similar candidate was not? We often do not know in part because AI operates in abstract mathematical terms that rarely correspond to human ideas and language. In addition, the more astonishing AI’s achievements have become, the more opaque they are to human understanding. After being handily defeated at Go by an AI program, one shocked world champion said AlphaGo’s extraordinary strategic play revealed that “not a single human has touched the edge of the truth of Go.”
Slowly, the creation of openly uncertain systems is becoming a key part of global efforts to make explainable and transparent AI. It is not enough to bring to light what AI knows, for example, by exposing which reward objective or data set was used in training an algorithm. To work with AI, to anticipate its moves, to gauge its strengths and ours, to parse the magic, we also should understand what it does not know, leading scientists assert. Dozens of frontline laboratories worldwide are working to build AI that can speak a language of uncertainty that humans can readily comprehend.
Some robots show people on-screen hypothetical scenarios about their next moves, in effect asking, “Should I move closer to or further from the stove?” or “Should I avoid a certain intersection on my way to fetch coffee?” Others play a kind of robot charades. In Losey’s lab, a standing robot often used in warehouses acted out for me a plethora of sometimes indecipherably similar ways for it to stack dishes. Its thoroughness raised unresolved research questions, such as how much and what kinds of uncertainty a system should display or how AI’s incertitude can interact productively with ours. “It’s not just a question of robot uncertainty,” says Laura Blumenschein, a soft robotics expert who cocreated the haptic arm. “It’s a question of human–robot systems and the combined uncertainty within them.”
Beyond robots, openly uncertain AI models have shown promise for use in medical diagnosis systems and already are being used to bolster AI-assisted drug discovery. For example, to address rising bacterial resistance to drugs, a new kind of model created by Yoshua Bengio and other top researchers in Canada has shown exciting potential to identify synthetic peptides, that is, small proteins that might be turned into new antibiotics. Instead of relying on pattern recognition to settle on one best answer, Generative Flow Networks explore less obvious paths in the data to uncover numerous possible answers, in this case candidate peptides that can be tested further by models and humans alike.
“The whole point is that we want to keep in mind many possible explanations—we want to account for uncertainty,” says Nikolay Malkin of Mila, the Quebec-based leading AI research institute where the algorithm was created. And by operating reflectively rather than relying on simplifying and opaque snap judgments, the new models shed light on both a problem’s deeper causal intricacies and their own decision-making processes. The system’s uncertainty can be an engine of transparency.
For many scientists, moreover, constructing AI that admits its uncertainty is not just a safety feature, a path to adaptability, a practicality. It is a matter of right and wrong.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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Julian Hough is a British computer scientist with a rising reputation and a kindly demeanor. The longer he has been in the field, however, the more concerned he has become about the pretense of certainty traditionally built into the machine. Hough offers a final word of warning. Any time that a system’s uncertainty is swept under the rug, he cautions, “it won’t be going away. It’s just going to be hidden in dangerous ways and basically hidden by system designers.” By way of example, he describes a scenario. “Say a cop robot is looking for a suspect, and it has 60 percent confidence in one person, but it’s been programmed to act at any level beyond 50 percent confidence. If it does not express that level of doubt, that’s very dangerous. It could have fatal consequences.”
This is a watershed moment in the history of AI. Uncertainty is at the heart of efforts to create systems that can better align with human aims. There is no easy blueprint for reimagining humanity’s most powerful and dangerous invention to date. Still, one day sooner than you may imagine, you might work side by side with a robot that will ask you good questions and admit to its uncertainty, all while expecting that you in turn will do so too.
This essay was excerpted and adapted by the author from Uncertain: The Wisdom and Wonder of Being Unsure (Prometheus Books). Copyright © 2023 by Maggie Jackson. Reprinted with permission.
About the AuthorMaggie Jackson is an award-winning author and journalist who is a leading thinker on technology’s impact on humanity. A former contributing columnist for the Boston Globe, Jackson’s writings have been translated into multiple languages and have appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, New Philosopher, and Le Monde’s Courrier International. Her expertise has been featured on NPR, MSNBC, and the BBC; and in many other global media outlets. She is the recipient of numerous grants, fellowships, and awards and has spoken at venues from Google to Yale.
Bedbugs. Just mention of the word is enough to give people the heebie-jeebies and send shivers down their spines—or start scratching. Beginning in early fall of 2023 and coinciding with Paris Fashion Week from September 25 to October 3, fear of the unhealthy vermin swept across Paris. There does not appear to be one incident that triggered the scare, but once the cry of “Bedbug!” went up, it quickly went viral online and in the Parisian media. A wave of YouTube and TikTok videos showed the proliferous pests crawling on bus seats, in trains, riding the subways, lounging at Charles de Gaulle airport, and taking in the latest plays in Paris theatre district the “Grands Boulevards.” Some anxious residents even refused to sit during their daily commutes. One British newspaper saw the humorous side of the panic, carrying the headline: “Coming Soon to a Cinema Near You? The Return of the Bud Bug.”1
Within days, the humble bedbug Cimex lectularius was being portrayed as public enemy No. 1. Politicians began holding press conferences on “the bedbug crisis” and vowing action. By September 29, the Deputy Mayor of Paris, Emmanuel Grégoire, ominously posted on X/Twitter: “No one is safe.”2 One MP, Ms. Mathilde Panot, carried a test tube filled with bedbugs into the French Parliament, complaining that pesky parasites were “making the lives of millions of our fellow citizens a living hell.”3
While they may give people the creeps, bedbugs are more of an annoyance than a major health threat. These small, reddish-brown insects have an affinity for feeding on the blood of humans as they sleep. During the day they love to hide in the cracks and crevices of headboards, box springs, mattresses, and bed frames next to their human prey, hence the name. According to the Mayo Clinic, they are not considered to be a serious health issue as they do not directly spread disease, although they can trigger allergic reactions and skin conditions, and scratching the bites can lead to infection.4
Bonne nuit. Dormez bien.
Ne laissez pas les punaises de lit piquer.
Most experts agree that there does appear to be an uptick in the bedbug population of Paris—and in many parts of the world. According to estimates from the French national pest control association, the number of calls to exterminators jumped about 10 percent over last year. However, this was not surprising as it corresponds with the spike in travel after the Covid pandemic.5 There is also evidence that bedbugs have become more resistant to insecticides while the rise in global temperatures have boosted their sex lives.6, 7 But a 10 percent increase hardly qualifies as a massive infestation.
Look closer, and all is not as it seems.
Thibault Buckley who works for a French company that specializes in dealing with bedbugs that have infested dogs, says that most of recent cases have turned out to be unrelated to bedbugs.8 The issue is also nothing new. For instance, a government survey of French households between 2017 and 2022 found that 11 percent were infested with the creepy critters.9 The French bedbug scare has also spread the fear of infestations to other European metropolitan areas. However, bedbugs have long been a feature, if a very unwanted one, of most major cities. What is new is the sudden media attention.
Soon after hearing of the bedbug infestation, Lebanese dermatologist Zeina Nehme happened to be on a trip to Paris when she decided to spend her weekend finding some of the tiny troublemakers and making a social media video about it. That’s when something odd happened: she could not locate a single bug—not in her apartment or the restaurants she visited or the vast rail network, the Paris Metro. “I actively searched to find one to take pics and do the reel. Nothing,” she said.10
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 29.1
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The Paris bedbug “invasion” has the hallmarks of a social panic involving a real or imagined threat. In this case, the threat is real—there are bedbugs and their numbers have been increasing, but their presence has been exaggerated. Bugs are a common feature of everyday life. Now however, in the wake of sensational media reports of invading bedbugs, people have begun to scrutinize their surroundings for evidence for the critters. In the past a bus or train traveler may have sat next to one and not paid much notice. These days, Parisians are hyperaware of any bug, especially while on public transport or in public places like the cinema—and people are seeing them everywhere.
One factor likely driving the scare is misidentifications. Bedbugs are often mistaken for other insects such as cockroach nymphs, which look similar but are slightly longer and more cylindrical, and also with fleas, ticks, or carpet beetles.11 Another factor leading to the perceived invasion of bedbugs, may be embarrassment—or a lack thereof. Until recently, if someone found the creepy crawlers in their home, it was not exactly a badge of honor and they may have been reluctant to mention it to their work colleagues around the watercooler. Now, with the surge in media interest, it appears to be chic to report finding the bugs and exchange war stories with fellow Parisians.
Goodnight. Sleep tight.
Don’t let the bedbugs bite.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References1. https://bit.ly/48FilZQ 2. https://bit.ly/48dCEhg 3. https://bit.ly/3RMPGLw 4. https://bit.ly/48EaR9z 5. https://bit.ly/3vm8ZEh 6. https://bit.ly/41KXORl 7. https://bit.ly/3tush9X 8. https://bit.ly/3H5NKJk 9. https://bit.ly/3vnhnmT 10. https://bit.ly/3S4GYdh 11. https://bit.ly/3ve397C
On October 17, 2005 the talk show host and comedian Stephen Colbert introduced the word “truthiness” in the premier episode of his show The Colbert Report:1 “We’re not talking about truth, we’re talking about something that seems like truth— the truth we want to exist.”2 Since then the word has become entrenched in our everyday vocabulary but we’ve largely lost Colbert’s satirical critique of “living in a post-truth world.” Truthiness has become our truth. Kellyanne Conway opened the door to “alternative facts”3 while Oprah Winfrey exhorted you to “speak your truth.”4 And the co-founder of Skeptic magazine, Michael Shermer, has begun to regularly talk to his podcast guests about objective external truths and subjective internal truths, inside of which are historical truths, political truths, religious truths, literary truths, mythical truths, scientific truths, empirical truths, narrative truths, and cultural truths.5 It is an often-heard complaint to say that we live in a post-truth world, but what we really have is far too many claims for it. Instead, we propose that the vital search for truth is actually best continued when we drop our assertions that we have something like an absolute Truth with a capital T.
Why is that? Consider one of our friends who is a Young Earth creationist. He believes the Bible is inerrant. He is convinced that every word it contains, including the six days of creation story of the universe, is Truth (spelled with a capital T because it is unquestionably, eternally true). From this position, he has rejected evidence brought to him from multiple disciplines that all converge on a much older Earth and universe. He has rejected evidence from fields such as biology, paleontology, astronomy, glaciology, and archeology, all of which should reduce his confidence in the claim that the formation of the Earth and every living thing on it, together with the creation of the sun, moon, and stars, all took place in literally six Earth days. Even when it was pointed out to him that the first chapter of Genesis mentions liquid water, light, and every kind of vegetation before there was a sun or any kind of star whatsoever, he claimed not to see a problem. His reply to such doubts is to simply say, “with God, all things are possible.”6
Lacking any uncertainty about the claim that “the Bible is Truth,” this creationist has only been able to conclude two things when faced with tough questions: (1) we are interpreting the Bible incorrectly, or (2) the evidence that appears to undermine a six-day creation is being interpreted incorrectly. These are inappropriately skeptical responses, but they are the only options left to someone who has decided beforehand that their belief is Truth. And, importantly, we have to admit that this observation could be turned back on us too. As soon as we become absolutely certain about a belief—as soon as we start calling something a capital “T” Truth—then we too become resistant to any evidence that could be interpreted as challenging it. After all, we are not absolutely certain that the account in Genesis is false. Instead, we simply consider it very, very unlikely, given all of the evidence at hand. We must keep in mind that we sample a tiny sliver of reality, with limited senses that only have access to a few of possibly many dimensions, in but one of quite likely multiple universes. Given this situation, intellectual humility is required.
Some history and definitions from philosophy are useful to examine all of this more precisely. Of particular relevance is the field of epistemology, which studies what knowledge is or can be. A common starting point is Plato’s definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB).7 According to this JTB formulation, all three of those components are necessary for our notions or ideas to rise to the level of being accepted as genuine knowledge as opposed to being dismissible as mere opinion. And in an effort to make this distinction clear, definitions for all three of these components have been developed over the ensuing millennia. For epistemologists, beliefs are “what we take to be the case or regard as true.”8 For a belief to be true, it doesn’t just need to seem correct now; “most philosophers add the further constraint that a proposition never changes its truth-value in space or time.”9 And we can’t just stumble on these truths; our beliefs require some reason or evidence to justify them.10
Readers of Skeptic will likely be familiar with skeptical arguments from Agrippa (the problem of infinite regress11), David Hume (the problem of induction12), Rene Descartes (the problem of the evil demon13), and others that have chipped away at the possibility of ever attaining absolute knowledge. In 1963, however, Edmund Gettier fully upended the JTB theory of knowledge by demonstrating—in what has come to be called “Gettier problems”14—that even if we managed to actually have a justified true belief, we may have just gotten there by a stroke of good luck. And the last 60 years of epistemology have shown that we can seemingly never be certain that we are in receipt of such good fortune.
This philosophical work has been an effort to identify an essential and unchanging feature of the universe—a perfectly justified truth that we can absolutely believe in and know. This Holy Grail of philosophy surely would be nice to have, but it makes sense that we don’t. Ever since Darwin demonstrated that all of life could be traced back to the simplest of origins, it has slowly become obvious that all knowledge is evolving and changing as well. We don’t know what the future will reveal and even our most unquestioned assumptions could be upended if, say, we’ve actually been living in a simulation all this time, or Descartes’ evil demon really has been viciously deluding us. It only makes sense that Daniel Dennett titled one of his recent papers, “Darwin and the Overdue Demise of Essentialism.”15
So, what is to be done after this demise of our cherished notions of truth, belief, and knowledge? Hold onto them and claim them anyway, as does the creationist? No. That path leads to error and intractable conflict. Instead, we should keep our minds open, and adjust and adapt to evidence as it becomes available. This style of thinking has become formalized and is known as Bayesian reasoning. Central to Bayesian reasoning is a conditional probability formula that helps us revise our beliefs to be better aligned with the available evidence. The formula is known as Bayes’ theorem. It is used to work out how likely something is, taking into account both what we already know as well as any new evidence. As a demonstration, consider a disease diagnosis, derived from a paper titled, “How to Train Novices in Bayesian Reasoning:”
10 percent of adults who participate in a study have a particular medical condition. 60 percent of participants with this condition will test positive for the condition. 20 percent of participants without the condition will also test positive. Calculate the probability of having the medical condition given a positive test result.16
Most people, including medical students, get the answer to this type of question wrong. Some would say the accuracy of the test is 60 percent. However, the answer must be understood in the broader context of false positives and the relative rarity of the disease.
Simply putting actual numbers on the face of these percentages will help you visualize this. For example, since the rate of the disease is only 10 percent, that would mean 10 in 100 people have the condition, and the test would correctly identify six of these people. But since 90 of the 100 people don’t have the condition, yet 20 percent of them would also receive a positive test result, that would mean 18 people would be incorrectly flagged. Therefore, 24 total people would get positive test results, but only six of those would actually have the disease. And that means the answer to the question is only 25 percent. (And, by the way, a negative result would only give you about 95 percent likelihood that you were in the clear. Four of the 76 negatives would actually have the disease.)
Now, most usages of Bayesian reasoning won’t come with such detailed and precise statistics. We will very rarely be able to calculate the probability that an assertion is correct by using known weights of positive evidence, negative evidence, false positives, and false negatives. However, now that we are aware of these factors, we can try to weigh them roughly in our minds, starting with the two core norms of Bayesian epistemology: thinking about beliefs in terms of probability and updating one’s beliefs as conditions change.17 We propose it may be easier to think in this Bayesian way using a modified version of a concept put forward by the philosopher Andy Norman, called Reason’s Fulcrum.18
Figure 1. A Simple Lever. Balancing a simple lever can be achieved by moving the fulcrum so that the ratio of the beam is the inverse of the ratio of mass. Here, an adult who is three times heavier than the child is balanced by giving the child three times the length of beam. The mass of the beam is ignored. Illustrations in this article by Jim W.W. Smith
Like Bayes, Norman asserts that our beliefs ought to change in response to reason and evidence, or as David Hume said, “a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.”19 These changes could be seen as the movement of the fulcrum lying under a simple lever. Picture a beam or a plank (the lever) with a balancing point (the fulcrum) somewhere in the middle, such as a playground teeter-totter. As in Figure 1, you can balance a large adult with a small child just by positioning the fulcrum closer to the adult. And if you know their weight, then the location of that fulcrum can be calculated ahead of time because the ratio of the beam length on either side of the fulcrum is the inverse of the ratio of mass between the adult and child (e.g., a three times heavier person is balanced by a distance having a ratio of 1:3 units of distance).
If we now move to the realm of reason, we can imagine substituting the ratio of mass between an adult and child by the ratio of how likely the evidence is to be observed between a claim and its counterclaim. Note how the term in italics captures not just the absolute quantity of evidence but the relative quality of that evidence as well. Once this is considered, then the balancing point at the fulcrum gives us our level of credence in each of our two competing claims.
Figure 2. Ratio of 90–10 for People Without–With the Condition. A 10 percent chance of having a condition gives a beam ratio of 1:9. The location of the fulcrum shows the credence that a random person should have about their medical status.
To see how this works for the example previously given about a test for a medical condition, we start by looking at the balance point in the general population (Figure 2). Not having the disease is represented by 90 people on the left side of the lever, and having the disease is represented by 10 people on the right side. This is a ratio of 9:1. So, to get our lever to balance, we must move the fulcrum so that the length of the beam on either side of the balancing point has the inverse ratio of 1:9. This, then, is the physical depiction of a 10 percent likelihood of having the medical condition in the general population. There are 10 units of distance between the two populations and the fulcrum is on the far left, 1 unit away from all the negatives.
Figure 3. Ratio of 18 False Positives to 6 True Positives. A 1 to 3 beam ratio illustrates a 25 percent chance of truly having this condition. The location of the fulcrum shows the proper level of credence for someone if they receive a positive test.
Next, we want to see the balance point after a positive result (Figure 3). On the left: the test has a 20 percent false positive rate, so 18 of the 90 people stay on our giant seesaw even though they don’t actually have the condition. On the right: 60 percent of the 10 people who have the condition would test positive, so this leaves six people. Therefore, the new ratio after the test is 18:6, or 3:1. This means that in order to restore balance, the fulcrum must be shifted to the inverse ratio of 1:3. There are now four total units of distance between the left and right, and the fulcrum is 1 unit from the left. So, after receiving a positive test result, the probability of having the condition (being in the group on the right) is one in four or 25 percent (the portion of beam on the left). This confirms the answer we derived earlier using abstract mathematical formulas, but many may find the concepts easier to grasp based on the visual representation.
To recap, the position of the fulcrum under the beam is the balancing point of the likelihood of observing the available evidence for two competing claims. This position is called our credence. As we become aware of new evidence, our credence must move to restore a balanced position. In the example above, the average person in the population would have been right to hold a credence of 10 percent that they had a particular condition. And after getting a positive test, this new evidence would shift their credence, but only to a likelihood of 25 percent. That’s worse for the person, but actually still pretty unlikely. Of course, more relevant evidence in the future may shift the fulcrum further in one direction or another. That is the way Bayesian reasoning attempts to wisely proportion one’s credence to the evidence.
Figure 4. Breaking Reason’s Fulcrum. Absolute certainty makes Bayes’ theorem unresponsive to evidence in the same way that a simple lever is unresponsive to mass when it becomes a ramp.
What about our Young Earth creationist friend? When using Bayes’ theorem, the absolute certainty he holds starts with a credence of zero percent or 100 percent and always results in an end credence of zero percent or 100 percent, regardless of what any possible evidence might show. To guard against this, the statistician Dennis Lindley proposed “Cromwell’s Rule,” based on Oliver Cromwell’s famous 1650 quip: “I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.”20 This rule simply states that you should never assign a probability of zero percent or 100 percent to any proposition. Once we frame our friend’s certainty in the Truth of biblical inerrancy as setting his fulcrum to the extreme end of the beam, we get a clear model for why he is so resistant to counterevidence. Absolute certainty breaks Reason’s Fulcrum. It removes any chance for leverage to change a mind. When beliefs reach the status of “certain truth” they simply build ramps on which any future evidence effortlessly slides off (Figure 4).
So far, this is the standard way of treating evidence in Bayesian epistemology to arrive at a credence. The lever and fulcrum depictions provide a tangible way of seeing this, which may be helpful to some readers. However, we also propose that this physical model might help with a common criticism of Bayesian epistemology. In the relevant academic literature, Bayesians are said to “hardly mention” sources of knowledge, the justification for one’s credence is “seldom discussed,” and “Bayesians have hardly opened their ‘black box’, E, of evidence.”21 We propose to address this by first noting it should be obvious from the explanations above that not all evidence deserves to be placed directly onto the lever. In the medical diagnosis example, we were told exactly how many false negatives and false positives we could expect, but this is rarely known. Yet, if ten drunken campers over the course of a few decades swear they saw something that looked like Bigfoot, we would treat that body of evidence differently than if it were nine drunken campers and footage from one high-definition camera of documentarians working for the BBC. How should we depict this difference between the quality of evidence versus the quantity of evidence?
We don’t yet have firm rules or “Bayesian coefficients” for how to precisely treat all types of evidence, but we can take some guidance from the history of the development of the scientific method. Evidential claims can start with something very small, such as one observation under suspect conditions given by an unreliable observer. In some cases, perhaps that’s the best we’ve got for informing our credences. Such evidence might feel fragile, but…who knows? The content could turn out to be robust. How do we strengthen it? Slowly, step by step, we progress to observations with better tools and conditions by more reliable observers. Eventually, we’re off and running with the growing list of reasons why we trust science: replication, verification, inductive hypotheses, deductive predictions, falsifiability, experimentation, theory development, peer review, social paradigms, incorporating a diversity of opinions, and broad consensus.22
We can also bracket these various knowledgegenerating activities into three separate categories for theories. The simplest type of theory we have explains previous evidence. This is called retrodiction. All good theories can explain the past, but we have to be aware that this is also what “just-so stories” do, as in Rudyard Kipling’s entertaining theory for how Indian rhinoceroses got their skin—cake crumbs made them so itchy they rubbed their skin until it became raw, stretched, and all folded up.23
Even better than simply explaining what we already know, good theories should make predictions. Newton’s theories predicted that a comet would appear around Christmastime in 1758. When this unusual sight appeared in the sky on Christmas day, the comet (named for Newton’s close friend Edmund Halley) was taken as very strong evidence for Newtonian physics. Theories such as this can become stronger the more they explain and predict further evidence.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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Finally, beyond predictive theories, there are ones that can bring forth what William Whewell called consilience.24 Whewell coined the term scientist and he described consilience as what occurs when a theory that is designed to account for one type of phenomenon turns out to also account for another completely different type. The clearest example is Darwin’s theory of evolution. It accounts for biodiversity, fossil evidence, geographical population distribution, and a huge range of other mysteries that previous theories could not make sense of. And this consilience is no accident—Darwin was a student of Whewell’s and he was nervous about sharing his theory until he had made it as robust as possible.
Figure 5. The Bayesian Balance. Evidence is sorted by sieves of theories that provide retrodiction, prediction, and consilience. Better and better theories have lower rates of false positives and require a greater movement of the fulcrum to represent our increased credence. Evidence that does not yet conform to any theories at all merely contributes to an overall skepticism about the knowledge we thought we had.
Combining all of these ideas, we propose a new way (Figure 5) of sifting through the mountains of evidence the world is constantly bombarding us with. We think it is useful to consider the three different categories of theories, each dealing with different strengths of evidence, as a set of sieves by which we can first filter the data to be weighed in our minds. In this view, some types of evidence might be rather low quality, acting like a medical test with false positives near 50 percent. Such poor evidence goes equally on each side of the beam and never really moves the fulcrum. However, other evidence is much more likely to be reliable and can be counted on one side of the beam at a much higher rate than the other (although never with 100 percent certainty). And evidence that does not fit with any theory whatsoever really just ought to make us feel more skeptical about what we think we know until and unless we figure out a way to incorporate it into a new theory.
We submit that this mental model of a Bayesian Balance allows us to adjust our credences more easily and intuitively. Also, it never tips the lever all the way over into unreasonable certainty. To use it, you don’t have to delve into the history of philosophy, epistemology, skepticism, knowledge, justified true beliefs, Bayesian inferences, or difficult calculations using probability notation and unknown coefficients. You simply need to keep weighing the evidence and paying attention to which kinds of evidence are more or less likely to count. Remember that observations can sometimes be misleading, so a good guiding principle is, “Could my evidence be observed even if I’m wrong?” Doing so fosters a properly skeptical mindset. It frees us from the truth trap, yet enables us to move forward, wisely proportioning our credences as best as the evidence allows us.
About the AuthorZafir Ivanov is a writer and public speaker focusing on why we believe and why it’s best we believe as little as possible. His lifelong interests include how we form beliefs and why people seem immune to counterevidence. He collaborated with the Cognitive Immunology Research Initiative and The Evolutionary Philosophy Circle. Watch his TED talk.
Ed Gibney writes fiction and philosophy while trying to bring an evolutionary perspective to both of those pursuits. He has previously worked in the federal government trying to make it more effective and efficient. He started a Special Advisor program at the U.S. Secret Service to assist their director with this goal, and he worked in similar programs at the FBI and DHS after business school and a stint in the Peace Corps. His work can be found at evphil.com.
References1. https://rb.gy/ms7xw 2. https://rb.gy/erira 3. https://rb.gy/pjkay 4. https://rb.gy/yyqh0 5. https://rb.gy/96p2g 6. https://rb.gy/f9rj3 7. https://rb.gy/5sdni 8. https://rb.gy/zdcqn 9. https://rb.gy/3gke6 10. https://rb.gy/1no1h 11. https://rb.gy/eh2fl 12. https://rb.gy/2k9xa 13. Gillespie, M. A. (1995). Nihilism Before Nietzsche. University of Chicago Press. 14. https://rb.gy/4iavf 15. https://rb.gy/crv9j 16. https://rb.gy/zb862 17. https://rb.gy/dm5qc 18. Norman, A. (2021). Mental Immunity: Infectious Ideas, Mind-Parasites, and the Search for a Better Way to Think. Harper Wave. 19. https://rb.gy/2k9xa 20. Jackman, S. (2009). The Foundations of Bayesian Inference. In Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences. John Wiley & Sons. 21. Hajek, A., & Lin, H. (2017). A Tale of Two Epistemologies? Res Philosophica, 94(2), 207–232. 22. Oreskes, N. (2019). Why Trust Science? Princeton University Press. 23. https://rb.gy/2us27 24. Whewell, W. (1847). The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History. London J.W. Parker.
In 2021 the CDC issued a grim statistic: more than one million Americans had died from overdoses since 1999 when it started tracking an opioid epidemic that began with prescription painkillers and is now dominated by fentanyl.1 Since that sobering milestone, another 300,000 have died.2 That is roughly the same number of Americans who died in all wars the United States has entered (1.3 million) combined, including the First and Second World Wars and the Civil War.3 The opioid epidemic is, aside possibly from obesity, the biggest health crisis of our time.
Most know about the frenzy of finger pointing, lawsuits, bankruptcy filings among pharmaceutical companies, drug distributors, national pharmacy chains, medical associations, and the Federal Drug Administration. There is plenty of blame to go around. What is not often discussed in the extensive media coverage about the epidemic is how we got here.
The story of how the opioid crisis got underway and who is responsible is a tale of greed, poor government regulation, and many missed opportunities. It began with good intentions based on bad data and later became a movement in which profits took precedence over morals. It is a tragedy that was largely preventable and, as such, one of the most infuriating chapters in modern U.S. history.
History of PainChronic pain affects 50 million Americans, more than those with high blood pressure, diabetes, or depression.4 Developing a medication that alleviates pain without too many side effects has been one of the drug industry’s holy grails. The market is enormous, and most people are long-term patients. Opiates were isolated as effective pain killers in the 1800s. At the turn of the 20th century—the drug industry’s Wild West days—they were dispensed over the counter. Over time, opiates earned a notorious and deserved reputation for addiction. German giant Bayer patented and marketed Heroin as, incredible as it now sounds, a cure for morphine addiction.
Congress did not pass a law requiring prescriptions for narcotic-based medications until 1938.5 It took another 33 years before the federal government created the Controlled Substances Act in 1971, listing oxycodone, fentanyl (along with cocaine and methamphetamine) as Schedule II drugs. That meant they had a risk of “severe psychological or physical dependence” but had medical and therapeutic uses. Doctors were supposed to balance the risks of opioids against the needs of patients who required them for short-term use after surgery or an accident, or longer treatment for disabling chronic pain.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, drug companies spent a lot of money searching for a nonaddictive painkiller. Every effort ended in failure. In a Science article, a pharmacologist and a chemist at the National Institutes of Health concluded that it was unlikely such a medication was possible.
This was the same time, however, when a few physicians were about to upend traditional medical views about pain and how to treat it. Until the early 1980s, medical schools taught that pain was only a symptom of some underlying physical condition. Physicians did not treat it as a stand-alone ailment but instead searched for what caused it. The specialty of “pain management” did not exist. An anesthesiologist, John Bonica, whom Time dubbed “pain relief’s founding father,” questioned the conventional wisdom. Bonica suffered chronic shoulder and hip pain from his pre-medical career, first as a professional wrestler, then a carnival strongman, and finally the light heavyweight world wrestling champion.6 Bonica contended that underdiagnosing pain meant millions of patients suffered needlessly. He cofounded the International Association for the Study of Pain (its journal, Pain, is the field’s leading publication) in 1974, and three years later the American Pain Society (APS).7
The incipient movement to prioritize pain was not long underway when a five-sentence “letter to the editor” in the January 10, 1980, New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) kicked off a parallel revolution in reconsidering established medical views about the risks of opioids. A doctor, Hershel Jick, and a grad student, Jane Porter, had examined 39,946 records of Boston University Hospital patients to determine adverse reactions and potential abuse for widely used medications. Almost a third (11,882) had “received at least one narcotic preparation” but they found only “four cases of reasonably well-documented addiction in patients who had no history of addiction.” Their conclusion was as unorthodox as it was decisive: “Despite widespread use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, the development of addiction is rare.”8
The letter cited two previous studies, both of which involved only hospitalized patients given small doses of opioids in a controlled setting. Very few had had them dispensed for more than five days. None were given painkillers after they were discharged from the hospital.
No one could have predicted the impact that letter had on the reassessment of using opioids to treat pain. During the next two decades it was cited over 1,600 times in textbooks, medical journals, and other publications. More than 80 percent of those who mentioned it left out that it only studied hospitalized patients who took opioids for a few days. Instead, that 99-word letter was widely cited to support far broader conclusions about the safety profile of opioids.9 (In 2017 the NEJM published a rare “Editor’s Note,” adding it to its webpage with the original Jick-Porter letter: “For reasons of public health, readers should be aware that this letter has been ‘heavily and uncritically’ cited as evidence that addiction is rare with opioid therapy.”)
The twin themes—that not treating pain was negligent and that opioids were safe for almost everyone—reinforced one another.
The World Health Organization (WHO) cited the Jick- Porter letter in 1986 as a cornerstone for challenging decades of medical dogma that “the risks of widely prescribing opioids far outweighed any benefits.” Six weeks after the WHO publication, Pain published a startling report, the “Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain.” The lead author was Russell Portenoy, a 31-year-old Memorial Sloan Kettering physician specializing in anesthesiology, neurology, pain control, and pharmacology. His coauthor was Kathleen Foley, a top pain management specialist.
Portenoy and Foley had studied 38 patients who had been administered narcotic analgesics—a third took oxycodone—for up to seven years. Two thirds reported significant or total pain relief. There was “no toxicity,” the two doctors reported, and only two patients had a problem with addiction, both of whom had “a history of prior drug abuse.” They concluded that “opioid maintenance therapy can be a safe, salutary and more humane alternative to the options of surgery or no treatment in those patients with intractable non-malignant pain and no history of drug abuse.”10
Pain as the Fifth Vital SignThat paper kicked off a contentious and at times rancorous debate over whether opioids had been unfairly branded for decades and underutilized in pain management. The charismatic Portenoy emerged as the unofficial spokesman for the embryonic movement to reassess opioids. He saw himself as a pioneer in reexamining outdated views about opioids. If he could convince doctors not to fear dispensing opioids, it could help millions of patients suffering from chronic pain.
A diverse, informal network of physicians contributed to the emerging reevaluation. Doctors specializing in pain management formed The American Academy of Pain Medicine and the American Society of Addiction Medicine (its slogan is “Addiction is a chronic brain disease”). They in turn encouraged patients suffering from chronic pain to form advocacy groups and petition the FDA to loosen opioid dispensing restrictions.
In 1990, American Pain Society president, Dr. Mitchell Max, wrote a widely read editorial lamenting how little progress had been made in treating pain. “Unlike ‘vital signs,’ pain isn’t displayed in a prominent place on the chart or at the bedside or nursing station,” he wrote.”11 Max’s fix was to have physicians ask patients on every visit about whether they were in pain. Doctors had for decades kept watch of four vital signs when examining patients: blood pressure, pulse, temperature, and breathing. The American Pain Society suggested “Pain as the 5th Vital Sign.”
There was no reliable diagnostic test, as there was for blood pressure or cholesterol. Pain was a subjective assessment based on the doctor’s observations and the patient’s descriptions of symptoms. What one patient described as moderate pain that restricted mobility might be excruciating and disabling for someone else. The first rudimentary measurements were developed around this time. One of them, the McGill Pain Index, had 78 words related to pain divided into 20 sections. Patients picked the words that best described their pain. Another, called the Memorial Pain Assessment Card, had eight simplified descriptions and patients selected the one that best matched their pain’s intensity. Yet another was developed by a pediatric nurse and child life specialist in Oklahoma—a chart for children with 10 handdrawn faces ranging from happy and laughing to angry and crying. Variations of that scale soon became a 1 to 10 rating for adults, 1 being “very mild, barely noticeable,” and 10 signifying “unspeakable pain.”
Those tools meant that differing pain tolerances among patients were no longer important. What mattered was tracking whether a patient’s pain was getting better or worse. The Joint Commission, an independent, not-for-profit organization responsible for accrediting 96 percent of all U.S. hospitals and clinics, became the first major group to endorse pain as the fifth vital sign. After the Veterans Administration embraced it, it was adopted quickly in the private sector.12
Over the next few years, a series of other small trials published in medical journals reinforced Portnoy’s 1986 study. They uniformly concluded that opioids did not deserve their terrible reputation and that they were extremely “effective in treating long-term chronic pain.” Buried in scientific footnotes was that “long-term” usually meant 12 to 16 weeks and “effective in treating” meant “superior to placebo.”13
An anesthesiologist and dentist, J. David Haddox, pushed the limits of the reevaluation movement. Haddox, who later became the American Academy of Pain Medicine president and went to work for Purdue Pharma, reported in Pain about the failure to treat the pain of a 17-year-old leukemia patient. That failure, wrote Haddox, had “led to changes similar to those seen with idiopathic opioid psychologic dependence (addiction).” “Pseudoaddiction” was a syndrome, he theorized, that doctors unintentionally caused when they failed to provide their patients with sufficient opioid painkillers. The “behavioral changes” that many doctors concluded constituted addiction, argued Haddox, was only evidence of how undertreated the patient was in terms of narcotic painkillers.14
America’s three major pain associations embraced pseudoaddiction.15 (It took a quarter century before a comprehensive study revealed that in the 224 scientific articles that cited pseudoaddiction, only 18 provided even the sketchiest anecdotal data to support the theory. The study concluded that pseudoaddiction was itself “fake addiction.”)
The same month that Haddox introduced pseudoaddiction, a dozen prominent doctors published “The Physician’s Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients” in the New England Journal of Medicine. Although the study was limited to terminally ill patients, pain management advocates enthusiastically applied its conclusion to all patients: “The proper dose of pain medication is the dose that is sufficient to relieve pain and suffering.… To allow a patient to experience unbearable pain or suffering is unethical medical practice.”16
New Jersey became the first state to adopt an “intractable pain treatment” law that recognized patients had a right to treat their pain. The statute shielded doctors from criminal or civil liability if the narcotics dispensed caused an addiction; 18 other states soon followed.
Enter Big PharmaPortenoy and colleagues contended that opioids should be the first treatment option for chronic nonmalignant pain if the patient had no history of addiction. Instead of setting a maximum dose, the emerging standard of care was that opioids should be dispensed until the patient’s pain was relieved. The twin themes—that not treating pain was negligent and that opioids were safe for almost everyone—reinforced one another. The Sackler family, owners of a small drug company, Purdue Pharma, would have been hard pressed to plan a better lead-in to their release a decade later of OxyContin, their blockbuster opioid-based painkiller.
Purdue used a Wizard of Oz analogy to promise the reps who sold the most oxycontin that “A pot of gold awaits you ‘Over the Rainbow.’”
When the pain reevaluation movement had begun in the mid-1980s, OxyContin was not even on the drawing board. It was in early development when pain was on its way to becoming the fifth vital sign. In the following decade, Purdue did what every other drug company with an opioid-based product did: spent millions underwriting and subsidizing the doctors, advocacy organizations, and pain societies who were at the vanguard of the reevaluation movement. Many pioneering doctors reaped big fees as company lecturers. Purdue and other drug firms subsidized courses at medical schools, professional conferences and conventions, and continuing education classes. And, similar to what happened with the launch of other major drugs, some government officials (even a few key FDA officials) eventually went to work for Purdue and other firms selling opioids. Purdue and its competitors spent lots of money on the pain advocates precisely because they were promoting ideas about pain treatment that the drug manufacturers enthusiastically embraced.
The opioids reevaluation movement might not have had such an impact if it was not for the development of a time-release opioid painkiller, OxyContin. Purdue, and its aggressive marketing of OxyContin, came at a time when doctors were more willing to believe that opioids could be safely prescribed.
Three psychiatrist brothers, Arthur, Mortimer, and Raymond Sackler had bought Purdue in 1952. It was then a tiny New York drug company whose product line consisted mostly of natural laxatives, earwax removers, and tonics that claimed to boost brain function and metabolism. A decade after purchasing Purdue, the Sacklers added a distressed British manufacturer, Napp Pharmaceuticals. The Sacklers had not thought about developing a painkiller until Napp took advantage of an opportunity in the United Kingdom.
Cicely Saunders, a British nurse-turned physician, had opened the world’s first hospice in London in 1967. Her biggest obstacle in alleviating patient’s terminal discomfort was the need to dose painkillers intravenously every few hours. The patients got little sleep and it was not possible to send them home to spend their last days surrounded by friends and family.
Morphine, Saunders found, was not as effective in alleviating pain as diamorphine (a brand name for heroin). Heroin’s biggest drawback, she concluded, was that “it may be rather short in action.”17 She experimented by adding sedatives and tranquilizers to extend the time pain was relieved, but she was stymied at every turn by intolerable side effects.
Still, Saunders had a permissive view of opioids and their addictive power. She did not think heroin had a “greater tendency to cause addiction than any other similar drug.… We have several patients in the wards at the moment who have come off completely without any withdrawal symptoms.”18
What she wanted was a revolutionary narcotic painkiller. In a single dose, it had to provide long relief from intense pain without causing sleepiness, motor coordination problems, and memory lapses. Several independent British pharmaceutical companies accepted her challenge. Smith & Nephew developed Narphen, a synthetic opioid it claimed was 10 times more powerful than morphine, quicker acting, and had a milder side effects profile. Although Saunders acknowledged that Narphen was a better end-of-life drug, it was not her holy grail for terminal cancer pain.
Smith & Nephew’s stumble handed the Sacklers an opportunity. Napp launched a significant research effort to find the new painkiller. When the breakthrough came in 1980, it promised not only to revolutionize pain care for the terminally ill, but it unwittingly provided the technology that would later fuel America’s opioid crisis. Napp introduced a morphine painkiller with a revolutionary, invisible- to-the-human-eye, sustained-release coating. That chemical layer consisted of a dual-action polymer mix that turned to a gel when exposed to stomach acid. Napp claimed the drug, MST Continus (continuous), released pure morphine at a steady rate over 12 hours. They could adjust the release rate by fine-tuning the density of the coating’s water-based polymer. It was the breakthrough painkiller for which Cicely Saunders had been searching since the late-1960s.
MST Continus carved out a market in the UK, but it was limited for end-of-life cancer and hospice patients. It took the Sacklers seven years (until 1987) to get FDA approval for that drug in the U.S. (which they renamed MS-Contin). The FDA had slowed the approval process since its active ingredient, morphine, was a Schedule II controlled substance. By the time it went on sale in America, Portnoy had published the first of his studies concluding that opioids were not as addictive as previously thought and that they should be prescribed liberally to treat pain.
Purdue, now run by two of the surviving Sackler brothers, Mortimer and Raymond, and some of their children, took note of the burgeoning pain management movement. Raymond’s son, Richard Sackler, also a doctor, led a company effort to find an improved painkiller, or at least one with much broader commercial appeal than MS-Contin. Richard Sackler thought that any new painkiller should not use morphine since it had a notorious reputation as an end-of-life medication. Purdue’s science team picked oxycodone, a chemical cousin of heroin. While there were some oxycodone-based painkillers on the market—Percodan (oxycodone and aspirin) and Percocet (oxycodone and acetaminophen)—they were immediate-release pills. If Purdue could master an extended-release oxycodone pill, it would be the first of its kind.
Their oxycodone-based drug was still an unnamed product. Its first clinical trial was only completed in 1989. It took until 1992 for Purdue to apply for a patent. In 1995, the company finally got FDA approval. And it also won an extraordinary concession from the government regulator. Although Purdue had not conducted clinical trials to determine whether OxyContin was less likely to be addictive or abused than other opioid painkillers, the FDA had approved wording requested by the company: “Delayed absorption as provided by OxyContin tablets, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.”19 (Curtis Wright, the FDA officer who oversaw the OxyContin label approval, soon left the agency to work at Purdue as its medical officer for risk assessment).
Marketing PainPurdue’s sales team highlighted that extraordinary sentence to convince physicians that it was a safer narcotic than its rivals. Purdue prepared an unprecedented marketing launch for OxyContin. The late Arthur Sackler was a marketing genius, widely acknowledged as having introduced aggressive Madison Avenue advertising tactics to selling pharmaceuticals. Arthur had handled the promotion for Hoffman LaRoche’s 1960s blockbuster drugs, Librium and Valium, and had made them the biggest-selling drugs in the world for a record 17 years.
Purdue laid out a sales strategy for OxyContin straight from Arthur’s playbook. Its twin sales pitches were that OxyContin relieved pain longer than any other opioid painkiller, and because it was a time-release product, it was less likely to be addictive.
Purdue sales reps raised “concerns about addiction” before physicians did. It was, they said, understandable that no matter how wonderful a drug, “a small minority” of patients “may not be reliable or trustworthy” for narcotic painkillers. If the doctors were still skeptical at that stage, the reps showed them the FDA-approved label that stated if OxyContin was used as prescribed for treating moderate to serious pain, addiction was “very rare.” What constitutes “very rare”? Less than one percent, according to the sales reps. To tilt the odds in favor of its “low risk of addiction” sales strategy, Purdue underwrote several studies that reported addiction rates from long-term opioid treatment between only 0.2 percent and 3.27 percent. However, those company-sponsored reports were never confirmed by independent studies.
Purdue also got help in promoting the “low risk of addiction” from the American Pain Society and the American Academy of Pain Medicine. Purdue and other opioid drug manufacturers were generous funders of both organizations. The groups issued a consensus statement emphasizing that opioids were effective for treating nonmalignant chronic pain and reiterating that it was “established” that there was a “less than 1 percent” probability of addiction.
Purdue sales reps hammered home that OxyContin released oxycodone into the bloodstream at a steady rate over 12 hours. That, Purdue claimed, made it impossible for addicts to get the rush they chased. Without a high, patients would not want more of the drug as it wore off. The company knew that was not true—its own clinical trials demonstrated that for some patients up to 40 percent of oxycodone was released into the bloodstream in the first hour or two. That was fast enough to cause a high and a resulting crash that required another pill in order to feel better.
Dispensing physicians had no idea what Oxy cost, nor did most care. Since they did not pay for the drugs, they let patients and their insurance companies worry about that.
Purdue revised its compensation packages for its sales team, especially top performers, in time for the OxyContin launch. Large bonuses could double a sales rep’s salary. In an internal memo to the “Entire Field Force,” Purdue used a Wizard of Oz analogy to promise the reps who sold the most that “A pot of gold awaits you ‘Over the Rainbow.’” Two months later after Oxy went on sale, another memo titled, “$$$$$$$$$$$$$ It’s Bonus Time in the Neighborhood!”, urged the sales team to push doctors to prescribe the higher-dose pills.
There was far greater profit for Purdue, and more money for the sales team, by pushing higher doses. There were three strengths when it went on sale: 10, 20, and 40 milligrams. An 80 mg tablet was released a month later (15, 30, 60, and 160 mg pills would arrive in a few years). Purdue’s production costs were virtually the same for each since oxycodone, the active ingredient, was inexpensive to manufacture. However, Purdue charged more for each additional strength. On average, a bottle of 20 mg pills cost twice as much as the 10 mg variety, and 80 mg pills were about seven times more expensive. If a patient took 20 mg pills twice a week, Purdue made less than $40 in profit. The same patient prescribed 80 mg pills twice a week returned $200 to Purdue, a 450 percent increase (that profit exceeded $600 a bottle in another five years).
Dispensing physicians had no idea what Oxy cost, nor did most care. Since they did not pay for the drugs, they let patients and their insurance companies worry about that.
Purdue created “Individualize the Dose,” a campaign designed to push the strongest doses. Sales reps told doctors that the company’s studies showed it was best to start patients on a medium to higher dose. The stronger doses, Purdue assured physicians, could be dispensed even to people who had never used opioids, all without adverse effects. The field reps contended that the higher-dose pills were no more likely to cause addiction. That was not true. Internal documents later revealed that Purdue’s sales team knew that stronger doses carried a significantly higher likelihood of dependence, addiction, and even potentially lethal respiratory suppression. While the company’s press releases claimed “dose was not a risk factor for opioid overdose,” internal communications are replete with references to the dangers of “dose-related overdose.”
OxyContin was instantly the most successful drug Purdue ever released. By 2001, only five years after it had gone on the market, its cumulative sales had passed a billion dollars, a first for Purdue. Although a lucrative hit for the Sacklers, OxyContin was less than ten percent of the opioid market. Johnson & Johnson, Janssen, Cephalon, and Endo Pharmaceuticals had their own narcotic painkillers. Their sales teams pitched them as aggressively as Purdue pushed Oxy, and all the companies subsidized the same nonprofits and patient advocacy groups. Janssen managed to get FDA approval in 1990 for the first fentanyl patch to treat severe pain. Fentanyl was then the most potent synthetic opioid, one hundred times stronger than morphine and 1.5 times more powerful than oxycodone. Two years after the FDA had given a green light to OxyContin, it approved Cephalon’s Actiq, a fentanyl “lollipop,” for cancer patients whose intense pain did not respond to other narcotics. Fentanyl patches and Actiq pops were diverted illicitly for big profits and sometimes with lethal side effects. There were widespread industry rumors that Cephalon’s sales team pushed its lollipops off-label as “ER on a stick” for chronic pain.
Still, by 2001, it was OxyContin that was in the crosshairs of some angry patients, the media, and the DEA. Small towns throughout Appalachia seemed overrun by a deluge of OxyContin, locally called “Hillbilly Heroin.” The DEA, meanwhile, was investigating diversion of the drug from the manufacturing plant Purdue used in New Jersey. It was also compiling evidence that Oxy contributed to overdose deaths by examining autopsy reports from across the country. The DEA wanted the FDA to put strict restrictions on the number of refills allowed for the painkiller.
In February 2001, OxyContin appeared for the first time in the New York Times, a front-page story—“Cancer Painkillers Pose New Abuse Threat”—about how it had become an abused drug in at least seven states.20 The Times raised the issue of whether Purdue’s hard-hitting marketing was partially responsible for the growing problems.
Purdue went all out to battle the bad press and its regulatory headaches. It hired big name legal talent. Rudy Giuliani, fresh off being America’s Mayor after his handling of the city in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, had just opened a private office and he began lobbying government officials on Purdue’s behalf. The company dispatched its medical officers and top executives to meet with the FDA and DEA. It assured both that it was working to control any abuse and diversion and it contested the findings about Oxy’s role in overdoses by pointing to the cocktail of illicit drugs in most of the autopsy reports. At that stage, the DEA could not find a death in which the victim had only Oxy, without alcohol, benzos, heroin, cocaine, cannabis, or some other drug. In the same month as the Times story, Richard Sackler sent an internal Purdue email that said, “We have to hammer on the abusers in every way possible. They are the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.”
Purdue emerged mostly unscathed from all the extra scrutiny. Although the FDA did require changes to OxyContin’s label, it was far less than what activists wanted. The FDA ordered the addition of a so-called black box warning. The bold-font warning was a reminder to doctors that OxyContin was “a Schedule II controlled substance with an abuse liability similar to morphine.” No drug company liked having a black box warning on its label, but as I learned in my reporting, Purdue was not upset since it considered the language a good compromise. One marketing executive remarked later, “It is black box lite.” It merely reiterated what most physicians knew already about OxyContin.
In 2004, OxyContin officially earned the dubious distinction as the most abused drug in America.21 Parents who had lost children to OxyContin were trying to raise awareness about the drug’s dangers. The biggest concern for Purdue, however, was an ongoing investigation into Oxy’s marketing by the West Virginia U.S. Attorney, John Brownlee, who started his probe in 2002. West Virginia was one of states hardest hit by OxyContin. In 2006,
Brownlee was ready to bring a case. He forwarded a six-page memo to the DOJ’s Criminal Division to get authorization to file felony charges against Purdue and its top executives for money laundering, wire and mail fraud, and conspiracy.22 Brownlee got bad news from headquarters. The Criminal Division vetoed all the serious felony counts and instead gave him permission only to bring less serious charges around misbranding the drug. That was a clean and straightforward prosecution.
In May 2007, Purdue and three non-Sackler executives accepted a plea agreement. The company and officers pled guilty to a scheme “to defraud or mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications.”23 Purdue’s fine was $634.5 million, and the three executives paid a combined $34.5 million.
Purdue signed both Consent and Corporate Integrity agreements. It agreed not to make “any written or oral claim that is false, misleading, or deceptive” in marketing OxyContin and to report immediately any signs of false or deceptive marketing. The strict terms of those agreements should have been the end of Oxy’s nationwide trail of devastation. Instead, the ink was barely dry before Purdue started flagrantly disregarding the rules. The deadliest years and record abuse with OxyContin came after the 2007 guilty pleas.
And Then It Got Even WorsePurdue went on a hiring binge that eventually doubled its sales force. It unleashed them to push Oxy with a renewed vigor. The company also paid millions to the “key physician opinion leaders” so they would convince doctors that OxyContin should be their first choice whenever a patient presented with serious pain. The results were impressive. In the year that Purdue pled guilty, sales passed $1 billion annually and profits exceeded $600 million. OxyContin provided 90 percent of Purdue’s profits.
The opioid crisis is a tragedy that was largely preventable and, as such, one of the most infuriating chapters in modern U.S. history.
When Purdue faced the possibility of generic competition in 2010, the company devised a “new and improved” coating that it said was more difficult to crush, snort or inject. Although Purdue’s two small studies showed the new version had “no effect” in reducing the addiction and overdose potential, the FDA still approved tamper-resistant OxyContin. (It took ten years before an FDA advisory panel ruled that the tamper-resistant Oxy had failed to reduce opioid overdoses).
With the FDA approval, Purdue spent millions on a splashy ad campaign directed to physicians. Titled “Opioids with Abuse Deterrent Properties,” Purdue touted its crush-resistant formulation as the first ever narcotic pain reliever that reduced the chances for abuse and slashed the addiction rate. The campaign worked. Many doctors believed it and increased their prescribing pace.
In 2011, four years after Purdue’s criminal guilty plea, OxyContin surpassed heroin and cocaine to become the nation’s most deadly drug. Sales were also at a record, each year breaking the previous year’s record. When there was a slowdown in 2013, the Sacklers brought in McKinsey & Company consultants, who laid out a plan to “supercharge” sales. The results were almost immediate. In 2015, Forbes listed the Sackler family on its “Richest Families” list for the first time. The Sacklers, with an estimated net worth of $14 billion, had jumped ahead of the Rockefellers, Mellons, and Busches, among many others. Forbes titled the family “the OxyContin Clan.”24
The news about the Sacklers great fortune was lost under a deluge of news about the national toll from OxyContin. By 2015, for the first time, opioids killed more people than guns and car crashes combined, and lethal overdoses even surpassed the peak year of HIV/AIDS deaths. Statisticians blamed OxyContin for the first decline in two decades in the life expectancy of Americans. And a CDC report confirmed what some doctors suspected: prescription opioid users were 40 times more likely to become heroin addicts, making Oxy the most effective gateway drug into heroin. The CDC urged doctors either to “carefully justify” or “avoid” prescribing more than 60 mg daily. Still, the guidelines were voluntary. Only seven states passed legislation to limit the number of prescriptions.
In 2016, OxyContin and the opioid epidemic became a presidential campaign issue. The Joint Commission, responsible for accrediting hospitals and clinics, reversed its 2001 position that pain should be the fifth vital sign. Even the FDA was slowly recognizing the extent of the problem. Parents who lost children to opioids had submitted a citizen’s petition to the FDA, pleading with the regulators to classify Oxy for severe pain only. After eight years on the back burner, the agency was seriously considering it.
It’s Only MoneySuddenly, the Sacklers and Purdue, and their competitors, were on the defensive. The Trump administration declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency in 2017. That action freed up extra federal resources for treatment. A few months later, forty-one state attorneys general subpoenaed internal Purdue marketing and promotion documents. Purdue announced plans to slash its sales force by half and that it would no longer market Oxy directly to individual physicians, instead concentrating on hospitals and clinics.
In 2019, a judicial panel decided to streamline the more than 2,500 pending lawsuits under the jurisdiction of a single federal judge in Ohio. The consolidated lawsuit was called the National Prescription Opiate Litigation. The following month, the Massachusetts Attorney General filed an amended complaint that was different from all others. It relied on Purdue’s internal records to conclude that eight of the Sackler-family directors had “created the epidemic and profited from it through a web of illegal deceit.” The New York Attorney General filed a similar action a few weeks later and added that the Sacklers had personally transferred hundreds of millions in assets to offshore tax havens.
To drive home how much the Sacklers had profited from OxyContin, court documents filed by the attorneys general revealed that the family directors had voted payments of $12 to $13 billion in profits since OxyContin went on sale. By the end of 2019, OxyContin had $35 billion in sales from its launch, while America recorded its 200,000 death since the government had begun tracking them.25
In the end, it was lawyers, state prosecutors, and the nation’s top class action litigators, who pried some financial justice from the many parties that shared responsibility for the national tragedy. Purdue filed for bankruptcy protection in late 2019 and the Sacklers sought protection from all the civil litigation so long as they contributed a lot of money to an overall settlement. In 2022, the family agreed to pay $6 billion toward a settlement and a bankruptcy judge signed off on a plan that freed them from civil litigation.26 (I co-wrote two New York Times opinion pieces that argued the judge had exceeded his bankruptcy court authority by discharging all actions pending against the Sacklers, who had not themselves filed bankruptcy. That issue and the complex bankruptcy plan are now pending before the Supreme Court.) Under the bankruptcy plan, Purdue became a public entity that continued to sell OxyContin, with any proceeds going to treatment and public health.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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In 2022, Johnson and Johnson paid $5 billion to settle the litigation pending against it. J&J also announced it was quitting the opioid painkiller business. The country’s three largest wholesale drug distributors—AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson—reached a settlement in the tsunami of litigation pending against them by paying a combined $21 billion.27 Another $13.8 billion came from the big three pharmacy chains, Walmart, Walgreens, and CVS. Rite Aid filed for bankruptcy protection. The litigation has produced about $55 billion in total settlements.28
Still none of that matters to many families who lost loved ones to the overzealous marketing of prescription painkillers. And, with the many families I have interviewed, they note that no one has gone to prison for having made such enormous profits off the deaths of several hundred thousand Americans. Many who helped fuel the epidemic, such as overprescribing doctors, owners of pill mills, and lax regulators at the FDA and in state health agencies, got away without so much as a slap on the wrist.
An unnamed plaintiff’s lawyer told The Guardian in 2018 that the Sacklers were “essentially a crime family… drug dealers in nice suits and dresses.” No prosecutors, however, had the courage to bring a criminal action against the Sacklers and other opioid kingpins.
What a shame.
About the AuthorGerald Posner is an award-winning journalist and author of thirteen books, including New York Times nonfiction bestsellers Why America Slept (about 9/11) and God’s Bankers (about the Vatican), and the Pulitzer Prize finalist Case Closed (about the JFK assassination). His latest, Pharma, is a withering and encyclopedic indictment of a drug industry that often seems to prioritize profits over patients. A graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, he was a litigation associate at a Wall Street law firm. Before turning to journalism, he spent several years providing pro bono legal representation on behalf of survivors of Nazi experiments at Auschwitz.
References1. https://rb.gy/6a7hv 2. https://rb.gy/8pyh2 3. https://rb.gy/h7pop 4. https://rb.gy/lviuy; https://rb.gy/wrekp 5. Cavers, D.F. (1939). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions. Law & Contemp. Probs., 6, 2. 6. “John Bonica, Pain’s Champion and the Multidisciplinary Pain Clinic,” Relief of Pain and Suffering, John C. Liebeskind History of Pain Collection, Box 951798, History & Special Collections, UCLA Louise M. Darling Biomedical Library, Los Angeles, CA. 7. Brennan, F. (2015). The U.S. Congressional “Decade on Pain Control and Research” 2001– 2011: A Review. Journal of Pain & Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy, 29(3), 212–227.; https://rb.gy/zmifj 8. Porter, J., & Jick, H. (1980). Addiction Rare in Patients Treated With Narcotics. New England Journal of Medicine, 302(2), 123. 9. https://rb.gy/zmg4c; https://rb.gy/leawh. In 2017, six researchers published in the NEJM the results of their review of all subsequent citations to the 1980 letter. “In conclusion, we found that a fivesentence letter published in the Journal in 1980 was heavily and uncritically cited as evidence that addiction was rare with long-term opioid therapy. We believe that this citation pattern contributed to the North American opioid crisis by helping to shape a narrative that allayed prescribers’ concerns about the risk of addiction associated with long-term opioid therapy.” Dr. Jick told the Associated Press in 2017: “I’m essentially mortified that that letter to the editor was used as an excuse to do what these drug companies did.” 10. Portenoy, R.K., & Foley, K.M. (1986). Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases. Pain, 25(2), 171–186. 11. Max quoted in Schottenfeld, J.R., Waldman, S.A., Gluck, A.R., & Tobin, D.G. (2018). Pain and Addiction in Specialty and Primary Care: The Bookends of a Crisis. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 46(2), 220–237. 12. Morone, N.E., & Weiner, D.K. (2013). Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign: Exposing the Vital Need for Pain Education. Clinical Therapeutics, 35(11), 1728–1732. 13. Sullivan, M.D., & Howe, C.Q. (2013). Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain in the United States: Promises and Perils. Pain, 154, S94–S100. 14. Weissman, D.E., & Haddox, J.D. (1989). Opioid Pseudoaddiction—an Iatrogenic Syndrome. Pain, 36(3), 363–366. 15. “Definitions Related to the Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Pain,” Consensus Statement of the American Academy of Pain Medicine, the American Pain Society, and the American Society of Addiction Medicine, approved by the American Academy of Pain Medicine Board of Directors on February 13, 2001, the American Pain Society Board of Directors on February 14, 2001, and the American Society of Addiction Medicine Board of Directors on February 21, 2001 (replacing the original ASAM Statement of April 1997), published 2001. 16. Wanzer, S.H., Federman, D.D., Adelstein, S.J., Cassel, C.K., Cassem, E.H., Cranford, R.E., … & Van Eys, J. (1989). The Physician’s Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients. A Second Look. 17. Saunders, C. (1965). The Last Stages of Life. The American Journal of Nursing, 70–75. 18. Saunders, C. (1963). The Treatment of Intractable Pain in Terminal Cancer. Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 56, 195–197. 19. https://rb.gy/l7kvh 20. https://rb.gy/tzwla 21. Cicero, T. J., Inciardi, J. A., & Muñoz, A. (2005). Trends in Abuse of OxyContin and Other Opioid Analgesics in the United States: 2002–2004. The Journal of Pain, 6(10), 662–672. 22. https://rb.gy/xdv0m 23. 2007-05-09 Agreed Statement of Facts, Para 20. 24. https://rb.gy/qi6ph 25. https://rb.gy/67baw 26. https://rb.gy/580po 27. https://rb.gy/hz79m 28. https://rb.gy/ma2m8
In a special double segment that is reminiscent of The National Enquirer in its heyday, 60 Minutes has aired another dramatic story on Havana Syndrome. If it had been a sporting event, the score would have been 8-0: eight people interviewed and not a single skeptic.
Billed by CBS News as a “breakthrough” in their five-year-long investigation, the episode that aired Sunday night, March 31, 2024, raises many important questions—not about the existence of Havana Syndrome, but the present state of journalistic integrity. As someone who has followed this saga from the beginning, the new 60 Minutes report was a case study in fearmongering and selective omission. The program was filled with misleading statements and circumstantial evidence that were used to gin up a story that is on life support after the U.S. intelligence community concluded last year that “Havana Syndrome” is likely a condition that never existed.
In the leadup to the broadcast, CBS News teased the segment with the headlines “Targeting Americans” and “Breakthrough in Havana Syndrome Investigation.” Yet in the report it was described as “a possible breakthrough” and there was no conclusive proof that Americans, or anyone else, have been targeted.1
60 Minutes reporter Scott Pelley featured an interview with Gregory Edgreen, a former American military intelligence officer who oversaw the Pentagon investigation into “Havana Syndrome.” He told Pelley that the present situation is dire for American security as “the intelligence officers and our diplomats working abroad are being removed from their posts with traumatic brain injuries—they’re being neutralized.”2
Edgreen disagreed with last year’s intelligence community consensus, left his position and has founded Advanced Echelon, a company devoted to caring for “Havana Syndrome survivors.”3 His interview is reminiscent of recent attempts by some media outlets to support the unfound claim the U.S. Government is covering up information on the existence of recovered alien bodies and crashed saucers. This is the opinion of one man who was involved in an investigation, yet he does not represent the intelligence community, which has deemed the purported attacks to be “highly unlikely” and the existence of the condition itself as dubious.
Enter David RelmanPredictably, Stanford microbiologist David Relman made an appearance and told Pelley that his panel found “clear evidence of an injury to the auditory and vestibular system of the brain.” This is not supported by the evidence. Relman failed to mention that not only have recent studies found no such damage, many Havana Syndrome patients have been diagnosed with psychosomatic disorders that are commonly triggered by stress.
Pelley also claimed that a senior Department of Defense official was attacked during last year’s NATO Summit in Lithuania. His source: multiple unnamed people. He said that the official involved—also unnamed—“was struck by the symptoms and sought medical treatment.” We are told nothing more. The trouble with this claim is that Havana Syndrome has been associated with a laundry list of common health complaints ranging from fatigue and forgetfulness to nausea, nosebleeds, headache, tinnitus, ear pain and difficulty sleeping. Throughout the broadcast there were also assertions that victims were suffering from brain injury—something that has never been demonstrated. These symptoms are also features of countless other medical conditions.
Also interviewed was an FBI agent identified only as “Carrie,” who said she had been attacked by a directed energy weapon and while she had been given permission to discuss her condition by her employer, “she wasn’t allowed to discuss the cases she was on when she was hit.” Appearing in disguise to protect her identity she described how one day in 2021 at her Florida home she felt “pressure and pain” in her head that radiated down her jaw and neck and into her chest before she passed out. Since then, she says she has experienced problems with long and short-term memory and difficulty with sensing spatial awareness: “If I turn too fast, my gyroscope is off… it’s like I’m a step behind where I’m supposed to be, so I’ll turn too fast and I will literally walk right into the wall.”
Pelley then claimed that “other sources”—anonymous of course—told 60 Minutes that one of the cases involved a suspected Russian spy who was caught speeding on a Florida highway in 2020. The man had apparently been interviewed by Carrie on several occasions. He was identified as a former Russian military officer with an electrical engineering background. While serving a sentence for reckless driving and evading police, “Carrie” said she was hit two more times—about a year apart—once in Florida, once in California. The “attacks” left her disoriented and a feeling that her body was pulsating.
The Russians Are Coming!Who is behind these attacks? The Russians, of course. Pelley casts suspicion for the “attacks” on a Russian military unit known as 29155. He also claims to have found the smoking gun—a document sourced online showing that one the unit’s officers had been paid for working on “nonlethal acoustic weapons.” This is not the dramatic find that it is made out to be. Acoustic weapons are in common use by governments around the world. The use of sound cannons—commonly known as Long-Range Acoustic Devices—have long been employed to control crowds. Beyond this they have shown little practical value as the waves rapidly disperse.
It was then claimed that unit 29155 may have been in the city of Tbilisi in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, when several Americans experienced mysterious health incidents there. An unnamed 40-year-old wife of a Justice Department official told Pelley that she was struck by an energy weapon when her husband was working at the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi in October 2021. She said she was suddenly overcome by a piercing sound in her left ear, felt “a fullness” in her head, developed a headache, and began vomiting. What happened next reads like a spy novel. She looked outside and spotted a car near the front gate and a man nearby. Pelley then showed her a photo of a member of unit 29155 who was thought to have been in the city at the time of the “attack.” When asked if it looked like the man in the photo, she unhesitatingly pronounced, “it absolutely does.” Shortly after, however, she grew hesitant: “I cannot absolutely say for certain that it is this man…” But after a few more seconds elapsed she proclaimed: “I can absolutely say that this looks like the man….” This is not exactly an icon-clad identification.
The woman says she continues to suffer balance problems, headaches and “brain fog,” the latter term being a common description of people experiencing anxiety. She also said that her symptoms typically worsen at night. These are common features of vestibular dysfunction. Pelley dramatically noted that the woman has also been treated for “holes in her inner ear canals.” While this could have been from a mysterious weapon, there is a more mundane explanation: perilymphatic fistula that can be caused by barotrauma from changes in air or water pressure, such as from flying or scuba diving. Strenuous physical exercise can also trigger the condition, as well as head trauma.
A Story with Nine LivesHavana Syndrome has become a cottage industry for podcasters, bloggers, and the news media because it’s a dramatic story that reads like a spy novel and is guaranteed to get clicks and views. It has also turned into the ultimate game of whack-a-mole. Like the cat with nine lives, it just won’t die. I cannot help but think that when enough people become aware of the full story—where key facts have not been omitted, Havana Syndrome will finally fade from the headlines. If I had watched this story with only a superficial knowledge of Havana Syndrome, I probably would have finished watching the episode convinced that there really have been Russian attacks on Americans using a secret weapon. But the facts point to a far more mundane explanation.
What happened to journalistic integrity? For years many journalists have reported that American citizens have been hit with a mysterious energy weapon. Scott Pelley has filed no less than three such reports for 60 Minutes.4 At the very least, viewers are entitled to hear from prominent skeptics whose voices were silenced. A news program that interviews eight believers and no skeptics isn’t a news program—it’s propaganda.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He is a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry and the co-author of Havana Syndrome: Mass Psychogenic Illness and the Real Story Behind the Embassy Mystery and Hysteria (Copernicus, 2020) with neurologist Robert Baloh.
References1. Costa, Robert (2024). The CBS Evening News, March 29, 2024, at 10:00 sec. and accessed at: https://www.cbsnews.com/evening-news/; See also https://www.cbsnews.com/video/targeting-americans-sunday-on-60-minutes/ 2. Pelley, Scott (2024). “Foreign adversaries may be involved in Havana Syndrome, sources say.” 60 Minutes (CBS News, NY). March 31. 3. See the Advanced Echelon homepage at: https://www.advancedechelon.net/about 4. See also: Pelley, Scott (2022). “Havana Syndrome: High-level national security officials stricken with unexplained illness on White House grounds.” 60 Minutes (CBS News, NY). February 20, accessed at: https://cbsn.ws/3MfZaLR; Pelley, Scott (2019). “Brain damage suffered by U.S. diplomats abroad could be work of hostile foreign government.” 60 Minutes (CBS News, NY). March 17.
Several years ago, I came across an imaginative essay entitled “Explaining Affirmative Action to a Martian.”1 The author, who I had never heard of, described a fictious interaction where a human explains the rationale of affirmative action to an alien. Among its gems is the following interaction:
Earthling: Black people were enslaved and subjugated for centuries, so, sometimes they get special dispensations. It’s only fair…
Visitor: So those black kids…were enslaved and subjugated, so they get to score 450 [standardized test] points lower than Asians?
Earthling: Well these particular black students didn’t experience slavery or Jim Crow themselves… But their grandparents might have experienced Jim Crow.
Visitor: Might have?
Earthling: Well, around half of black students at elite colleges are actually the children of black immigrants so they have no ancestral connection to American slavery or Jim Crow…
Visitor: … I’m utterly confused by you creatures.
The author of this essay was Coleman Hughes, a Columbia University undergraduate at the time. In the intervening years, Hughes has been one of the leading voices on race. As a long-time listener and fan of Hughes, I was eager to read his first book, The End of Race Politics: Arguments for a Colorblind America. It did not disappoint.
Hughes has a gift for clearly and dispassionately evaluating one of our most explosive social topics. Oftentimes in today’s world, the political left exaggerates the prevalence of racism while the political right a priori assumes that all such accusations lack merit. What we so desperately need is a middle ground: An analysis that deals honestly with the racism which does exist without inflating it. This is what Coleman Hughes does.
What makes his book excellent is, ironically, the mundane manner in which he evaluates race. Hughes carefully dissects the arguments of neoracism, an ideology he defines as “discrimination in favor of non-whites…justified on account of the hardships they endure—and hardships their ancestors endured—at the hands of whites.” Reading Hughes is a breath of fresh air. He gives neoracism the long overdue hearing it deserves, one that is fair but critical.
Hughes forces readers to think in terms of counterfactuals. This is typically missing from public discourse but is essential for evaluating double-standards and identifying what philosophers call the “special pleading” fallacy where rules are inconsistently applied. For example, the author points out that Yale University did not denounce the racism of a psychiatrist who gave a talk saying, “I had fantasies of unloading a revolver into the head of any white person that got in my way, burying their body and wiping my bloody hands as I walked away relatively guiltless.” Yet, as Hughes puts it, “Suppose [the speaker] had described fantasies about shooting black people in the head, burying them, and walking away… Is there any doubt that the Yale administration would have condemned her racism?”
In chapter five, Hughes delves into seven central tenants of neoracism, such as “Racial disparities provide direct evidence of systemic racism” and “White people have power in society, but Black people don’t.” Reading the book, and this chapter in particular, felt like following the author on a tour of three-legged stools. Each claim seems believable on its face but Hughes raises compelling arguments against them. For instance, consider the racial disparity tenant mentioned above which includes the claim that “there would be no racial disparities, or at least large ones, in a fair society.” It is easy to see the appeal: Blacks have been historically discriminated against and are on the short end of many troubling disparities. However, Hughes discusses factors other than racism that could explain group differences. Perhaps most critical is the age gap, such that the median White person is 10 years older than the median Black person. Wilfred Reilly points out that the age gap is even more striking (31 years) when comparing the modal (most common) age.2 Might that play a role in some disparities, such as wealth or incarceration rates?
One of the joys of reading Hughes’ book, at least for myself as a research psychologist, is the way key psychological concepts are infused throughout—even if not explicitly named (and since the author has no formal background this is not surprising). The notion of tribalism, something my colleagues and I have studied in the context of politics,3 is depicted as key to the neoracist ideology “because it casts every event as an instance of us versus them, good versus evil, black versus white.” Sadly, one of the most important lessons4 from social psychology—the subfield largely devoted to understanding how humans interact with each other—of the past 50 years is the ease with which people separate into groups and develop preference for in-group members.
Elsewhere, in critiquing what he calls “chronic victimhood,” Hughes writes, “A wise therapist wouldn’t tell you to accept chronic victim status…and think of yourself as forever trapped in your experience of trauma. The wise therapist would instead help you develop strategies for moving past the trauma you’d suffered, empowering you to escape the trauma’s gravitational pull.” Here, the author is getting at the idea of mindset, a concept developed by Stanford Psychology Professor Carol Dweck. Hughes is correctly pointing out that victimhood and its downstream difficulties should be viewed in the context of a growth mindset—something that is malleable—rather than in the context of a fixed mindset, which is not changeable. Growth mindsets suggest that people have agency to change; unsurprisingly, research generally supports the idea that it leads to better outcomes. A study by Jessica Schleider, for example, found that a single 20–30 minute computer-based session focused on enhancing a growth mindset reduced depression among adolescents when evaluated nine months later.5
There was one observation Hughes made in passing that clearly reveals his status as a gifted intellectual with a keen eye towards understanding how people think and behave. He starts by critiquing the position that America has failed to “acknowledge and atone for its past [racism]” by pointing out several facts which seem to contradict this assertion, including the adoption of Juneteenth and Martin Luther King Day as federal holidays, affirmative action programs, and most critically, Congress issuing apologies for slavery. Hughes argues that “none of this paints a picture of a general public, or a government, that is resistant to historical soul-searching.” Several paragraphs later he continues, “To this day, it remains a talking point among media pundits that America has ‘never’ issued a formal apology for slavery.” And this is where he makes his insight:
We must realize that a game is being played here. Normally when someone demands an apology, they actually want one. But sometimes they don’t. Sometimes the ability to continue demanding the apology is worth more than the apology itself. Sometimes the debt is worth more unpaid than paid… This is why every new apology, program, or holiday that they demand is forgotten as soon as it’s achieved… It’s not clear to me whether neoracists play this game consciously or whether there is self-deception involved. But either way, we are indeed playing a game, and if we don’t realize it, then everyone loses.
If you took out the word “neoracist” and told me this passage was from Eric Berne’s seminal 1964 book, Games People Play, I would have believed you. Hughes is arguing that a game of shifting goalposts is occurring. One could argue another instance of this happened in the aftermath of George Floyd’s death. First, there were demands for Chauvin to be convicted. After he was convicted, the guilty verdict was seen as insufficient. For instance, Bernie Sanders tweeted the common sentiment “The jury’s verdict delivers accountability for Derek Chauvin, but not justice for George Floyd.”6 If no game were occurring, which is to say that opinion was also held before the conviction, then it seems to suggest courts are unable to administer justice for victims. This raises challenging questions about how justice would be administered (if possible) and who would decide what constitutes justice.
My only substantiative critique of the book is that, while it functions as a highly effective counter to ideas presented by radical neoracists, Hughes could have bolstered his argument in favor of colorblindness by also speaking more explicitly to moderates. I think many left-of-center people are put off by the ideas of activists such as Ibram X. Kendi and Robin DiAngelo, and are disturbed by the way race is discussed in elite circles. However, I also think most would still favor mild affirmative action programs that they believe are appropriately calibrated. People who fall into this camp might agree with 90 percent of the book and even agree that colorblindness is a better approach to race than our current one. Yet, they might also argue that the best solution is to reduce, yet not eliminate, the consideration of race.
Overall, I found The End of Race Politics to be an excellent read from a superb up-and-coming author. Those teaching classes on race who include Kendi’s How to Be an Antiracist on their syllabus should seriously consider adding this book to the reading list for a diversity of viewpoints. Students could then engage with scholars who hold diametrically opposing positions and debate the merits of each.
I doubt that will happen anytime soon, but will be delighted if proven wrong.
A review of The End of Race Politics: Arguments for a Colorblind America by Coleman Hughes
About the AuthorMichael H. Bernstein is an experimental psychologist and an Assistant Professor at Brown University. His research is focused on the overlap of cognitive science with medicine. He is Director of the Brown Medical Expectations Lab and co-editor of The Nocebo Effect: When Words Make You Sick. For more information, visit michaelhbernstein.com.
References1. https://bit.ly/3Vi24Xv 2. https://bit.ly/48UG3Be 3. https://bit.ly/498cmNi 4. https://bit.ly/4amn181 5. https://bit.ly/4cddOR0 6. https://bit.ly/3TuKcGu
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.” —Sherlock Holmes
The “game” of my title refers to the one played by media outlets and podcasters for the past seven years interviewing rogue scientists and conspiracy theorists to spin tales of Americans being zapped by nefarious foreign actors with sonic or microwave weapons. This includes the authors of studies suggesting that there were brain and inner ear injuries suffered by many victims of Havana Syndrome when those studies were clearly flawed and any competent mainstream scientist who read them would have seen these shortcomings. Indeed, they did—there were at least two classified studies that found no evidence of such attacks, instead emphasizing the likely role of stress.1, 2, 3, 4 Publicly, these politicians and pundits were referring to the events in Cuba as attacks, yet gave no hint of the findings of U.S. intelligence agencies.5
On March 18, 2024, the National Institutes of Health released two studies that failed to find any evidence of brain or inner ear damage in victims of Havana Syndrome—a mysterious array of ailments that have befallen U.S. Government personnel in Havana, Cuba, since 2016.6, 7 The results were published in the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and are in stark contrast with two earlier studies published in the same journal in 2018 and 2019 that purported to uncover brain anomalies in American diplomats and intelligence officers who served in Havana.8, 9 While some media outlets are portraying this discrepancy as a deepening mystery, it is nothing of the sort.
The earlier publications were riddled with flaws.10 In fact, the editorial board of the European journal Cortex called for the authors of the 2018 study to clarify their methods or retract the article.11 Their attempt at clarification did little to quell the controversy.12 The NIH study was more comprehensive and took great pains to have a well-matched group of control subjects. The studies were conducted over a five-year period beginning in 2018. Sophisticated MRI scans were taken of the brains of Havana Syndrome participants and compared to a healthy control group of government workers in similar jobs. Some of the control subjects even worked at the American Embassy in Havana.
The Havana Cohort: A Group Under StressA major finding of the new study was that 41 percent of those who reported Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs) “from nearly every geographic area, met the criteria for Functional Neurological Disorders” (FND) or exhibited symptoms indicative of underlying psychological distress.13 It is noteworthy that mass psychogenic illness, which some skeptics have long tied to the episode, is a form of FND. The presence of functional disorders is not surprising because they are commonly triggered by stress and the American staff in Havana were, by any definition, under exceptional stress. They had been counselled that they would be under surveillance 24/7 once they arrived in Havana and later told that they may be targets of a mysterious weapon and to be vigilant for strange sounds and symptoms. They were even warned not to stand or sleep near windows as it could render them vulnerable to an attack. In FNDs the brain structure and hardware are unaffected, but the sending and receiving of messages is disrupted, hence neurologists often refer to it as a software issue.
Havana Syndrome participants also reported more symptoms of depression, fatigue, and post-traumatic stress. The lead author of one of the studies, Dr. Leighton Chan, emphasized that the symptoms in Havana Syndrome patients were “very real, cause significant disruption in the lives of those affected and can be quite prolonged, disabling and difficult to treat.”14 Another member of the research team, neuropsychologist Louis French, noted that the presence of mood symptoms and post-traumatic stress were not unexpected. “Often these individuals have had significant disruption to their lives and continue to have concerns about their health and their future. This level of stress can have significant negative impacts on the recovery process,” he said.15
No Evidence of AttacksAs for the role of a directed energy weapon that has long been proposed as the cause behind the events, Dr. Chan said if an “external phenomenon” such as “a directed energy ‘attack’ is truly involved it seems to create symptoms without persistent or detectable physiologic changes.”16 While the researchers found no evidence of an external source for the symptoms, this does not prove that there wasn’t one, leading one media outlet, the Daily Mail, to suggest that a weapon was likely involved but its presence was undetectable. The newspaper interviewed Georgetown University Neurologist Dr. James Giordano, a persistent critic of the possible role of psychogenic illness in Havana Syndrome victims, who was quick to dispute the findings of FNDs. “Let me be very definitive, we’re not talking about a functional neurological disorder, which is a psychosomatic disorder,” Dr. Giordano said. “We’re talking about a disruption of neurological function, that then created a host of effects, including downstream physiological effects that manifested themselves cognitively, motorically, and behaviorally.”17
Giordano’s position lacks supporting evidence. One could also argue that there was no evidence of extraterrestrial involvement, but that doesn’t prove space aliens weren’t targeting victims with a ray gun. On the weight of evidence, stress appears to have played a major role in the outbreak. While critics like Giordano have jumped on the statement that the symptoms were real and severe as evidence that they were not functional, psychosomatic symptoms are real and can be as severe as any other symptoms and often involve the same brain pathways.18
After release of the NIH reports, one of the world’s leading experts on FNDs, British neurologist Jon Stone, told The Guardian science podcast that this condition was a plausible explanation as many of the patient’s symptoms “got worse over time,” which is typical of a functional disorder. Brain injuries, on the other hand, are typically “worse at the time of the injury, then they slowly improve,” he said. The paper’s world affairs editor Julian Borger was then asked to weigh in. He said that while a “secret weapon” seemed far-fetched, it was equally unlikely that so many diplomats and spies would be affected by psychogenic illness. This response highlights a common misconception of psychogenic disorders: the symptoms are real and can happen to anyone regardless of education level or training.19
The Extraordinary Claims of David RelmanIn 1953, Nobel laureate Irving Langmuir devised the term “pathological science” to refer to instances “where there is no dishonesty involved but where people are tricked into false results by a lack of understanding about what human beings can do to themselves in the way of being led astray by subjective effects, wishful thinking” and the like.20 The history of science is rife with examples of extraordinary claims that were eventually discredited. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries several astronomers, most notably Percival Lowell, claimed to discern through their telescopes a network of canals on Mars. This turned out to be an exercise in the subjective nature of human perception involving Martian geology where people saw what they expected to see. In 1903, French physicist Prosper-René Blondlot claimed to have discovered N-rays, a new form of radiation that turned out to be a product of experimenter bias and self-deception.21, 22 In 1989, chemists Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann created international headlines amid claims they had achieved cold fusion—a limitless source of clean energy. Their experiment turned out to be flawed and could not be reproduced. To this list we should add the name of Stanford microbiologist David Relman.
Media coverage of the NIH studies has been dominated by the lack of evidence for brain damage and the findings of significant stress-related disorders in many of the subjects who reported anomalous health incidents. Considerable attention has been given to Dr. Relman, who was chosen by the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) editors to deliver an accompanying editorial. Relman oversaw two panels that studied the claims of people reporting AHIs and the circumstances surrounding them.23, 24 He contends there is still a mystery surrounding some of the victims and holds the door ajar to the possible involvement of “pulsed radiofrequency energy.” The problem is, the two panels he oversaw showed bias by failing to interview prominent skeptics, ignoring evidence for mundane explanations, and giving considerable weight to unproven claims that supported his pet energy weapon theory. I have previously documented these and other shortcomings in Skeptic, including how one of his panels botched the diagnostic criteria for the presence of psychogenic illness.25, 26, 27 Neither panel conducted a single physical examination of a patient or engaged in any directed testing.28 The decision to choose Relman to write the commentary may be an attempt by the JAMA editorial board to mitigate the damage to their reputation after they published two poorly designed studies that have received much criticism by the scientific community.29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
A bugaboo of Relman is the appearance of “abrupt-onset sensory phenomena” in a subset of patients on which he places great significance.38 In his commentary he mentions these cases while discussing “Havana Syndrome” reports from around the world. He writes: “Most strikingly, these phenomena often displayed strong location dependence, in that they quickly dissipated when the individuals vacated their initial location, and then returned when the location was revisited.” These incidents were followed by such conditions as “vertigo, dizziness, imbalance, blurry vision, tinnitus, headache, nausea, and cognitive dysfunction, sometimes leading to chronic disability.”39 The implication is that they may have been targeted by a directed energy weapon.40
In the press briefing, Dr. Chan said that his team looked at these reports that Relman had flagged as “cases of concern” for intelligence agencies—people who reported an acute onset coinciding with a “strong sense of locality or directionality.” But Chan said he was unable to study them as Relman had not provided the name of a single person involved, and that his definition of “locality or directionality” was not well-defined. Dr. Chan also noted that “cases of concern” were confined to “a really small group of individuals” who were affected very early in the outbreak in Cuba because early on U.S. Embassy personnel were counselled to move away from where they initially experienced symptoms. “If you’re on the X, get off the X,” they were told.41 Cases of concern were first noted in the National Academies of Sciences study that was conducted between 2019 and 2020, and only looked at reports in Cuba and China. If there were later cases of concern identified globally in Relman’s second panel that convened between 2021 and 2022, it was not conveyed to Dr. Chan.42
Why is it that the two panels headed by David Relman uncovered patterns that the American intelligence community—including the CIA and FBI—failed to find? This is a red flag. It is noteworthy that Relman’s panels had limited resources and access to government documents. For instance, in discussing the National Academy of Sciences committee and the attempt to examine cases of concern, he observed: “We did not really have the means to do our own investigation of these cases. We simply collected all that we could from those that had done various and sundry investigations and tried to make the most sense out of it we could.”43
While Relman claims to have found a small group of outliers, why weren’t the names of these victims given to the NIH study authors so they could be examined more closely? If these cases are deemed to be of such significance, why haven’t detailed interviews with these victims been released so others can read the descriptions? How many people are we talking about? The true test of the scientific method is to open your data to outside scrutiny, and in this instance, there is little to scrutinize. The ECREE Principle—extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence—was never more apropos. There are just too many questions surrounding these cases to make the claims that are being asserted. The symptoms in abrupt onset cases can be caused by an array of common conditions. While a sound may appear to be targeted, there is a considerable body of literature on ear-witness testimony, which is notoriously unreliable and subject to error.44 An energy weapon could theoretically produce what is discerned to be a concentrated beam of sound, but so can a cricket rubbing its wings or legs together. We know that some of the reports involving a beam of sound that accompanied early Havana Syndrome victims were recorded during the “attacks,” and later identified as crickets.45, 46 Curiously, Dr. Relman’s commentary was crickets when it came to this alternative explanation.
Occam’s RazorSome media commentators and rogue scientists continue to speculate that a small number of cases in U.S. personnel in both Cuba and later around the world, may have involved a directed energy weapon. Yet, Occam’s razor fits well here. Given two competing explanations, the simplest is the most likely. The entire episode is explainable using conventional psychology, and without recourse to foreign actors and secret weapons. It is noteworthy that the NIH findings are consistent with the conclusions of a report issued in March 2023 by the Director of National Intelligence that found no evidence of sonic or microwave weapons or the involvement of state actors. Instead, intelligence agencies traced the health complaints to an array of pre-existing conditions, environmental factors, and anxiety reactions.47
The appearance of Functional Neurological Disorders in the NIH studies is consistent with the early events in Havana, which suggest a psychological origin. A 2022 interview with CIA officer Fulton Armstrong is revealing. Armstrong was in Havana during the initial “attacks” and says that the man who first reported the mysterious sounds and became known as “patient zero,” had engaged in a zealous campaign to get embassy officials to take the sounds seriously. “He was lobbying, if not coercing, people to report symptoms and connect the dots,” he said.48 This lobbying could have primed other staff to frame future sounds and states of unwellness as an attack by a nefarious state actor. It is also notable that when other staff believed they were under attack from a sonic weapon, they recorded the sounds accompanying them. These sounds were consistent with the mating call of the Indies short-tailed cricket.49
By 2017, the State Department began counselling new staff being posted to Cuba to be vigilant for mysterious sounds and health incidents.50 This counselling created an expectation of illness and provided the frame through which sounds and symptoms were interpreted. Suddenly, mundane events such as a headache, fatigue, insomnia, or tinnitus were perceived as symptoms of a possible attack—a classic setup for psychogenic illness.51 “Patient zero” was pivotal in laying the foundation for the mysterious sounds that were noticed to coincide with subsequent “attacks”—the sounds of crickets. While cricket sounds cannot cause physical sensations such as head pressure and tingling, hearing a cricket sound and fearing it may be emanating from a neuroweapon can trigger anxiety reactions. It is well-known that panic attacks often occur when people visit the same location associated with anxiety or previous attacks.
The Importance of TimingDr. Relman’s “cases of concern” raise many questions. As Dr. Chan observed, they were poorly defined, small in number, and not a single person was identified or further studied. Relman should release the information on each of these cases so their testimony can be scrutinized. The timing is also important. Relman contends that some of the early victims in Cuba were unaware that their colleagues were suffering from Anomalous Health Incidents.52 This claim is not consistent with the known timeline, which begins with so-called patient zero. This early series of events in Havana have been meticulously pieced together using interviews with over three dozen American and foreign officials and confidential government documents.53, 54
Scrutinizing these cases could help clarify the possible role of what psychologists refer to as “retrospective interpretation.” It is plausible that once alerted to their possible targeting by an energy weapon, staff would have thought back to when they arrived in Havana and identified any unusual sounds or medical events. While at the time these incidents were not deemed to have been worthy of seeking medical attention or reporting to their superiors, later, in light of the energy weapon scare, these ambiguous events could have easily been redefined as “attacks.”55
For years Relman has asserted that there was “clear evidence of an injury to the auditory and vestibular system of the brain” in some Havana Syndrome patients.56 This is a reference to a study conducted by University of Miami neurologist Michael Hoffer.57 The vestibular system deals with the workings of the inner ear, spatial awareness, and balance. Neurologist Robert Baloh, who created some of the tests that were used to assess the patients and has written the standard textbook in the field, has steadfastly maintained that Hoffer’s study was riddled with flaws and failed to demonstrate inner ear damage. Among the study flaws was the mystifying decision not to use housemates as a control group, and the notion that a directed energy attack could cause inner ear or brain damage without affecting hearing, which makes no sense.58 That the NIH studies failed to corroborate Hoffer’s findings comes as no surprise. David Relman is an acclaimed microbiologist, but he is not an expert in vestibular medicine. This is a classic example of someone outside of their field of expertise being led astray.
Relman’s attempt to take a small number of cases that are vaguely defined and discussed in passing in both his commentary and in his two panel reports, are essentially lipstick on a pig. No matter how hard you try to alter its appearance, at the end of the day, it’s still a pig. Like Bigfoot, chupacabras, and alien abductions, the evidence is lacking and there are alternative plausible explanations which are firmly grounded in established science.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References1. Acoustic Signals and Physiological Effects on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba, November 2018. Declassified United States Government study. 2. Kirk, J. M. (2019). The strange case of the Havana ‘Sonic Attacks’. International Journal of Cuban Studies, 11(1), 24—42. See p. 27 3. https://bit.ly/4a7JvJY 4. https://bit.ly/49qjQeJ 5. One of the most vocal has been U.S. Senator Marco Rubio. 6. https://bit.ly/43ESTm3 7. https://bit.ly/3VyUDeK 8. https://bit.ly/3TPzPhx 9. https://bit.ly/4cwQM80 10. https://bit.ly/43ziVav 11. https://bit.ly/3PBMoKO 12. https://bit.ly/43uri77 13. https://bit.ly/3VyfKh9 14. ibid. 15. ibid. 16. Chan et al., 2024, op cit., pp. E10—E11. 17. https://bit.ly/3TpaiKE 18. Personal communication with Professor Robert Baloh, Department of Neurology, UCLA Medical School, March 23, 2024. For an excellent overview of FNDs see https://bit.ly/3VBqLyb 19. https://bit.ly/3vpmdAo 20. https://bit.ly/4aaO8mS, quotation on p. 16 reproduced from the original 1953 article with commentary by R.N. Hall. 21. Klotz, Irving M. (1980). “The N-Ray Affair.” Scientific American 242(5):168—175 22. Nye, Mary Jo (1980). N-rays: An Episode in the History and Psychology of Science. Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 11(1):125—156. 23. https://bit.ly/3xdTnne 24. Declassified United States Government Commissioned Report (2022). Anomalous Health Incidents: Analysis of Potential Causal Mechanisms, IC Experts Panel. 25. https://bit.ly/43uvCTP 26. https://bit.ly/4aaQ6ng 27. https://bit.ly/49fvmcy 28. https://bit.ly/3TzPxfH 29. https://bit.ly/43ziVav 30. https://bit.ly/3PCKbiu 31. https://bit.ly/3IY7gbr 32. https://bit.ly/3PyQT8Y 33. https://bit.ly/3PAXnUU 34. Baloh, R.W., and Bartholomew, R.E. (2020). Havana Syndrome: Mass Psychogenic Illness and the Real Story Behind the Embassy Mystery and Hysteria. Copernicus Books. 35. https://bit.ly/3vpoz2c 36. https://bit.ly/498CQhC 37. https://bit.ly/3PBajdI 38. Relman, 2024, op cit., p. E1. 39. Relman, 2024, op cit., p. E1. 40. While Relman writes about the plausibility of the possible role of microwave radiation in his commentary, he has not always been so confident. After the National Academies of Sciences report appeared, he was asked by National Public Radio reporter Sarah McCammon, “How confident are you that microwaves are what’s behind these symptoms?” His response: “We were not confident…we didn’t have any direct evidence that this could explain the entire story for sure or even parts of it…[and] we were not familiar with or read into the exact circumstances of these cases, so we couldn’t comment on the situational information that might have either supported or refuted this idea.” See: https://bit.ly/3x7kTma 41. Myles, R., moderator (2024). “NIH Telebriefing on Publication of Study Findings on Federal Employees with reported Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs) in JAMA.” This embargoed media briefing featured Dr. Leighton Chan, Dr. Carlo Pierpaoli, and Dr. Louis French who answered questions from journalists. 42. Myles, 2024, op cit. 43. https://bit.ly/3TNskaW 44. Öhman, L. (2013). All Ears: Adults’ and Children’s Earwitness Testimony. University of Gothenburg. 45. Acoustic Signals and Physiological Effects on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba, November 2018. Declassified U.S. Government study 46. https://bit.ly/3VwwOUC 47. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Unclassified: National Intelligence Council Updated Assessment on Anomalous Health Incidents, 2023. 48. https://bit.ly/3Tp6PvO 49. Acoustic Signals and Physiological Effects on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba, November 2018. Declassified U.S. Government study. An updated analysis with similar results was published on October 16, 2021 and titled, An Analysis of Data and Hypotheses Related to the Embassy Incidents, JSR-21-01, McLean, Virginia, 143 pp. 50. Oppmann, P., and Labott, E. (2017). “U.S. Diplomats, Families in Cuba Targeted Nearly 50 Times by Sonic Attacks, says U.S. Official.” CNN News, September 23. 51. One Embassy staffer told me: “The Embassy was a tightly-knit community with a very active rumor mill; many people were buzzing about the incidents’ and the related ailments starting as far back as December 2016. We knew as far back as March or April [2017] that doctors were comparing the symptoms to Traumatic Brain Injury. We were absolutely primed to know what the symptoms were. Additionally, many of us were experiencing headaches, mental fog, irritability, etc. —completely understandable given the high stress environment and the fact that we went asleep every night wondering whether we’d be zapped in our beds, and consequently lay awake for hours at a time, days on end, stretching into weeks and months.” 52. Merchant, 2021, op cit. 53. https://bit.ly/3TNFkNU 54. Baloh and Bartholomew (2020). pp. 29—37. These are highly respected journalists and Golden has won two Pulitzer Prizes for his reporting prowess. 55. The NIH study found that the first reported AHI occurred in 2015. All previous investigations had placed the date as late 2016. But this does not mean we should push back the start of ‘Havana Syndrome’ to 2015. Once American staff were interviewed about their AHIs, they would have been asked to recount any unusual health incidents or sounds that they experienced since arriving in Havana. As the U.S. Embassy was reopened under Obama in 2015, it is conceivable that any mysterious sounds or health complaints that were recalled during this period, could have easily been relabelled after the fact as an incident or ‘attack.’ That at least one person reported an AHI in 2015 should receive no great significance. 56. See, for example: https://bit.ly/4aaRIxk; see also, Merchant, 2021, op cit. 57. https://bit.ly/3TP84pv 58. Baloh and Bartholomew (2020). op cit.
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” —Theodosius Dobzhansky
Why can one person smoke and drink heavily into their 90s while another dies from cancer in their 40s? Why are we fat? Why does a suntan look and feel so good if it is bad for us? Why is alternative medicine so popular? Do vaccines work and are they safe? Do toxins in our food cause cancer?
In this article I outline the emerging field of Evolutionary Medicine, looking at how our Stone Age ancestors lived, got sick, and got well over millions of years, and pointing to how we can live longer, healthier, and happier lives today.
As a skeptic, I have learned to often question ideas that are accepted as “common knowledge.” As a physician, I know that some of the drugs and treatments that we are encouraged to use today are only marginally useful at times and sometimes even toxic. Where does evolution come in? I have found that applying evolutionary thinking to common medical knowledge can provide us with fresh insight into the cause and cure of common diseases.
Evolutionary medicine draws insights from three areas of scientific research: (1) archaeologists’ ongoing discoveries about the lives of our paleolithic ancestors; (2) anthropologists’ observations of modern humans living in cultures that have changed little since the Stone Age; and (3) findings of molecular geneticists that have unraveled the story told by our DNA.
These studies have led to fundamental changes in our understanding of what it means to be healthy. We now know that many problems we experience today are, in fact, understandable in terms of the natural capacities that helped us survive in earlier times. Evolutionary medicine can expose many fallacies behind commonly accepted medical practices and the quackery that fosters popular health fads.
What is Evolutionary Medicine?Some time ago I was invited to co-teach a course in Evolutionary Medicine at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Professors of parasitology and evolutionary biology, Armand Kuris and Bob Warner, explained that they needed a “real doctor” in the class because their knowledge of human disease and medical treatment was understandably limited. Since inviting a practicing physician to join the mix aligns with the interdisciplinary approach for which UCSB has become known, how could I refuse?
We were fortunate to use the just-published Why We Get Sick as the course text. In it, evolutionary theorist George Williams and psychiatrist Randolph Nesse merged their knowledge of health and disease with emerging archaeology and evolutionary biology to begin answering questions about why rather than simply how we get sick.
It soon became impossible to avoid seeing my own patients as the not-so-distant descendants of our Stone Age forbears. From allergies to the most terrifying cancer, from the ravages of mental illness to the most mysterious autoimmune disease, Darwinian evolution was no longer simply an elegant theory. I was seeing its consequences daily: in the diseases from which my patients suffered but also in how they could be healed.
When I began to share these evolutionary insights with my patients—for example, how we heal from a sprained ankle or why so many people struggle with diabetes— it didn’t take long to see positive effects. These conversations often helped patients develop an entirely new approach to problems from which they’d long suffered as significant improvements in their health soon followed.
The Primal DietConsider your teeth. Many of the best-preserved fossils we have found are teeth. That’s because tooth enamel is the hardest, longest lasting substance in the body. These fossils reveal that Stone Age teeth had a rough time of it, undergoing wear and tear as tools for cutting and grinding and chewing many hours a day. Remarkably, however, they had few cavities, the number one dental problem we have today! Since cavemen didn’t have toothbrushes, fluoridated water, dental floss, or dentists, why were their teeth so healthy?
The answer is diet. The bacteria that rot teeth feed mainly on sugars. Unlike proteins and fats, sugars are tiny and sticky. Streptococcus mutans, the main bacterial culprit in tooth decay, lives in the crevices around our teeth and turns sugar into lactic acid that then erodes the surrounding dental enamel, leaving holes—or cavities—in which more bacteria can live. We know from genetic studies that S. mutans has existed in its current form for several million years. It has found a good niche, so why mutate?
When fibrous roots, sour fruits, and occasional honey were the only scarce carbohydrates in a paleolithic person’s diet, these bacteria found very little to feed on. In contrast, our modern diet, overloaded as it is with simple carbs and sugary sodas, offers a bacterial paradise. It’s no surprise, then, that dental cavities are the most widespread chronic disease of childhood in the world today.
This understanding about dental hygiene leads to one of the most frequent and important questions I hear in my practice. What should I eat? Our early human ancestors spent several million years gathering and chasing down every bite of food they ate. The reason we covet sweet, salty, and greasy foods today is that they are important for survival and were rare. Not so today. Simply by reaching into the refrigerator, in a few minutes we can snag all the calories we need to get through the day. We know that eating too much is bad for us, but we seem powerless to stop.
The problem is not just a lack of willpower. We spend billions of dollars a year on foods low in carbohydrates, fats, and sugars or high in vitamins, antioxidants, or omega-3 fatty acids—hoping they will help us lose weight. We dish out billions more on diets, unused gym memberships, surgery, and appetite suppressing injections. Meanwhile, our healthcare system is burdened with hundreds of billions spent on obesity-related illnesses. Gluttony may be a vice, but overeating is an epidemic fed by wholly modern myths about food.
In the past 50 years, we’ve witnessed a tidal wave of obesity as nutritionists, doctors and food manufacturers promoted a fear of fatty foods. But low fat doesn’t mean low in calories. And calories count. Making food with less fat often means packing in more carbohydrates to make it appealing. A low-fat label gives us the false impression that we can eat as much of these “harmless, healthy” foods as we want. But if there were an easy diet that really worked, we’d all know about it. We’d all be thin. The fact that so many diet books sell each year is all the evidence we need that none of them is universally effective.
What did our ancestors eat? We can calculate that to get enough calories our earliest primate ancestors spent up to 12 hours a day finding, chewing, and grinding mostly plant-based foods, much as gorillas do today. As they evolved, their diet expanded to include berries, grubs, fruits, eggs, mushrooms, and the occasional small animal when they could catch one. They were omnivores. We estimate that our ancestors consumed up to 300 different foods in a typical week; today we average about 30.
Many of the roots and vegetables on which ancestral humans thrived were loaded with what your mom might call roughage. Stone Age fruit bore little resemblance to today’s plump, sweet, and juicy produce. An apple then looked and tasted more like today’s hard crabapple. Berries were small, and archaic citrus fruits would make a sour lime taste sweet in comparison. Along with honey and later primitive grains, these fruits were the main source of carbohydrates. Before the advent of agriculture barely 12,000 years ago, most foods contained very few starchy carbs. Before people began cultivating wheat, corn, and rice, the wild versions of these grains grew sparsely, had thick husks, and produced few kernels containing little starch. Root crops were tough and required a lot of chewing. Nuts were tiny and bitter, more like today’s acorns. Fruits were scrawny, fibrous, and none too sweet.
Evolutionary Prescription for a Healthy Diet* Forget about a low-fat diet. Go low-carb instead. Minimize bread, cereal, pasta, potatoes, rice, beans, and other grains. None were on the menu in the Paleolithic. * Maintain a healthy weight and avoid obesity by restricting the number of calories you’re ingesting to what you burn. * Be omnivorous. Eat a wide variety of foods to ensure you get all the vitamins and minerals you need—without taking vitamin pills or supplements. * In the absence of gnawing on bones like a caveman, include dairy products and root vegetables for calcium. * If you are vegetarian for ethical reasons, you have to be very careful to avoid nutritional deficiencies, especially in children. * Throw all rules out the window on your birthday and other special occasions. Eat whatever you want and enjoy it. Since fruit and grains appeared for only a few weeks each year, it was vital for our ancestors to eat as much of them as possible when available, before the birds, insects, and other animals could get to them. When fruit ripened, early humans gorged themselves until they were stuffed—then ate again an hour or two later. As a result, our ancestors evolved a nearly insatiable craving for carbohydrates. The only limit was the size of their stomachs, and those could stretch to accommodate the seasonal abundance.
During times of plenty, Stone Age people ate a whole lot more each day than they needed. Those whose bodies were better at storing up those extra calories as fat, bought some insurance for any lean times ahead and passed on their genes for getting fat on to the next generation. This cycle of abundance and want lasted for millions of years. We are its inheritors.
Paleoanthropologists love to debate, “Which came first, bigger brains or more protein in the diet?” We do know that as our ancestors became cleverer, they became better hunters. (Hunting and tracking may indeed be the evolutionary basis for our ability to think scientifically, but that is another, long story.) Eating animals added protein and fat to their diets, providing more calories often for less effort than eating plants. Before farming changed everything, abundant meat was the main course for hundreds of thousands of years.
Taming fire, roughly one million years ago, was a key evolutionary event. Cooking breaks down starch and proteins, making them easier to chew and digest. More energy became available from every bite. Quickly, time spent chewing dropped from 12 to 3 hours a day. This may have been the advent of leisure; time to sit around the fire and tell stories, sing, and pass along knowledge.
Only a few hundred thousand years after harnessing fire, early hominids set out on their first great migrations around the globe. Humans loved meat. In areas where game was abundant, some settled for tens of thousands of years. When meat became scarce, because of a changing climate, overhunting, or just bad luck, it was time to pick up stakes and search for happier hunting grounds. The disappearance of many species of large animals such as massive marsupials in Australia, ground sloths in North America, and bison, elk, and aurochs in Europe, followed the spread of modern humans.
By the late Stone Age, around 50,000 years ago, Homo sapiens emerged as accomplished and resourceful hunters. Studies show they got around half their calories from meat and fat, 40 percent from roots and vegetables, and 10 percent from fruits and berries. These humans, with bodies and brains similar to yours and mine, ate very well. It is from this time that we have evidence of the first obese people. There probably weren’t many of them, but a few were able to lead pampered, sedentary lives, supported by the advancing skills of the growing tribe. Sculpted images of enormously obese women, known as “Venus” figurines, are among the earliest surviving works of art, carved more than 30,000 years ago. Of course, we don’t know the exact meaning these images held for their late Stone Age makers, but it is likely that they were expressions of beauty, or at least attractiveness. Fat women have been cherished for their fertility in most cultures until very recently. “Survival of the fittest” might be better expressed as “reproduction of the fattest.”
Some hormones evolved to shut down our appetites when we had eaten enough fats and proteins. That is why fatty foods are so “satisfying.” However, others, such as GLP-1—the hormone that the new weight loss drugs Wegovy and Ozempic mimic so effectively—are released by sugar and carbs in our diet. They trigger the production of insulin and in our past helped us to pack away those excess carb calories as fat. In higher doses (mimicked by the weight loss injections) they slow down movement of food through the gut, making us feel “full” and thus suppressing our appetite.
Germ WarfareDrop the word infection into any conversation and watch ears prick up. Mention diarrhea or COVID, and people will begin to edge away. Measles, mumps, or mononucleosis get little reaction any longer. However, up the ante with herpes, tuberculosis, or syphilis, and you can sense people starting to squirm. Invoke pus, bleeding, or plague, and you are edging beyond the bounds of polite conversation.
Most of us have a primal fear of infectious diseases, for good reason. Alongside medicine’s stellar achievements of the past few centuries—hygiene, antibiotics, vaccines, and vastly safer childbirth—many microbes have battled humans to a draw, and some are even gaining ground. As soon as we conquer one infectious disease, another seems to take its place. We defeat smallpox, arm-by-inoculated-arm, and HIV comes out swinging. COVID-19, a more lethal cousin of the common cold, caused us to apply dampers to the world economy for months. We are in an evolutionary arms race with no end in sight. As the human population rises, there are more hosts for our microscopic enemies to attack.
Even with the discovery of antibiotics less than a century ago, bacteria, parasites, and viruses have not retreated. Within a year of the first use of penicillin, some germs were found to resist it. And while vaccines have loosened the stranglehold once held on us by measles, mumps, hepatitis, and polio, as yet we have no shots to prevent HIV, herpes, West Nile, or a horde of other viruses. In the tropics, new strains of influenza emerge annually from animal hosts and spread at jet speed onto the wider world stage.
On the home front, patients come to me every day sneezing and coughing, aching and fevered, hoping an antibiotic will provide a quick fix. Sadly, these drugs have no effect against viral infections and, when used inappropriately, breed drug-resistant bacteria in our bodies. At the same time, some people worry that vaccines against the killer diseases of childhood actually damage their children. They resist immunizations, depending on others to get the shots that derail an epidemic.
Fighting infections has never been easy. Microbes invade our bodies and evade our immune systems in clever ways that science is still deciphering. In the past, they jumped from person to person, while today they leapfrog from city to city. They are nimble adversaries. Evolution happens when genes mutate and spread to the next generation—and many bacteria produce a new generation every 90 minutes!
Nevertheless, working in our favor are the very Stone Age defenses we often misunderstand. Our healthy skin, thick mucus, fever, inflammation, and antibodies are the body’s first responders on the front lines of the fight against infections. We suppress them at our peril. Understanding how our cave-dwelling forebears survived such onslaughts, long before they could reach for a bottle of pills, can teach us how to respond better to infections today.
A Few Paleolithic Symptoms That Have Lingered OnCoughing evolved to clear our airway of foreign particles—dust blown by the wind, smoke from a fire, and food inhaled when we meant to swallow. By forcefully expelling air from our lungs, coughing gets the grime out. A sneeze serves a slightly higher purpose.
Mucus, or phlegm, is also a defense mechanism. This complex and wonderful concoction of proteins and other gooey stuff entraps and disarms germs, helping us to swallow them into our stomachs where powerful acids wait to destroy them.
Evolutionary Prescription for Weight Loss Eat fewer calories. * Eat fatty foods and proteins to satisfy your hunger, rather than starchy, sugary ones. Fats and proteins trigger satiety hormones and take more time to digest. * Fool your Stone Age appetite by filling up on bulky, low-calorie vegetables such as celery, radishes, and salads. Also, drinking warm liquids such as chicken broth can trick your body into feeling full for a while. * Watch out for fruit juice and sodas. They are mostly sugar and water. * Exercise because it’s enjoyable and healthy, but don’t rely on it to shed weight. You’d have to exercise for hours to work off a single sugary soda. * Eat meals whatever time of day you want to. A calorie is a calorie no matter when you eat it. What happens when we are confronted with a cold virus? A virus is really very simple. It’s just a bundle of genes, wrapped in a protein coat. All it needs is to find a good place, i.e., you, in which to set up housekeeping, make a few million copies of itself, and then move on. For contagious diseases, it’s the moving on that matters. If they can’t get out of us to a new victim, they die out. Cold viruses such as COVID are spread on airborne droplets of moisture when we cough. Making us cough, by irritating our airways, is the evolutionary tactic a virus uses to spread itself.* Diarrhea is a similar strategy of gut viruses, the “stomach bug.”
Well-meaning parents often encourage their sick children to “cough it up” to clear phlegm out of their airways. However, coughing actually irritates our airways. It’s like scratching an itch. The more you scratch, the more irritated it gets. Coughing actually makes a sore throat worse and spreads the virus to others. We are playing right into the virus’s hands.
Sneezing is even worse. Have you ever seen the famous photo of a sneeze, spraying droplets ten feet across a room? Sneezing serves the virus’s purpose by loading them on an express flight to the next victim—our children, coworkers, spouses, or strangers. This is why masks are useful in stopping the spread of airborne viruses. To really be helpful, however, you need a really good mask, such as an N95, made of multiple layers of hydrophobic filters that stop the droplets from ever reaching your nose.
When you feel the need to cough, don’t let the virus win. Suppress it. By drinking a small amount of liquid, you can help your body eliminate the germs by ingesting them. At the same time, you will prevent the irritation and swelling that coughing brings. Sometimes you can’t help but cough. In those cases, your mom had it right: Cover your mouth. Not just a polite hand in front of the face— really press your hand or inner elbow over your mouth to seal off any air from coming out. (And then be sure to wash your hand—thoroughly). This decreases the rapid flow that irritates your airway as well as stops the spread of germs. This was common advice 50 years ago when coughing around others was considered impolite at best.
Unfortunately, all the over-the-counter cough remedies containing dextromethorphan (the DM in Robitussin-DM) and other ingredients don’t do much. They coat your throat, but they don’t help suppress coughing. Without any evidence they are effective, we spend billions a year on cold remedies such as Echinacea, Airborne, vitamin C, Dayquil, Nyquil, antihistamines, decongestants, cough suppressants, and fever reducers that do nothing to shorten the infection and have minimal effect on the symptoms. Some even work against the healing process.
When we take an antihistamine to dry up the sniffles, it limits the mucus available to help engulf the virus. The sole over-the-counter expectorant used in the United States, guaifenesin, thins mucus, which makes it less effective at trapping bacteria. Codeine-based cough suppressants, now very hard to come by, can help and are useful when simply making an effort to suppress the cough fails, especially at night when we need to sleep.
The most effective way to defeat a cold virus is to recognize that we are all in this together. Once we’re infected, washing our hands and covering up when sneezing or coughing is the kindest thing we can do for others. Rest, stay hydrated, and let your immune system do what it evolved to do. When a true cure for the common cold comes along, it won’t need to be advertised or sold in alluring packages at the checkout counter. It will be obvious to all of us because of how well it works, every time. And then, like polio and smallpox, colds will be history.
You Give Me FeverIf evolution is a long war between us and germs, then a cold is a daily skirmish on the front line. While viruses reproduce quickly, our bodies react more slowly. It can take days for our immune system to mobilize specific antibodies to fight a virus.
Over millennia, we evolved a quicker response. Germs are adapted to infect us when our body temperature is normal. By turning up our internal thermostat when we first detect an infection, our bodies make it harder for the virus to grow. Shivering probably evolved to warm us when we got cold. A shaking “chill” making us hot—called a rigor in medicine—is often our first line of defense. When we feel a chill, we want to take to our beds because that is exactly what we should do. If we take a fever reducer, such as aspirin or Tylenol, we can suppress the fever and may feel well enough to be up and around. This can divert energy our body needs to fight off the infection—and affords the virus many more opportunities to spread to others.
Increasing our temperature also speeds up the activity and circulation of disease-fighting white blood cells. In early mammals, those who responded to microbe invasion by developing a fever and limiting their activity would have survived better and passed on these defenses to their descendants. It makes evolutionary sense that children get hotter faster than adults. Kids are more likely to run into germs they have never encountered before and to which they have no immunity. They need the quick general defense a fever can muster.
If a fever provides an evolutionary advantage for a near naked primate, what happens when we bundle up in blankets? We can cause our temperature to rise higher than it naturally would and so overshoot the safety mark. Exceeding 103F (39.5C) degrees can do more harm than good. Extreme temperatures can lead to seizures in children and dehydration and worse in adults. Taking a fever reducer such as aspirin, acetaminophen (Tylenol), ibuprofen (Advil and Motrin), or naproxen (Aleve) is entirely appropriate in these conditions. These medications all short-circuit our body’s natural ability to raise a fever.
Is there any sense in the old saying, “feed a cold and starve a fever”? When we have a simple cold, eating has been shown to quadruple the production of the virus-fighting hormone interferon. When we start to get hot, however, it’s not food we need but fluids. It’s no coincidence that a fever kills our appetite. Fluids trigger the production of interleukin-4, which works particularly well against many of the bacteria that cause fevers. The return of hunger is usually a sign that you are getting better.
A Paradox of PreventionPolio offers a good example of how “progress” can inadvertently help a virus to spread in a way that evolution couldn’t. Polio is a virus that usually grows in our guts. When excreted, it survives for weeks in freshwater pools and stagnant ponds.
Throughout history, infants who were exposed to the virus early in life while they were still protected by antibodies in their mothers’ milk, usually experienced only a mild infection. Fewer than one in a thousand had the paralytic form associated with the epidemics of the last century.
Paradoxically, modern hygiene in the late nineteenth century prevented infants from ingesting water contaminated with the virus while still breastfeeding. Coming in contact with that virus later in life in swimming pools or ponds, at a time when they were no longer protected by maternal antibodies, caused them to contract the much more serious paralytic form of the disease. By 1900, small epidemics of paralytic polio began to appear throughout the industrialized world. By 1952, with breastfeeding at a minimum and better sanitation more widely practiced, polio infected thousands of children who had failed to acquire immunity in infancy. At its peak in 1950, the epidemic paralyzed 60,000 people a year.
A vaccine developed in 1952 by Jonas Salk arrested the spread of the disease within a few years. Polio is now almost wiped out. However, certain religious and political objections still hamper universal use of the vaccine.
Other diseases that could be eradicated, linger on—mumps, measles, chickenpox, and hepatitis. As vaccination has made certain childhood infections so uncommon in Western countries, some people have become comfortable with not vaccinating their children. These parents are counting on the immunity of those who do get vaccinated (herd immunity) to prevent the spread of these childhood illnesses to their own kids.
Evolutionary Prescription for Toxins* Be very careful with the dose of all drugs—prescription, over-the-counter and recreational. All can be toxic. * Unfortunately, alcohol is a toxin. Newer evidence suggests the less the better. * Get all the vitamins you need from sunshine and a healthy diet, not pills or supplements. Vitamins are essential but can be toxic in large doses. * Don’t worry about toxins in peanut butter. * Don’t obsess about buying “organic.” As far as your health is concerned, there is no difference between organic and nonorganic. Remember measles? Measles ranks high on the list of all-time lethal diseases. By some estimates, measles wiped out up to a third of all the people along the trade routes of the Middle Ages—and that was even before the European Age of Exploration opened vast new territories for the virus. In the past 150 years it has killed 200 million people—including 128,000 in 2021, most under the age of five.
The measles virus evolves very slowly. With so many innocent immune systems to infect in the past, it didn’t need to change much to find plenty of hosts. Luckily, it’s easier to make vaccines for slower-changing viruses because they are so stable. Faster-changing viruses, such as COVID, HIV, and influenza, form more elusive moving targets.
Today, many of us have forgotten how dangerous many formerly common infections were. Measles was a worldwide scourge. Mumps can make men sterile. Rubella can cause birth defects when it infects a pregnant woman. One vaccine, MMR, prevents all three. Diphtheria and Whooping Cough (Pertussis) were once dread diseases of childhood. Tetanus kills. Here too a single vaccine, DPT, prevents all three. Smallpox, which killed 300 million people in the last century, has now been eradicated by a worldwide vaccine campaign.
By skipping vaccination, some parents hope their children will dodge a risk. However, serious side effects of the vaccine occur at a much lower frequency than serious complications of the disease. Fears once raised that measles vaccine causes autism have been thoroughly debunked.
If enough people avoid vaccination, those once serious diseases will continue to evolve and come roaring back. Mumps and whooping cough are returning to the United States. Polio is still making its crippling rounds. Skipping vaccination is a terrible gamble. When these viruses strike, unvaccinated children are the first to fall.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the science of vaccination became even more politicized. This is unfortunate because priming our immune systems to recognize and fight off infections is one of the most effective and least harmful methods of protection we have. In the Stone Age, every infection set off a race between the “bugs” and our defenses. Vaccines activate this age-old system by injecting tiny amounts of weakened strains of these germs, allowing us to be forearmed.
The Not So Common ColdColds are caused by viruses—not by being out in cold weather or getting tired or soaked with rain. Understanding the evolutionary origins of viruses can help us stop them in their tracks. Most cold viruses evolved in enormous prehistoric populations of migrating birds and beasts. Because there were millions of animals in these flocks and herds, viruses could spread from one individual to another, never needing to infect the same creature twice—much like a wave spreading across the water.
By contrast, our paleolithic ancestors lived in isolated bands of a few dozen people. Archaeologists estimate that as recently as 70,000 years ago there were only 10,000 humans alive on the entire planet. Each family or clan clung together as closely as possible, seldom interacting with other groups. Stealing food or mates posed too great a risk to encourage much contact. So even if an animal virus managed to infect a person, it was very difficult for it to spread beyond the group it first entered. The common cold was not so common back in the Stone Age. Clearly, we aren’t going to solve the problem of colds by going back to living in isolated tribes. However, the insights of evolutionary medicine can help in arresting the rapid spread of these and other viruses in our modern world.
Under the InfluenzaInfluenza, the “flu,” kills around 400,000 people worldwide, and 36,000 people in North America—most years. In flu pandemics, which occur every 20 years or so, tens of millions die.
As with the common cold viruses, the earliest humans didn’t have enough contact with other groups to allow the flu to spread. Yoshiyuki Suzuki (Oxford University), who studies the evolution of influenza, estimates the first flu epidemics in humans occurred no earlier than 8,000 years ago. This coincided with the development of farming and village life, when people, fowl, and pigs first began living cheek by beak by jowl.
Unlike the more stable measles, mumps, and chickenpox viruses, the flu virus changes its outward appearance (that is, it evolves) rapidly. Shrouded in an ever-varying coat of proteins, like a shape-shifter in a science fiction novel, it cloaks itself in order to hide from our immune systems. However, once it gets past our defenses, it always causes the same miserable symptoms—high fever for days, severe body aches, a racking cough, and nasal congestion. It’s like a cold, only much worse.
Flu’s ability to change its surface coat so rapidly forces us to come up with a revised flu vaccine every year. Modern medicine maintains a constant watch for emerging strains in order to predict which to include in the following year’s vaccine. Before the advent of annual flu vaccines, many more people got sick and died of the flu every year, especially those over 60.
Occasionally, farmers and food handlers are infected with a strain of flu derived from another animal at the same time they have a human flu virus in them. When this happens, the two kinds of flu can merge to become an entirely new strain. The combined virus is often better at infecting us because we have no antibodies that recognize its novel appearance. This is how the avian flu pandemics of 1918, 1957, 1968 and the swine flu pandemic of 2009 occurred, and also why some people think COVID-19 originated in a live animal food market in China. (Doing justice to the debate between the “wet market” and the alternative “lab leak” theory of the origin of COVID-19 requires a separate article).
Quarantine, an early scientific method for halting the spread of disease, yields excellent results—if it is done quickly enough. That’s how SARS, the first well-known Coronavirus, was stopped in 2003. With proper public health policies in place, and enough people who take them seriously, we could likely contain any newly emerging virus within weeks, even a novel strain of the flu, without relying on vaccines. However, quarantine is expensive, inconvenient, and may even deprive people of some rights or even their livelihood for a short period. Still, that price would be minuscule compared to the devastation of a full-blown pandemic such as we have recently experienced.
On the home front, the best way to protect ourselves is to be clear about how such germs spread. Not being “part of the herd” and not going out in public when we are sick can go a long way toward stopping the spread. Covering our mouths when we cough or wearing effective masks helps a lot, as does thoroughly washing with plain old soap and water. Washing is a lot more effective than hand sanitizer, which doesn’t kill all types of viruses or even fully remove them from our hands.
Toxins and CancerMany things in our world are toxic. Radium, benzene, arsenic, and asbestos are widely known to cause cancer, but most of us are rarely exposed to them. On the other hand, smoking, drinking, obesity, and excess sun exposure together account for about 50 percent of all cancers.
The most significant food toxin known to cause cancer in humans is Aflatoxin, a fungal byproduct found in moldy peanuts. It contributes to the occurrence of liver cancer, mostly in parts of Africa and Asia where the hepatitis B virus, a cofactor for this cancer, is prevalent and moldy food is common. Yet, if you search online, you will find a long list of alleged cancer-causing culprits, including soda, hydrogenated oils, microwave popcorn, farmed fish, refined sugar, white flour, pickled, salted or smoked foods, and grilled red meat. We frequently hear that some common chemical such as the sweetener we use in our coffee “causes cancer.” None of these claims is backed by scientific evidence.
Evolutionary Prescription for Cancer* Watch your weight. Obesity hikes the odds of several cancers. * Exercise at least 30 minutes a day, three times a week, to lower your general risk of cancer by about 10 percent. * Keep vitamin D levels up to snuff by getting 30 minutes of sun three days a week on parts of your body not usually exposed. * Don’t smoke. You’ll decrease your lifetime risk of lung cancer by 90 percent and your overall risk of dying of any cancer by 25 percent. * Get a colonoscopy after age 50. You’ll decrease the risk of dying from colon cancer by 80 percent. * Lower your chance of getting some cancers by a third by saying no to antioxidant and vitamin supplements—particularly A, C and E. * Girls and young women: Say yes to the new HPV vaccine. It reduces the risk of cervical cancer by 95 percent. When scientists say a chemical “may cause cancer,” it usually means it was tested and found to damage the DNA of a bacteria or cause tumors in rats. However, such research uses doses hundreds or thousands of times what a person would ingest, pound-for-pound. And rats are genetically different from you and me. They get cancer very easily and that’s why we use them for tests. Just showing that a toxin causes cancer in rats, or abnormal changes in bacteria or cells in a Petri dish, doesn’t come close to demonstrating it will do so in humans. Our livers are three times the size of the whole rat and work hard to protect us. Please don’t misunderstand what I’m saying. I am a scientist. I trust good evidence. However, not all research is done well and we must remain skeptical—though not cynical—especially of fear-inducing claims.
Since we can’t ethically test toxins on humans, we look for “natural experiments”—groups of people exposed to a chemical at work or by accident. We then compare them against a similar but unexposed group to see what effects these toxins have. Beyond a few well-studied carcinogens—and Erin Brockovich’s cinematic arguments about a cancer cluster—there is scant linkage between trace toxins in our environment or food and cancer or other illnesses.
Your plastic water bottle, for example, won’t give you cancer. If it did, we would have detected thousands, indeed millions, of cancer cases already. The same is true for tap water. There’s no credible evidence that food preservatives, deodorant, stress, aluminum, processed foods, aspartame (Equal), or saccharin (Sweet’N Low) cause cancer. If you examine the reports carefully you will see that they are usually based on extrapolating from experiments on cells or animals given huge relative doses and always contain qualifiers such as “can” or “may” cause cancer.
We have always lived in a world chock full of poisons, and we have evolved potent defenses against the natural threats we’ve encountered in our long ascent from the primordial swamp. Our not so fragile forebears thrived among greater toxic threats than we might imagine. Why do some things smell and taste “bad”? Often it’s because they were bad for us. Our tough skin, hardy livers, and purifying kidneys evolved to neutralize many toxins that passed the nose test to make their way past this first line of defense.
Meanwhile, there is no shortage of products being offered to help our bodies “cleanse” ourselves of toxins by using homeopathy, chelation, or colonics. We can buy “probiotics” to counter the antibiotic we took when we had a cold. (The marketers don’t mention that all yogurts have these bacteria—it’s what makes them yogurt in the first place.) We can sweat in saunas, chill in ice baths, soak in spas, or spend money on supplements—all in the name of “cleansing.”
Is there any real evidence that people who make such efforts are healthier than the rest of us? Not one bit. Contrary to countless celebrity testimonials, decades of research provide zero evidence that using any detoxifying products actually improves health or prevents cancer.
Dodging CancerThere’s a good evolutionary reason why we heal so well from wounds and infections but have trouble fending off cancer. Natural selection, the weeding out of harmful traits, has a hard time acting on illnesses that occur later in life. By the time most cancers appear, people have usually finished having children. A cancer predisposition that appears only after our reproductive years gets a free pass to the next generation.
Children do get cancers, of course. Terrible as these cases are, fortunately they are rare compared to other causes of death. Most cancers occur in older people. The single most important reason cancer is increasing in the developed world is because we are living longer, not because of toxins in our food and environment.
Cancer still kills one in six people worldwide, but that means 84 percent of us will die of something else. In less-developed countries where life expectancy is shorter, most people die of infections and accidents, as in times past. In those places, cancers don’t even make it into the top ten causes of death.
While research has made significant progress against certain cancers, our fear leaves plenty of openings for a Pandora’s box of alternative therapies. This has always been the case with poorly understood diseases. In the days before the discovery of the poliovirus, rumor attributed polio to everything from fleabites to airborne toxins, insecticides, and poverty. When the vaccine came along, some people thought it was the cause. Many of these same suspects are blamed for cancer today.
One popular theory suggests that a diet low in fiber causes colon cancer. This idea arose from a 1979 book that reported a lower rate of colon cancer in men in Africa than in the West. The author attributed this to their high-fiber diet and using a squatting posture during defecation. He forgot to take into account that men in Africa die younger than men in the West, and the rate of colon cancer increases as we age. A meta-analysis of more than 80,000 participants demonstrated that fiber doesn’t prevent colon cancer. Still the myth lives on in health food stores and breakfast cereal ads.
Antioxidants are now popularly claimed to prevent cancer (as well as aging, heart disease, and “inflammation”). These molecules do limit oxidation, a kind of cell damage that can contribute to cancer—in the lab. Remember, however, oxidants and free radicals are part of how our cells fight off infection and clear damaged cells from our bodies! When tested in people, there is no evidence that antioxidants—including beta carotene, lycopene, acai berries, cumin, turmeric, or vitamins A, C or E—can prevent cancer. Vitamin A in excess can cause liver damage, osteoporosis, hair loss, dry skin, and birth defects. It seems our bodies make all the antioxidants we need, so supplementing them can make matters worse. Studies done in actual people, not Petri dishes, show that excess vitamin E, folic acid, and beta-carotene can actually increase the risk of cancer.
Vitamin SupplementsOur Stone (and Iron, Bronze, Middle, and Steam) Age ancestors survived without ever taking vitamin pills, but it wasn’t always easy. In hard times, especially when they roamed into new territory, experienced harsh winters, droughts, and floods, food could be hard to find. Their bodies evolved to be very good at absorbing whatever vitamins they needed, especially when they were in short supply. We inherited this ability to store most vitamins for times of scarcity.
Today, of course, we can buy a plethora of vitamins and minerals off the shelf, mixed in myriad combinations. Some of us gulp down enough to choke a horse. This is a high-risk endeavor because an excess of certain vitamins (A, D, E, and K) can be toxic. Some of our legislators are enthusiastic supporters (read: on the payroll) of the vitamin industry. Vitamins are sold as “dietary supplements,” not as drugs, and are largely unregulated. There are no safety inspections or uniform requirements for those who manufacture or market them, and therefore no guarantee you are getting what you pay for.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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The only real proof we need for the benefit of vitamin pills should be that taking them makes us healthier. However, people who take them, in small or mega doses, are sick just as often and have just as many other illnesses as those who don’t. Of the 13 known vitamins, six can be taken in overdose. Every year more than 60,000 people in the United States overdose on vitamins—80 percent of them are children under the age of six.
If you eat a variety of unprocessed food you get all the vitamins, minerals, and antioxidants you need. Let your body do all it evolved to do, and you will get just the amounts you need.
Alternative MedicineMany “alternative” therapies, such as acupuncture, massage, Reiki, homeopathy, aromatherapy, naturopathy, and ayurveda promise to make us well while causing less harm than medicine. Do they work?
As most doctors and some alternative practitioners know, most people who seek medical attention get better on their own, no matter what we do to them. This is because most illnesses are mild and self-limiting. Still, many of us are not content with letting nature take its course. When we feel a sniffle, we reach for some over the counter medicine. None can make us better. When we get better, we want to believe it was because of what we took.
We spend billions each year on brand named pills and folk remedies that have lingered from earlier times. They became popular in the same manner as do all superstitions. One person tried them, got better, and believes the treatment worked. They pass this along through retelling and retailing, and so a so-called cure is born.
Alternative medicine practitioners now use TikTok, YouTube, Facebook and X (Twitter) to speed the spread of their “cures.” Although some of these practices are actually harmful, the false hope they offer to the seriously ill is misleading at best and criminal at worst. Sadly, modern medicine has sometimes been little better, pushing marginally useful pills or physical therapy on us when time and a better understanding of the natural process of healing would accomplish just as much—and at less risk and a lower cost.
What’s Next?If you find this approach intriguing, I urge you to look further into what evolution has to say about how we heal from injuries, why allergies are more common today than in earlier times, how much sleep we really need, who we find sexually attractive, the benefits of grandparents, how many periods should a woman have in her lifetime, why morning sickness was good for us, why we get depressed, the advantages of Attention Deficit Disorder, what use are emotions, the origins of anxiety, whether cholesterol is really bad for us, why do so many people need glasses, how does sickle cell disease protect some people from malaria, and what can we do to live longer healthier lives. These topics and dozens more are the subject of the fascinating new science of Evolutionary Medicine.
About the AuthorWilliam Meller, M.D., is a board-certified internist who runs a medical practice and clinic in Santa Barbara, CA, where he also coordinates three busy medical centers. He has been published in The Journal of the American Medical Association and has been featured in the Wall Street Journal, among other publications. He is the author of the book Evolution Rx: A Practical Guide to Harnessing Our Innate Capacity for Health and Healing.
While not going so far as arguing, as some have, that psychotherapy is always effective, I’d like to present some data and offer some contrasting considerations to Harriet Hall’s article: “Psychotherapy Reconsidered” (in Skeptic 28.1). Probably no other area within social science practice has been so inordinately and unfortunately praised and damned. Many of us working in the field have long been acutely aware of the difficulties to which Hall and others point, as well as other problems. However, we also regularly observe the positive changes in clients’ lives that psychotherapy—properly practiced—has produced, and in many cases, the lives it has saved.
In her article, the late Harriet Hall, whose work I and all skeptics admire and now miss, stated that no-one can provide an objective report about the field, indeed, that there “…aren’t even any basic numbers,” that we don’t know whether psychotherapy works, that it is not based on solid science, and that there is “…no rational basis for choosing a therapy or therapist.”
Hall and other sources she quotes are quite correct in saying that there is much we still don’t know about human psychology, and much that we don’t understand about how the mind and psychotherapy work. Yet it’s also necessary to look at the data and analyses which demonstrate that psychotherapy does work. The case for the defense is made in detail in The Great Psychotherapy Debate: The Evidence for What Makes Psychotherapy Work by Bruce Wampold and Zac Imel, and also in Psychotherapy Relationships That Work by Wampold and John Norcross, both of which present decades of meta-analyses. They review conclusions from an impressive number of psychotherapy studies and show how humans heal in a social context, as well as offer a compelling alternative to the conventional approach to psychotherapy research, which typically concentrates on identifying the most effective treatment for specific disorders by placing an emphasis on the particular components of treatment.
This is a misguided point in Hall’s argument, as she was looking at the differences between treatments rather than between therapists. Studies that previously claimed superiority over one method to another ignored who the treatment provider was.1 We know that these wrong research questions arise from using the medical model where it is imperative to know which treatment is the most effective for a particular disorder. In psychotherapy, and to some extent in medicine generally, the person administering the treatment is absolutely critical. Indeed, in psychotherapy the most important factor is the skill, confidence, and interpersonal flexibility of the therapist delivering the treatment, not the model, method, or “school” they use, their number of years in practice, or even the amount of professional development they’ve had. How we train and supervise therapists largely has little impact on the outcomes of psychotherapy, unless each therapist routinely collects outcome data in every session and adjusts their approach to accommodate each client’s feedback.
The Bad News About PsychotherapyHall is right on the point that psychotherapy outcomes have not improved much over the last 50 years. Hans Eysenck’s classic study debunking psychotherapy was performed in 1952.2 His view was not challenged until 1977, when a meta-analysis showed that psychotherapy was effective, and that Eysenck was wrong.3 It found the effect size (ES) for psychotherapy was .8 above the mean of the untreated sample. Recent meta-analyses show that this ES has remained the same over the intervening 50 years, despite the proliferation of diagnoses and treatment models.4
Hall was also accurate in saying that much conflicting data exists from studies about the efficacy of the hundreds of types of psychotherapy. Yet she was incorrect in saying that we don’t even have basic numbers. We now have decades of meta-analyses showing what works and what doesn’t work in psychotherapy.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Hall was also mostly on-target when she stated, “…proponents of each modality of psychotherapy give us their…impressions about the success of their chosen method.” Decades of clinical trials comparing treatment A to treatment B point to the conclusion that all bona fide psychotherapy models work equally well. This is consistently replicated in trials comparing therapists who use two different yet coherent, convincing, and structured treatments, as long as these treatments provide an explanation for what’s bothering the client in addition to discussing a treatment plan for the client to work hard at overcoming their difficulties. Psychotherapy research clearly shows that all models contribute 0–1 percent towards the outcomes of psychotherapy.11 This means that proponents of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy—or any model—claiming its superiority to other treatments, are not basing their claims on the available evidence.
Another correct statement of Hall’s is that most therapists have no evidence to show that what they’re doing is effective. This lack of evidence led others to conclude that, “Beyond personal impressions and informal feedback, the majority of therapists have no hard, verifiable evidence that anything they do makes a difference…Absent a valid and reliable assessment of their performance, it also stands to reason they cannot possibly know what kind of instruction or guidance would help them improve.”12
For decades, free pen-and-paper measures by which therapists can track their outcomes have been available,13 recently superseded by online versions.14 These Feedback Informed Treatment (FIT) online platforms are easy to use and have been utilized by thousands of therapists around the world to get routine feedback from every client on each session. The result: Data from hundreds of thousands of clients is continually being updated. Regrettably, those of us who use these methods are still a small minority of therapists practicing around the world compared to the unknown numbers who, as Hall rightly pointed out, provide psychotherapy in its manifold (and perhaps unregulated) forms.
The online outcome measurement platforms mentioned above are recommended by the International Center for Clinical Excellence (ICCE).15 For decades, the ICCE has been aggregating data from therapists around the world and so providing evidence that corroborates some of Hall’s critical claims about psychotherapy. Current data show that dropout rates, defined as clients unilaterally stopping treatment without experiencing reliable clinical improvement, are between 20–22 percent among adult populations (even when therapists use FIT).16 Dropout rates are typically higher (40–60 percent) for child and adolescent populations. This raises the unfortunate possibility that dropout rates for therapists who don’t get routine feedback from clients are probably higher still.
Hall was, however, incorrect in stating that we don’t know about the harms of psychotherapy. There are many examples of discussions and analyses of what doesn’t work in psychotherapy and what can cause harm.17 One study of aggregated data shows that the percentage of people who are reliably worse while in treatment is 5–10 percent.18
Regrettably, the data indicate that the average clinician’s outcomes plateau relatively early in their career, despite their thinking they are improving. One review found no evidence that therapists improve beyond their first 50 hours of training in terms of their effectiveness, and a number of studies have found that paraprofessionals with perhaps six weeks of training achieve outcomes on par with psychologists holding a PhD, which is equal to five years of training.19 These data support Hall’s statement that unless they are measuring their outcomes, no therapist knows whether their method is more (or less) effective than the methods used by others. Even then, it leads to a conflation that it’s due to the method instead of the therapist. Studies also show that students often achieve outcomes that are on par or better than their instructors. These facts are amply demonstrated in Witkowski’s discussion with Vikram H. Patel,20 whose mental health care manual Where There Is No Psychiatrist is used primarily in developing countries by non-specialist health workers and volunteers.21
Further, there is now evidence that psychotherapists who have been in practice for a few years see themselves as improving even though the data show no such improvement.22 Psychotherapists are not immune either to cognitive biases or to the Dunning-Kruger effect, and a majority rate themselves as being above average. In other words, psychotherapists generally overestimate their abilities. Finally, meta-analyses show that there is a large variation in effectiveness between clinicians, with a small minority of top performing therapists routinely getting superior outcomes with a wide range of clients. Unfortunately, these “supershrinks” are a rare breed.23
To balance the bad news above, following is some of the data which shows that psychotherapy works.
The Good News About PsychotherapyPsychotherapy works. It does help people. Since Eysenck’s time and in response to the numerous sources cited by Hall, many studies have demonstrated that the average treated client is better off than eighty percent of the untreated sample.24 That doesn’t mean that psychotherapy is eighty percent effective, but it does mean that if you take the average treated person and you compare them to those in an untreated sample, that average treated person is doing better than eighty percent of people in the untreated sample. This effect size means that psychotherapy outcomes are equivalent to those for coronary artery bypass surgery and four times greater than those for the use of fluoride in preventing tooth decay. As discussed earlier, this has remained constant for 50 years, regardless of the problem being tested or the method being employed.
Just as in surgery, the tools that psychotherapists use are only as effective as the hands that use them. How effective are psychotherapists? Real world studies have looked at this question, asking clinicians to measure their outcomes on a routine basis with each client in every session. They’ve compared these outcomes against those in randomized clinical trials (RCTs). It must be noted that in RCTs researchers have many advantages that real world practitioners do not. These include: (a) a highly select clientele, in that many published studies have a single unitary diagnosis while clinicians routinely deal with clients with two or more comorbidities; (b) they have a lower caseload; and (c) they have ongoing supervision and consultation with some of the world’s leading experts on psychotherapy. Despite all this, the data documents that psychotherapy outcomes are equivalent with those of RCTs.25
Therapists around the world, including me, have been using Feedback Informed Treatment (FIT) for decades. I have been seeing clients since 1981 and my clinical outcomes started to improve when I started incorporating FIT into my practice nearly 20 years ago. Those of us who use FIT routinely get quantitative feedback from every client at the beginning of every session. We ask about the client’s view of the outcomes of therapy in four areas of their life: (1) their individual wellbeing; (2) their close personal relationships; (3) their social interactions; and (4) their overall functioning. This measure is termed the Outcome Rating Scale or ORS.26 At the end of every session, we also get quantitative feedback about four items to gauge the client’s experience of: (1) whether they felt heard, understood, and respected by us in that session; (2) whether we talked about what the client wanted to discuss; (3) whether the therapist’s approach/method was a good fit for the client; and (4) an overall rating for the session, also asking if there was anything missing in that session. This measure is termed the Session Rating Scale or SRS.27 The resulting feedback is successively incorporated into the therapy, ensuring that the client’s voice and preferences are privileged.
Research shows that individual therapists vary widely in their ability to achieve positive outcomes in therapy, so which therapist a client sees is a big factor in determining the outcome of their therapy. Data gathered over a 2.5-year period from nearly 2,000 clients and 91 therapists documented significant variation in effectiveness among the clinicians in the study and found certain high-performing therapists were 10 times more effective than the average clinician.28 One variable that strongly accounted for this difference in outcome effectiveness was the amount of time these therapists devoted outside of therapy to deliberately practicing objectives which were just beyond their level of proficiency.29
What these studies show is that we’ve been looking in the wrong place for the answers as to why the outcomes of psychotherapy have not improved over the last 50 years. We’ve been studying the effects within the therapy room rather than what happens outside of the therapy room, i.e., what clients bring into their therapy and what therapists do before and after they see their clients.
Indeed, clients and their extra-therapeutic factors contribute 87 percent to outcomes of psychotherapy!30 Extra-therapeutic factors comprise the client’s personality, their daily environment, their friends, family, work, good relationships, and community support. On average clients spend less than one hour per week with a therapist. The extra-therapeutic factors are the components of the client’s life to which they return, and which make up the other 167 hours of their week. This begs the question “does this mean that there’s nothing we can do about it?” The key is for therapists to a) attune to these outside factors and resources, and b) tap into them. The remaining 13 percent of treatment effects which accounts for positive outcomes in therapy is made up of: the individual therapist, between 4–9 percent; the working alliance (relationship) between therapist and client, 4.9–8 percent; the expectancy/placebo and rationale for treatment, 4 percent; while the model of therapy contributes an insignificant 0–1 percent. This highlights that who the therapist is and how they relate to their clients is the main variable accounting for positive outcomes outside of the client’s extra-therapeutic factors.
So, how should you choose a therapist?There is now a movement led by eminent researchers, educators, policymakers, and supervisors in the psychotherapy field to ensure that after graduation therapists consciously and intentionally engage in ongoing Deliberate Practice—critically analyzing their own skills and therapy session performance, continuously practicing their skillset (particularly training their in-the-moment responses to emotionally challenging clients and situations), and seeking expert feedback. Deliberate Practice is based on K. Anders Ericsson’s (who made a name for himself as “the expert on expertise”) three decades of research on the components of expertise in many domains of activity, including in sport, medicine, music, mathematics, business, education, computer programming, and other fields. Building on research in other professional domains such as sports, music, and medicine, a 2015 study was conducted to understand what differentiated top performing therapists from average ones.31 It found that top performing therapists spent 2.5 times more time in Deliberate Practice before and after their client sessions than did average therapists, and 14 times more time in Deliberate Practice than the least effective therapists!
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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Experts in the field encourage therapists, supervisors, educators, and licensing bodies to “change the rules” about how psychotherapists are trained and how psychotherapy is practiced.32 The research reviewed here highlights that we can do this in two main ways: first, by making our clients’ voices the central focus of psychotherapy by routinely engaging in Feedback Informed Treatment with every client in every session to create a culture of feedback; and second, by each therapist receiving guidance from a coach who uses Deliberate Practice. To ensure accountability to clients, health insurance companies, and the psychotherapy field itself, this should be the basis for all practice, training, accreditation, and ongoing licensing of therapists.
In summary, psychotherapy does work. For readers who are curious to explore why psychotherapy works and which factors contribute to it doing so, I’d highly recommend Better Results: Using Deliberate Practice to Improve Therapeutic Effectiveness33 and its accompanying Field Guide to Better Results.34
About the AuthorVivian Baruch is a relationship coach, counselor, psychotherapist, and clinical supervisor specializing in relationship issues for singles and couples. She has been practicing since 1981, has been a psychotherapy educator at the Australian College of Applied Psychology, and taught supervision to psychotherapists at the University of Canberra. In 2004, she trained with Scott D. Miller, and has been using Feedback Informed Treatment (FIT) for 20 years to routinely incorporate her clients’ feedback into her psychotherapy and supervision work.
References1. https://rb.gy/iw4yb 2. https://rb.gy/4y3su 3. https://rb.gy/bc9u9 4. Miller, S.D., Hubble, M.A., & Chow, D. (2020). Better Results: Using Deliberate Practice to Improve Therapeutic Effectiveness. American Psychological Association. 5. Wampold, B.E., & Imel, Z.E. (2015). The Great Psychotherapy Debate: The Evidence for What Makes Psychotherapy Work. Routledge. 6. Norcross, J. C., & Lambert, M. J. (Eds.). (2019). Psychotherapy Relationships That Work: Volume 2: Evidence-Based Therapist Responsiveness. Oxford University Press. 7. https://rb.gy/qm2hz 8. https://rb.gy/x7bm9 9. https://rb.gy/rfq74 10. https://rb.gy/rz91t 11. Wampold, B.E., & Imel, Z.E. (2015). The Great Psychotherapy Debate: The Evidence for What Makes Psychotherapy Work. Routledge. 12. Miller, S.D., Hubble, M.A., & Chow, D. (2020). Better Results: Using Deliberate Practice to Improve Therapeutic Effectiveness. American Psychological Association. 13. https://rb.gy/edpb6 14. https://rb.gy/ktioc 15. https://rb.gy/2bjuy 16. https://rb.gy/6f55y 17. https://rb.gy/tpuo2 18. https://rb.gy/uqp3k 19. https://rb.gy/obhfg 20. Witkowski, T. (2020). Shaping Psychology: Perspectives on Legacy, Controversy and the Future of the Field. Springer Nature. 21. Patel, V. (2003). Where There Is No Psychiatrist: A Mental Health Care Manual. RCPsych publications. 22. Miller, S.D., Hubble, M.A., & Chow, D. (2020). Better Results: Using Deliberate Practice to Improve Therapeutic Effectiveness. American Psychological Association. 23. Ricks, D. F. (1974). Supershrink: Methods of a Therapist Judged Successful on the Basis of Adult Outcomes of Adolescent Patients. In D.F. Ricks, A. Thomas, & M. Roff (Eds.), Life History Research in Psychopathology: III. University of Minnesota Press. 24. https://rb.gy/obhfg 25. https://rb.gy/uulpw 26. https://rb.gy/d5mbx 27. Ibid. 28. https://rb.gy/0hvy3 29. https://rb.gy/rkr85 30. Wampold, B.E., & Imel, Z.E. (2015). The Great Psychotherapy Debate: The Evidence for What Makes Psychotherapy Work. Routledge. 31. https://rb.gy/ye406 32. https://rb.gy/r2jb8 33. Miller, S.D., Hubble, M.A., & Chow, D. (2020). Better Results: Using Deliberate Practice to Improve Therapeutic Effectiveness. American Psychological Association. 34. https://rb.gy/f3c3e
Skeptic: Let’s start with the big questions. What is the problem to be solved? And why is systems biology the right method to find the answer?
Leroy Hood: The problem is this great complexity. Reductionism is the approach where you take an element of a complex system and study that element in enormous detail. However, studying one element in a complex system gives you no insight into how the complex system works. Systems biology highlights something extremely important—namely, biological networks underlie all of the complex responses and phenotypes of human beings. So, we first identify the network components and then study their dynamics. Systems biology takes a global, holistic view of a problem by thinking in terms of the networks that encode the information that is responsible for each phenotype, and so forth. The most fascinating part of the systems approach is that it can be applied to any kind of complex problem—physiological, psychological, or sociological.
Skeptic: Take DNA. Crick & Watson drilled down to the molecular structure—that’s reductionism. But then you have to build back out to the phenotype and the entire body, and how it interacts with systems both within the body and externally.
Hood: Correct. That’s systems biology. The first thing to figure out is what are the elements of information that DNA encodes—the genes. Once you’ve identified the 20,000 or so genes, you figure out how these genes connect to form these networks. Finally, you watch the networks operate during the dynamics of what you are studying. The really important thing about systems is that they operate across multiple scales. A system can be thought of at the level of one molecule, one cell, an organ, or at the level of the whole organism, and then you really begin to see how the various hierarchical levels operate differently in space and time.
Nathan Price: There has been tension between molecular biologists and systems biologists, especially in the early days, because molecular biology sometimes can feel very satisfying and concrete: “Here’s the protein…and here is its sequence.” In contrast, when building a system, you often see very complex relationships amongst all these.
Skeptic: OK. Let’s consider weight loss and diets. Why are diets faddish? And during a particular fad, why does a particular diet work for some, but not others?
Price: Let me give a specific example. First, studies in which we compared people who went on to lose weight with those who didn’t. In the thousands of measurements we’ve made, was there anything predictive about whether or not people would lose weight? When we looked at metabolites and proteins—once you normalize for BMI—nothing. But in the microbiome, two features were predictive.
The first was how fast your microbiome was growing. If your bacteria are growing fast, every calorie you eat is a calorie either for yourself or your microbiome. If your microbiome is consuming more, it is easier to lose weight. The second big factor is whether the genes in your microbiome are more likely to break down complex carbohydrates. Let’s say you eat a sweet potato. Some microbiomes will break that down into simple sugars that will spike your insulin more, making it harder to lose weight. But if you have a microbiome that will break down those same complex carbohydrates into short-chain fatty acids, it’s easier to lose weight. That was quite predictive and captured a fair amount of the variance between individuals.
Another big example is trying to lower something like LDL cholesterol. Some of that is genetically encoded and you can predict the blood level of LDL cholesterol from the genome, without knowing anything about a person’s diet or lifestyle. So we looked at whether people going through a wellness program could lower their LDL cholesterol without medication. If you had high LDL but your genome predicted low, you could lower it. But if your genome predicted high and you were high, you couldn’t. That is an incredibly useful tool that lets us know what you can change easily and what is going to be hard to change.
In short, we have a totally new method to look at your genetic potential versus your actual outcome. You get a roadmap of which lifestyle changes will make the greatest difference to your health. That’s big!
Skeptic: Hopefully, that kind of test will soon be available in every doctor’s office.
Hood: Exactly! That’s why I’ve proposed a second genome initiative where we take a million people for 10 years and conduct all these analyses. This will give us all the correlations for 150 different genetic risks, and all the correlations with the phenotype, so we can show unequivocally how this transforms the quality of your life. I guarantee that today we’re giving drugs to many people who should never be taking them. They could manage themselves just by diet and exercise.
Skeptic: You write that the 10 most popular drugs in the U.S. work for only about 10 percent of the people treated. Seriously?
Hood: Isn’t that absolutely striking? Yet it is true. A critical outcome of the million-person project is that we’ll have blood biomarkers that can tell us, unequivocally, which individuals are going to respond to particular drugs and which are not. That’s something pharma companies would hate because their bottom line likes this idea of one drug for everybody.
Price: Another factor is that your microbiome transforms about 13 percent of the drugs you take. That means you could be taking a drug, but if you have the wrong microbiome, it could change that compound so that you’re not even on the drug you think you are. This is a big problem that drug companies need to start thinking about systemically.
Skeptic: So, what exactly is the microbiome?
Price: Understanding the microbiome is one of the hottest areas in health and has just emerged quite recently. The microbiome is the bacteria and other small organisms that live on your skin and in your gut. Everything you take into your body—food, a supplement, a drug—passes through the microbiome before it gets to you. There are now tests that provide useful information about your microbiome.
For starters, you can see how your microbiome affects your digestion. You might have microbes that are making too much ammonia, which will cause your stomach to not be acidic enough to break down your food the way you need to. We can evaluate that. Recently, we ran a trial on people with Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS). They can now get a test, implement personalized interventions, and resolve their symptoms—in most cases—over the course of about a month.
The 10 most popular drugs in the U.S. work for only about 10 percent of the people treated.
Skeptic: Now that’s individualized medicine. When this knowledge and technology aren’t available, we have to resort to large-scale treatments. “Here’s the problem. Here’s our drug. Give it to everybody with that problem and hope maybe half get better.”
Hood: And today, thanks to the million-person genome project, the genome itself is going to reveal a whole series of diseases. For example, there are roughly 7,000 rare diseases. Many are single-gene defects. For each of those, we’re going to have to find a drug that works. And it’s going to be essential to examine the genome as early in life as possible because some cause disease during childhood or infancy. You want to know immediately which gene defects you have. Your physician will hopefully have these data and keep track of these things for you.
Skeptic: In that example, what would be the financial model for pharmaceutical companies?
Hood: First, the small molecule drugs today can only attack five percent of the proteins that exist in your genome. That’s a very small number. The pharmaceutical companies will need to generate lots of new drugs that can attack more than five percent. Second, they must figure out how to scale the research. If the clinical trial is going to cost three billion dollars per trial, it’s never going to work for individualized medicine. You need really efficient ways of generating lots of drugs and screening them effectively. Third, the federal government is probably going to have to help financially. A disease that’s devastating in infancy wipes out the productivity of that person for life. Avoid that and you have a productive, creative, functional citizen. You can make compelling arguments for being able to deal with these diseases at an appropriate time.
These are things pharmaceutical companies are just barely beginning to think about at a proper scale.
Skeptic: So we’re really at an intersection between academia, private industry, and government to make the transition from raw knowledge to application to industrial-size production of such kits and applications.
Price: We can progressively get access to information in ways that are simpler and cheaper than before. We already have the microbiome test and the blood measurement device that we hope will soon be approved in the United States. It’s already FDA-approved for a supervised blood draw, in which you need another person to stand next to you while you do it. We have successfully tested this in trials, including a big one of nearly 20,000 people with the University of Cambridge. So far, there have been no reported adverse events. And we have a 99.9 percent success rate of being able to get a measurement off the device when people use it at home. You can obtain your own blood sample and drop it in the mail.
Skeptic: This sounds somewhat similar to Elizabeth Holmes and Theranos.
Price: There are two different paths you can take on blood analysis. One is that you can try to get conventional clinical lab tests, which are typically done on large volumes of blood, and you try to miniaturize that. That’s what Theranos tried. And they failed. In fact, they were fraudulent all along the way, which is why Elizabeth Holmes is now in prison. Pretty much all other companies that tried to go down that route have also failed.
But there’s another path—the one that we’re pursuing—in which you use small volumes of blood to do what are called omics-based measures. These are your metabolomics (measuring all the metabolites out of the blood) or proteomics (measuring all the proteins). Those technologies, based on mass spectrometry or on capture agents, are only done on very small volumes.
We can make thousands of measurements out of that small volume. The challenge is how to interpret all of that information. Working with that data, tying it to health outcomes, connecting it to electronic health records, and monitoring people’s health is a much bigger challenge. It’s much more of an AI-data problem than anything else. And I’d much rather try to solve the information technology challenge than go down the Theranos road.
Hood: What Elizabeth Holmes projected is going to be done. I just want to say that it is a valid way of thinking about the technology. Technically, it’s far more difficult. But we are going to learn how. It’s going to take 10 or 15 years. It’s just a matter of getting appropriate, miniaturized measurements in microfluidics or nanotechnology.
Skeptic: Let’s talk about the future of medicine. What is CRISPR?
Price: CRISPR allows you to go into a genome and essentially edit any base pairs that you want. Incredibly powerful, it holds the potential to end all genetic-related disease, or at least monogenetic defects. Huntington’s disease is a compelling example. Unlike most genetic traits, it has essentially 100 percent penetrance. If you have the gene for Huntington’s, you will get Huntington’s disease. But you can CRISPR it out. Even in the embryonic stage! That eliminates the gene, and all your progeny forever will not carry it. That’s amazing.
Skeptic: What about stem cells?
Price: Stem cells are the body’s raw materials—cells from which all other cells with specialized functions derive. They are very powerful because they are generative. They grow all other cell types. Of particular interest are induced pluripotent stem cells which are programmed to grow tissue. And so, you put them in—in a way taking a leap of faith—trusting in the intelligence of the stem cells to act on their programs and to rebuild the right tissue. It’s all evidence-based, but we don’t fully understand the logic of how they do it.
Skeptic: What about cancer?
Price: Most of us may have already had cancers in our lives, but they started and then our immune system cleared them out. However, when you develop a tumor, your immune system didn’t recognize. The cancer fooled your immune system. Immunotherapies—not trying to kill the cancer off with a drug, but rather teaching the immune system to get the cancer that it missed—are one of the most exciting developments.
If you know the molecular properties of the cells that have become cancers and were missed by your immune system, you can create a vector that will look for certain gene expressions or molecular properties or some combinatoric aspect of those cells, then go in and initiate a program that will stick a molecule up from the outside of the cell. That molecule will act as a signal to macrophages, which are cells in the immune system that come and eat other cells, in this case destroying the tumor cells.
We have a totally new method to look at your genetic potential versus your actual outcome. You get a roadmap of which lifestyle changes will make the greatest difference to your health.
Skeptic: What about stories of injecting tumors with vaccines? Jimmy Carter was treated this way for his brain tumor.
Price: It’s a similar idea. You take pieces of the cancer cells, and then you create antibodies. You’re placing a signal into the immune system that says these are fragments of something foreign. Your immune system can then look for those specific tumor cells and kill them. It doesn’t yet work for the majority of cancers, but for the fraction that it does, it’s amazing.
Skeptic: Is part of the problem that there are so many different kinds of cancers, and they’re different in each body?
Price: Exactly. And that is why precision medicine is probably more advanced in cancer research than any other area. You can pull out the tumor and you can sequence it. You can look at its gene expression, its metabolites, and its proteins. You can take your genome and the genome of your cancer and design a map of exactly what’s different about those cells. You can do this on a per-person basis, and it’s at the core of individualized therapy.
I think the term cancer is a total misnomer. We should move away from terms like prostate cancer, lung cancer, or breast cancer. It should always be cancers. Cancers are a huge, massively heterogeneous, highly diverse set of diseases and conditions and molecular mutations, not at all a single phenomenon.
Skeptic: Starting today, what can each one of us do to be healthier?
Price: Exercise. You lose between zero and one percent of your muscle mass per year as you age. Decade after decade, that adds up. You become frail in your later years. There are things you really want to be able to do when you’re older—for example, to stand up from the ground without any assistance. When you’re young, that’s easy; when you’re older, it gets harder. If you lose that ability, you’re putting yourself at much greater risk. Balance and posture are also important. So are stretching and range of mobility.
Skeptic: And what can we do to keep our minds healthy?
Price: I think that we have really been on the wrong track in Alzheimer’s, for a long time.
First, people almost always say amyloid plaques cause Alzheimer’s. I don’t think that’s true. I think the biggest factor is metabolism and what the brain has to do to maintain energy. Your brain is only two percent of your body’s biomass, but it uses 20 percent of your body’s energy. That’s 10 times more metabolically demanding than the body average. So, every second of every day, you’ve got to supply it with energy. As you get older, your ability to perfuse oxygen into your brain through your blood vessels goes down. It decreases, just like muscle mass.
As that happens, certain regions of the brain become lower in oxygen. The amount of energy that you can create goes below the amount that you need, so certain neurons start dying. As they die, you put more demand on the remaining neurons. Their demand goes up while their supply stays the same. Then they die, which puts even more pressure on those remaining. So you get this cascade of cell death.
The second big factor that everyone knows about is that if you have the gene APOE, you have a high risk of Alzheimer’s. How can your neurons keep making a lot of energy under these low-oxygen conditions? Supporting cells, called astrocytes, are really important here. There is a 9:1 ratio of astrocytes to neurons, and they support energy generation in the neurons. So you want to keep the cholesterol level in the astrocytes low in order to keep energy generation high in neurons under low oxygen conditions.
APOE has a role in the transport of cholesterol out of astrocytes. APOE4 does it slowly, APOE2 does it fast. And if all you do is take those two facts—the lowering of oxygen and the difference in the efficiency of keeping positive energy balance under that condition—you can recapitulate the ages at which all the different genotypes get Alzheimer’s disease with very close accuracy. That’s true for a whole range of genetic and environmental backgrounds.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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Then there’s a gene called TREM2 that has to do with the energetics of what’s required to clear debris. If these cells are dying, you get all this debris that you’ve got to clean out. That comes at an energetic cost. And if you spend energy doing that, you don’t have as much energy left to protect the nerve. As your neurons die and you lose synapses, as that synapse firing goes down, you cross a threshold where you can no longer do what’s called Hebbian learning—what fires together, wires together. But you don’t have enough firing to learn, so the brain has to secrete a molecule in order to recruit additional synapses— amyloid beta. It is brought in by the brain or made by the brain in order to recruit these synapses so you can keep cognition going. Now, as a byproduct, these things glom together and form amyloid plaques. Amyloid can embed in your blood vessels and constrict them, which then gets us back to the central problem of limited energy because it’s limiting oxygenation into the brain. But the plaques aren’t the cause of the disease.
Skeptic: So, what can be done to prevent that or treat it?
Price: Exercise. Under the model I just described, it’s obvious why.
Skeptic: How do you see the future of health and wellness?
Hood: I think any brand-new idea almost never can be achieved in the context of an existing bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are honed by the past, can barely deal with the present, and have difficulty dealing with the future. Initially, 80 percent of the biologists in the U.S. were opposed to the Human Genome Project.
As a young assistant professor at Caltech, I started thinking about where I wanted my future scientific career. I had a real interest in human biology and disease. It was 1970 and I was dismayed by the complexity of the problem and by the lack of tools we had for dealing with it. I decided to develop instruments that allowed one to read and write DNA, which could decipher that complexity by generating big data from individual humans. Put simply, lots of information on individuals that—when analyzed—could lead to insights into wellness and prevention.
I hope we were able to convince you that this sort of thinking is absolutely mandatory for improving healthcare in the future, and that scientific research is now on the right track.
This print interview has been edited from a longer conversation on The Michael Shermer Show.
About the IntervieweesLeroy Hood developed the DNA sequencer which enabled the reading of the entire human genetic code as part of the Human Genome Project. His work was also instrumental in the creation of treatment for AIDS. Hood founded the discipline of systems biology and is one of only 15 individuals elected to all three U.S. National Academies (the National Academy of Science, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine).
Nathan Price is Chief Science Officer of Thorne HealthTech and Professor at the Institute for Systems Biology. Selected as an Emerging Leader in Health and Medicine by the National Academy of Medicine, he received the Grace A. Goldsmith Award for his work on scientific wellness, and is the author of more than 200 peer-reviewed scientific publications
What happens when sex is more about identity than pleasure, intimacy, or interaction? And what happens when culture warriors gang up on sexuality—and from several directions? And has this affected our mental health? After over 40 years and 40,000 sessions with individuals and couples as a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist and Certified Sex Therapist, I am growing alarmed at the changes I see taking place in our society— most notably, the prospects for using sexuality to nourish ourselves physically or emotionally are declining. Simply stated, sex is seen less and less as an activity that contributes to mental health. Instead, it’s increasingly seen as an abstraction, only vaguely related to the currently more important activity of establishing and policing identity.
Changing DefinitionsEven though our culture today seems dominated by sexual issues, it isn’t really sex that many people have on their mind. These days, cultural conversations about sexuality often focus on issues such as skepticism regarding true consent in heterosexual sex, a huge expansion of the definition of trauma, the invention and legitimation of “sex addiction,” and newly imposed limits on when it is acceptable to express interest in sex with someone for the first time.
Many Americans increasingly seem to want to protect themselves from sex, rather than embrace it. Note that enthusiastically pursuing your sexual identity or orientation is not the same thing as embracing sexuality itself. And knowing what you don’t want is not the same as knowing what you do want.
In fact, many of the newly minted sexual identities and orientations are about not having sex: asexual (lacking in sexual attraction to others), graysexual (inbetween asexual and sexual), aromantic (little to no romantic feelings toward others), or lithromantic (can feel romantic love but has no need for those feelings to be reciprocated). When people talk about sexual identity, they’re referring less to what they do, and more to the community to which they belong. In fact, as Temple University’s Jennifer Pollitt says, “There is a huge difference between orientation, behavior, and identity. The sexual or romantic behavior you engage in does not necessarily correlate with the identity that you’re using to describe your experiences or orientation.”1
If behavior “does not correlate with identity,” then what is identity based on? And on what basis do individuals decide to accept their own erotic behavior? Until recently, the convergence of behavior and identity was considered an important aspect of mental health. Now, in addition to turning language on its head, this conception of sex seems to endorse “splitting” (black-and-white, all-or-nothing thinking), which most psychologists—from the most Freudian to the most modern—agree is psychologically harmful.
Those attached to gender discourse may use the language of sex, but what they’re really talking about is self-image and community, not sexuality. Their conversations are not about a dyadic connection with another, which has been, historically, considered a hallmark of adult development and mental health.
TrendsNot surprisingly, the two generations that have gone through puberty most recently indeed have sex less than previous generations of late teens and young adults. UCLA’s annual California Health Interview Survey is the country’s largest state health survey. In 2021, it found that the number of Californians ages 18–30 reporting no sexual partners in the prior year reached 38 percent,2 almost double the number a mere ten years earlier. This trend is, I submit, part of a larger society-wide mental health challenge.
With the ubiquity of internet, social media, and smartphones, young people are less interested in distraction-free, in-person relating. They don’t develop the necessary skills to create or enjoy it, which include patience, listening, fluency in social cues, reading the impact of what they say on others, and tolerating/ignoring the possibility that something interesting is happening somewhere else.
The demand to feel emotionally safe and unchallenged as much as possible interferes with intimacy as well. Readers will recognize countless instances of young people being “offended” instead of disagreeing, bristling at “microaggressions” and “cultural appropriations” that aren’t about them, and not wanting to debate those who view things differently. In addition, young people are now launching into adulthood later, so they don’t have as much privacy or money, and don’t aspire to being in a couple nearly as much. Consequently, one of the main things about sex—“it’s what you do in a dyad”—has less appeal. The current ease of masturbating to pornography exacerbates this by facilitating erotic experiences that are about seeing and imagining, rather than feeling physically and emotionally.
At the same time, many young people are self-identifying with new versions of sexual identity and orientation at higher rates than ever before. According to a 2022 Gallup poll, the percentage of U.S. adults who identify as something other than heterosexual has doubled over the last 10 years, from 3.5 percent in 2012 to 7.1 percent.3 The change is mostly seen among those age 30 and under.
Identity and CommunityAmerican society now instructs young people to express their ordinary alienation, angst, anxiety, identity concerns, and resentments in the language of gender (along with race). This automatically provides many of today’s youth with a community in which they can participate and to which they can belong. Naturally, almost everyone wants to feel that they belong to something—that’s part of mental health. Yet it’s easy to see that claiming membership in these various communities is not completely harmless.
The now-common insistence that everyone reveal their pronouns (i.e., their gender identity) in completely non-sexual environments (such as university lectures, medical settings, commercial websites, email signature lines, and social media profiles) is accompanied by the new insistence that anyone who prefers not to do so is declaring that they are unfriendly toward LGBT people. Little consideration is given to the possibility that someone might not consider their gender to be the most salient part of their identity (which, for example, might be their race, religion, ethnicity, or profession). Or that they feel it is a private matter and no one else’s business.
These communities can even harm one’s health in the form of permanent and irreversible interventions, such as puberty blockers and surgeries intended to change sex. Advocates for gender-affirming care have worked hard to portray it as lifesaving and suicide prevention by fearmongering with inflated statistics about suicidal ideation. But when researchers compared transgender youth with teens suffering from mental health problems, there was little difference in suicide rates between the groups. Transgender youth are not much more suicidal than teens with garden variety mental illness, which means that failing to affirm a child’s transgender identity does not drive suicidal behavior. A recent study analyzed data from the world’s largest pediatric gender clinic, the UK’s Tavistock, and found the rate of completed youth suicides to be 0.03 percent, which is hardly a suicide epidemic.4 In reality, very few youths who identify as transgender ever commit suicide. And it really is true that concerned parents are being fed false suicide statistics that misleads them into believing their child is likely to kill themselves if they don’t consent to puberty blockers, hormones, and surgeries for them.
Claims that scientific studies show clear mental health benefits of gender-affirming medical treatments for transgender youth are not supported by evidence. Some of the studies commonly touted as demonstrating positive mental health outcomes show no or possibly even negative association between administering hormones and mental health. Studies purporting to demonstrate mental health benefits are often misleading due to their short follow up durations, often spanning just a few months to two years. There is no long-term data on this experimental protocol, and it is typically within the 4–8 year range that individuals start expressing regret.
But frightened, unhealthy thinking about sexuality is not limited to any political or cultural viewpoint. As I detailed in my book America’s War On Sex,5 the conservative religious Right generally opposes whatever makes sex simpler, safer, more enjoyable, and easier to separate from stable monogamous relationships. Rather than focusing on healthy pleasure (including how satisfying sex supports stable marriage), they tend to focus more on the unhealthy aspects of sex, such as emotional danger, STIs, coercion and violence, and unwanted pregnancies.
The Right has always disliked the optionality and autonomy of sexual exploration, opposing unmarried women having easy access to birth control pills; fighting the availability of sex toys; and restricting TV advertising of products such as condoms and tampons. Today’s manifestation of this instinct now extends to banning books from public and school libraries; restricting gender medicine; banning private swing clubs; and requiring registration to watch internet porn (currently enacted in Utah, Virginia, and Louisiana, with a dozen more states pending).
Masturbation and Mental HealthWhether we like to acknowledge it or not, masturbation is the primary sex life of almost everyone. And how you manage and accept or reject this fact can have a large influence on your mental health. Masturbation typically involves fantasy, and so talk of masturbation inevitably turns to pornography. Unfortunately, commentators and activists of all ideologies seem to agree that viewing pornography somehow colonizes a viewer’s brain so that he (always a he) becomes a dangerous, amoral predator who wants to have sex with every woman except his own mate.
Whether our fantasies involve pornography or not, they reveal a common theme about humans— that privately, we’re all perverts.
In their 2011 book A Billion Wicked Thoughts,6 data scientists Ogi Ogas and Sai Goddam revealed the most common sexual terms among 400 million internet searches. Being coerced is by far the most common sexual fantasy of women. Large (i.e., taboo) age differences between partners is a very popular fantasy of both men and women. This tells us that people’s public pronouncements about others’ masturbation are mostly performative, designed to imply that “I’m moral, I’m not over-sexed, and I definitely don’t have risky sexual impulses inside me.”
The fear of sexual fantasy reaches its climax with the anti-masturbation and anti-pornography NoFap movement. It currently claims over 300,000 members, and its website logs almost two million monthly visitors. With an anti-science tradition stretching back to noncredentialed activist Gary Wilson and to Christian fundamentalism, the group claims a wide range of harms from masturbating and watching porn, and corresponding benefits in abstaining from them—without any valid empirical evidence.
Of course, some people do masturbate or use pornography in self-defeating ways, but they often have mental health struggles with, for example, OCD, depression, bipolar disorder, Asperger’s or autism, or borderline personality disorder.
While masturbation itself is not a prerequisite for mental health, vilifying it and obsessively struggling to maintain abstinence can undermine having a healthy mental life. Those compensatory behaviors tend to demonize one’s own sexual impulses, which are then often experienced as rage and shame—turned in on oneself (which typically leads to depression), or focused outward (as explosiveness or even violence). As Andrew Sullivan wrote, “the suppression of these core emotions [sexuality] and the denial of their resolution in love always leads to personal distortion and compulsion and loss of perspective.”7
Psychology, Sex, and Mental HealthAmerican psychotherapy has never been comfortable or well-educated about sexuality—for example, you can get a license to practice without hearing the words “vibrator” or “oral sex” in your training. And now the profession has extended its distance from ordinary or positive sexuality by instead focusing more on trauma and identity while disparaging pornography. Meanwhile, it has no answer to common issues such as desire discrepancy, infidelity after the other partner has lost desire, purity culture, adolescent sexuality, or the impact of technology on sexuality.
Psychologists used to include sexual desire and satisfaction in their profile of mental health. Today, the focus regarding sex is about trauma, consent, sex addiction, porn addiction, love addiction, “emotional affairs,” and sexual identity and orientation.
As a profession, psychologists are refusing to challenge even the most extreme activists, instead abandoning kids and families to gender-affirming specialists. While psychology has extensively studied questions such as “Why can’t some alcoholics take even one drink a year?” and “What’s the difference between sadness and depression?” and “What predicts whether a couple will divorce?” it dares not touch tough questions such as “Why is ‘asexual’ suddenly a complex orientation rather than a simple preference?” or “If children can’t consent to sex with an adult, why are they competent to select their gender?” or “How do we account for concentrated clusters of young teens claiming they’re transgender or non-binary in certain schools, when there aren’t similar clusters across town?”
As a result, psychology has only limited tools in dealing with children or adults with questions about gender or orientation. Almost overnight, gender-affirming specialists have acquired great status and professional power.
But by validating even the extremes of gender choice, gender spectrum, and gender activism industry in schools, the media, psychology, medicine, and elsewhere, our society now encourages young people to express their ordinary alienation, angst, anxiety, identity concerns, and resentments in the language of gender. Wouldn’t it be better if young people would simply say “It’s my life!” instead of “I just discovered I’m gender queer and demand hormones and surgery.”
Sexual IntelligenceDespite all these issues we can be intelligent about sex. To that end, there are three dimensions to enjoyable sex: self-acceptance, communication, and emotional skills. Together, these make up what I call Sexual Intelligence. Despite the contrasting public policy and psychosocial goals of both the political Left and the Right, each side in the culture wars should promote Sexual Intelligence as a vehicle for both societal and individual mental health.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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Sexual Intelligence enables individuals to make choices that fit their own values, create stable erotic partnerships, resist mass media messages of perfectionism, encourage thoughtful decision-making, and resist impulsivity while allowing for self-expression. These are all good for mental health. And they are contrary to aggressive activism, name-calling, discrimination, and feeling threatened by others’ choices, from any direction or worldview.
Sexual Intelligence also depends on recognizing that information itself is not the enemy. Talking about sexuality and asking questions does not equal discrimination or “violence.” Likewise, acknowledging that humans are a varied group is a simple acceptance of the fact that adults need the skills of getting along with each other—i.e., communication and respect.
That approach to sexuality would greatly promote the mental health of everyone. It would also help cool down the culture wars. Healthy sex, after all, benefits all of society.
About the AuthorMarty Klein has been a Licensed Marriage & Family Therapist and Certified Sex Therapist for 42 years—over 40,000 sessions with individuals and couples. Marty is an outspoken critic of many popular and clinical ideas about sexuality and emotional health; for example, he is regarded as the foremost critic of the concept of sex addiction. A former instructor at Stanford Medical School, Marty’s humor, insights, and down-to-earth approach are regularly featured in the national media, such as the New York Times, the New Yorker, and NPR. He is the author of seven books on sexuality, including Sexual Intelligence and Beyond Orgasm.
References1. https://tinyurl.com/3ctw74z7 2. https://tinyurl.com/393wx5f7 3. https://tinyurl.com/552wpktv 4. https://tinyurl.com/ysdrce7b 5. https://tinyurl.com/4pz8e4df 6. https://tinyurl.com/abctfwm7 7. https://tinyurl.com/mr3cbzu5
Throughout most of the last century, both political Right1 and Left2 were unified, a rare occurrence in itself, in their opposition to the decriminalization of marijuana. By 2023, public opinion had shifted. Most Americans now support legalization for medical and recreational use,3 and this support extends across the political divide. Nearly two-thirds of the electorate supports legalization, making it one of the least divisive issues in the country.4 At this writing, 23 states have legalized recreational marijuana, along with Washington, DC, and Guam.5
The third that opposes legalization remains, though, and there are reasoned arguments against legalization. Significant research establishing the adverse effects of marijuana consumption exists, noting its correlation with neurophysical decline,6 cognitive impairment,7 highway deaths,8 lower educational attainment,9 addiction,10 and other adverse health effects.11 Within the last decade, correlations have been found between both distal and proximal drug use (including the use of marijuana) and sexual aggression.12
Buchanan, Michigan (Callie Lipkin / Gallery Stock), “The Nicest Place in America (2020)”
There are also reasonable arguments against legalization based on the burdens it is claimed it would produce on society: the tax revenue received from the longstanding legal sale of alcohol and tobacco pales in comparison to the costs of healthcare for the individuals who consume them.13 So some argue marijuana legalization would only further increase the costs to the taxpayer.
In 2019, Alex Berenson of the New York Times published Tell Your Children: The Truth About Marijuana, Mental Illness, and Violence. In it, Berenson warned that paranoia, one of the established side effects of marijuana consumption, is likely to trigger violence in those suffering from psychosis.14 The book was predictably lauded by those pundits who saw it as a revelatory argument against legalization.15 Berenson cited stories such as that of Raina Thaiday, who stabbed eight children to death, seven of which were her own (the eighth was her niece). Berenson noted the ruling of schizophrenia for Thaiday, in which the Justice who presided over her case wrote, “All the psychiatrists thought that it is likely that (Thaiday’s) long-term use of cannabis caused (Thaiday’s) mental illness schizophrenia to emerge.”16 Tell Your Children is chock full of historical tragedies such as Thaiday’s from the 1970s to the present day. The book describes scalping, mutilation, mass shootings, and spousal murder by psychotic perpetrators triggered by smoking marijuana. The author warned that today’s marijuana is considerably more potent (that is, higher concentration of THC) than that used 40+ years ago, and so predicted that such atrocities will only get worse. Yet Berenson’s argument is not new. Cannabis-induced violence has been argued by the U.S. Department of Justice for decades.17
New research challenged the Department’s claims, examining the rates of violent crime in states that had legalized medical and recreational marijuana. The data suggested that legalization not only failed to increase violent crime rates, but it also possibly led to a decline in crimes such as homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault.18 Likewise, Tell Your Children was challenged by many in the scientific community. They argued the author was guilty of confusing correlation with causation and selectively selecting his data, and even likened his anecdotal data to the long-discredited “reefer madness” panic of the past.19
Having grown up during the 1980s at the height of the War on Drugs, I read Tell Your Children with interest, and asked myself if Berenson’s fears were valid. Was he right? Turns out, I live in a small Michigan community that offers an ideal cluster sample in which to test his claims. It’s called Buchanan.
In the fall of 2020, I heard a radio ad calling for nominations to be considered for Reader’s Digest’s Nicest Place in America. I wrote about Buchanan. My essay won.20 Reporters from around the world covered the story.21 Coincidentally, that same year, Buchanan fully implemented marijuana legalization.22 Michigan had passed a medical marijuana law in 2008, and we’d spent the previous 10 years respectfully debating whether or not to follow suit in our small town. In the fall of 2019, the city adopted a plan for six dispensaries.
Location of marijuana dispensaries in Buchanan, MI
The Nicest Place in America has since become the go-to destination for Michigan stoners. At this writing, there is one legal dispensary for every 860 residents, one of the highest per capita ratios in the state.23 We even have a local marijuana ambassador, Freddie “The Stoner” Miller, who’s been seen on the Jimmy Kimmel Live! TV show.24
Buchanan seemed like the perfect case study of the effects of marijuana legalization. Did The Nicest Place in America see an increase in violent crime rates in the years following its adoption of recreational marijuana? I began by looking up our demographics. I found that, in many ways, Buchanan is a microcosm of America. We have a population of 4,270 and enjoy a diverse citizenry that is 83.2 percent White, 11 percent Biracial, 4.38 percent African American, Hispanic (.445 percent), and Asian (.445 percent). We have a poverty rate of 7.85 percent and a median household income of $43,668.
Much of Buchanan’s demographic data is comparable to that of the United States as a whole, though the U.S. has a considerably larger Hispanic population (18.2 percent), a larger median household income ($64,994), and a higher poverty rate (12.8 percent). Buchanan’s industrial statistics are likewise similar to those of the nation, with the workforce distributed across manufacturing, education, retail trade, and professional and technical services.25 Perhaps most significantly, Buchanan’s unemployment insurance claims skyrocketed to record levels in April 2020, as did those throughout the country.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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I then called Sean Denison, Buchanan’s mayor. He told me he’d seen no evidence of violent crime increase since 2020. When I called Tim Ganus, our Police Chief, he told me that he also doubted crime spiked. Still, though, to really know, you need data. I submitted a Freedom of Information Act Request to the Buchanan Police Department to obtain arrest records for violent crimes from 2016 to 2022. Chief Ganus called me again to establish what I meant by “violent crime.” I told him he knew more about this than I did, so I’d leave it up to him. He suggested arrests for assault and for those that would constitute a felony. I concurred. One week later, I had the information in hand. Each report encompassed one calendar year.
Here’s what I found:
There was a total of 855 adult arrests between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2022. Of these, there were a total of 105 (12.2 percent) arrests deemed “violent.” These offenses included nonaggravated assault, aggravated felonious assault, sexual assault, parental kidnapping, and robbery.
- In 2016, there were 29 arrests, one for parental kidnapping, one for sexual assault, 21 nonaggravated (misdemeanor level) assaults, and six aggravated (felonious) assaults.
- In 2017, there were 17 arrests, one for robbery, 12 for non-aggravated (misdemeanor level) assaults, and four for aggravated felonious assault.
- In 2018, there were 23 arrests, one for robbery, 17 for non-aggravated assault, and five for aggravated felonious assault.
- In 2019, there were 21 arrests, two for sexual assault, 17 for non-aggravated assault, and two for aggravated felonious assault.
- In 2020, the first full year of implementation, there were 21 arrests, two for sexual assault, 15 for non-aggravated assault, and four for aggravated felonious assault.
- In 2021, the second year of implementation, there were 19 arrests, one for parental kidnapping, three for sexual assault, one for forcible sexual contact, nine for non-aggravated assault, and four for aggravated felonious assault.
- In 2022, the third year of the implementation, there were 22 arrests, 16 for non-aggravated assault and six for aggravated felonious assault.
Did violent crime increase in Buchanan after 2020? Hardly. Any fears of increased violent crime following marijuana legalization in The Nicest Place in America proved unwarranted. We’re still safe, and so, I’m glad to report, is our title.
About the AuthorJohn D. Van Dyke is an academic and science educator. His personal website is www.vandykerevue.org.
References1. https://rb.gy/17hag 2. https://rb.gy/fzigf 3. https://rb.gy/rkncw 4. https://rb.gy/qx0x8 5. https://rb.gy/m049q 6. https://rb.gy/4a3e9 7. https://rb.gy/36zd3 8. https://rb.gy/eft8n 9. https://rb.gy/m2mcd 10. Shover, C.L., David, C.S., Gordon, S.C., & Humphreys, K. (n.d.). Association between medical cannabis laws and opioid overdose mortality has reversed over time. PNAS, 116(26). 11. https://rb.gy/m2mcd 12. https://rb.gy/wofyp 13. https://rb.gy/ifprp 14. https://rb.gy/hi3zc 15. https://rb.gy/iibix 16. Berenson, A. (2019). Tell Your Children: The Truth About Marijuana, Mental Illness, and Violence. Free Press. 17. Inciardi Inciardi, J. A., & Saum, C. A. (1998). Legalizing Drugs Would Increase Violent Crime (From Illegal Drugs, p. 142–150, 1998, Charles P. Cozic, ed. See NCJ-169238). 18. https://rb.gy/k7fmq 19. https://rb.gy/luf2z 20. https://rb.gy/c1xun 21. https://rb.gy/annph 22. https://rb.gy/cg4xr 23. https://rb.gy/cqg5s 24. https://rb.gy/1xmah 25. https://rb.gy/0is0v
The public is frequently told to “trust the science,” and then ridiculed for holding any views that differ from what is reported to be the scientific consensus. Should non-experts then naively accept the authorized narrative, or are there good reasons to be skeptical?
Is sugar-free gum good for your teeth?When we’re told that four out of five dentists recommend sugarless gum, we assume that five dentists independently examined the evidence and four of them concluded that chewing gum is good for your dental health. However, those dentists aren’t examining completely independent evidence. They sat through the same lectures in dental school, they have ready access to the same studies, they go to the same conventions, and they talk to each other, so we should worry about correlated errors.
Even worse, most dentists may have never even read a study about chewing gum, let alone conducted one of their own. Suppose they heard that most dentists recommend sugarless gum; they might well figure those other dentists are probably doing so for good reason, and so they would recommend it too. In other words, the dentists are following the herd mentality and just going along to get along. Perhaps most dentists believe chewing gum is good for dental health because they believe that most other dentists believe this, even though few if any of them have any good, independent reason to think this is true.
Herding can be a rational behavior. It would not be a good use of time or money for every dentist to conduct an independent study to assess the evidence and determine whether sugarless gum is good for dental health. However, herding can lead an entire scientific community to converge on the wrong answer, and they typically won’t know whether they’ve converged on the right or the wrong answer.
We can see how a dangerous emperor-has-no-clothes situation could easily arise. Suppose a dentist questions whether chewing gum really is good for dental health. He or she considers raising the issue at a convention but then remembers that most dentists recommend gum and worries that they’ll be mocked for questioning the consensus view. So they decide to keep quiet, the field moves on, nobody’s beliefs are challenged, and no new evidence is collected.
This may be a low-stakes example, and there probably are good scientific reasons to believe that chewing sugar-free gum is good for dental health. But herding is a problem in many scientific fields, including those studying arguably more important questions, such as the health of democracy.
How We VoteConsider this example from an academic subfield I happen to know well. Among scholars of political behavior, there is a broad consensus that American voters don’t know or care much about policy, and their voting decisions are largely driven by party identity. Such claims are commonplace in academic papers, conferences, classrooms, textbooks, and public writings. To a member of the general public who has never taken a political science class, this claim might seem absurd. The average American may not be as informed as we would hope, and their policy preferences might diverge from ours. Yet even a brief conversation with a voter would likely reveal that they know and care about policy and think about it when they decide which candidates to support in elections. How can such a strong claim unsupported by good evidence be the scientific consensus?
When I challenged this scientific consensus,1 I received significant public and private criticism from scholars of political behavior. A few of my critics engaged with my arguments and evidence, but most did not. Instead, they typically made appeals to authority, such as, “How dare you challenge what’s been established wisdom for seven decades?”.
In other words, they were herding. They assumed that something must be right because that’s been the consensus view in their field for a long time. They were not able or willing to provide further evidence or arguments in support of their position, and they simply dismissed anyone who challenged them, thereby creating a strong incentive for other scholars to uphold the consensus.
The Good and the Bad ScenarioRoughly speaking, there are two different ways in which an apparent scientific consensus might arise. In the good scenario, scientists are conducting genuinely good work, rigorously vetting each other’s work, and the theory, the evidence, and the analyses supporting the consensus view are all really strong. In this scenario, if reasonable, objective, intelligent individuals from outside the field examined all of the evidence, they too would be provisionally confident in the consensus.
In the bad scenario, the scientists are not always conducting good work, don’t rigorously vet each other’s work (or they engage in selective vetting based on whether or not they like and/or agree with the conclusions of a study), and the theory, the evidence, or the analyses supporting the consensus are not robust. In this scenario, a reasonable, objective, intelligent individual from outside the field who examined the evidence, the analyses, and the theory would be, at best, genuinely uncertain. Nevertheless, some scientists and all too many media pundits and politicos repeatedly state that there is a scientific consensus in support of their preferred view. Dissenters, whether scientists themselves or not, are ostracized.
Unfortunately, the bad scenario occurs too often— much more often than many scientists, commentators, and cultural leaders presume. We already saw one way in which the bad scenario can arise—herding. Here are some additional ways in which the bad scenario can arise and why skeptics should view appeals to scientific consensus, on their own, as uncompelling. I also discuss how non-experts can better distinguish between the good and bad scenarios, and how scientists can do more to avoid the latter.
The Illusion of Scientific ConsensusCommentators and leaders often assert that their position is the consensus view, but without providing direct evidence of that consensus. Just as social media and public discourse don’t accurately reflect the views of regular Americans, they also need not accurately reflect the views of scientists. Making it even more difficult to assess scientific consensus, those who do not hold the views of the purported consensus are often dismissed as not being legitimate members of the scientific community.
In the rare cases in which we are presented with systematic evidence on the views of the scientific community, the results are often underwhelming. Doran and Zimmerman conducted a survey of earth scientists to assess the extent of scientific consensus on climate change, and they concluded that “the debate on the authenticity of global warming and the role played by human activity is largely nonexistent among those who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes.”2 Specifically, in one question, they asked earth scientists “Do you think human activity is a significant contributing factor in changing mean global temperatures?” and 82 percent of them said yes. The meaning of significant is open to interpretation, and even among people who answer yes, there could be genuine disagreement about the extent to which climate change is a problem and the right ways to address it. Furthermore, the survey’s response rate was only 31 percent, and we don’t know if those responding are representative of all scientists who were contacted. Even still, nearly one in five scientists surveyed did not answer yes to this seemingly anodyne question. So maybe the consensus isn’t as strong as we’re frequently told.
Doran and Zimmerman further find that the apparent scientific consensus on climate change gets stronger as they restrict their sample. For example, if they focus on scientists who actively and primarily publish papers on climate change, 97 percent of those scientists answered yes to the question above. One potential interpretation is that when people become immersed in climate science research, they increasingly converge to the truth. Another is that earth scientists who do not hold the desirable view on this question are prevented from publishing papers on climate science. The recent admissions of one climate scientist suggest that journals indeed will not publish the papers of authors who do not conform to the preferred narrative.3
Broad Consensus Doesn’t Mean High CertaintyScientists in a particular field all have access to essentially the same information, so I would expect many of them to have similar beliefs on many scientific questions. How confident are they in those beliefs?
Even if 100 percent of earth scientists agreed that human activity is a significant contributing factor to an increase in mean temperature readings from around the globe, it would still tell us nothing about the certainty with which they held those beliefs. If someone is only 51 percent sure of a claim, they might answer yes to the forced-choice two-option question. So for all we know, although 82 percent of earth scientists answered yes, all of those individual scientists might still be genuinely uncertain.
For this reason, the percentage of scientists who agree with a statement is not a very informative statistic. How sure are they that human activity influences global mean temperature? (Also, how much do they think human activity influences temperature? If it’s a small effect, we’ll want to consider the other costs and benefits before making any rash decisions; if it’s a large effect, we should allocate more resources to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels.) For some questions, 49 percent certainty might be more than enough to warrant taking a costly action— if you were 49 percent sure that your car was going to explode in the next minute, you would get out and run. For other questions, 51 percent certainty is not nearly enough—if you were 51 percent sure that you were going to win the lottery, you wouldn’t quit your job.
Unfortunately, surveys of scientists typically elicit no information about the certainty with which the respondents hold their beliefs. However, since 18 percent of scientists did not agree that human activity is a significant factor in changing mean global temperatures, and since those 18 percent have access to largely the same information as the majority, I would be surprised if all of the 82 percent who agree with the statement hold that belief with strong certainty. Indeed, it would be quite strange if 82 percent of experts were virtually certain while 18 percent of experts weren’t even sure enough to say yes to the binary question.
Correlated ErrorsA scientific estimate can diverge from the truth for many reasons, but the hope of the scientific community is that if we conduct a lot of studies, the errors will cancel out, and when we conduct meta-analyses, our estimates will converge to the truth.
The problem with this logic is that not all errors cancel each other out. Often, scientific studies are biased, meaning that even if we repeated them over and over with infinitely large sample sizes, we still wouldn’t get closer to the truth. Further, the biases of different, related studies are likely correlated with one another.
Consider the increasingly common claim that diet sodas are bad for your health. Although we currently lack a compelling biological explanation as to why, dozens of scientific studies report that consuming diet soda and other artificially sweetened beverages causes a host of health problems including obesity, diabetes, and heart attacks. What’s the evidence for this claim? People who regularly consume diet soda typically have more health problems than people who don’t consume sweet beverages (people who drink sugary beverages are usually excluded or analyzed separately).
Why is there a strong correlation between diet soda and health problems? It could be that diet soda causes health problems. Alternatively, health problems might cause people to drink diet soda. For example, perhaps people switch from regular soda to diet soda after they become obese or diabetic. Or there could be confounding factors that influence both diet soda consumption and health. For example, perhaps people with a sweet tooth are more likely to consume diet soda and also more likely to consume sugary desserts, which cause health problems. These latter possibilities are sources of bias. Because of reverse causation and confounding, the correlation between diet soda consumption and health is not, in and of itself, convincing evidence that diet soda is bad for you. For all we know, it could be good for you insofar as it’s a substitute for sugary foods and beverages.
It doesn’t matter how many observational, correlational studies we conduct on this topic. They will likely all yield similar results, and we still would not learn much about the actual effects of diet soda on health. If all the studies are biased in the same direction, a scientific consensus could emerge that is based on hundreds or even thousands of studies and still be wrong.
Selective ReportingScientific results that happen to align with the predispositions of journal editors and peer-reviewers are more likely to be written up and published than those that go against the accepted wisdom in a field. Scientists often conduct multiple tests and selectively report those that are the most publishable, meaning that the published record is often biased, even if each individual analysis is unbiased. In some cases, scientific results might be skewed in the direction of sensational, surprising, or newsworthy findings. However, once a field has settled upon an apparent consensus and desires to maintain it, perhaps we should worry that results affirming the consensus are much more likely to be published than those that conflict with that consensus.
Archives of Sexual Behavior, a scientific journal published by Springer Nature, recently retracted an article on rapid onset gender dysphoria in response to criticism from activists.4 The retraction note says nothing about the scientific validity of either the data or analysis in that article. Rather, the paper was purportedly retracted on the grounds that participants in a survey did not consent to participate in a study, a claim that the author of the study contests.5
In 2017, Hypatia, an academic philosophy journal, published a paper entitled “In Defense of Transracialism” [that is, changing one’s racial identity].6 Hundreds of academics signed an open letter asking the journal to retract the paper.7 The open letter did not seriously engage with the arguments in the paper; rather, it asserted that the availability of the paper causes harm. The associate editors of the journal issued an apology and condemned the paper. The editor-in-chief criticized the associate editors and defended the journal’s review process but resigned soon after.8 Ultimately, the paper was not retracted, but the philosophy community has signaled that certain arguments and conclusions would not be allowed in their field.
There are many more examples of academic studies being retracted or condemned for reasons unrelated to merit, credibility, integrity, or validity. And unfortunately, these cases are just the tip of the iceberg. For every public retraction, there are likely many more studies that never make it through peer review because of their undesired or unpalatable results. And for every one of these, there are likely many more studies that never get written up and submitted because the author reasonably infers that a paper with such results would either not be published or would harm their reputation.
Some scientists and journal editors openly admit to engaging in this kind of selective reporting. In 2022, the editors of Nature Human Behavior published new ethics guidelines for their journal.9 They reserved the right to decline publication of any submitted paper and retract any published paper that might cause “substantial risk of harm.” In other words, the editors of the journal can reject or retract any study for reasons that are completely unrelated to its scientific validity. So, if the results and conclusion of one scientific result are deemed to be safe by journal editors, while those in another are deemed harmful, only the safe study gets published. This would lead to a scientific consensus around the safe result, even if it were factually wrong.
FraudAnother obvious but important reason the scientific record might fail to reflect the truth is that some scientists engage in fraud. They might manipulate data points to make their results more favorable or even fabricate entire data sets whole cloth. We would all hope that this kind of outright scientific misconduct is rare, but it does happen. Two prominent behavioral scientists from Harvard and Duke University both independently appear to have intentionally manipulated or fabricated data in different parts of the same study—ironically, a study about dishonesty.10 The president of Stanford recently resigned (but kept his faculty appointment) after evidence came to light that strongly suggests he intentionally manipulated images in his neuroscience studies.11 And these are just recent, high-profile examples that made the news. There are likely more cases of fraud that don’t come to light, don’t make the news, and do not lead to a correction of the scientific record.
Career IncentivesPartly because of the phenomena discussed above, we can’t know if a scientist who publicly supports a conclusion genuinely holds that view. To publish papers, secure grants, get a good job, get tenure, receive praise, and avoid banishment, scientists must not question the key tenets of their field. Some of this is natural. A biochemist is not likely to make much progress in her field if she doesn’t accept the atomic theory or the periodicity of elements, and biochemistry as a field won’t make much progress if it has to devote significant journal space and lab time to questions that are already well settled. However, most scientific claims aren’t nearly so well-established, and we’ll never know if they’re truly right or wrong if scientists aren’t able to publish novel theoretical perspectives, data, or analyses that challenge them. Paradigms, as defined by Thomas Kuhn, could simply never shift.
In addition to the incentives for individual researchers, scientific fields as a whole often have a strong incentive to collectively uphold a consensus. Virologists won’t be able to secure as much funding and support for their research if the public and the rest of the scientific community were to think that virology researchers caused a global pandemic. As a result, others outside the field shouldn’t necessarily be persuaded by the sheer fact that virologists oppose the lab-leak theory of COVID-19 origins, which, it just so happens, would be very bad for their careers.
Science vs. ValuesNot all important questions are scientific questions. What is the effect of eating bacon on my chances of having a heart attack? is a scientific question. Should I eat bacon? is not. When you consider whether or not to eat bacon, you’ll want to think about a lot of things that can be scientifically quantified such as health risks, nutritional value, economic costs, and so on. However, you’ll also want to think about other questions such as How much do I enjoy eating bacon?, What are the ethical implications of eating pig products?, and Does my enjoyment of bacon outweigh the health risks and ethical downsides?. These latter questions are about your personal values, and by the personal experiential nature of the questions, scientists are probably less equipped to answer them than you are.
Just as individual decision-making involves values, so does public policy. So, If we banned the sale of bacon, how much would it increase unemployment in Iowa? is a scientific question, while Should we ban the sale of bacon? is not. And scientists’ values aren’t necessarily any more enlightened than those of citizens, elected officials, and bureaucrats in deciding the latter. So we should consider scientific evidence when assessing the costs or benefits of different policy decisions, but science alone cannot dictate which policies to implement.
Unfortunately, the difference between science questions and value judgments is often forgotten or ignored by scientists themselves. We’re often told things such as, there is a scientific consensus that we should raise the gas tax, economists support surge pricing for parking, education researchers oppose standardized testing, or a scientific journal endorses a political candidate,12 and similar statements should be roughly as persuasive as anthropologists prefer mayonnaise over mustard. Scientists shouldn’t be in the business of telling people what to do. They should provide people with information so that they can make better decisions and policies conditional on their values.
PoliticizationThis article presents a number of different explanations for the potential emergence of an unreliable scientific consensus. All of these concerns are exacerbated when a scientific question becomes politicized or is of great public interest. If a particular scientific claim happens to align with the values, policy preferences, or political objectives of scientists, you can imagine that the incentives for misrepresenting the scientific consensus, selectively reporting results, accepting the conclusions of biased studies, and herding become even greater. And if an undesirable result can lead a scientist to be ostracized by not just their peers but by journalists, friends, family, and activists, the distortionary incentives become even stronger.
This poses a vexing problem for the otherwise-promising practice of evidence-based policy. All else equal, the more relevant science is for policy, the less reliable it will likely be. This is because scientists, like everyone else, are individuals with their own values, biases, and incentives. They probably already had strong views about policy before they analyzed any data, which means they’re even more likely than normal to report results selectively, publish biased studies, herd on a politically desirable conclusion, and so on. Unfortunately, this means that we should be more skeptical of scientific findings when that question is particularly politicized or policy-relevant.
All that said, avoid nihilism or worse.Consumers of scientific information should be skeptical of an apparent scientific consensus, and they should think about some of the factors discussed here when deciding how skeptical they should be. How politicized is this topic? What are the career incentives for the scientists? How easy would it be for scientists to selectively report only the favorable results? Would a study have been published if it had found the opposite result or a null result? The answers to these questions will not definitively tell us whether the scientific consensus is right or wrong, but they should help us decide the degree to which we should simply trust the consensus or investigate further.
Although skepticism is warranted, nihilism is not. Even when a topic is highly politicized and when there are good reasons to worry about biased studies, selective reporting, herding, and so on, the scientific community can still find the right answer. The debate over evolution by natural selection would seem to feature many of the problems I’ve discussed, and yet, the scientific consensus is almost surely right in that case. However, you shouldn’t think evolution is right just because it’s the scientific consensus. You should think it’s right because the evidence is strong. And if scientists want to convince more people about evolution, they shouldn’t simply appeal to scientific consensus. They should present and discuss the evidence.
Science is a process, not a result.If we want to learn more about the universe for the sake of enjoyment or with the goal of improving our lives, science is our best hope. So don’t become a nihilist, and don’t replace science with something worse such as random guessing or deference to authority, religious or political. Remember that science is just the word we use to describe the process by which we generate new knowledge by questioning, experimenting, analyzing, and testing to see if we are wrong rather than confirming that we are right. It involves repeated iterations of hypothesizing, experimenting, analyzing, empirical testing, and arguing.
If a group of so-called scientists stop theorizing, testing, and challenging, then they’re no longer engaged in science. Perhaps they’re engaged in advocacy, which is a respectable thing to do, particularly if the theory, evidence, and arguments on their side are strong. Yet advocacy and science are distinctly different activities and shouldn’t be conflated.
Science is not a specific person13 or even a group of people. Science is not a particular result or conclusion. It is not content but method. It is to remain always open to skepticism while never succumbing to cynicism. The goal of science is not for everyone to agree or behave in the same way. To the extent that there is a goal or purpose of science, it’s for us to challenge what we thought we knew, to obtain new information, and thereby get successively closer to the truth. Of course, we don’t know what the truth is, and the scientific process is imperfect, so, as part of a healthy scientific process, we can sometimes move away from the truth. However, if we’re doing this correctly, we will get successively closer to truth more often than not.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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At various points in our history, there has been a scientific consensus that the sun revolves around the earth, that humans do not share a common ancestor with other animals, that force equals mass times velocity, and that bloodletting is an effective medical treatment. More recently, doctors told people for decades to treat soft-tissue injuries with ice, while the most current evidence now suggests that cold therapy delays healing.14
To its credit, the scientific process has allowed us to correct these mistakes. However, the scientific record is imperfect and ever-changing. So even if the scientific consensus might be right more often than not, we should not accept it on faith alone.
The scientific community should actively work to address the problems discussed here. It should try to set up better institutions and career incentives to reduce the prevalence of biased studies, selective reporting, and herding. It should do a better job of conveying the uncertainty associated with any scientific claims and beliefs. And it should not impose its values on others. In the meantime, members of the public should continue to be skeptical, but not cynical, while asking for better evidence and arguments before reflexively accepting a reported scientific consensus.
About the AuthorAnthony Fowler is a Professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He is the editor-in-chief of the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, an author of Thinking Clearly with Data, and a host of Not Another Politics Podcast.
References1. Fowler, A. (2020). Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting?. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 15(2), 141–179. 2. Doran, P.T., & Zimmerman, M.K. (2009). Examining the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change. Eos, Transactions American Geophysical Union, 90(3), 22–23. 3. https://rb.gy/9h54n 4. https://rb.gy/23irm 5. https://rb.gy/gulwn 6. Tuvel, R. (2017). In Defense of Transracialism. Hypatia, 32(2), 263–278. 7. https://rb.gy/fys22 8. https://rb.gy/24iw4 9. https://rb.gy/5qmym 10. https://rb.gy/acict 11. https://rb.gy/ihwxa 12. https://rb.gy/vmjj7 13. https://rb.gy/adckm 14. Wang, Z. R., & Ni, G. X. (2021). Is It Time to Put Traditional Cold Therapy in Rehabilitation of Soft-Tissue Injuries Out to Pasture?. World Journal of Clinical Cases, 9(17), 4116.
A pediatric neurologist at Boston Children’s Hospital diagnosed my son, Misha, with autism spectrum disorder at age three. At Massachusetts General Hospital, another pediatric neurologist answered my call for a second opinion only to rebuff my hope for a different one. “I did not find him to be very receptive to testing,” the expert sighed. Both neurologists observed that Misha didn’t respond to their request to identify colors, body parts, or animals, that he averted his eyes from theirs, that he pawed their examination table when he didn’t flap his arms. Autism, the doctors said, constituted a lifelong condition. Medical science didn’t understand its causes or cures, and scarcely comprehended the limits of its woes.
How could the neurologists deduce such a bleak judgment from 90 minutes in the bell jar of their examination rooms? If they knew so little about autism, then how could they gavel down a life sentence? I remembered reading somewhere that a properly trained neurologist ought to be able to argue both for and against any single diagnosis in a stepwise process of elimination. I opened the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), leafed to the entry under autism, and plucked out of its basket several inculpating symptoms. Aggrieved, I sought out the Handbook of Differential Diagnosis, a companion volume, and underlined an admonitory passage: “Clinicians typically decide on the diagnosis within the first five minutes of meeting the patient and then spend the rest of the time during their evaluation interpreting (and often misinterpreting) elicited information through this diagnostic bias.” Now what?
As an educated citizen of progressive Cambridge, Massachusetts, I consumed large volumes of such second-hand, semi-digested information. I felt that I should, and believed that I could, develop my own, independent judgment about Misha’s condition. I would do my own research, and I would draw my own conclusions based on what I learned.
These virtues turned out to be constituent features of my error. My skepticism and sense of responsibility blended with my stubbornness as I struggled to evaluate a welter of “holistic” attitudes about medicine and health. Several fixed ideas confronted me. Autism, I read, is neither the psychopathology listed in the DSM nor the organic twist of disease supposed by neurologists. Autism, these alternative sources explained, is one among an epidemic of preventable chronic illnesses that American children contract from toxins in the environment. Holistic therapy, according to another, contains the requisite resources. Vitamin therapy, homeopathy, and antifungal treatment could heal children like Misha of their injuries.
The claim that autism is a treatable, toxin-induced chronic illness is a half-century old. Its history forms a pattern of culture and credulity imprinted on our own time. Today, indeed, as one in every 36 children receive the diagnosis, and as controversies swirl around COVID-19, more people than ever turn to holistic remedies to treat illnesses real and imagined. Homeopathic remedies fly off the shelves at pharmacies, alongside an array of alleged immunity-boosting, anti-inflammatory vitamins and herbal supplements.
Critics view the vogue for holism as the product of an irrational transaction between charlatans and suckers. As I reflect on my experience with Misha in the grassroots of autism agonistes, however, I find the issues don’t divide so tidily. The question isn’t whom to trust or what to believe, but how to make an existential choice between incommensurable propositions.
A family friend introduced me to Mary Coyle, a homeopath at the Real Child Center in New York. Coyle said Misha had likely contracted autism from contaminants in the environment. Was I aware of the epidemic of chronic illnesses afflicting children like him? Some of them, Coyle explained, received diagnoses of asthma, chronic fatigue, or dermatitis. Others were diagnosed with fibromyalgia, Lyme disease, or PANDAS (Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections). Pathogens lying at the nexus between the body and the environment fooled medical specialists at places like Boston Children’s Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital. Coyle urged me to abandon their dead-end query, “Is your child on the autism spectrum?” To help Misha, I needed to switch the predicate and envisage a different question: “How toxic is your child?”
My kitchen turned into an ersatz pharmacy of unguents, powders, drops, and tablets.
Why not find out? Although I had never heard of homeopathy or Coyle’s sub-specialty of homotoxicology, I believed that with some study I could probably draw the necessary distinction between evidence and interpretation in the test results. Coyle herself had been trained by conventional physicians before seeking out propaedeutic instruction in holistic medicine. Holism sounded nice.
We started out with an “Energetic Assessment.” Measuring Misha’s rates of “galvanic skin response,” Coyle said, would weigh the balance of electrical vibrations conducted through his pores. Toward this end, she deployed an electrodermal screening device that deciphered imbalances in his “meridians,” or “pathways.” Toxic metals, alas, appeared from the results to be obstructing his “flow” of energy.
With Coyle’s theory confirmed, she referred me to Lawrence Caprio to canvass for food and environmental allergens. Caprio, like Coyle, had defected from conventional to alternative medicine. I learned that while attending medical school at the University of Rome he had befriended a homeopath in the Italian countryside and lived “a very natural lifestyle”; the experience led him to pursue naturopathy.
Misha—Caprio now reported—turned out to be “intolerant” of bread, butter, eggplant, oatmeal, peanuts, potatoes, and tomatoes. Misha also displayed a “sensitivity” to bananas, car exhaust, cheese, chlorine, chocolate, cow milk, dust mites, garlic, onions, oranges, soy beans, and strawberries. Caprio flagged “phenolics” such as malvin (in corn sweeteners) and piperin (in nightshade vegetables and animal proteins).
Next, I mailed urine and stool samples to the Great Plains Laboratory in Kansas. The director there, William Shaw, had worked as a researcher in biochemistry, endocrinology, and immunology at the Centers for Disease Control before he quit and set up his own laboratory. Shaw suspected lithium in “the bottled water craze” and fluoridation in the public water supply as just two of the causes of autism. He came to believe that government scientists woefully misunderstood such sources. He compared their dereliction to the Red Cross’s failure to intervene in the Holocaust. Shaw also found toxic levels of yeast flooding Misha’s intestines.
Homeopathy, naturopathy, and renegade biochemistry cast me outside the institutions of science where Misha’s neurologists practiced. But to grasp how these new realms might be objective correlates of Misha’s condition—and how toxins, foods, and yeast might be culprits—I had only to remind myself of the progressive demonology that made the diagnosis seem plausible.
Industrial corporations have been chewing up the land, choking the air, and despoiling the water, I read, turning the whole country into a hazardous materials zone. I’d read Silent Spring, in which ecologist Rachel Carson claimed that our bodies weren’t shields, but permeable organisms that absorbed particulates. I’d heard Ralph Nader liken air and water pollution to “domestic chemical and biological warfare.” I’d finished Bill McKibben’s The End of Nature with the requisite dread. Listening to progressive news media about “forever chemicals” evoked moods that swung between indignation and paranoia. I paid for eco-friendly cribs, de-leaded the windows in our apartment, and tried to shop organic.
As Coyle, Caprio, and Shaw whispered in my ear, though, my imagination boggled with an even greater catalogue of possible pathogens. Our food contained more pesticides, hormones, and insecticides than I had suspected. Our air is filled with methanol and carbon monoxide. Chlorine, herbicides, and parasites degraded our tap water. Mold festered in our walls, floors, and ceilings. Formaldehyde lurked in our furniture. Heavy metals hid in our lotions, shampoos, and antiperspirants. Synthetic chemical compounds—polychlorinated biphenyls, phthalates, bisphenol A, polybrominated diphenyl ethers—seeped into our toys, diapers, bottles, soaps, and appliances. Even our Wi-Fi, cell phones, refrigerator, light bulbs, and microwave oven emitted radiation through electromagnetic fields.
Had the dystopia of the contemporary world poisoned my son? Coyle, Caprio, and Shaw not only defined autism as a preventable, “biomedical” illness, they traced the mechanism of harm to his pediatrician’s office.
Misha had received three-in-one vaccines against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP) and measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) according to the recommended schedule. The holistic experts now told me that these vaccines contain dangerous metals, including mercury and aluminum. The vaccines, I read, could have spread from Misha’s arm to his gut and persisted long enough to perforate an intestinal wall. Mercury, a neurotoxin, could have leaked into his bloodstream and surreptitiously addled his brain. Or his pediatrician could have set off a chain reaction that had the same effect. The antibiotics she gave him for petty infections could have reduced the diversity of natural flora that controlled yeast in his gastrointestinal tract. An overabundance of yeast could have generated enzymes that perforated his intestines even if live-virus vaccines had not done so directly.
Either way, undigested food molecules such as gluten (in wheat) and casein (in dairy) could have joined forces with environmental toxins and heavy metals and attached to Misha’s opiate receptors, disrupting his neurotransmitters and triggering allergic reactions. The ballooning inflammation would have thwarted his immune responses. If so, then his “toxic load” could be starving his cells of nutrients. Escalating levels of “oxidative stress” could be congesting his metabolism. No wonder he lacked muscle tone, coordination, and balance!
How could I dismiss their diagnosis of “autism enterocolitis,” AKA “leaky gut?” My liberal education prided open-mindedness, after all. In 1998, a midlevel British lab researcher named Andrew Wakefield published a study warranting the diagnosis in The Lancet, one of the world’s most prestigious medical journals. Wakefield’s paper, it turned out, “entered his profession’s annals of shame as among the most unethical, dishonest, and damaging medical research to be unmasked in living memory,” according to Brian Deer’s The Doctor Who Fooled the World.
In the meantime, both liberal and conservative politicians echoed the implications of Wakefield’s hoax. “The science right now is inconclusive,” Barack Obama said in 2008. Thousands of media outlets around the world reported a controversy between two legitimate sides. “Fears raised over preservatives in vaccines,” a front-page headline in the Boston Globe announced. Wakefield appeared on television with articulate parents by his side. “You have to listen to the story the parents tell,” he said on CBS’s 60 Minutes. Reputable television programs did just that. ABC’s Nightline, Good Morning America, and 20/20, NBC’s Dateline, and The Oprah Winfrey Show broadcast the gravamen of the indictment out of the mouths of well-educated parents.
The accusation against antibiotics resonated with definite misgivings that I held over the dispensations of American medicine. Doctors in the United States order more excessive diagnostic tests, perform more needless caesarean sections, and prescribe more superfluous antibiotics than their counterparts around the world. A prepossessing dependence on technology encourages American medicine to treat symptoms rather than people. From this indubitable truth, Coyle, Caprio, and Shaw drew an uncommon inference that aggressive medical care had sabotaged Misha’s birthright immunity.
Misha, so endowed, could have repaired the damage done, no matter whether vaccines or antibiotics had upset his “primary pathways.” His body would have availed “secondary pathways” such as his skin and mucous membrane. Coyle said his innate capacity for adaptation had been telegraphing itself in his fevers, his eczema, his ear infections, even his runny noses. Yet his pediatrician had stood blind before the hidden meaning of these irruptions. Reaching into her chamber of magic bullets, she prescribed steroid creams for his eczema, acetaminophen for his headaches, amoxicillin for his ear and sinus infections, antihistamines for his coughs and runny noses, and ibuprofen for his fevers. This “Whac-a-Mole mentality,” Coyle despaired, had plugged his “secondary pathways” as well.
The trio of virtuoso healers would help me sidestep the adulterated dialectic of science and charm Misha’s autism out of its chronic condition.
A vicious cycle set in. Vaccines and/or antibiotics had predisposed Misha’s microbiome to harbor viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Turning toxic, they invaded his cells, tissues, and fluids. The foreign occupation precipitated allergies. The allergies provoked inflammation, which arrested metabolic energy, which led to anemia, which invited recurring infections. His pediatrician perpetuated those with cascading doses of foreign chemicals. “Rather than freak out and take medication and look to suppress,” Coyle counseled, “we should celebrate that the body is working and go and look at the primary pathways and clear out the blockages.” Up to 103 degrees Fahrenheit, “the fever might be a good thing.”
If I could accept that “allopathic” medicine did not stand apart and speak objectively, but instead reflected the sickness of American society, then the trio of virtuoso healers would help me sidestep the adulterated dialectic of science and health. A holistic treatment protocol would charm Misha’s autism out of its chronic condition and turn it into a treatable medical illness. “The body’s infinite wisdom,” Coyle said, “would take care of the rest.” As the protocol purged and flushed his toxins, the fawn of nature would close the holes in his intestines. His allergies would ebb, reducing inflammation, reviving cellular respiration, and reconnecting his neurotransmitters. The realignment of his meridians would reflow his energy. “Once you clear,” Caprio said, “the whole thing just changes dramatically.”
Autism parents first embraced holistic treatments in the 1960s and 1970s, when emphatic personal testimonials, printed and distributed in underground newsletters, led to the formation of grassroots groups such as Defeat Autism Now! (DAN!) and ushered in the “leaky gut” theory. DAN! grew out of the psychologist Bernard Rimland’s Autism Research Institute. Rimland’s 1964 book Infantile Autism blew up the prevailing, psychogenetic thesis of autism’s origins, which blamed mothers for failing to love their children enough.
The Today Show and The Dick Cavett Show had given psychologist Bruno Bettelheim, the chief exponent of the “refrigerator mothers” thesis, free reign to liken them to concentration camp guards. Rimland’s Infantile Autism refuted that thesis. Letters poured into his Autism Research Institute from grateful parents attesting to the efficacy of the holistic approach: vitamin therapy, detoxification, and elimination dieting. Pharmaceutical companies rolled out new childhood vaccines for measles (1963), mumps (1967), and rubella (1969) and combined the immunizations against pertussis, diphtheria, and tetanus into one injection. Rimland began distributing an annual survey that queried parents about the effects.
Belief in an etiology variously called “leaky gut,” “autism enterocolitis,” or “toxic psychosis” awkwardly amalgamated elements from both ancient and modern medical philosophy. The old idea of disease as a sign of disharmony with nature queued behind the modern concept of infection through the invasion of microorganisms. But no theory of etiology needs to be complete for a treatment to work. “Help the child first,” Rimland urged, “worry later about exactly what it is that’s helping the child.”
Like anti-psychiatry activists, breast cancer patients, and AIDS activists, autism parents confronted physicians with the backlash doctrine of “consumer choice” in specialist medical care. “The parent who reads this book should assume that their family doctor, or even their neurologist or other specialist, may not know nearly as much as they do about autism,” William Shaw wrote in Biological Treatments for Autism.
The first television program to elevate parental intuitions, Vaccine Roulette, aired in 1982 on an NBC affiliate in Washington, DC. The show promoted the vaccine injury theory—and won an Emmy Award. Accelerating rates of the diagnosis over the next decades brought the injury theory from a simmer to a boil. In the 1960s, an average of one out of every 2,500 children received the diagnosis. By the first decade of the 21st century, the prevalence rose to one out of every 88, an increase of over 2,500 percent. Up to three-quarters of autism parents used some form of holistic treatment on their children.
A Congressional hearing in 2012 featured their cause, heaping suspicion on vaccines, speculating on gut flora, and praising the efficacy of vitamins, homeopathy, and elimination dieting. Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat from Ohio and one-time Presidential candidate, expressed outrage over the spectacle of “children all over the country turning up with autism.” Kucinich blamed “neurotoxic chemicals in the environment,” particularly emissions from coal-burning power plants. Like the autism parents in attendance at the hearing, Kucinich did his own research and drew his own conclusions.
“There’s no such thing as ‘conventional’ or ‘alternative’ or ‘complementary’ or ‘integrative’ or ‘holistic’ medicine,” alternative medicine skeptic Paul Offit complained the next year. “There’s only medicine that works and medicine that doesn’t.” Clever and concise, Offit’s polemic nonetheless begged the relevant questions. Who decides what works? Fundamental science is one thing; therapeutic interventions are quite another. “Evidence-based medicine,” introduced in 1991, supplies a template of criteria to translate medical science into clinical medicine. Atop its hierarchy sits the “randomized control trial,” a methodology loaded with social and financial biases. Even when a therapy works incontrovertibly, that fact doesn’t free its applications of ambiguity. Antibiotics work. We’ve known that since the 1930s. But which of their benefits are worth which of their costs?
When does an accumulation of confirmed research equal a consensus of reasonable certainty? In 1992, ABC’s 20/20 exposed a cluster of autism cases in Leominster, Massachusetts. A sunglasses’ manufacturer had long treated the city as a dumping ground for its chemical waste. After the company shuttered, a group of mothers counted 43 autistic children born to parents who had worked at the plant or resided near it. Commenting on the Leominster case, the eminently sane neurologist Oliver Sacks voiced a curious sentiment. “The question of whether autism can be caused by exposure to toxic agents has yet to be fully studied,” Sacks wrote, three years after epidemiologists from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health determined that no unusual cluster of cases had existed in that city in the first place. Who gets to decide the meaning of “fully studied”?
Bernard Rimland and the autism parents in his movement answered the question for themselves. “There are thousands of children who have recovered from autism as a result of the biomedical interventions pioneered by the innovative scientists and physicians in the DAN! movement,” Rimland insisted in the group’s 2005 treatment manual, Autism: Effective Biomedical Treatments.
William Shaw and Mary Coyle, both DAN! clinicians, adapted Rimland’s manual for Misha. Coyle vouched personally for the safety and efficacy of the holistic treatment therein. She swore she used it to “recover” her own son.
Interdicting toxins marked the first step on the “healing journey.” Taking it obliged me to decline Misha’s pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (for pneumonia) and his varicella vaccine (for chickenpox). Meanwhile, I eliminated from our cupboard and refrigerator the foods for which Caprio had proved Misha sensitive and intolerant, and I prepared a course of “optimal dose sub-lingual immunotherapy” to “de-sensitize” him. Coyle drew up a monthly schedule to detoxify him with homeopathic remedies from a manufacturer in Belgium. Shaw itemized vitamins and minerals to supplement Misha’s intake of nutrients, plus probiotics and antifungals to control his yeast and rehabilitate his intestinal tract. My kitchen turned into an ersatz pharmacy of unguents, powders, drops, and tablets.
Every morning, I inserted two tablets of a Chinese herbal supplement, Huang Lian Su, into an apple. This would crank-start his digestion. I added half a capsule of methylfolate into his breakfast. This would juice his metabolism. Ten minutes after he finished breakfast, I stirred Nystatin powder into warm coconut water, drew two ounces into a dropper, irrigated his mouth, and ensured that he abstained from eating or drinking for ten more minutes. Fifteen minutes before his midday snack, I squeezed six drops of a B12 vitamin under his tongue. Every evening, I slipped him two more Huang Lian Su tablets.
An exception in federal law places vitamins, supplements, and homeopathic remedies outside the FDA’s approval process. Only their manufacturers know what these dummy drugs contain.
To fortify his glucose levels, I could elect to give him two vials of raisin water every other hour. To normalize his alkaline levels, I added a quarter-cup of baking soda to his baths. The “de-sensitizing drops,” however, had to be dribbled onto his wrists twice every day. Misha also needed regular, carefully calibrated doses of boron, chromium, folic acid, glutathione, iodine, magnesium, manganese, milk thistle, selenium, vitamins A, C, D, E, and zinc.
Homotoxicology, the core modality, entailed his daily ingestion of homeopathic “drainage remedies” to purge toxins and open pathways. The bottles arrived in the mail. Coyle provided a table of equivalencies, linking particular remedies to organs. This compound for his small intestines; That one for his large intestine; This one for his kidney; and That one for his mucous membrane.
At the same time, homeopathy’s whole-body scope of intervention claimed to relieve a wide range of illnesses. Shaw and his colleagues said the modality could treat autism, plus sensory integration disorder, central auditory processing disorder, speech and language problems, fine motor and gross motor problems, oppositional defiance disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, eating disorders, headaches, eczema, and irritable bowel syndrome. The marketing materials that accompanied Misha’s compounds claimed that they could treat bloating, constipation, cramps, flatulence, nausea, night sweats, and sneezing.
I learned the shorthand rationale as part of my self-education. Homeopaths stake their claim on a manufacturing process that distinguishes their remedies from pharmaceutical medicaments. It’s called “succussion.” A label that reads “4X,” for example, indicates that the original ingredient has been diluted four times by a factor of 10—the manufacturer has succussed it 10,000 times. “12X” indicated that the original ingredient has been succussed one trillion times.
The compounds prescribed for Misha said they contained asparagus, bark, boldo leaf, goldenrod, goldenseal, horsetail, juniper, marigold, milk thistle, parsley, passionflower, Scottish pine root, and other herbs and plants of which I’d never heard. Having been succussed, though, the remedies actually contained no active ingredients. In the bottles remained “the mother tincture,” a special kind of water said to “remember” the original ingredient. The only other ingredient listed on the label was an organic compound that served as a solvent and preservative. Thirty-one percent of some of Misha’s remedies contained ethanol alcohol, a proof as strong as vodka or gin. Coyle instructed me to “gas off the alcohol” on the stove before serving him.
Succussion confused me. Misha’s reaction worried me. He looked a fright. Black circles ringed his eyelids. Yeast blanketed his nostrils and lips. Rashes and red spots appeared all over his body. Pale and lethargic, he oscillated between diarrhea and constipation. He broke out with recurring fevers. He stopped gaining weight. Because he didn’t speak, or reliably communicate in any other manner, I couldn’t understand why his emotions seemed to be running at an unusually high pitch.
Coyle explained that different glands and organs in the body stored specific feelings. The kidneys stored fear. The pancreas stored frustration. The thyroid stored misunderstanding, the liver anger, the lungs grief, the bladder a sense of loss, and so forth. Those emotions poured out as his body excreted toxins. I shouldn’t regard the worsening of his symptoms as a side effect, but rather as a necessary condition of his recovery—“aggravations,” in homeopathy’s parlance. A Table of Homotoxicosis charted the correspondences with the precision and predictability of biochemistry. Nor should I abandon the treatment. To do so would be to “re-toxify” him. I must allow the treatment to fully fledge. I must keep my nerve.
I lost my nerve. It took 18 months of gnawing doubt and thousands of dollars out the door. Then one day I swept all the vitamins, antigens, probiotics, antifungals, and homeopathic remedies into the trash bin. I restored Misha to a regular diet, caught him up on his vaccines, and demanded (and received) a full refund from Coyle.
I had blundered into a non sequitur. The environment is toxic. Conventional medicine does reflect the sickness of our culture. Yet that doesn’t render holism any better. The supplement industry, I came to understand, has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into thousands of clinical studies without demonstrating that vitamins, herbal products, or mineral compounds are either safe or effective, much less necessary. The Food & Drug Administration (FDA) neither tests the industry’s marketing claims nor regulates its product standards.
Caprio and Coyle regard Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) as a reproach to modern, Western medicine. TCM, they pointed out, is 5,000 years old. Actually, I learned, Chairman Mao Zedong contrived TCM after 1950 as a means of controlling China’s rural population and burnishing the regime’s reputation abroad. In 1972, during Richard Nixon’s tour of Chinese hospitals, his guides stage-managed a demonstration of TCM’s miracles. American media reported the healing event at face value and launched the holistic health movement stateside. Several years later, the FDA sought to regulate the vitamin and supplement industry. Manufacturers fought back with a marketing campaign centered on “freedom of choice” and convinced Americans to stand up for their right not to know which ingredients may (or may not) be contained in their daily vitamins.
I needed to file a public records request with the Connecticut Department of Public Health to discover that Lawrence Caprio had been censured and fined for improperly labeling medication, for practicing without a license, and for passing himself off as a medical doctor. I also learned that Caprio’s naturopathy license had been suspended for two years after the FDA determined his bogus “sensitivity tests” violated its regulations. Misha, an actual immunologist confirmed, had no food allergies in the first place.
Was my son ever really burdened by toxins? Coyle said the results of the “energetic assessments” revealed that Misha carried quantities of heavy metals. Degrees of dangerousness were measured against a standard range credited to “Dr. Richard L. Cowden.” I sent Misha’s results to Cowden. I stated my belated impression that meaningful ranges for heavy metals don’t exist—we all have traces—and my belief that autism cannot be reversed. “I have reversed advanced autism in many children,” Dr. Cowden snapped. “I saw reversal of more than a dozen cases of full-blown autism, including my own grandson. So I am pretty sure the parents of those dozen+ children would debate you on your IMPRESSION/BELIEF.”
Cowden advised me to repeat Misha’s energetic assessment through the Internet and to place him into an “infrared sauna” to detoxify him. I declined.
Even before Misha’s first energetic assessment, the FDA had accused the device’s manufacturer of making unapproved claims. The FDA had approved it only for measuring “galvanic skin response.” But the company’s marketing materials had crossed over into unapproved diagnostic and predictive territory when they claimed that the “software indicates what is referred to as Biological Preference and Biological Aversion.” The software was recalled. “Dr. Cowden,” I also learned too late, was not the “Board Certified cardiologist and internist” that he advertises. He surrendered his medical license in 2008 after the Texas Board of Medical Examiners twice reprimanded him for endangering his patients. According to the American Board of Internal Medicine, Cowden’s certifications are “inactive.”
The “homotoxicology” that Coyle practiced had sounded to me like a branch of toxicology. But the two fields turn out to have nothing in common. An analysis of clinical trials of homotoxicology established that it is “not a method based on accepted scientific principles or biological plausibility.” Actual toxicologists pass a rigorous examination for their board certifications and adhere to a code of ethics. Homotoxicologists become so simply by declaring themselves homotoxicologists.
As for vitamins, supplements, and homeopathic remedies: an exception in federal law places them outside the FDA’s approval process. Only their manufacturers know what these dummy drugs contain. Last year, after fielding numerous reports of “toxic” reactions, finding “many serious violations” of manufacturing controls, and recording “significant harm” to children, the FDA warned the consuming public.
Homeopathy offers no detectable mechanism of action, nor any reason to believe that “aggravating” the primary symptoms of an illness is necessary to cure it. Water does not “remember,” at least not if the laws of molecular physics hold true. The tinier the dosage, homeopaths insist, the more potent the therapeutic effect the mother tincture will deliver. By this logic, a patient who misses a day might die of an overdose.
As I steered Misha back toward medical science, though, I remembered the gap that holism fills for parents like me. I took him to a “neuro-biologist,” a “neuro-psychologist,” and a “neuro-immunologist.” His “neuro-ophthalmologist” ordered an MRI. His “neuro-radiologist” read the images with algorithms—and pronounced his brain “normal” due to the absence of indications of damage.
That determination proved only the vacuity of scientific materialism. The “biological revolution” that seized psychiatry in the 1980s aspired to network the anatomical, electrical, and chemical functions of the brain. A procession of neuroimaging technologies held out the promise of progress: electroencephalography (EEG); computerized axial tomography (CAT); positron emission tomography (PET); magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS); magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The resulting studies have always fallen pitifully short of a credible evidentiary threshold and have never done anything to expand treatment options. Mainly, neuroimaging has furnished opportunities to market the research industry, a breakthrough culture that has never broken through.
Holism, by contrast, answers prayers in the immaterial world, bidding to restore harmony through an aesthetically elegant fusion of mind, body, and spirit. As Coyle explained on her website: “Homotoxicology utilizes complex homeopathic remedies designed to restore the child’s vital force and balance the biological flow system.”
One part of me still craves holism’s beautiful notions. Another part recognizes in their desiccated spiritualism the return of a repressed pagan unconscious. I can no more believe in goblets of magic water and occult energy than I can conceal my disappointment with “neuro-radiology.”
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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Scientists long ago dispatched the “leaky gut” theory with a series of disproof. Holistic parents, researchers, and clinicians, however, continue to reject what they contend are the false revelations of cold, mechanical instrumentalism. Tylenol, electromagnetic fields, “toxic baby food,” COVID-19 vaccines, HPV inoculation, “geo-engineering,” and genetically modified foods top the current indictment. William Shaw published a paper in 2020 purporting to demonstrate “rapid complete recovery from autism” through antifungal therapy. Mary Coyle attested last year to having healed her son’s chickenpox through “natural” remedies.
Many of the holistic advocacy organizations intermittently lost access to social media platforms during COVID. Yet censorship has deepened the martyrdom ingrained in this theodicy of misfortune. A spiritual war against invisible enemies animates their imaginations and elevates their personal disappointment to the status of a historical event. Rebaptized in nature’s holy immunity by ascetic protocols of abstinence and purification, they turn over a new leaf, as it were, and crave vindication above all else. “This book offers you two messages,” Bernard Rimland promised of the testimonials that he collected in Recovering Autistic Children: “You are not alone in your fight, and you can win.”
Here’s another message: Children need love and respect above all. As René Dubos wrote in Mirage of Health, “As far as life is concerned, there is no such thing as ‘Nature.’ There are only homes.”
About the AuthorJohn Summers is a writer, historian, and Editor-in-Chief of Lingua Franca Media, Inc., an independent research institute in Cambridge, MA. He received his PhD in American history from the University of Rochester. For a decade, he taught at Harvard University, Boston College, and Columbia University. After leaving academia, he edited The Baffler magazine for five years. He is a father of a boy with autism.
The human colon may represent the most biodense ecosystem in the world. Though many may believe that our stool is primarily made up of undigested food, about 75 percent is pure bacteria—trillions and trillions, in fact, about half a trillion bacteria per teaspoon.
Do we get anything from these trillions of tenants taking up residence in our colon, or are they just squatting? They pay rent by boosting our immune system, making vitamins for us, improving our digestion, and balancing our hormones. We house and feed them, and they maintain and protect their house, our body. Prebiotics are what feed good bacteria. Probiotics are the good bacteria themselves. And postbiotics are what our bacteria make.
Our gut bacteria are known as a “forgotten organ,” as metabolically active as our liver and weighing as much as one of our kidneys. They may control as many as one in ten metabolites in our bloodstream. Each one of us has about 23,000 genes, but our gut bacteria, collectively, have about three million. About half of the cells in our body are not human. We are, in effect, a superorganism, a kind of “human-microbe hybrid.”
Having coevolved with us and our ancestors for millions of years, the relationship we have with our gut flora is so tightly knit as to affect most of our physiological functions. Yet our microbiome is probably the most adaptable component of our body. Gut bugs like Escherichia coli (E. coli) can divide every twenty minutes. The more than ten trillion bugs we churn out every day can therefore rapidly respond to changing life conditions. Every meal, we have the opportunity to nudge them in the right direction.
Thousands of years ago, Hippocrates is attributed as saying that all diseases begin in the gut or, more ominously, “death sits in the bowels.” Of course, he also thought women were hysterical because of their “wandering uterus.” (“Hysteria” comes from the Greek husterikos for “of the womb.”) So much for ancient medical wisdom. The pendulum then swung to the point of incredulity when the medical community refused to accept the role of one gut bug, Helicobacter pylori, as the cause of stomach and intestinal ulcers. Out of frustration, one of the pioneers chugged a brew of the bugs from one of his ulcer patients to prove the point, before finally being vindicated with the Nobel Prize in 2005 for his discovery.
In some ways, the pendulum has swung back, with overstated causal claims about the microbiome’s role in a wide range of disparate diseases that are casually bandied about. Perhaps the boldest such claim dates back more than a century to Élie Metchnikoff, who argued that senility and the disabilities of old age were caused by “putrefactive bacterial autotoxins” leaking from the colon. He was the first to emphasize the importance of the gut microbiome to aging. He attributed healthy aging to gut bacteria that fermented carbohydrates into beneficial metabolic end products like lactic acid and associated unhealthy aging with putrefaction, the process in which bacteria degrade protein into noxious metabolites as waste products.
There is no shortage throughout history of oldtimey crackpots with quack medical theories, but Metchnikoff was no slouch. He was appointed Louis Pasteur’s successor, coined the terms “gerontology” and “probiotics,” and won the Nobel Prize in medicine to become the founding “father of cellular immunology.” More than a century later, some aspects of his theories on aging and the gut are now being vindicated.
Young at GutFull-term, vaginally delivered, breastfed babies are said to start out with the gold standard for a healthy microbiome, which then starts to diverge as we age. The microbiomes of children, adults, the elderly, and centenarians tend to cluster together, such that a “microbiomic clock” can be devised. Dozens of different classes of bacteria in our gut so reliably shift as we age that our age can be guessed based on a stool sample within about a six-year margin of error. If these changes turn out to play a causal role in the aging process, then, hypothetically, our future high-tech toilet may one day be able predict our lifespan as well.
The transition from adulthood into old age is accompanied by pronounced changes to the microbiome. Given large interpersonal differences, there is no “typical” microbiome of the elderly, but the trends are in the very direction Metchnikoff described: a shift from the fermentation of fiber to the putrefaction of protein. This deviation from good bugs to bad is accompanied by an increase in gut leakiness, the spillage of bacterial toxins into the bloodstream, and a cascade of inflammatory effects. This has led to the proposal that this microbiome shift is a “primary cause of aging-associated pathologies and consequent premature death of elderly people.”
The most important role a healthy microbiome has for preserving health as we age is thought to be the prevention of systemic inflammation.
As profound a change in microbiome composition from early adulthood into old age, there’s an even bigger divergence between the elderly and centenarians. When researchers analyzed centenarian poop, they found a maintenance of short-chain fatty acid production from fiber fermentation. For example, in the Bama County longevity region in the Guangxi province of China, fecal sample analyses found that centenarians were churning out more than twice as much butyrate as those in their eighties or nineties living in the same region. Butyrate is an anti-inflammatory short-chain fatty acid critical for the maintenance of gut barrier integrity. At the same time, there were significantly fewer products of putrefaction, such as ammonia and uremic toxins like p-cresol. The researchers concluded that an increase of dietary fiber intake may therefore be a path toward longevity. An abundance of fiber feeders also distinguished healthy individuals ninety years and older from unhealthy nonagenarians.
Centenarian ScatInterestingly, the microbiomes of Chinese centenarians shared some common features with Italian centenarians, suggesting that there could be certain universal signatures of a longevity-promoting microbiome. For example, centenarians have up to about a fifteenfold increase in butyrate producers.
A study of dozens of semi-supercentenarians (those aged 105 to 109) found higher levels of health-associated bacteria, such as Bifidobacteria and Akkermansia. In vaginally delivered, breastfed infants,
Bifidobacteria make up 90 percent of colon bacteria, but the level may slip down to less than five percent in adult colons and even less in the elderly and those with inflammatory bowel disease. But centenarians carry more of the good bacteria in their gut.
Bifidobacteria are often used as probiotics, but anti-aging properties may exist in their postbiotics. Bifidobacteria are one of the many bacteria that secrete “exopolysaccharides,” a science-y word for slime. That’s what dental plaque is—the biofilm created by bacteria on our teeth. Exopolysaccharides produced from a strain of Bifidobacteria isolated from centenarian poop were found to have anti-aging properties in mice, reducing the accumulation of age pigment in their brains and boosting the antioxidant capacity of their blood and livers.
Akkermansia muciniphila is named after the late Dutch microbiologist Antoon Akkermans and from Latin and Greek for “mucus-lover.” The species is the dominant colonizer of the protective mucus layer in our gut that is secreted by our intestinal lining. Unfortunately, that mucus layer thins as we age, a problem exacerbated by low-fiber diets. When we eat a fiber-depleted diet, we starve our microbial selves. Our famished flora, the microbes in our gut, have to then compete for limited resources and may consume our own mucus barrier as an alternative energy source, thereby undermining our defenses. Mucus erosion from bacterial overgrazing can be switched on and off on a day-to-day basis in mice supplanted with human microbiomes with fiber-rich and fiber-free diets. You can even show it in a Petri dish. Researchers successfully recreated layers of human intestinal cells and showed that dripping fiber (from plantains and broccoli) onto the cells at dietary doses could “markedly reduce” the number of E. coli bacteria breaching the barrier. Aside from eating fiber-rich foods, A. muciniphila helps to directly restore the protective layer by stimulating mucus secretion.
A. muciniphila is a likely candidate for a healthy aging biomarker, as its abundance is enriched in centenarians and it is particularly scarce in elders suffering from frailty. A comparative study was undertaken of the microbiomes of people in their seventies and eighties experiencing “healthy” versus “non-healthy” aging, defined as the absence or presence of cancer, diabetes, or heart, lung, or brain disease. Akkermansia, the species most associated with healthier aging, were three times more abundant in the fecal samples of the healthy versus non-healthy aging cohort. Among centenarians, a drop in A. muciniphila is one of the microbiome changes that seems to occur about seven months before death, despite no apparent changes in the physical status, food intake, or appetite at the time. To prove a causal role in aging, researchers showed that feeding A. muciniphila to aging-accelerated mice significantly extended their lifespans.
Cause, Consequence, or ConfoundingA recurring recommendation from centenarian poop studies is the promotion of high-fiber diets, one of the most consistently cited pieces of lifestyle advice in general for extreme longevity and health. An alternative proposal is a fecal transplant, from a cocktail of centenarian stool. Both approaches assume a cause-and-effect relationship between fiber-fueled feces and long lives, but there remains much controversy over whether age-related microbiome changes are cause, consequence, or confounding.
Aging is accompanied by dysbiosis, an unhealthy imbalance of gut flora characterized by a loss of fiber-fed species. Rather than a changing microbiome contributing to the aging process, it’s easier to imagine how aging could instead be contributing to a changing microbiome. Loss of taste, smell, and teeth with age could lead to decreased consumption of fiber-rich foods, replaced by salted, sweetened, easier-to-chew processed foods. The drop in the quantity and diversity of whole plant foods—the only naturally abundant source of fiber—could result in a dysbiosis that leads to early death and disability. Or, the decline in diet quality could directly dispose to disease, with the dysbiosis just an incidental marker of an unhealthy diet.
There are also ways aging can be connected to dysbiosis independent of diet. While the rates of antibiotic prescriptions in childhood and through middle age have dropped in recent years, prescription rates among the elderly have shot up. Even non-antibiotic pharmaceuticals can muck with our microbiome. A study pitting more than a thousand FDA-approved drugs against forty representative strains of gut bacteria found that 24 percent of marketed drugs inhibited the growth of at least one strain. Reduced physical activity could also contribute to sluggish, stagnant bowels that could leave our gut bugs no other choice but to turn to protein for putrefaction once preferred prebiotics are used up. Nursing home residents are often fed the kind of low-fiber diet that can contribute to the “decimation” of a healthy microbiome.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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So, while researchers have interpreted the link between dysbiosis and frailty as a poor diet leading to poor gut flora leading to poor health, the arrows of causality could potentially go in every which direction. Maybe there’s even a chicken-or-the-egg feedback loop in play. With so many interrelated factors, you can imagine how hard it is to tease out the causal chain of events.
These questions crop up all the time in microbiome research. For example, the microbiomes of centenarians aren’t just better at digesting fiber. They’re better at detoxifying industrial pollutants, such as petrochemicals; food preservatives like benzoate and naphthalene, used in petroleum refinement; and haloalkanes, widely used commercially as flame retardants, refrigerants, propellants, and solvents. None of these detoxification pathways was found in the microbiomes of the Hadza, one of the last hunter-gatherer tribes in Africa. Did the enhanced detoxification in centenarian guts (compared to younger individuals) contribute to their longevity, or did their longevity contribute to their enhanced detoxification (given their longer lifetime exposure and accumulation of chemicals)?
The microbiomes of centenarians and semi-supercentenarians are better able to metabolize plant fats than animal fats, but maybe that’s just due to their eating more plant-based diets. The Bama County longevity region centenarians who had such an abundance of fiber feeders were eating more than 70 percent more fiber (38 g versus only 22 g per 2,000 calories) compared to those aged eighty through ninety-nine living in the same region. The only way to know if their longer lives eating more healthfully just led to a better microbiome or if their better microbiome actually contributed to their living longer is to put it to the test.
Fecal Transplant ExperimentsLongevity researchers have good reason to suspect a causal, rather than bystander, role for age-related microbiome changes, given fecal transplant studies showing that the lives of old animals can be extended by receiving gut bugs from younger animals. Centenarian stool has anti-aging effects when fed to mice. Researchers fed mice fecal matter from a 70-year-old individual that contained Bilophila wadsworthia, a pro-inflammatory bacteria enriched by a diet high in animal products, versus feces from a 101-year-old containing more fiber feeders. Mice transplanted with the centenarian microbiome ended up displaying a range of youthful physiological indicators, including less age pigment in their brains. This raises the possibility that we will one day be using centenarian fecal matter to promote healthy aging. Why bathe in the blood of virgins when you can dine on the dung of the venerable?
Plugging Leaks with FiberOne of the mechanisms by which intestinal dysbiosis may accelerate aging is a leaky gut. This can lead to tiny bits of undigested food, microbes, and toxins slipping through our gut lining and entering uninvited into our bloodstream, triggering chronic systemic inflammation. Thankfully, there’s something we can do about it.
To avoid gut dysbiosis, inflammation, and leakiness, plants should be preferred. The reason vegetarians tend to have a better intestinal microbiome balance, a high bacterial biodiversity, and enhanced integrity of the intestinal barrier, and also produce markedly less uremic toxins in the gut, is likely that fiber is the primary food for a healthy gut microbiome. Cause and effect was established in a randomized, double-blind, crossover study of pasta with or without added fiber.
Dysbiosis Inflammation ImmunosuppressionThe most important role a healthy microbiome has for preserving health as we age is thought to be the prevention of systemic inflammation. Inflammaging is a strong risk factor not only for premature death. Those with higher-than-average levels of inflammatory markers in their blood for their age are more likely to be hospitalized, frail, and less independent, and suffer from a variety of diseases, including common infections.
In Japan, for example, more than 40 percent of all centenarian deaths are due to pneumonia and other infectious diseases. In one of the largest studies, involving nearly 36,000 British centenarians, pneumonia was the leading identifiable cause of death. Inflammaging has not only been shown to increase susceptibility to coming down with the leading cause of bacterial pneumonia but older adults with more inflammation also tend to suffer increased severity and decreased survival.
As we age, our immune system macrophages (from the Greek for “big eaters”) start to lose their ability to engulf and destroy bacteria. The same happens in regular mice. But mice raised microbe-free don’t suffer from the leaking gut, subsequent inflammation, and loss of macrophage function. To connect the dots between the inflammation and loss of function, researchers found that the macrophage impairment could be induced in microbe-free mice by infusing them with an inflammatory mediator, which, when dripped on macrophages in a Petri dish, could directly interfere with their ability to kill pneumonia bacteria. Because our immune system is also responsible for cancer defense, immune dysfunction caused by the inflammation resulting from dysbiosis may also help explain why cancer incidence increases so steeply as we age (and why microbe-free mice have fewer tumors and live longer).
Avoiding Dietary AntibioticsOther than getting enough fiber, what else can we do to prevent dysbiosis in the first place? There are a number of factors that contribute to microbiome imbalance. For example, on any given day, an average of about two and a half doses of antibiotics are consumed for every one hundred people in Western countries. The havoc this can play on our microbiome may explain why antibiotic use predicts an increased risk of cancer, though confounding factors, such as smoking, that are associated with both, could also potentially explain this link.
Up to three-quarters of antibiotic use is of questionable therapeutic value. Avoiding unnecessary use of antibiotics and using targeted, narrow-spectrum agents whenever possible can help protect our gut flora, but most people may not realize they’re consuming antibiotic residues every day in the meat, dairy, and eggs they eat. As much as 80 percent of the antibiotics used in the United States doesn’t go to treat sick people but rather is fed to farm animals in part as a crutch to compensate for the squalid conditions that now characterize much of modern agribusiness. But do enough antibiotics make it onto our plates to make a difference?
Infections with multidrug-resistant bacteria are on target to become the world’s leading cause of disease and death by the year 2050, poised to surpass even cancer and heart disease. Excessive antibiotic use can result in our guts becoming colonized with these superbugs, so researchers set out to calculate how many animal products one would need to eat to achieve antibiotic concentrations in our colon to give resistant bugs an advantage. Single servings of beef, chicken, or pork were found to contain enough tetracycline, ciprofloxacin, tilmicosin, tylosin, sarafloxacin, and erythromycin to favor the growth of resistant bacteria. One and a half servings of fish (150 g) exceeded minimum selective concentrations of ciprofloxacin and erythromycin. Two cups of milk could tip the scales for tetracycline, ciprofloxacin, tilmicosin, tylosin, and lincomycin. And, legal levels of erythromycin and oxytetracycline in two eggs could also exceed safe levels.
We need to stop squandering lifesaving miracle drugs just to speed the growth of farm animals reared in unhygienic conditions, and we also need to stop the reckless overuse in medicine.
Excerpted from How Not to Age: The Scientific Approach to Getting Healthier as You Get Older by Michael Greger. Copyright © 2023 by Michael Greger. Reprinted with permission from Flatiron Books. All rights reserved.
About the AuthorMichael Greger, M.D. FACLM is a graduate of the Cornell University School of Agriculture and the Tufts University School of Medicine. He is a practicing physician and author of Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching and Carbophobia: The Scary Truth Behind America’s Low Carb Craze. Three of his recent books—How Not to Die, the How Not to Die Cookbook, and How Not to Diet—became instant New York Times Best Sellers. Greger has lectured at the Conference on World Affairs and the National Institute of Health, testified before Congress, and appeared on shows such as The Colbert Report and Oprah Winfrey.
Leonardo da Vinci was a man of many talents. He was one of the few individuals to have made contributions to both the arts and science. His work extends to civil engineering, chemistry, geology, geometry, hydrodynamics, mathematics, mechanical engineering, optics, physics, pyrotechnics, warfare, and zoology.
Da Vinci was one of the best artists of his generation and many of his paintings are greatly admired today and command astronomical prices (his Salvator Mundi fetched the highest auction price ever). He was also an extraordinary illustrator, leaving thousands of manuscripts full of drawings of machines, fluid mechanics, humans, and many other topics. In addition, he was also a sculptor, architect, and more. As the type specimen of a Renaissance man, he put his mind to many different subjects, and he excelled at most of them. He was generally considered a genius by his contemporaries. In addition to all of this, he was described as a handsome and charming man, who was able to convince a whole room of the feasibility of something impossible.1 However, as it is sometimes said of promising but lazy children, some said that he would have been capable of even more accomplishments had he put his focus on them for longer and worked harder.
Revealingly, in his time, Leonardo was not considered to be at the same level as Michelangelo or even Raphael, perhaps because his notebooks were not published until much later. However, today many consider him superior to all his peers and—in a few extreme cases—some people fall into what we might call the “cult of Leonardo,” whose adherents believe that his genius was almost superhuman.
Consider a recently published article titled “Leonardo da Vinci’s Visualization of Gravity as a Form of Acceleration” by Morteza Gharib, Chris Roh, and Flavio Noca (henceforth GRN).2 In it, the authors propose that Leonardo understood gravity in a way that was not surpassed until the works of Galileo, Newton, and even Einstein. Had GRN presented their ideas in a less spectacular way, their article could have been a flawed, but mainly harmless one. Unfortunately, they chose to take the more risky path of venturing unfounded, under-researched, mind-blowing claims under the guise of solid scholarship, starting with the assertion that Leonardo saw gravity not as a force, but as an acceleration:
About 500 years ago, Leonardo da Vinci tried to uncover the mystery of gravity and its connection to acceleration through a series of ingenious experiments guided only by his imagination and masterful experimental techniques.
The shocking revelation that they put forth is that Leonardo “almost” (bit of wiggle room there) anticipated Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, in particular, the so-called “Equivalence Principle” (see Figure 1):
As with Galileo, Leonardo’s geometrical representation of the equation of motion is as insightful as Newtonian mechanics’ representations of equations of motion. […] After Newton, Albert Einstein referred to the equivalency of gravity and acceleration, when he introduced the principles of “strong equivalency” while developing his theory of relativity in the early twentieth century.
Figure 1. (Click image to enlarge) Einstein’s equivalence principle states that gravity is indistinguishable from being in an accelerated system of reference. This was famously illustrated by Einstein using a thought experiment: imagine we are in a closed room. Is there any way we can know if the down force that we feel is due to gravity? Maybe the room is in a spaceship, away from big masses and accelerating upwards with acceleration g. Einstein concluded that both situations are equivalent.
Considering gravity as an acceleration instead of a force is indeed a crucial difference between Einstein’s and Newton’s conceptions. The assertion that Leonardo could have hit upon this insight centuries before Einstein is the most preposterous claim in GRN’s article and likely what has made it so ballyhooed in the popular press. To give just a couple of examples of some of those reviews, here is one from Ars Technica:
[Leonardo attempted] to draw a link between gravity and acceleration—well before Isaac Newton came up with his laws of motion, and centuries before Albert Einstein would demonstrate the equivalence principle with his general theory of relativity.3
Here’s another one from CNET:
Before Galileo, Newton, and Einstein, it seems to be Leonardo da Vinci who started piecing together the gravity puzzle […] Rather, it’s kind of the same thing as acceleration…. [Einstein] called it the equivalence principle, and soon, this eye-opening concept would blossom into the mind-bending theory of general relativity. The rest, as they say, is history.4
Let’s summarize GRN’s argument. First, they assert that Leonardo had a good understanding of how objects fall with constant acceleration under the effect of gravity. Second, they present a thought experiment devised by Leonardo that, they claim, shows he understood that gravity is equivalent to being in an accelerated frame of reference. Finally, they present a quantitative model, purportedly based on Leonardo’s manuscripts, and they compare it against Newtonian mechanics. Let’s consider each of these points.
Acceleration of Falling ObjectsTo support their claim that Leonardo understood that gravity produces a constant acceleration on falling objects, GRN provide the following quote from Leonardo’s M manuscript: “a weight that descends freely in every degree of time acquires…a degree of velocity”5 (ellipsis in their article). They further tell us that “many scholars of Leonardo note that this statement indicates that Leonardo correctly understood that the velocity of a falling object is a linear function of time.”
Now consider Leonardo’s quote in full: “The free-falling body acquires a degree of displacement over each degree of time, and over each degree of displacement it acquires a degree of velocity.”6 It is not completely clear what Leonardo meant by this, since the original sentence can be translated in slightly different ways; but the simplest interpretation is that Leonardo didn’t have a full understanding of acceleration. He repeats similar ideas in various places,7 including in drawings and calculations.8 For the full quote, I have used a translation from Prof. Enzo Macagno, one of the scholars that GRN cite in support of their hypothesis. Macagno has this to say about Leonardo’s understanding of gravity relative to this quote:
what Leonardo is trying to express is that over equal intervals of time there are constant increments for both distance traversed and for velocity. If this is understood, we may study critically what Leonardo said to detect how far he went in his descriptions of motion during free fall. Even if he did not add anything new to this question, or actually detracted from it, it is still important to know his “degree” of understanding.9
However, Macagno then notes that, “In his descriptions of an accelerated motion, which could not be correct because of an intrinsic inconsistency between velocity and displacement,” an observation that is hardly in support of GRN’s claim.
Another point to consider is the concept of “free fall.” Today we apply it to objects moving exclusively under the influence of the Earth’s gravity. However, when Leonardo talks about free fall (“discienso libero”), he was probably referring to something different. Da Vinci was very conscious of the effect of air drag. In almost every case where he talks about falling objects, he mentions the effect of air and he even includes it in his simplified calculations.10 In his manuscripts, he has many things to say about the effect of air on falling objects and vice versa. To me, it is much more likely that for Leonardo, free fall meant something closer to what we now call “terminal velocity”— that is, that constant velocity which a falling object reaches due to the balance between gravity and air resistance.
Further, Leonardo mentions several times that, on sunny clear days, the air is lighter at higher altitudes, so that the air becomes thicker as the object falls. This means that he thought that, at terminal velocity, objects decelerate as they fall. This is actually true, although the effect is probably much weaker than what Leonardo implies. None of these considerations discussed at length by Da Vinci in his manuscripts are mentioned in GRN’s article.
Leonardo’s Thought ExperimentHaving argued that Leonardo thought that objects fell with constant acceleration, the next step in GRN’s article is to “prove” that Leonardo had a deeper understanding, namely that he was somehow aware that gravitation was not a force, but an acceleration in a manner similar to Einstein’s equivalence principle (see Figure 1). To do this, GRN analyze a thought experiment that Leonardo described in slightly different forms in various parts of his manuscripts.
Figure 2. Leonardo’s thought experiment. The jar moves from left to right releasing beads as it moves (Manuscript M, 143r).
The experiment consists of an open “container” (a jar, a funnel, and even a cloud in his various descriptions) that moves horizontally as it allows some particles to fall (beads or hail grains). Leonardo then considers the geometry of the system, giving special consideration to the case where the jar moves horizontally at the same speed as the first released bead falls vertically. This can be seen in Figure 2 as drawn by Leonardo, where he explains that, in this particular case, the trajectory of the first bead, the one of the jar, and the line that connects all beads, form an isosceles right triangle.
Figure 3. GRN’s interpretation of the experiment. All movements are accelerated, and the beads follow parabolas.
GRN analyze this problem using a more modern Newtonian approach. As is commonly done in high school physics problems, they start by simplifying away the effect of the air—an unusual assumption in this case—given that Leonardo constantly talks about the effect of air on falling objects. They also use the perhaps more reasonable assumption that particles leave the jar at the same speed as the jar itself, not considering that they must be moving with some relative speed out of it. They show their results in a graphic similar to Figure 3.
Figure 2 is not identical to the one drawn by Leonardo, but some salient features are still there: an isosceles right triangle, abn, defined by the movement of the jar (an), the falling trajectory of the first bead (ab), and the straight line that connects all the beads (bn). GRN assert that this is what Leonardo had in mind and they use the fact that, in both cases, the line formed by the falling beads is a straight line as proof that their assumptions are correct. They contrast it against the case in which the jar moved at constant velocity while the beads fall accelerated by gravity, in which case the beads align, but in a vertical line. They never entertain the more logical possibility: that Leonardo thought that the beads fell vertically at more or less constant velocities.
Then GRN go on to explain that this system can be better understood from the point of view of the accelerated frame of reference of the moving jar, a technique not available in Leonardo’s time but in the toolbox of Newtonian mechanics. Probably, they do this to remind us of Einstein’s Equivalence Principle, wherein the connection between gravity and acceleration is deeper and where accelerated frames of reference are equivalent to gravity fields. To me, it is clear that GRN’s ulterior and ultimate motivation is to establish a connection with the General Theory of Relativity. Throughout the article they leave small hints of this; for example, they say that “Leonardo’s studies of objects in free fall demonstrate that gravitational and pseudo-acceleration fields are indistinguishable locally when their magnitudes are the same.” Here, the words “fields” and “indistinguishable locally” have nothing to do with anything Leonardo writes, but GRN say it anyway because it is a language that feels more Einsteinian. In another part of the article, they say: “in other words, he [Leonardo] switched time with space to be able to conduct this experiment,” which is a thinly veiled way of suggesting that Leonardo was wise to the space-time continuum.
Of course, Einstein’s Equivalence Principle is deeper than just comparing accelerations. That could have been done in Newtonian mechanics. The crucial point that Einstein understood is that the mass of an object subjected to a gravitational field plays no role in its dynamics. All objects are accelerated equally, even light! Leonardo never says that all objects fall at the same speed independently of their weight; quite the contrary. Leonardo gives various examples where they don’t, although he mentions air resistance as one reason. Famously, Galileo was the first person to prove that all objects fall at the same speed (not including the effect of air), and there is no reason to believe that Leonardo knew that before Galileo.
Figure 4. Leonardo’s Manuscript M 217r (left), and my translation (right). The image above has been mirrored from the original for ease of understanding. Leonardo wrote from right to left, using his left hand, to prevent smudging the ink as he wrote.
I have translated the page where Leonardo presents the experiment of the hail cloud (see Figure 4). My translation is quite literal, except that I have simplified the third paragraph which, to me, was a little bit reiterative and confusing. It is clear that Leonardo thought that hail grains fell mostly vertically, without any appreciable horizontal velocity, as indicated by the vertical lines that connect every grain with the location at the moment it was released. Leonardo thought that the effect of the air would make objects quickly stop any horizontal movement (see Figure 5). The fact that he also thought that this experiment could be performed substantiates the assumption that he was considering objects falling at constant velocity. Should we believe Leonardo was thinking that clouds could be seen accelerating to absurdly great speeds or that hail grains were not affected by air resistance?
Figure 5. Objects thrown at different angles. The image has been mirrored for ease of understanding (Codex Arundel 92v).
Simply by inspecting Figure 4 and the other pages that Leonardo devoted to this problem, it is clear that he was interested in a simpler geometrical problem: two things that start moving from the same point at the same constant speed but in perpendicular directions will have trajectories that define the two legs of an isosceles right triangle. And the trivial corollary is that if the velocities are different, the triangle will not be isosceles. Da Vinci draws examples of each of these cases and explains how this can be used to estimate the speed of the clouds.
If Leonardo really thought that the particles were following the beautiful parabolic trajectories shown in Figure 3, why didn’t he draw them that way rather than drawing, as he did, vertical lines of no clear meaning? GRN never comment on this obvious weakness in their claim.
Leonardo’s Model?The next section in GRN’s article is truly strange. In what seems like a misguided attempt to perform a quantitative validation of Leonardo’s ideas on gravity, they make extraordinary assumptions and take huge leaps of faith. They interpret the line in Figure 4 labeled “equation of movement” (it can also be translated as “balanced movement”) as meaning that this figure encodes the actual physical equation of movement. After observing that Leonardo seemed to have bisected the axes, they decide that “presumably, the distance between consecutive bisecting locations represents the distance the object traveled during a fixed time step,” although Leonardo says nothing of the sort. He very clearly says that these bisections represent possible speeds of the cloud, relative to the speed of the hail. According to the supplementary materials provided by GRN, it seems that they came up with “Leonardo’s model” for gravity acceleration by looking at the figures, which may explain their misunderstanding.
GRN claim that “Leonardo’s model” is given by the formula: z(t) ∝ 2(t-1)n, where z is the vertical location of the object, t is time, n is the number of bisections, and ∝ means “proportional to.” It is a strange mixture of a discrete description in terms of bisections (n) and a continuous one in time (t). They recognize that this model is incorrect, but after a few additional assumptions which I will not discuss here, they realize that it is not as bad as it might seem initially. In fact, they say that in certain circumstances it is quite good. They write: “Leonardo’s gravitational constant is 0.9774 (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8535, 1.101), which is close to the nondimensional gravity of 1. These two observations suggest that Leonardo’s model of natural motion, while imperfect, was an accurate representation of his observation of falling objects.”
I don’t think this section requires detailed commentary. GRN start with their wrong interpretation of Leonardo’s manuscripts, invent a model based on what they think a figure means, make some unsupported assumptions, and end up with something that has nothing to do with what Leonardo might have had in mind. One could imagine that they wanted to end their article with some hard numerical results, and they distorted Leonardo’s meaning until it yielded something they could use.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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There is, however, an additional point I would like to mention. The model they attribute to Leonardo is invalid for times close to zero (ironically, the only ones for which air drag is insignificant). The plot of z against t that they show in their article and in the supplementary materials does not begin at the origin. The object starts falling only after it is already eight percent of its way down!
As we have seen, there is no basis to believe that Leonardo da Vinci, genius though he undoubtedly was, had a knowledge of gravity ahead of his time, much less at the level of Newton or Einstein. Every year, thousands of articles are written with the only intention of entertaining casual readers. Their flaws are obvious to most knowledgeable readers. However, this article was published in a peer-reviewed journal by a well-known academic institution. The authors claim to have studied the topic scientifically and their conclusions are not easy to dismiss. One must dig into Leonardo’s large corpus of manuscripts to be able to properly analyze their claims, and few are willing or have the language skills to do so. I have tried my best to examine GRN’s claims carefully. After looking at all the evidence, I remain unconvinced.
Leonardo da Vinci was one of the greatest minds in history. He is unrivaled in having made significant contributions to both science and the arts. There is simply no need for GRN’s hyperbole that Leonardo was a genius who foresaw relativity theory centuries ahead of his time. Their claim is not supported by any fair reading of the original manuscripts. Rather, their paper is a generator of disinformation that has helped to decrease the already too low signal-to-noise ratio in public conversations about science.
About the AuthorJosé María González Ondina is an Associate Researcher at the University of Florida. He received his PhD from Cornell University. He spent most of his career as an ocean modeler, studying underwater sound propagation and sediment transport at the Plymouth Ocean Forecasting Centre. He also spent a decade at the Ocean & Coastal Research Group (University of Cantabria, Spain) developing numerical models for coast engineering.
References1. Giorgio, V. (1550) Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects. 2. https://rb.gy/7sfix 3. https://rb.gy/8lhni 4. https://rb.gy/wvnhr 5. Manuscript M, folio 45r, folio 43r. 6. I am using the translation of Enzo Macagno from Leonardian Fluid Mechanics in the Manuscript M, page 18. 7. For example here: “Hence, in each doubling of the quantity of time the body doubles the length of fall and the velocity of its motion.” from Manuscript M, folio 44v. 8. Manuscript M, folio 45r. 9. Enzo Macagno, Leonardian Fluid Mechanics in the Manuscript M, page 18. 10. Manuscript M, folio 44v.
The practice of discussing educational testing in the same sentence with the term “war” is not necessarily new or original.1 What may be new to readers, however, is to characterize current debates involving educational testing as involving a war against: (1) accurate perceptions about the way things really are (reality), and (2) sound judgment in practical matters (common sense).
Education, Testing, and the Real WorldEducation is compulsory in American society, and no one escapes testing—whether standardized or unstandardized—in their schooling experience, even before entering school. As newborns, infants are given Apgar scores to assess their overall health.2 When a child is ready to enter preschool, s/he may be assessed with a standardized test to determine school readiness in understanding basic concepts, cognitive and language development, and early academic achievement.
As children matriculate through the primary school years, they are required to pay attention to teacher lessons; resist natural impulses to fidget, talk out of turn, or bother one’s neighbor; complete worksheets quietly at one’s desk; complete and return homework assignments; and complete national or state-mandated standardized academic achievement tests that measure “what students know and can do.”3 In some cities, students must complete tests to determine eligibility for entrance into elite or specialty high schools,4 and students in some states must successfully complete tests in order to graduate high school.5 Well before students are scheduled to graduate, they have, until recently, been required to complete standardized college admissions tests in order for their applications to be competitive for colleges of their choice.6
Enter Basic Common SenseWhen enough years are spent surrounded by age peers in schools, everyone—regardless of background, race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status—intuitively understands that comparatively, some peers are intellectually smarter, other peers are roughly the same, and others are intellectually slower. These differences are most determinative of one’s overall level of academic achievement from kindergarten to high school graduation and beyond. Some pupils have a natural proclivity to be voracious readers and progress successfully through their academic programs much more quickly than others. They are able to grasp and understand difficult and abstract academic material more quickly, have a wide range of intellectual interests and hobbies, and are much more likely to be selected for admission to programs for the gifted and talented. These are generally the A and B students and tend to enroll in advanced foreign languages, trigonometry, pre-calculus, chemistry, and other advanced placement (AP) classes in high school.
Then there are students who struggle with school—particularly as the curriculum becomes more conceptual, complex, and abstract. These students have often been identified as “slow learners,” and school generally becomes a profoundly aversive experience. In higher grades, many tend to select vocational courses or may sometimes drop out of school before graduation, and these are generally known as the C and D students in their classes. The majority of pupils, however, fall somewhere in between those two extremes.7
When interacting with curricula, brighter students can generalize learning more easily to new classes of similar information never before encountered, while slower students have more difficulty in remembering what has been previously learned. Using a simple illustration from the early elementary school years (and barring specific reading disabilities), teachers can teach brighter students the phonetic rules for sounding out words such as “groan” and “moan.” Later, when these students encounter similar words that they have not seen before, such as “Joan” or “loan,” they can more easily apply what they have previously learned and correctly sound out these new words as well as understand their meaning. In contrast, when slower students encounter new words that have the same phonetic spelling and pronunciation as previously learned words, they find it more difficult to spontaneously apply what they have previously learned to sound out these new words, and consequently, word identification mastery takes them more time.8
Similarly, slower students will be easily confused over the rules that govern the correct pronunciation of words with the same “ei” letter combination but different pronunciations, e.g., neighbor, heist, and weird. In contrast, brighter students will internalize these nuances more quickly, readily identify these words correctly, and so move on to master more complex words. These differences in word identification skills also influence reading comprehension.
To be sure, slower students will eventually learn how to pronounce correctly similar words governed by different phonetic rules, but teaching such students requires instruction where broader learning objectives are broken down into smaller hierarchical steps, teaching is much more intentionally explicit, and greater amounts of time are devoted to learning and practice.9 If you learned academic subjects more quickly than other students, you probably have found other areas (e.g., art, music, athletics, home and auto repair, cooking, or just learning to get along with others) that took you longer than others, including those who took longer than you on the purely academic subjects.
Regardless of grade level brighter students can more quickly internalize and consolidate the required mental schemata for representing material that is learned, and then use this knowledge as a foundation upon which to build new schemata.10 Slower students have more difficulty consolidating information to be learned, or at least it requires more time to consolidate prerequisite information compared to brighter age peers. When slower peers attempt to mentally consolidate new information built on a shaky foundation, new information is poorly understood.
Brighter students can generally follow along at the pace of regular instruction, while slower students cannot, and eventually fall further and further behind as they get older. The older pupils are, the more they begin to self-select into secondary school tracks that are more suitable to their intellectual capabilities and interests, resulting in extremely wide individual differences in academic performance at higher grades. By the time students reach 11th and 12th grades, for example, brighter students are able to solve complex mathematical equations while slower students still struggle with mastering elementary fractions. As a result, the brightest students in high school tend to enroll in advanced placement courses such as foreign languages, pre-calculus, chemistry, and physics, while slower students gravitate to vocational courses.
Anti-testing hostility has found a powerful, organized voice whose prime directive is to diminish the influence—if not the outright banishing—of standardized testing.
Psychologists refer to this basic phenomenon as “individual differences in mental ability and learning potential,”11 and no one knows this better than teachers. In the elementary grades, for example, teachers regularly come into contact with wide individual differences in performance on standardized achievement tests, despite all students being taught the same material under the same teacher. That’s why it is a bit unfair to hold teachers solely responsible for the achievement test performance of their students, since students can perform poorly on achievement tests despite exemplary teaching, and can also perform well on achievement tests despite mediocre teaching.
Enter Painful RealitiesThere are no racial, ethnic, language, or socioeconomic subpopulation groups, anywhere on any continent on the globe, that display equal means in their respective distributions of mental test scores.12 These individual differences in mental test scores, when consolidated and averaged, will inevitably result in statistically significant average differences in academic achievement across subpopulation groups. Of course, there is also significant overlap among these groups. Although the full range of test scores and performance—from severe intellectual disability to mental genius—can be found within all racial and ethnic subpopulation groups,13 it is nevertheless true that these abilities are not equally distributed across such groups. Group differences have been observed since the beginning of standardized testing. In fact, they begin as early as three years of age, remain consistent over decades, and have proven stubbornly resistant to intervention.14 The largest gaps between subpopulation groups in both mental test scores and the achievement outcomes that result from such scores will be most noticeable at the extremes of their respective distributions.15 Because this is such a sensitive subject it should be noted that these are average differences between groups and tell us nothing about the ability of any single member of any group.
Differences in academic achievement are not equally distributed across socioeconomic groups or across communities and school districts, as these have more or less different concentrations of low to high performing students. Studies consistently show that even massive allocation of funds to school districts, without other interventions, has no significant effect on raising academic achievement.16 School systems are keenly aware of this, which is why comparisons of achievement test scores across school districts are careful to use race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status as a covariate in comparing scores. That is, schools having similar concentrations of students from particular racial/ethnic groups and socioeconomic backgrounds are compared to other schools with similar backgrounds. This way, when schools having concentrations of students from similar backgrounds show significantly different levels of academic achievement, higher performing schools can be studied intensively to determine the key factors that are responsible for their relative success.17
For purposes of this analysis, the term education establishment refers to the constellation of education school professors, teacher education textbooks and journals, teacher certification training programs, and professional teaching associations (e.g., the American Educational Research Association, or AERA; the National Education Association, or NEA) that dominate thought and opinion within the education and teaching professions. Within that group, there are four arguments held by anti-testing critics that are given prominence that far outweighs their scientifically demonstrated validity.
Claims That Testing Harms StudentsEighteenth Century social philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of children born in freedom and innocence, but eventually corrupted and enslaved by society,18 is the basic assumption that undergirds hostility toward standardized testing among many educators. According to critics, standardized testing places undue emotional stress on students due to test scores’ relation to important outcomes. They argue that testing fails to measure accurately the capabilities of students with different learning styles and penalizes pupils who are not good test takers.
Another common argument is that standardized testing fails to account for language deficiencies, empty stomachs, learning disabilities, difficult home lives, or cultural differences.19 The tests are said not to measure student progress or improve student performance, but rather penalize students’ critical thinking and creativity due to the multiple-choice testing format (or its opposite), namely, that tests confer an unfair advantage to students who perform well on multiple-choice tests by learning test-taking strategies without having deep knowledge of the subject matter.
Anti-testing hostility has found a powerful, organized voice in numerous movements whose prime directive is to diminish the influence—if not the outright banishing—of standardized testing in pre- and post-higher education. The opt-out movement, for example, began in New York in 2014 among mostly White, highly-educated, and politically liberal parents who were united in their refusal to have their children sit for standardized testing in schools.20 They claimed that judging teacher performance by students’ test scores is unfair and that testing unduly narrows the school curricula by creating a “teaching-to-the-test” instructional ethos. Some stated they were in outright opposition to the implementation of Common Core State Standards.21
It would not be an overstatement to say that certain criticisms have their origin in various neo-Marxist ideologies. There, standardized tests are portrayed as instruments of oppression designed by capitalistic test-construction companies to crush students’ dreams of a better life and trap them in the social classes in which they were born. One such critic writes:
Rather than providing for an objective and fair means of social mobility, the tests were a tracking mechanism limiting the odds of improving on one’s family’s economic and social position in America…. The SAT aptitude test in particular was designed from the beginning to facilitate social Darwinism, selecting for White Anglo-Saxon males; Jim Crow segregation, eugenics, and protecting the Ivy League’s racial stock provided the legal and cultural context in which the SAT was born.22
These criticisms are feeble, shallow, and above all, dishonest. Rebuttals to these fallacies, patiently documented and dissected by recognized testing scholars, are readily available to anyone with a fair and open mind.23
Claims of Cultural Bias in TestsThe critically acclaimed 1991 film Boyz N the Hood told the tale of three Black youths growing up in a South Central Los Angeles ghetto, and the differences in their eventual life outcomes as a function of having (or not having) a strong father figure. One of the boys has a strict but caring father figure (named Jason “Furious” Styles), while the other two do not. In numerous spots throughout the movie, Mr. Styles imparts pithy pearls of wisdom to the boys, intended to guide them throughout life. In one such sequence, he opines on the SAT requirement for college:
Most of those tests are culturally biased to begin with. The only part that is universal is the Math.24
Wrong. Although popularly believed, the claim that contemporary standardized mental testing is culturally biased is patently false, as revealed in hundreds of empirical studies.25 When critics accuse standardized tests of cultural bias, they typically mean that a test includes words, concepts, or ideas that are perceived to be more familiar to White middle-class examinees compared to other groups, or that a test’s standardization samples fail to include sufficient representation of non-White, lower socioeconomic status (SES) persons.26
Both of these conditions are alleged to foster an unfair disadvantage to lower SES non-White examinees, purporting to cause them to have lower average scores relative to more advantaged White test takers. While some critics may not be familiar with the content of tests or the racial/ethnic makeup of standardization samples, they nevertheless believe that standardized tests are biased simply because the average scores achieved by different subpopulation groups are not equal. Such a definition of test bias is widely rejected by contemporary testing experts.27
The cold reality, however, is that test companies, like all other companies that must be profitable in order to stay in business, routinely and carefully examine their test items for any evidence of statistical bias in the production phase, before any updated test revisions are published. Items that show actual evidence of statistical bias (i.e., items that statistically perform differently for test takers of different racial/ethnic groups) are discarded, and the results of statistical tests for biased test items are typically published in test manuals for open review by the general public.28
Crying RacismWhenever attempts to tar and feather tests with charges of cultural bias fail, the next step is to simply smear them with the charge of racism. In today’s heated political climate few things are more effective in attracting panicked attention than labeling persons, organizations, or products as “racist.” In the 1990s, test critics began to point out that the term “aptitude” in the (then-called) Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT), could be perceived as measuring something innate that is impervious to effort or instruction.29 This, coupled with the fact that these tests reflect the significant subpopulation group differences in mean scores discussed above, prompted the College Board to change the middle word of the SAT from “aptitude” to the more bland descriptor “assessment” in 1993.30 That euphemism, however, did little to quell the ire of critics, who continued to accuse standardized college testing of being racist.31
In today’s heated political climate few things are more effective in attracting panicked attention than labeling persons, organizations, or products as “racist.”
To be fair, it is relatively easy to locate offensive quotes by 19th and early 20th-century testing supporters who freely ascribed the adjectives “inferior” and “superior” to racial groups on the basis of significant mean differences in IQ scores.32 It comes as little surprise, therefore, when Ibram X. Kendi, founder and director of the Center for Antiracist Research, declares that:
Standardized tests have become the most effective racist weapon ever devised to objectively degrade Black and Brown minds and legally exclude their bodies from prestigious schools.33
Kendi and many others never doubt that contemporary testing must be racist, based on the false belief that such testing was birthed out of a history of racism.34 There is no doubt that these types of claims are very effective in poisoning contemporary public discourse, but such invective does not hold up under critical examination or hard evidence.
First, many early researchers were extremely cautious about, and resistant to, interpreting group differences in text performance as ironclad indicators of any innate inferiority/ superiority of groups. While racist attitudes were certainly more prevalent a century ago compared to today, many early American IQ test researchers were keenly aware of racial discrimination and unequal social circumstances of racial groups during the times in which they wrote, and so urged their peers to avoid hasty and intemperate generalizations from performance on tests until environmental disadvantages could be properly ruled out.35
Second, not a few early 20th-century researchers intentionally showcased the exceptional IQ test performance of high-scoring non-White (particularly African-American) students, who achieved scores several standard deviations above the general mean.36 Their writings disprove the assertion that there is something intentionally nefarious deeply embedded within mental tests that unfairly suppresses the intellectual capabilities of examinees who are not White and/or middle class.
Third, one study using a large and representative dataset of school-aged students in California, analyzed the sources that account for IQ test score variance (using Analysis of Variance, a long-standing, well-established, and widely-used statistical method), and demonstrated that the largest sources of IQ test score variability are within and between families that in many cases share the same racial group and social class.37 If two members of this same dataset are selected at random (regardless of race, ethnicity, social class, or family) and the difference in their IQ scores are calculated and averaged and the procedure repeated an infinite number of times, the average difference between randomly selected pairs of IQ scores is 17 points.
Given that the mean of modern IQ tests is 100 and its standard deviation is 15, this average 17-point difference between such randomly chosen pairs exceeds the average score differences between Black and White students in the dataset (i.e., 12 points). Simply stated, the average IQ point difference between siblings in the same family exceeds the average test score difference between African Americans and White Americans. Taken together, these findings demonstrate the oft-repeated claims that IQ and other mental tests are inherently flawed and discriminate unfairly along racial lines, are simply false. This won’t convince Ibram X. Kendi, however, since his definition of racism is any group difference of any kind anywhere, thereby rendering the concept unfalsifiable.
Lowering StandardsWhenever two or more subpopulation groups achieve unequal means in their test score distributions, any set cutoff score that a college or university uses to determine acceptance or rejection for admission will display unequal percentages across groups as to who is selected or rejected. That is a statistical reality. For admissions committees that champion Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) mandates, standards must be lowered for members of lower-scoring groups in a manner that camouflages what is actually being done.
Researchers have long acknowledged that obtaining data on college admissions decisions is an uphill battle, as colleges strive to prevent access to the criteria on which acceptance decisions are made. When such information is obtained, the results confirm what many have always suspected.
That is to say, Black and Latino applicants are admitted with test qualifications that are as much as one standard deviation or more below the average test scores of White and Asian applicants,38 and this practice has predictable consequences. To illustrate, many Black and Hispanic students find themselves on academic probation or switch majors (from the major into which they were initially admitted) to enter disciplines that are less demanding.39 Many of those so admitted will simply drop out and fail to graduate, creating “artificial failures” that would have been successful if properly matched to institutions that enroll students with comparable qualifications.40
This observation was solidly reinforced in Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor’s 2012 book Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students It’s Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won’t Admit It. In it, the authors examined and compared enrollment, graduation rates, and doctorate/STEM graduate degrees of Black and Hispanic students in the state of California in the eras before and after Proposition 209 was passed in that state. Proposition 209 (Prop 209, also known as the California Civil Rights Initiative, or CCRI), was a ballot proposition approved in 1996, which prohibited state governmental institutions from considering race, sex, or ethnicity in public employment, contracting, and education.
When comparing the pre-Prop 209 to the post-Prop 209 eras, the number of Black students receiving bachelor degrees from University of California (UC) schools, the number of UC Black and Hispanic freshmen who went on to graduate in four years (as well as graduate with STEM degrees), and the number of graduates with GPAs of 3.5 or higher all significantly rose. This hard data was used to support the general thesis that when students are matched (through objective standardized test scores) to institutions where all students are admitted under the same standards (and standards are not artificially lowered to satisfy diversity goals), minority students benefit significantly.
These practices are so pervasive, that Black students who meet the same college admissions requirements as their peers often write of their frustration and resentment at being unfairly judged by other students as having been admitted solely because of their race and under lower standards.41 In one particularly heartbreaking account, a successful Black journalist wrote of his frustrations taking two years out of his professional life to teach journalism to Black students, admitted under lowered academic standards, at a small, historically Black college. He writes of his reluctant efforts to repeatedly lower basic academic expectations in order to accommodate a critical mass of students whose attitudes, values, achievement motivation, academic preparation and qualifications, and intellectual capabilities demonstrated that they had no business being at an institution of higher learning.42
One strategy for justifying lowering standards is for college admissions committees to claim that their admission standards are “holistic.”43 That is, criteria for admission presumably must take into account a wide range of factors that provide a more “three-dimensional picture of the whole person,” as opposed to the more “narrow” consideration of standardized test scores. Yet critics charge that the deep subjectivity of such practices represents little more than academic flimflam.44
The oft-repeated claims that IQ and other mental tests are inherently flawed and discriminate unfairly along racial lines, are simply false.
Recently, testing companies have come to serve as enablers of lowered college admissions standards. For example, the College Board spent two years (2017–2019) creating an “adversity index,” a 100-point scale that provides a rough measure of the degree of adversity versus privilege in the life of a prospective applicant. In theory, adversity index scores could be used to balance lower standardized test scores in an effort to justify lower admissions standards. Ultimately, however, these efforts of testing companies to placate their critics once again proved futile.45
Another strategy is to claim that empirical research supports the benefits of having diverse academic settings compared to those not as diverse. For example, a DEI advocate cited research support for claims that students who enroll in more diverse classrooms earn higher GPAs, more diverse college discussion groups generate “more novel and complex analyses,” and that greater exposure to diversity in college settings increases civic attitudes and engagement.46
However, studies of such an important topic as the benefits of diversity in college admissions require at minimum systematic replication as well as hundreds of studies by independent researchers (conducted at a wide variety of institutions) if they are to yield results that can be subjected to appropriate meta-analyses.
One study, however, is notable for its elegance, clarity, and simplicity. In 2002, researchers specifically evaluated the claim that increased racial diversity in college enrollments enriches students’ educational experience and improves relations between students from different cultural groups.47 They argued that prior self-report data claimed to demonstrate support for this notion were misleading, as they suffered from biased item wording, methodological flaws, and the tendency for responses to reflect social desirability effects.
To correct for these flaws, the researchers analyzed self-report data from a random sample of more than 4,000 American college students, faculty, and administrators who were asked to simply evaluate various aspects of their educational experience and campus environment, but without any direct references to racial/ethnic diversity. They then correlated their data with the percentage of Black student enrollment in predominantly White student bodies. They found that, contrary to what diversity advocates would predict, no consistent positive correlation was found between increased diversity and respondents’ assessments of educational satisfaction.
Delete Standards AltogetherEventually, what was previously unthinkable, has now become unavoidable: objective standards in and of themselves are seen as an impediment to the goals of achieving diversity, equity, and inclusion. Hence, testing necessary for demonstrating mastery of taught subject matter must itself be abolished.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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In one example, the Oregon state legislature eliminated (for two years, until the state can re-evaluate its graduation policies) the long-standing requirement that students successfully pass a high school exit exam in order to demonstrate proficiency in reading, mathematics, and writing. This was done in response to criticisms that the testing requirement was inequitable because higher percentages of Black and Hispanic students failed the test.48
Various anti-testing writers and organizations applaud the news that more and more institutions of higher education no longer require standardized test scores as a condition for selection,49 under the pretense that “the social and academic costs of continuing to rely on…tests outweigh any possible benefits.”50
Where are we headed?At the time of this writing, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the admissions programs at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina (where race is used as one of many factors in student admissions) violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees equal protection for all U.S. citizens.51 In a videotaped reaction to the decision, President Biden stated that the decision “effectively ends affirmative action in college admissions,”52 a sentiment echoed by many who support the continued and fair race-neutral use of standardized tests. Nevertheless, many commentators have also suggested ways in which admissions committees can circumvent the decision by no longer requiring standardized testing, or by changing the manner in which applicants write their college essays to signal their racial group membership.53
There is simply no way to produce a mental test that effectively measures the abilities and skills needed to predict success in educational programs but at the same time satisfies the political goals of racially proportional representation as demanded by DEI advocates.54 Given this reality, the war involving standardized testing has by no means ended, but rather is just beginning.
About the AuthorCraig Frisby is Associate Professor Emeritus in School Psychology from the University of Missouri, Columbia. He has served as an Associate Editor for School Psychology Review, the official journal of the National Association of School Psychologists, and Associate Editor for Psychological Assessment, a journal published by the American Psychological Association. He currently serves as Associate Editor for the Journal of Open Inquiry in the Behavioral Sciences. He is the author of Meeting the Psychoeducational Needs of Minority Students: Data-based Guidelines for School Psychologists and Other School Personnel and co-editor of the recently published Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology: Nature, Scope and Solutions. Watch him on C-SPAN discussing education reforms to benefit the African American community
References1. https://rb.gy/px4qc; https://rb.gy/ee7vq 2. https://rb.gy/b0xfx 3. https://rb.gy/2247j 4. https://rb.gy/8lwgq 5. https://rb.gy/uh0da 6. https://rb.gy/0vkuf 7. Frisby, C.L. (2013). General Cognitive Ability, Learning, and Instruction. In C.L. Frisby, Meeting the Psychoeducational Needs of Minority Students, 201–266. Wiley. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Jensen, A.R. (1993). Psychometric G and Achievement. In B.R. Gifford (Ed.), Policy Perspectives on Educational Testing, 117–227. National Commission on Testing and Public Policy. Springer. 11. https://rb.gy/row4i; Jensen, A.R. (1987). Individual Differences in Mental Ability. In J.A. Glover & R.R. Ronning (Eds.), A History of Educational Psychology, 61–88. Plenum. 12. Lynn, R. & Vanhanen, T. (2006). IQ and Global Inequality. Washington Summit Publishers; Rushton, J.P. & Jensen, A.R. (2005). Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11(2), 235–294. 13. Gottfredson, L.A. (1997). Mainstream Science on Intelligence: An Editorial With 52 Signatories, History, and Bibliography. Intelligence, 24(1), 13–23. 14. Rushton, J.P. & Jensen, A.R. (2005). Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11(2), 235–294; Gottfredson, L. (2005). Implications of Cognitive Differences for Schooling Within Diverse Societies. In C.L. Frisby & C.R. Reynolds (Eds.), Comprehensive Handbook of Multicultural School Psychology, 517–554. Wiley.; https://rb.gy/24n08 15. Ibid. 16. https://rb.gy/pvhup; Greene, J.P. (2005). Education Myths: What Special Interest Groups Want You to Believe About Our Schools—and Why It Isn’t So. Rowman & Littlefield.; https://rb.gy/65e0w 17. https://rb.gy/jpry7; Whitman, D. (2008). Sweating the Small Stuff: Inner–City Schools and the New Paternalism. Thomas B. Fordham Institute Press. 18. Rousseau, J. (2019). The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right. (Trans. by G. Cole) Compass Circle. 19. https://rb.gy/bdg1d 20. https://rb.gy/l8bls 21. https://rb.gy/r8xlx 22. Soares, J.A. (Ed.) (2020). The Scandal of Standardized Tests: Why We Need to Drop the SAT and ACT (p. ix). Teachers College Press. 23. Phelps, R.P. (2003). Kill the Messenger. Transaction; Phelps, R.P. (2005). Defending Standardized Testing. Erlbaum; Phelps, R.P. (2009). Educational Achievement Testing: Critiques and Rebuttals. In R.P. Phelps (Ed.), Correcting Fallacies About Educational and Psychological Testing, 89–146. American Psychological Association; https://rb.gy/8b1mv 24. https://rb.gy/r449n 25. Camara, W.J. (2009). College Admissions Testing: Myths and Realities in an Age of Admissions Hype. In R.P. Phelps (Ed.), Correcting Fallacies About Educational and Psychological Testing, 147–180. American Psychological Association.; Reynolds, C.R., Altmann, R.A., & Allen, D.N. (2021). Chapter 15: The Problem of Bias in Psychological Assessment. In C.R. Reynolds, R.A. Altmann & D.N. Allen, Mastering Modern Psychological Testing: Theory and Methods (2nd Ed.), 573–614. Springer.; Jensen, A.R. (1980). Bias in Mental Testing. Free Press. 26. Jensen, A.R. (1980). Bias in Mental Testing. Free Press. 27. Warne, R.T., Yoon, M. & Price, C.J. (2014). Exploring the Various Interpretations of ‘Test Bias’. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 20(4), 570–582. 28. Ibid. 29. https://rb.gy/btc99 30. https://rb.gy/4ixp7 31. https://rb.gy/hvz82 32. Galton, F. (1870). Hereditary genius: An Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences. Appleton.; Brigham, C. (1923). A Study of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press.; Gould, S.J. (1996). The Mismeasure of Man (revised and expanded). W.W. Norton & Company. 33. https://rb.gy/foaup 34. https://rb.gy/nk8fu; https://rb.gy/3ec9n; https://rb.gy/3gnwb 35. Bond, H.M. (1924). What the Army ‘Intelligence’ Tests Really Measured. Opportunity, 2, 197–198.; Canady, H.G. (1942). The American Caste System and the Question of Negro Intelligence. The Journal of Educational Psychology, 33(3), 161–172.; Canady, H.G., Buxton, C. & Gilliland, A.R. (1942). A Scale for the Measurement of the Social Environment of Negro Youth. The Journal of Negro Education, 11(1), 4–13.; Klineberg, O. (1934). Cultural Factors in Intelligence Test Performance. The Journal of Negro Education, 3(3), 478–483.; Long, H.H. (1925). On Mental Tests and Racial Psychology—a Critique. Opportunity, 134–138. 36. Bond, H.M. (1927). Some Exceptional Negro Children. The Crisis, 34(8), 257–259, 278, 280.; Bousfield, M.B. (1932). The Intelligence and School Achievement of Negro Children. The Journal of Negro Education, 1(3/4), 388–395.; Jenkins, M.D. (1939). Psychological Study of Negro Children of Superior Intelligence. The Journal of Negro Education, 5(2), 175–190. 37. Jensen, A.R. (1980). Bias in Mental Testing (p. 43). Free Press.; Jensen, A.R. (1998). The G Factor: The Science of Mental Ability (p. 357). Praeger. 38. Murray, C. (2021). Facing Reality: Two Truths About Race in America, 67–71. Encounter Books.; Riley, J.L. (2014). Chapter 6: Affirmative Discrimination. In J.L. Riley, Please Stop Helping Us: How Liberals Make It Harder for Blacks to Succeed, 141–168. Encounter Books. 39. https://rb.gy/9zbnl 40. Riley, J. (2014). Please Stop Helping Us: How Liberals Make It Harder for Blacks to Succeed. Encounter Books.; Sander, R.H. & Taylor, S. (2012). Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students It’s Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won’t Admit It. Basic Books 41. Carter, S.L. (1992). Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby. Basic Books.; https://rb.gy/18cbl 42. https://rb.gy/h1olw; https://rb.gy/4e8sn 43. https://rb.gy/xkcte 44. https://rb.gy/xlr6p 45. Soares, J.A. (2020). The “Landscape” or “Dashboard Adversity Index” Distraction. In J.A. Soares (Ed.), The Scandal of Standardized Tests: Why We Need to Drop the SAT and ACT, 76–94. Teachers College Press. 46. https://rb.gy/b884w 47. Rothman, S., Lipset, S.M., & Nevitte, N. (2002). Does Enrollment Diversity Improve University Education? International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 15(1), 8–26. 48. https://rb.gy/sw9u8; https://rb.gy/xqvc9 49. https://rb.gy/oa9o4; https://rb.gy/md53l; https://rb.gy/1qw9z 50. Schaeffer, R.A. (2020). The SAT/ACT Optional Admissions Growth Surge: More Colleges Conclude “Test Scores Do Not Equal Merit”. In In J.A. Soares (Ed.), The Scandal of Standardized Tests: Why We Need to Drop the SAT and ACT, 97–113. Teachers College Press. 51. https://rb.gy/za7v3 52. https://rb.gy/z22hf 53. https://rb.gy/r4k0d 54. Gottfredson, L. (2000). Skills Gaps, Not Tests, Make Racial Proportionality Impossible. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6(1), 129–143.
Institutionalized experiments take a while to fail so fully as to be discredited. The 1917 Russian Revolution put its people “seventy years on the road to nowhere,” three generations of poverty, fear, and violence (as the news media, quoting protesters, declared in the regime’s last year).1 Poles who survived communism dismissed it as something that “looks good on paper.”
The situation with schools or colleges of education—a division within a university devoted to teaching its students to be teachers and school leaders, commonly called, “ed schools”—is not nearly so bad. While elite ed schools have been and often are steeped in the political/cultural ideology of the day, whatever that might be, non-elite ed schools are less radical. Most education professors at state universities bearing directional names, such as Southern Mississippi, North Texas, and Central Michigan—who train the bulk of teachers and principals—actually have worked in schools, an experience that tends to instill more pragmatism than ideology. Most educational leadership professors are former principals with backgrounds as athletic coaches, and accordingly less fans of Critical Theory than of the Friday Night Lights. Those with real-world experience have taught me the most about our schools.
Yet a skeptical examination of ed schools reveals a century-plus experiment that failed, harming millions of students, particularly the disadvantaged. The best education professors should go back to leading or teaching in schools rather than keeping afloat insular, often arrogant institutions. Especially as regards the teaching of reading, the failings of ed schools are painfully obvious and, unfortunately (and ironically), it is illiterate students who pay the price for their failure.
As the Chair in Leadership at the Department of Education Reform at the University of Alabama, it is my contention that American ed schools were bad from the beginning, spreading academic mediocrity and compliance mindsets that left K-12 educators ill-suited to resist the various deeply flawed fads and fallacies that came their way. Worse, long before the rest of higher education, ed schools succumbed to the lure of the big bottom line, focusing on raising revenue rather than mentoring young minds.
Yet you can’t replace something with nothing, so I will end my analysis with ideas about how we could have different and far better ed schools, in part by creating education markets, coupling school choice with varied alternatives for educator training and certification.
Bad From the BeginningYou can’t understand an institution without knowing its history. Reporting for my school newspaper in 1976, I asked retiring Baltimore County school superintendent Dr. Joshua Wheeler, known for his progressive policies, why our 110,000-student system did not require proficiency tests since, as everyone knew, some students graduated even though they were illiterate. Dr. Wheeler explained that, “the purpose of public education is not to educate students. The purpose of public education is to provide an education for those few who want it.” In that case, I suggested, everyone including taxpayers might be happier if we let students drop out. Dr. Wheeler retorted, “we can’t do that. Crime would go up. Unemployment would go up. Parents would be angry…and whenever we do require more homework and start failing kids, parents complain that their kids are working too hard.”2
From the beginning, such anti-learning mindsets have dominated ed schools. As scholars such as David F. Labaree3 and Raymond E. Callahan4 detail, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, what were termed “normal schools,”5 which had trained teachers, were repackaged as teachers colleges and, eventually, middling universities. Elite institutions such as Columbia University developed their own ed schools (which Columbia segregated from the rest of campus), in response to political demands to produce greater numbers of teachers and school leaders to meet expanding demand.6 From 1900 to 1940 the percentage of high school-aged children actually in high schools grew from 11 percent to 73 percent, fundamentally changing the institutions. Local businesses wanted these new high schools to produce compliant factory workers and to improve their community’s reputation. Further, as Dr. Wheeler suggested, keeping children in school and out of the workforce looked like a good idea, since a teen sleeping on a school desk is a student, while the same teen sleeping on a park bench is an unemployment statistic.
Two ed school ideologies exploded in popularity, even while eroding standards. As E.D. Hirsch chronicles in The Schools We Need and Why We Don’t Have Them,7 idealistic progressives (Hirsch terms them “romantics”) such as John Dewey, argued that emphasizing content meant deemphasizing children, so he viewed memorization and book learning as dehumanizing and interfering with children’s natural curiosity. Such misguided idealism has done enormous damage to schooling, enabling the adoption of failed techniques, such as whole language to teach reading (more on that below).
Though the idealists (whom Labaree terms “pedagogical progressives”) get more attention, “administrative progressives” had more impact. Administrative progressives agreed with pedagogical progressives that traditional book learning (“to educate students” as Dr. Wheeler put it) should be marginal in school. Yet in contrast to the idealists, administrative progressives wanted schools to serve the purpose of social utility rather than individual fulfillment, so they created schools that were bureaucratic, not organic. All too many administrative progressives believed that few students (and fewer still among minorities) had the capacity to learn much, thus making academic achievement inherently elitist.
One sees this in the 1918 Cardinal Principals of Secondary Education issued by the National Education Association, then an administrator organization rather than a teachers’ union. The Cardinal Principals lists seven goals for schooling, with a single goal—Command of Fundamental Processes—covering nearly all scholarly disciplines. (The other goals were health, worthy use of leisure, citizenship, worthy home membership, vocation, and ethical character.) As Labaree notes:
If school subjects have to be adjusted to the capacities of the students and to the requirements of the job market, and if most students have modest capacities and most jobs have modest skill requirements, then only a few classes need provide a rigorous academic content for the college bound elite, while most students need classes that are less academic, less demanding, and better suited to their modest future roles in society. This is a straightforward prescription for diluting academic content.8
While few educators have ever heard of the Cardinal Principals, the document’s ideas defined education for generations of educators and remain dominant today. As critics Hirsch and Diane Ravitch9 detail, contempt for knowledge meant freedom: both in ed schools and real schools, teachers can do what they want in a way that engineers cannot. After all, it is tougher to cover up a fallen bridge than an illiterate graduate.
Institutions define themselves by what they are not. From the beginning, ed schools distinguished themselves from the rest of academia by their indifference to academic content: after all, the teacher’s job was not to educate children. Other professors noticed. The doctorate in education, the EdD, has never carried much respect in academic circles. Labaree, who taught in Stanford’s ed school concludes:
Those teaching in the university think of those in ed schools as being academically weak and narrowly vocational. They see ed school teachers not as peers in the world of higher education but as an embarrassment, who should not be part of the university at all. To them the ed school looks less like a school of medicine than a school of cosmetology.10
As Jonathan Wai (another contributor to this issue) and I have detailed, ed schools have low standards and give out high grades. Both undergraduate and graduate ed students average lower intelligence test scores than other students, and elite universities do not pick EdDs to be their chancellors.11
Further, as American Enterprise Institute scholar Rick Hess and former Columbia ed school (Teachers College) dean Art Levine demonstrate,12, 13 there is little evidence that earning graduate degrees makes either teachers or their leaders better at their jobs; indeed, when surveyed, they say as much. The same holds for teacher certification.14
Yet graduate degrees in education serve important economic and symbolic purposes. K–12 educators get pay raises for obtaining graduate degrees, and their tuition (usually paid by their employers) produces a cash stream for colleges. Symbolically, many administrators claim authority over parents and teachers by invoking their first name, “Dr.” I have never met a physics PhD who insisted on being called “Doctor,” and seldom met an EdD who didn’t. In this sense, education graduate degrees recall Lord Farquaad’s giant, somewhat phallic castle, which led Shrek to ask, “do you think maybe he’s compensating for something?”
There are (at least) two other unfortunate legacies of administrative progressives, sexism and compliance cultures, each reinforcing the other.15 Administrative progressives bureaucratized, consolidating small schools where many principals still taught (and which were often led by women) into large, differentiated bureaucracies. Encouraged by school boards, emulating the business best practices of 1918 scientific management methods, administrative progressives transformed schools into factories where the workers (teachers) batch-process students under the direction of professional managers (principals and superintendents) who prize compliance and uniformity.
At a time when “professional” meant male, administrative progressives hit upon athletic coaching as a career path to attract men into teaching, with the prospect of fast promotion into administration. By the middle of the 20th century, it seemed only natural that in schools male administrators would boss around female teachers, who were expected to be compliant, not self-directed. Even today, while most teachers are women, most principals and superintendents are still men. Most male principals are former coaches who stress teamwork and compliance over integrity, covering up rather than exposing scandals to protect schools’ reputations, and showing loyalty to colleagues who have strayed.16 For women, the plurality fast track into administration is to become a curriculum specialist. As in education generally, this subfield possesses no specific scientific knowledge, so its “experts” stress compliance to rules and regulations, while showing loyalty to higher-ups. Generally, neither male nor female school leaders focus very much on academic learning beyond basic minimum requirements.
The Decline and Fall of Schools, But Not Ed SchoolsDespite ed school deficiencies, public schools held together until 1970 or so, chiefly because of discrimination in the workplace. The fact that college-educated Blacks and women had few career paths other than teaching, ironically enabled schools to hire high talent for low wages. Smart teachers often kept schools from straying too far into intellectual vacuity. And ironically, civil rights laws (and social norms) changed all that. From 1970 to 2005, among female high school graduates in the top tenth of cognitive ability, the proportion entering teaching fell from roughly a quarter to a tenth, with similar changes among African Americans.17 The daughters of teachers went into more prestigious, more lucrative fields; in the case of two of my relatives, college teaching and investment banking.
This did not seem to trouble ed schools, nor the school leaders they trained. Both my experiences as a school board member (when I once had to explain to an award-winning principal why he should hire math teachers who know math) and the empirical evidence indicate that in hiring teachers, the leaders trained by ed schools prefer compliance over intelligence.18 Political leaders are only now realizing that we cannot get better schools without raising pay for new teachers in order to get more of the most talented people to give teaching a try; some will like it and stay.19
Contempt for academic knowledge likely explains an interesting conundrum exposed by the rise of homeschooling. Parents untrained in medicine could not remove their children’s tonsils. Parents untrained in law could not capably represent their children in court. Yet currently, the bulk of the empirical evidence indicates that on both student achievement and socio-emotional skills, students homeschooled by parents do as well as or slightly better than those taught by certified teachers (even in calculus!).20 Granted, homeschooling families tend to have relatively high motivation and are thus a self-selected sample, but mere enthusiasm would not close the gap that separates amateurs from professionally trained doctors or lawyers. The fact that it does for education undermines the claim that ed schools produce education professionals.
The compliance-oriented, intellectually mediocre school bureaucracies developed by schools of education have cost trillions of dollars, while simultaneously damaging equity, higher education, and democracy.
Compliance-oriented, intellectually mediocre school bureaucracies developed by schools of education have cost trillions of dollars, while simultaneously damaging equity, higher education, and democracy.
Regarding equity, the flight of the bright from teaching came at a time when schools needed them most. Schooling began bureaucratizing in the early 20th century, at a time of stable two-parent and extended families, unlike today. From 1960 to 2010, the percentage of children spending substantial periods either without parents or in single-parent homes skyrocketed from under a tenth to about half, and far more in disadvantaged communities. Statistically, this likely explains the academic achievement and wealth gaps separating Asian Americans from White Americans, and in turn, White Americans from African Americans.21 Family fragility requires smarter, more innovative teachers than ed schools produce, ones attuned to the needs of these children.
The success of certain charter schools that have closed achievement gaps, staffed by teachers trained outside schools of education, demonstrates that most disadvantaged children can master the material when educators keep order, build relationships with parents and students, and set measurable, achievable goals to get kids reading at grade level before leaving elementary school. The successful methods used by such poverty-high achievement schools were consistently resisted by ed schools, even before Critical Race Theory could be invoked to cast teaching disadvantaged children math and standard English as culturally insensitive, despite parental objections.22
Even mainstream journalists, who normally defend ed schools, are starting to agree. For over a half-century, armies of education professors, paid consultants, and for-profit publishers dissuaded teachers from using phonics to teach reading, as journalist Emily Hanford details in her six-part podcast, “Sold a Story: How teaching kids to read went so wrong.”23 They dismissed decades of empirical research that demonstrated that phonics works far better for the vast majority of students as being “reactionary,” instead requiring the use of progressive methods such as “three cueing,” in which students guess what a word is without understanding how its letters sound. (There are superb professional musicians who play only “by ear,” or even teach students to start out by imitating what the teacher plays before learning to read sheet music. But no one teaches music by having their student first begin by guessing at what a song or passage of written music sounds like, even though music notation is much more intuitively obvious than writing).
Steeped in compliance to authority, many teachers assumed that the education professors knew best because they were professors, and then blamed themselves for not doing it right. When the George W. Bush administration and some state governments legally mandated phonics-based reading instruction, certain education professors and their allies sabotaged implementation. This harmed everyone, but particularly disadvantaged students, whose families were less likely to teach phonics at home (as my dad did) or employ tutors.
Regarding higher education, ed schools have been part of a broader movement to make universities more bureaucratic and less intellectual, in effect, more like K-12 schools. Since 1990, administrative staff (who often make more than teachers), frequently with doctorates in education, have outnumbered college professors and usurped faculty governance, as Benjamin Ginsberg details in The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrative University and Why it Matters.24 A large literature suggests that the habits of schools of education—batch-processing students and boosting their bottom line while shorting academic standards—have in recent years become the norm in most non-STEM departments throughout higher education. Empirical studies by Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa25 find little measured academic learning in college, with unfortunate later-life outcomes.26 In short, in terms of their academic rigor, higher education institutions have increasingly become like ed schools, emphasizing social utility in ways that undermine it.
There is a second huge cost to higher education, with implications for free speech, critical thinking, and democratic governance. Increasingly, administrators impose compliance to “best practices,” even when, in the case of sexual matters27 and race relations, empirical evidence indicates the new orthodoxies are unscientific and ineffective, failing to lessen conflict, diversify leadership, or fit scientific evidence.28 In Woke Racism: How a New Religion has Betrayed Black America,29 the African American Columbia University linguistics professor John McWhorter makes a compelling case that Anti-Racist higher education and corporate bureaucrats have imposed ineffective practices, while terminating their critics and blocking practices (including teaching phonics) that would reduce real inequities.
What is to be done?Ed schools operate in a monopolistic manner and under the direction of bureaucratic experts. But what if the bureaucratic experts are wrong about the techniques of schooling? Or what if many parents want their children to get more out of school than mere social utility? As the history of ed schools, and of large and powerful organizations in general demonstrates, one shouldn’t rely on the “experts” to self-correct.30 Even with the of best intentions, what if what the experts dictate works for some students but not others? Montessori schooling—a method of education that is based on self-directed activity, hands-on learning, and collaborative play—might be best for some students, especially those from socially and economically advantaged homes who receive content knowledge at home and become bored or frustrated with normal classroom routines. A more disciplined school experience might work better for those from less fortunate circumstances. And every student works best at the speed appropriate to their development.
So should we simply defund ed schools and pension off their professors? As noted, teacher and leader certification from ed schools does not seem to produce more effective educators. Yet policymakers, parents, and prospective educators are used to ed schools; and for the latter, they do enable valuable networking. The bottom line is that you can’t replace something with nothing. If we defunded ed schools, they would likely reappear, just under a new name or in a different form.
One alternative, advanced by my collaborators and myself, would be to restructure ed schools around actual academic disciplines that have demonstrated rigor and scientifically established bodies of knowledge. And there’s an instructive precedent. Long marginal members of academia, in the 1960s business schools reformed with a focus on applied mathematics, economics, and behavioral science, gaining more respect and more students. Today, an MBA often helps get a well-paying job. Ed schools could likewise reform by offering their students content that teachers and school leaders really need. Psychology (especially learning theory), biology, statistics, and content knowledge in the disciplines taught in K–12 schooling would make good candidates.31 Unfortunately, ed school professors, even if informed and well-intentioned, are not incentivized to do this; indeed, existing certification and accreditation organizations (whose approval is required for federal funding) would likely derail such efforts.
A broader answer would be to replace the existing bureaucratic mindset with pluralistic ones.32 The prevailing systems of teacher certification and school accreditation encourage uniformity precisely where variety is needed. If there’s one thing true about students it is that they vary: one size never fits all. The current system is hamstrung by the way it empowers a small number of nontransparent state bureaucrats and accreditors whose “best practices” fail to reflect either public goals or scientific knowledge about how to achieve those goals.33 And there are better ways.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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Mehta and Teles34 have shown that successful professions build, select, and train for knowledge and independent judgment rather than mere compliance to rules and deference to superiors. Only a professional– rather than a compliance-based human capital model (along with higher pay) seems likely to build respect for teachers as professionals. Further, education models that work well for certain students and teachers fail for others, leading Mehta and Teles to question the wisdom of a single uniform certification system as opposed to multiple systems (such as for Montessori schooling, the high performance-oriented No Excuses schooling, and Classical schooling), each with their own training and distinct certification pathways, as is the case in more rigorous fields such as architecture and psychotherapy, where the clients legitimately want and need different things.
Coupled with school choice that provides a range of options, as is the case in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands (which have better schools than the United States), such systems could incentivize schools of education to reform and so produce the educators parents really want for their children…or else lose market share to those institutions that do. Despite having been trained by certified teachers, most parents, regardless of socioeconomic or demographic particulars, actually want math teachers who actually know math. Therein lies hope and a pathway to the future.
About the AuthorRobert Maranto holds the 21st Century Chair in Leadership at the Department of Education Reform at the University of Arkansas. He has written widely on civil service reform, higher education reform, and K–12 school reform, particularly on charter schools. He has served on his local school board, and a board governing a charter school in another state. With others, he has produced sixteen scholarly books so boring his own mother refused to read them, including President Obama and Education Reform, Beyond a Government of Strangers, School Choice in the Real World: Lessons From Arizona Charter Schools, and Radical Reform of the Civil Service. In 2009 he co-edited both the conservative-leaning The Politically Correct University, and the liberal-leaning Judging Bush.
References1. https://rb.gy/gba0b 2. https://rb.gy/oq9yg 3. Labaree, D.F. (1995). The Trouble with Ed Schools. Yale University Press. 4. Callahan, R.E. (1962). Education and the Cult of Efficiency. University of Chicago Press. 5. The name derives from the French “école normale,” meaning a “model school,” with no reflection on the students or their abilities. 6. Pawlewicz, D.D. (2020). Blaming Teachers: Professionalization Policies and the Failure of Reform in American History. Rutgers University Press. 7. Hirsch, E.D. (1996). The Schools We Need and Why We Don’t Have Them. Doubleday. 8. Labaree, D.F., Hirsch, E.D., & Beatty, B. (2004). The Ed School’s Romance with Progressivism. Brookings Papers on Education Policy, 7, 89–130. 9. Ravitch, D. (2000). Left Back: A Century of Battles Over School Reform. Simon & Schuster. 10. Ibid., p. 91. 11. https://rb.gy/yg6ou 12. Hess, F.M. (2013). Cage-Busting Leadership. Harvard Education Press. 13. Levine, A. (2006). Educating School Teachers. The Education Schools Project. 14. Stotsky, S. (2015). An Empty Curriculum: The Need to Reform Teacher Licensing. Rowman and Littlefield. 15. This paragraph and the next two summarize https://rb.gy/dffow 16. Maranto, R. (2020). Why American School Corruption Remains Hidden: Diagnoses and Prescriptions for Reform. International Journal of Education Law and Policy. Vol. 15 (2019, but publication in 2020), 55–66. 17. Gastic, B. (2014). Closing the opportunity gap: Preparing the next generation of effective teachers. Teacher Quality, 2, 91–108. 18. https://rb.gy/uu66i 19. https://rb.gy/zmyf9 20. Maranto, R., & Bell, D.A. (Eds.). (2018). Homeschooling in the 21st Century: Research and Prospects. Routledge. 21. This has been widely documented empirically, and almost completely ignored by the American Educational Research Association, which is to say, research oriented ed school professors. See https://rb.gy/tyyr7. For nuanced, updated treatments with ideas for serving children with unstable family structures, see Rowe, I.V. (2022). Agency. Templeton Press; Cheng, A.A., & Maranto, R. (2023). Parent Involvement, Family Structure, and Children’s Economic Outcomes. In G. Brown & C.A. Makridis (Eds.), The Economics of Equity in K–12 Education: A Post-Pandemic Policy Handbook for Closing the Opportunity Gap and Using Education to Improve the American Economy. Rowman & Littlefield. 22. Maranto, R. & Ritter, G. (2014). Why KIPP Is Not Corporate: KIPP and Social Justice. Journal of School Choice. 8: 2(April–June), 237–57; Maranto, R. and Shuls, J.V. (2011). Lessons from KIPP Delta. Phi Delta Kappan 93: (November) 52–56. I speak from personal experience as one who tried to create a partnership between a successful high poverty charter school and an ed school. 23. https://rb.gy/pcqbz 24. Ginsberg, B. (2011). The Fall of the Faculty. Oxford University Press. 25. Arum, R., & Roksa, J. (2011). Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses. University of Chicago Press. 26. Arum, R. & Roksa, J. (2014). Aspiring Adults Adrift: Tentative Transitions of College Graduates. University of Chicago Press. 27. Melnick, R.S. (2018). The Transformation of Title IX. Brookings Institution Press. 28. For details, see works within Frisby, C.L. & Maranto, R. (Eds.) (Forthcoming, 2023). Social Justice Verses Social Science: White Fragility, Implicit Bias, and Diversity Training. National Association of Scholars. 29. McWhorter, J. (2021). Woke Racism: How a New Religion Has Betrayed Black America. Penguin. 30. https://rb.gy/3vjon 31. https://rb.gy/7cupp 32. Ostrom, V. (1974). The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. University of Alabama Press. 33. https://rb.gy/tsmjf 34. Mehta, J., & Teles, S. (2014). Professionalization 2.0: The Case for Plural Professionalism in Education. In McShane, M., & Hess, F. (Eds.), Teacher Quality 2.0: Will Today’s Reforms Hold Back Tomorrow’s Schools? Harvard Education Press.
When you drive past any American school, you’ll see signs telling you to reduce your speed and declaring the area to be a “drug-free zone,” with draconian penalties for violators. While we can all agree on keeping drugs away from school children, drugs are not the only thing we keep out of schools. Unfortunately, when it comes to educational policy and practice, research findings have also found themselves banned from schools. Why is that?
The State of Education ResearchGetting your measurements and calculations right matters immensely when building an airplane that is unlikely to crash or a building unlikely to collapse. In Turkey and Syria, when a 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit, outdated building methods contributed greatly to the death toll.1 Engineers and builders need to make sure that the evidence they bring to the table is factually correct. Once you leave the concrete world where accurate facts are prized—or at least clearly have consequences you can detect—things get a lot fuzzier. In the realm of social science, particularly education and policy research, it isn’t always clear to a policy maker, practitioner, or parent what constitutes good evidence, especially when experts disagree.
Does that mean that researchers in the social sciences and education don’t think they have accumulated important evidence? No. So, from the perspective of those who recognize the value of accumulated knowledge and research evidence, it’s confusing why those in education policy and practice don’t appear to listen to researchers or fail to use what is considered the “best evidence” to date on a particular topic. When he realized that most research doesn’t impact policy or practice, educational psychologist David Berliner lamented: “Once upon a time, early in my career, when the world seemed quite a bit simpler than it really is, I believed that my research, and that done by my fellow educational psychologists, would influence what happens in America’s classrooms and in teacher education. I believed in the model of research that famous researchers often espoused.”2 And that’s often the belief many graduate students from the social sciences initially hold, and that many distinguished scholars in their specific subfields still hold. Why?
Education is filled with fads and myths. Hot topics such as learning styles,3 multiple intelligences,4 grit,5 and mindset6 have, at best, only weak support, even though they continue to be trumpeted by the media and have become a part of the popular conversation. Though these are well-recognized examples, the history of education shows7, 8 that they are by no means exceptions.
The replication crisis in which many published research results have proven difficult or even impossible to reproduce, has sent shock waves across all areas of science,9 especially social science,10 including the oftentimes policy-influential domain of economics.11 A paper published in Science that estimated the reproducibility of psychological science research was downloaded over 40,000 times and covered in over 231 news outlets,12 for example, “Over half of psychology studies fail reproducibility test” (Nature13) and “Psychology’s replication crisis is running out of excuses” (The Atlantic14). Not only are social scientists themselves justifiably skeptical whether some seemingly established findings will stand the test of time, but the broader public has become cynical regarding the value of expert opinion in general.
Within the social sciences, different fields have different theoretical, empirical, and tool-based approaches they employ based on their niche-specific promotion incentive structures (pay, promotion, awards, recognition), typically linked to publishing in particular field-valued journals. Generally, the more publications you have in the more prestigious journals, the greater your chance of receiving pay raises, promotions, prizes, and other perks. Since this translates into the need to write for the handful of peers in one’s field, the disciplines are largely siloed, i.e., publications and information get stacked up in specialist journals, encased in technical language, equations, and symbols. Only rarely, and at risk, do scholars dare build on the work of those outside their own discipline, or in some cases even within them. The unfortunate reality is that the use of research-based evidence in formulating education policy is quite limited because politics and personal values dominate. For example:
Ron Haskins, a respected former Republican committee staffer in Congress and now a Brookings Institution scholar, was asked several years ago about the role research played in what was, at the time, a contentious congressional debate about welfare reform. Without missing a beat, he responded that, based on his personal experience, the best research might exert five percent of the total influence on the policy debate, with an upside potential of 10 percent. Personal values and political power, Haskins went on to say to his now silent and disappointed audience, were what really mattered in Congress.15
Why Research Carries Little Weight in PolicymakingPolicymakers16, 17 have explained that research use is not really linear in the way that most researchers hope.18 On the playing field of hardball politics, research is more often used to: (a) support and justify a favored, pre-existing ideological, and long-held point of view, or (b) help inform the thinking around a decision-making process in a way that is quite specific, context-dependent, and disconnected from the findings in a journal article. Simply stated, research results usually just sit on the bench during the policy-making process.
Moreover, the rigor of the methods employed is rarely the primary concern of those using the research. In making policy, what counts is whether a given piece of research provides support for a predetermined decision, in a particular on-the-ground context. Bill Knudsen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary in the U.S. Department of Education, noted in a personal communication that, based on what he saw in working with legislators, perhaps at most 10 percent of decision making in education policy is evidence-based, and the definition of what is considered as evidence is quite loose, with little distinction made between mere qualitative evidence and the ascending levels of scientific rigor such as Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) evidence and above. (See Figure 1.) Of course, the unfortunate fact that evidence often fails to impact practice is also true in health care19 and numerous other fields: “Yet even today, health care experts maintain that 80 percent to 90 percent of daily medical practice is not anchored in such evidence because the specific, detailed information practitioners need still does not exist.”20
Figure 1. Research Design & Evidence Chart, redrawn based on a chart by CFCF [CC BY-SA 4.0] (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-based_education)
One reason for this lacuna is that in U.S. education policy a small set of individuals, often dominated by education economists or graduates from certain types of education policy or reform programs, tend to cite each other while ignoring a lot of the broader social science evidence that has important bearing on particular topics.21 And this is probably not intentional. When you are trained to think in a certain way and exposed largely to many others who also think that same way and value similar research methods and approaches, groupthink tends to take hold. While this problem is inherent to all academic disciplines, not just education policy, some are better than others at being truly multidisciplinary.
Academics who produce research evidence across social sciences and in education believe their subfield has much to offer those in education policy and practice. So they often feel frustrated that decision makers don’t usually read their publications. And the public doesn’t read research publications either: A.K. Biswas and Julian Kircher, who measured the impact of academic conferences and publications on real-world practice, noted, “Practitioners very rarely read articles published in peer-reviewed journals. We know of no senior policymaker or senior business leader who ever read regularly any peer-reviewed papers in well recognized journals like Nature, Science or Lancet.”22
The history of education reform shows that most efforts have not proven successful.7 This is largely because top-down education reform efforts tend to evaporate at the point of impact, namely, the classroom.8 This is true even for efforts such as common core, which enjoyed wide bipartisan support.23 The disconnect between research and policy/practice is the rule, not the exception. Nor is such lack of success confined to education. Reform efforts in criminal justice and welfare policy often have gone awry.15 The education research and policy community often avoid discussing failure,25 perhaps in part because many look to education as the solution to those, and, increasingly, most perceived problems in society. Thus, though educational research has accumulated and, in some ways, has become more rigorous, the disconnect between research on the one hand and policy and practice on the other has remained quite consistent over time.2 Realistic policy scholars argue that this doesn’t mean policy reform should be abandoned, but only that incremental change is more likely to prove effective than any quick-fix “silver bullets.”24
SolutionsSome simply accept the verdict of history—the disconnect between research and practice is to be expected as the default condition in any field. This is especially true given that experts in education policy are unclear as to what a genuine solution might look like. Nonetheless, there continue to be important efforts to join the two. Both history and common sense suggest that gradual steps, monitored, measured, and revised, hold greater promise than one massive attempt to bridge the chasm. Here are some suggestions.
Improve the quality of evidence.A necessary first step is to improve the research evidence base in education policy. Sadly, replications in the field of education are not standard at present. When researchers looked at the top 100 education journals they found that only 0.13 percent of education articles were replications.26 And though economists are highly influential in education policy as a research field, as are political scientists and to some extent sociologists, the research of psychologists and other social and behavioral scientists is noticeable only by their scarcity. Economic thinking and approaches are influential in all areas of policy, including in education,27 though they provide only one of the toolsets available for researching social science, education, and policy issues.28
Additionally, a small group of education policy scholars and influencers in think tanks dominate and serve as gatekeepers determining which ideas gain entry to shape the research, which topics are discussed, and which never receive a fair hearing.21 A truly multidisciplinary approach to integrating evidence from every possible discipline relevant to education research and policy would be another important step in improving the evidence base in education. New research is not always necessary—just integrating research evidence that has accumulated in as yet unincorporated fields would be productive.
Multidisciplinarity, of course, faces the incentive structure constraints in academia that arise from the silo effect described earlier, but hopefully that too can change incrementally over time.29 One way would be to first get the broader public, especially policymakers and practitioners, to read research.22 Even when the most rigorous relevant research is collected in an educational repository such as What Works Clearinghouse, policymakers and practitioners often don’t take the time to read it. They have different incentives and interests than researchers, who are trained and then rewarded in designing experiments and evaluating scientific evidence.30
Engage the public.Academics should publicly engage and teach scholars in other fields as well as the broader public about their research, whether through writing for the news and in magazines, going on podcasts and doing interviews, writing popular books and articles, using social media, and other methods.31 Some go so far as advocating giving research away to the public by making clear accounts of research methods freely available on the Internet, along with the data and results so that they can be replicated easily. However, this must be done responsibly, given that the replication crisis has made it unclear in some areas whether the cumulative evidence is strong enough to communicate or be useful in policy and practice.32 The challenge here is to explain just how research results published in an academic journal are actually relevant to the average person in their everyday life.
Build better relationships.If they want to influence policy, researchers should get to know state-level policymakers and form mutually beneficial relationships with them. Policy making at the national level is usually out of reach, so there is a greater chance at the state or more local level.15 Doing so, however, is a two-way street. Building relationships with state or local-level policymakers and politicians requires learning how the political process works and being available to help solve real, on-the-ground problems within short time frames.
Communicate in plain language.Academics also need to be able to communicate their findings in plain language so that those outside academia—or even their particular discipline—can understand and use that knowledge.32 History professor Patricia Limerick33 made this case forcefully in her poignant article titled, “Dancing with Professors: The Trouble with Academic Prose.” Other scholars argue: “If academics want to have an impact on policymakers and practitioners, they must consider popular media, which has been ignored by them.”22
New research is not always necessary—just integrating research evidence that has accumulated in as yet unincorporated fields would be productive.
The technical jargon used in each academic subfield often prevents integrating knowledge across subfields and hinders those outside of academia from using relevant research findings. Writing policy briefs and other publications in plain language is not incentivized by traditional academic positions where a Darwinian calculus rules in the form of “publish and get grants or perish.”34 However, it is precisely the mass media that can transmit knowledge so that research findings could better find their way into policy decision-making. Learning why, when, and how to enter the public arena should be integrated into graduate training programs across the physical, biological, and behavioral sciences if researchers have any hope of impacting policy and practice.
Publishing for the general public needs to be incentivized.An additional challenge is that academia rewards producing research that those in policy and practice just don’t think addresses their needs.16 One solution would be for academia to reward scholars in the tenure and promotion process for communicating and publishing the relevance of their research findings to a broader audience. Doing so could be included as part of the service component of the usual research-teaching-service pay-and-promotion criteria.
Work with practitioners in research-practice partnerships.Some education researchers are embracing Research Practice Partnerships (RPPs),16, 35 for example, between researchers at a university and practitioners in local schools. (Full disclosure: I’m involved in an RPP in Northwest Arkansas,36 and it is well worth it). RPPs work because practitioners are a part of the research process so that their research needs are met. While academic research questions are often disconnected from practice, there are some cases where not only the answers but also properly framed questions can be useful to practitioners. And for some questions, the results are publishable in an academic journal and so do reward the researchers.
Since RPPs are a partnership, the typical independence of the researcher for purposes of evaluation is not present and a clear conflict of interest could arise. However, because policy changes often are constrained by many moving parts, when the time comes for implementation, gradual yet positive change can move the needle provided that the practitioners understand why the research is useful and so are eager to use it to help kids in their schools.
Top-down solutions often won’t work.Eric Kalenze,37 a leading authority in the field of curriculum and content development, argues that top-down reform efforts don’t work largely because there isn’t either the infrastructure or buy-in from schools that are necessary to make it happen. He explains how in the school where he taught, there was a period when a supportive principal and a group of dedicated teachers could truly make effective education reform work, but the confluence of these positive factors is hard to scale. Despite this, he argues that bottom-up efforts are worth pursuing to help kids, including efforts that build on evidence use.30
Involve the teachers.Educational psychologist David Berliner argues:
It is the tinkering by teachers and researchers, and the study of their craft by the teachers themselves, that seems to me the most likely to pay off in improved education. If those in the research community can learn to do more design experiments in real-world settings, and join teacher-researchers to produce knowledge about how things work in real-world classrooms, the great disconnect might become a much smaller disconnect. Educational research would end up being less a field of traditional scientific research, and much more a field of engineering, invention, and design.38
This perspective aligns with the focus on RPPs through getting teacher buy-ins and developing mutual respect to bridge the disconnect.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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In their book Gradual: The Case for Incremental Change in a Radical Age, authors Greg Berman and Aubrey Fox explain that there have been successful policy reform efforts, such as Social Security, where the confluence of a large number of positive changes fortuitously came together.24 Perhaps by approaching all of these possible solutions while thinking of novel ways to end the separation between research and policy/ practice can lead to gradual but positive change. Avoiding unintended consequences will require a clear-headed understanding of all of the relevant research and facts that influence education.39
However, given the current climate of political polarization and the culture wars in education policy, the use of evidence in policy and practice remains an ongoing challenge, but one that might be overcome gradually, if more people better understood both the history of failures and the fact that radical changes are much less likely than positive small ones to help educate children — whether inside or outside of schools.40
About the AuthorJonathan Wai is Associate Professor and the Endowed Chair in Education Policy in the Department of Education Reform at the University of Arkansas, with a joint appointment in the Department of Psychology. He is also Affiliate Faculty in Educational Psychology at the University of Alabama. He studies education policy through the lens of psychology. His fields of expertise include gifted education, talent development, intelligence, individual differences, higher education, educational psychology, expertise, and education policy.
References1. https://rb.gy/hqw07 2. Berliner D.C. (2008). Research, Policy, and Practice: The Great Disconnect. In Lapan S.D., Quartaroli M.T. (Eds.), Research Essentials: An Introduction to Designs and Practices, 295–326. Jossey-Bass, 296. 3. Pashler, H., McDaniel, M., Rohrer, D., & Bjork, R. (2009). Learning Styles: Concepts and Evidence. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 9(3), 105–119. 4. Lubinski, D., & Benbow, C.P. (1995). An Opportunity for Empiricism [Review of the book Multiple intelligences: The Theory in Practice, by H. Gardner]. Contemporary Psychology, 40(10), 935–938. 5. Crede, M., Tynan, M.C., & Harris, P.D. (2017). Much Ado About Grit: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis of the Grit Literature. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113(3), 492–511. 6. Macanamara, B. N., & Burgoyne, A. P. (2022). Do Growth Mindset Interventions Impact Students’ Academic Achievement? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis With Recommendations for Best Practices. Psychological Bulletin. Advance online publication. 7. Ravitch D. (2000). Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms. Simon & Schuster. 8. Tyack D., & Cuban L. (1995). Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform. Harvard University Press. 9. Ritchie, S. (2020). Science fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth. Metropolitan Books. 10. Nosek et al. (2022). Replicability, Robustness, and Reproducibility in Psychological Science. Annual Review of Psychology, 73, 719–748. 11. Ankel-Peters, J., Fiala, N., & Neubauer, F. (2023). Do Economists Replicate? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 212, 219–232. 12. Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science. Science, 349(6251), aac4716. 13. https://rb.gy/468hv 14. https://rb.gy/gc40k 15. Bogenschneider K., Corbett T. (2021). Evidence-Based Policymaking: Envisioning a New Era of Theory, Research, and Practice (2nd ed.). Routledge. (p. 3). 16. Conaway, C. (2020). Maximizing Research Use in the World We Actually Live in: Relationships, Organizations, and Interpretation. Education Finance and Policy, 15(1), 1–10. 17. Tseng V. (2012). The Uses of Research in Policy and Practice and Commentaries. Social Policy Report, 26(2), 1–24. 18. Weiss C.H. (1977). Research for Policy’s Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research. Policy Analysis, 3, 531–545. 19. Bryk, A.S. (2015). 2014 AERA Distinguished Lecture: Accelerating How We Learn to Improve. Educational Researcher, 44(9), 467–477. (p. 468). 20. Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. (2012). Best Care at Lower Costs: The Path to Continuously Learning Health Care in America. National Academies Press. 21. Phelps, R.P. (2023). The Malfunction of U.S. Education Policy: Elite Misinformation, Disinformation, and Selfishness. Rowman & Littlefield. 22. https://rb.gy/w750p 23. Loveless T. (2021). Between the State and the Schoolhouse: Understanding the Failure of Common Core. Harvard Education Press. 24. Berman, G., & Fox, A. (2023). Gradual: The Case for Incremental Change in a Radical Age. Oxford University Press. 25. Greene J.P., McShane M.Q. (2018). Failure Up Close: What Happens, Why It Happens, and What We Can Learn From It. Rowman & Littlefield. 26. Makel, M.C., & Plucker, J.A. (2014). Facts Are More Important Than Novelty: Replication in the Education Sciences. Educational Researcher, 43(6), 304–316. 27. Berman E.P. (2022). Thinking Like an Economist: How Efficiency Replaced Equality in U.S. Public Policy. Princeton University Press. 28. Singer, J.D. (2019). Reshaping the Arc of Quantitative Educational Research: It’s Time to Broaden Our Paradigm. Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 12(4), 570–593. 29. https://rb.gy/sr9zh 30. Kalenze, E. (2020). What It Will Take to Improve Evidence-Informed Decision- Making in Schools. American Enterprise Institute. 31. https://rb.gy/vub63 32. Lewis, N.A., Jr., & Wai, J. (2021). Communicating What We Know and What Isn’t So: Science Communication in Psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16(6), 1242–1254. 33. https://rb.gy/erm32 34. Lilienfeld, S.O. (2017). Psychology’s Replication Crisis and the Grant Culture: Righting the Ship. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(4), 660–664. 35. Booker L., Conaway, C., Schwartz N. (2019). Five Ways RPPs Can Fail and How to Avoid Them: Applying Conceptual Frameworks to Improve RPPs. William T. Grant Foundation. 36. Tran, B.T.N. (2022). Expanding Gifted Identification to Capture Academically Advanced, Low-Income, or Other Disadvantaged Students. Journal for the Education of the Gifted, 45(1), 64–83. 37. Kalenze E. (2019). What the Academy Taught Us: Improving Schools From the Bottom Up in a Top-Down Transformation Era. John Catt. 38. Berliner D.C. (2008). Research, Policy, and Practice: The Great Disconnect. In Lapan S.D., Quartaroli M. T. (Eds.), Research Essentials: An Introduction to Designs and Practices, 295–326. Jossey-Bass, 311. 39. Harden, K.P. (2021). The Genetic Lottery: Why DNA Matters for Social Equality. Princeton University Press. 40. Maton, K.I. (2016). Influencing Social Policy: Applied Psychology Serving the Public Interest. Oxford University Press.
Is it more of a disadvantage to be born poor or Black? Is it worse to be brought up by rich parents in a poor neighborhood, or by poor parents in a rich neighborhood? The answers to these questions lie at the very core of what constitutes a fair society. So how do we know if it is better to have wealthy parents or to grow up in a wealthy neighborhood when “good” things often go together (i.e., kids with rich parents grow up in rich neighborhoods)? When poverty, being Black, and living in a neighborhood with poor schools all predict worse outcomes, how can we disentangle them? Statisticians call this problem multicollinearity, and a number of straightforward methods using some of the largest databases on social mobility ever assembled provide surprisingly clear answers to these questions—the biggest obstacle children face in America is having the bad luck of being born into a poor family.
The immense impact of parental income on the future earnings of children has been established by a tremendous body of research. Raj Chetty and colleagues, in one of the largest studies of social mobility ever conducted,1 linked census data to federal tax returns to show that your parent’s income when you were a child was by far the best predictor of your own income when you became an adult. The authors write, “On average, a 10 percentile increase in parent income is associated with a 3.4 percentile increase in a child’s income.” This is a huge effect; children will earn an average of 34 percent more if their parents are in the highest income decile as compared to the lowest. This effect is true across all races, and Black children born in the top income quintile are more than twice as likely to remain there than White children born in the bottom quintile are to rise to the top. In short, the chances of occupying the top rungs of the economic ladder for children of any race are lowest for those who grow up poor and highest for those who grow up rich. These earnings differences have a broad impact on wellbeing and are strongly correlated with both health and life expectancy.2 Wealthy men live 15 years longer than the poorest, and wealthy women are expected to live 10 years longer than poor women—five times the effect of cancer!
Why is having wealthy parents so important? David Grusky at Stanford, in a paper on the commodification of opportunity, writes:
Although parents cannot directly buy a middleclass outcome for their children, they can buy opportunity indirectly through advantaged access to the schools, neighborhoods, and information that create merit and raise the probability of a middle-class outcome.3
In other words, opportunity is for sale to those who can afford it. This simple point is so obvious that it is surprising that so many people seem to miss it. Indeed, it is increasingly common for respected news outlets to cite statistics about racial differences without bothering to control for class. This is like conducting a study showing that taller children score higher on math tests without controlling for age. Just as age is the best predictor of a child’s mathematical ability, a child’s parent’s income is the best predictor of their future adult income.
Although there is no substitute for being born rich, outcomes for children from families with the same income differ in predictable and sometimes surprising ways. After controlling for household income, the largest racial earnings gap is between Asians and Whites, with Whites who grew up poor earning approximately 11 percent less than their Asian peers at age 40, followed by a two percent reduction if you are poor and Hispanic and an additional 11 percent on top of that if you are born poor and Black. Some of these differences, however, result from how we measure income. Using “household income,” in particular, conceals crucial differences between homes with one or two parents and this alone explains much of the residual differences between racial groups. Indeed, the marriage rates between races uncannily recapitulate these exact same earnings gaps—Asian children have a 65 percent chance of growing up in households with two parents, followed by a 54 percent chance for Whites, 41 percent for Hispanics and 17 percent for Blacks4 and the Black-White income gap shrinks from 13 percent to 5 percent5 after we control for income differences between single and two-parent households.
Just as focusing on household income obscures differences in marriage rates between races, focusing on all children conceals important sex differences, and boys who grow up poor are far more likely to remain that way than their sisters.6 This is especially true for Black boys who earn 9.7 percent less than their White peers, while Black women actually earn about one percent more than White women born into families with the same income. Chetty writes:
Conditional on parent income, the black-white income gap is driven entirely by large differences in wages and employment rates between black and white men; there are no such differences between black and white women.7
So, what drives these differences? If it is racism, as many contend, it is a peculiar type. It seems to benefit Asians, hurts Black men, and has no detectable effect on Black women. A closer examination of the data reveals their source. Almost all of the remaining differences between Black men and men of other races lie in neighborhoods. These disadvantages could be caused either by what is called an “individual-level race effect” whereby Black children do worse no matter where they grow up, or by a “place-level race effect” whereby children of all races do worse in areas with large Black populations. Results show unequivocal support for a place-level effect. Chetty writes:
The main lesson of this analysis is that both blacks and whites living in areas with large African-American populations have lower rates of upward income mobility.8
Multiple studies have confirmed this basic finding, revealing that children who grow up in families with similar incomes and comparable neighborhoods have the same chances of success. In other words, poor White kids and poor Black kids who grow up in the same neighborhood in Los Angeles are equally likely to become poor adults. Disentangling the effects of income, race, family structure, and neighborhood on social mobility is a classic case of multicollinearity (i.e., correlated predictors), with race effectively masking the real causes of reduced social mobility—parent’s income. The residual effects are explained by family structure and neighborhood. Black men have the worst outcomes because they grow up in the poorest families and worst neighborhoods with the highest prevalence of single mothers. Asians, meanwhile, have the best outcomes because they have the richest parents, with the lowest rates of divorce, and grow up in the best neighborhoods.
The impact that family structure has on the likelihood of success first came to national attention in 1965, when the Moynihan Report9 concluded that the breakdown of the nuclear family was the primary cause of racial differences in achievement. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an American sociologist serving as Assistant Secretary of Labor (who later served as Senator from New York) argued that high out-of-wedlock birth rates and the large number of Black children raised by single mothers created a matriarchal society that undermined the role of Black men. In 1965, he wrote:
In a word, a national effort towards the problems of Negro Americans must be directed towards the question of family structure. The object should be to strengthen the Negro family so as to enable it to raise and support its members as do other families.10
A closer look at these data, however, reveals that the disadvantage does not come from being raised by a single mom but rather results from growing up in neighborhoods without many active fathers. In other words, it is not really about whether your own parents are married. Children who grow up in two-parent households in these neighborhoods have similarly low rates of social mobility. Rather, it seems to depend on growing up in neighborhoods with a lot of single parents. Chetty in a nearly perfect replication of Moynihan’s findings writes:
black father presence at the neighborhood level strongly predicts black boys’ outcomes irrespective of whether their own father is present or not, suggesting that what matters is not parental marital status itself but rather community-level factors.11
Although viewing the diminished authority of men as a primary cause of social dysfunction might seem antiquated today, evidence supporting Moynihan’s thesis continues to mount. The controversial report, which was derided by many at the time as paternalistic and racist, has been vindicated12 in large part because the breakdown of the family13 is being seen among poor White families in rural communities today14 with similar results. Family structure, like race, often conceals underlying class differences too. Across all races, the chances of living with both parents fall from 85 percent if you are born in an upper-middle-class family to 30 percent if you are in the lower-middle class.15 The take-home message from these studies is that fathers are a social resource and that boys are particularly sensitive to their absence.16 Although growing up rich seems to immunize children against many of these effects, when poverty is combined with absent fathers, the negative impacts are compounded.17
Children who grow up in families with similar incomes and comparable neighborhoods have the same chances of success. In other words, poor White kids and poor Black kids who grow up in the same neighborhood in Los Angeles are equally likely to become poor adults.
The fact that these outcomes are driven by family structure and the characteristics of communities that impact all races similarly poses a serious challenge to the bias narrative18—the belief that anti-Black bias or structural racism underlies all racial differences19 in outcomes—and suggests that the underlying reasons behind the racial gaps lie further up the causal chain. Why then do we so frequently use race as a proxy for the underlying causes when we can simply use the causes themselves? Consider by analogy the fact that Whites commit suicide at three times the rate of Blacks and Hispanics.20 Does this mean that being White is a risk factor for suicide? Indeed, the link between the income of parents and their children may seem so obvious that it can hardly seem worth mentioning. What would it even mean to study social mobility without controlling for parental income? It is the elephant in the room that needs to be removed before we can move on to analyze more subtle advantages. It is obvious, yet elusive; hidden in plain sight.
If these results are so clear, why is there so much confusion around this issue? In a disconcertingly ignorant tweet, New York Times writer Nikole Hanna-Jones, citing the Chetty study, wrote:
Please don’t ever come in my timeline again bringing up Appalachia when I am discussing the particular perils and injustice that black children face. And please don’t ever come with that tired “It’s class, not race” mess again.21
Is this a deliberate attempt to serve a particular ideology or just statistical illiteracy?22 And why are those who define themselves as “progressive” often the quickest to disregard the effects of class? University of Pennsylvania political science professor Adolph Reed put what he called “the sensibilities of the ruling class” this way:
the model is that the society could be one in which one percent of the population controls 95 percent of the resources, and it would be just, so long as 12 percent of the one percent were black and 14 percent were Hispanic, or half women.23
Perhaps this view and the conviction shared by many elites that economic redistribution is a non-starter accounts for this laser focus on racism, while ignoring material conditions. Racial discrimination can be fixed by simply piling on more sensitivity training or enforcing racial quotas. Class inequities, meanwhile, require real sacrifices by the wealthy, such as more progressive tax codes, wider distribution of property taxes used to fund public schools, or the elimination of legacy admissions at elite private schools.24 The fact that corporations and an educated upper class of professionals,25 which Thomas Piketty has called “the Brahmin left,”26 have enthusiastically embraced this type of race-based identity politics is another tell. Now, America’s rising inequality,27 where the top 0.1 percent have the same wealth as the bottom 90 percent, can be fixed under the guidance of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) policies and enforced by Human Resources departments. These solutions pose no threat to corporations or the comfortable lives of the elites who run them. We are obsessed with race because being honest about class would be too painful.
There are, however, also a number of aspects of human psychology that make the powerful impact of the class into which we are born difficult to see. First, our preference for binary thinking,28 which is less cognitively demanding, makes it easier to conjure up easily divisible, discrete, and visible racial categories (e.g., Black, White, Asian), rather than the continuous and often less visible metric of income. We run into problems when we think about continuous variables such as income, which are hard to categorize and can change across our lifetimes. For example, what is the cutoff between rich and poor? Is $29,000 dollars a year poor but $30,000 middle class? This may also help to explain why we are so reluctant to discuss other highly heritable traits that impact our likelihood of success, like attractiveness and intelligence. Indeed, a classic longitudinal study by Blau and Duncan in 196729 which studied children across the course of their development suggests that IQ might be an even better predictor of adult income than their parent’s income. More recently Daniel Belsky found that an individual’s education-linked genetics consistently predicted a change in their social mobility, even after accounting for social origins.30 Any discussion of IQ or innate differences in cognitive abilities has now become much more controversial, however, and any research into possible cognitive differences between populations is practically taboo today. This broad denial of the role of genetic factors in social mobility is puzzling, as it perpetuates the myth that those who have succeeded have done so primarily due to their own hard work and effort, and not because they happened to be beneficiaries of both environmental and genetic luck. We have no more control over our genetic inheritance than we do over the income of our parents, their marital status, or the neighborhoods in which we spend our childhoods. Nevertheless, if cognitive differences or attractiveness were reducible to clear and discrete categories, (e.g., “dumb” vs. “smart” or “ugly” vs. “attractive”) we might be more likely to notice them and recognize their profound effects. Economic status is also harder to discern simply because it is not stamped on our skin while we tend to think of race as an immutable category that is fixed at birth. Race is therefore less likely to be seen as the fault of the hapless victim. Wealth, however, which is viewed as changeable, is more easily attributed to some fault of the individual, who therefore bears some of the responsibility for being (or even growing up) poor.
We may also fail to recognize the effects of social class because of the availability bias31 whereby our ability to recall information depends on our familiarity with it. Although racial segregation has been falling32 since the 1970s, economic segregation has been rising.33 Although Americans are interacting more with people from different races, they are increasingly living in socioeconomic bubbles. This can make things such as poverty and evictions less visible to middle-class professionals who don’t live in these neighborhoods and make problems with which they may have more experience, such as “problematic” speech, seem more pressing.
Still, even when these studies are published, and the results find their way into the media, they are often misinterpreted. This is because race can mask the root causes of more impactful disadvantages, such as poverty, and understanding their inter-relations requires a basic understanding of statistics, including the ability to grasp concepts such as multicollinearity.
Of course, none of this is to say that historical processes have not played a crucial role in producing the large racial gaps we see today. These causes, however, all too easily become a distraction that provides little useful information about how to solve these problems. Perhaps reparations for some people, or certain groups, are in order, but for most people, it simply doesn’t matter whether your grandparents were impoverished tenant farmers or aristocrats who squandered it all before you were born. Although we are each born with our own struggles and advantages, the conditions into which we are born, not those of our ancestors, are what matter, and any historical injustices that continue to harm those currently alive will almost always materialize in economic disparities. An obsession with historical oppression which fails to improve conditions on the ground is a luxury34 that we cannot afford. While talking about tax policy may be less emotionally satisfying than talking about the enduring legacy of slavery, redistributing wealth in some manner to the poor is critical to solving these problems. These are hard problems, and solutions will require acknowledging their complexity. We will need to move away from a culture that locks people into an unalterable hierarchy of suffering, pitting groups that we were born into against one another, but rather towards a healthier identity politics that emphasizes economic interests and our common humanity.
Most disturbing, perhaps, is the fact that the institutions that are most likely to promote the bias narrative and preach about structural racism are those best positioned to help poor children. Attending a four-year college is unrivaled in its ability to level the playing field for the most disadvantaged kids from any race and is the most effective path out of poverty,35 nearly eliminating any other disadvantage that children experience. Indeed, the poorest students who are lucky enough to attend elite four-year colleges end up earning only 5 percent less than their richest classmates.36 Unfortunately, while schools such as Harvard University tout their anti-racist admissions policies,37 admitting Black students in exact proportion to their representation in the U.S. population (14 percent), Ivy League universities are 75 times more likely38 to admit children born in the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution as they are to admit children born in the bottom 20 percent. If Harvard was as concerned with economic diversity as racial diversity, it would accept five times as many students from poor families as it currently does. Tragically, the path most certain to help poor kids climb out of poverty is closed to those who are most likely to benefit.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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Decades of social mobility research has come to the same conclusion. The income of your parents is by far the best predictor of your own income as an adult. By using some of the largest datasets ever assembled and isolating the effects of different environments on social mobility, research reveals again and again how race effectively masks parental income, neighborhood, and family structure. These studies describe the material conditions of tens of millions of Americans. We are all accidents of birth and imprisoned by circumstances over which we had no control. We are all born into an economic caste system in which privilege is imposed on us by the class into which we are helplessly born. The message from this research is that race is not a determinant of economic mobility on an individual level.39 Even though a number of factors other than parental income also affect social mobility, they operate on the level of the community.40 And although upward mobility is lower for individuals raised in areas with large Black populations, this affects everyone who grows up in those areas, including Whites and Asians. Growing up in an area with a high proportion of single parents also significantly reduces rates of upward mobility, but once again this effect operates on the level of the community and children with single parents do just as well as long as they live in communities with a high percentage of married couples.
One thing these data do reveal—again, and again, and again—however, is that privilege is real. It’s just based on class, not race.
About the AuthorRobert Lynch is an evolutionary anthropologist at Penn State who specializes in how biology, the environment, and culture transact to shape life outcomes. His scientific research includes the effect of religious beliefs on social mobility, sex differences in social relationships, the impact of immigration on social capital, how social isolation can promote populism, and the evolutionary function of laughter.
References1. https://rb.gy/n0b2s 2. https://rb.gy/hyrbb 3. https://rb.gy/e72y9 4. https://rb.gy/borp3 5. https://rb.gy/hhbv7 6. https://rb.gy/4y12m 7. https://rb.gy/ws3ri 8. https://rb.gy/885jf 9. https://rb.gy/swsnm 10. https://rb.gy/fqske 11. https://rb.gy/xamwr 12. https://rb.gy/6hgl4 13. https://rb.gy/gyd8f 14. https://rb.gy/wevmn 15. https://rb.gy/8603b 16. https://rb.gy/j31um 17. https://rb.gy/njjfe 18. https://rb.gy/zey0m 19. Ibid. 20. https://rb.gy/tvgor 21. https://rb.gy/m8d6d 22. https://rb.gy/hjnr1 23. https://rb.gy/vhiqi 24. https://rb.gy/ci5jd 25. https://rb.gy/1x19z 26. https://rb.gy/il8nx 27. https://rb.gy/5wkgb 28. https://rb.gy/du3le 29. https://rb.gy/ayncj 30. https://rb.gy/6h3e4 31. https://rb.gy/kav1r 32. https://rb.gy/sp0vu 33. https://rb.gy/d61g7 34. https://rb.gy/6n3r3 35. https://rb.gy/7wi4s 36. https://rb.gy/dd5gp 37. https://rb.gy/bwrqt 38. https://rb.gy/5jsod 39. https://rb.gy/wg63i 40. https://rb.gy/dj43h
Everyone knows the problems with American education; there is no point in rehashing them. Identifying the source of those problems, however, is essential to any meaningful reform. At every level, educational innovation is choked off by bureaucratic administrators who benefit from the current structure’s inefficiencies. Let’s be clear, there is no grand administrative conspiracy— both game theory and public choice economic theory predict that when a structure empowers a certain group1 (in this case, educational bureaucrats), the structure will gradually evolve to manifest the priorities of the group in power. Understanding this simple point leads to an understanding of how educational reform could occur. True educational reform would require creating a structure that empowers the learner, not the administrative bureaucracy. This article describes in detail a workable plan for doing so. Every one of these ideas is feasible for implementation right now. Beginning with higher education, here is a vision for what American education could be.
Higher EducationMy 2021 Skeptic article on post-pandemic higher education,2 described how the same market forces that had made entertainment cheap and constantly accessible had done the same for educational content. Indeed, learning has never been cheaper or more accessible—unless you need certification in the form of a degree. American colleges and universities, emboldened by a scam-of-the-century system where students could pay for higher education with easy-toget Pell Grants, and where the school could keep the money even when students defaulted on loans,3 leveraged their ability to verify the transaction of education (through degrees). School “leaders” expanded their bureaucracies, football stadiums, campus amenities, and diversity efforts, while undercutting the teaching faculty by injecting adjuncts and teaching assistants to do the actual instructing.4 Students who went to college to enjoy four years of a lazy river ride,5 or to attend mega-sporting events, seemed not to mind, but cynics saw the whole system of higher education as beyond saving. There was, however, a notable exception—a new program, led by a visionary at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Sanjay Sarma, who led in a variety of roles at MIT’s Open Learning Department from 2012 to 2022 developed an open-learning “micromasters” program. In his book, Grasp: The Science Transforming How We Learn,6 he pointed out that the educational structure is designed to both teach students and to “winnow” them into next level institutions based on judgment and performance. The “winnowing” function has now largely been eliminated because high-level education can be made accessible to just about anyone at any time.
In some cases, workplaces have begun offering in-house credentials to employees. However, employers don’t like to reward credentials that employees can then use at another job somewhere else. Workforce needs should inform the creation of educational programs and the development of credentials, but a neutral third-party verification system through colleges and universities is probably best for workers.Anyone can “get into” MIT right now on the Open Learning website.7 If you pass the Open Learning course, and perhaps even take a test, MIT will award you with a micro-credential indicating that you have mastered the content in, say, supply chain management to the extent that MIT’s faculty thinks it sufficient to earn MIT verification.
The cost is between $1,000 and $1,200. In 2021, I predicted that the disjunction between the high cost of college education and the lowered cost of learning could not last. Just a few months later, MIT’s Open Education model was sold to edX (2U) for 800 million dollars.8
The Open Learning concept has given birth to two new players in the “game” of higher education. The first is Axiom, which delivers high-quality instruction through an open-learning model.9 The second is the Digital Credentials Consortium, a process dedicated to finding ways to use blockchain technology to verify educational transactions.10
Currently, a teacher or professor passes knowledge and skills on to students, but it is their school or college that verifies the “transaction” by issuing diplomas bearing its imprimatur. Blockchain verification, administered largely through rigorous mastery-level testing, could eliminate the need for diplomas. In practice, digital credentialing would look something like peer-to-peer lending verified by a blockchain, where a bank is not necessary to act as a third-party verifier.
If peer-to-peer lending has been around for a while, why do banks still exist? The answer is that institutions that have built up a century’s worth of legal leverage by aggressively lobbying their politicians, don’t die easily. And that’s what makes Sarma and MIT all the more significant. It is as if the CEO of a major banking or insurance institution decided to cut profits and deliver better services. MIT has a credentialing power, thanks to its earned reputation, to verify a transaction of learning through an open-source model.
After my 2021 paper was published, I contacted Dr. Sarma and he invited me to the MIT campus. I met with him and several members of MIT’s Open Learning faculty. At that time, I had just finished my second decade as a public high school teacher and had spent several years developing education programs for in-service STEM teachers. The entire secondary structure seemed strained to the point of collapse (a subject I wrote about for the Skeptic Reading Room in 2022),11 and I left MIT in June of 2022 believing their Open Learning system could save education.
It seemed that education, at all levels, was or is on the verge of a “Netflix-Blockbuster” moment. When Netflix started streaming in 2007, Blockbuster stores could be found in every hamlet in America. Just a few early adopters could recognize what streaming services would do to the home entertainment business, and at that moment Blockbuster still looked like a strong business model. By 2014, Blockbuster went bankrupt as home entertainment turned to a cheaper and more agile model of entertainment delivery. Between 2007 and 2014 there was little technological change on the part of Netflix. Instead, those seven years represent the amount of time that it took users to recognize, understand, and use the new streaming service. A critical mass of users had to be reached before the business model turned.
With education available at all times, schools really should just teach two things: how to become interested in an academic subject and how to use the educational ecosystem to saturate that interest level.
It is clear that even if Axiom and digital credentialing are offering an impressive new world of Open-Source education, a student population that graduates from traditional schools won’t know how to use or access this type of content. The current Open-Source model needs to begin early in a student’s education for students, teachers, guidance counselors, and parents to understand how it works and become comfortable with it.
Open-Source learning does have some weaknesses. It lacks a face-to-face component, and because Open-Source learning is universal, it is not local. These are issues that can be effectively addressed by connecting the model to existing educational institutions, but in order to explain how, we first need to connect Open-Source learning to K–12 education.
Open-Source Learning and Secondary EducationBefore offering a new vision for education, I submit there are three educational myths that need to be dispelled. First—online education and face-to-face education only exist as an either/or construct. Second—interest-based education, where students develop an interest in a topic and then explore content and develop skills around that interest, does not constitute a serious method for learning. Third—an educational structure must be hyper-competitive (the winnowing function) because it is the pressure that forces students to learn complicated topics. Let us examine these three myths, and explore solutions:
- Online Education and Face-to-Face EducationIn Grasp, Sanjay Sarma explained that education currently operates within a Seat-Time Model (STM) where students are generally rewarded with grades after they have spent a certain amount of time in a class. He advocates a Mastery-Learning Model (MLM), or a competence-based model for education, one where students leave a course of study once they have demonstrated mastery. If the goal is “mastering” certain material, methods, or procedures (for example, the alphabet, adding fractions, changing a tire or a diaper), it would make sense to combine the best aspects of online and face-to-face learning so that a student attains the most complete education possible.
Students who study through a MLM module can still read actual books and work with pencil and paper, but their progress would be tracked through constant testing. A MLM treats tests as living parts of the learning process, not as “educational autopsies” to be administered after students have absorbed content. Again, the MLM lacks a face-to-face component, and it is not localized, though these weaknesses can be filled by teachers.
If students work through a MLM, teachers would no longer have to assign them grades. They would also not be subject to the various external forces that often cause or reward grade inflation. MLM tracks both student progress and mastery. Teachers, then, would need to localize the curriculum by showing how the content that students are learning in an MLM connects to the local community and workforce.
In practice, this means that an MLM on, say, chemistry would have “gaps” built into it. Teachers would no longer be record-keepers (no grading) but rather would need to be connected to workplaces and universities, to access the content-area knowledge necessary to guide students. Teachers would therefore need to be sustained through a new type of professional development that begins with them being exposed to the intellectual community around them and ends with their creating a Teacher-Generated Curriculum.12 Ideally, community members would take an active part in student education. When a local business leader comes into a high school classroom and says, “I’m paying people to do what you just did for your classroom project,” it is certainly a powerful moment.
This brings up an important problem for traditional methods of education—there are populations of students who are unlikely to go past high school given the current educational model. Lowering costs and increasing accessibility for higher education can help reach them, but if their only experience of high school involves failing classes and a revolving door in the teaching staff, they are unlikely to advance, either in school or at work. Students need to have a positive, engaging experience, and have someone from a post-secondary institution come in and explain that if they find school engaging, they’re likely to continue on to the next level.
- Interest-based education is not a serious method.Eventually, if learners are empowered, then a mastery-learning “ecosystem” will evolve.13 The ecosystem will offer mastery education to anyone at any time. It’s likely that grade-level distinctions for mastery will fade. A top-down, seat-time approach to educating students will cease to make sense in such an educational environment. Currently, most state educational standards are designed by experts in various fields with little concept of what students can accomplish. (Meet every stated requirement for high school graduation, and I will congratulate you on being the smartest person on the planet.) But with education available at all times, schools really should just teach two things: how to become interested in an academic subject and how to use the educational ecosystem to saturate that interest level.
Obviously, the state has a right and duty to enforce a basic level of educational proficiency on schools, but a traditional top-down educational model has simply not worked.14, 15 Students at all levels cheat the system either through a skim-and-scam method toward content material,16 or through outright cheating. A qualitative study completed way back in 1992 found that 67 percent of students at 31 college campuses self-reported having cheated on classwork and exams.17 This was all before ChatGPT and other Artificial Intelligence systems began being used by students to write essays.
Cheating is the most cynical act in which a student can engage because it shows they see no value at all in the actual content of education, but only in obtaining the necessary grade (“even a D will do”) and/or credential. Traditionally, this problem has been solved by a hodgepodge of educational assessments. College entrance administrators recognize that grades, where the standards vary widely from school to school and teacher to teacher, are not a very good indicator of a student’s abilities. To correct for this, the ACT , SAT, and Advanced Placement exams have been (until recently) adopted by local educational systems as a means of providing a nationalized standard of ability to master successfully further education.
†The College Board is an American not-for-profit organization that develops and administers standardized tests, such as the widely used SAT (originally the Scholastic Aptitude Test, then later the Scholastic Assessment Test) and the Graduate Record Exam (GRE), as well as curricula used by K–12 and post-secondary education institutions as part of the college admissions process. It also provides resources, tools, and services to students, parents, colleges, and universities for college planning, recruitment and admissions, financial aid, and retention.This creates an unnecessarily exhausting situation for students, teachers, and guidance counselors in high schools. Grades must be kept so that students can meet local graduation requirements, but because those grades are but a limited predictor of either present subject mastery or predicted future performance, the College Board† tests offer reliable and valid metrics. Students, for example, who take an AP course earn a grade in the class from the teacher/school, then also receive a score (1–5) on the AP exam. The grade does not affect the score nor the score the grade.
The decentralized nature of the system keeps credentialing power in the hands of administration. Placing that credentialing power in the hands of the learner, by means of micro-credentials accrued through blockchain in a digital transcript, would rapidly reshape the educational landscape.
The College Board has, in the past, provided an important function, but one that, I submit, is now obsolete for three reasons:
- The College Board has moved to unify its testing requirements across the AP classes, and the purpose of most of the classes now seems to be to teach students how to effectively meet the requirements of the College Board rubrics. Students taking the short answer questions on the AP history exams, for example, are exhorted to use a three-sentence Answer-Cite-Explain model. This is not necessarily the best means of showcasing an understanding of history, but it does make it easier to grade the exams through an assembly line approach.
- The College Board is invested in the idea of testing a student’s college potential. Testing students for potential was only necessary when colleges needed to winnow out the most likely to benefit from attending a college campus and learning from the small amount of information that could be transferred in a classroom/lecture hall over four years. When education is available to everyone at all times, it is useless to measure potential or aptitude.
- The College Board’s educational model has always been political, and legally unstable. The AP courses essentially set national curricula, and states have had to adopt their local standards and laws to allow for students to take AP courses. Controversies, particularly in history, become inevitable.18 It would seem impossible to get Americans, many of whom are more politically-charged (in whatever direction) than ever, to agree on a set of content standards for a U.S. history course.
An educational ecosystem could save American schools from curricular paralysis. Simply turn the questions over to the students, and then let them access the educational ecosystem to answer those questions. For example, students in a U.S. History course might be asked “What is the main narrative in United States history from 1877 to the present?” Students would need to answer the question with a central thesis but address three other points of view in the process. A student who stated that the African American experience is the main narrative would need to show a mastery of other perspectives and explain the primacy of the African American experience in their final work.
When people read because they are interested in the subject matter, they don’t cheat. They also don’t compete. This brings us to the final myth.
- The educational structure must be competitive.Please consider, for a moment, the absurdity of an educational system that implicitly tells teenagers that their entire future (for kids who might live another 75 years!) will be determined by how well they learn the volume of a cylinder formula, or by their ability to retain the definition of the word “catholic” before they turn 18. For most students and parents, the system is bewildering and frustrating. However, the worst thing about a competitive educational system is what it does to the people who succeed in it.
Ivy League professor William Deresiewicz noted that a competitive structure ultimately deprives students of the ability to be happy for another’s successes.19 This might sound menial, but if someone is jealous that another person has made a creative breakthrough, then it becomes impossible to build upon that breakthrough. How can someone become a genuinely creative thinker in that context?
Removing the winnowing function from education would create opportunities for cooperative education where students learn to converse rather than debate. Again, in an educational ecosystem no one is trying to “get in” anymore. You can access the ecosystem at any time. This is not to say that face-to-face learning will disappear or that brick-and-mortar universities will cease to exist.
One can imagine an educational structure where students learn and test to mastery and then receive a micro-credential that verifies their learning. Those micro-credentials would accrue in a centrally administered digital transcript, sometimes called an “achievement wallet.” Institutions might require that students earn their way onto campus (and thereby access to valuable face-to-face learning) by obtaining a certain specified set of micro-credentials. This would embed fairness into college admissions, drastically reduce administrative costs by eliminating the cumbersome and controversial admissions procedures, and ensure that students entered campus with the right knowledge.
The current system of “grading” students is not only useless for verifying the transaction of content and skills, it actively harms the educational process itself20 by distracting both teachers and students from instructing and learning.
$2 Million Is All It Took to Get the Ball RollingThis entire concept of a cooperative educational future, with mastery-learning micro-credentials, and a new definition of what it means to be a teacher might sound fantastic in both senses of the word. However, all of this technology already exists. Currently, however, decision-making power rests with an educational bureaucracy spread out across almost 14,000 K–12 school districts and nearly 4,000 colleges and universities. The decentralized nature of the system keeps credentialing power in the hands of administration. Placing that credentialing power in the hands of the learner, by means of micro-credentials accrued through blockchain in a digital transcript, would rapidly reshape the educational landscape.
Eventually, students will go to school for the purpose of learning how to become interested in subjects and how to navigate a Mastery-Learning Model. They will have to learn to deal with frustration, how to study independently, how to read at a deep level, and how to converse with other students about content.
Teachers and guidance counselors will no longer need to take grades or keep records. All of that will be done through the ecosystem, and students will prove mastery via testing. Teachers, then, could connect with their colleges and universities through new forms of professional development and be respected as knowledge producers and content masters. Guidance counselors, freed from record keeping and college admissions, could work to help students emotionally and intellectually navigate their actual learning process.
By implementing this vision, we can reduce pressure on the teen years. A student who hates math at 15 might develop an interest in math at 40. There’s nothing preventing it. If teenagers go through a trauma, or a growth spurt, or sometimes just feel paralyzed by “all the drama,” it would be possible to back off for a while, or to develop alternate means of education. (Many a fifteen-year-old boy might benefit from six months off from school to learn a trade, or just work, or see how professionals in an area in which they have an academic interest actually go about their day and earn a living). They could always come back later and pick up on their more traditional style of learning.
Still, this much change seems overwhelming, and educational change in the U.S. will, by law, have to happen on a state-by-state basis. After leaving the MIT campus in 2022, it made sense to me that a process of mastery learning should actually begin with in-service teachers. This makes sense because teachers are a population of adults who have constant contact with students. If the teachers understand how mastery learning and micro-credentialing work, they can gradually make students and parents understand.
At the start of the 2023 legislative session, Sanjay and I met with leadership in the Indiana Senate and House. As a result of these discussions, two million dollars was allocated, over the biennium, to develop education programs for in-service teachers. The money would be awarded in competitive grants to Indiana’s colleges and/or universities and the educational programs must focus on the study of content (History, English, STEM, etc.) and can have a workforce education component.21 Teachers can earn a micro-credential after completing a combination of online and in-person education that culminates with a Teacher Generated Curriculum ready for the classroom. Programs will be overseen by the Indiana Department of Education and the Indiana Commission for Higher Education.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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The state already had a contract with a vendor for “achievement wallets”22 and was looking to overhaul the high school experience by making new forms of work-based education, with new forms of credentials, possible. Why not issue every teacher in the state a digital transcript, and allow them to accrue micro-credentials for both extra pay and for license renewal?
Just like that, a new type of education program, with a new type of credential and a new kind of transcript were all encoded into law and overseen by centralized institutions. An experimental group of over 60,000 teachers now have access to a new form of affordable (indeed compensated, since teachers are paid to complete coursework) and accessible education largely devoid of messy bureaucracy. If the teachers become familiar with such an efficient system, how long before they, and then their students, and the parents of those students, start to demand it?
About the AuthorChris Edwards teaches World History, English, and Mathematics at a public high school in Indiana. He is a frequent contributor to Skeptic on a variety of topics and has had his original connectthe- dots teaching methodology published with the National Council for Social Studies. He is the author of numerous books, including the young adult STEM title All About the Moon Landing (Blue River Press, 2023), the fantasy novella The Strongman’s Tale (See Sharp Press, 2023), and Self-Taught: Moving from a Seat Time Model to a Mastery-Learning Model (Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2022) about educational reform.
References1. Yoeli, E., & Hoffman, M. (2022). Hidden Games: The Surprising Power of Game Theory to Explain Irrational Behavior. Basic Books. 2. Edwards, C. (2021). The Future of Higher Education: Reengineering Learning for a Post-Pandemic World. Skeptic (Vol. 26, No. 1). 3. https://rb.gy/sajwc 4. https://rb.gy/60i5n 5. https://rb.gy/sjmyw 6. Sarma, S. (2021). Grasp: The Science Transforming How We Learn. Anchor Books. 7. https://rb.gy/qg96g 8. https://rb.gy/8uyzn 9. https://rb.gy/i10mm 10. https://rb.gy/hs9df 11. https://rb.gy/9xrsc 12. Edwards, C. (2011). Three Cheers for Teachers: Educational Reform Should Come From Within the Classroom and Science Can Inform Our Reforms. Skeptic (Vol. 17, No.1). 13. https://rb.gy/9xrsc 14. Caplan, B.D. (2018). The Case Against Education: Why the Education System Is a Waste of Time and Money. Princeton University Press. 15. Arum, R., & Roska, J. (2011). Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses. The University of Chicago Press. 16. Carr, N.G. (2020). The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains. W.W. Norton & Company. 17. Williams, A.E. & Janosik, S.M. (2007, November). An Examination of Academic Dishonesty Among Sorority and Nonsorority Women. Journal of College Student Development, 48(6), 706–714. 18. https://rb.gy/nskn6 19. Deresiewicz, W. (2015). Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life. Free Press. 20. https://rb.gy/bb6ba 21. https://rb.gy/izx1l 22. https://rb.gy/q0dgs
During her sojourns among the Inuit throughout the 1960s and 70s, pioneering anthropologist Jean Briggs observed some peculiar parenting practices. In a chapter she contributed to The Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence, a collection of essays from 1994, Briggs describes various methods the Inuit used to reduce the risk of physical conflict among community members. Foremost among them was the deliberate cultivation of modesty and equanimity, along with a penchant for reframing disputes or annoyances as jokes. “An immodest person or one who liked attention,” Briggs writes, “was thought silly or childish.” Meanwhile, a critical distinction held sway between seriousness and playfulness. “To be ‘serious’ had connotations of tension, anxiety, hostility, brooding,” she explains. “On the other hand, it was highest praise to say of someone: ‘He never takes anything seriously’.”1 The ideal then was to be happy, jocular, and even-tempered.
This distaste for displays of anger applied in the realm of parenting as well. No matter how unruly children’s behavior, adults would refrain from yelling at them. So, it came as a surprise to Briggs that Inuit adults would often purposely instigate conflicts among the children in their charge. One exchange Briggs witnessed involved an aunt taking her three-year-old niece’s hand and putting it in another child’s hair while telling her to pull it. When the girl refused, the aunt gave it a tug herself. The other child, naturally enough, turned around and hit the one she thought had pulled her hair. A fight ensued, eliciting laughter and cheers from the other adults, who intervened before anyone was hurt. None of the other adults who witnessed this incident seemed to think the aunt had done anything wrong.
On another occasion, Briggs witnessed a mother picking up a friend’s baby and saying to her own nursling, “Shall I nurse him instead of you?” The other mother played along, offering her breast to the first woman’s baby, saying, “Do you want to nurse from me? Shall I be your mother?”2 The nursling shrieked in protest, and both mothers burst into laughter. Briggs witnessed countless more of what she calls “playful dramas” over the course of her research. Westerners might characterize what the adults were doing in these cases as immature, often cruel pranks, even criminal acts of child abuse. What Briggs came to understand, however, was that the dramas served an important function in the context of Inuit culture. Tellingly, the provocations didn’t always involve rough treatment or incitements to conflict but often took the form of outrageous or disturbing lines of questioning. This approach is reflected in the title of Briggs’s chapter, “‘Why Don’t You Kill Your Baby Brother?’ The Dynamics of Peace in Canadian Inuit Camps.” However, even these gentler sessions were more interrogation than thought experiment, the clear goal being to arouse intense emotions in the children.
From interviews with adults in the communities hosting her, Briggs gleaned that the purpose of these dramas was to force children to learn how to handle difficult social situations. The term they used is isumaqsayuq, meaning “to cause thought,” which Briggs notes is a “central idea of Inuit socialization.” “More than that,” she goes on, “and as an integral part of thought, the dramas stimulate emotion.” The capacity for clear thinking in tense situations—and for not taking the tension too seriously—would help the children avoid potentially dangerous confrontations. Briggs writes:
The games were, themselves, models of conflict management through play. And when children learned to recognize the playful in particular dramas, people stopped playing those games with them. They stopped tormenting them. The children had learned to keep their own relationships smoother—to keep out of trouble, so to speak— and in doing so, they had learned to do their part in smoothing the relationships of others.3
The parents, in other words, were training the children, using simulated and age-calibrated dilemmas, to develop exactly the kind of equanimity and joking attitude they would need to mature into successful adults capable of maintaining a mostly peaceful society. They were prodding at the kids’ known sensitivities to teach them not to take themselves too seriously, because taking yourself too seriously makes you apt to take offense, and offense can often lead to violence.
Are censors justified in their efforts at protecting children from the wrong types of lessons?
The Inuit’s aversion to being at the center of any drama and their penchant for playfulness in potentially tense encounters are far removed from our own culture. Rather their approach to socialization relies on an insight that applies universally, one that’s frequently paid lip service in the West but even more frequently lost sight of. Anthropologist Margaret Mead captures the idea in her 1928 ethnography Coming of Age in Samoa, writing, “The children must be taught how to think, not what to think.”4 People fond of spouting this truism today usually intend to communicate something diametrically opposite to its actual meaning, with the suggestion being that anyone who accepts rival conclusions must have been duped by unscrupulous teachers. However, the crux of the insight is that education should not focus on conclusions at all. Thinking is not about memorizing and being able to recite facts and propositions. Thinking is a process. It relies on knowledge to be sure, but knowledge alone isn’t sufficient. It also requires skills.
Cognitive psychologists label knowing that and knowing how as declarative and procedural knowledge, respectively.5 Declarative knowledge can be imparted by the more knowledgeable to the less knowledgeable—the earth orbits the sun—but to develop procedural knowledge or skills you need practice. No matter how precisely you explain to someone what goes into riding a bike, for instance, that person has no chance of developing the requisite skills without at some point climbing on and pedaling. Skills require training, which to be effective must incorporate repetition and feedback.
What the Inuit understood, perhaps better than most other cultures, is that morality plays out far less in the realm of knowing what than in the realm of knowing how. The adults could simply lecture the children about the evils of getting embroiled in drama, but those children would still need to learn how to manage their own aggressive and retributive impulses. And explaining that the most effective method consists of reframing slights as jokes is fine, but no child can be expected to master the trick on first attempt. So it is with any moral proposition. We tell young children it’s good to share, for instance, but how easy is it for them to overcome their greedy impulses? And what happens when one moral precept runs up against another? It’s good to share a toy sword, but should you hand it over to someone you suspect may use it to hurt another child? Adults face moral dilemmas like this all the time. It’s wrong to cheat on your spouse, but what if your spouse is controlling and threatens to take your children if you file for divorce? It’s good to be honest, but should you lie to protect a friend? There’s no simple formula that applies to the entire panoply of moral dilemmas, and even if there were, it would demand herculean discipline to implement.
Unfortunately, Western children have a limited range of activities that provide them opportunities to develop their moral skillsets. Perhaps it’s testament to the strength of our identification with our own moral principles that few of us can abide approaches to moral education that are in any regard open-ended. Consider children’s literature. As I write, political conservatives in the U.S. are working to impose bans on books6 they deem inappropriate for school children. Meanwhile, more left-leaning citizens are being treated to PC bowdlerizations7 of a disconcertingly growing8 list of classic books. One side is worried about kids being indoctrinated with life-deranging notions about race and gender. The other is worried about wounding kids’ and older readers’ fragile psyches with words and phrases connoting the inferiority of some individual or group. What neither side appreciates is that stories can’t be reduced to a set of moral propositions, and that what children are taught is of far less consequence than what they practice.
Do children’s books really have anything in common with the playful dramas Briggs observed among the Inuit? What about the fictional stories adults in our culture enjoy? One obvious point of similarity is that stories tend to focus on conflict and feature high-stakes moral dilemmas. The main difference is that reading or watching a story entails passively witnessing the actions of others, as opposed to actively participating in the plots. Nonetheless, the principle of isumaqsayuq comes into play as we immerse ourselves in a good novel or movie. Stories, if they’re at all engaging, cause us to think. They also arouse intense emotions. But what could children and adults possibly be practicing when they read or watch stories? If audiences were simply trying to figure out how to work through the dilemmas faced by the protagonists, wouldn’t the outcome contrived by the author represent some kind of verdict, some kind of lesson? In that case, wouldn’t censors be justified in their efforts at protecting children from the wrong types of lessons?
To answer these questions, we must consider why humans are so readily held rapt by fictional narratives in the first place. If the events we’re witnessing aren’t real, why do we care enough to devote time and mental resources to them? The most popular stories, at least in Western societies, feature characters we favor engaging in some sort of struggle against characters we dislike—good guys versus bad guys. In his book Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, psychologist Paul Bloom describes a series of experiments9 he conducted with his colleague Karen Wynn, along with their then graduate student Kiley Hamlin. They used what he calls “morality plays” to explore the moral development of infants. In one experiment, the researchers had the babies watch a simple puppet show in which a tiger rolls a ball to one rabbit and then to another. The first rabbit rolls the ball back to the tiger and a game ensues. But the second rabbit steals away with the ball at first opportunity. When later presented with both puppets and encouraged to reach for one to play with, the babies who had witnessed the exchanges showed a strong preference for the one who had played along. What this and several related studies show is that by as early as three months of age, infants start to prefer characters who are helpful and cooperative over those who are selfish and exploitative.
That such a preference would develop so early and so reliably in humans makes a good deal of sense in light of how deeply dependent each individual is on other members of society. Throughout evolutionary history, humans have had to cooperate to survive, but any proclivity toward cooperation left them vulnerable to exploitation. This gets us closer to the question of what we’re practicing when we enjoy fiction. In On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction, literary scholar Brian Boyd points out that animals’ play tends to focus on activities that help them develop the skills they’ll need to survive, typically involving behaviors like chasing, fleeing, and fighting. When it comes to what skills are most important for humans to acquire, Boyd explains:
Even more than other social species, we depend on information about others’ capacities, dispositions, intentions, actions, and reactions. Such “strategic information” catches our attention so forcefully that fiction can hold our interest, unlike almost anything else, for hours at a stretch.10
Fiction, then, can be viewed as a type of imaginative play that activates many of the same evolved cognitive mechanisms as gossip, but without any real-world stakes. This means that when we’re consuming fiction, we’re not necessarily practicing to develop equanimity in stressful circumstances as do the Inuit; we’re rather honing our skills at assessing people’s proclivities and weighing their potential contributions to our group. Stories, in other words, activate our instinct, while helping us to develop the underlying skillset, for monitoring people for signals of selfish or altruistic tendencies. The result of this type of play would be an increased capacity for cooperation, including an improved ability to recognize and sanction individuals who take advantage of cooperative norms without contributing their fair share.
Ethnographic research into this theory of storytelling is still in its infancy, but the anthropologist Daniel Smith and his colleagues have conducted an intensive study11 of the role of stories among the Agta, a hunter-gatherer population in the Philippines. They found that 70 percent of the Agta stories they collected feature characters who face some type of social dilemma or moral decision, a theme that appears roughly twice as often as interactions with nature, the next most common topic. It turned out, though, that separate groups of Agta invested varying levels of time and energy in storytelling. The researchers saw this as an opportunity to see what the impact of a greater commitment to stories might be. In line with the evolutionary account laid out by Boyd and others, the groups that valued storytelling more outperformed the other groups in economic games that demand cooperation among the players. This would mean that storytelling improves group cohesion and coordination, which would likely provide a major advantage in any competition with rival groups. A third important finding from this study is that the people in these groups knew who the best storytellers were, and they preferred to work with these talented individuals on cooperative endeavors, including marriage and childrearing. This has obvious evolutionary implications.
What do children learn from parents’ concern that single words may harm or corrupt them?
Remarkably, the same dynamics at play in so many Agta tales are also prominent in classic Western literature. When literary scholar Joseph Carroll and his team surveyed thousands of readers’ responses to characters in 200 novels from authors like Jane Austen and Charles Dickens, they found that people see in them the basic dichotomy between altruists and selfish actors. They write:
Antagonists virtually personify Social Dominance—the self-interested pursuit of wealth, prestige, and power. In these novels, those ambitions are sharply segregated from prosocial and culturally acquisitive dispositions. Antagonists are not only selfish and unfriendly but also undisciplined, emotionally unstable, and intellectually dull. Protagonists, in contrast, display motive dispositions and personality traits that exemplify strong personal development and healthy social adjustment. They are agreeable, conscientious, emotionally stable, and open to experience.12
Interestingly, openness to experience may be only loosely connected to cooperativeness and altruism, just as humor is only tangentially related to peacefulness among the Inuit. However, being curious and open-minded ought to open the door to the appreciation of myriad forms of art, including different types of literature, leading to a virtuous cycle. So, the evolutionary theory, while focusing on cooperation, leaves ample room for other themes, depending on the cultural values of the storytellers.
In a narrow sense then, cooperation is what many, perhaps most, stories are about, and our interest in them depends to some degree on our attraction to more cooperative, less selfish, individuals. We obsessively track the behavior of our fellow humans because our choices of who to trust and who to team up with are some of the most consequential in our lives. This monitoring compulsion is so powerful that it can be triggered by opportunities to observe key elements of people’s behavior—what they do when they don’t know they’re being watched—even when those people don’t exist in the real world. But what keeps us reading or watching once we’ve made our choices of which characters to root for? And, if one of the functions of stories is to help us improve our social abilities, what mechanism provides the feedback necessary for such training to be effective?
In Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic Punishment, and Other Biological Components of Fiction, literary scholar William Flesch theorizes that our moment-by-moment absorption in fictional plots can be attributed to our desire to see cooperators rewarded and exploiters punished. Citing experiments that showed participants were willing to punish people they had observed cheating other participants—even when the punishment came at a cost13 to the punishers— Flesch argues that stories offer us opportunities to demonstrate our own impulse to enforce norms of fair play. Within groups, individual members will naturally return tit for tat when they’ve been mistreated. For a norm of mutual trust to take hold, however, uninvolved third parties must also be willing to step in to sanction violators. Flesch calls these third-party players “strong reciprocators” because they respond to actions that aren’t directed at them personally. He explains that
the strong reciprocator punishes or rewards others for their behavior toward any member of the social group, and not just or primarily for their individual interactions with the reciprocator.14
His insight here is that we don’t merely attend to people’s behavior in search of clues to their disposition. We also watch to make sure good and bad alike get their just deserts. And the fact that we can’t interfere in the unfolding of a fictional plot doesn’t prevent us from feeling that we should. Sitting on the edge of your seat, according to this theory, is evidence of your readiness to step in.
Another key insight emerging from Flesch’s work is that humans don’t merely monitor each other’s behavior. Rather, since they know others are constantly monitoring them, they also make a point of signaling that they possess desired traits, including a disposition toward enforcing cooperative norms. Here we have another clue to why we care about fictional characters and their fates. It doesn’t matter that a story is fictional if a central reason for liking it is to signal to others that we’re the type of person who likes the type of person portrayed in that story. Reading tends to be a solitary endeavor, but the meaning of a given story paradoxically depends in large part on the social context in which it’s discussed. We can develop one-on-one relationships with fictional characters for sure, but part of the enjoyment we get from these relationships comes from sharing our enthusiasm and admiration with nonfictional others.
This brings us back to the question of where feedback comes into the social training we get from fiction. One feedback mechanism relies on the comprehensibility and plausibility of the plot. If a character’s behavior strikes us as arbitrary or counter to their personality as we’ve assessed it, then we’re forced to think back and reassess our initial impressions—or else dismiss the story as poorly conceived. A character’s personality offers us a chance to make predictions, and the plot either confirms or disproves them. However, Flesch’s work points to another type of feedback that’s just as important. The children at the center of Inuit playful dramas receive feedback from the adults in the form of laughter and mockery. They learn that if they take the dramas too seriously and thus get agitated, then they can expect to be ridiculed. Likewise, when we read or watch fiction, we gauge other audience members’ reactions, including their reactions to our own reactions, to see if those responses correspond with the image of ourselves we want to project. In other words, we can try on traits and aspects of an identity by expressing our passion for fictional characters who embody them. The outcome of such experimentation isn’t determined solely by how well the identity suits the individual fan, but also by how well that identity fits within the wider social group.
Parents worried that their children’s minds are being hijacked by ideologues will hardly be comforted by the suggestion that teachers and peers mitigate the impact of any book they read. Nor will those worried that their children are being inculcated with more or less subtle forms of bigotry find much reassurance in the idea that we’re given to modeling15 our own behavior on that of the fictional characters we admire. Consider, however, the feedback children receive from parents who respond to the mere presence of a book in a school library with outrage. What do children learn from parents’ concern that single words may harm or corrupt them?
Today, against a backdrop of increasing vigilance and protectiveness among parents, kids are graduating high school and moving on to college or the workforce with historically unprecedented rates of depression16 and anxiety,17 having had far fewer risky but rewarding experiences18 such as dating, drinking alcohol, getting a driver’s license, and working for pay. It’s almost as though the parents who should be helping kids learn to work through difficult situations by adopting a playful attitude have themselves become so paranoid and humorless that the only lesson they manage to impart is that the world is a dangerous place, one young adults with their fragile psyches can’t be trusted to navigate on their own.
Parents should, however, take some comfort from the discovery that even pre-verbal infants are able to pick out the good guys from the bad. As much as young Harry Potter fans discuss which Hogwarts House the Sorting Hat would place them in, you don’t hear19 many of them talking enthusiastically about how cool it was when Voldemort killed all those filthy Muggles. The other thing to keep in mind is that while some students may embrace the themes of a book just because the teacher assigned it, others will reject them for the same reason. It depends on the temperament of the child and the social group they hope to achieve status in.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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Should parents let their kids read just anything? We must acknowledge that books, like playful dramas, need to be calibrated to the maturity levels of the readers. However, banning books deemed dangerous deprives children not only of a new perspective. It deprives them of an opportunity to train themselves for the difficulties they’ll face in the upcoming stages of their lives. If you’re worried your child might take the wrong message from a story, you can make sure you’re around to provide some of your own feedback on their responses. Maybe you could even introduce other books to them with themes you find more congenial. Should we censor words or images—or cease publication of entire books—that denigrate individuals or groups? Only if we believe children will grow up in a world without denigration. Do you want your children’s first encounter with life’s ugliness to occur in the wild, as it were, or as they sit next to you with a book spread over your laps?
What should we do with great works by authors guilty of terrible acts? What about mostly good characters who sometimes behave badly? What happens when the bad guy starts to seem a little too cool? These are all great prompts for causing thought and arousing emotions. Why would we want to take these training opportunities away from our kids? It’s undeniable that books and teachers and fellow students and, yes, even parents themselves really do influence children to some degree. That influence, however, may not always be in the intended direction. Parents who devote more time and attention to their children’s socialization can probably improve their chances of achieving desirable ends. However, it’s also true that the most predictable result of any effort at exerting complete control over children’s moral education is that their social development will be stunted.
About the AuthorDennis J. Junk holds degrees in anthropology and psychology and a Masters in British and American literature. His first book is He Borara: a Novel about an Anthropologist among the Yąnomamö.
References1. https://rb.gy/hjcpn 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Mead, M. (1928). Coming of Age in Samoa. William Morrow and Co. 5. https://rb.gy/i7a0h 6. https://rb.gy/sx5oh 7. https://rb.gy/wq45k 8. https://rb.gy/6vi33 9. https://rb.gy/6w2nt 10. Boyd, B. (2010). On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction. Belknap Press. 11. https://rb.gy/n3sxn 12. Carroll, J., Gottschall, J., Johnson, J.A., & Kruger, D. (2012). Graphing Jane Austen: The Evolutionary Basis of Literary Meaning. Palgrave Macmillan. 13. https://rb.gy/1az75 14. Flesch, W. (2008). Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic Punishment, and Other Biological Components of Fiction. Harvard University Press. 15. https://rb.gy/dw9gt 16. https://rb.gy/jgaf2 17. https://rb.gy/c3gs4 18. https://rb.gy/hejk8 19. Vezalli, L., Stathi, S., Giovannini, D., Cappoza, D. & Trifiletti, E. (2014). The Greatest Magic of Harry Potter: Reducing Prejudice. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 45(2), 105–121.
“And why do you look at the speck in your brother’s eye, but do not consider the plank in your own eye?” —MATTHEW 7:3
“The greatest of faults, I should say, is to be conscious of none.” —THOMAS CARLYLE, HISTORIAN & ESSAYIST
Schools, from kindergarten to graduate programs, are always ground zero in any culture war. Ban their books! Fire their teachers! Extremists from both the right and the left share this censorious impulse to protect their children from dangerous ideas—dangerous ideas being defined as anything on which people disagree, usually sex, race, gender, sex, history, religion, prejudice, and did I say sex? They deliver propaganda. We tell the truth. They indoctrinate our children. We educate them.
Let’s stipulate that everyone is biased. The brain comes packaged with a bunch of self-serving mechanisms (the confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and so on) that allow us to justify our own perceptions and beliefs as being accurate, realistic, and wise. My favorite bias is the bias that we are unbiased. Social psychologist Lee Ross named this phenomenon “naive realism,” the conviction that we perceive objects and events clearly, “as they really are,” so anyone who disagrees with us is not seeing clearly.
Science, which might be defined as the systematic effort to force us to see clearly especially when we are wrong, is always under attack from those who cannot tolerate the mere existence of dissonant views. Today, however, the venom of polarizing ideologies has been poisoning the process more than ever. How true, but now how quaint, seems the sublime observation by Richard Feynman to students in his 1964 class at Cornell University:
If your guess disagrees with experiment, it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It doesn’t make any difference how beautiful your guess is, how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is. If it disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong. That’s all there is to it.
We read that now and shake our heads, knowing how so many people, including scientists and scholars who should know better, respond when an experiment disputes a belief: “Your guess is racist/sexist/socialist/other-ist, simply because you tried to test the veracity of something we already know is true.” “The experiment is wrong, because it is impossible for my guess to be wrong, because I’m right.” “The experiment is biased.” “Your interpretation is biased.” “You are biased. You are racist and reactionary.” “No, you are biased. You are a communist and a socialist to boot.” “Plus, your ideas are revolting.”
I got to thinking about the problem of bias in my own profession when I was sent a copy of Ideological and Political Bias in Psychology (edited by Craig Frisby, Richard Redding, William O’Donohue, and the late, much admired Scott Lilienfeld). This massive collection—33 chapters running some 950 pages—is a scholarly effort to describe the academic and intellectual harms to psychological science, academia, and society when the vast majority of its practitioners identify themselves as liberal to progressive.1 I fully agree, which is why I find it unfortunate that the title blurs “ideological and political.” I, along with many (most?) politically liberal psychologists of my generation, am as horrified and dismayed by the left-wing ideological changes imposed throughout academia as any conservative is—just as many politically conservative people are horrified and dismayed by the rise of ideologically driven right-wing extremists.2
Both extremes are currently doing great damage to our society. Nevertheless, the rise of today’s Ideological Left is indisputably a major factor underlying the uncritical acceptance of Critical Race Theory, hiring requirements stipulating that applicants have done enough for “diversity,” and (failed) efforts to change prejudices, “implicit biases,” and “microaggressions,” real and assumed, through censorship of dissenting views and mandatory sensitivity (re-education) workshops. It’s now the Ideological Left that, waving the banner of justice and diversity for all except those who disagree with them, has put entire areas of investigation virtually off limits, and caused countless brilliant scientists to be excoriated, shunned, or suspended for taking on taboo subjects or questioning current orthodox beliefs. The eminent gender scientist J. Michael Bailey has a chapter in the Frisby volume, describing how he has been attacked from the right for his work on sexual orientation and from the left for his research on trans issues, daring to dispute the inaccurate—dare I say biased—claims of trans activists. Recently, under pressure from such activists, The Archives of Sexual Behavior caved, retracting a paper he co-authored with Suzanna Diaz on Rapid Onset Gender Dysphoria.3
The most taboo topics are genetic, evolutionary, or other biological explanations of behavior and group differences. Evolutionary biologists Jerry Coyne and Luana Maroja have written despairingly of the ideological capture of their profession.4 I filed their superb lament under “read this and weep,” remembering how, in the 1970s, feminist psychologists fought hard against the way biological explanations were being applied in the justification of inequality and misogyny. Who imagined that from there it would be only a short step from correcting a bias in research to imposing new biases—not letting biology raise its nose, or paw, in explaining anything. At the time, research was also profoundly biased by focusing on the “normal” male, with findings often wildly and inappropriately generalized to women; Robert Guthrie’s splendid book, Even the Rat Was White, identified deeply embedded biases in the study of race. (One colleague, noting that rats are nocturnal but researchers study them in daytime, said, “actually, psychology is the study of the white male sleepy rat.” Psychology had plenty of biases to correct.)
Thus, the scientific fight against bias and dogma is never ending, and the ideological wheel is always turning. The New School for Social Research was founded in New York City in 1919 as an act of protest against university presidents who had fired pacifist professors for opposing America’s decision to enter the First World War; nearly a hundred years later, in 2015, the Heterodox Academy was founded “as a response to the rise of [progressive Left] orthodoxy within scholarly culture that leads people to fear shame, ostracism, or any other form of social or professional retaliation for questioning or challenging a commonly held idea.” In previous eras universities were perfectly willing to silence or eject liberal faculty and students who protested the Vietnam War or wouldn’t sign loyalty oaths in the heyday of anticommunist fervor. Nor have Conservative Christian colleges welcomed liberals and atheists with open arms or allowed them unlimited free speech.
In every era too, there have been the ideologically committed academics and practitioners who try to kill the messengers of news that threatens their beliefs and, more important, their livelihoods. In the late 1990s, when psychiatrists and psychotherapists were being convicted of malpractice for their use of coercive methods to generate false recovered memories and multiple personalities, one recovered-memory practitioner offered his clinical colleagues at a convention this advice:
I think it’s time somebody called for an open season on academicians and researchers…in particular, things have become so extreme with academics supporting extreme false memory positions, so I think it’s time for clinicians to begin bringing ethics charges for scientific malpractice against researchers, and journal editors— most of whom, I would point out, don’t have malpractice coverage.
Some psychiatrists and clinical psychologists took his counsel and sent harassing letters to researchers and journal editors, made spurious claims of ethics violations against scientists studying memory and children’s testimony, and filed nuisance lawsuits aimed at blocking publication of critical articles and books. None of these pre-internet efforts were successful at silencing the memory scientists, but they paid a big price for their courage in anger, frustration, and considerable expense.5
Perhaps, then, instead of talking about a liberal-conservative bias in education, we should be thinking about liberal-conservative biases and orthodoxies by topic. The bias that is most relevant today is what Keith Stanovich, that stalwart promoter of critical thinking, calls the “myside bias,” which lives in the intersection of confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance. In 2021, when the din echoing across the political chasm was at it loudest, he published The Bias That Divides Us, arguing that we don’t live in a post-truth society so much as a “myside” society.6 Each side is perfectly able to value the truth and respect the facts, he argues, but only insofar as those facts confirm what their side believes on a particular subject. “Intelligence does not inoculate against it,” Stanovich noted, “and myside bias in one domain is not a good indicator of bias shown in any other domain.”
For example, as other researchers have found, among conservatives, higher levels of scientific literacy and education are associated with reduced acceptance of climate change, the importance of vaccination, and trust in science; among liberals, the reverse is true.7 But whereas most liberals accept the scientific evidence that supports climate change and vaccination, many—to pull up a random example from myownside—do not accept the evidence that questions the safety and necessity of “gender affirming” medical interventions on young teenagers. As people trek step by step into the territory of ideology, their views tend to become increasingly impervious to data. Indeed, Stanovich finds, as did Elliot Aronson and I in our book on cognitive dissonance, that bias and other cognitive blind spots are especially prevalent among the most intelligent and highly educated members of society, precisely because they see themselves as being smarter and less vulnerable to bias. Yale-educated Ted Cruz, anyone? Harvard-educated Robert F. Kennedy Jr., anyone? The Supreme Court, anyone? Accepting lavish gifts and trips from mega-billionaires doesn’t affect their decisions, or does it?
What is new about the latest turn of the ideological wheel in universities and many organizations is the institutionalization of rules, language, and policies that permit, indeed require, the exclusion of those who dissent from the new progressive orthodoxy. What is new is the immediate availability of an army of authoritarian activists who mobilize at the drop of a tweet to get scientific articles retracted from once-serious journals and their editors fired. What is new is that too often, the journals capitulate. What is new is that universities and scientific institutions have stopped being the grown-ups, fearful for their wallets if they say no to organized social media pressure.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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But some of the problems across academia today stem from generational and economic changes that have nothing to do with liberal bias. For example, the seeds of “safetyism,” students demanding intellectual and emotional protection from any dangerous ideas they might encounter in college—otherwise known as “education”—were planted decades ago by a generation of fearful, overprotective parents who controlled every aspect of their children’s lives, as Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt describe so well in The Coddling of the American Mind.8 Colleges responded with a return to in loco parentis policies, since students and parents insisted on them. At the same time, the corporatization of universities had transformed students into paying consumers, with the ensuing need for administrations to yield to their “demands” for everything from safety to higher grades to the power to censor unwelcome speakers. (Another turn of the wheel: my college cohort had lots of demands too, from getting the U.S. out of Vietnam to letting boys into our rooms. We marched with signs that said “in loco parentis is loco” and “the Open- Door policy failed in China, too.”)
So my modest proposal is that we focus our energies issue by issue, domain by domain, ever aware of our own myside biases, and to hell with labels. I will always be liberal in supporting child labor laws, abortion on demand, expanded access to voting, and many other issues. But I resigned from the ACLU years ago for its failure to support teachers who were being fired for espousing dissenting ideas and for defending those who would fire them on “social justice” grounds. I will protest where I can the once-“liberal” organizations that fail to defend free speech and civil rights, including women’s rights. To change the currently entrenched ideological culture on most college campuses and a growing number of mainstream institutions, we will need the best efforts of liberals and conservatives alike, and damn the dissonance that will ensue.
About the AuthorCarol Tavris is a social psychologist and writer on many topics in psychological science. Her books include Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), with Elliot Aronson; Estrogen Matters; and The Mismeasure of Woman. A Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, she has received numerous awards for her efforts to promote science, skepticism, critical thinking, and gender equity.
References1. Frisby, C., et al. (Eds.). (2023). Political Bias in Psychology. Springer. 2. https://rb.gy/4mojn 3. https://rb.gy/xlstj 4. https://rb.gy/dn137 5. Tavris, C., & Aronson, E. (2020). Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me) (3rd ed.). Mariner. 6. Stanovich, K. (2021). The Bias That Divides Us. MIT Press. 7. https://rb.gy/2dd34 8. Lukianoff, G., and Haidt, J. (2018). The Coddling of the American Mind. Penguin Books.
“Hoover’s strengths lay not in any great instinct for media manipulation or press management, but in the areas that had always served him well: the ability to learn quickly, to adapt to new situations, and to deliver what he believed his bosses wanted.” (G-Man, 168)
“The Bureau was on the side of law and order, that is, God’s side… Breaking the law was permissible, as long as it was for the greater glory of God.” (Gospel, 58)
Skepticism involves doing the hard work of both acknowledging thought distortions and researching more nuanced explanations based on additional data. Studying the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is, perhaps surprisingly, relevant to skepticism, partly because of the Burueau’s involvement in controversial claims. G-Man offers new evidence about how the FBI skirted the limits of the law in its investigations, and that there was a real conspiracy to cover up any evidence of this in the first days after Hoover died. Given the FBI’s controversial involvement in national politics, both books are well-timed as once-classified documents are released and make headlines.
John Edgar Hoover was instrumental in the formation of the FBI as we know it today. The agency was less than a decade old when Hoover was hired in 1917, and he became Director just seven years later at the remarkably young age of 29, a position he held until his death in 1972. The FBI gained its current name (and the ability of agents to carry guns) battling gangsters in the 1930s, which launched Hoover and the Bureau into the headlines. The FBI became even more respected as the country’s defender against espionage. The Bureau’s response to the Civil Rights movement generated some controversy and divided opinion, and Hoover died days before the Watergate Hotel break-in that would ultimately lead to the fiercest criticism of the Bureau since before Hoover’s directorship.
The length of Hoover’s reign is often attributed to “politely delivered” blackmail, but Gage persuasively argues that Hoover’s longevity as Director had more to do with the FBI’s exemption from Civil Service hiring rules for agents, his underappreciated genius as a bureaucrat, and a few strokes of random chance that went in his favor.
Gage, a historian at Yale, uncovered the unredacted version of the anonymous letter that the FBI wrote to Martin Luther King Jr., urging him to commit suicide, truth being stranger than fiction. However, social norms change, and this is part of Gage’s thesis in G-Man: instances of Hoover’s antisemitism, racism, and sexism were, in fact, reflective of the mainstream a century ago; he mirrored most of the society in which he lived. Perhaps not coincidentally, when Hoover went to law school, civil liberties theory barely existed, having been birthed largely out of the events of World War I. Despite finding other evidence as to Hoover’s racism, Gage documents that Hoover opposed the race-based mass internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Although Hoover has been praised for most of his early reforms professionalizing FBI policy and practice, he also fired most Jewish employees and Black agents when he became the Director. When later criticized for having so few African American agents, he inflated their numbers by having his Black chauffeur go through the motions of becoming an agent, though his only assignment remained that of driving the Director. The FBI did not have any Black men working as Special Agents until 1962.
Also part of Gage’s thesis is that Hoover’s FBI was more central to mid-20th century America—and to the rise of conservatism—than has previously been understood. This begins with Hoover’s underappreciated early career role as the underling in charge of the post-World War I Palmer Raids (named for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer) on American radicals. It continues with Hoover’s Depression-era moralism, his difficulty distinguishing action from speech in spy hunts of World War II and the early Cold War, and culminates with Hoover’s increasingly outspoken views on religion and the Bureau’s interference with the 1960s Civil Rights movement.
G-Man’s narrative of biography and discussion of the FBI is seamlessly interwoven. While this is partly due to Gage’s considerable ability as a writer, the task is made easier because of the unusually high degree of overlap between them. The Bureau was Hoover’s full-time job for his entire adult life, and the author provides new evidence that most of Hoover’s off-hours socializing were spent with other FBI agents, partially in groups he created as Director. Gage even discovered that Hoover’s college fraternity was his preferred source from which to hire, including for FBI leadership positions. During his tenure, the FBI’s responsibilities and staff both exploded, which gave him an outsized influence on the development of bureau culture.
Much of G-Man’s history is based on applying existing scholarship to the study of the FBI, and Gage is masterful in her ability to cover a vast number of topics concisely without slowing the narrative, while also being able to underscore important points without ever seeming repetitive. G-Man is that rare gem of a book that can be enjoyed by the novice while also being appreciated by the scholar.
For example, while Gage makes a strong case that Hoover’s near half-century as FBI Director was due to his skill at both the job and at navigating political bureaucracy, his relationship with President Kennedy may be an exception: although Gage denies that Hoover blackmailed the President into unexpectedly keeping him on as Director, she does provide evidence for the plausibility of blackmail in this case. Ironically, Hoover’s reputation might be better if he had stepped down then: his approach to organized crime conflicted with that of Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, the President’s brother and Hoover’s boss. Although Gage states that Hoover lied to the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy’s assassination, she makes clear that he only did so to save the FBI from embarrassment, and that Hoover strongly believed in Oswald’s guilt as the lone assassin.
One of the secondary sources used by Gage is R. Jeffreys-Jones’s The FBI: A History. It forms a solid complement to Gage’s book, filling in the history of the FBI before and after Hoover. Similarly, Gage’s discussion of Hoover’s sexuality brought to mind D.M. Charles’s book Hoover’s War on Gays. Gage offers new evidence that Hoover was gay, which is relevant, even for an academic historian, for two reasons. First is the probable hypocrisy of the FBI’s “Sex Deviates” program and the FBI’s central role in the anti-gay “Lavender scare” of the early Cold War. More interesting, perhaps, is Gage’s documentation that in the inner circle of the Washington DC social world, his same-sex partnership was more accepted in the 1930s than in the 1950s, and a reminder that historical change is not entirely unidirectional. Hoover’s dual stance on homosexuality illustrates another theme that Gage’s research highlights—Hoover succeeded by adapting when it was necessary to further his career.
Hoover’s imposing his (at least professed) morals on the FBI, which amplified the acceptance of that Manichean view on the whole country, is just one of many themes of G-Man. In contrast, The Gospel According to J. Edgar Hoover places that issue front and center.
Both authors agree that only family circumstances prevented Hoover from choosing the ministry as his career, but his Pastor claimed that he imparted Christian values to the Bureau. Hoover opposed the imposition of Christianity as a state religion, but consistently said, publicly and privately, that “godlessness” was the country’s greatest threat.
As Director, Hoover could enforce these beliefs on the Bureau. In the 1930s, he instituted an annual Catholic spiritual retreat for agents, regardless of their religious belief, which Martin suggests was promoted so heavily in the bureau that it felt mandatory, to the point where lack of attendance could damage an agent’s career. For religious balance, as well as a chance to proselytize to non-agent employees, “The FBI initiated an annual Mass and Communion Breakfast in 1950,” eventually subsidizing it so that lower-salaried employees could not use its cost as an excuse not to attend. Martin supports all of this with primary source documents and first-person interviews. Black FBI agents were prohibited from attending the annual Catholic spiritual retreat. When the annual prayer breakfast and mass were so successful that agents organized a more frequent semi-official group attendance at a Protestant Vesper service, the church chosen was said to be the most racist one in the region.
From 1960 until his death, Hoover wrote essays for the magazine Christianity Today, which were so popular that, in one year, requests for reprints exceeded the circulation of the magazine. They were available, at taxpayers’ expense, from the FBI.
Hoover may have overstepped when, upon being enraged by the new Revised Standard Version of the Bible, he ordered the FBI to open an official investigation of it in January 1953. All of Hoover’s pro-Christian work did not go unnoticed among the religious. Although Presbyterian, many Americans believed he was Catholic, since he publicly praised that denomination and spoke before Catholic groups so frequently. He was publicly lauded by Christian organizations of many types, including The Chicago Bible Society, the National Religious Broadcasters, the Jesuits, the Pentecostals, and the Billy Graham Evangelical Association.
Unlike Gage, Martin extends his analysis beyond Hoover’s death, noting that as of 2021, only four percent of Bureau agents were Black, despite repeated lawsuits. He mentions that a woman who was the FBI’s Personnel Director in the early 2000s believed that evangelicals were the best group from which to hire. More recently, the FBI has been criticized for monitoring Muslim or Black extremists far more closely than racist White extremists.
At the least, the FBI has had a history of discriminating against any would-be employee who is not a conservative White Christian man, with conformity necessary for acceptance within the Bureau. Potentially more dangerous is the message, often implied and sometimes stated outright, that when laws and conservative Christian values are in conflict, conservative Christian morals must prevail.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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Both books have minor faults. When Gage cites books solely by author, it is important that they be listed in the bibliography. The one by Jeffrey Stone isn’t. I was expecting more historical context in Martin’s Gospel of J. Edgar Hoover, which is closer to being a monograph than a narrative, and what context he does give is more theological than historical. Martin does not provide a significant discussion of White Christian conservatism outside of the FBI, which I view as a missed opportunity.
Gage’s book places the FBI as a shaper as much as a reflector of U.S. values. Martin underscores that for the FBI, the value of law and order is seen as embedded in a dangerous overlap of racism and a Christian belief in the goodness of God. Gage documents in greater detail than Martin how Hoover absorbed these values as a youth, while Martin details more than Gage how he infused these values into the FBI strongly enough that they survived until today, 50 years after his death. The two books complement each other well, and I highly recommend both.
About the AuthorMichelle Ainsworth holds an MA in History and she is currently researching the cultural history of stage magic in the United States. She is a humanist and lives in New York City.
On March 5, 2023, NBC News, in conjunction with ProPublica,1 a nonprofit newsroom that investigates “abuses of power,” published what can only be described as a hit piece against the legendary paleoanthropologist Tim White, now a professor emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley. Other news outlets, such as the SFGATE and AOL, picked up the story.2, 3 The article revolved around Tim White’s use of a skeletal teaching collection that may contain Native American bones and teeth.
UC Berkeley has recently faced criticism for having Native American bone collections and, thus, they have changed their policies to ramp up repatriation efforts, abandoning their long-held view that teaching and research should be prioritized. Repatriation involves turning over bone and other artifacts to a Native American tribe that claims an ancestral connection to them.
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and similar state laws were intended to unite human remains, sacred objects, associated funerary objects, and items of cultural patrimony with their lineal descendants and culturally affiliated tribes. Teaching collections, which are of unknown origin and have been used to train the next generation of osteologists— from forensic anthropologists to orthopedic doctors—were not intended to be included in these laws. Yet, repatriation activists are attempting to claim these collections, and they are also attacking those who have used the collections. University administrators, including anthropologists working to repatriate remains, are helping this latest phase in the repatriation compromise. Repatriation activists have already successfully campaigned to remove the name of the first anthropology professor at UC Berkley, Alfred Kroeber, from the anthropology building.4 Tribes have also successfully claimed artifacts that have no affiliation to Native Americans, such as a 16th century Spanish breastplate.5
Alfred Kroeber was the first professor of anthropology at UC Berkley. In 2021, the university removed his name from the anthropology building. (Credit: Screenshot of UC Berkeley video by Roxanne Makasdjian and Clare Major)
Let us now return to Tim White. As one of the world’s most influential paleoanthropologists, he shaped the field on multiple levels. He discovered two species of over 4-million-yearold early human ancestors from Ethiopia: Ardipithecus kadabba and Ardipithecus ramidus. These two species are close to the base of the human evolutionary family tree. They are the best contenders for the first early humans, over a million years older than Lucy’s species, Australopithecus afarensis. White is also the author of the best-selling textbook, Human Osteology,6 a beautifully illustrated work that helps guide students in learning bone anatomy and contains fascinating case studies of forensics, human evolution, and archaeology. White revived research on cannibalism, and in 1992 put forth a rigorous method to ensure that sites where cannibalism was indeed practiced, are correctly assessed.7
Alfred Louis Kroeber, regarded as the founder of the study of anthropology in the American West, shown here circa 1907. In 1901, he began his more than 40-year career at UC Berkeley’s Department of Anthropology, and was Director of the university’s anthropology museum from 1909 to 1947. (PIC 1978.128 courtesy of UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library)
Because he understands how valuable bones are in telling us about the past, White has also been conscientious in following repatriation laws, such as NAGPRA.8 He played a key role in the repatriation debate, rightly arguing that repatriation of remains needs to be made on a preponderance of evidence, scientific and otherwise, that shows an affiliation between the human remains and the modern-day tribal claimants. In one case, White, along with Robert Bettinger of UC Davis and Margaret Schoeninger of UC San Diego, sued the University of California for access to study 9,000-year-old Paleo-Indian remains found on the campus which could help us understand the First Americans. The researchers lost the lawsuit on the grounds that the tribes claiming the remains (who were not parties to the suit) would have to be made parties to the suit to adjudicate adequately the claims of the plaintiff-anthropologists, and that therefore the plaintiffs’ suit would be dismissed.9 The remains were transferred to the La Posta Band of Digueño Mission Indians based on a geographic link coupled with oral creation myths. At UC Berkeley, White was, for many years, part of the university’s repatriation committee in which he served in an advisory role (professors don’t make repatriation decisions; chancellors do) and strictly adhered to the law, which calls for a balancing of scientific proof along with other evidence.
Tim White started teaching at UC Berkeley in 1977; for decades, he has taught osteology to thousands of students. Human osteology is learned by anthropology students who plan to go into human evolution research, archaeology, and forensics, but it is also a class for future orthopedic doctors. These students were taught to identify human remains, understand bone biology, and determine basics such as the sex of the remains. There is no way to teach someone osteology correctly without using a skeletal collection as reference.
Teaching collections are distinct from research collections, which have information of provenience (origin), and documents regarding excavation history, and can be assessed for details including antiquity, number of individuals, culture, and much more. Research collections ought not to be used for teaching (so that research collections stay intact), and one of the first changes that I (EW) made when I got to San José State University was to properly separate teaching and research collections, including ensuring that others followed the new stricter guidelines.
Teaching collections are in place to teach, but they also help the maintenance of research collections by allowing osteology to be taught with remains that are of unknown provenience. As I (EW) explain to my students, the “UK” marks on the bones in our teaching collection do not stand for “United Kingdom” but for “unknown.” In other words, they cannot be affiliated with any tribe.
In the ProPublica/NBC article, Tim White was accused of poor storage of human remains because there were drawers of bones that were sorted by bone, e.g., a drawer of femora (thigh bones) or a drawer of humeri (upper arm bones). This is an appropriate storage method for teaching collections; every university that I (EW) have visited—from the U.S. to Canada and across the Atlantic in Europe down to Kenya in Africa—uses a similar sorting method for their teaching collections. Accusing White of mishandling remains for this practice is absurd; further absurdity ensued when the authors attempted to paint this as some house of horrors that evokes an evil professor standing over his past victims.
In addition, the university and the journalists acted as if White had hidden this collection from repatriation efforts. But there was no clandestine action at all on White’s part. He followed both the legal requirements of NAGPRA and the university policy. NAGPRA requires federally funded institutions, such as universities, to repatriate human remains when they can be affiliated to an existing tribe. The law was designed to be a compromise. It allows for the continuation of research on unaffiliated collections as well as the continuation of maintaining teaching collections. It is not a law about reburying Native American skeletal remains; it is intended to repatriate ancestral bones to culturally affiliated tribes.
Thus, the collection White used to teach classes from 1977 to 2018 was never subject to NAGPRA, as the remains are of unknown origins and cannot be affiliated to any specific tribes. Indeed, the remains may not even be Native American! As Tim White explained about teaching collections: “There’s nobody on this planet who can sit down and tell you what the cultural affiliation of this lower jaw is, or that lower jaw is. Nobody can do that.” The articles criticizing White do not dispute that assertion or provide any basis for disputing it. Furthermore, the UC Policy10 that was in effect from 1985 through 2020, and only changed in 2021,11 stated that:
…the University’s collections of human remains and Cultural Items serve valuable educational and research purposes important to the enhancement of knowledge in various disciplines. The University maintains these collections as a public trust and is responsible for preserving them according to the highest standards while fulfilling its mission to provide education and understanding about the past and present through continued teaching, research, and public service.
Further, regarding teaching collections, the policy statement included the following:
Given the importance of the study of human osteology in archaeology, paleontology, and comparative morphology, and the importance of skeletal material in training students at the lower division, upper division, and graduate level, campuses normally retain the discretion to use such items in teaching. Campuses are encouraged to take into consideration the views and concerns of Native American and Native Hawaiian representatives when making decisions regarding the teaching and research use of Native American and Native Hawaiian skeletal materials.
This policy even allowed for culturally affiliated collections to be maintained and utilized, but left the decision up to the tribe rather than the university:
In circumstances in which cultural affiliation (or cultural association) has been established or other repatriation requirements have been met but in which an affiliated (or associated) tribe has chosen not to request repatriation, an affiliated (or associated) tribe may request that the affiliated (or associated) remains or Cultural Items not be used for teaching or research. The decision of the affiliated (or associated) tribe as to whether the remains and cultural items can be used in teaching or research shall normally be accepted as final by the University, subject to exceptions provided by federal law.
These policy statements were written in anticipation of NAGPRA’s passing. The policy, which balanced Native American concerns with those of the university’s education and research mission, was replaced by a policy that abandoned this balance and called for a cessation of research and teaching on all collections until it can be determined they do not fall under NAGPRA, or California’s equivalent CalNAGPRA.12
In 2019, the University of California’s president called for reporting of all skeletal collections on all ten campuses, which went beyond simply looking at anthropology department research collections. It was at this point that White notified Hearst Museum Director Lauren Kroiz and NAGPRA Liaison Tom Torma of the teaching collection. Thus, all along the way, White scrupulously followed the rules of the University of California and never broke state or federal repatriation laws.
The teaching collection White used was created before his arrival; it is over a century old. Teaching collections usually contain remains from a variety of sources. At San José State University where I (EW) teach, the teaching collection predates not only my arrival but also that of my predecessor; it contains remains from medical donations, remains likely purchased from India when it had a thriving skeletal trade, and remains likely from historical and archaeological sites. The collection at UC Berkeley, from descriptions found in letters to the Native American Heritage Commission13 (the nine-member body administering the California Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act) written by Dr. Sabrina Agarwal, the University’s Chair of the NAGPRA Advisory Committee, seems similar to the collection at San José State University and to many teaching collections around the globe.
Repatriation of remains needs to be made on a preponderance of evidence, scientific and otherwise, that shows an affiliation between the human remains and the modern-day tribal claimants.
Upon examination of the collection Sabrina Agarwal noted that 22 individuals were not Native American; these likely came from medical donations, as determined by writing on the bones. However, she also stated that there was a minimum of 95 individuals who could be Native American.14 It is difficult to fathom how she came to this conclusion. Minimum number of individuals (MNI) is a technique used to determine the minimum possible number of individuals from a site of commingled burials; it cannot be used for a collection that has been built from an accretion of materials over decades and which contains many fragments. For instance, in a site where there are 15 left femora and 9 right femora, the assumption is that if you can match 9 of the left femora with the right femora, then the MNI is 15.
However, if you had the same number of femora and some were of an unknown side, you may get a very different MNI—for instance, with 7 left femora, 9 right femora, and 8 un-sided femora, the MNI is 12. The 7 left femora and two of the un-sided femora can be paired with the 9 right femora, the remaining 6 un-sided femora could be paired to give three more individuals; thus, the number is 12. There are other methods that use landmarks, require that each bone be at least 50 percent complete, or look at zones of bones rather than sides. Regardless of the specific method used, the techniques further take into account bone size and the individual’s estimated age at death. Considering that the teaching collection was described by Agarwal as represented by “thousands of smaller disarticulated and commingled skeletal and dental remains,” there is no way to determine MNI in such a collection.
Another issue is that Agarwal wrote in her letter to the Native American Heritage Commission that “no in-depth or destructive analysis was made”; yet, she could somehow detect that the majority of the teaching collection could have come from Native American remains. How could this be determined? Even with close examination and in-depth analysis of the remains, determining ancestry requires nearly complete skulls or DNA. Even if she is correct in her assumptions, this still leaves the fact that repatriation laws are not acts to rebury Native American bones; they are to repatriate remains to affiliated tribes. I (EW) reached out to Agarwal asking how she concluded that there was a minimum of 95 individuals and how she concluded that these remains were Native American; no reply was received.
It is likely that UC Berkeley’s teaching collection will be lost, and tribal repatriation activists will bury the remains, even if they are not Native American. This will open the door for more losses of teaching collections. Once research collections are slated for repatriation, tribal activists will come for teaching collections believed to be Native American; then they will come for all human bones. And it’s worse than that—I (EW) have been told that even images of skeletal remains (Native American or not) may cause “harm” to tribal members. Even X-rays are already a target, as we have written about in the journal Regulation.15
Such procedures that harm science in general and anthropology and archaeology in particular won’t end there. In the ProPublica/NBC article we mention in the opening paragraph, the cultural director of the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians, lamented that, “The university housed recordings and items that ethnographers and anthropologists had previously collected from Chumash elders.” And, she said: “They stole those items.” Don’t be surprised if they come for ethnographic materials next.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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The scandal-promoting news reports, with their expressions of anguish, anger, horror, and shame, accompanied by accusations of desecration, stealing, looting, lying and grave robbing, ignore the question of why Tim White, or anyone else, would legitimately want to study bones. The answer is that they provide unique information and insight—not available from any other source—into human history and prehistory. These include disease, injury, occupational activities, diet, DNA relationships, the presence of certain alleles with known adaptive value, the age and sex structure of the population, population size and density, and cultural practices associated with disposition of the dead. In Europe and Asia, where such research is not suppressed, scientists are making huge strides in pursuing such inquiries.
The same scandal-promoting reports ignore the complexity of NAGPRA, which requires evidence of cultural affiliation for repatriation to occur. In many cases, repatriation activists offer as evidence oral traditions that have no temporal or geographical grounding, but rather consist of tales of supernatural creatures and events that would not be accepted as evidence if offered by any other racial group in the United States.
If public schools cannot teach Biblical creationism (as courts have so ruled, including the United States Supreme Court in the Louisiana creationism case), it is difficult to see why Native American animist creationism should be accepted as proof in American legal proceedings.
About the AuthorElizabeth Weiss, professor of anthropology at San José State University, has spent over two decades studying skeletal remains to try to understand past peoples’ lives. Weiss has written over 100 articles in journals ranging from the American Journal of Physical Anthropology to Quillette. You can find more of her work at: elizabethweiss74.wordpress.com.
James W. Springer is a retired attorney and anthropologist based in Peoria, Illinois. He is the co-author, with Elizabeth Weiss, of the book Repatriation and Erasing the Past (University of Florida Press, 2020), which takes a critical look at laws that mandate the return of human remains from museums and laboratories to ancestral burial grounds.
References1. https://bit.ly/40fTPuu 2. https://bit.ly/40cVam7 3. https://aol.it/3K3agEV 4. https://cnn.it/3lzyM7n 5. https://bit.ly/3TJU6mZ 6. White, T. D., Black, M. T., and Folkens, P. A. (2011). Human Osteology: Third Edition. Academic Press. 7. White, T. D. (1992). Prehistoric Cannibalism at Mancos 5MTUMR-2346. Princeton University Press. 8. https://bit.ly/3JJ2rD8 9. White v. University of California, 2012 WL 12335354 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied 136 S. CT. 983 (2016) 10. https://bit.ly/3LQbrc5 11. https://bit.ly/3K9cfrv 12. https://nahc.ca.gov/calnagpra/ 13. https://nahc.ca.gov/ 14. https://bit.ly/42RHcb5 15. https://bit.ly/3FLzbdt
The Abortion Debate in ContextIn the mid-1980s, demographer Ron Lesthaeghe staked his career on an undiscovered—and shocking—aspect of human societies he had been documenting.1 Birth rates had rapidly slowed in the most industrialized countries and were steadily slowing across developing countries. Family structures were also changing rapidly, including more people getting divorced and living alone or raising children alone.
Demographers and social scientists today2 know this phenomenon as the “second demographic transition.” But you certainly don’t need to be a demographer to see that family life is changing.
As women, the working class, and others have increasingly accessed occupational, educational, and political opportunities previously denied to them, more and more people are getting married later in life and having fewer children. Why? Because they are prioritizing career specialization over longer periods so as to be competitive in the growing global marketplace. More people in the world today are reaping the rewards of economic specialization than at any time in human history.
It is a fascinating transitional period. And it is, in significant part, a transitional period of family formation and of reproduction. Amongst other things, the ability for women to control their reproduction has been key to their success in higher education and high career achievement. The birth control pill was approved by the FDA in 1960, and this, along with many other factors, changed the demographics of colleges, universities, and the labor force forever.
It is in this complex and dynamic context that we find our culture embroiled in a national debate over abortion access.
The history of abortion legislation in the United States is a punitive and heavy-handed one. Every state in the U.S. had outlawed abortion by 1910, and, by 1967, 49 states classified commission of abortion as a felony crime.3
However, things had begun to change in the late 1960s. By the mid-1970s, a third of U.S. states had adopted legal allowances for abortion under circumstances of medical emergency. And, of course, in 1973 the landmark Roe v. Wade ruling came out. What made Roe (along with its peer Doe v. Bolton) powerful was its framing of abortion access as a right that state laws could not constitutionally restrict.
Over a dozen Supreme Court rulings have since followed, clarifying what is required from women, and what protections women have when getting an abortion. But the bombshell ruling repealing Roe v. Wade in June 2022 thrust the issue back into public discourse. Though economic recession, crime, and healthcare continued to be Americans’ top concerns heading into the 2022 midterm elections, Pew Research Center polling found abortion was a “very important” issue to 56 percent of registered voters, up from 43 percent four months earlier.4 Looking first towards within-party primary elections, many Republican politicians are in an arms race to top one another on how restricted they want to make abortion so as to appeal to their conservative base, even while realizing that this extreme position could backfire in general elections because most Americans support relatively liberal abortion policies.5
Bringing Data to the DiscussionSo, what’s real and what isn’t when it comes to the politics around abortion? Can we navigate this topic as sanely and as rationally as possible? If so, how? Here at the Skeptic Research Center, we can’t promise to provide answers to culture’s most complex topics, but what we can do is provide context.
We asked 3,014 adults in the U.S. to fill out a 15-minute survey between August 2022 and October 2022. Everyone taking the survey passed attention, response time, fraud, duplication, and bot check. The average survey taker was 44 years old; 46.4 percent of participants identified as White, 32.2 percent as Hispanic, and 21.2 percent as Black.
We polled people on a variety of topics. In addition to asking about their preferred abortion policy (ranging from a total banning of abortion to unrestricted abortion access), we asked them two “accuracy” questions. These questions can help us understand how informed individuals are on the general topics of abortion, and how this impacts their abortion policy attitudes. For example, the number of abortions performed over the last forty-or-so years has steadily declined, but how many people know this? So, the first accuracy question we asked was, “How has the number of abortions performed changed since 1980?”
Our second accuracy question pertained to the recent Supreme Court overturning of Roe v. Wade: “By overturning Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has banned abortion,” with two answer options: “true” or “false.” Of course, the overturning of Roe v. Wade did not ban abortion; rather, it delegates abortion policy to state governments instead of to the federal government.
Now, to our results. First, we asked people about which abortion policy they support (see Figure 1). We gave them five options ranging from “outlawed entirely” to “legal at any time during pregnancy.” We found that both extreme positions on abortion are unpopular. For example, only about 20 percent of Americans appear to believe that abortion access should be legal at any time during pregnancy. This is an extreme-left position, given that this could potentially allow the termination of fully viable human fetuses. At the other end of the political spectrum, fewer than 10 percent told us abortion access should be outlawed entirely. This would be an extreme-right position because it would completely strip women of their ability to make decisions about their pregnancy.
While we did find some people holding extreme positions, the important point is that those extremes were not popular amongst most people surveyed. In fact, as seen in Figure 1, the majority of people polled (69.52 percent) either believe abortion services should be accessible to women in cases of emergency (rape or medical necessity) or for any reason up to either the 1st or 2nd trimester. And, again, those hoping to outlaw abortion entirely were a tiny minority—about 90 percent of our sample believed abortion should be accessible to some extent.
Figure 1. Source: Skeptic Research Center. Download full report.
We did, however, find an astonishing degree of ignorance and inaccuracy in our sample. It would seem that the American public is profoundly ill informed on the topic of abortion. For example, half of Americans—regardless of political affiliation—were incorrect about the consequences of Roe v. Wade being overturned by the Supreme Court! (See Figure 2.) Democrats were the least accurate, with only 36.8 percent understanding that overturning Roe did not outlaw abortion. About half of Republicans and political non-affiliates also got this wrong.
Figure 2. Source: Skeptic Research Center. Download full report.
Why are people so confused about the meaning of the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe? Following the Court’s decision, some state legislatures did swiftly enact abortion-ban policies. For example, within 100 days of the overturning of Roe, 66 abortion clinics across 15 states were forced to close.6 Activists in many more states fought to maintain their existing abortion protections, to the relief of many. So, despite the reality that Roe v. Wade’s overturning did not, in fact, mean that the United States Supreme Court banned abortion, it is reasonable to suppose that some people—fearing the worst—mistakenly came to believe that it did.
We also found a surprising degree of inaccuracy regarding peoples’ estimates of the number of abortions performed since 1980. While the number of abortions being performed each year has dropped steadily over the ensuing decades, the vast majority of people believed the number of abortions being performed had been increasing.
In a follow-up analysis, we were able to determine what demographic characteristics were associated with inaccuracy. We found that people in our sample who were younger, less educated, more religious, more anxious, and more trusting of political figures were also more inaccurate about abortion-related topics. Each of these traits, e.g., age, educational attainment, and religiosity, independently correlated with being inaccurate.
Why were these characteristics correlated with inaccuracy about abortion-related issues? There are many probable reasons. Being younger (relative to older) means that most of our reproductive years are still ahead of us, and this might make it more difficult to reason coolly about an emotional topic like abortion. More religiously-inclined individuals may view abortion in moralistic terms and become more anxious about the encroaching sin of abortion access, leading them to overestimate the prevalence of abortions or the sweeping impact of the SCOTUS decision overturning Roe v. Wade. And trusting politicians may be associated with inaccuracy because of politicians’ tendency to overstate or misinterpret facts to further their political agenda.
It is difficult to know for certain why these characteristics were related to inaccuracy on these issues. Most likely, other factors (perhaps even more significant), which we happened to miss in our survey, are driving inaccuracy as well. Our goal is to point in the direction of some of the context on this issue.
Finally, we did something that analysts rarely do—we looked at how accurate people are in their perceptions of one another. What we found was shocking. Democrats told us that they believe almost 60 percent of Republicans want to outlaw abortion entirely, while the actual proportion of Republicans in our sample that wanted to outlaw abortion entirely was only 15.7 percent. Those with no political affiliation told us that they believe 51.8 percent of Republicans want to outlaw abortion entirely. But, most interesting of all, Republicans themselves told us that they believe about half (49.6 percent) of Republicans want to outlaw abortion entirely.
In other words, not only are Democrats and politically non-affiliated people inaccurate about what most Republicans believe on this issue, but even Republicans are inaccurate about what members of their own preferred party think about abortion policy!
How Best to Discuss Politically-Charged IssuesMuch more information is available in the full Skeptic Research Center report on abortion, which you can access for free online. The following are a few big-picture observations from our standpoint:
First, abortion is fundamentally a tradeoff. Where does the right to autonomy begin and end? Where does the responsibility of society to protect human life begin and end? These are enormous questions that involve some core components of our collective knowledge, philosophy, and worldviews. Answers aren’t likely to be simple, intuitive, or easily agreed upon.
Second, data and context provide the only intelligent way forward. One must leave emotions out of it. Telling pro-lifers or pro-choicers that they are immoral probably won’t convince anyone inclined to disagree with you. Inevitably, you are more in love with your favored reasons than with the actual details of the counterargument. Looked at from an adversary’s perspective, you have simply regurgitated talking points that their own talking points are designed to rebut.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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How do we get out of this intellectual cul-de-sac? The most promising path would seem to lie in disseminating facts and accurate information. With this report, you can now see which abortion policies Americans tend to support and which they tend to oppose. Most Americans do not embrace either extreme, and what informed debate there is takes place amongst more moderate positions. Additionally, it would appear that our sources of information on abortion are overloaded with falsehoods and inaccuracies. Most Americans were uninformed on the issues about which we asked, and, tragically, they were even uninformed about one another.
What might our national discourse on abortion look like if more people were more informed about the world, the issues at hand, and each other? One might only hope—or one might actually collect and distribute helpful and accurate information!
Download and share the complete Skeptic Research Center Report on Abortion.About the AuthorKevin McCaffree has a PhD in sociology from the University of California, Riverside. He is an associate professor at the University of North Texas and co-directs the Worldview Foundations Research Team.
References1. Lesthaeghe, R., & Van de Kaa, D.J. (1986). Twee demografische transities. Bevolking: groei en krimp, 1986, 9–24. 2. https://rb.gy/x4u7q 3. https://rb.gy/7w6vz 4. https://rb.gy/7l7pg 5. https://rb.gy/1lf5u 6. https://rb.gy/d8dar
The class followed its usual script. The professor took center stage, exposing the deep racism, sexism, and homophobia of a previous generation, and like well-rehearsed actors we students assumed our roles as moral arbiters in a semester-long show trial. This was a course called “Darwin and Natural Selection” and we were intrepid voyagers on the Beagle 2.0 heroically exposing the bigotry of a man born in 1809.
I’m an undergraduate English major at Dartmouth College. Whether it’s Lewis and Clark in my course on 19th century American history or Michael Pollan in my “Garden Politics” class, the focus is unchanged. The same reliable arguments about the author’s “racial commodification” or Clark’s “masculinely imposed pollution” secure an incontestable stamp of approval and get placed in the recycle bin for next class. These opinions are dissent-proof; simple confirmations of what we already know.
Last year’s annual review1 of Dartmouth students’ political leanings found that 91 percent of the class (myself included) held unfavorable views of Donald Trump against just three percent favorable. Only eight percent of the student body identified as “somewhat” or “very” conservative, one percent reporting “very,” while 17 percent reported moderate views and 73 percent “somewhat” or “very” (myself included) liberal views. This orthodoxy is enforced by a high degree of self-censorship. A survey2 of 45,000 students at over 200 colleges by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) found that more than eight out of 10 reported being afraid to express their true beliefs at least some of the time and nearly six out of 10 said that they would “hesitate to publicly disagree with a professor.” Even among the almost entirely liberal faculty (as much as 95 percent in the social sciences3), more than a third of professors report4 self-censoring to avoid running afoul of the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) bureaucracy on college campuses. This is compared to nine percent at the height of the red scare.5 When it comes to views on race, sex, and gender identity, we are all in the majority; and as Mark Twain advised, “Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect.”
Dartmouth champions “many cultures, one community,”6 a proclamation that underscores its commitment to cultivating the “great natural resource”7 that is diversity. The college prominently displays the high numbers of Black, Indigenous, and other people of color (BIPOC) admitted into every undergraduate class, with an express spotlight on geographic heterogeneity. The most recent undergraduate class,8 for example, saw a minority rate of 45 percent and included students from all 50 states, 26 different tribal nations, and 74 different countries.
This same detailed breakdown, however, is not provided for the economic background of incoming students. When it comes to class, the college is strategically ambiguous. Nowhere does Dartmouth publish the number of poor kids admitted. Instead, it obscures the data by measuring what percentage of the incoming class qualifies for need-based scholarships and reporting the average scholarship grant provided. Rather than reveal the income distribution of its students, the college showcases the percent of students “projected to be eligible for Pell Grants.” While Dartmouth qualifies anyone who is eligible as “low income,” these grants have no specific income threshold and are dispensed to anyone who demonstrates “exceptional financial need.”
The diversity that Dartmouth champions is the kind that adds more colorful pins to the world map hanging outside the DEI office but does little to help those most disadvantaged—poor kids. It is what Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas described as the “aesthetic of diversity;” an ornamental policy designed to admit full-pay minorities under the guise of diversity. What if we pulled out all those pins and reorganized them onto a poster charting income distribution? In light of the inscrutable measures of economic diversity provided by the college itself, we must instead rely on public records of family income using data from the Internal Revenue Service.9, 10
At Dartmouth, 21 percent of my classmates are from families in the top one percent of the income distribution ($652,657 a year in 2023, according to Fortune magazine), while only 14 percent come from the bottom 60 percent (less than $65,000 a year) and just seven percent are from the bottom 40 percent (less than $46,000 a year). Put it this way: if your parents make more than $630,000 a year you are 120 times as likely to be admitted to Dartmouth than if your parents make less than $46,000. Dartmouth student families have the second highest median income (Brown is 1st) in the Ivy League and are first in the Ivy League in the percentage of students they draw from the top one percent; 45 percent are from the top five percent, 58 percent are from the top 10 percent, 69 percent are from the top 20 percent, and 2.6 percent are from the bottom 20 percent.
The exhausting discourse on racism, sexism, and gender identity in my classes is a comforting distraction. As David Brooks put it in a recent New York Times editorial,11 “Elite institutions have become so politically progressive in part because the people in them want to feel good about themselves as they take part in systems that exclude and reject.” The social justice crusade on campus obfuscates the uncomfortable fact that there is no real diversity at Dartmouth. Everyone is from the same background—they’re rich.
Of course, one might argue that kids with wealthy parents are simply better equipped to handle the rigors of college. This is probably true and there is no question that rich students have higher GPAs, score higher on standardized tests, and even have higher IQs than poor students. Indeed, research by The Century Foundation12, 13 showed that the achievement gap between the educational outcomes of lower and upper income students is 7 times the effect of race (i.e., the gap between White and Black students).
A study14 published earlier this summer by Harvard economist Raj Chetty, however, revealed that even after controlling for ACT/SAT scores, “Children from families in the top one percent are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago) as those from middle-class families [$83,000–$116,000].” Chetty goes on to explain that, “The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, which tend to be stronger for students applying from private high schools that have affluent student bodies, and (3) recruitment of athletes, who tend to come from higher-income families.” 24 percent of the advantage is explained by athlete recruitment, while a whopping 46 percent is explained by legacy preference in the admissions office. Dartmouth is cultivating its “great natural resource” in the garden of Versailles.
Perhaps this explains why Dartmouth is so willing to cop to charges of systemic racism or rampant sexual assault on campus, both of which are alleged to be easily fixed under the guidance of DEI policies enforced by Human Resources. It is far easier than owning up to the far more formidable problem of class discrimination, which might require canceling student debt, paying the dining staff higher wages, or admitting more poor students. Substantive change is hard and sometimes requires us to do more than wear an “8 against hate” Ivy League t-shirt; but so long as we assume all Black people are alike, regardless of income or place of birth, all the college needs to do to fulfill its diversity goals is admit more rich foreign-born minorities. One study15 showed that, although Black immigrants make up less than one percent of America’s total population, they comprise 41 percent of the Black students at Ivy League universities. Apparently, this is a far easier solution than offering more scholarships to kids who grew up in poverty.
With the Supreme Court striking down race-based affirmative action, however, class looks to be the only game in town. On the day of the ruling, June 29th, I received two campus-wide emails. The first,16 from College President Sian Beilock, warned us that Dartmouth’s diversity was under threat and assured us of the school’s commitment to “Diversity, including racial diversity,” pledging to “adapt its holistic admissions process to this new legal landscape.” The second email, from Dean Scott Brown, further assured us all that “[we] are not alone” and explained that some of us may respond with more intense negative emotions than others, attaching an extensive list of crisis response and mental health resources. In a series of emails that repeated the word “diversity” six times, not once was it preceded or followed by “economic,” “financial,” “class,” or even “socioeconomic.” In fact, those words are not found anywhere in either email. Class is simply not part of the conversation.
Most Americans, however, disagree with President Beilock and Dean Brown. According to a survey17 conducted in April 2023 by researchers at Harvard, Stanford, and the University of Texas, an overwhelming majority of Americans agree that public (74 percent) and private (69 percent) colleges and universities should not be able to use race as a factor in college admissions. Dartmouth is undoubtedly relieved that none of those Americans are on campus.
Read more about Education Matters in Skeptic magazine 28.3
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Noam Chomsky wrote that, “The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum.” Dartmouth is desperate to keep the diversity debate in bounds because they know the court’s historic ruling is mostly legal theater. Just as California’s public colleges and universities subverted their own state’s highest court ruling banning race-based admissions by going SAT/ACT test optional and doubling down on their nebulous “holistic admissions process,”18 Dartmouth may simply tinker with its current scheme of aesthetic diversity. But as symbolic and unauthoritative as it might be, the Supreme Court’s ruling does do one thing—it puts class at the center of the conversation.
Dartmouth is diverse in the same way Silicon Valley is “connecting the world;” and like when we realized that Facebook was not “bringing us closer together” but instead polarizing communities and making us more lonely, a similar reckoning looms over the college diversity narrative. Facebook friends will never replace face-to-face interactions, but Dartmouth can be diverse. Embracing economic diversity and offering poor kids a gateway into the upper echelons of society might even enliven class discussion with the views of those whose “lived experiences” are truly different and disadvantaged. Is this not the real value of diversity?
About the AuthorNicolas Lynch-Pinzon is a recent (September 2023) graduate and English major at Dartmouth College. Volunteering for the Bernie Sanders campaign in 2016 and working on subsequent local elections inspired his scientific research on the relationship between social capital and populism. Now graduated, he hopes to pursue his interest in writing, generally, and screenwriting, specifically.
References1. Surendran, P., Lu, E., & Sasser, A. (2022, June 12). Class of 2022: Senior Survey. The Dartmouth. https://www.thedartmouth.com/article/2022/06/senior-survey-22 2. 2022-2023 College Free Speech Rankings. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. (n.d.). https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/2022-2023-college-free-speech-rankings 3. Langbert, M., & Stevens, S. (n.d.). Partisan Registration and Contributions of Faculty in Flagship Colleges. NAS. https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/partisan-registration-and-contributions-of-faculty-in-flagship-colleges 4. The Academic Mind in 2022: What Faculty Think About Free Expression and Academic Freedom on Campus. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. (n.d.-b). https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/academic-mind-2022-what-faculty-think-about-free-expression-and-academic-freedom 5. Abrams, S. J. (2023, March 5). Self-Censorship on College Campuses Is Widespread and Getting Worse. The Daily Beast. https://www.thedailybeast.com/self-censorship-on-college-campuses-is-getting-worse 6. Diversity & Inclusion. Dartmouth. (n.d.). https://home.dartmouth.edu/campus-life/diversity-inclusion 7. Commitment to Diversity. Dartmouth Admissions. (2023, August 9). https://admissions.dartmouth.edu/about/commitment-diversity 8. Class Profile. Dartmouth Admissions. (2023a, August 9). https://admissions.dartmouth.edu/apply/class-profile-testing 9. Aisch, G., Buchanan, L., Quealy, K., & Cox, A. (2017, January 18). Economic Diversity and Student Outcomes at America’s Colleges and Universities: Find Your College. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/college-mobility/ 10. Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Saez, E., Turner, N., & Yagan, D. (n.d.). The Equality of Opportunity Project. https://opportunityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/coll_mrc_summary.pdf 11. Brooks, D. (2023, August 2). What if We’re the Bad Guys Here? New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/02/opinion/trump-meritocracy-educated.html 12. Strauss, V. (2012, February 10). How to Attack the Growing Educational Gap Between Rich and Poor. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/how-to-attack-the-growing-educational-gap-between-rich-and-poor/2012/02/10/gIQArDOg4Q_blog.html 13. Kahlenberg, R. D. (2010). Rewarding Strivers: Helping Low-Income Students Succeed in College. (No Title). https://www.amazon.ca/Rewarding-Strivers-Helping-Low-Income-Students/dp/0870785168 14. Chetty, R., Deming, D. J., & Friedman, J. N. (2023). Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges (No. w31492). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/papers/w31492 15. Massey, D. S., Mooney, M., Torres, K. C., & Charles, C. Z. (2007). Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States. American Journal of Education, 113(2), 243-271. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510167 16. Letter From the President on Affirmative Action. Dartmouth. (2023, June 29). https://home.dartmouth.edu/news/2023/06/letter-president-affirmative-action 17. 17. Liptak, A., & Murray, E. (2023, June 7). The Major Supreme Court Decisions in 2023. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/07/us/major-supreme-court-cases-2023.html 18. Bowman, E. (2023, June 30). Here’s What Happened When Affirmative Action Ended at California Public Colleges. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2023/06/30/1185226895/heres-what-happened-when-affirmative-action-ended-at-california-public-colleges
2023 was a budget-writing year for the Indiana General Assembly, which consists of 100 House Members and 50 Senators, and on the first day of the session I found myself sitting outside of the Senate chambers waiting for a meeting with the budget chairperson for the senate, Senator Ryan Mishler. A few minutes before the meeting, Sanjay Sarma, the former vice-president of MIT’s Open Learning Department (and currently the president of the Asia School of Business in Malaysia) told me something to the effect of, “I’m going to let you lead the meeting, we are all behind you.”
This meeting, plus a few others with senate leaders, led to a significant increase in funding for a new and innovative type of teacher-education program. I am confident it will enhance the experience of thousands of students and begin a process of turning classroom teaching into a sustainable and respected profession.
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The program itself, and a succinct and workable plan for education reform are outlined in the “Education Matters” edition of Skeptic. That issue also includes articles on the Uses and Abuses of Testing, Resistance to Evidence Use in Education Reform, and why Schools of Education themselves need to be reformed.
However, none of the concrete reforms in that plan can begin until the greatest myth in teaching is dispelled: educational reform will not be created out of sympathy for teachers. Instead, reform must be built upon new ideas presented by teachers. Teachers themselves need to stop bleeding and start leading. And the place to start is by dispelling existing myths.
The MythIf the administration, public and/or the government really understood what it was like to be a teacher, then things would change.There is no way to express to people who are not K–12 teachers what it is like to be a K–12 teacher. No less an intellect than Bertrand Russell, in his essay on Education, wrote:
Those who have no experience of teaching are incapable of imagining the expense of spirit entailed by any really living instruction. They think that teachers can reasonably be expected to work as many hours as bank clerks. Intense fatigue and irritable nerves are the result….1
More recently, Alexandra Robbins’s book The Teachers: A Year Inside America’s Most Vulnerable, Important Profession (2023) begins with “You may think you know what’s inside, but you don’t.”2
All of that is to say that I will not waste much space trying to convey the experience of being a teacher, other than to say that after 21 years I have become like a deep-sea blobfish (the pressure being the only thing holding me together). My point is to address the pervasive and poisonous notion held by teachers that if we just express enough suffering then someone will change the system. At its worst, this attitude results in the teacher resignations (usually to higher-paying jobs in the private sector, especially for STEM). Many explain they don’t really want to resign, but hope that resignations will sound a cry for help or a plea for change. Evidence for this can be seen in a number of places.
The New York Times recently posted a short film titled Empty Classrooms, Abandoned Kids: Inside America’s Great Teacher-Resignation.3 It showcases all of the reactions of teachers in the school systems: crying in cars, resigning then shouting at the school board, expressing the trauma of overwork, emotional strain and lack of support. The film argues that politicians are to blame.
This is pervasive; just search YouTube for “teacher resignations” and watch whatever comes up; then read the comments below the videos. While the image of teachers expressing their suffering is a clichéd optic pulled out in the hope of reform, it has never worked and it never will work.
The reason is simple: expressing suffering and hoping to initiate change is worthless, especially when one is dealing with a bureaucracy. Bureaucratic systems evolve, over time, to benefit bureaucrats. If they don’t start out that way, they quickly become so. The current American educational system de facto exists primarily for administrators, and educates students only to the degree necessary to maintain the administrative structure. Whether the structure is public, private, or charter makes little difference; the system is decentralized into 14,000 districts with weak or nonexistent oversight. In the case of public schools, an elected board is hired to approve budgets. But how can the public reasonably expect part-time board members to understand the byzantine nature of educational law, and parse unnecessary expenditures out of the budget? And guess who writes the budgets?
There is no conspiracy of administrators making the system the way it is. Game Theory4 would predict that a system which empowers local bureaucracies will, in time, evolve to be an expression of bureaucratic priorities. Consider these points:
- There is no administrator shortage. Click on the Human Resources page of your local school district or of your state and you will see openings for aides, teachers, substitutes, bus drivers, etc. and those openings will sometimes be posted for months or years. There are almost never administrative openings, and when they do occur, they fill almost immediately.
- Taxpayer money funds school bureaucracies for the purpose of sustaining and supporting teachers. But then, hundreds of thousands of teachers will pay, out of pocket, to join a teacher’s association or union for the sole purpose getting protection from the bureaucracy. And even if teacher unions are all of the things their detractors say they are, the pernicious question remains, “Why do so many teachers feel the need to be protected from their own school administration?”
- Parents of special needs children might wonder why school districts, who receive federal money for the purpose, never seem to be able to hire enough aides for special needs students. And yet, there is always money for the district to keep lawyers on retainer, so that the district can protect itself from lawsuits that result from failing to provide the appropriate services in the first place.
- Many school districts lack adequate teaching materials. Instead of putting money in a fund for teachers to choose materials, the district will hire a bureaucrat (Curriculum Director, or Assistant Superintendent of Something-or-Other) with full benefits and a six-figure salary, whose only job is to tell teachers that there is no money for new books.
- Bureaucrats spend public money buying books and professional development that express how important the bureaucracy is, and this leads to an educational industry of books and professional development designed to uphold the bureaucracy. Ibram X. Kendi, et. al, Critical Race Theory, and all of the “Undoing Racism” workshops in schools that have caused so much controversy,5 for example, are no more or less vapid than Ruby K. Payne’s self-published books about “Understanding Poverty”6 that were so much the rage at the turn of the century. Payne’s idea that schools exist to teach the “hidden rules” of the middle class to poor kids, is about as effective in improving student performance as Kendi’s idea that racism is structural.
Critical Race Theory is not radical, it’s conservative in the sense that it empowers the administrative class. There’s nothing radical about saying that the educational structure is racist and that it fails students who are in poverty. A radical solution to this would be to create a mastery-learning model of education where all students would have access to educational structures at all times, including a simple online credentialing system. This would unburden teachers and counselors with unnecessary grading and record keeping so they could focus on student interests and well-being. That’s radical; but it requires no bureaucrats, so the bureaucracy isn’t interested.
This brings us to the problem with the teacher mythology. For too long, teachers have believed that we are so essential that if enough of us suffer and leave the profession, then change will have to occur. To understand why this will never happen, watch The Big Short (2017) about the 2008 housing crisis, and in particular the scene where Steve Carell’s character, based on the real-life Mark Baum, “bets” on a massive default on sub-prime housing loans. In the scene Carell-as-Baum can’t figure out why all of those bad loads still have good ratings. A high-ranking executive explains that if they don’t, the lenders will simply go to competitors and pay for a better rating.7
The lesson is simple: a corrupt bureaucratic system will mask its bureaucratic corruption right up to the point where it collapses and takes everything else with it.
The fact is, as teachers leave, the bureaucracy masks the problem by lowering teacher licensure standards and outsourcing instruction to credit-recovery programs. The bureaucrats respond by lobbying the government to loosen licensure requirements for teachers. For example, in my home state of Indiana, it is now possible for school districts to license “adjuncts” who possess the barest of credentials.
The Indiana Principals Association supported the adjunct teaching bill.8 The IPA’s support for the bill is not just a betrayal of the teaching profession, but a very public expression of bureaucratic mediocrity. Principals have no ideas for making teaching more sustainable, so they just want to make it easier to put warm bodies in the classrooms. The public might ask, “Won’t this eventually cause graduation rates to collapse?” Well, if graduation rates meant anything it might. However, virtually every school district in the country buys expensive “credit recovery” programs from private vendors. If students fail classes, or if there are no teachers, it’s no problem. Those students can just sit in a room for a little while and click their way to graduation.
It’s hard to catch districts doing this, because the bureaucracy only gets caught when the scam works too well. In 2017, National Public Radio busted Ballou public high school in Washington, D.C. for what amounts to fraud only because in 2016 the school graduated every single senior, and that senior class had a 100% college acceptance rate. After NPR aired a positive story about Ballou, whistleblowers inside detailed what really happened.9
If you are wondering why complaints from upper class parents aren’t creating change in the system, it’s because the bureaucracy placates these parents by creating enclaves for “advanced” or “gifted” students at the elementary and middle school levels, and those students then filter into Advanced Placement classes, or International Baccalaureate programs where there is a perception a higher standard of education can be expected. The College Board oversees the AP programs, as well as the SAT and ACT, and in the process has created a money-making scam rivalled only by televangelism; its real purpose was revealed when exams were watered down and poorly administered during the 2020 pandemic,10 lest revenue fail to come in, and when their leadership protected themselves during recent controversies.11
Dispelling the Myth and Changing FocusDispelling the teacher mythology about reform means that teachers should act as if we are respected professionals. Rather than recording ourselves crying in cars; we need to be publishing papers in our content areas. Instead of rallying at the statehouse at the behest of a teacher’s union, we need to be presenting new ideas to foundations and lawmakers, looking for reform opportunities that exist outside of the bureaucratic educational structure. Students need us, and we cannot allow a corrupt bureaucratic structure to destroy the good work that can still occur in classrooms daily.
I came to these conclusions years ago, and decided to avoid the gray mediocrities in the educational bureaucracy. They aren’t there to help teachers. Instead, I worked on publishing content-area articles and academic books. This work attracted the attention of a science foundation in Indianapolis, and they funded a new teacher education program where secondary teachers collaborated with professors. The foundation and I worked together to get state funding; we partnered with a public university and added a workforce education component with private money.
I wrote textbooks in my content area that are vastly more effective than what the big textbook producers create and got them published by Rowman & Littlefield Education.12 Then I got grant funding through the Indiana Dept. of Education to buy classroom sets. I then applied to present underlying methodology with the National Council for Social Studies, and was accepted to do so in 2016.
Because of my papers in Skeptic, in the summer of 2022, I had the opportunity to meet personally with the faculty of MIT’s Open Learning Department, where, in a school that is mercifully free of an actual education department, I saw an opportunity to develop new programs outside of the current structure. Instead of rallying at the statehouse with the union, I set up meetings with lawmakers and presented plans. In 2023, the Indiana State Teachers Association lost its right to even have discussions over working conditions,13 but the effort I was involved in gained a million dollars in annual funding for a new and innovative form of education for in-service teachers.
Because I stopped believing in the great teacher mythology, I was also able to shed the great teacher inferiority complex. No one in the scientific community ever looked down on me. The politicians in my conservative state, including Senator Jeff Raatz (R) who is the Education Chairperson, all listened intently, expressed support for new programs that help students, and then they actually appropriated funding.14
I am a public-school teacher with over two decades of experience, and the only thing against me is the educational bureaucracy, including the unions who perpetuate the “teachers-will-suffer-until-reform-happens” myth that is supposed to support me.
But all that is okay. Because of MIT’s Open Learning Department, I have seen the future of education. Schools will only need to focus on teaching students two things: how to become interested in a subject, and then how to develop an academic skill set necessary to satiate that interest. Teachers will earn respect as knowledge producers because they will be generating curricula that is directly connected to the community needs. You can read about all the practical details of how this will work in the “Education Matters” issue of Skeptic.
This future is not a fantasy; it’s already here, and economic forces are molding its creation faster than anyone could have imagined. Everything just needs to be connected and expressed in a vision that the public understands. Because I was able to dispel the great teacher mythology and shed my inferiority complex, I have seen a future of respected teachers, engaged students, supportive parents, and a workforce whose needs are being met.
I have seen the future, I plan to actively help shape it, and the educational bureaucracy is not in it.
About the AuthorDr. Chris Edwards teaches History and English at a public high school in Indiana. He is a frequent contributor to Skeptic and the author of numerous books with Rowman & Littlefield Education. He can be reached at scientechsummer@gmail.com.
References1. Russell, B., Egner, R. E., & Denonn, L. E. (2010). The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. Routledge. 2. Robbins, A. (2023). The Teachers: A Year Inside America’s Most Vulnerable, Important Profession. Dutton, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC. 3. The Learning Network. (2022, November19) https://bit.ly/468FC4M 4. Yoeli, Erez; Hoffman, Moshe. (2022) Hidden Games: The Surprising Power of Game Theory to Explain Irrational Behavior. Basic Books. 5. Kendi, I. X., & Schmidt, A. (2022). How to Be an Antiracist. btb. 6. Payne, R. K. (2013). Framework for Understanding Poverty. Aha! Process. 7. https://youtu.be/mwdo17GT6sg 8. Eskrow, K. (2022, May 10) https://bit.ly/3QTJ4fg 9. McGee, K. (2017, November 28) https://bit.ly/3MB2ov6 10. https://bit.ly/3QTVN1t 11. Hartocollis, A. & Fawcett, E. (2023, February 1). https://bit.ly/3Szzi34 12. https://bit.ly/3MCneKK 13. Bill limiting discussions between teachers, administrators heads to Gov. desk (wrtv.com) 14. https://bit.ly/468Tv31
…the basis for these epidemics is the emotional conflict aroused in children who are being brought up at home amidst traditional tribal conservatism, while being exposed in school to thoughts and ideas which challenge accepted beliefs.1 —Pediatrician G.J. Ebrahim, Muhimbili Hospital, Tanzania
On Monday October 2, 2023, news reports from western Kenya told of a bizarre condition that had swept through St. Theresa’s Eregi Girls’ High School. At least 62 students were hospitalized after exhibiting uncontrollable twitching of their arms and legs, including rhythmic muscle contractions and spasms.2 At times the girls were reported to appear as if possessed by spirits and complained of headaches, dizziness, and knee pain. Many were unable to walk and had to be taken in wheelchairs to waiting ambulances. The strange outbreak occurred in the town of Musoli, about 230 miles northwest of Nairobi. When school opened the next day parents stormed the campus demanding that it be closed until more was known about the outbreak.3 By Wednesday, education officials shut down most of the school as the number of students taken to hospital reached 106.4
International media coverage of the outbreak was often ominous. The Hindustan Times reported: “Mystery Illness in Kenya Leaves School Children with Paralyzed Legs.”5 The Indo-Asian News Service proclaimed: “Mysterious Disease Paralyzes 95 Girls in Kenya.” The Latin American CE Noticias Financieras news agency carried the apocryphal headline: “Nearly 100 Students Walk like ‘Zombies’ in Kenya, Mysterious Illness Raises Alarm Bells.”6
Many people took to social media to blame the COVID-19 vaccine, which was given to the school’s students in July of last year. Others suggested that the girls were faking. Samples of blood, urine, phlegm, and stool were taken, along with throat swabs. All proved to be unremarkable. By Thursday, Kenyan health officials also ruled out the role of infectious disease and instead concluded that they were suffering from “hysteria” in response to stress from upcoming exams.7 The reaction to this episode highlights several misconceptions about outbreaks of “mass hysteria.” As someone who has studied this topic for over three decades, allow me to make some observations.
Observation #1: In attempting to quell an outbreak, never ever use the H-word.The word “hysteria” is a loaded term that has a checkered past. It was commonly used during the 19th century to stigmatize women as psychologically unstable and emotionally volatile. Most Western physicians and psychiatrists no longer use the term, which has been superseded by more neutral designations such as “mass psychogenic illness,” “mass sociogenic illness,” and “functional neurological disorder.” The condition is used to describe the converting of psychological conflict or trauma into physical symptoms for which there is no organic basis.8
The phenomenon typically occurs in small cohesive groups that are experiencing extraordinary anxiety and is best thought of as a collective stress response that occurs in normal, healthy people. People react much more receptively to being told they were experiencing a stress reaction instead of being told they were involved in an outbreak of “mass hysteria.”
Observation #2: Identify the correct type of outbreak.Authorities should immediately consider the possibility of a toxin or disease agent, but once these have been eliminated, they should look at the likelihood of mass psychogenic illness. There are two main types of outbreak: anxiety-based and motor-based. The former is common in schools and factories in developed countries where a small cohesive group is suddenly exposed to what is perceived to be a harmful agent. The most common trigger is a strange or unfamiliar odor. Symptoms are benign and short-lived and most commonly include headache, nausea, dizziness, shortness of breath, and general malaise. There is also a conspicuous absence of pre-existing group tension. Most episodes last from only a few hours to a day.
Motor-based outbreaks are most common in less developed countries. They evolve more slowly, often taking weeks or months to incubate. They typically occur in the strictest schools where there is tension between students and administrators or some other conflict. Under such prolonged stress, the nerves and neurons that send messages to the brain become disrupted, resulting in an array of neurological symptoms such as twitching, shaking, convulsions, and trance-like states. This is the same type of outbreak that affected the young Puritan girls in Salem, Massachusetts in 1692 and led to the infamous witch craze. Symptoms will typically subside over time, but in cases where the perceived harmful agent (often demons or spirits) is still believed to be active, episodes can endure for months. There are several cases on record that have persisted for years.9
Observation #3: Find out what is causing the stress and eliminate or at least reduce it.In the Kenyan episode authorities have blamed exam tension. While this is a common scapegoat and could be a contributing factor, it is rarely the main driver. Since the 1960s, there have been many outbreaks of mass psychogenic illness in Africa.10 Most involve motor-based symptoms that occur in school settings. But not just any school. Christian schools have long been a hotbed of tension and a clash of cultures between the African world and the West. This is the exact setting of the Kenyan episode.
These outbreaks typically revolve around missionary schools that are notorious for ignoring local traditions such as the common practice of ancestor worship, and instead immersing students in Western religious and cultural practices.11 Theologian Jack Partain observes that “Many African theologians—themselves highly educated and westernized Christians—speak of their passionate desire to be linked with their dead and of their own inner struggle.” The belief that ancestors watch their every move and may not always approve, generates conflict for students in missionary schools because while they are taught to worship their ancestors at home, they study the Bible prohibitions at school.12
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.4
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Similar conflicts have also arisen in African Muslim schools. In 1995, over 600 girls at Islamic secondary schools in the Northern Nigerian states of Jigawa and Kano began to exhibit bouts of screaming, crying, foaming at the mouth, and partial paralysis. At other times they would break into spontaneous dancing that resemble performances in Indian masala films. American anthropologist Conerly Casey studied the outbreak and noted that the Bollywood films that the girls were watching commonly had plots that featured the splendor of romantic love, while arranged marriages were still common among the Hausa. Conspicuously, only ethnic Hausa girls were afflicted by the condition. Casey concluded that a driving force behind the outbreak was the psychological conflict generated between the pressure to follow local traditions including arranged marriages, and the desire to emulate the actors who were promoting the glories of romantic love. The episode coincided with other stresses, including a deadly meningitis epidemic that killed thousands. Adding further pressure on the liberal Hausa girls who watched the Indian dance movies was their ostracism by religious and school authorities who portrayed them as being sexually promiscuous and drug users.13
Moving ForwardThe recent outbreak in Kenya, along with kindred episodes over the past century, should be seen for what they are: collective manifestations of distress that serve as tension-relieving exercises. They are part ritual, part hysteria, and signal to the wider community that something is seriously amiss. These and other kindred outbreaks are never spontaneous reactions to stress per se; they are always couched in some unique context. It is up to investigators to identify what that is and to address it. However, like so many other outbreaks in Africa involving religious schools over the past century, the recent events in Kenya are yet another manifestation of the traditional superstitions and the legacy of colonialism with its newer superstitions that still haunt the continent like spectres from the past.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References1. Ebrahim, G.J. (1968) “Mass Hysteria in School Children, Notes on Three Outbreaks in East Africa.” Clinical Pediatrics 7:437-43 2. “At least 62 Eregi Girls Students Hospitalised Over Mysterious Illness.” The Star (Nairobi), Kenya), October 2. 3. “Parents Storm Eregi Girls Following Mysterious Illness.” The Star (Nairobi), October 3. 4. “Eregi Girls’ High School Closed After ‘Strange Illness.’” The Star (Nairobi), October 4; Lusigi, B. (2023). “Mysterious Disease? Eregi Girls Students Suffering from Panic, Medics Say.” The Standard (Nairobi), October 5. 5. Chitre, M. (2023). “Mystery Illness in Kenya Leaves School Children with Paralysed Legs; Over 90 Girls Hospitalised.” Hindustan Times, October 5. 6. “Nearly 100 Students Walk like ‘Zombies’ in Kenya, Mysterious Illness Raises Alarm Bells.” CE Noticias Financieras, October 5, 2023. 7. Lusigi, B. (2023). “Eregi Girls Students Could be Psychologically Disturbed, Officials say as School Closed.” The Standard (Nairobi), October 5; Makokha, Shaban (2023). “Eregi Students Suffered From Hysteria.” The Daily Nation (Nairobi), October 6. 8. Bartholomew, R., & Wessely, S. (2002). “Protean Nature of Mass Sociogenic Illness: From Possessed Nuns to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Fears.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 180(4):300-306. 9. Bartholomew, R. E., and Sirois, F. (1996). “Epidemic Hysteria in Schools: An International and Historical Overview.” Educational Studies 22(3):285-311; Bartholomew, R. E., with Rickard, R.J.M. (2014). Mass Hysteria in Schools: A Worldwide History Since 1566. McFarland. 10. See, for instance: Rankin, A. M., and Philip, P. J. (1963). “An Epidemic of Laughing in the Buboka District of Tanganyika.” Central African Journal of Medicine 9:167-170; Kagwa, B. H. (1964) “The Problem of Mass Hysteria in East Africa.” East African Medical Journal 41:560-566; Muhangi, J. R. (1973). A Preliminary Report on Mass Hysteria in an Ankole School in Uganda. East African Medical Journal 50:304-309. 11. Thomas, R. M. (editor). (1991). International Comparative Education: Practices, Issues, & Prospects. New York: Pergamon Press, p. 204. 12. Interview between Robert Bartholomew and Jack Partain, Professor Emeritus in Religion at Gardner-Webb College in Boiling Springs, North Carolina, who taught at the Baptist Seminary of East Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, for 13 years. Conducted by telephone on January 17, 2004. See also: Partain, J. (1986). “Christians and Their Ancestors: A Dilemma of Theology.” Christian Century (November 26), p. 1066. 13. Casey, C. (1999). “Dancing Like They Do In Indian Film: Media Images, Possession, and Evangelical Islamic Medicine in Northern Nigeria.” Paper presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Chicago, Illinois, November 17-21; Casey, C. (2017). “Bollywood Banned, and the Electrifying Palmasutra: Sensory Politics in Northern Nigeria.” In Asian Video Cultures: In the Penumbra of the Global, edited by Joshua Neves and Bhaskar Sarkar, pp. 176–197. Duke University Press.
The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 shocked us into realizing that oil is a scarce commodity, its supply can be manipulated, and the price can rise suddenly and so can inflict “pain at the pump.” However, after each oil crisis briefly induces people to drive less and conserve energy for a while, the price eventually falls, and automakers again offer big gas guzzlers while smaller, fuel-efficient cars don’t sell as well.
Then, starting in the late 1990s, oil prices increased, with the price of a barrel of oil rising from $30 in mid-2003 to $60 by August 2005, which then climbed steeply to an all-time record of $147 by July 2008. This real oil crisis has no single, simple cause the way the 1973 OPEC embargo or the Iran-Iraq turmoil of 1979 produced temporary disruptions. Rather, the real effects of declining petroleum reserves are being felt as China and India demand more oil for their rapidly growing economies. Short-term events such as the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the Iranian nuclear buildup, Hurricane Katrina’s disruption of oil production in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005, and other factors like the 2020 economic slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, caused spikes or crashes in the prices, but even after the effects of such events end, price still keeps climbing. Only a global recession, triggered by excessive speculation on overpriced real estate and too many people being given mortgages they could not afford on these same overpriced houses, pushed down oil demand, and the price retreated (although still nowhere near 1973 or 1979 levels).
The long-term effect is gradual, so we don’t see the gas station lines in the U.S. now the way we did in the 1970s (although they do occur in China), yet as the price at the pump reaches painful levels above $4 a gallon, people start to conserve again. As of this writing, gas is selling for over $5 a gallon in California.
To understand what may lie in the future, let’s start from the beginning.
The Origin of OilWhat is oil? How is it found and produced? Contrary to popular myth, oil is not produced from the bodies of long-dead dinosaurs. Rather, it is organic material that is formed by the decomposition of trillions of marine plankton as they became buried in sediments.1 Oil is actually a mixture of many different kinds of complex organic molecules, mostly long chains of carbon atoms with hydrogen atoms attached, or hydrocarbons. Chemically, oil is about 85 percent hydrogen and 13 percent carbon, with minor amounts of sulfur, nitrogen, and oxygen. The simplest of these hydrocarbons is methane (CH4), which is the major component of natural gas, along with longer-chain molecules like ethane (C2H6), propane (C3H8), and butane (C4H10).
These organic molecules start out as kerogen, a complex mixture of decayed organic matter in sedimentary rocks. The most common source of kerogen is deep-water shales, which often trap lots of decaying matter and are formed where there is not much oxygen to break it down. Rocks rich in kerogen are known as source rocks.
However, most source rocks are highly impermeable shales, so there is no point in drilling them directly. In addition, the kerogens in them are not yet oil when they first form. Instead, the kerogens must be cooked under pressure to break down into simpler liquid hydrocarbons we know as petroleum. These restrictive conditions greatly limit which rocks will produce oil and which ones will not. Under a normal geothermal gradient, the source rock must be buried about 2500 m (8000 feet) in the Earth’s crust, where the temperatures are at least 65°C (150°F) so the kerogen will break down into liquid petroleum. If they are buried too deep (greater than 4600 m or 18,000 feet), they will be heated too much (above 150°C or about 350°F), and the kerogen will break down into natural gas. We call this narrow range of suitable depths and pressures the “oil window.” The vast majority of the organic-rich rocks of the world have not resided in that range of ideal conditions long enough to produce oil. Time is also a critical factor. The kerogens must remain in the oil window long enough for oil to be produced, but not too long or they will be overcooked and break down.
If all the conditions are right for the source rock to remain within the oil window, liquid oil will be produced and then migrate out of the source rock to a reservoir rock, which has high porosity. This means oil can saturate it. Contrary to popular myth, a “reservoir” is not some big underground cavern full of oil. Rather, it is a solid rock with a high volume of porosity between the grains (sometimes up to 40 percent pore space in sandstones), and high permeability (interconnectedness between the pore spaces that allows the fluid to flow through).2 Typically, these are well-sorted (i.e., same-sized sand grains) quartz sandstones. They have lots of pores, with no fine clay or silt to clog them. Other rocks, such as limestones or granitic rocks, have no natural pores, but if they are fractured, they can develop high porosity and permeability along the fractures. Once the oil migrates from the source rock to the reservoir rock, a third condition is essential: an impermeable seal on top of the reservoir rock to trap the oil and prevent it from migrating further upward. The trapped oil then stays in the reservoir rock until drilling releases it.
Thus, the ideal conditions to produce oil—abundant source rocks cooked for a long time in the narrow oil window, with a good reservoir above the source with a seal on top—are really rare. This is one of the many reasons petroleum is actually quite scarce in most crustal rocks, and also why it is so difficult to find and obtain. There are far more rocks below our feet that might be good for producing oil but didn’t meet all these conditions: source rocks that never reached the oil window or were too heated; source rocks with no reservoir rocks above them; potential reservoir rocks with no seal above them; and so on. Vast quantities of oil have been generated in the geologic past, and even trapped, only to be destroyed by tectonics and erosion.
Oil geology is a risky business. Most promising prospects turn out not to have economical deposits of oil in them, and most holes that are drilled come up dry.3 Yet all that is needed is one really good producing well out of dozens of dry holes, and the payoff may be enough to keep them going, even when it costs over $2 million or more to drill a typical hole and $15 million for an offshore well.
The Draugen offshore drilling rig in the Norwegian Sea was initially developed with five subsea wells connected to a central platform. It costs about $15 million for an offshore well.
Given that oil is naturally scarce, the problems with the global oil supply now make a lot more sense. In addition, petroleum is not found everywhere, but most of the proven reserves are in just a handful of countries, most of which are members of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC). The major producers are in the Persian Gulf and Middle East (especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran, and Iraq); followed by certain parts of the former Soviet Union; the United States and Canada; and a few other countries around the globe, such as Venezuela, Libya, Norway, and Nigeria.
The Origin of CoalCoal consists of solid bits and pieces of undecayed plant material, mainly organic matter. Most often, it forms when large amounts of dead plants collect in a swampy setting, and instead of decaying, they are buried by sands and muds, and eventually compressed into coal.4 Coal is typically concentrated in individual layers (coal seams) interbedded with other sedimentary rocks, although it can be widely dispersed as well. Coal exists in several different forms, called ranks.
The peak of global discovery of major oil fields occurred over 40 years ago, and there have been no giant oil fields found since.
Peat (used for heating and to produce the distinct, smoky flavor in whisky) is not yet coal, even though it consists largely of unconsolidated, undecayed plant remains. It contains 60 percent carbon along with abundant gases and moisture. The lowest rank of coal is brown coal (lignite), with roughly 70 percent carbon and a considerable moisture and volatile content. Soft coal (bituminous coal) contains 80–90 percent carbon, and much of the moisture and many of the gases have been removed from the parent organic material by compaction. Finally, hard coal (anthracite) contains little moisture or gases and is 90–100 percent carbon.
Carbon content and combustibility increase with rank. Higher-ranked coals are more valuable fuels because they generate more heat per mass consumed. The economic value of coal is also affected by the content of potential pollutants. Unfortunately, many high-carbon anthracite and bituminous coals of eastern North America are also rich in sulfur, which produces acid rain.
The main coal-producing regions of the U.S. are in the northern Appalachians (especially in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky).5 These coal deposits have mostly been turned into anthracite by the high temperatures and pressures of the mountain building that created the Appalachians 330 million years ago. Unfortunately, this coal is also high in sulfur. There is also significant coal in the Illinois Basin, although that resource is mostly high-sulfur bituminous coal, so its mining has ceased. The main coal deposits currently exploited are the shallow lignites of the Powder River Basin in northeast Wyoming, which yield giant coal seams that are many meters thick, and not buried very deeply, making them relatively cheap to mine. These are extracted by huge strip mines and shipped by rail all over the country. Although this coal is low in sulfur (making it preferable to other sources), it is only lignite coal, so a lot more of it is required to produce the same amount of energy.
Trends in Oil and Coal ConsumptionHow long is the global supply of oil going to last? This question was best addressed by an oil geologist named M. King Hubbert back in 1956. A remarkably brilliant and innovative geologist and geophysicist, he spent his career in the oil business (Shell Oil), several government jobs (U.S. Geological Survey), and also in university professor posts. Hubbert made many contributions which led to much greater success in finding oil. Given his track record, geologists had good reason to take his ideas seriously.
What was Hubbert’s prediction, and why was it so startling? While working for Shell, Hubbert gave a presentation at the 1956 American Association of Petroleum Geologists meeting at which he suggested that oil production should follow a bell-shaped curve, from slow growth at the beginning, to exponential growth to a peak, then a steady decline afterwards (Figure 1, top of page). He made the prediction that U.S. oil resources would peak between 1965 and 1971, depending upon which figure you used for oil reserves.6 Hubbert lived long enough to see that U.S. oil production had clearly peaked in 1970, and has been steadily declining since then (Figure 2). Although his ideas were rejected in oil company circles, they have long been accepted by academic geologists with no commercial interest to defend, and are now considered more and more realistic, even by oil companies.
Figure 2. The actual history of oil production in the U.S., which followed Hubbert’s prediction with remarkable consistency. This plot also shows the peak in U.S. discoveries in the 1930s, and how the peak of production occurred about 40 years later.
The end of “cheap oil” will happen soon but we will probably not realize it until oil-producing countries can no longer keep up with demand, no matter how high price rises.
How did Hubbert get the idea that oil production should follow a bell-shaped curve? Economic geologists had long known that this is the normal pattern seen in about any non-renewable mineral resource, such as oil, gas, coal, uranium, or any of the metals. Early in its history, a resource is consumed slowly, since it does not have a lot of established markets. Then a market develops, and suddenly the resource is produced and consumed at an exponentially increasing rate as the easiest-to-reach deposits are quickly mined or drilled. This exponential growth curve cannot last forever, and the production slows down as most of the easily reached deposits become exhausted. The market for the resource, however, continues to put high demand and even higher prices on the resource, even though only low-quality deposits remain. Exploration for less and less desirable deposits occurs in an attempt to extract even the most expensively obtained, lowest-grade resources that are left. Sooner or later, even these poor lowgrade deposits cannot keep up with demand, and production declines rapidly as there are no more new discoveries. The supply eventually runs out, no matter how much prices rise and demand increases. Then there is an abrupt economic adjustment as the mineral resource can no longer be found at any price, and people learn to do without it.
Figure 3. The history of production of anthracite coal in Pennsylvania, a classic example of the bell-shaped production of a non-renewable resource that goes from rapid mining to peak production to total exhaustion.
We can see this with the production history of anthracite coal from Pennsylvania (Figure 3) or many other resources.7 The demand for coal increased rapidly in the late nineteenth century as the Industrial Revolution and the development of steel created demand for coal-fired furnaces in western Pennsylvania. However, the dangerous job of mining these coal deposits in deep, easily collapsed shafts hundreds of feet below mountains meant that the good deposits were exhausted by the 1920s, and production has been declining ever since. There hasn’t been any significant coal production in Pennsylvania in over 35 years, even though the legends of Pennsylvania coalfields are still part of our culture. Mining companies shifted to other states with more abundant and easily mined coal.
Some people ask: what about supply and demand? It is true that over the short term, you see price fluctuations due to small changes in the supply-demand balance. In the case of coal, there were major downward spikes during World Wars I and II and the Great Depression, as wars and economic slowdown decreased or disrupted demand and production. There were also peaks during the post-war boom times of the 1920s and 1940s–1950s. However, these were just short-term blips on a long-term trend. Supply and demand only works when the supply is elastic; that is, you can always make or grow more of it if the price is high enough. Non-renewable mineral resources are inelastic: they cannot, over the long term, increase their supply. There was only a limited amount of them in the Earth’s crust to begin with, the minerals are no longer being generated at any significant rate by the Earth, and when they are exhausted, you just can’t make more.8
The Future of Fossil FuelsIt is now well established that the long-term use of fossil fuels is the major source of rising atmospheric carbon dioxide, the major driver of human-induced climate change and global warming. All scientific organizations that deal with the subject agree9 that we must scale back our use of carbon-based fuels and eventually eliminate them almost completely if we have any chance of saving the planet from the negative effects of climate change. The debate and discussion are now about how to go about this, which green energy sources should play a major role in the future, and how we wean ourselves off carbon-based fuels in the meanwhile.
By far the worst polluter among fossil fuels is coal, which releases more carbon dioxide per ton than oil or natural gas (coal alone makes up over 40 percent of carbon dioxide from all sources), and also releases methane, a much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide.10 It also has other extremely negative environmental effects, from strip mining of whole mountains, to the pollution of waterways with mine waste and the air with coal fly ash, to the long-term health of coal miners. Fortunately, coal mining is rapidly vanishing from the global economy, not due to excessive government regulation, but due to capitalism and free market forces: natural gas and solar have become much cheaper than coal.
As described, Hubbert’s “peak oil,” the global peak of coal consumption worldwide, already happened in 2013. The global peak in coal’s contribution to the energy mix was in 2008, when it accounted for 30 percent of global energy production. Both demand and production have been declining rapidly ever since. Coal mining is now virtually extinct in Great Britain, the birthplace of the coal industry. A clear sign of the times is the bankruptcy of many big American coal mining firms such as Peabody Energy, Murray Energy, Cloud Peak, and 11 other companies in recent years as coal cannot compete with the low prices of solar and natural gas.
The only countries that still mine significant coal are China (46 percent of the world’s production), India (9.5 percent of the world’s production), with minor amounts (less than 10 percent) from Indonesia, Turkey, Australia, followed by the remnants of the U.S. coal industry. However, both China and India are committed to scaling back and effectively phasing out their coal consumption, so coal is on the way out worldwide as a fuel source—and also as a polluter. Phasing out coal was one of the primary goals of the Paris Climate Accords in 2016, and of the COP26 agreement in Glasgow in 2021. Although China built a few new coal-fired power plants in 2020, globally, more coal power was retired than built. The U.N. Secretary General said that countries should stop generating electricity from coal by 2030, and many countries are on target to meet that goal. The end of using coal as a source of energy is in sight.
The situation for phasing out oil and natural gas is much more complicated. Many of us forget (or do not realize) that we use oil in many other ways besides energy. Nearly every synthetic substance we use, from the huge array of plastics to all the fabrics (nylon, rayon, Dacron, polyester, and many others) are produced from cheap oil. Many of your clothes are likely made from these synthetic fabrics, and nearly every object in a typical room has plastic in it. When oil becomes too expensive for these things, what will we do? Suddenly, we will no longer be able to import thousands of cheap plastic toys for our kids, or wear polyester or spandex clothes, or use products made largely of plastic, like the computer parts I’m using to write this article, or drink water and soda from plastic water bottles. When cheap oil becomes expensive, plastics will have to be recycled and rationed, and become much too precious for most of the ways we use and waste them today. And you can’t make plastics cheaply from anything but oil. Not from coal or anything else.
Then there’s another huge consumer of oil—agriculture, especially fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. All these products are derived from oil. An acre of corn consumes 80 gallons of oil in the form of pesticides, fertilizers, herbicides, and fuel for the tractors. We’ve replaced the human and animal labor of a century ago with machinery that requires lots of cheap oil. Our entire modern agricultural system of monoculture crops that have no resistance to pests, and which deplete the soil rapidly, can only be sustained by throwing oil at it in the form of herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers. Without it, our food supply would collapse, and the world would be looking at a global famine. The end of cheap oil will force everyone to re-examine agricultural practices.
So, when is the global oil peak of Hubbert’s curve going to happen? Various authorities have pegged it at different times, from the early 2000s (so it might have already happened) to the 2020s and later (so it’s happening or is about to happen).11 It will be extremely hard to detect because the short-term “noise” and fluctuations in oil price and production make it difficult to see the overall trend until it is long past us. The “noise” of the short-term cycles of boom and bust in the price of oil makes it difficult for anyone to see a long-term trend that takes decades to fully develop and peak. At any given time, the price might become high and the oil become scarce, thanks to the power that Saudi Arabia, with the largest reserves in the world, can wield. From 2010–2014, Saudi Arabia cut their exports to drive up the price. Then in 2014, they rapidly increased production12 to drive down the price and punish Russia, and drive small U.S. companies out of business. However, during the global recession of 2008, the price of oil dropped due to the economic slowdown and again, during the COVID-19 economic slowdown of 2020–2021, the price of oil plummeted due to lack of demand. Most people only sense these short-term fluctuations due to specific events, but cannot see the bigger “signal” of the overall trend in oil production through all the short-term “noise.”
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.2
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A more reliable measure of when the peak has occurred is obtained by plotting when the peak of oil discoveries occurred globally and noting that the peak of production will follow about 30–40 years later. This is vividly demonstrated by the history of U.S. oil discovery and production (Figure 2), when the peak of discovery occurred in the 1930s and the peak of production occurred in the 1970s, about 40 years later. The bad news is that global oil discoveries peaked in the early 1960s, and have been declining since, even while the price and demand for oil is near record highs. The idea that cheap, abundant oil will soon become scarce is well-documented and supported by existing data. The fact that Hubbert’s hypothesis exactly predicted the U.S. oil peak (Figure 2),13 and seems to be predicting the global peak, should be strong enough evidence in and of itself. There is also the fact that the peak of global discovery of major oil fields occurred over 40 years ago, and there have been no giant oil fields found since then (nor do most oil geologists think there are more to be found). Most of the world’s older oil fields are nearing exhaustion.
The end of “cheap oil” will happen soon but we will probably not realize it until oil-producing countries can no longer keep up with demand, no matter how high the price rises. Hopefully, the world will have already begun to phase out the use of oil and natural gas to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. If we don’t, the climate effects will be even more severe, and oil itself will start to get very expensive and too precious to waste on any but the most essential uses.
About the AuthorDonald Prothero taught college geology and paleontology for 35 years, at Caltech, Columbia, and Occidental, Knox, Vassar, Glendale, Mt. San Antonio, and Pierce Colleges. He earned his PhD (1982) in geological sciences from Columbia University. He is the author of over 40 books (including six leading geology textbooks, and several trade books), and over 300 scientific papers, mostly on the evolution of fossil mammals (especially rhinos, camels, and horses) and on using the Earth’s magnetic field changes to date fossil-bearing strata.
References1. Prothero, D. R., & Schwab, F. (2013). Sedimentary Geology (3rd ed.). W.H. Freeman. p. 286. 2. Ibid., p. 288. 3. Ibid., p. 293. 4. Ibid., p. 283. 5. Ibid., p. 286. 6. Hubbert, M.K. (1956). Nuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels. In Drilling and Production Practice, American Petroleum Institute & Shell Development Co. Publication No. 95, 9–22. 7. https://bit.ly/3MI6H90 8. Prothero, D.R. (2013). Reality Check: How Science Deniers Threaten Our Future. Indiana University Press. p. 227. 9. https://go.nasa.gov/3GVy382 10. https://bit.ly/3Ld2Pf5 11. Deffeyes, K. (2001). Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage. Princeton University Press. p. 285. 12. https://bit.ly/3AgboPG 13. Deffeyes, K. (2001)
Skeptic: How did you get interested in energy? Koonin: I was educated in New York City public schools and grew up in a middle-class household. I went to Caltech as an undergrad, MIT for my PhD, and then returned to Caltech as faculty for 30 years. I was the Provost for the last nine. I […]
Coinciding with Truman’s historic upset over Dewey, Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger published the first known ranking of U.S. presidents in Life magazine in November 1948. Schlesinger’s methodology was simple: he surveyed an array of historians and political scientists, asking them to rank presidents from “Failure” to “Great.” Schlesinger repeated his survey in 1962.
Twenty years later, the Siena College Research Institute (SCRI) took up the mantle of ranking presidents. The SCRI conducts its survey every second year of the first term of a new president. Other outlets have benefited from the presidential-ranking game as well. C-SPAN has released a poll with every new president since 2000. These types of rankings are also published by the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, The History News Network, The Times, and the United States Presidency Centre in London. However, the mainstay of the presidential ranking remains the SCRI. As we shall see, there are three significant problems with this methodology: presentism, the evolving role of the presidency, and sui generis.
Left to right: James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison
The Problem of PresentismPresentism is “the tendency to interpret the past in present terms,”1 and therein lies the first of the three major fallacies of ranking presidential performance. Cultural norms evolve over time, and it is impossible to predict how these cultural norms will change in the future.
In 2001, only 35 percent of Americans supported samesex marriage,2 and George W. Bush was re-elected in 2004 after backing a constitutional amendment banning it.3 His predecessor, Bill Clinton, signed The Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, one of the most discriminatory anti-gay statutes in American history.4 Barack Obama opposed gay marriage when he first ran for president.5 Yet today, 75 percent of Americans support same-sex marriage.6 Times change, and so do attitudes.
Our current social norms recognize the importance of electing an African American to the Executive Office. The day after Barack Obama became the first African American U.S. president, the occasion was so historic, the public clamored for newspapers to save and the November 5, 2008 issue of the New York Times hit $400 on eBay.7 Around the world, Obama’s victory was hailed as nothing short of amazing.8
Will Obama’s historic accomplishment be remembered as such, though? When Americans reflect on the legacy of John F. Kennedy, they note his idealism, his ability to inspire, and his untimely death. What is not often recalled is that JFK was also our first non-Protestant president and anti-Catholic bigotry was still very much in the mainstream when he was nominated.
Our attitudes towards tragedies have changed as well. President Joe Biden’s lowest ranking is “Luck” (he ranks 34th). This most likely reflects the tragedies Biden endured prior to assuming the office; in 1972, then Senator-elect Biden suffered the loss of his first wife and daughter in a car accident, and would lose his son Beau to brain cancer in 2015. While Biden’s losses are indeed tragic, the choice to use this in rating his unluckiness crystallizes the problem of presentism in ranking presidents. In fact, more than half (25 of 46) of our presidents have lost children before, during, or after their time in office. Surely the loss of a child is the most painful experience any parent can have, but Joe Biden is not alone (i.e., “unlucky”) in this respect.
The Evolving Role of The PresidencyIn addition to the survey, respondents are asked simple “yes/no” questions including “Is the Presidency growing too big?” Nearly half (44 percent) responded, “yes,” 35 percent responded “no,” and the remaining 21 percent did not respond. The question itself affirms the second major fallacy in “ranking” presidents: the job has changed dramatically since President Washington took office.
Consider the subcategory “Executive Appointments.” Washington appointed a total of four advisors, including Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of State) and Alexander Hamilton (Secretary of The Treasury). There are now 15 executive cabinet positions. Despite this, respondents today are asked to compare and contrast presidents who served in colonial times with those considering tax breaks for Americans who buy solar-powered automobiles.9
Left to right: Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, and Rutherford B. Hayes
Sui GenerisThe third fallacy of presidential ranking surveys is the fact that each president faced his own unique challenges. Sui generis is a Latin term that translates to “of its own kind,” and refers to anything that is peculiar to itself: of its own kind or class. And no job is more of its own kind than the U.S. presidency.
Below, I’ve included an analysis of the three broad categories used to construct the SCRI rankings: “attributes,” “abilities,” and “accomplishments,” with select subcategories included to highlight the most obvious limitations.
AttributesFamilyPresidents should neither be given credit nor blamed for their ancestry. With a single exception, all presidents have been White Christian men of relative affluence. Being the son of a president also factors heavily into the Siena College ranking: John Quincy Adams ranks second in this category, and George W. Bush ranks 22 (his highest ranking). Interestingly, George H.W. Bush’s father, Prescott Bush, served as a U.S. Senator, yet Bush Sr. ranks 14 places higher (8) than his son Dubya.
EducationBarack Obama, who graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law school, ranks 24th in this category. He is ranked just above Grover Cleveland (26), who dropped out of school at age 16 but well below George Washington (7), who dropped out at 11. Woodrow Wilson (8), who earned a PhD in political science from Johns Hopkins University, ranks well above Calvin Coolidge (32), who graduated cum laude from Amherst, but well below John Adams (3), who graduated 15th in a class of 24 at Harvard.
ExperienceUntil Donald Trump (44), every president was either a military leader, governor, senator, or representative (state or federal). Perhaps our most qualified president was James Buchanan (36), who served five terms in the House of Representatives, a decade in the Senate, and was Secretary of State under Polk and Pierce’s Minister to Great Britain. Historians rightly deem “Old Buck” a failure for thinking the issue of slavery would be readily accepted by the country following the Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court, which ruled that the U.S. Constitution did not extend American citizenship to people of Black African descent, and thus they could not enjoy the rights and privileges the Constitution conferred upon American citizens. He was followed in office by a man who lost more races than he won: Lincoln (28) was a failed Whig Representative from the Illinois frontier who, during his time in office, abolished slavery and preserved the union.
Left to right: James Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, Grover Cleveland, and Woodrow Wilson
IntegrityIf nothing else, Grover Cleveland (ranked 26th) was a man of integrity. The only president to serve two non-consecutive terms, he was known for his spotless record. Cleveland paid child support for a son he may have fathered as a bachelor in 1874. When he ran for the Presidency, the Republicans discovered this, and hecklers soon chanted “Ma! Ma! Where’s your pa?” Cleveland’s supporters asked him how he wanted to address the issue. Cleveland simply replied, “Above all, tell the truth.” The sole Gilded Age Democrat in the White House, he vetoed 584 bills, including 238 pocket vetoes (414 first term, 170 second term), more than all other presidents before him, combined. Cleveland’s last words? “I have tried so hard to do right.”
Despite this, historians surveyed at Siena found reasons to rank Ronald Reagan (24) two places higher than Cleveland in the “integrity” category. In contrast to the budget-slashing/reform-minded Cleveland, Reagan’s defense spending increased while entitlements stayed roughly equal. Reagan’s budgets tripled the deficit and grew the national debt from $995 billion to $2.9 trillion, more than was accumulated in the entire prior history of the United States.10 It is $31 trillion today.
Reagan’s Presidency was also marked by numerous scandals. In addition to Iran-Contra, the Reagan years saw HUD rigging, Wedtech, and the EPA Superfund misallocation. And let’s not forget the Savings & Loan crisis. As Martin Mayer rightly described in The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry, the S&L scandal dwarfed previous scandals like Teapot Dome under Harding (42) and Credit Mobilier under Grant (25). The scandals resulted in the investigation, indictment, or conviction of over 138 administration officials, the largest number for any president in American history up until that time.
ImaginationHow does one gauge how imaginative a president was, exactly? Judging from his love of jokes and his speeches, Lincoln (1) was certainly imaginative. He even held a patent, for a flotation device for harboring ships. Musical proficiency may also be indicative of imagination. At least 11 presidents were musicians, Jefferson (2), Truman (5), and Nixon (21) being especially proficient. Nixon appeared on the Jack Paar Show with a classical piece of his own, “Concerto #1.” He also invited Ella Fitzgerald to the White House and backed her up on the piano.
Herbert Hoover, though, ranks 35th in imagination. Most historians now give Hoover credit11 as a good, capable administrator who found himself in the wrong place at the wrong time. In fact, prior to his presidency, Hoover made a name for himself organizing shipments of food for starving millions in Central Europe following World War 1 and then organized massive relief for victims of the Great Mississippi Flood in 1927. After the Crash of 1929, Hoover submitted bills to Congress to create the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to aid businesses and loan federal money to states to feed the unemployed while expanding public works.12 Following his presidency, he spent his days railing against the New Deal,13 meeting Hitler,14 opposing the atomic bomb,15 and serving Truman in further expanding food relief in war-torn Europe. Hoover was equally prodigious as an author, writing books ranging from foreign policy to his own childhood to fly fishing.16 The man was anything but unimaginative.
Left to right: Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt
IntelligenceNo intelligence test has ever been administered to any sitting president, and most died before intelligence tests were invented. However, some studies have been conducted that estimate presidential intelligence with varying findings. The Gough Adjective Check List (1965) has been applied to presidents through the years, as has the Historical Figures Assessment (1977). Simonton (2006) determined “intellectual brilliance” by the statistical technique of factor analyzing 14 distinct descriptors ranging from “curious” and “wise” to “inventive” and “artistic.”17 Predictably, he found Thomas Jefferson’s score (3.1) most “intellectually brilliant,” nearly three times that of his closest runner-up, John Quincy Adams (1.2). The Siena poll ranks John Quincy Adams fifth in intelligence (behind his father [4]), Madison (3), Lincoln (2), and Jefferson (1). James Garfield (20) and Chester Arthur (36) rank near the middle. Both were multilingual, easily conversing in Greek, Latin, and English. Garfield was ambidextrous and able to write simultaneously in both dead languages. He also spoke and campaigned in German. Garfield and Arthur also somehow manage to rank lower than Lyndon Johnson (22), who dropped out of Southwest Texas State Teachers College, now Texas State University, after one year to teach elementary school. (Johnson would return and graduate a year later). Intelligence is among FDR’s (10) lowest categories, though he ranks higher than Garfield and Arthur. This is, perhaps, because “The Boss” was likewise fluent in German, Latin, and French before he entered Groton Preparatory School.18
According to the survey, Donald Trump is the least intelligent president we’ve ever had. The participants’ decision may have been affected by Trump’s refusal to reveal his grades from Fordham and Wharton, the latter from which he earned a B.S. in economics. This ranks Trump less intelligent than Andrew Johnson (42) and Zachary Taylor (32), neither of whom was fully literate until adulthood.
The literature reveals that every sitting president was regularly derided for their lack of intelligence and/ or lack of fitness for the office during their tenure. Biden (27) regularly endures being labeled “stupid” by his detractors,19 and Barack Obama (9) was called a “retard” by Ann Coulter.20 George W. Bush (41) was described as a “numbskull,”21 and his predecessor Bill Clinton (8) was called an “idiot.”22 Even Thomas Jefferson (2), probably the smartest man ever to hold the office, was described by none other than John Adams as “unfit for office (…) a child, a dupe to his party.”23
Interestingly, Warren G. Harding is near the bottom at 43. The child of doctors, he entered college at the age of 14. He also famously went camping with other “unintelligent low achievers” Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and Harvey Samuel Firestone.24
Willingness to Take RisksRisk-taking only ranks favorably if the risk taken benefits the country. Polk (7) was willing to risk the lives of American soldiers in the name of Manifest Destiny. The Mexican American War was, as described by then-Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant (18), “one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. It was an instance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory.”25 Regardless of the reasons for the war, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo garnered 55 percent of Mexican Territory, which now includes parts of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah.26
Left to right: Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon
George W. Bush (20) was willing to take risks, certainly. His preemptive and unnecessary invasion and occupation of Iraq was disastrous.27 Nixon (12) was willing to risk taping himself, including the “Watergate cover-up” conversations that would lead to his resignation.
AbilitiesAbility to CompromiseA sitting president’s ability to compromise is worthy of judgment. But here again, context is crucial and every president faces a different challenge. Franklin Roosevelt (4) had an easier task before him in getting Congress to compromise in 1932 and 1936 than presidents without majorities in both Houses.28 His successor, Truman (12), famously battled with the “Do Nothing” Congress, and Bill Clinton (3) governed like a conservative after his party lost seats in both Houses.
If there was ever a president known for compromise though, it would be Rutherford B. Hayes (23). In 1876, Hayes lost the popular vote to Democrat Samuel Tilden. Worse yet, no clear winner emerged because the outcomes in South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana were unclear, and both parties claimed victory. A compromise was reached in the form of the Electoral Commission Act; the commission decided that Hayes and the Republicans would take the White House, and, in return, federal troops would be removed from the South.29 This “compromise” resulted in the end of Reconstruction and the rise of the Southern Democratic Party (and White Supremacy) until the mid-1960s.30
Communication Ability (Speak, Write)Donald Trump (43) was the most effective media manipulator the Executive Office ever held. In an era in which millions are regularly spent on political ads, Trump received over $2 billion in free media coverage, more than all of his primary and general election opponent(s) combined.31 His preferred communication channel of social media amassed nearly 150 million followers by the end of his presidency. Yet he has ranked 39 places below Thomas Jefferson, (4) who was such a terrible public speaker that he refused to deliver a State of the Union address to Congress. Instead, Jefferson sent a letter, a tradition that stood until Woodrow Wilson (7) addressed Congress in person in 1913.
AccomplishmentsParty LeadershipJimmy Carter (36) failed to work with his own party, as evidenced by Ted Kennedy’s challenge at the 1980 Democratic Convention.32 Carter is ranked only two spots above Franklin Pierce (38), whose own party ran an “Anyone but Pierce” campaign at his party’s 1852 convention.33
Left to right: Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clint
George Washington (18) was apparently far better at working with his party than either Carter or Pierce. This is perplexing, as The Father of our Country not only didn’t have a political party but warned about them in his final address and died believing they were unnecessary.34
Relationship with CongressJames Monroe (5), enjoyed the “Era of Good Feelings” in 1815, following the U.S.’ loss to Britain in the War of 1812. However, George W. Bush also enjoyed a similar “Era of Good Feelings” following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when his approval rating hit 92 percent,35 and his Party easily expanded their majority in the midterms. Seven days later, all members of the 107th Congress except Barbara Lee of California voted to authorize President Bush to use military force against those responsible.36 In spite of all this, Bush ranked a distant 22nd.
Court AppointmentsEasily the worst and most disastrous Supreme Court decision ever issued was that of Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857). As noted in a previous section, James Buchanan (43) expected that the issue of slavery dividing the country would be settled by the Taney Court’s ruling. It is perplexing then, that the man who appointed Taney to SCOTUS twice (Andrew Jackson) is ranked 30, a full 13 points above Buchanan. Four presidents—William Henry Harrison (42), Zachary Taylor (37), Andrew Johnson (44), and Jimmy Carter (19)—made no SCOTUS appointments at all. Yet only Carter is ranked higher than Jackson.
Domestic AccomplishmentsIn “Domestic Accomplishments,” Thomas Jefferson (6) is ranked very highly. In 1803, the Senate ratified a treaty with France, promoted by President Jefferson, that doubled the landmass of the new country, eventually encompassing 15 states. It is puzzling, then, that Franklin Pierce is ranked near the bottom in this category (41), even though he signed the Gadsen Purchase in 1851, in which Mexico sold 29,670 square miles of land that eventually became southern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico.37
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.2
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Foreign Policy AccomplishmentsHere Franklin Roosevelt ranks first, followed by Lincoln, and then Washington. Each led as world-altering wars were being fought. Donald Trump ranks 45th in this category, with historians declaring him the worst foreign policy president ever. Trump brokered agreements between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, and also withdrew from The Trans-Pacific Partnership, bombed Syria twice, and left the Paris Climate Agreement. All these decisions pale in comparison to ignoring secession, a sin committed by the three presidents who preceded Lincoln. One could argue that the Civil War shouldn’t fall under “foreign policy accomplishments.” If this is the case, then, why rank Lincoln so highly?
Left to right: George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald J. Trump, and Joe Biden
Avoid Crucial MistakesEasily the most crucial mistake a president can make is committing troops to an unnecessary war. Such a mistake is made even worse when the war is lost. In 2003, George W. Bush (38) committed this mistake by invading Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted nine years, cost trillions of dollars, caused hundreds of thousands of Iraqi military and civilian deaths and thousands of U.S. military casualties.
Worse still was The War of 1812. James Madison’s decision to go to war with Great Britain cost 15,000 American lives,38 yet Madison (11) almost cracks the top 10!
Presidents can and should be judged by their performance in office. But presentism, the evolving role of the office, and the fact that each president faces unique challenges, makes ranking them no more reliable than a parlor game.
About the AuthorJohn D. Van Dyke is an academic and science educator. His personal website is www.vandykerevue.org.
References1. https://bit.ly/3Zsxf0K 2. https://pewrsr.ch/40LfZF2 3. https://bit.ly/3nyjnEI 4. https://bit.ly/3TPYbGB 5. https://bit.ly/3lKOfS9 6. https://bit.ly/3LX0q92 7. https://reut.rs/3lPKUB4 8. https://bit.ly/3zhigfp 9. https://bit.ly/3zcSQzD 10. Yergin, D. & Stanislaw, J. (1998). The Commanding Heights. The Free Press. 11. https://bit.ly/2uK4JeT 12. https://bit.ly/2ExgGwp 13. https://bit.ly/3JR4AN7 14. https://bit.ly/3G12md0 15. https://bit.ly/3KfHMbe 16. https://bit.ly/3TQBpOM 17. Simonton, D. K. (2006). Presidential IQ, Openness, Intellectual Brilliance, and Leadership: Estimates and Correlations for 42 U.S. Chief Executives. Political Psychology, 27(4), 511–526. 18. Wink, J. (2015). 1944: FDR and the Year That Changed History. Simon and Schuster. 19. https://bit.ly/3KkwWRq 20. https://cnn.it/3TVihPF 21. https://bit.ly/3lOsb9b 22. https://bit.ly/3zfh6AX 23. Adams, J. (1981). Diary of John Quincy Adams, Volume 1 November 1779–March 1786. D.G. Allen, M. Friedlaender, R.J. Taylor, & C. Walker (Eds.). Harvard University Press. 24. https://bit.ly/40IifwO 25. https://to.pbs.org/2Mp29oz 26. https://bit.ly/42OsvFy 27. https://bit.ly/3lOOtrp 28. https://bit.ly/3Kide8D 29. https://bit.ly/42RTv6U 30. Gillette, W. (1982). Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869–1879. Louisiana State University Press. 31. Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis. Princeton University Press. 32. https://n.pr/3nvHVhO 33. https://n.pr/2xrtHUJ 34. https://bit.ly/2NlyIWS 35. https://bit.ly/3ZlRixD 36. https://cnn.it/3ZpcYsP 37. https://bit.ly/3Zpkm7p 38. https://bit.ly/3G1Ldzw
The world faces two energy crises: (1) too much, because we are changing the Earth’s climate and chemistry and so inviting global catastrophe; and (2) too little, because the bulk of humanity still lives in poverty, without enough for a decent standard of living. The answer to both is to go nuclear. Upon examination, the arguments made against nuclear energy, including: emissions, waste disposal, accidents, and proliferation are shown to be exaggerated, unfounded, or soluble using even currently available technology.
The Paris Accords have been a failure in reducing global warming. Solar and wind energy have not been the panacea environmentalists promised. To avoid catastrophic economic impacts, the United States needs to keep producing oil and gas until other ways of mitigating global warming can be found. Fracking has helped turn the United States into the world’s leading oil and gas producer. But the health of future Earth relies on keeping a strong economy while we transition away from oil…
Advances in civilization are driven by the availability of excess energy. As the human population has exploded over the past two centuries, the global consumption of energy has also drastically expanded. But the current economic model is unsustainable without the development of a clean, unlimited source of energy. Space-based solar power (SBSP) can directly access the power of the Sun, and has the potential to be that clean, unlimited baseload power source of energy for the entire planet.
After her wrongful conviction for murder in 2007, Amanda Knox was haunted by one question: why? Why did this happen? How could the pursuit of justice have gone so far off course? Corruption and evil were not satisfactory answers for her. Instead, she found understanding through the study of motivated reasoning and cognitive bias, which led her see how well-intentioned people could have arrived at such false conclusions, and how she herself could become a better thinker.
The monsters of fiction and film function as coping mechanisms and cautionary tales, and sometimes fill voids in otherwise pedestrian lives. Most will remain fiction, but one — ironically, the most far-fetched — seems to be slowly taking shape.
Media coverage often claims scholastic admissions tests (e.g., SAT, GRE) are inaccurate, inequitable, and ineffective because: (1) any racial/ethnic differences are caused by test bias; (2) tests don’t predict anything important; (3) tests merely reflect wealth not acquired skills or academic potential; so (4) admissions would be fairer without them. This article presents mainstream scientific evidence that each claim is false. Since admission test scores are the most resistant to bias, getting rid of them would make admissions less fair.
Despite much ballyhoo in the media, all efforts thus far have failed to provide substantive evidence that might link the appearance of UFOs, now called UAPs (unidentified aerial phenomena), with aliens from other planets. This failure results from limitations imposed by both biology and distance. As Morton Tavel explains, when these factors are combined, they render any such contacts virtually impossible.
Alternative archaeologist Graham Hancock has for 40 years been writing bestselling books about the possibility of a lost ancient civilization that existed long before the Egyptians, Hittites, and Babylonians, and now he hosts a wildly popular Netflix documentary series called Ancient Apocalypse in which he presents his theories about what destroyed this lost civilization, which he suggests is described in the legend and myth of Atlantis, in stunning cinematographic beauty. But is it true? In this analysis of the documentary series and Hancock’s theories Michael Shermer considers the evidence and finds it wanting.
Who are the “magicians of the gods,” in Graham Hancock's alternative history series Ancient Apocalype on Netflix, and where did they come from? Professor of geology, Marc Defant, applies critical thinking to Hancock's historical and literary research to identify the erroneous conclusions in both his series and in his many books, which have been highly influential in presenting Hancock’s alternative theory of history to those less prepared to evaluate the evidence (or lack thereof).
Skeptic: Are you one of the insiders that those in power consult?
Blinder: I don’t think I’m an insider anymore, but I certainly was once. I went to Princeton University, where I majored in economics, and then went to graduate school at the London School of Economics, and then MIT for my PhD. I was one of several economic advisers to candidate Bill Clinton in 1992, and then when he won the election, I joined his administration as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers. Clinton then nominated me for the Federal Reserve Board.
Skeptic: What really goes on at the Federal Reserve? As you know, there are a number of conspiracy theories surrounding it, from political favoritism to secretly running the world…
Blinder: The Federal Reserve is placid, quiet, well-mannered, and orderly… if anybody said anything that sounded political in a partisan sense, you could see the other faces around sort of scowling. That was unlike working in the Clinton White House, or any White House, Republican or Democrat, which is inherently political. Another difference is that the Fed decides what it’s going to do with interest rates, and then it just happens. It doesn’t go up to the chairman of some congressional committee, or the White House, or anybody else. On the other hand, if you make a “decision” in the White House, that’s only the first step! Then the decision meets the Congress, and usually gets changed in many, many ways.
Skeptic: Yet, you openly state that you are a left-leaning liberal. Why would that matter in economics? Scientists, for example, would not say anything like, “I’m a left-leaning physicist.”
Blinder: Simple — it’s a policy science. It’s analyzing historical and current events and making recommendations. If you’re involved in the policy side of economics (not everybody is, but I have been for decades), you’re making decisions that often involve value judgments. Here’s a very simple example: What should we do with the tax code? If we’re cutting taxes, who should get the benefits? Rich people, poor people, middle-class people? All those things have political aspects, and if you’re involved in the actual policy formulation, you’re going to be involved in some way with politicians.
Skeptic: You’re saying that we know the effects of raising taxes or lowering taxes, or the effects of a flat tax, progressive tax, or regressive tax, and that these concepts have mathematical reasoning behind them. But how should society decide which is the “right” tax? We might think the poor should be helped more or the rich should get tax breaks. But that’s not a scientific matter. That’s more of a political question.
Blinder: Absolutely, but it has scientific aspects because in each case you want to know what the side effects are. If you’re helping the poor or the rich, what might be the negative side effects? There are technical scientific aspects to it, but ultimately these things are decided in Congress, and there politics is ruling the roost.
Skeptic: When discussing economics, you often hear terms such as GDP (Gross Domestic Product, that is, the market value of all the final goods and services produced and sold in a specific time period). Is it a reliable measure of an economy’s health?
Blinder: The P in GDP stands for product. It’s a measure of production, and as a measure of production, it’s pretty good. But there are other things in societies that matter. How healthy are people? How long are they living? Are they happy? These are not measured in GDP.
Skeptic: Other frequently used terms that confuse people are monetary and fiscal policies. What’s the difference between them?
Blinder: Monetary policy has to do with interest rates, the money supply, and credit lending — things that the Central Bank of a country (in the case of the US, the Federal Reserve) either has control over (interest rates) or a lot of influence over (the money supply and credit). Fiscal policy refers to things that are outside the scope of the Federal Reserve and are controlled, in short, by the duly elected political government, which includes the President and his Administration, the Congress, and the apparatus that works for the Congress. They develop and decide on fiscal policy, which pertains to taxes, transfer payments like unemployment benefits, welfare, and Social Security, but also government purchases of goods and services. For example, how many soldiers will we have? How many judges will we have? How many FBI agents will we have? How many IRS agents will we have? The Federal Reserve has nothing to do with any of those things.
Skeptic: Is there a strong wall separating those two?
Blinder: Yes. When it is breached, it creates controversy. One example is Arthur Burns, Chair of the Federal Reserve heavily influenced by Richard Nixon. Another example, going in the other direction, came when Alan Greenspan endorsed the Bush tax cuts in 2001. That got a lot of economists concerned about the Fed poaching over the line and therefore inviting the fiscal authorities to do the same in the other direction, which could result in terrible monetary policy. But it’s important to note that the Federal Reserve has no standing in the Constitution at all. It’s not even mentioned in the Constitution. And the U.S. Congress, if they could pass a bill and get the President to sign it — these are big ifs — could abolish the Fed tomorrow or control the Fed tomorrow. It has that right. That’s not true in all countries. In some other countries, the central bank does have constitutional protection.
Skeptic: A lot of people put the Fed up there, just below the Illuminati, thinking there are these guys in a dark room somewhere with their cigars, making decisions. What do you think about these types of conspiracy theories?
Blinder: I understand that feeling. First of all, the Federal Reserve does have real power and can set interest rates. It doesn’t have to ask the President or the chairs of the relevant committees in Congress, or anybody else. If you went back decades, the Federal Reserve quite deliberately cloaked itself in mystery. It had the attitude of “we don’t say anything, and if we say it, we say it cryptically.” There’s a famous incident of Alan Greenspan testifying to a committee in Congress, and after one of these Greenspan perorations of twisted prose and dangling participles, a senator said, “well, I understand what you mean Mr. Chairman.” And Greenspan looked him in the eye and said, “if you understood what I said, I must have misspoken.” That was the attitude of the Federal Reserve back then. It’s not the attitude now. Tune in to one of current Chairman Jay Powell’s press conferences. He speaks plain English. He takes questions from the press. It’s just one example of how much the Fed, and other central banks too, have changed on this dimension over the decades.
Skeptic: Let’s talk about current events. Since we’re living through inflation now and the Fed is raising interest rates, what are the causes and effects there? How is raising interest rates going to cause prices to go down? For example, if I own a small retail store and the interest rate on my loan to run my business and pay my rent or mortgage goes up, don’t I have to raise my prices to cover the higher costs of doing business?
Blinder: The short-term interest rate influences every other interest rate in the economy — consumer loans, business loans, mortgages, and the government’s borrowing costs. That doesn’t deter the federal government, but if you’re running a state or local government, your borrowing costs go up and you may spend less, e.g., build fewer roads. If you’re a consumer, you may not buy the house that you thought you would buy because the mortgage rate is higher or the car that you thought you might buy, because the auto lending rate is higher. If you’re a business, you may not make the investment that was kind of on the margin. And finally, when the Fed pushes interest rates up, that tends to kick the stock market down.
Skeptic: That doesn’t sound good. In the example you just gave, don’t we want the business owner to take the loan and expand their business?
Blinder: We do in good times, including in noninflationary times. But if you read The Federal Reserve Act, it gives the Federal Reserve the responsibility to keep inflation low. And when inflation is up 6–8 percent, it’s not low, and so the Fed’s legal responsibility is to bring inflation down. How far down? Well, about 10 years ago when Ben Bernanke was chairman, the Fed enunciated a numerical target, two percent for a particular measure of inflation, called the deflator for personal consumer expenditures. The current inflation is way too high, and the Fed has no magic wand to bring it down. What they have is control over interest rates, which slows down the economy. If you’re asking, isn’t it generally good for businesses to invest? Yes, it is. But if you’re trying to slow down the economy, you need to have less of that. And that’s what they’re doing.
Skeptic: And about inflation itself, why are prices going up, most notably for essential goods like gasoline and food?
Blinder: Crude oil prices are a significant factor, and it costs more for two main reasons. One was the whole world started recovering rapidly from the pandemic recession — all the countries at once. And that raised the demand and, consequently, the price of oil. Then Russia invaded Ukraine — both major sources of oil — which constricted supply, shooting the price up even further. When oil is so much more expensive, that quickly expands to energy in general, because a lot of energy is generated directly or indirectly by oil or other fossil fuels related to oil. Another thing that’s aggravating people these days is the higher prices they see in the grocery store. A lot of that can be traced to the war in Ukraine as well. Ukraine and Russia were major sources of wheat, corn, and fertilizer, and the war meant that the supplies were constricted. And then the third thing is slightly more subtle, which is the apparent difficulty of (and greater than most U.S. economists thought it would be) setting the supply side of the economy straight again after the dislocations from the pandemic.
Many economists like myself, and I admit this error, overestimated how fast capitalism would do its usual work. When capitalists see opportunities for profit, e.g., when the price of something is high, they come in and supply it and make a lot of money. That’s happening, but it’s happening slowly. We are also having difficulties with the supplies of many industrial inputs. The one that’s gotten the most attention, but it’s just an example, is computer chips. It’s hard to find a new car these days because a car is a bunch of computer chips with wheels. And the automakers can’t get enough computer chips to make enough cars. The final reason is we probably had what economists call an overshoot of production beyond full employment. A boom that went too far. You’ll have noticed that the unemployment rate, which peaked at the worst month of the pandemic at almost 15 percent, is now down to 3.7 percent — one of the lowest numbers we’ve had in the entire post-war period. When you get an overshoot, you get peak demand for things, and that drives prices up.
Skeptic: Right, but why are American farmers raising their prices? Why does that have anything to do with Ukraine?
Blinder: It does because a lot of agricultural products, such as crops, are sold in world markets, just like oil. So, the price of wheat, to an American in America, is not going to be very different from the price of wheat in France or in Indonesia. When the crop from Ukraine is not available for sale, that raises the price of wheat, including what American farmers get for their wheat.
Skeptic: Sometimes you hear that one of the drivers of inflation is that the government just “prints too much money,” for example, for all the different programs such as the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the Paycheck Protection Program, and so forth. How can the government just print money or borrow money without it driving up inflation?
Blinder: Fiscal policies that are not tax-financed — some are, but many are not — add to the budget deficit. They have to be financed either by printing money or floating debt instruments, which we call government bonds. The federal government debt has been exploding in recent years because of the very large budget deficits. When the pandemic struck, the government started writing checks to a great number of people, and they were not financed by printing money by the Fed. They were financed by government debt. That kind of activity tends to push up interest rates.
Skeptic: Let’s look at some history. Kennedy was really a fiscal conservative, not so different from Eisenhower or Nixon. Where did things start to change?
Blinder: Eisenhower thought deficits were harmful and immoral. In the Eisenhower years, we actually ran a surplus. I think the Reagan years were, in many ways, a turning point in terms of the attitudes of both political parties toward budget deficits. Reagan came in with the pledge to cut income taxes, which would be balanced by serious cuts in spending and faster economic growth. The spending cuts never really happened to any large extent. The boom never happened either. But the tax cuts did happen. And at the end of the Reagan years, we were stuck with — by American standards — very large budget deficits as a share of GDP. The deficits lingered through several attempts by both Republicans and Democrats to bring them under control. There was some success in that regard under Bush Sr., but the big step came from Bill Clinton, which was both tax increases and spending cuts.
Skeptic: Would you describe Clinton as a fiscal conservative?
Blinder: I think that’s right. By the end of the Clinton administration, we were running sizable surpluses in the federal government. And there was actually talk about what might happen if we paid off the whole national debt. It sounds so silly now.
Skeptic: Let’s end by addressing the stock market elephant in the room. Are we witnessing the end of the Bull Market that began after the 2008/2009 recession? Are stocks no longer a good investment?
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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Blinder: Whenever I hear that the stock market has hit yet another record high, I think “yes, they should hit a record high every day, a little bit higher than the previous day…on average.” Of course, the stock market doesn’t behave that way at all! It goes through extremes — up, down, up, down… But over the long run there’s a clear pronounced upward trend. Yet over short periods of time, it’s not unusual for the stock market to go up 20 percent or down 20 percent. Every time it goes down — like now — people cringe because it doesn’t feel very good… But these declines have happened many times in the past, and the stock market always makes up the lost ground. The wise thing to do is not watch the market every day. Be in it for the long haul.
This print interview has been edited from a longer conversation with Blinder on The Michael Shermer Show that you can watch or listen to.
About the IntervieweeAlan S. Blinder is a Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, a former Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, and a former member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. A regular columnist for the Wall Street Journal, he is the author of many books, including the New York Times bestseller After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead. His new book is A Monetary and Fiscal History of the United States.
A review of A First Look at Second Sight by Bob Loomis (2022) and Cues: Variations on the Second Sight Act by Leo Behnke (2005)How can people appear telepathic, and what is the history of duos demonstrating this type of mindreading as entertainment?
Two-person theatrical mindreading acts have been popular in the U.S. and Europe since the mid-1800s, with even earlier roots. In the most common form of this telepathy act, small objects shown to one partner roaming in the audience are correctly identified by the second performer, who is blindfolded and on stage, with no apparent communication between them.
The history of these acts is discussed most thoroughly in the groundbreaking book A First Look at Second Sight by Bob Loomis, in which he also scatters advice to would-be performers throughout. Cues: Variations on the Second Sight Act by Leo Behnke sketches some leading performers’ careers (including more recent ones), but most of the book is about how to perform such an act. The words in these titles reflect their respective subjects: “Second Sight” was an earlier common name for the two-person telepathy performance (also known as “clairvoyance”), while the use of secret “cues” from one performer to the other has been the most frequently (and clandestinely) employed method to accomplish this illusion.
A crude variant of the telepathy trick was revealed in the earliest book to substantively discuss magic tricks in English, The Discoverie of Witchcraft in 1584. Two-person mindreading was occasionally performed by magicians over the next two and a half centuries but only became common among stage magicians with the successful 1840s show of the highly influential magician Jean Eugene Robert-Houdin (from whom Houdini took his stage name), and specialists are mostly a somewhat later development. In the early 20th century, the most famous performers of such an act were the husband-and-wife duo, The Zancigs. Both Behnke and Loomis agree that the Zancigs presentation of the act was superior to all others. The Sharrocks and Mercedes both had repeat bookings at the prestigious Palace Theater in New York, Eddie Fields and his partner had a long and successful career (mostly in department stores), while The Roberts were booked regularly and for high fees for decades in theaters and nightclubs.
In total, more than a hundred successful teams are profiled in detail, and a few dozen more are listed in Loomis’s A First Look at Second Sight, while Behnke’s Cues provides much shorter entries on half as many. Most acts consisted of a man and a woman, but a man and a boy were common in the earlier years, and other variations have appeared. Even some mind-reading animal acts are profiled by Loomis, with many more listed in an appendix.
These acts were most commonly called “second sight” in the 19th century and “telepathy” or “clairvoyance” more recently. The fundamental technique utilized is the secret communication of information from the performer in the audience to their partner on stage. Although Behnke and Loomis both give examples of electronics being secretly used to accomplish this, the authors agree that (even at its peak) electronics were usually only a supplement to other techniques. By far, the most common clandestine method was the use of elaborate spoken codes or a similarly vast array of subtle visual cues.
For example, if the performer in the audience borrows keys from an audience member, “keys” could be coded to his blindfolded onstage partner by saying “What object am I holding?” while the phrase “Which object am I holding?” could indicate that, say, a dollar bill has been loaned. How many variants of the question can be used in a way that won’t arouse suspicion? This becomes even more challenging when we learn that dates and even serial numbers were commonly transmitted. My favorite example of an uncommon object successfully coded was a model of a gas stove from someone’s pocket! Both books caution that some people who tried the act gave it up because of the vast amount of memorization and relentless practice required to perform the act effectively.
Some of the best acts confirm the skeptic’s dictum that the unexplained is not the same as the unexplainable. As such, despite mostly appearing as entertainers, two-person mindreading acts have often been perceived as exemplifying real psychic powers. The Zancigs were studied by The Society for Psychical Research (SPR), and even a century later, a leading reference book1 on them says in part that “Mrs. Zancig had well-developed clairvoyant faculties,” though the author acknowledges that other authorities deduced that they used trickery in the form of an elaborate code to create this illusion. The team of Blackburn and Smith had been tested by the same SPR in the 1880s and were determined to be genuine, though one of them later confessed that they indeed employed trickery. The Piddingtons were heard by 20 million London radio listeners in 1949. They initially denied that their work was genuine telepathy, but their manager stated otherwise, and a prominent newspaper called for the SPR to test them as well.
There are other ethical challenges faced by performing mind readers. Worst of all, at least a few of these performers went so far as to provide lucrative private counseling based on the strength of their mind-reading ability, a tragic dilemma dramatized in both the original 1947 film as well as the recent 2021 remake of William Lindsay Gresham’s novel, Nightmare Alley. Some skeptics may also be disappointed at learning of the number of performers who supplemented their income by selling horoscopes, which Behnke encourages.
My criticism of the groundbreaking Loomis book is mostly stylistic: it reads like a rough draft; a manuscript in need of a content editor and a style rewrite. Repetition can be a teaching tool, but here it reads more like sloppiness. For example, discussion of the book’s origin confusingly overlaps between the foreword and the first chapter, while the much later discussion of the variant act using animals explains how pigs were trained for this before stating that pigs were the most used animal because they were easily trainable. Worse, there are several instances in which a profile of a performer ends with Loomis writing about a newly discovered book or article, adding to or even changing what is written on the preceding pages!
As a “how-to” text, Loomis’s book is equally disorganized. Integrating remarks on technique into a history text is not inherently bad, but it is difficult to do well, especially when that history is presented as a series of biographies. This can lead to both confusion and repetition. The primary tactic Loomis uses is pointing out what can be learned from a particular act’s experience in the form of uniform “Observations.” Some of these are useful for anyone (“Observation 27: Don’t believe everything you read.”), any entertainer (“Observation 8: Have an applause-pulling ending.”), or stage psychics only: (“Observation 9: Do not claim genuine ESP.”). One blunder in applying this format is that although he uses these 39 “Observations” throughout the text, they are not listed until an appendix. As a teaching technique, I might have found these “Observations” more effective if summed up, in addition to, or instead of, being scattered throughout the text.
Similarly, although non-academic conversational tone and tangential comments can make a text livelier, Loomis overdoes this to the point of tedium, for example, “No pun intended—Okay, we admit it. It was!” The book is also burdened by frequent paragraph-long discussions of “Trivia” (such as the number of magicians—not only telepathy performers—who flew airplanes). Meanwhile, his core subject of performer profiles is also uneven, ranging from half a page to several pages, with length not always proportionate to their influence, fame, or success with the act.
Some problems with Loomis book might have been easily avoided. Parts of the backmatter, especially Appendix B, could have been either rearranged or integrated into the main text. With so much discussion of the influence of one performer on another, or comparison of techniques between acts, the book’s reverse chronological format can be awkward, and the lack of a useful index is a major hindrance. The book’s “Index” mostly repeats the Table of Contents, and Appendix C does little more than paraphrase it. A little more editorial work would have made A First Look at Second Sight a more coherent and convenient reference.
The sourcing of A First Look is sadly uneven. Although Cues is older, it is the closest there was to an existing history. As such, I was very surprised that Loomis did not at least mention it. Also strange, although the copyright is 2021 (though listed as 2022 on Amazon.com), Loomis’s “Books Cited” lists only one title published later than 2005. Its sourcing is otherwise exemplary, such as his examining two copies of a scarce antiquarian text (owned in different places) or using multiple sources to document a performing duo that was covered in an otherwise excellent earlier book with just one source.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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Leo Behnke’s Cues is more clearly arranged and well edited, and is a well-produced hardcover. Unfortunately, it is seven times as expensive though only one-third the length of the Loomis text. Skeptics may especially appreciate Behnke’s brief discussion of the ancillary but fascinating ancient roots of mindreading performances. His selections of whom to profile are generally well chosen, and he does include more recent performers than does Loomis. It is not always clear why some acts in Cues are profiled in the history section and others in the “Types of Presentation” section. In his chapter on promotion, the assumption that marketing is done on paper rather than digitally is not up to date. Behnke has a few useful remarks preceding his list of recommended how-to books, while his separate end-of-book bibliography is only a short title checklist and includes such far afield (though interesting) books as The Golden Bough by James Frazer and a seminal book on the history of cryptography and cryptology, David Kahn’s The Code Breakers.
Both books are recommended for the serious investigator because Loomis doesn’t detail a how-to system as Behnke does, and Behnke’s insights as a veteran performer of the act are very valuable. Loomis discusses many more performers than the casually interested reader probably wants to know. For understanding the history of stage psychics, A First Look At Second Sight is a major contribution, especially in combination with John Buescher’s Radio Psychics, which I reviewed in Skeptic 27.3 (2002).
About the AuthorMichelle Ainsworth holds an MA in History and she is currently researching the cultural history of stage magic in the United States. She is a humanist and lives in New York City.
References1. Shepard, L.A. (1991). The Encyclopedia of Occultism and Parapsychology, p. 1852. Gale Research.
As Mary McCarthy famously wrote of Lillian Hellman, “Every word she writes is a lie, including ‘and’ and ‘the.’” This observation now has particular applicability to Republican congressman George Santos. He’s biracial. He’s a Jew; no, he later explained, he’s Jew-ish. His mother died on 9/11. He went to two universities. He’s wealthy. He is a Ukrainian descendant of Holocaust survivors. “I’ve never seen anything like this,” Gerard Kassar, chair of the Conservative Party of New York State, told Washington Post reporters on December 31. “His entire life seems to be made up. Everything about him is fraudulent.” When a politician is shocked about lies and deceptions, you know we have hit the nadir. Nowadays, for your lie to get attention, you really have to think big. One lie isn’t enough; you must pile them on.
Time to think critically about lying.
Everybody lies. Toddlers start lying as soon as they start speaking, suggesting that deception evolved right along with language as an adaptive strategy. My friend and longtime colleague Carole Wade told me of searching the house early one morning for her three-year-old son, finally finding him in the pantry with cookie crumbs all over his face. “I told you not to eat those cookies,” she said sternly. “Me no eating cookies, Mommy,” he said.
Young Jason lied for the clearest and most universal of reasons: to avoid punishment and loss of (cookie-crumbed) face. At first, children’s lies are impulsive, caught-in-the-act defenses, and only with age do children develop the cognitive abilities to understand the likely consequences of a lie (and also to lie more efficiently).
I was an expert witness for the defense at a military trial in which a man was accused of sexually abusing an 8-yearold child. The girl, in the midst of being beaten by her father (“disciplining her,” as he called it), had suddenly shouted, “He touched me!” The father stopped immediately and took her to a doctor, who demanded details. Who touched you? Where? How often? When? This poor little girl, who only wanted her father to stop hitting her, was now forced into more lies to support the original one, ending with a false allegation against the one name she could come up with quickly: her father’s best friend and neighbor, who was immediately arrested. I was struck by a question posed to me by a juror: “Why would she lie?” he asked. She was not lying, I explained, in the sense that adults use the word: saying what one knows to be an untruth with the intention to deceive. She simply wanted her father to stop beating her, and her first lie succeeded. Yet she, a child, would have no understanding of the likely long-term consequences of her impulsive remark — that the friend would be arrested, that there would be a trial, that her lie would feed on itself, that she could not ever renege and tell the truth because her father would be even angrier to learn that she “lied” about his friend. She was ensnared.
As this story shows, lies live in the space between truth and consequences. Humans have only about a 50-50 chance of accurately detecting someone else’s lie. As psychologist Paul Ekman, famous for his early research on facial expressions of emotion, once speculated, evidence suggests that human societies muddle along best when we are able to lie but get away with it only sometimes — and also when we can’t be 100 percent certain we can discern anyone else’s lies. This faculty allows lies to serve as truth’s handmaiden, a close ally if not quite an honorable one, creating a fuzzy line that permits the social niceties that keep relationships humming along (“that outfit is stunning on you”; “I’m sorry I missed your wedding, but my goldfish died and I was grieving”). We sometimes call those kinds of lies “good manners.” Of course, sometimes our lies explicitly shield the truth in the name of self-preservation — to avoid getting divorced, fired, punished, or beaten up.
That military juror’s question to me revealed the individualist bias inherent in thinking about lies: It’s all in the person. Is he or she telling a lie, or is that person a liar? There are those who are liars: they lie as often as they breathe; having no core self or moral compass, they simply morph into whatever they want to be or say that day. Fortunately, they are not the norm, which is why such individuals are called “pathological” liars. At the other end of the spectrum are those who strive to live by their core values of honesty and kindness, which is why they are often called “whistle-blowers,” or “moralists,” or “naïve idiots.”
The rest of us fall somewhere along a continuum, lying consciously to others for self-protection or self-enhancement, as the occasion arises. For the majority, therefore, lying is more of a social phenomenon than a psychological or irrational one. Social psychologist Mark Frank, who has been studying deception for many years, observes that “There is a particular structure to every situation in which a lie is told”: the person who lies, their target, their motive, the form of the lie, and, crucially, the stakes associated with telling the lie — what is to be gained, what lost. Lying to avoid punishment is among the first motives to emerge in young children, especially lying to parents, who have the power to punish them, and it remains the number one motive in adulthood, where “punishment” takes more varied and subtle forms. Other leading motives are lying to protect a loved one, to be “loyal” to peers, to avoid embarrassment, and to gain a reward in attention, praise, self-esteem, or promotion.
Thus, to fully understand when and why a person is likely to lie, we need to know what the stakes are for telling the truth versus making something up to deliberately deceive. What does a lie stand to bring them, and what are the consequences if they are caught out?
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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And that brings us back to George Santos. The real tragedy of this story is not that he is a pathetic fool, but rather that there were no serious consequences to his lies: his fellow citizens nonetheless entrusted him to hold office, he got away with his outrageous claims for years, and the guardrails of the social norms that might once have protected us from pathological liars, con men, and shameless wooers of votes are disintegrating. In the Trump era, much has been said about the line between a truth and a lie, but the greater social danger is the obliteration of the line between a lie and its consequences. Once upon a time, anyone bullshitting as blatantly as Santos would have been shamed or laughed out of office. Today, however, anyone’s lie, no matter how outrageous or delusionally conspiratorial or batshit crazy, will find thousands, even millions, of supporters.
How did we get to this point? Not because there’s something in the drinking water that’s making people lie more. It’s because, one step at a time, our society’s moral and social standards have been changing, to the point where, for many, telling the truth is for suckers. I recently reread the ethicist Daniel Callahan’s book The Cheating Culture, which delineates those steps. Titles of eight of his chapters tell the story:
- “Everybody Does It”
- Cheating in a Bottom-line Economy
- Whatever It Takes
- A Question of Character
- Temptation Nation
- Trickle-Down Corruption
- Cheating from the Starting Line
- Crime and No Punishment.
Callahan wrote this in 2004. Talk about being prescient.
About the AuthorCarol Tavris, PhD, is a social psychologist who has written hundreds of articles, book reviews, and op-eds on many topics in psychological science. Her books include Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), with Elliot Aronson; Estrogen Matters; and The Mismeasure of Woman. A Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, she has received numerous awards for her efforts to promote science and skepticism, including an award from the Center for Inquiry’s Independent Investigations Group; and an honorary doctorate from Simmons College for her work in promoting critical thinking and gender equity.
If you want to make sense of GDP, inflation, interest rates, and economic policy, this is the article for you. We will address the following questions:
- What is the secret to the success of capitalist nations, which have grown by leaps and bounds in the past 200 years?
- What drives the economy — consumer spending, business investment, or government stimulus?
- Why are young people so attracted to democratic socialism, and is there a better alternative?
- Should valuable goods and services such as college education, medical services, and transportation be made available to the public for free?
- What is money, what is it based on without a gold standard, and can cryptocurrency ever replace it?
- Are booms and busts and periods of inflation and recession (like we’re experiencing now) inevitable?
- Do economists offer any solution to the global warming threat?
To answer the first question, let’s start from the beginning. In 1776, the same year the American colonies declared their political independence, a Scottish professor of moral philosophy, Adam Smith, wrote a declaration of economic independence called The Wealth of Nations, although its full title reveals it to be a work of behavioral science: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. It was the first major treatise in economics; it became a bestseller, and Adam Smith became known as the “father of modern economics.”
Professor Smith Goes to WashingtonIn his classic work, Smith addressed the question, “What public policy would be the most conducive to increase the wealth of nations?” His model was revolutionary. As Columbia professor (and founder of the National Bureau of Economic Research) Wesley Mitchell stated, “Adam Smith did for economics in many ways like what Charles Darwin did for biology…a new framework.”1
Basically, Smith rejected the traditional model of authoritarian government at the time. Back then, the state had its hands in everything. England, France, Russia, and other European states constantly interfered in the economy by regulating foreign trade, granting monopolies to certain industries, licensing various occupations, setting wage rates, and even requiring permission to move from one town to another. Labeled “mercantilism,” the government sought to control every aspect of economic life with the purpose of achieving the most rapid growth of a country’s wealth. Exploitation of precious metals, a favorable balance of trade through high tariffs, and wars against nations were used to succeed at the expense of other nations. As Bertrand de Jouvenel observes, “Wealth was therefore based on seizure and exploitation.”2
That, however, wasn’t working. Progress was painfully slow, and life for most humans was, in the oft-quoted observation of the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbs, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”3 Adam Smith devised a solution. He contended that wars, tariffs, and regulations were not only mostly counter-productive but actually decreased the wealth of nations. He proposed a radical alternative, which he labeled a “system of natural liberty” — that the wealth of nations could increase much faster if everyone was allowed the fullest opportunity to pursue their own self-interest, that is, to have the freedom to trade, chose an occupation and business, and to decide for themselves how best to use their labor and capital without government interference. He believed his policies would reduce tensions between nations and allow everyone to improve their standard of living.
Smith wrote, “Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men” (emphasis added).4 As Wesley Mitchell concludes, “You see how bold and sweeping that argument is from Adam Smith’s eyes…it is evident, in his own local situation, [that man] is a better judge of where his economic interest lies than any statesman could be. Therefore, the individual will get on best if he is left alone by the government… This is the great argument for laissez faire.”5
The Scottish philosopher did not use the term “laissez faire” or “free market capitalism” to describe his model, but rather a “system of natural liberty” and occasionally “the invisible hand.” It consisted of five basic themes:
- Pro-savings, capital investment, and entrepreneurship
- Limited government (laissez faire)
- Balanced budgets, except in times of war
- Sound money (gold/silver standard)
- Free trade.
Smith boldly predicted that if a nation adopted his model of competitive free enterprise, limited government, sound money, and free trade, there would be “universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people.”6 It would liberate all people and all nations, rich and poor, from the drudgery of never-ending poverty into a new era of prosperity. On another occasion, Smith opined, “Little else is required to carry a state to the highest level of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.”7
Figure 1. Source: Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP. 1–2000 CE. Angus Maddison; IMF
Figure 2. Source: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2019.
Standard of LivingIndeed, it wasn’t long after the publication of The Wealth of Nations that the West witnessed the industrial revolution and a dramatic leap in prosperity, as Figure 1 demonstrates: Poverty also declined dramatically over the past 250 years. The percentage of people who earn no more than $2 a day has fallen from 81 percent in 1800 to less than 10 percent today, as tracked in Figure 2.
Another metric of higher living standards is stock market performance. Figure 3 demonstrates what economists call “the triumph of the optimists” in the 20th century.
Figure 3. A century of stock market performance for the United States, the world (including the U.S.), and the world (not including the U.S.). Credit: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists. Princeton University Press, 2002.
Despite two world wars and the Great Depression, stock markets in 34 countries (in North America, Europe, and Japan) have enjoyed an upward trend. The red line represents “American Exceptionalism” — Wall Street having outperformed all other major country stock markets since 1900.
Of course, correlation is not necessarily causation. How much of the leap in output, reduction in poverty, and bull markets was due to the policies recommended by Adam Smith?
We know that his book was an instant bestseller, and was translated over time into all major languages. The classical model of low taxes, free trade, and the gold standard was in fact adopted gradually by Britain and then the United States, followed by other nations. Not all countries adopted the Adam Smith model — the Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern nations being the chief examples — but gradually, most did.
Smith’s laissez faire policy — that “government governs best which governs least,” in the words of Henry David Thoreau — became a popular cause in the 19th century, when the West imposed constitutional limitations on government power, reduced tariffs, and adopted the gold standard.
To be clear, Adam Smith was no anarchist. He saw a vital role for government to establish a “tolerable administration of justice,” the rule of law, the need for military defense, and public works, including public education. Overall, however, he advocated far less government intervention than nations had practiced in the past.
Economic Freedom Index Confirms Adam Smith’s ModelSince the early 1990s, the Fraser Institute of Canada has rated most countries on their degree of economic freedom. They have found a direct correlation between the level of economic freedom and a country’s standard of living. The think tank uses five criteria linked to Adam Smith’s classical model to determine each nation’s level of economic freedom:
- Size of government
- Property rights and legal structure
- Sound money
- Trade policy
- Business regulation.
Their studies demonstrate that the freer the countries, the richer they are. Figure 4 shows their results.
Figure 4. Countries with greater economic freedom have substantially higher per capita incomes. Source: Economic Freedom of the World: 2022 Report; World Bank, 2022, World Development Indicators (online database).
What Drives the EconomyWhat is it about economic freedom that leads to higher and faster economic growth? The power to choose results in greater specialization, a comparative advantage, and increased productivity. Entrepreneurship and innovation in creating new products, better processes, and business management skills are the catalysts for a higher standard of living.
According to economists, the major factor in advancing an individual and a nation comes from the supply side of the economy — innovation, entrepreneurship, and new technologies, all funded by a generous pool of savings and investment capital. Countries that encourage high saving rates and creative inventions tend to grow faster. In this regard, America has been the land of opportunity for entrepreneurs from around the world to pursue their dreams.
Is GDP What It’s Made Out to Be?It is a popular myth that “consumer spending drives the economy,” a statement that comes from a misunderstanding of GDP. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most common measure of the economy. It accounts for the final purchase of goods and services by consumers, businesses, and governments. Since consumer spending represents the largest sector of GDP — a full two-thirds — many media analysts conclude that it is consumption, rather than investment, that drives the economy.
However, the media and Wall Street analysts forget that GDP is not the same as “total spending in the economy.” GDP measures final output only — the finished goods and services that consumers, businesses, and government buy each year. It amounted to nearly $27 trillion 2022.
GDP is an important measure of our standard of living, but it leaves out some important elements of the economy. Most importantly, it omits the value of the supply chain — all the intermediate stages of production that move products and services along the production, wholesale, and retail sectors to the finished product. The value of the supply chain is larger than GDP itself, around $32 trillion this year!
When you include the supply chain, you get what the government calls gross output (GO). The federal government now publishes GO along with GDP every quarter. GO is a much better, broader definition of total economic activity because it measures spending at all stages of production. GO represents the “top line” of national income accounting, while GDP is the “bottom line.” Both are essential to understanding how the economy works.
Using GO as the complete measure of total economic activity, we learn that consumer spending is only one-third, not two-thirds, of GO. Thus, consumption is important, but not as important as business spending along the production process.8 Figure 5 demonstrates how much bigger and more volatile business spending (designated as B2B) is compared to consumer spending.
Figure 5. Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census Bureau. Graph by Ned Piplovic.
Thus, we see that business activity is the big elephant in the room and it is it that determines the economic success of a nation. Consumption is the effect, not the cause, of prosperity. As MIT professor Shlomo Maital concludes, “The health and wealth of a large number of individual businesses — small, medium and large — determine the economic health and wealth of a nation. When they succeed, managers create wealth, income, and jobs for large numbers of people. When they fail, working people and their families suffer. It is businesses that create wealth, not countries or governments. It is businesses that decide how well or how poorly off we are.”9
In the classroom, I use Seattle as an example. Why is Seattle a booming, prosperous metropolitan city today? Is it because its residents suddenly decided to buy more goods and services with their credit cards? No, it was innovative businesses that came up with new products that consumers didn’t know they wanted until the business engineers came up with the new ideas. I ask students to name these companies. They include Boeing (the 700 commercial jet series), Microsoft (Windows software), Starbucks (new kinds of coffee), and Amazon (the online everything store), among others. Granted, all of these companies needed customers to be profitable and to expand, but which came first, the consumer wanting these products, or creative entrepreneurs who invented the new product? Clearly the catalyst, the first mover, is on the business side of invention — on the supply side.
In economics, this is known as “Say’s Law of Markets,” named after the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767–1832), known as the “French Adam Smith.” Dynamic change and economic growth come from the supply side.
Adam Smith Turns 300: Is His Model Still Relevant?As we celebrate this year the 300th anniversary of Adam Smith’s birth (1723), it is appropriate to ask: How much of this classical model of economics is relevant today? In the face of world wars and occasional economic crises (especially the Great Depression of the 1930s), we see that most nations have largely moved away from laissez faire. Government has gotten bigger and more intrusive in almost every nation, although the differences between countries are still large (as evidenced by the Economic Freedom Index in Figure 4).
Figure 6. Average tariff rates from 1830 to 2010 comparing France, the UK, and the U.S. Sources: Imlah, Economic Elements
Certainly the Smithian doctrine of free trade has been the most successful policy recommendation. As we can see from Figure 6, most Western nations have gradually recognized the benefits of free trade and reduced and even eliminated the protectionist system of tariffs and quotas. Other countries have followed suit. Few countries depend on tariffs and duties as their primary source of revenue anymore. Even the “America First” doctrine has not materially raised tariffs. Globalization is here and it’s here to stay.
Figure 7. Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF). Graph by Ned Piplovic.
What about limited government? Not the case. As Figure 7 shows, governments of the developed world have grown dramatically since the 19th-century world of laissez faire was abandoned. In fact, there does not appear to be any evidence that government power has diminished among the major countries. One crisis following another has resulted in an ever-bigger government. Granted, marginal income tax rates on corporations have been declining for some time, but they have been offset by tax increases elsewhere, especially the Value Added Tax (VAT) and sales taxes, and by a dramatic rise in deficits and the national debt.
However, it is worth pointing out that the size of government (in terms of percentage of GDP) has declined sharply in the former Communist nations of Russia and the Eastern Bloc following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its central planning model. China has adopted “state capitalism” over “market capitalism,” but even there the size of government as a percentage of GDP fell sharply after 1980. Instead of 80 percent government control of the economy, China now controls less than 20 percent (in terms of GDP).
Why Has Socialism Failed Throughout History?After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet system in 1989–91, most authoritarian regimes liberalized their economies by cutting taxes, reducing regulations, privatizing government-controlled industries, and inviting foreign capital into their countries.
In very recent times, however, the appeal of “democratic socialism” has made a comeback, especially among young people, who are angry about inequality, attracted to the idea of free medical services (single-payer systems), free college tuition, and even free bus transportation in major cities, and enthusiastic about raising already progressive taxes on the rich to pay of these services. When I discuss the appeal of democratic socialism in lectures at colleges and universities, I begin by writing on the blackboard:
“From each according to his ability, to each according to his need,” and asking the students if this statement reflects their view of an ideal society. Usually two-thirds of the students vote in favor of it.
This is the classic motif of democratic socialism: You work hard, and you get what you need.
I then say, “Okay, students, let’s put our economics hat on and analyze the implications of this idealistic statement.”
First, I ask students, “How much money do you need to live comfortably?” The answer varies depending on the state where they grew up, but let’s assume on average they say around $50,000. Then I ask, “What happens if you make more than $50,000? Do you get to keep this money under this system?”
The answer is “no.” Any salary over $50,000 is put into the community pot to help out those who don’t make $50,000 and accomplish the goal of giving everyone what they need.
Finally, I ask, “What is the marginal tax rate under this system?”
Eventually, students come to the inevitable conclusion: It amounts to a 100 percent marginal tax rate, a confiscatory rate. Thus, we see there is little incentive for an individual to keep working after they earn $50,000.
Then I ask, what about somebody who earns only $30,000 a year? Under this model, they receive an additional $20,000 from the community fund. What incentive do they have to earn more than $30,000? None, because they get the additional $20,000 no matter what.
This exercise is an eye-opener to many students. They realize that no one in this system has an economic incentive to work for more, other than being a compassionate person. And that’s why socialism has failed time and time again. It doesn’t offer incentives to succeed, as an individual, a business, or a nation.
Only after this exercise do I point out that the statement is from Karl Marx.
Democratic Socialism or Democratic Capitalism?Is there an alternative to democratic socialism that would appeal to most young people? It is at this point that I introduce what I call “democratic capitalism,” where everyone benefits from the market economy — not just capitalists, but employees, executives, customers, suppliers, investors, and the community. It’s called the “stakeholders philosophy.”
The story of Henry Ford’s $5-a-day policy is the best example of the stakeholder philosophy. The president of the Ford Motor Company did something revolutionary in 1914 — the maker of the Model T shared the profits with his workers by doubling their wages overnight to $5 a day. This was unprecedented. It not only improved the lives of the average worker, but it gave them enough money to buy the product they were making, the automobile. In one day, Henry Ford destroyed the two biggest arguments by the Marxists against capitalism — exploitation and alienation.
Today there are many examples of businesses that share their success with their workers through profit sharing, stock options, and 401(k) plans. For example, over 12,000 employees at Microsoft have become multi-millionaires because of their stock option plan. The inequality issue could be minimized if more businesses engage in profit sharing.
Should Essential Needs be Free?The free enterprise system is built on the pricing mechanism, which operates as a rationing system. Since we live in a world with limited resources and unlimited demand, prices develop for all goods and services, and those prices vary according to supply and demand.
One thing almost all economists agree on today is that free-enterprise capitalism is the best model to fulfill our ever-expanding needs and wants. It has produced an unparalleled increase in the quantity, quality, and variety of goods and services that no socialist government could imitate. In my Chapman University economics class, I ask a student to go to a large grocery store and find out how many types of bread there are; and another student to go to a liquor store and find out how many types of beer there are. (The answers will astonish you.)
As socialist historian Robert Heilbroner declared that after the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “Capitalism has won. Capitalism organized the material affairs of humankind more satisfactorily than socialism: that however inequitably or irresponsibly the marketplace may distribute goods, it does so better than the queues of a planned economy; however mindless the culture of commercialism, it is more attractive than state moralism; and however deceptive the ideology of a business civilization, it is more believable than that of a socialist one.”10
However, socialism is not dead by a long shot. Advocates criticize the capitalist model for creating growing inequality of wealth and income, and causing pollution and global warming. Critics of capitalism also complain that the free market cannot provide adequate goods and services to the poor at a reasonable price, and therefore, the best solution is to offer subsidized or free education, transportation, medical services, food, and other essentials to the less fortunate.
In response, I do an exercise with my students on whether the marketplace can fulfill the needs to the rich, the middle class, and the poor. I ask students to examine a variety of needs in society — for example, automobiles, hotels, restaurants, housing, and entertainment — and see how well the marketplace fulfills those needs at each income level.
Students quickly identify markets in these industries for the rich, the middle class, and the poor. For example, there are automobiles for the rich (Mercedes Benz, Lexus, and Tesla), for the middle class (Toyota, Honda, Buick), and for the poor (Chevrolet, Ford, and Kia). There are hotels for the rich (Ritz-Carlton), the middle class (Hilton), and the poor (Motel 6). There are restaurants for the wealthy (Ruth’s Chris Steak House), the middle class (Red Lobster), and the poor (McDonald’s). Conclusion: Capitalism is not just for the rich.
Moreover, the profit motive and competition results in better, cheaper, and newer products being created all the time by entrepreneurs in what Joseph Schumpeter termed “the creative destruction” of dynamic capitalism. (I prefer the less harsh term “creative disruption” popularized by Harvard’s Clay Christensen). As Andrew Carnegie said, “Capitalism is about turning luxuries into necessities.” Big-screen 4K televisions used to cost upwards of $5,000, now they are under $500. One of the fun exercises I do with my students is to create two lists: new products and services that didn’t exist 30 years ago, and old products and services that are now obsolete. Students love discovering how long both lists are.
“Cheaper and better” is the best way to describe the benefits of free enterprise. The exceptions tend to be government-run or government-controlled industries, such as medicine and the post office.
What about inequality? It is true that in recent years during the bull market on Wall Street, there is evidence of growing inequality of wealth and income. However, as I point out to my students, when it comes to the quantity, quality, and variety of goods and services, that inequality gradually disappears. I hold up a smartphone as an example. Almost everyone from rich to poor has a smartphone, which contains an almost unlimited source of knowledge and wisdom. It’s today’s great equalizer.
The Danger of Offering Valuable Products and Services for FreeDespite the benefits of free-market capitalism, there is a growing demand by young people that the government provide free services in education, medicine, and transportation. Surveys show that most college students are worried that the average person can no longer afford a decent higher education or adequate medical care. Note that these two areas are where there are heavy government regulation and subsidies.
“Cheaper and better” applies to almost all goods in the market economy, but not education or medical services. They tend to more expensive and show little improvement recently. Why? Public education is highly subsidized in the United States through federal grants and student loans, yet SAT scores have not improved, indeed, the U.S. is falling behind other nations on standardized educational average test performance. The budget for the U.S. Department of Education exceeds $650 billion a year. Where are the results?
One of the grand principles of economics is that “There is no such thing as a free lunch.” Somebody has to pay, and in the case of free medical services and education, it is the taxpayer.
Offering valuable goods for free also violates one of the cardinal principles of economics: the accountability principle, or “user pays.” Those who benefit should pay. Why? Because they are aware of the cost, they shop around for the best deal, and they demand quality for their money.
Should a valuable service like college education be free, as Senator Bernie Sanders and other democratic socialists advocate? Germany has offered free tuition for college students for years, and the results have been mixed, with problems of overcrowding of classrooms, poor selection of majors, and fewer funds for research.11
In medicine, the all-important principle of accountability is often violated. Those who benefit do not pay. Instead, a third party pays — your employer, your insurance company, or the government. This is known as the “third party problem.” Patients often don’t know the actual cost of their medical expenses. This is especially true in countries that have socialized (single-payer) medical systems such as Canada and most European countries. There’s a disconnect between those who pay (taxpayers) and those who receive the benefits: long lines, shortages, and poor quality of care are common problems in many of these countries.12
The third-party problem is serious in the U.S. As a result, the medical system is expensive, uncompetitive, and often rife with insurance and Medicare/Medicaid fraud.
Singapore’s Medisave Success StoryWhat is the solution? Not the single-payer systems used in Canada and Europe. One of the best examples of a successful medical system is Medisave in Singapore. While the U.S. spends 18 percent of GDP on healthcare, Singapore spends only 4.7 percent, while providing universal healthcare to its citizens — and is ranked the number one most healthy country in the world — in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, and maternal mortality.
And it does so inexpensively. For instance, major surgeries cost 62–92 percent less in Singapore than the U.S. A heart-bypass surgery that would cost $130,000 in the United States costs just $18,000 in Singapore.
They achieve this “cheaper and better” approach in medicine by requiring every worker to have a health savings account, with a high deductible and co-pays that workers can afford. Competition and shopping around for low prices are encouraged because employees pay for most routine expenses through their health savings accounts (accountability principle). A similar health-living program can be found at Whole Foods Market in the United States, with their health savings plans and wellness programs.13
Money, Inflation, and BitcoinAnother major issue in society is the value of our currency. Money is the life’s blood of the economy. The dollar (and other currencies such as the euro and the yen) function as our primary medium of exchange and store of value. However, can we lose faith in the dollar if it loses its value, resulting in runaway inflation? A stable dollar is essential for businesses to operate efficiently. When inflation gets out of hand, it can wreak havoc on businesses, wage earners, and consumers. Once price inflation gets started, it’s hard to contain, because workers demand higher wages, consumers go into debt to buy now to avoid paying higher prices later, and businesses raise prices to keep ahead of rising costs, and also famously try to hide price increases by downsizing products (known as “shrinkflation”).
Rising inflation also causes the Federal Reserve and other central banks to raise interest rates to slow down the economy, often resulting in a recession or a monetary crisis. No wonder the stock market often tanks during a rise of inflation.
Figure 8. Source: Reinhart, C. & Rogoff, K. (2013) Shifting Mandates: The Federal Reserve’s First Centennial. American Economic Review 103:3, p. 48.
As Figure 8 demonstrates, price inflation used to raise its ugly head only during times of war, but since World War II, it has become a permanent feature of the U.S. economy.
There are plenty of excuses why inflation has gotten worse since World War II. They could include:
- Never-ending wars
- The creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913
- Going off the gold standard in 1933 and 1971
- Adoption of Keynesian economics (bigger government and never-ending deficit spending)
- All of the above.
Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff are convinced that the most critical factor was going off the gold standard by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 and completely disbanding gold by President Nixon in 1971, thus eliminating entirely the discipline of the gold standard, and allowing the government to print money (increase the money supply) as much as they wish.
The key to controlling the purchasing power of the dollar and other currencies is closely linked to controlling the supply of money and credit. Unfortunately, in today’s world, politicians and central banks are under constant pressure to expand the money supply and engage in easy money.
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have become a private alternative to the dollar as a medium of exchange, speculative asset, and inflation hedge, because of limited supply, like gold. Bitcoin, created in 2008 by a mysterious person named Satoshi Nakamoto, can be “mined” through open-source software and is limited to 21 million coins. Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a public ledger called a blockchain. The price of bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies have soared as an alternative currency, but have faced serious challenges, including delays in recording transactions on the blockchain, lack of regulation, tax complications, and fraudulent business practices exemplified by the FTX debacle. The blockchain technology clearly has great potential in business, real estate, and the financial markets, but the outlook for bitcoin and other digital currencies is still uncertain and speculative, depending on how well governments handle the inflation problem.
The last great Federal Reserve chairman was Paul Volcker, who ran the Fed from 1979 until 1987 during the Carter and Reagan administrations. By raising interest rates to 21 percent and curtailing monetary expansion, Volcker successfully overturned the entrenched inflationary psychology that was built into the American economy since World War II. We entered a period of disinflation — no real deflation — and then, like an old penny, inflation came back with a vengeance after the 2020 pandemic. The Trump and Biden administrations engaged in aggressive fiscal (big spending, tax cuts, and trillion-dollar deficits) and monetary (easy money) policies combined to overstimulate the economy to offset the global pandemic lockdown. We are now paying the price with an inflationary boom-bust cycle.
The Boom-Bust CycleThat brings us to this question: how do we control the ups and downs of economy, money and credit, and minimize the never-ending cycle of inflationary booms followed by recessions or worse? The key solution is twofold: The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy needs to be one of stability rather than a never-ending battle between “fighting recession” and “fighting inflation.” The Fed has changed directions between easy money (cutting interest rates) and tight money (raising interest rates) nearly a dozen times since 1980. And fiscal policy (taxes and spending) needs to be dependable and restrained, living within its means during full employment and so minimizing federal deficits. That will make the Fed’s job easier.
Environmentalism and the Global Warming ThreatEconomists have made significant contributions to the debates over ecology and climate change. Yale professor William Nordhaus was awarded the Nobel prize in economics in 2018 for his pioneering work on the economic impact of rising global temperatures and the “negative externalities” of air and water pollution.
According to economists, the best way to reduce smog and curtail the emission of greenhouse gases is through a combination of new technologies in the private sector and to impose high carbon taxes on polluters. Instead of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) trying to discover a way to reduce automobile emissions, they set strict emission limits and higher fuel mileage standards and let engineers in the car and truck manufacturers come up with a solution — which they did. Starting in 1975, automobiles, trucks, and buses were equipped with the newly invented catalytic converter.
To demonstrate the results of these government regulations, I do a survey every year with my students in Southern California. I ask them, “Since 1960, has air pollution gotten better or worse in the LA area?” Typically 60–70 percent say “worse.” Then I show them Figure 9 (previous page).
Figure 9. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Graph by Ned Piplovic.
Figure 9 shows two trends — increased use of cars and trucks on Los Angeles freeways, and at the same time a dramatic 97 percent reduction in air pollution, thanks to the catalytic converter and other government regulations. Students are shocked. I tell them how in the 1960s the smog was so bad that it was almost impossible to see downtown LA or Catalina Island. Now, most days are clear. The near elimination of smog in Southern California is truly an environmental success story.
The United States and Europe have made great strides in reducing greenhouse emissions. The real problem lies with developing countries such as China and India, as Figure 10 shows.
Figure 10. Annual total production-based carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and industry, excluding land-use change, measured in tonnes (based on territorial emissions, which do not account for emissions embedded in traded goods). Source: Our World in Data (2022) (CC BY 4.0) based on the Global Carbon Project.
Economists tend to be more skeptical and less alarmist regarding the environmental and global warming threats because they are solution-oriented, see progress, and advocate a cost-benefit analysis to these hot-button issues. William Nordhaus has been criticized by both environmental alarmists and by global warming skeptics. He believes global warming is a real threat, but as an economist, he is also alert to the dangers of going overboard: “If, for example, attaining the 1.5°C goal would require deep reductions in living standards to poor nations, then the policy would be the equivalent of burning down the village to save it.”14
The FutureIdeally, we would like to live in a prosperous society promised by Adam Smith through “peace, easy taxes, a tolerable administration of justice,” and let’s add stable prices, a clean environment, and maximum liberty for all. Is this ideal society beyond reach?
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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Perhaps. I see slow growth ahead, punctuating by recessions from time to time, with the world being burdened with a growing military-industrial complex, a bloated bureaucracy, excessive government debt, more debilitating regulations, a permanent welfare state, an incredibly complex tax system, and politicians falling all over each other to throw more money at their respective pet projects. New technologies can mitigate these burdens, but not entirely. Perhaps there is a white knight out there coming to put America back on a sound fiscal and monetary basis, but I fear Humpty Dumpty has fallen and can’t be put together again. I don’t see America becoming another Venezuela, but neither do I see it as another Singapore.
It’s easy to become pessimistic. Perhaps we can learn something from Adam Smith, who was the ultimate optimist. Nearly 250 years ago, he wrote:
The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition… is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration.15
Economic Terms Used in This ArticleGross Output (GO)the market value of all goods and services produced at all stages of production in a year in a country; considered the “top line” in national income accounting.Gross Domestic Product (GDP)the market value of all final goods and services produced in a year in a country; considered the “bottom line” in national income accounting and standard measure of economic growth.Consumer Price Index (CPI)the weighted average of prices of a basket of consumer goods and services; released monthly by the US Bureau of Labor.Invisible hand doctrinethe idea advocated by Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723–1790) that the voluntary actions of individuals will benefit society in general.Say’s Law of MarketsDeveloped by French economist J.-B. Say (1767–1832), the supply-side theory that economic growth is determined by changes in production and the supply of new goods and services (often said in short hand, “supply creates demand”) and an economic policy that encourages technology, entrepreneurship, savings and capital investment.Keynesian EconomicsDeveloped by British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), the theory that economic activity is determined by changes in aggregate spending by consumers, business and government (often said in short hand, “demand creates supply”), and an economic policy that advocates big government deficit spending and during economic downturns.Marxist EconomicsDeveloped by German economist Karl Marx (1818–1883), the theory that capitalism is exploitive (capitalists don’t share the profits with workers) and destabilizing, and will eventually collapse and be replaced by socialist central planners who operate the means of production.Gold Standarda monetary policy where a country’s money (such as the dollar) is backed by gold, and monetary policy is limited by the rise and fall in the supply of gold.The FedShort for the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, which determines the supply of money and credit, the price of money (interest rates), and the lender of last resort during a financial or economic crisis.Laissez faireFrench for “let us alone,” the philosophy that government should not interfere with the actions of individuals as consumers and business people.Democratic Socialismthe philosophy that government (elected by the people) should provide the basic needs (food, shelter, medical services, education) for the public and be paid for by progressive taxation.Democratic Capitalismthe stakeholder philosophy that successful businesses should fulfill the needs of customers, and share the profits with their employees, suppliers, investors, and the communities they operate in.About the AuthorMark Skousen is a Presidential Fellow and the Doti-Spogli Endowed Chair of Free Enterprise at Chapman University. He has a BA, MA, and PhD in economics (George Washington University, 1977). In 2018, Steve Forbes awarded him the Triple Crown in Economics for his work in theory, history, and education. He has taught economics, business and finance at Columbia Business School and Columbia University. He has worked for the government (CIA), non-profits (president of FEE), and been a consultant to IBM and other Fortune 500 companies. He is the author of over 25 books, including The Making of Modern Economics and The Maxims of Wall Street. He has been editor-in-chief of an award-winning investment newsletter, Forecasts & Strategies, since 1980. He produces “FreedomFest, the world’s largest gathering of free minds,” every July in Las Vegas and other cities. His website is skousenbooks.com.
References1. Mitchell, W.C. (1934). Lecture Notes on Types of Economic Theory (p. 13). Hassell Street Press. 2. De Jouvenel, B. (1999). Economics and the Good Life (p. 100). Transaction. 3. Hobbs, T. (1996/1651). Leviathan (p. 84). Oxford University Press. 4. Smith, A. (1965/1776). The Wealth of Nations (p. 651). Modern Library. 5. Mitchell, Lecture Notes, pp. 15–17. 6. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 11. 7. 1755 lecture by Adam Smith, recorded by Dugald Stewart, cited in Clyde E. Danhert, ed., Adam Smith, Man of Letters and Economist (p. 218), Exposition, 1974. 8. https://www.grossoutput.com/ 9. Maital, S. (1994). Executive Economics (p. 6). Free Press. 10. https://bit.ly/3WUSEiN 11. See for example Jon Marcus, https://bit.ly/3QgeHh9 12. For a critique of the Canadian single payer system, see https://bit.ly/3CcWOtF 13. Flynn, S. (2019). The Cure That Works: How to Have the World’s Best Healthcare at a Quarter of the Price. Regnery. 14. Nordhaus, W.D. (2018). Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge of Economics (p. 451). Nobel prize lecture. 15. Smith, A. (1965/1776). The Wealth of Nations (p. 326). Modern Library.
How serious is the homeless situation in America? Nearly everything about homelessness is complicated, beginning with the question of just how many Americans experience homelessness each year. The most commonly used metric comes from what are referred to as “point-in-time” counts: annual headcounts conducted by regional agencies across the country known as continuums of care. These point-in-time counts are so named because they only count the number of people who are homeless in a given jurisdiction on a particular night of the year; for that reason and a few others — including the natural difficulty associated with counting people who, by definition, have no fixed address — they tend to drastically underestimate the size of the homeless population.
That doesn’t make them useless, however. While citing a point-in-time count in isolation is usually a mistake, looking at successive counts longitudinally can provide at least an indicator of whether homelessness is rising or falling. Based on that metric, the federal government’s analysis of all the most recent counts tells us that nationwide homelessness, which had been climbing steadily since 2016, appeared to plateau between 2020 and 2022.1 The point-in-time counts registered only a 0.3 percent increase in homelessness over that period.
That’s a bit of good news, but the topline numbers mask a story that is, again, more complicated. While homelessness nationwide stayed surprisingly flat given the societal shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, decreases in many parts of the country were offset by sharp spikes in homelessness elsewhere. California’s continuums of care noted a 6.2 percent increase; smaller in relative terms than some other states, but more than enough to swamp modest reductions in the rest of the nation. In a year when the sum of all 2022 point-in-time counts recorded an additional 1,996 un-housed individuals, California alone contributed 9,973 people.
Again, these numbers should not be taken as gospel. Still, they do point to the scale of the crisis that the Golden State and a number of other regions face. California, home to about 12 percent of all Americans, is where nearly one-third of the country’s homeless population resides.
Unsurprisingly, the homelessness crisis has come to dominate urban politics in California and the other regions where it is most severe. Polling during the 2022 election cycle found that it was the second most important issue to California voters, behind inflation and the cost of living.2 Following the election, newly minted Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass declared a state of emergency over homelessness as one of her first acts in office.3 On the opposite coast, New York City Mayor Eric Adams has gambled on a plan to involuntarily commit homeless people.4
The crisis has also produced a cottage industry of books, op-eds, and even documentaries purporting to explain how homelessness got so bad. Rampant mental illness and addiction are popular explanations. So are liberal decadence and permissiveness, according to conservative commentators: deep blue cities, the argument goes, are being hit particularly hard because the woke progressives who run them have effectively incentivized homelessness through generous welfare benefits and an indulgent attitude toward drug use. Needless to say, these arguments are particularly popular on the right — and receive regular coverage from Rupert Murdoch-owned media ventures — but it is not uncommon to hear them repeated in left-leaning circles as well.
It’s easy to see why these arguments have caught on. Those cities that face the biggest homelessness problems — San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Portland, and Seattle among them — are run by Democrats, and their electorates tend toward social liberalism on issues such as drug decriminalization. Weather is also a factor, according to this line of reasoning. San Francisco and Los Angeles, in particular, are renowned for their mild climates, so living on the streets in these cities is presumably less miserable. Further, the rise of homelessness in these cities has been accompanied by a commensurate rise in public drug use, along with people publicly experiencing very severe mental health emergencies. All of these are easily observable facts, and it is extremely tempting to craft a neat causal story out of any one of them. Writers such as San Fransicko author Michael Shellenberger, journalist Sam Quinones, and various fellows at the Manhattan Institute have done exactly that.
However, we should be wary of any causal reasoning about social crises that emerges out of anecdotes and folk wisdom. To be sure, the character of the homelessness crisis has been shaped by all of the above factors: substance abuse disorders, mental illness, public policy in liberal cities, and even nice weather. But a careful look at the evidence reveals that none of these things, with one exception, can be said to have caused the homelessness crisis. The exception is public policy — but even there, the relation is different from what the aforementioned writers have posited.
Let’s start with drug use. Quinones has promulgated the argument that drug addiction — in particular the proliferation of a new, especially dangerous strain of meth — is “worsening America’s homelessness problem”5 (or, as New York Magazine put it, has “supercharged homelessness”).6 He may very well be correct that this new version of meth is worse than others; while this is not my field, I feel very comfortable advising Skeptic readers not to do meth. That said, there is absolutely no evidence that meth use is in any way driving homelessness as a large-scale social phenomenon.
Determining causality for this phenomenon is difficult. Drug use, including meth use, for example, can precipitate individual bouts of homelessness. To understand homelessness in aggregate, however, it is important to distinguish between the precipitants of homelessness and the drivers of homelessness. Precipitants are particular and non-generalizable; they are the set of individual circumstances that cause a particular person to become homeless. Drug addiction is a common precipitant, but so are fleeing domestic violence, becoming unemployed, or getting hit with unexpected medical bills. Think of it like an extreme weather event: an individual spark may precipitate a major forest fire, but only under certain conditions. A key driver in this analogy is the carbon pollution that has made summers in many heavily forested areas significantly hotter and drier. Without that driver, you would still get forest fires, but they would not be anywhere near as devastating.
The precipitants of homelessness can be some combination of structural factors, personal mistakes, and plain bad luck. While one or a handful of precipitating factors can explain why a particular person became homeless, they can’t necessarily tell us much about overall rates of homelessness.
Counterfactual reasoning can be a useful tool for determining causality. You think A causes B. Remove A. If B still happens, then A was not the cause. (The rooster crows and the sun rises, in David Hume’s famous example, but no one thinks the rooster causes the sun to rise, which is easily testable by silencing the rooster and noting that the sun still rises.) Employing counterfactual reasoning here, if drug use were a driver of homelessness in aggregate, we would expect states with higher rates of drug abuse to also have higher rates of homelessness. In fact, no such relation exists between the data on drug addiction and those on homelessness: West Virginia, which leads the nation in drug overdose deaths,7 has one of the lowest rates of homelessness in the country.8 California’s overdose death rate is about one-quarter of West Virginia’s!9
Research has found that Housing First Programs are more effective than Treatment First Programs in keeping people from returning to homelessness.
Nor can state-level variation in rates of mental illness explain variation in rates of homelessness. Mental illness can be difficult to quantify, but Mental Illness America estimates that California’s rate of adult mental illness is about the same as the national average.10
The mild weather hypothesis — that un-housed individuals naturally gravitate toward balmier climes — fails on similar grounds. While it is true that West Coast cities have some of the most severe homelessness problems in the United States, a more systematic look at regional patterns of homelessness doesn’t turn up any correlations between average temperature and homelessness. Both New York and the District of Columbia have higher overall rates of homelessness than California, despite notably more inclement weather.11
To the extent that weather is a factor in homelessness, it matters because of how it affects the character of homelessness: cities with more hostile climates tend to have proportionally fewer unsheltered people and more sheltered but un-housed individuals. That is likely because colder cities tend to build more shelters in order to prevent their un-housed residents from freezing to death; and un-housed people, conversely, are more likely to seek out even substandard shelter when the alternative is potentially fatal. Nonetheless, whether sheltered or unsheltered, affected individuals are still experiencing homelessness.
So much for some of the more popular theories purporting to explain the rise of mass homelessness. Note that their failure to explain state-by-state variation in rates of homelessness is not the only failure of these theories. Each of them is also heavily reliant on individual characteristics to explain a large-scale social phenomenon. This is clearly true with the substance use and mental illness hypotheses, but it applies to the weather hypothesis as well; if California’s moderate weather were to have a significant effect on its rate of homelessness, it presumably would be because large numbers of un-housed people from around the country had chosen to relocate somewhere warm and sunny.
Almost no aggregate human behavior can be explained by a single cause. This is where the distinction between drivers and precipitants becomes critical. We should be skeptical of any explanation for a mass phenomenon that depends so heavily on the individual behaviors of hundreds of thousands of people. While personal decisions and bad luck can play a role in individual cases, it strains credulity to blame these individual factors for a decades-long societal trend. We should instead give more credence to theories that rely on systemic forces — forces that can affect hundreds of thousands of people at once, no improbable coincidences required.
If none of the above hypotheses can explain mass homelessness, what can? To my mind, the best and most thorough treatment of this question comes from a recent work of the public affairs scholar Gregg Colburn and the data scientist Clayton Page Aldern. Their answer is right in the title of their 2022 book: Homelessness is a Housing Problem.
As in the above summary of differing hypotheses, Colburn and Page Aldern tested different explanations for homelessness by looking at regional variations in homelessness rates. However, they analyzed more finely-grained data, relying on city-by-city comparisons instead of state-by-state ones. After investigating a number of non-housing explanations for large-scale homelessness — including climate, generous welfare benefits, mental illness, and substance use disorder — they concluded there was no evidence that these factors can explain why some U.S. cities have significantly higher rates of homelessness than others.
Instead, they write: “Vulnerable households live in every city of the country; the differences in rates of homelessness can be attributed to structural factors associated with the housing market.” Homelessness is most severe in the metropolitan areas where housing costs are highest, because the pricier that housing becomes, the greater the risk that people with low incomes or other serious challenges will be locked out of whatever homes are available.
This is not a new finding. In fact, it is the consensus among most serious researchers of this problem. In their definitive book on homelessness, In the Midst of Plenty, Marybeth Shinn and Jill Khadduri note that “homelessness is essentially a lack of access to affordable housing.” Similarly, an influential 2018 study by Zillow (a leading online housing information and analysis site) found that rates of homelessness increase fastest in cities where, on average, rents exceed one-third of income.12
It follows, then, that the cities with the most severe homelessness problems also have sky-high rents. The most recent Consumer Affairs ranking of U.S. cities by housing costs looks a lot like a list of places bearing the brunt of mass homelessness: San Jose, San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, Seattle, New York, and Portland all make it into the top ten.13
Why these cities are so expensive is no mystery. Much as researchers generally agree that housing costs drive large-scale homelessness, the overwhelming expert consensus is that these stratospheric costs are the result of a profound housing shortage.
It then becomes predictable why so many of the country’s most expensive cities — and a disproportionate share of the country’s homeless population — are concentrated in California. For more than a century, California was at the forefront of a nationwide movement to restrict homebuilding. Berkeley, where I live, pioneered the use of single-family-only zoning in 1916; they capped residential levels at low levels expressly in order to exclude Black and Chinese people.14 More recently, beginning in the 1960s, cities like Los Angeles enacted a series of “downzonings” — zoning map changes intended to sharply reduce the number of homes that could be legally built citywide.15
Even where it is legal to build, California and its constituent municipalities have made it extraordinarily easy for incumbent landowners to veto proposed housing development — for arbitrary reasons, or for no reason at all.16 As a result, the state has failed for decades to build sufficient housing to meet growing demand. The state Department of Housing and Community Development estimates California needs to make up a 2.5 million home deficit over the next eight years.17
To arrest rising rates of homelessness, expensive cities need to relieve cost pressures by building more housing. While building more subsidized affordable housing is necessary, a growing body of research shows that even building market-rate homes makes rents more affordable for everyone.18 The relation between housing supply and homelessness is best illustrated by a striking finding from Colburn’s and Aldern’s Homelessness is a Housing Problem: rates of homelessness are lowest in the cities with the highest vacancy rates. That is because a high vacancy rate indicates that a city has a lot of housing relative to demand.
Building enough housing for everyone will do a lot to prevent homelessness. What about those who are already homeless? Here, again, the answer is housing. Homelessness experts have coalesced around a “Housing First” model that prioritizes moving un-housed people into permanent housing and providing optional “wraparound” services. This model is best understood by contrasting it with “treatment first” models that prioritize interventions such as mandatory mental health care and addiction counseling over providing permanent housing.
The conventional wisdom that mental illness and substance use caused mass homelessness has fueled support for a treatment-first approach; however, a substantial body of research has found that Housing First programs are more effective than treatment first programs in keeping people from returning to homelessness. A landmark randomized control trial in Santa Clara County, California found that Housing First programs even work for the highest-need clients — those who are chronically homeless and have severe behavioral challenges.19
While Housing First works, it can only work at scale under the right housing market conditions. That is the key finding of our recent report at California YIMBY (the acronym for Yes In My Back Yard in contrast to the opposing NIMBY, Not In My Back Yard), “Housing Abundance as a Condition for Ending Homelessness: Lessons from Houston, Texas.”20 My research for that report sought to answer the following question: How has Houston, Texas managed to reduce homelessness by more than half over the past decade, even as major California cities have seen large increases in their homeless population?
The answer is that Houston implemented an aggressive Housing First strategy and built far more housing per capita than any large California city. Houston’s abundant housing prevented people from falling into homelessness faster than the region’s homeless infrastructure could help them; it also made it cheaper and easier for homeless services agencies to locate and acquire housing for its Housing First programs.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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To be clear, setting up a robust Housing First infrastructure isn’t cheap under the best of circumstances; by its nature, it requires significant multi-year investments. However, pro-housing land use policies mean that Houston is able to house people at a significantly lower per-person cost than other major cities. For example, we found that the cost of housing and providing services to a single un-housed individual for a year is more than two times more expensive in San Francisco than it is in Houston — between $40,000 and $47,000 annually in the former city as opposed to $17,000 to $19,000 in the latter. This gulf is largely a function of how much it costs to acquire or develop housing in each city.
Further, Houston’s investment in housing its homeless population may well be offset by savings elsewhere. A number of studies suggest that investing in Housing First programs can drive down the cost of caring for un-housed people through other means, such as visits to the emergency department of hospitals. One study from Canada concluded that $10 spent on Housing First programs reduced the spending required on other services for high-needs individuals by $9.60.21
The most important thing Houston’s example can show us is that good public policy can, in fact, achieve significant reductions in homelessness. Crises like those faced in Los Angeles and San Francisco are neither inevitable nor insurmountable. However, emulating Houston’s success requires that policymakers in other cities see homelessness clearly and reject simple “solutions” that place blame for a social problem on the individual failings of its victims. Most of all, policymakers need to grapple with the role that decades of failed, regressive housing policies have played in fueling the crisis. The evidence is clear on the problem of homelessness; the only question is whether voters will decide to act upon it.
About the AuthorNed Resnikoff is the policy director at California YIMBY, a nonprofit that advocates for state laws to end the housing shortage. He was previously a journalist and has written for the New York Times, The Atlantic, The Nation, and The San Francisco Chronicle. He has also worked as an analyst for the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s Office, which advises the California legislature on policy and budget matters. He holds a master’s degree in public policy from UC Berkeley’s Goldman School of Public Policy.
References1. https://bit.ly/3IBWlWd 2. https://bit.ly/3XhwCWU 3. https://lat.ms/3ivxF73 4. https://n.pr/3vVliUN 5. https://bit.ly/3kcQyvO 6. https://nym.ag/3W20rtJ 7. https://bit.ly/3k711sO 8. https://bit.ly/2M9PFNW 9. Ibid. 10. https://bit.ly/3W7M1YR 11. https://bit.ly/3GU1Iie 12. https://bit.ly/2L9EW7w 13. https://bit.ly/3ZtQnNa 14. https://bit.ly/3ICvGIP 15. https://bit.ly/3k8HvfF 16. https://bit.ly/3ZpHyDU 17. https://bit.ly/3XpMhU6 18. https://bit.ly/3CICTTN 19. https://bit.ly/3CHkve1 20. https://bit.ly/3CGKpP8 21. https://bit.ly/3XhwOFC
I wish to thank Michael Shermer and his editorial team for sponsoring a debate on Skeptic.com between myself, representing hard determinism, and Stuart Doyle, representing libertarian free will. Doyle began the debate with his essay “Free Will Is Real.”1 I responded with my own article “A Skeptical Analysis of Doyle’s Defense of Free Will”.2 Then Doyle began the second round with his piece “A Reply to Gary Whittenberger’s Critique of My Case for Free Will.”3 And now I will reply to Doyle’s reply to complete the second round.
Doyle and I present, explain, and defend contrasting, inconsistent, and in some ways contradictory models of human decision making. I do believe that the free will model is far inferior to the hard determinism model in so many ways, including conceptual clarity, the reasonableness of premises, and evidential support. However, I cannot say that hard determinism is the clear victor, yet. Much study and research remain to be done. I suspect that one of these days some definitive experiments will be performed which will yield clear results enabling the crowning of the champion – hard determinism. But for now, I will expose the flaws in Doyle’s model and show how the determinist model fares better. I am hardly alone in my position. Many reputable philosophers, scientists, and public intellectuals are now on our determinist team, including Sam Harris, Jerry Coyne, Robert Sapolsky, Richard Dawkins, and Sean Carroll. Even most compatibilists favor some form of determinism with reservations or qualifications. In a survey of philosophers on the topic of free will, only 13.7 percent endorsed libertarianism and on the topic of the mind only 27.1 percent endorsed non-physicalism.4, 5 In the first century or perhaps even in the 16th century Doyle would have been in the majority among experts, but in this 21st century he is definitely in the minority.
As I did in my reply to Doyle’s first essay, here I will quote liberally from Doyle’s second essay to prevent any misunderstandings. I have used quotation marks to delineate his words, unless otherwise indicated.
“My first article makes three main points: We are the true sources of our own actions because the whole human, not the parts, is the correct scale at which to examine free will.”
I strongly disagree. ‘Willing’ is simply making decisions, and I will simplify our debate by focusing on a single paradigm of decision making – choosing between two options. The whole human includes many parts, including the heart, kidneys, skin, feet, bones, eyes, and brain. Of all the parts of the whole human, only the brain makes choices between two options. And thus, Doyle’s choice of scale is patently false.
“Because of an asymmetry in time, the right criterion for free will is the ability to be unpredictable in principle.”
This is surely mistaken. Making a choice between two options is simply not free, and this is true regardless of the predictability of the choice. What does “free” mean? It means unconstrained, unlimited, undetermined, untethered, or unregulated. Making a choice is very likely, almost certainly, determined by brain processes which represent either a chance mechanism (usually in the case of ‘ties’ between the two options) or prior factors such as genetics, environment, rearing, or life experience. There is far more evidence for the determined choice hypothesis than for the free choice hypothesis. Doyle has not come close to proving or even substantially supporting his position.
“We are fundamentally unpredictable because we each have the properties of an undecidable system.”
What is an “undecidable system”? Doyle does not provide a definition. Nor does he show how this concept is related to making choices between two options. In addition, Doyle has not come close to rationally showing that we are “fundamentally unpredictable” in our two-option choices. If the underlying system is determined, as I and others have hypothesized, then ultimately we should get quite good at predicting a brain’s decisions.
“The first point is an argument against determinists like Sam Harris who say that though the subjectively felt intention to act is the proximate cause of acting, there are ultimately other physical causes beyond our control.”
Doyle does not provide a quote from Sam Harris on this point. Simply citing a podcast interview of Harris in the reference section is insufficient. I remain skeptical that Harris made this assertion. I believe that felt intentions are not causes of acting at all, but instead represent or reflect brain processes which are the causes. Doyle provides no evidence that felt intentions cause choices or actions.
“But as it stands, my first point is vulnerable to objection from a philosophical position known as ‘epiphenomenalism.’ This view proposes that a mental event (such as intending to act) is not even a proximate cause of a physical event (such as acting). According to the epiphenomenalists, mental events do not affect physical events any more than the motions of a car’s shadow affects the motions of the car.”
This is an adequate statement of the epiphenomenal position.
“Whittenberger certainly has not provided any argument for epiphenomenalism, but his assertion of it, if true, would pose a serious problem for the first main point in my previous article. Below, I’ll give a defense against the epiphenomenalist objection.”
Although other relevant experts might not concur, I think Doyle and I would agree that some form of dualism is true – that reality consists of at least two kinds of events – physical events and mental events. Examples of mental events are an intention to act, imagining an apple, and “subvocal sentences in the head.” Examples of physical events include actions themselves and firings of neurons in networks. So far, mental events can only be ‘observed’ by the subject himself, whereas physical events can be observed by persons who are not the subject. And so we say that mental events are subjective, whereas physical events are objective. It is now well accepted in the 21st century that physical events have the power to influence and cause other physical events. But there is no good evidence and no scientific consensus that mental events have the power to influence and cause physical events. Until there is, the epiphenominalist position should be the default position. The burden of proof is actually on Doyle.
“But first I’ll address several other of Whittenberger’s assertions, which are easier to answer. I’ll Start with one of Whittenberger’s basic misunderstandings. In response to my second main point (2), He writes:”
This is false because Doyle, as most free will advocates do, has confused determinism with predictability. Our choices are probably determined (except perhaps when chance plays a role), whether or not our choices are predictable either by ourselves or by other people.
“The claim that I have confused determinism with predictability, ironically exhibits confusion on Whittenberger’s part. I do exactly the opposite of conflation between determinism and predictability; I delineate them. Usually, deterministic processes are assumed to be ultimately predictable, but I describe how they can be fundamentally unpredictable.”
This is not a delineation, but I will attempt to provide one. Choosing between two options is determined, if and only if a process which is given the same input always yields the same output. However, even if the system is deterministic, we may be unable to accurately predict the output without sufficient knowledge of the inputs and the intervening process. So for practical purposes, high predictability results from a highly deterministic system plus sufficient knowledge or understanding of the system.
“By drawing on the concept of undecidability, I show that determinism and predictability are not inextricably linked.”
No. Doyle does not show what he claims here to have shown. He does not define “undecidability.” He does not show the relationship of this concept to determinism and predictability. And he does not show the relevance of this concept to a simple decision scenario like the two-option choice situation.
“In this way, I clearly characterize determinism and predictability as two distinct and independent properties.”
We agree that they are distinct and independent, but still they are going to be positively significantly correlated. The greater the determinism, the greater the predictability.
“In my first article, I spend about 600 words arguing that predictability is the right criterion for free will.”
The argument does not succeed. “Free” means “not determined.” It does not mean “not predicted” or “not predictable.”
“Whittenberger disputes this but does not engage with the argument at all. He offers no reason for his disagreement on this main point, other than his confused accusation of confusion.”
At best, Doyle’s argument is unclear, and at worst, it is mangled.
“In a similar manner, Whittenberger misunderstands my third main point (3), and asserts its negation without engaging with its supporting arguments:”
What you are expected to do, however, depends on what we know about how brains work and what we know about your brain and your history. We may come to a point in the future of neuroscience and behavior science where what we expect you to do will be exactly what you in fact do, especially if determinism is true, as we currently believe.
What’s wrong with this? It seems accurate to me.
“I argue in the ‘Self-Reference and Undecidability’ section of my article that it is in principle not possible to perfectly predict the deliberative decisions of human beings—neither now nor in the future.”
The argument does not succeed. It lacks proper definitions and explication of relationships, especially pertaining to the concepts of “self-reference” and “undecidability.”
“The case laid out in that section is meant to disprove the common assumption that all human behavior could be predictable, given enough data and analysis. Whittenberger merely reasserts the common assumption, as if I had not yet heard of the basic idea I set out to topple.”
Doyle did not succeed in his attempted disproof. If determinism is true and if we have enough knowledge of the algorithm and inputs to the algorithm, then we should be able to predict the outcomes of all or most two-option choices, except when the options are tied, which is usually not the case. I speculate that when the algorithm does not yield a definite choice of either option, i.e. when the options are tied, then the brain uses a subroutine of “picking randomly.” However, even the outputs of this subroutine might be predictable with enough knowledge.
“The problem here is likely that Whittenberger has not bothered to fully digest the concept of undecidability.”
The problem here is that the concept of undecidability is indigestible.
“One of the necessary features of an undecidable system is the potential to access an infinite computational medium. That is the same thing as having an infinite state-space, as I describe in my article.”
I must say that this sounds like what we call “woo” in skeptical circles. Doyle is wildly throwing around terms without telling us in plain language what they mean. Examples are “undecidable system,” “infinite computational medium,” and “infinite state-space.” This is not helpful.
“Whittenberger mistakenly believes that the number of available options has some kind of bearing on the issue:”
But more importantly, individual decisions in real time have a finite options-space. For example, if you are going to a Baskin-Robbins Store to get ice cream, your options set will probably consist of only a few specific ice creams of a few specific flavors.
“A system with only two options can be undecidable, which means that it is impossible to predict which of the two options will actualize.”
This appears to be a tautology since Doyle is implying that “undecidable” just means “unpredictable”. This is not helpful. It might be better if he said, “In my opinion there are some choices between two options which are unpredicatable.” That clearer statement might lead us to running some experiments.
“This is the case in the most simple textbook example of undecidability: the halting problem in Turing machines. One must lack even cursory knowledge of undecidability in order to think that a finite options-space rules out unpredictability. As the one who introduced the concept to Whittenberger, I am partially responsible for this failure.”
Doyle did not give any explanation of “the halting problem in Turing machines” or tell how it is relevant to our topic. I suspect that it isn’t relevant. Doyle has not shown that all two-option choices are unpredictable either in practice or in principle.
“Now for the next family of missteps, we turn to a concept introduced by Whittenberger: the “decision-making mechanism” (DMM). The DMM is a hypothetical part of the brain that supposedly makes decisions. It incorporates information from all other parts of the brain in order to make its decisions, yet those other parts of the brain are arbitrarily excluded from Whittenberger’s definition of the DMM.”
Those other parts of the brain produce outputs which are inputs to the DMM. There is no “arbitrary exclusion.” Just think of a proper flow chart here.
“According to Whittenberger, the other parts of the brain store representations of our genetics, environment, life experiences, and their interactions, while the DMM takes those representations as inputs for a complicated algorithm that spits out a decision.”
There is no “spitting.” Spitting is impolite. In my view the DMM has inputs, an algorithmic process, and an output. The complexity of the algorithm will vary with the number of factors on which the options are compared. Suppose the subject is choosing to buy one of two options in the ice cream store. She might compare the two options on just flavor and price, and so here the algorithm is likely to be pretty simple. On the other hand, suppose the subject is choosing to accept one of two jobs after graduation from engineering school. She might compare the two options on ten factors such as nature of the work, salary, retirement compensation, work environment, local cost of living, advancement potential, creativity opportunity, distance from family and friends, personality of the supervisor, and length of a training period. And so here the algorithm is likely to be much more complex. (When there are more than two options in a choice situation, the algorithm would need to run many times.)
“So the difference between our views is that I claim decisions come from the functioning nervous system taken as one whole entity (a person), while Whittenberger insists that the decision making part is partitioned in some important way from the other parts.”
Doyle had claimed that decisions come from the whole person, but he is mistaken. The whole person has parts which do not participate in or make decisions. Your big toe does not make decisions. Your brain makes decisions, and there is likely to be one part or one neuronal circuit of your brain that makes the decisions. I have called this part the “Decision Making Mechanism” or DMM. In the 20th and 21st centuries we have learned a great deal about the specialization in parts of the brain, and these advances are likely to continue. I predict that in the next 20 years the DMM will be identified.
“I give a reason in my article for why I think the whole person is the right unit of analysis; when analyzing the will, we should be talking about what most people mean when they say that they will to do something.”
Doyle is mistaken on both these points. In analyzing the will (making choices between options), the brain in general and the DMM more specifically is the right unit of analysis. What experts talk about on this subject should supersede what “most people” talk about. Folk psychology is not a reliable basis for a science of the brain and mind.
“They are talking about desires, intentions, decisions, and commitments that are experienced.”
These mental events can be part of the analysis, but there is no good evidence that they have causal powers.
“Most people would agree that the thermostat on my wall should not count as having a will. The reason is that the thermostat does not experience anything, though it does make ‘decisions’ in an impoverished sense of the word. Will has dimensions of experience.”
Again, I don’t know why we should place so much emphasis on what “most people” think. I agree with Doyle that the thermostat probably does not experience anything. It doesn’t have mental events. Does it make decisions? Well, it depends on how we define “decision.” The thermostat makes responses. When human brains make two-option decisions, these decisions are often, but not always, accompanied by “dimensions of experience” or mental events. But we, i.e., our brains, can make decisions without any conscious experience of them!
“Whittenberger equivocates between willful choosing and ‘choosing’ in the thermostat sense. Willful choosing involves the nuanced textures of experience that can’t exist without a whole person, including a qualitative integration of memories, present senses, and imagined futures.”
The brain chooses between two options. This choice is probably determined, although in the case of ties, it may be made by a ‘chance subroutine.’ The choice may be accompanied by an experience or mental event, but it need not be. Where do I equivocate here? I don’t.
“Whittenberger offers no argument against the whole person as the source of decisions, and he offers no argument for the DMM as the source of decisions.”
In this second rebuttal essay, I did offer a strong “argument” against the whole person as the source of decisions. I hope that upon further reflection, Doyle does not disagree that the brain is the source of decisions. But I go one step further. I hypothesize that within the brain there is a part, a neural circuit, or a physical function which actually makes the decisions, receiving inputs and yielding an output. Why is this likely to be true? First, the brain has parts specializing in function. The somato-sensory cortex collects inputs from different skin areas of the body. The auditory nerve carries auditory information from the ears to the auditory cortex. The cerebellum coordinates muscle movements. Need I go on? Secondly, all two-option decisions have a similar conceptual structure. They have inputs. They have an output – selection of option X or Y. They compare options on factors pertinent to the options. I gave some examples of this in my ice cream and job choice scenarios. For these two reasons, it is likely that the DMM exists and will be identified. I suggest that the breakthrough will be facilitated by the use of fMRI (or other scanning devices) and AI in combination.
I’ll briefly offer a suggestion on how the algorithm of the DMM might work. It might calculate the overall value of each option in the choice scenario by combining component values on relevant factors, e.g. V = ax + by + cz + v. It may then operate on the rule ‘Select the option with the highest overall value at the present time.’ In cases of ties in the overall values of the options, then the brain is likely to rely on a ‘random subroutine.’ This is only one suggestion for the algorithm, and others should certainly be considered.
“Such an argument would surely be needed since the concept of the DMM seems incoherent under scrutiny, as I will now show.”
I have shown in this essay that the concept of the DMM is coherent and perfectly rational.
“If the DMM takes inputs from other parts of the brain where those inputs are represented, then where does the DMM represent the inputs which it receives?”
Just think of a flow chart. There may be many parts of the brain which send inputs to the DMM. The algorithm of the DMM incorporates these inputs. Think of the algorithm as an equation with variables and constants combined in a structured way. That is the framework for explaining the DMM, but of course the details will be filled in after significant research.
“The DMM is supposed to integrate memories into the decision making process. Memories are stored in a distributed way, involving all of the brain areas which were involved in the original experience of the remembered event. There is no other way for the brain to represent memories.”
I think “no other way” is too strong an assertion here, but I buy the general description. But it doesn’t really matter. The DMM could receive inputs from many widely scattered sources or locations. No problem.
“That means the DMM, which by definition excludes most parts of the brain, has no way to represent the memories which it supposedly uses in its algorithm.”
Of course it would! It’s neurons ‘all the way down.’
“The only apparent way out of this problem would be to say that the representational parts of the brain send compressed gists of memories, not full episodic memories with their visual dimensions, emotional dimensions, auditory dimensions, etc. to the DMM. But this isn’t really a way out.”
I have already provided a “way out.”
“In order to construct a compressed gist of a memory that works for decision making, it needs to be determined which aspects of the memory are relevant to the decision at hand. But in order to assess the relevance of the various aspects of memory, the whole memory must be directly available to be assessed.”
Not necessarily. There could be neuronal processes intermediate between the stored memories and the DMM which represent factors, like ice cream flavor or salary of a job, which then become inputs to the DMM. The details will need to be filled in by careful research.
“And relevance is not binary; the more relevant and less relevant aspects of memory should be registered as such in the making of any decision. That relevance ranking is one of the main things that would be needed from a decision making algorithm.”
Relevance could be binary in some cases. Relevance must be encoded in neuronal processes. The flow chart can be expanded and complicated as needed to fit the data. Relevance could be evaluated prior to or within the DMM. Not a problem.
“Such an algorithm can’t function without direct access to full memory representations, which are distributed throughout the whole brain.”
“Can’t”? What is Doyle’s evidence for this assertion? Why couldn’t partial memory representations be used? Memories may be widely distributed without being represented in the “whole brain.”
“There is no way for Whittenberger’s postulated DMM to do this. The whole person is a far more plausible decision maker.”
There are lots of ways for the DMM to do this. I have already refuted Doyle’s ‘whole person as decider’ hypothesis.
“The person at least exists, which can be proven to anyone who tries to coherently doubt his own existence.”
Of course, the whole person exists, but it is not what makes the decisions, as I have already shown.
“The existence of the DMM can not be verified to this epistemic standard.”
Doyle has not shown that the DMM “cannot be verified,” but I do agree that it has not yet been verified. There are good reasons to believe and predict that it will be verified, as I have shown.
“It is arbitrarily delineated from the rest of the brain, yet unspecified in its physical and computational form.”
This is just a false statement. I have not delineated the DMM arbitrarily, but I have delineated it by function! Other parts of the brain have been similarly delineated by function. I have given an outline for its computational form. It will be found to be composed of neurons in some kind of circuit.
“Its supposed informational inputs are implausible, which makes its basic functionality implausible.”
Of course, the informational inputs and functionality of the DMM are plausible. Doyle has not proven otherwise. Plausibility is a low standard, which I have easily met.
“The mechanistic nature of the DMM is supposed to reduce away the human agent, but the DMM is itself presumably made of mechanistic parts with their own causal rules of ‘decision,’ so it may as well be reduced away to elementary particles.”
As I have already shown, the “human agent” is not the proper level of analysis here. Of course, the DMM would be mechanistic and have mechanistic parts. It’s mechanisms ‘all the way down.’ It’s not magic!
“All things considered, I don’t think I can believe in anything so mystical as the DMM.”
Neither the brain as a whole nor the hypothetical DMM is mystical or magical. The usual features are referenced: neuronal processes and circuits, mechanisms, natural laws, physical reality.
“Now I’ll move on to address epiphenomenalism, the philosophical view which, if true, would pose a serious problem for the first main point (1) in my first Skeptic article. Here is Whittenberger’s presentation:”
Our conscious desires and intentions often precede our choices, but this hardly means that they cause them. It could be the case, and probably is the case, that both our conscious desires and intentions and our choices are caused by a third factor which precedes them both. And so, I believe the author is making a classical thinking error known as “post hoc, ergo propter hoc.” As we all learned in graduate school, correlation does not necessarily indicate causation, even when the correlation is sequential.
“Of course, taking such a hard line skeptical attitude toward causation would obliterate the validity of Whittenberger’s own proposed ‘test of determinism,’ which completely depends on correlation.”
There is no hard line here. Sequential correlation does not necessarily indicate causation. For example, if you pray to God that there will be an open parking space for you and then it turns out that there is, then this does not necessarily ensure that the prayer caused the open spot. Similarly, if a conscious intention occurs before an action, this does not necessarily ensure that the intention caused the action.
“The only way Whittenberger’s DMM hypothesis could ever be supported by research on brain and behavior would be by observed correlations between localized brain activity and behavior.”
Doyle is forgetting here that a sequential correlation is necessary, but not sufficient to infer causation.
“When scientists find that certain patterns of activity in a monkey’s dorsal premotor cortex correlate with the monkey’s subsequent choice, does Whittenberger declare ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’? Certainly not. Suddenly correlation does indicate causation, when it’s convenient. And it has to.”
My inference has nothing to do with convenience. It has to do with additional evidence. There are many studies of brain damage, brain stimulation, or other brain alteration which show that changes in the brain cause changes in the mind. And some of these changes are intentionally brought about by a clinician or researcher. I refer Doyle to familiar studies on the effects of splitting the corpus callosum in epileptic patients, the effects of subjects taking LSD, and the producing of vivid hallucinations during Penfield’s electrical stimulation of brains. From these studies we can see how causation can be inferred. They entail more than sequential correlation.
“As David Hume pointed out 275 years ago, there is nothing else but correlation to observe when looking for causation.”
“Nothing else”? I think Hume just didn’t look deep enough. In addition to temporal correlation, we can look at experimental manipulations.
“My presumption of causal mental states is no more threatened by charges of ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’ than is the presumption of causal action potentials.
Doyle is just mistaken here. There is an important difference. The hypothesis of ‘brain states cause or produce mental states’ can actually be investigated experimentally, whereas the hypothesis of ‘mental states cause or produce brain states’ cannot, or at least nobody, including Doyle, has suggested an efficient methodology for doing this.
“The epiphenomenalist denies that the mental can affect the physical. But he seems unreasonably comfortable with the fact that the physical can affect the mental.”
I disagree. We epiphenomenalists feel reasonably comfortable and very confident that the physical can affect the mental. We have much evidence supporting our view, while Doyle has little or no evidence to support his.
“Such one-way causation would be special in the world of causation. A bowling pin is the kind of thing that can be affected by a bowling ball because the bowling ball is the kind of thing that can be affected by a bowling pin. Actions and reactions are the rule in causation.”
The bowling ball does affect the bowling pins, but the shadows created by the pins neither affect the pins nor the ball. The shadow-to-pin relationship is one of representation, reflection, or indication, not of causation! In the same way, it is likely that mental events represent, reflect, or indicate neuronal events, but do not cause or influence neurons in any way. This is the core of epiphenomenalism.
“Even a car’s shadow exerts a tiny vacuum force on the car.”
Even if this were true, the force is minuscule and does not alter what we see in the motion of the car. Again, the shadow is representative. The car’s engine is causal.
“Epiphenomenalists unwittingly postulate the only exception to actions and reactions. Why should such an exception be expected? How does it work? Why aren’t there more exceptions? These questions are probably not any more tractable than the question of how the mental can affect the physical. And without answers to these questions, the epiphenomenalist is committing the fallacy of special pleading.”
There is no special pleading here. Doyle’s questions for epiphenomenalists, like myself, are appropriate, and we have answered all or nearly all of them.
“The draw of epiphenomenalism seems to be our mere lack of knowledge about how the mental might affect the physical. We can’t see any mechanism which connects the two. But this lack of apparent connection works both ways.”
No, it does not work both ways! We have good evidence, reasons, and arguments to conclude that brain events affect, influence, or cause mental events. But the converse is not true.
“That’s what’s so hard about the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness; there is no apparent necessary connection between matter and conscious experience.”
I disagree. There is good evidence that conscious, subjective, or mental experience arises from and is completely dependent on brain events, probably neuronal events.
“But since we know that conscious experience does exist, we should conclude that the lack of apparent necessary connection between mental and physical is only a feature of our ignorance. It can not imply that there is no connection. We should not be fooled by our mere failure to see a connection in either direction.”
Here Doyle misrepresents the state of philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology. Of course, conscious experience exists! Of course, brain events exist! There appears to be a necessary connection between them: Brain events cause mental events, but mental events do not cause brain events. Mental events represent, reflect, or indicate brain events. That’s the consensus of experts right now.
“But we do have a good reason to reject epiphenomenalism: it relies on special pleading, failing to justify its needed exception to the rule of action and reaction. This is my preliminary argument against epiphenomenalism. Other writers have already made many other arguments for and against, with the dispute showing no signs of final resolution. So I don’t expect this brief treatment to conclude the issue for those in the field.”
No, so far we do not have good reason to reject epiphenomenalism. There is no special pleading for it. A reaction may be merely a representation.
“But my argument should be enough to answer Whittenberger’s unargued claims. Nothing in either of his articles should lead to any doubt about the realities of free will”
I have made strong arguments for my claims, much stronger than Doyle has made for his. Our skepticism about “free will” is warranted. When we make a choice between two options, our choice is dependent on pre-existing factors, usually many of them, and it is certainly not “free.” Our brains almost always choose the option valued the more highly.
“We humans are the true sources of our own actions because the whole human, not his parts, is the correct scale at which to examine free will. Because of an asymmetry in time, the right criterion for free will is the ability to be unpredictable in principle. We humans are fundamentally unpredictable because we each have the properties of an undecidable system.”
Our brain is the true source of our own actions because the brain is the part of us which specializes in collecting information, processing it, and using it to select and initiate action. Our right big toe doesn’t do this. Our liver doesn’t do this. Our brain does this. Doyle is just using the wrong scale to analyze decision making. He has not rationally demonstrated that human decisions are either undecidable, fundamentally unpredictable, or undetermined, and I doubt that he or anybody else will.
About the AuthorGary J. Whittenberger PhD is a freelance writer and retired psychologist, now living in North Hollywood, California. He was formerly a leader in many freethought groups in Tallahassee, Florida. He received his doctoral degree from Florida State University after which he worked for 23 years as a psychologist in prisons. He has written many published articles on science, philosophy, psychology, and religion. He is the author of two books—God Wants You to be an Atheist: The Startling Conclusion from a Rational Analysis, and God and Natural Disasters: A Debate Between an Atheist and a Christian.
References1. Doyle, Stuart T. “Free Will is Real.” Skeptic.com. 16 March 2023. 2. Whittenberger, Gary. “A Skeptical Analysis of Doyle’s Defense of Free Will.” Skeptic.com. 28 March 2023. 3. Doyle, Stuart T. “A Reply to Gary Whittenberger’s Critique of My Case for Free Will.” Skeptic.com. 5 April 2023. 4. Caroll, Sean. “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Sean Carroll Blog. 2013. 5. Bourget, David & Chalmers, David J. “What do philosophers believe?” Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500 (2014)
If you search the web or look in introductory science textbooks, you will find the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method often depicted as the scientific method. However, the H-D method is inadequate as a description of the scientific method, especially when it comes to assessing pseudoscientific or other dubious claims. An alternative to the H-D method more effectively discards the pseudoscientific bathwater while preserving the scientific baby.
Carl Sagan succinctly described the alternative method, which I term the multiple hypotheses (MH) method, when he wrote: “If there’s something to be explained, think of all the different ways in which it could be explained. Then think of tests by which you might systematically disprove each of the alternatives.”1 Rather than the H-D method, the MH method is the way science is best conducted.2
The Most Common MethodThe H-D method is usually described as involving a series of steps. Different descriptions of the H-D method list different numbers of steps with somewhat different descriptions of the steps, but in its basic form the H-D method consists of the following four steps.
Step 1: Observe a phenomenon to be explained and propose a hypothesis to explain it.
Step 2: Deduce one or more consequences of the proposed hypothesis assuming the hypothesis to be correct.
Step 3: Collect empirical data to see if the deduced consequences hold true.
Step 4: Draw conclusions based on the results of the empirical investigations. If the consequences of the proposed hypothesis do not hold true, the hypothesis is either rejected or modified. If the consequences or implications do hold true, the hypothesis is said to be supported by the data.
Christiaan Huygens provided a description of the H-D method as far back as the 17th century, and in the 20th century Bertrand Russell noted that the H-D method has been taught to generations of students since then.3 More recently, Peter Lipton supports the assertion that the H-D method undergirds descriptions and applications in science stating that “the hypothetico-deductive model seems genuinely to reflect scientific practice, which is perhaps why it has become the scientists’ philosophy of science.”4 The H-D method certainly seems reasonable enough, which is why it is so widely endorsed and accepted.
The Method Which Should Be UsedIt is my contention that science operates best according to the multiple hypotheses (MH) method rather than according to the H-D method. The MH method explains a phenomenon using the following steps.5
Step 1: Observe a phenomenon to be explained and diligently identify alternative hypotheses as explanations.
Step 2: Diligently identify a full range of empirical consequences of the hypotheses, including consequences that distinguish among the alternative hypotheses.
Step 3: Diligently obtain empirical data to see which consequences of the hypotheses hold true.
Step 4: To the extent the data are in agreement with the consequences of one hypothesis substantially more than with the consequences of any of the other hypotheses, a person is justified in tentatively accepting that one hypothesis as an explanation for the phenomenon. Conclusions can change when additional alternative hypotheses and data are identified.
A Powerful Tool to Combat PseudoscienceAccording to the H-D method, researchers investigate one or more consequences of a single hypothesis, without regard for any other hypotheses. If the H-D method is taken to be the proper depiction of the scientific method, researchers can conclude the scientific method supports their favored hypothesis whenever evidence is found that is predicted by that hypothesis. The H-D researcher’s conclusion is not burdened by a concern that other hypotheses might better explain the given data or that the data at hand are but a small proportion of all relevant data.
In contrast, if the MH method is taken to be the proper depiction of the scientific method, a researcher cannot say the scientific method supports a favored hypothesis just because it correctly predicts a given set of data. According to the MH method, a researcher can say their hypothesis is supported by the scientific method only if all the data are explained by their hypothesis better than by other available hypotheses. Such differences between the methods are important, especially when it comes to investigations of pseudoscientific and other dubious beliefs.
The H-D method allows pseudoscientists and purveyors of other dubious beliefs to all too easily claim that their theories are supported by the results of the scientific method. Consider the theory of intelligent design (ID), which predicts that the fossil record will have substantial gaps between species. Such gaps are found in the fossil record. Using the H-D method, the existence of gaps can be said to support the theory of ID. In fact, the more fossils paleontologists find, the more gaps there are between them. Therefore, using the H-D method as the scientific method, intelligent design theorists can claim the scientific method supports the theory of intelligent design. And according to the H-D method ID theorists need go no further than testing this single prediction before they can say their theory is supported by the application of the scientific method. As a result, intelligent design theorists can argue their theory is scientific, rather than pseudoscientific.
Use of the MH method would reach a different conclusion. The theory of intelligent design does indeed predict substantial gaps between species in the fossil record. So does the theory of evolution through natural selection, in which the transition from species to species should be relatively smooth without substantial gaps. However, fossils are not a complete record of the existence of all species, and not all fossils have been uncovered. As a result, substantial gaps in the fossil record are to be expected and indeed are predicted by the theory of evolution through natural selection. Since both the theory of intelligent design and the theory of evolution through natural selection make the same predictions about gaps in the fossil record, such data alone do not provide the means to choose between the two theories, according to the MH method. Therefore, if they were to use the MH method, intelligent design proponents could not claim their theory is acceptable according to the scientific method.
Given leeway in choosing whatever data best suit your purpose (i.e., “cherry picking”), some empirical support can be found to agree with just about any dubious claim. As a result, the H-D method allows pseudoscientists to claim the scientific method supports just about any theory. In contrast, the MH method makes clear that a theory cannot be accepted by the scientific method unless the theory is shown to be superior to other available theories in accounting for data.
A myriad of theories have been proposed to explain the evolution of species, including the theories of natural selection, creationism, intelligent design, Lamarkianism, and De Vries mutation.6 The myriad of data that has been collected is in far better agreement with the theory of evolution through natural selection than with any other of the theories. That is why we are justified in accepting the theory of evolution through natural selection, even if that acceptance must always remain tentative.
Skeptics well understand that the theory of intelligent design is discredited when the entire wealth of available data is considered. This means skeptics are using the MH method, rather than the H-D method, when they argue that belief in the theory of intelligent design is not supported by the scientific method. Pseudoscientific and other dubious beliefs would be less likely to flourish if the public understood that science requires the use of the MH, rather than the H-D, method. Rather than teaching the H-D method, we should be teaching the MH method.
I interpret Carl Sagan’s well-known skeptical credo that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” (the ECREE principle as it is now called) as implying that accepting an extraordinary claim requires that evidence be sufficient to make alternative explanations implausible, as specified by the MH method.7 In this regard, note how skeptics regularly investigate and raise doubts about paranormal beliefs in the pages of Skeptic. Such investigations are informative precisely because they provide one or more plausible alternative explanations for phenomenon that are purported to be paranormal. In other words, skeptics debunk paranormal beliefs by using the MH method to compare alternative explanations.
The MH method is not only the best representation of the scientific method; it is also the best way to think critically in any endeavor. Whether making philosophical arguments, legal prosecutions, medical diagnoses, or repairing motor vehicles, the best procedure is to consider (and rule out) alternative explanations. For example, a criminal prosecutor rarely succeeds in obtaining a guilty verdict if alternative theories of a crime proposed by the defense are not shown to be implausible. The same holds for making other arguments or reaching other decisions whether in or outside of science.
Why It MattersAccording to the H-D method, any pseudoscientific belief can be said to be supported by the application of the scientific method as long as even a single empirical consequence of the belief holds true. According to the MH method, once a skeptic presents an alternative hypothesis that explains the available data as well as the pseudoscientific explanation, pseudoscientists are not permitted to claim their beliefs are supported by the scientific method. Under these conditions, pseudoscientists must withhold judgment according to the MH method. That is an important difference between the two methods. The H-D method allows pseudoscientists to all too easily claim their beliefs are supported by the scientific method, while the MH method does not.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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The MH method is neither new nor revolutionary. The method was described at least as far back as 1890.8 And building on such prior descriptions, the MH method was championed by John Platt in his widely cited article in Science entitled “strong inference.”9 As I already noted, Carl Sagan also championed the MH method. In addition, the MH method is the backbone of the logic of causal inference, such as in the widely influential work of W.R. Shadish, T.D. Cook, and D.T. Campbell in their 2002 book Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference.10 Nonetheless, the H-D method, rather than the MH method, is still propagated as the scientific method.
It is a mistake—with substantial consequences—to describe the scientific method without explicitly noting that alternative hypotheses must be considered before a theory can be accepted. We should not be teaching an incorrect description of how science operates. When we describe the scientific method, we should explicitly teach the MH method and not the H-D method.
Best practices in science use the MH method. If everyone (including scientists, journalists, politicians, jurists, and educators) internalized the MH method rather than the H-D method, fewer people would likely reach dubious conclusions about the world. And the public would be less likely to misunderstand what it means to be scientific.
About the AuthorCharles S. Reichardt is a professor of psychology at the University of Denver. He is the author of Quasi-Experimentation: A Guide to Design and Analysis, and The Method of Multiple Hypotheses: A Guide for Professional and Academic Researchers.
References1. Sagan, C. (1995). The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark. Random House. 2. Reichardt, C.S. (2021). The Method of Multiple Hypotheses: A Guide for Professional and Academic Researchers. Routledge. 3. Russell, B. (1931). The Scientific Outlook. Norton. 4. Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed.). Routledge. 5. Reichardt, C.S. (2021). The Method of Multiple Hypotheses: A Guide for Professional and Academic Researchers. Routledge. 6. Kean, S. (2012). The Violinist’s Thumb: And Other Lost Tales Of Love, War, And Genius, As Written By Our Genetic Code. Little Brown. 7. Sagan, C. (1979). Broca’s Brain: Reflections on the Romance of Science. Random House. 8. Chamberlin, T.C. (1890/1965). The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses. Science, New Series 148(3671): 754–59. 9. Platt, J. R. (1964). Strong Inference. Science 146: 347–53. 10. Shadish, W.R., T.D. Cook, and D.T. Campbell. (2002). Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. Houghton Mifflin.
The “apocalypse” in Graham Hancock’s Ancient Apocalypse is a hypothetical global catastrophe of biblical floods and continent-wide conflagrations. It was supposedly triggered by the impact of tens of thousands of fragments of a broken comet that burst in the air like bombs or exploded when they slammed into the ground. No spoiler alert is necessary. Hancock serves up a not-so-subtle animated shower of descending comets that graces the opening title sequence of every episode. The story’s narrative arc puts it on a trajectory that makes an impact hypothesis inevitable, even though Hancock avoids the word “comet” until the final episode teaser.
The supposed cataclysm’s timing coincides with the beginning of the Younger Dryas, an interval of cold climate at the end of the last ice age in much of the northern hemisphere that lasted about 1,200 years. Its year of onset is not the same everywhere, but its beginning is best discerned from an abrupt drop in temperature recorded in isotope data from Greenland ice cores in an annual layer that fell as snow about 12,920 years ago. The Younger Dryas is the latest in a series of 26 similar cold periods that took place over the last 120,000 years, called “Dansgaard-Oeschger events” (named after Willi Dansgaard and Hans Oeschger) that paleoclimatologists attribute to changes in ocean circulation caused by the influx of fresh water from melting ice sheets.1
In Episode 1, “Once There Was a Flood,” Hancock claims that there is evidence to support his notion that “the worldwide tradition of a global flood stops being just a myth and starts being a memory—an account of real events.” Puzzling over the ruins of Gunung Padang in Indonesia, for example, he concludes that such megalithic structures were built when sea levels were lower, during the last ice age:
I believe it has something to do with what happened around 12,800 years ago, when the Ice Age suddenly and quite dramatically shifted gears. Things had gradually been getting warmer for quite a long period of time. And then suddenly, two things happen at once. First, global temperatures plunge to the level that they were at the peak of the Ice Age, and they do so almost literally overnight. And secondly, there’s a sudden and inexplicable rise in sea level.
Throughout the series, Hancock incorrectly states that the Younger Dryas began 12,800 years ago, which is off by about 120 years. This is probably due to his confusion with geochronological terminology and inappropriate rounding. Ice core data reveal that the Younger Dryas began in Greenland at about 12,846 years BP, with the “Before Present” fixed at 1950 CE, or 73 years ago.2 Thus, the Younger Dryas began about 12,920 years ago, rounding to the nearest decade.
Global Flood Myths or Memories?Hancock believes that the story of Noah in the Bible is based on fact, corroborated by other flood myths from around the world, and caused by the climate change that occurred at the onset of the Younger Dryas:
Now, normally, in an Ice Age, when you enter an episode of freezing, you do not expect to see a large amount of water dumped in the world ocean because that water has been turned into ice. What happened was a literal great flood. Between 12,800 and 11,600 years ago, the oceans of the world rose dramatically in a series of immense deluges one after another… This epoch of immense floods would have traumatized all of humanity. And indeed, there’s testimony that it did. Nearly every ancient culture preserved traditions of a great flood that swallowed up the Earth… From the Sumerians to the Babylonians, the ancient Greeks to the Chinese, all have similar versions of the same tale. The notion that all of this is just a coincidence, just invented independently by individual cultures doesn’t make sense…
Hancock makes a valid point here. Humans everywhere and at all times throughout our history tell stories of disasters they’ve experienced. Some are inspired to record them in their art or write poetry and music. The spiritual “Wasn’t That a Mighty Storm” appeared in Black churches shortly after the Great Galveston Hurricane of 1900, the deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history. “Broken Levee Blues” was written and recorded by Lonnie Johnson after the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, the most destructive river flood in the U.S. “Five Feet High and Rising” was written and recorded by Johnny Cash about the Ohio-Mississippi Flood of 1937, another of America’s worst disasters that left a deep impression on him as a child.
These catastrophic floods all took place within one small region of the world—the south-central U.S.—within a span of 40 years (much smaller than Hancock’s century-long timing error). These folk songs represent oral history of the time and are actual accounts of real events that were traumatizing. The floods were a significant factor in the Great Northward Migration of African Americans during the first half of the 20th century, and their social impact endures.
If three epic floods had taken place within 40 years of one another about 13 millennia ago, we could not possibly know from analyzing oral histories if they were simultaneous or if the storytellers got the facts right. Even if we had physical evidence, radiocarbon dates are only accurate to within a couple hundred years, so we cannot prove that Hancock is wrong. His logic amounts to this: Since the various myths (or memories) have uncertain timing, then they could be about the same event, so they must be the same event. Further, since stories come from all around the world, then they could be about a global event, so they must be about a global event.
Of course, the ancient inhabitants of flood-prone places 12,920 years ago had no written language. They had no ability to communicate accurate information over long distances or pass it down through time. Because of their relative linguistic and technological isolation, their view of the world was inherently myopic compared to that of relatively recent times. Their horizons were very close, and they had no way of knowing whether or not the events they could observe were also taking place everywhere else simultaneously. Major flooding events, like those that took place in 1900, 1927, and 1937, would have disrupted their entire known world and affected people they encountered from beyond it. Their descendants also had temporal myopia. Verbal history is a form of copying. Since such copies are noisy (i.e., prone to variation and thereby error), they eventually become unreliable. In contrast, the 20th century had newspapers and even faster telegraph and radio, so everyone knew that these were not global events. Even today, we can go to the internet to read first-hand accounts of long-dead individuals who experienced these events as adults.
Graham Hancock’s Global Apocalyptic FloodIn addition to timing, Hancock’s facts about sea level rise during the late Pleistocene are also wrong. There is no evidence that the world’s oceans rose dramatically in a series of deluges during the Younger Dryas. Hancock’s claim contradicts the sea level data collected around the world (Figure 1). For example, corals in Barbados recorded rates decreasing from 20 mm/year at 13,900 years BP (before 1950) to 4 mm/year 11,550 years BP.3
Figure 1. Sea level rise for the last 24,000 years, based on published compilations of data. Credit: Robert A. Rohde: http://bit.ly/3WXq2Va. Click image to enlarge.
In 1937, Johnny Cash’s family was warned that they had to “head for the hills” as his papa watched the water come up five feet (1.5 meters) and keep on rising, before he abandoned their house that day.4 Even at 20 mm/year, that would take 75 years, much longer than the average lifetime of a coastal inhabitant 12,800 years ago. The storm surge associated with the 1900 Galveston flood was up to 3.7 meters, corresponding to 185 years of sea level rise during Hancock’s proposed flood catastrophe.
In round numbers, the current rate of sea level rise is 4 mm/year (and rising), about the same as at the end of the Younger Dryas, a rate that many global warming deniers dismiss as too low to be concerned about or even to measure. It’s this day-to-day imperceptible sea-level rise that Hancock thinks concerned the ancients most, as they seem to have ignored the catastrophic floods that take place multiple times every generation in many parts of the world.
In subsequent episodes, Hancock repeats the false claim that there was a major and unique sea level rise event 12,800 years ago as he attempts to tie it in with flood mythology.
Episode 2, “Stranger in a Time of Chaos”:
A period of great cataclysms and floods that had as big an impact here as it did nearly everywhere else in the world…sometime at the end of the last Ice Age, around 12,800 years ago. Could the story of Quetzalcoatl’s arrival date back as far as that?
Episode 3, “Ghosts of a Drowned World”:
So we have a date for the destruction of Atlantis, 9600 BC. That’s exactly the same time as an episode of global cataclysm and catastrophic sea level rise that occurred at the end of the Ice Age. Coincidence? Maybe.
Episode 5, “Legacy of the Sages”:
We’ve been referring to this as the Ancient Apocalypse, but scientists call it the Younger Dryas. It began 12,800 years ago with a cataclysm, and it ended 11,600 years ago, the exact date of the construction of Göbekli Tepe. The world suffered through some kind of tremendous geological upheaval, including immense floods, followed by more than 1,000 years of freezing temperatures. Life on Earth fundamentally changed. The saber-toothed tigers and mammoths went extinct. But humanity survived. And around 11,600 years ago, the freeze ended with another final immense flood that raised sea levels around the world. It was then, only after the Earth was calm again, that the work on Göbekli Tepe began. And I believe the timing was no coincidence.
Unfortunately for Hancock the rate of sea level rise during the Younger Dryas was lower than it was just before the Younger Dryas. During more than ten thousand years of relentless but probably unnoticed sea level rise, local and regional catastrophes like the 1900 Galveston hurricane and the 1927 Mississippi flood undoubtedly happened somewhere on Earth every year, wiping out settlements, destroying livelihoods, killing people, and displacing survivors. Stories about such events are going to be passed to future generations as oral histories or other forms of non-written communication and recorded petroglyphs, monuments, and chants.
The Younger Dryas Impact HypothesisHancock begins building the case for a comet impact in the last several episodes. In Episode 6, “America’s Lost Civilization,” he associates Ohio’s Serpent Mound Valley with the end of the last ice age when “something huge was happening all over the planet” (again getting the timing wrong):
Something apocalyptic called the Younger Dryas. It was a period of radical climate change and rising sea levels. Humanity survived, but barely. I find it intriguing, by means of its alignment to the summer solstice sunset, that Serpent Mound serves as a signpost, a date stamp, drawing our attention to the skies of 12,800 years ago, a time when we know there was a global cataclysm big enough to have destroyed an advanced civilization.
Eventually, Hancock drops his first hint about the Younger Dryas Impact Hypothesis (YDIH):
Perhaps the stars, or something resembling stars, did fall to Earth. Perhaps there was great flooding afterwards, part of those earthshaking cataclysms of the Younger Dryas. If the original version of Serpent Mound was designed sometime around the end of the last Ice Age, as I believe, then perhaps it was intended to carry a message to the future, a warning even, as to what caused that apocalyptic series of events around 12,800 years ago, a warning to look to the heavens for stars falling from the sky.
In Episode 7, “A Fatal Winter,” Hancock visits other archaeological sites around the world that point him in one direction— the YDIH in which he introduces his grand finale:
For a long time, it remained a mystery as to what triggered the floods, fires and plunging temperatures of the Younger Dryas, but new geological evidence has suggested a terrible possibility. Evidence still visible today in the scarred landscape of prehistoric America, where I’m headed next. I’m quite persuaded that the origin of serpent symbolism has to do precisely with those serpents in the sky that we call comets.
Uniformitarianism vs CatastrophismAs a subject matter expert in impact physics and planetary defense, it is my professional opinion that Graham Hancock misrepresents science in claiming that there is a strong “what’s called ‘uniformitarian trend’” in geology. Ironically, he makes that assertion while discussing the Channeled Scablands, for which the widely accepted geological explanation is a series of catastrophic floods from ice dam collapses that released water from the enormous prehistoric Lake Missoula. Regarding this event, at least, geologists are catastrophists. Nevertheless, Hancock goes on to say that “modern geologists” don’t like cataclysms very much. Not so. It waIt was a modern geoscientist named Gene Shoemaker who proved that Meteor Crater in Arizona and Ries Crater in Bavaria were created by asteroid impacts. And another named Walter Alvarez was one of the leaders of the team that discovered the impact event that wiped out the dinosaurs. Modern geologists embrace cataclysms fully…when there is evidence for them.
Unfortunately, in his Netflix series, Hancock doesn’t interview any scientists or subject matter experts about impact physics or geology. Instead, he asks amateur geologist and author Randall Carlson to weigh in on his unorthodox speculations that the professionals don’t know what they are talking about, haven’t properly identified the source of floodwaters, and that the water actually came from the Arctic ice cap. Carlson also thinks that the floods are not as old as geological dating demonstrates, and are really a single event that happened at the onset of the Younger Dryas.
It’s Comets!Hancock did interview Allen West, the mastermind of the YDIH and leader of the so-called Comet Research Group. West’s unconventional career path toward avocational science parallels that of Hancock (a journalist who became interested in archaeology) and Carlson (an author and podcaster interested in geology). Like Hancock and Carlson, West (a consultant and self-taught geologist) began his foray into unorthodox science by writing a book for a publisher that specializes in new age beliefs (Inner Traditions). His 2006 book, The Cycle of Cosmic Catastrophes, introduced the YDIH. It was updated the following year in the first paper in the peer-reviewed Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,5 by a group of authors that incorporated themselves as the Comet Research Group (CRG) in 2016.
Plagued by self contradictions, logical fallacies, basic misunderstandings, misidentified impact evidence, abandoned claims, irreproducible results, questionable protocols, lack of disclosure, secretiveness, failed predictions, contaminated samples, pseudoscientific arguments, physically impossible mechanisms, and misrepresentations, the YDIH has never been accepted by experts in any related field.6 Authors of these skeptical papers include Vance Haynes7, 8, 9, 10 (who discovered and characterized the black mat, central to YDIH claims) and Michail Petaev11, 12, 13 (lead author of the paper describing a platinum anomaly in Greenland, falsely cited by proponents as evidence for the YDIH). These problems are summarized in many peer-reviewed and popular articles, most recently in an exhaustively researched review article, now in review.14
The skepticism has increased following instances of questionable conduct by the Comet Research Group leaders that included a pattern of personal attacks on skeptics15, 16 inappropriate data manipulation17, 18, 19 and a conviction for a crime of dishonesty involving misrepresentation of scientific credentials.20, 21
Speaking only for myself, the persistent lack of transparency by the CRG suggests that information contradicting their hypothesis is being withheld, which raises a serious red flag. Several of the supposed “impact markers” cited in their original paper seem to have failed to pan out. For example, no data was ever provided to support the claim of “fullerenes with extraterrestrial helium.” (Fullerenes are a form of carbon having a large spheroidal molecule consisting of a hollow cage of atoms, of which buckminsterfullerene was the first known example). The three coauthors responsible for that work have never published anything about it again and are either unreachable by email or unresponsive to questions. Most proponents have stopped citing extraterrestrial fullerenes as evidence, but the claim has never been officially withdrawn. One must ask, “Why?”
Another line of evidence that seems to have fallen out of favor, but has not been formally withdrawn, is the putative discovery of hexagonal nanodiamonds [diamond particles with dimensions of only a few nanometers] at the Younger Dryas Boundary in Greenland in 2008 for an episode of the true science series NOVA that was removed from streaming after producers discovered irregularities in the story they were told. An expedition by other CRG members back to Greenland in 2009 failed to confirm the 2008 discovery, but this negative result was never published. Why?
None of the other supposed impact markers listed in the original 2007 paper are unique to impact. The graphs of abundance data for those indicators exhibit puzzling anomalies that suggest improper plotting. After 15 years, however, the authors of that paper have never made their raw data available. Again, one must ask “Why?”
In an effort to give the YDIH proponents an opportunity to publicly answer these questions and make their data available to everyone, I recently created several PubPeer pages. I would encourage other skeptics to use PubPeer to ask their own questions and request release of the raw data that is required to make an informed judgment about the hypothesis.22
These ongoing issues aside, West’s and Hancock’s claims about the YDIH, such as West’s assertion that the Earth was hit by tens of thousands of comet fragments, and Hancock’s estimate that there are probably 200 objects bigger than a kilometer in diameter in the Taurid meteor stream, still go far beyond what anyone has been able to get through peer review.
West’s extraordinary claim lacks evidence. Several scientists, including myself, suggested a test for this idea several years ago. If there were a Tauridresonant swarm containing large objects in sufficient numbers to affect the impact risk, it would have been observable in the summer of 2019. We urged an observational campaign that had the potential to confirm YDIH speculations about its existence.23, 24 Lack of confirming observations suggest that this is yet another failed prediction of the YDIH.
Consideration of Relevant Information Is Not a FallacyScience is a field that is built on trust, and researchers must always consider the reliability of the sources of information on which they base their professional opinions. It is common for scientists to reject data that is produced by a scientific instrument that they know to be untrustworthy, and the same is true when assessing information from any source they judge to be unreliable.
West’s fraud conviction and other misdeeds put YDIH skeptics into a Catch-22 situation. When we learned that West had pretended to be a trained geophysicist to bilk California taxpayers, many of us stopped believing any data for which he was solely responsible regarding the impact hypothesis—which is most of it. Our discovery of modern-aged carbon spherules in supposed Younger Dryas Boundary (YDB)-aged samples prepared by West (with the spherules being the source of supposed YDB impact diamonds) made us all the more suspicious. The “discovery” of hexagonal diamonds for a TV show, in samples prepared solely by West a couple months after they were collected in 2008, could not be reproduced in the subsequent 14 years following another expedition for that purpose; this added to our mistrust. West’s ongoing refusal to share samples—or even reveal his raw data—gives the appearance of his having something to hide. Of course, we cannot prove misconduct in cases other than the image manipulation or the fraud in California, both of which he admitted—one under penalty of perjury— when he applied for and was granted an expungement.
Thus, in addition to the problems with West’s data discussed above, I believe scientists have a perfectly valid reason to be extra skeptical of his claims about the YDIH. This is not an argumentum ad hominem fallacy. Assessing the reliability, competence, honesty, and professionalism of a practitioner of science in their relevant field is no different than examining the bona fides of an accountant, lawyer, housekeeper, or child-care provider before hiring them. This is why job applications often require letters of recommendation and background checks. The ad hominem fallacy only applies to criticism of someone because of personal characteristics that are irrelevant to the claim they are making. To be clear, I am not making any accusations of fraud or misconduct other than for the cases that have already been admitted. Since raw data have not been made available, and samples have been withheld, I cannot make a judgment one way or another about the veracity of that evidence.
In the final episode of Ancient Apocalypse, West told Hancock that, “Scientists unfortunately are taught to be cynical about things.” No, they are not. Rather, they are taught to be skeptical, that is, curious, logical, rigorous, open, and honest. These are mindsets that both West and Hancock would do well to put in practice.
It’s Not Comets!There are other fatal scientific flaws with the YDIH, some of which require detailed technical explanations that have already been published. There is also at least one fatal logical flaw that is easy to explain to non-specialists. It employs exactly the same circular logic that Hancock applies when he claims that ubiquitous flood myths refer to a single global event, as opposed to many different undated and unspecified local and regional floods that were catastrophic to the observers but went unnoticed to everyone else in the world.
Near Earth Objects (NEOs) are asteroids and comets that visit the vicinity of Earth’s orbit. Astronomical surveys, populations of craters on the moon, and observations of meteors entering the Earth’s atmosphere have allowed us to quantify the number of objects of a given size that can be expected to collide with the Earth over a given period of time. Meteorologists and insurance actuaries talk about “hundred-year floods,” the sizes of which are location-dependent. By analogy, planetary defenders can talk about “hundred-year impacts” for the entire planet.
For example, we estimate that an object the size of the one that exploded over Siberia, known as the Tunguska event, on average and over the long run, happens somewhere once every 500 years. We estimate that the asteroid that exploded over Chelyabinsk, Russia in 2013, injuring 1500 people, in terms of mass and energy was about a tenth as big as the Tunguska asteroid. There are about ten times as many Chelyabinsk-sized NEOs as there are Tunguska objects, so they happen 10 times as frequently—with a long-term average occurrence somewhere on the planet of every 50 years.25 Figure 2 shows the history of incoming asteroids that burn up as fireballs, as recorded by U.S. sensors around the world.
Figure 2. Reported bolide events with geographic location data from U.S. government sensors, released by NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Center for Near Earth Object Studies. Credit: Alan B. Chamberlin (JPL/Caltech). Source: https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/fireballs/. Click image to enlarge.
When one of these objects explodes in the atmosphere its mass does not magically disappear. Most of it vaporizes and then re-condenses in the form of spherules that fall out nearby. If it’s rich in platinum-group elements, the condensed vapor contributes to their abundance at the surface. In cases where diamond-bearing meteorites fall, the nanodiamonds are the last component to weather away because of their hardness and chemical inertness. Every location on Earth is likely to have peak abundances in meteoritic material associated with the long-term flux of local or regional airburst events in its sedimentary column.
The circular logic of the Comet Research Group is similar to Hancock’s circular flood logic:
Hancock Flood Logic
- Hypothesis: There was a global flood.
- Fact: There are flood stories from every culture.
- Fact: There is uncertainty in the time and extent of the floods in the stories.
- Inference: If the Hypothesis is true, then the stories are all about the same flood.
- Conclusion: If the stories are all about the same flood at the same time, then the Hypothesis is true.
However, the actual CRG impact logic is even worse, because not all spherules, platinum-group elements, or nanodiamonds are impact markers. Some can have terrestrial origins, and can even be anthropogenic or introduced contaminants. To wit:
CRG Impact Logic
- Hypothesis: There was a global comet catastrophe.
- Fact: There are indicators that might be impact markers in sediments of roughly the right age.
- Fact: There is uncertainty in the age and extent of the indicators.
- Inference: If the Hypothesis is true, then the indicators are impact markers that are from the same impact at the same time.
- Conclusion: If the indicators are impact markers that are from the same impact at the same time, then the Hypothesis is true.
CRG impact logic is illustrated by Figure 3. Only a fraction of the dated samples is within a standard deviation of the Younger Dryas boundary (lower edge of the shaded band). None of these locations have been shown to lack concentrations of indicators at other stratigraphic depths. The indicators are presumed to be impact markers and therefore provide a valid cosmic stratigraphic index of the YD onset. Most radiocarbon dates must therefore be rejected. This confirmation bias and circular logic exactly parallels Graham Hancock’s reasoning that undated or poorly dated oral histories are evidence for a global flood.
Figure 3. 14C dates of samples purported to be from the Younger Dryas boundary (error bars indicate ± 1 standard deviation). The shaded band is the Younger Dryas. Source: Holliday et al. (2014).26 Click image to enlarge.
ConclusionIn my opinion, Graham Hancock’s Ancient Apocalypse has many of the attributes of pseudoscience: rejection of the scientific method, extraordinary claims without extraordinary (or even ordinary) evidence, dismissal of contrary evidence, contempt for recognized subjectmatter experts, unfalsifiable claims, confirmation bias, and lack of peer review. Nevertheless, some skeptics might conclude that the one scientifically viable element of Ancient Apocalypse is the hypothesis that a swarm of comet fragments triggered a global catastrophe at just the right time by colliding with the Earth.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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As well, and given the fact that peer review is fallible, it is my professional opinion that the YDIH should also be viewed by skeptics with suspicion. Virtually all experts, working independently in the relevant fields, who have stated their opinions about the YDIH, have expressed skepticism. The negative scientific consensus that emerged very quickly after the first peer-reviewed publication introduced the YDIH 15 years ago has not changed.
Graham Hancock’s series has not swayed scientists from maintaining their skeptical opinion (indeed, it has amplified with increased data and analyses) despite the popular interest it has garnered. If YDIH researchers want to convince scientists that their hypothesis is scientifically viable, they must become more transparent about their evidence by making their raw data available and by admitting and publishing their failures. In short, they must become scientists, not storytellers.
In memory of Ken Frazier, my friend and skeptical mentor. He was dedicated to the promotion of science and reason as the longtime editor of the Skeptical Inquirer, and to the love of natural beauty, wildlife, mountain vistas, sunsets, night skies, and his family and friends. In the farewell column he penned when he knew he only had a few weeks left, he expressed confidence that new generations will continue to carry the torch of the scientific skepticism and wonder that were so important to him. Let’s honor his memory by ensuring that his faith in us was well placed.
About the AuthorMark Boslough received his PhD (Caltech, 1983) in applied physics, with studies in geophysics. He joined Sandia National Laboratories, where he was an experimental and computational physicist. He departed Sandia in 2017 and joined Los Alamos National Laboratory. His research is focused on computational modeling of airbursts, their physical effects, and their contribution to the NEO risk. He participated in documentary field expeditions to airburst sites, including the Libyan Desert of Egypt, Tunguska, and Chelyabinsk. He served on the asteroid mitigation panel for the National Research Council and coauthored the report “Defending Planet Earth” delivered to Congress.
References1. See, for example: Schulz, M. (2002). On the 1470-year pacing of Dansgaard-Oeschger warm events. Paleoceanography 17(2) 41–49. 2. https://bit.ly/3G9FRld 3. https://bit.ly/3IhTr8E 4. https://bit.ly/3I5xfyr 5. https://bit.ly/3X0bDrO 6. For this citation I have compiled over 50 references to peer-reviewed scientific papers, which may be found here: http://bit.ly/3wkqJNg 7. https://bit.ly/3WWtwrl 8. https://bit.ly/3jEyHOd 9. https://bit.ly/3Gzg9Io 10. https://bit.ly/3WGgu1g 11. https://bit.ly/3VNiyDK 12. https://bit.ly/3GbuM2V 13. Holliday, V.T., Daulton, T.L., Bartlein, P.J., Boslough, M., Breslawski, R.B., Fisher, A.E., Jorgeson, I.A., Scott, A.C., Koeberl.C., Marlon, J., Severinghaus, J., Petaev, M.I., Claeys., P., (2023). The Younger Dryas Impact Hypothesis: A Cosmic Catastrophe Revisited (in review). 14. Holliday, V.T., et al. (2023). op cit. 15. Howard, G. in the “Cosmic Tusk” blog. Howard is CRG director, cofounder, and YDIH coauthor. He frequently posts personal attacks and engages in smear campaigns against critics of the CRG, YDIH, and Graham Hancock. In addition to me, his targets have included, Elizabeth Bik, Alexandra Witze, Christian Koeberl, John Hoopes, Marc Defant, Vance Holliday, Todd Surovell, David Meltzer, Alan Harris, Faye Flam, Nicholas Pinter, Tyrone Dalton, Jaqueline Gill, Phil Plait, Andrew Scott, Dick Kerr, Rex Dalton, and David Morrison. He often refers to his targets by nicknames he has created. Mine is “The Bos” and he created an entire category dedicated to me, called “The Bos Files” which was archived shortly after the CRG was incorporated. https://bit.ly/3WStpge 16. Bik, E. (2021). Blast in the past: Image concerns in paper about comet that might have destroyed Tall el-Hammam. Science Integrity Digest. 17. https://bit.ly/3WWDSYj 18. https://go.nature.com/3iaDpmv 19. Allen West has agreed to publish another correction to replace another inappropriately modified image and to remove false statements: https://bit.ly/3Ghw2BY 20. Dalton, R. (2011). Comet theory comes crashing to Earth. Pacific Standard (May 14). 21. Allen West, formally Allen Whitt, Declaration of Defendant. Aug. 11, 2010, Case No: FWI—012305, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino. “On March 4, 2002, I was convicted in the Superior Court of the County of San Bernardino of the charge of violation of Business and Professional Code section 17500.” 22. Here is a list of links to active PubPeer pages about articles supporting the YDIH and other CRG research, but which contain uncorrected false statements and/ or unanswered questions about data: https://bit.ly/3i0JGRS, https://bit.ly/3G2mfzq, https://bit.ly/3vt85m9, https://bit.ly/3WWEbCr, https://bit.ly/3i58fwX, https://bit.ly/3CiKEQh 23. https://wapo.st/3Qaotl5 24. https://bit.ly/3GB0uIE 25. Boslough, M., Brown, P. and Harris, A., 2015, March. Updated Population and Risk Assessment for Airbursts From Near-Earth Objects (NEOs). In 2015 IEEE aerospace conference (pp. 1–12). IEEE. 26. https://bit.ly/3GH4J59
What is gender identity? Why do some people feel an inconsistency between their natal sex and the gender they consider themselves to be, and when and why does that “dysphoria” begin? A few very young children, mostly boys, prefer the clothes, names, and activities of girls before they even have a concept of “boy” and “girl.” But do the reasons for their gender incongruence apply to the adolescents, mostly girls, who show no interest in transitioning until puberty or later? How shall we determine which procedures are safest and most effective for treating children and young teenagers with gender dysphoria, without assuming they all are the same as the countless others who are nonbinary, “questioning,” and experimenting?
Many Republican politicians and pundits are focusing on the groundzero battlefield: gender-affirming clinics. In these clinics, children and young teenagers who come in presenting with gender dysphoria are often given puberty-blocking medication; later they may move on to cross-sex hormones and eventually to breast and genital surgery. Scores of Republican-led bills across the country aim to limit or prohibit these procedures for anyone under the age of 18 or 19. And while they are at it, Republicans in states such as Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Kentucky hope to ban or restrict drag queen performances and any discussion of LGBTQ issues in schools.
It’s no wonder that anyone who opposes these hate-fueled attitudes and political measures is uncomfortable raising concerns about the gender clinics. Who wants to give ammunition to bigots? Don’t I have an obligation to defend the clinics if states are passing laws to close them? Besides, what’s wrong with helping children transition? Who wants to prohibit medical interventions for these children and youths if, as parents are assured, puberty blockers will keep their anxious 12-year-old from committing suicide? What parent, when asked “Would you rather have a live son, or a dead daughter?” (yes, this is a common question), would not approve any intervention proposed? An increasing number of professionals, detransitioners, and transgender adults themselves, that’s who,1 arguing for complexity and evidence, nuance and patience. But, inevitably in our nation’s current hyper-polarized political climate, it’s getting harder for “gender critics” to make themselves heard over the din of hate-mongers on one side and righteous “gender-affirming” warriors on the other.
That is why Hannah Barnes’s Time to Think: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Tavistock’s Gender Service for Children is particularly relevant today. Barnes, an investigative journalist for BBC’s Newsnight, delineates each step in the rise and fall of the Tavistock’s Gender Identity Development Service (GIDS). Her book deserves widespread attention, when so many liberal media outlets are censoring dissenting voices and when very few books that question gender-affirming assumptions can even be published. (Barnes has yet to find an American publisher.) Readers may wonder what a book about a London clinic, albeit a prestigious one, in a country with a National Health Service that is as different from the American health care as possible, can have to say about the situation here, but it can, and it does. To be sure, the story Barnes tells is measured, contained; the life and death of one clinic is an important chapter, but only one, in a larger book that remains to be written.
Barnes interviewed dozens of clinicians who worked at GIDS—some with years of experience in cases of gender dysphoria and others practically drafted right out of school to keep up with the tidal wave of referrals; staff and directors; staunch defenders of the GIDS program and their doubting colleagues. She also interviewed several patients, some who transitioned and others who did not, to give a flavor of their experiences, satisfactions, anger, and regrets.
At the start, Barnes reports her conversation with Anna Hutchinson, a senior clinical psychologist who, in 2017, wondered aloud: “Are we hurting children?” In the four years she had been there, the number of children referred to GIDS had jumped from 324 to 2,016. (In 2022, there were more than 7,500 children on the waiting list.) Hutchinson dared wonder, says Barnes, whether medical interventions were “the best and only approach for all the young children in her care.” A large number of the children had psychological problems; many had been in foster care or endured parental divorce, death, abuse, or trauma. The elephant in the waiting room was that many were gay or bisexual, yet all were thrown into the same transgender hopper. The gay patients told of their self-hatred and being bullied in school, resulting in their wish to be transgender rather than gay—a wish shared by more than a few of their parents. “Better a straight son than a gay daughter” would be an accurate mantra for them.
“How could such different lives and presentations lead to the same answer—puberty blockers?” Hutchinson mused to Barnes. Precisely the central question, and Barnes gives us the answer in a timeline of GIDS’s history. Timelines can help us go forward by looking backward. How did we get from then to now? Who are the players? Who got the money? Where did it come from? Who set the policies? How and why did the central issue ignite, how did it become a wildfire, and who got burned? Barnes provides a timeline to highlight a central narrative in a cacophony of voices and events.
1989: The Gender Identity Development Service opened at a small hospital in south London.
1994: GIDS moved to the prestigious Tavistock and Portman Trust in north London. The Tavistock was psychoanalytically oriented, and its treatments for gender dysphoria were standard at the time: psychotherapy, exploration of the child’s gender distress or confusion, and a philosophy of “watchful waiting” to see whether these issues continued through the changes of adolescence or abated. The service saw 12 patients that year; 24 two years later.
2000: The “Dutch protocol,” developed by a gender clinic in the Netherlands, was gaining attention in medical circles. Its developers maintained that youths who had shown gender dysphoria since early childhood and who were psychologically stable should be offered puberty blockers as early as age 12, followed, if they wished, by crosssex hormones at 16 and breast and genital surgery at 18. (The protocol claimed—incorrectly, it would later turn out—that puberty blockers’ effects on bones, muscles, and brains were completely reversible if the child later wanted to detransition.) Such early intervention with puberty blockers would allegedly aid diagnosis and treatment by giving transgender children time to explore their gender identity without the potentially distressing physical changes of puberty. In practice, none of the 54 children initially selected stopped taking blockers; all went on to cross-sex hormones.2
The Dutch were so…Dutch. So sane, so committed to gender equality; what could go wrong with their protocol? Pressures were therefore mounting on GIDS to make its gender treatment less conservative—that is, less psychotherapeutic and “talky”—and replace it with the Dutch protocol, shifting from its early “watchful waiting” approach to intervention with puberty blockers. One GIDS clinician told Barnes that “the political pressure from activist groups was astonishing.”
What will it take for the United States to learn from GIDS’s fall and from the ability of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and now England to change their guidelines?
By 2000, GIDS, having treated 150 children and adolescents, decided it would be a good idea to assess how they were doing with a “retrospective audit.” Two-thirds were boys. Fully 97.5 percent had one or more of the associated problems that would concern Hutchinson 17 years later: many had been in foster care, had lost a parent through death or divorce, and reported sexual or physical abuse. Many were depressed or anxious, and 25 percent had histories of self-harm. Some were autistic. Fully 70 percent had five or more of these difficulties. Of course, this unscientific study could not determine the causal relation, if any, between a child’s emotional problems and gender dysphoria; the goal was simply to identify the patients’ needs and plan future research. This was GIDS’s “first clinical audit,” Barnes writes. “It was also its last.”
2000–2005: The tension among the staff at GIDS was mounting: on one side, those who wanted to conduct therapy with the children and help them explore gender issues; on the other, a younger cohort of newly-minted activist clinicians who accepted children’s self-identification more readily and were less inclined to value extensive therapy. As Barnes shows, this fundamental schism revealed itself in arguments about how many assessment sessions a new patient needed before being prescribed puberty blockers or hormones: from six to four to three to…
2005: A report by the medical director, psychiatrist David Taylor, triggered by staff concerns that some children were being referred for puberty blockers after only two or three assessment sessions, described “a pressure [from patient and parent groups] that was ‘quite onerous’ and one that ‘made it very difficult for people to have freedom of thought.’” The central problem, he noted, was that the clinicians “fundamentally disagreed” about what they were treating and thus how to treat it: children distressed because they were trans, or children who identified as trans because they were distressed? Or both? Taylor advised the board that GIDS be turned into “an assessment and treatment service of the highest standard,” with research being “an essential component.” His report was suppressed and remained unavailable to the GIDS staff and the public for 15 years.
2011: GIDS and University College London Hospitals began an Early Intervention observational study to test the Dutch protocol. The impact of suppressing puberty in 44 children ages 12 to 15 would be assessed. An interim report would be produced in three years, a final report in six. Another lost opportunity: nothing was published for ten years.
2014–2015: GIDS rolled out its Early Intervention plan, removing the lower age limit of 12 for puberty blockers. By now, GIDS was largely a medical referral service, with little if any psychotherapy provided. As the volume of patients increased, the number of therapeutic assessments declined. And just as with the Dutch protocol, most of the children put on blockers went on to cross-sex hormones, with little time and space for reflective “exploration.”
2015: The number of teenage girls with gender dysphoria had risen by 5,000 percent (!) in seven years, now making up 70 percent of new referrals.3 Pressed once again by concerned staff, the GIDS leadership commissioned an external consultant to advise on working practices. The consultant recommended that GIDS “take the courageous and realistic action of capping the number of referrals immediately.” They did not.
2018: Another opportunity to change course arose when psychiatrist David Bell presented the concerns of ten experienced GIDS clinicians to the Tavistock board. His staff was worried that children were being harmed with irreversible procedures and lack of follow-up evidence to assure their safety. His own conclusion was that GIDS was “not fit for purpose.” The Trust overruled his report, finding no evidence of “any immediate issues in relation to patient safety or failings in the overall approach taken by the Service.” Nothing changed.
2020: About 25 percent of the Tavistock’s income was now coming from referrals to GIDS, up from six percent in only five years. Money from GIDS was “propping us up,” one senior Tavistock clinician told Barnes.
2021: The results of the Early Intervention Study, begun in 2011, were finally published. The researchers “identified no changes in psychological function, quality of life or degree of gender dysphoria” in the youngest patients put on puberty blockers. No changes meant no improvement. An assessment of GIDS by the Care Quality Commission, which regulates all health and social care services in England, gave GIDS its lowest rating, “inadequate.”
2022: England’s National Health Service announced that GIDS would be closed in 2023, replaced by smaller regional centers that will offer a greater focus on mental health.
Why did GIDS persist so long, in the face of repeated objections from its own staff and in the absence of research and clinical follow-up on the thousands of young patients in its care? A perfect combustion of money and institutional rigidity. No one in authority wanted to jeopardize the budget that came from the enormous number of referrals. Ultimately, GIDS succumbed to the rigidity of institutions that, once certain practices are in place, cannot readily turn themselves around. A truly adequate response to the problems at GIDS, as David Bell told Barnes, would have required “a complete structural rethink.” The Tavistock had become so committed to GIDS, he said, that it could not allow itself to see the evidence that threw the whole enterprise into question. GIDS had such power “that no doubt could be allowed in.”
Rethinking? Doubting? Not abilities that most institutions welcome or reward.
Still, GIDS would likely have stumbled along if it were not for the major “rethink” of the risks of the Dutch protocol. The NHS commissioned Dr. Hilary Cass, a highly respected pediatrician and former president of the Royal College of Pediatrics and Child Health, to review GIDS’s service for patients under the age of 18, and in 2022 she issued an interim report. There was simply insufficient evidence, the report concluded, to advise about the value of hormone treatments. Because GIDS evolved so rapidly in response to demand, it was not subjected to “the normal quality controls that are typically applied when new or innovative treatments are introduced.”4 Accordingly, the Cass report recommended significant changes in treating children and young teenagers with gender dysphoria: clinicians should begin with psychosocial therapy and psychological support, not medical treatments. They should keep in mind that gender incongruence can be “a transient phase” for prepubescent children and adolescents, so caution is warranted before beginning transition procedures. To avoid the dominance of any one clinical or medical perspective, young people would henceforth be treated by a team of experts in pediatric medicine, autism, neurodisability, and mental health; puberty blockers would be permitted only as part of a formal research program.
The Cass report is not an outlier. Sweden, Norway, and Finland have all revised their guidelines for transgender treatment. They too have severely curtailed the use of puberty blockers for youths under 18, concluding that the evidence to support puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones is weak and that the risks currently outweigh the benefits.5 Even the Dutch are rethinking the Dutch protocol.6
Barnes’ chronology is deeply informative as a case study of how an organization lives, thrives, and dies. That is its strength and its limitation. She does not place the GIDS story in the larger context of what has been happening in the worlds of sexology and gender medicine over the last twenty years, let alone of the politically and ideologically motivated groups fighting for trans rights. We learn only obliquely how powerful lobbies came to shape and control the conversation, ostracizing dissenters and doubters as being “transphobic” and ignoring the role of homophobia seething under the surface.7 Although Barnes’s interviewees spoke often of the “pressures” they were under from activist groups, and although we hear from the GIDS whistleblowers and dissenters who were shunned and ignored, Barnes offers no examples of the human costs of those pressures elsewhere, in lives uprooted, careers destroyed, and, to this day, eminent professionals in the field silenced and disrespected. Stephen Levine, a noted psychiatrist who won the Society for Sex Research and Therapy’s highest award in 2005 and had been its president, was rejected in 2022 and 2023 from presenting his critical analysis of the Dutch protocol.8
What will it take for the United States to learn from GIDS’s fall and from the ability of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and now England to change their guidelines? It’s hard to imagine our ever having a single, highly respected scientist, such as Dr. Hilary Cass, whose conclusions would be accepted by both sides on this politically bifurcated issue. Here, “following the money” in the transgender marketplace leads not to one leading institution but to a vast web of clinic locations, state politics, and vested interests: hospitals, which offer menus of hormonal and surgical options; plastic surgeons, ever on the lookout for a new market; the pharmaceutical company that manufactures puberty blockers, once a niche market that exploded; “cowboy surgeons” (a term popularized by the non-cowboy surgeon Atul Gawande) who blur boundaries, ignore guidelines, and are at the ready to provide operations for the growing market; and of course the independent clinics, including Planned Parenthood, that have expanded their health services to include (and to be compensated for) transgender medication.
How do you assure a young person of a procedure’s safety and longterm effectiveness when there are no randomized controlled studies that demonstrate the superiority of one intervention over another?
To be sure, there are signs of change. Genspect, an international group of professionals, trans people, detransitioners, and parents who are gender critical, hosts webinars and provides services for detransitioning individuals. Whistleblowers are coming forward: Jamie Reed, a former case manager at the Transgender Center at Washington University’s Children’s Hospital, finally felt compelled to file a report with the Missouri Attorney General’s office complaining—just as the GIDS dissenters did—of inadequate evaluations, lack of a consensus protocol, and the numbers of young patients inappropriately rushed to treatment.9 Dissenting members of the American Academy of Pediatrics have publicly accused their own professional body of pushing a harmful drugs-first approach on teenagers based on “scant and shoddy” evidence, bowing to pressure from young activist doctors, and suppressing dissenting voices.10 The May 2023 issue of The Economist made its cover story: “The evidence to support medicalised gender transitions in adolescents is worryingly weak.”11
And a growing number of gender-critical physicians, including midwives and OB-GYNs, are reporting their own cases of unanticipated harms suffered by the detransitioners they treat. A February 2023 paper in Frontiers of Global Women’s Health contains the first published account of a young woman who had transitioned early; had her breasts removed, leaving her with extensive, painful scarring that required more surgery; detransitioned; and later, after having a baby, “grieved her inability to breastfeed.” The authors observe that breastfeeding is “undervalued” in transgender medicine; the common attitude is that removing breasts is no big deal, breast milk is nothing special, and a detransitioned woman can always have a “reversal.” To read this article is to feel heartsick at this woman’s original reasons for transitioning—she developed breasts at 10 that made her uncomfortable with her changing body; the other kids teased her and boys and men sexually harassed her—and after hearing about gender identity she “became persuaded that her bodily discomfort was because she was transgender.”12
But what it will take—what it almost always takes—are lawsuits. Chloe and Layla are suing Kaiser Permanente and the medical providers who facilitated their hormonal and surgical transitions as young teenagers, including a double mastectomy for Chloe at age 15 and for Layla at 13. These lawsuits will bring the issue of “informed consent” front and center, because all clinics say they take no action without it. Unfortunately, as Stephen Levine has shown, the statements that pass for informed consent today are inconsistent and unsatisfactory.13 How do you assure a young person of a procedure’s safety and long-term effectiveness when there are no randomized controlled studies that demonstrate the superiority of one intervention over another? What outcomes are even considered ideal? Will you inform your patient, Levine writes, about “rates of later desistance, increased mental suffering, increased incidence of physical illness, educational failure, vocational inconstancy, and social isolation”? Parents give consent because they believe they are saving their children’s lives and guaranteeing their children’s future satisfaction with their bodies, but are they told of the higher risk of severe lifelong medical complications, depression, and, yes, suicide among transgender adults?
Moreover, what does having “informed consent” from a 12-year-old or a 14-year-old mean? Teenagers, by definition, want what they want now, consequences be damned—especially if they are autistic, depressed, and/or anxious. How many of them can imagine how they will feel in five years, let alone 10 or 30? Does a 13-year-old understand the physical complications of having her breasts removed, or that he will lose his fertility, or that they may never be able to have an orgasm? Barnes quotes one therapist who spoke of the “worrying lack of understanding” among patients, such as a young trans man, a natal female, who asked if he would start producing sperm once on testosterone.
The final footnote to Barnes’s story: This year, prompted by the Cass report, an English law firm is expected to file a class-action criminal-negligence suit against the Tavistock and Portman Trust. More than 1,000 clients are expected to join the suit. I suspect that clinics in the United States will be paying close attention. The lawyers certainly are.
Suggested Resources* Lisa Selin Davis’s Substack * Society for Evidence-Based Gender Medicine * Genspect
About the AuthorCarol Tavris, PhD, is a social psychologist and writer. She has written hundreds of articles, book reviews, and op-eds on many topics in psychological science. Her books include Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), with Elliot Aronson; Estrogen Matters; and The Mismeasure of Woman. A Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, she has received numerous awards for her efforts to promote science and skepticism, including an award from the Center for Inquiry’s Independent Investigations Group; and an honorary doctorate from Simmons College for her work in promoting critical thinking and gender equity.
References1. Dr. Erica Anderson, a clinical psychologist who is a transgender woman, is one outspoken advocate of the need for more light and less heat: https://bit.ly/3mehL2C 2. Biggs, M. (2022) The Dutch Protocol for Juvenile Transsexuals: Origins and Evidence. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, doi:10.1080/0092623X.2022.2121238 3. In a previous column, I tried to bring a social-psychological perspective to bear on this astonishing rise of gender dysphoria among teenage girls (“I didn’t know there was another side,” Skeptic vol. 27 no.1). 4. See https://bit.ly/3m9kDy0 5. See the assessment by the Society for Evidence-Based Gender Medicine, https://bit.ly/3Gc3GtC 6. https://bit.ly/3GbQqFh 7. Trans activists were not pleased when psychologist Ken Zucker’s longitudinal research found that most of the young boys with gender dysphoria grew out of their desire to be female and became gay men. See Singh D., Bradley S.J. & Zucker K.J. (2021). A Follow-Up Study of Boys With Gender Identity Disorder. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 12:632784. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2021.632784. 8. Stephen Levine’s clear, straightforward testimony, “13 Untruths Behind Gender Affirmative Therapies for Kids,” is available at: https://bit.ly/3GgJ3fK. See also his paper on reconsidering the Dutch studies: https://bit.ly/40GfBb0 9. https://bit.ly/3GkCloX 10. https://bit.ly/3ztKJyP 11. https://archive.ph/laCvu 12. https://bit.ly/43wpf1N 13. See Levine’s discussion on reconsidering informed consent: https://bit.ly/3KbXra3
Is psychotherapy effective? Which of the many types is best? Are certain therapies better suited to treat certain problems? How can you rationally choose a therapist? Is it better to pick a psychiatrist, a psychologist, or some other type of counselor? There is a veritable cornucopia of individuals offering advice about mental health issues, from celebrities to life coaches to pastors to concerned friends, some with formal training and some with no credentials at all. Does psychotherapy ever make patients worse? What is the risk-benefit ratio?
We are handicapped by a lack of information. In his recent book Fads, Fakes and Frauds, the Polish psychologist Tomasz Witkowski likens the current situation to the old Indian fable of the blind men trying to describe an elephant. One feels the trunk and says an elephant is like a snake, another feels the knee and says an elephant is like a tree, a third feels the tail and says an elephant is like a rope, and so on. They only knew about the part they had touched, and they couldn’t accept the conflicting reports of the other blind men, so they remained ignorant of the full picture of the animal.
Similarly, proponents of each modality of psychotherapy give us their subjective impressions about the success of their chosen method. No one has the whole picture; no one can provide an objective report about the whole field. There aren’t even any basic numbers. No one knows how many therapists there are, or how many patients consult them, or what the actual outcomes are, or what happens to the patients who leave therapy for one reason or another, or how many are harmed by therapy. No therapist knows whether their method is more (or less) effective than the methods of others.
By the most recent account, there were over 600 types of psychotherapy. There may be more. Some are no longer used and some have changed their names, but new ones are constantly appearing. Most of them have never been tested for efficacy, and only a few have been demonstrated to be effective and then only for certain problems. Wikipedia has an alphabetical list of psychotherapies.1 To give just one example, each from the first half of the ABCs: attachment therapy, biofeedback, cognitive behavioral therapy, dreamwork, emotional freedom technique, Freudian psychoanalysis, Gestalt therapy, hypnotherapy, interpersonal reconstructive therapy, journal therapy, logotherapy, Morita therapy. Where would you begin to choose? Life isn’t long enough to try them all or even to understand them all, much less put them to the test.
What if there were a similar situation for other treatments? What if there were 600 different ways of treating a hip fracture? What if 600 different antibiotics were being used to treat strep throat? How could doctors rationally choose? They would look for the scientific evidence. There would be clinical studies that used control groups. Outcomes would be meticulously tracked. We would have objective data. Why should psychotherapy be exempt from the usual methods of scientific investigation?
When conflicting data emerge from different studies, meta-analyses and systematic reviews of all the published data can help resolve the conflict. A 2017 review found that while most of the studies favored psychotherapy, effectiveness was confirmed in only seven percent.2
A 2021 review of over 400 studies3 found that mindfulness-based and multi-component interventions showed some efficacy and singular positive psychological interventions, cognitive and behavioral therapy-based, acceptance and commitment therapy-based, and reminiscence interventions “made an impact.” However, effect sizes were moderate at best, and the quality of the evidence was low-to-moderate.
Not very impressive after a century of research.
In his book, Tomasz Witkowski revealed that some therapists who are aware of the efficacy studies say they are following evidence-based methods; but in practice, they fail to do so, thinking the methods are not appropriate for their patients. And he says some of them consciously discard crucial information.
When Psychotherapy is HarmfulAnything that has effects can have side effects, and yet 79 percent of effectiveness studies failed to mention negative effects. It’s hard to determine how many patients are harmed. Only about two percent of psychologists are sued for malpractice and it has been estimated that up to 80 percent of liability cases are won by the therapists. If they lose, the punishment is usually trivial: from reprimands to expulsion from an organization they belong to. Afterwards, they are usually free to continue practicing.
Disproportionate power exists in the provider/patient relationship. Patients tend to feel helpless and have poor self-esteem. They trust the therapist as a knowledgeable expert who will know how to solve their problems. However, that may not be true. Jeffrey Masson, an experienced psychotherapist, wrote a book titled Against Therapy: Emotional Tyranny and the Myth of Psychological Healing. In it, he confessed that many times he was acutely and painfully aware of his inability to help, felt bored, uninterested, irritated, helpless, confused, ignorant, and lost. When he could offer no genuine assistance, he never acknowledged this to a patient. And he believed that everything he experienced was felt by other therapists as well.
Adverse effects of psychotherapy can be anything from crying during a session to attempted suicide. Harms may be caused by the therapist or by the therapy. According to psychologist Noam Shpancer, estimates for the incidence of negative outcomes from psychotherapy have varied from three percent to 20 percent.4 Accurate numbers are hard to come by, for several reasons that he explains.
Unscrupulous therapists may prioritize their own needs (exploitative, voyeuristic, narcissistic) over those of the patient. Some may indulge in inappropriate sexual behavior. And even well-meaning ethical therapists who adhere to standard practices can do harm. For example, therapy may lead to excessive self-absorption, adopting a victim role, and reduced capacity to make independent judgments. Becoming dependent on a therapist may impair the development of coping skills.
One example of well-documented harm from psychotherapy is that of recovered memory therapy, once controversial and now scientifically discredited. Its practice is no longer recommended by any mainstream organization. Practitioners believed that memories of childhood traumas such as sexual abuse could be repressed and forgotten but were retained in the subconscious and could still affect adult behavior. This claim is not supported by any evidence. Therapists offered to help patients remember the forgotten trauma, using treatments that included psychoanalysis, hypnosis, journaling, past life regression, guided imagery, and even the use of sodium amytal for interviews.
What these procedures were really doing was creating false memories. Research by Elizabeth Loftus and others has shown that it is easy to create false memories which can sometimes seem more real than true memories. The False Memory Syndrome Foundation was created to assist those falsely accused of abusing children. Some individuals were jailed and families were destroyed because of “memories” of abuse that never happened. The only way to determine that a “recovered” memory is true is to find external confirmation.
Studies have found other harms to patients.5 The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program was counterproductive: it increased drug use. At-risk adolescents in the Scared Straight program were more likely to offend. Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) has been shown to worsen symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and anxiety scores. In a small study of trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy for PTSD in young children, 10 percent of patients experienced a negative event such as fear of the dark, even enuresis or encopresis (urinary or fecal incontinence, respectively). Some experienced cognitive therapists suggest that Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) can be toxic6 to some individuals, particularly those with obsessive personalities, by increasing worry and introspection, fueling rather than relieving anxiety and depression.
Some psychotherapies are brief; others, like Freud’s psychoanalysis, go on interminably. Freud behaved more like a witch doctor than a scientist. He has been discredited for fabrication and making claims that can’t be tested. Psychoanalysis is controversial and its effectiveness has been contested, but it continues to be widely taught and practiced. Albert Ellis has documented the many ways that psychotherapy is frequently harmful to patients.7
The FDA requires that the side effects of drugs be listed along with the benefits. Unfortunately, there are no such warnings required for psychotherapy. Isn’t this a double standard? Robyn Dawes, in his book House of Cards,8 writes a scathing critique of psychology and psychotherapy as a being such a precarious structure built on myth rather than science:
the rapid growth and professionalization of my field, psychology, has led it to abandon a commitment it made at the inception of that growth. That commitment was to establish a mental health profession that would be based on research findings, employing insofar as possible well-validated techniques and principles… Instead of relying on research-based knowledge in their practice, too many mental health professionals rely on “trained clinical intuition.”
Dawes is particularly incensed by professionals who make assertions in commitment hearings and sexual abuse cases based on psychological techniques that have proven to be invalid. He says there is a real science of psychology; however, it is being ignored, derogated, and contradicted by the very people who should know better.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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Some psychotherapeutic interventions have been shown to be no better than talking with a friend. Pilot programs in underserved areas are showing that brief training can enable laymen and non-specialist health workers to provide effective psychotherapy.
In Goa, Wellcome-funded MANAshanti Sudhar Shodh (MANAS),9 led by Professor Vikram Patel, trained non-specialist health workers to deliver psychosocial interventions, including psychoeducation, yoga, and interpersonal therapy. They ran a trial of 2,796 people having common mental disorders and found 65.9 percent of those who were treated with a collaborative care approach, including psychosocial interventions, recovered after six months, compared to just 42.5 percent in the control group.
The bottom line: psychotherapy works to help some patients, but we have no idea why. It is not based on solid science and there is, at present, no rational basis for choosing a therapy or a therapist.
About the AuthorHarriet Hall, MD, the SkepDoc, was a retired family physician, former flight surgeon, and retired Air Force Colonel who writes about medicine, pseudoscience, alternative medicine, quackery, and critical thinking. She was a contributing editor and regular columnist for both Skeptic and Skeptical Inquirer magazines and an editor at ScienceBasedMedicine.org, where she wrote an article every Tuesday since its inception in 2008. She wrote the book Women Aren’t Supposed to Fly: The Memoirs of a Female Flight Surgeon. The full texts of all her many hundreds of articles can be read on her website www.skepdoc.info. This was the last column Harriet wrote for Skeptic before she died in January 2023.
References1. https://bit.ly/3jkQhH0 2. https://bit.ly/3jmoSo3 3. https://go.nature.com/3Ve4Qtg 4. https://bit.ly/3VgdwPB 5. https://bit.ly/3Wgx0VK 6. https://bit.ly/3WdWLpK 7. https://bit.ly/3WxpKEK 8. https://bit.ly/3VnUlUk 9. https://bit.ly/3WdN76d
In my first year of graduate school at Rutgers, I attended a colloquium designed to forge connections between the cultural and biological wings of the anthropology department. It was the early 2000s, and anthropology departments across the country were splitting across disciplinary lines. These lectures would be a last, and ultimately futile, attempt to build interdisciplinary links between these increasingly hostile factions at Rutgers; it was like trying to establish common research goals for the math and art departments.
This time, it was the turn of the biological anthropologists, and the primatologist Ryne Palombit was giving a lecture for which he was uniquely qualified — infanticide in Chacma baboons. Much of the talk was devoted to sex differences in baboon behavior and when it was time for questions the hand of the chair of the department, a cultural anthropologist, shot up and demanded to know “What exactly do you mean by these so-called males and females?” I didn’t know it at the time but looking back I see that this was the beginning of a broad anti-science movement that has enveloped nearly all the social sciences and distorted public understanding of basic biology. The assumption that sex is an arbitrary category is no longer confined to the backwaters of cultural anthropology departments, and the willful ignorance of what sex is has permeated both academia and public discussion of the topic.
Male and female are not capricious categories imposed by scientists on the natural world, but rather refer to fundamental distinctions deeply rooted in evolution. The biological definition1 of males and females rests on the size of the sex cells, termed gametes, that they produce. Males produce large numbers of small gametes, while females produce fewer, larger ones. In animals, this means that males produce lots of tiny sperm (between 200 and 500 million sperm in humans) while females produce far fewer, but much larger, eggs called ova (women have a lifetime supply of around 400). Whenever scientists discover a new sexually reproducing species, gamete size is what they use to distinguish between the males and the females.
Although this asymmetry in gamete size may not seem that significant, it is. And it leads to a cascade of evolutionary effects that often results in fundamentally different developmental (and even behavioral) trajectories for the two respective sexes. Whether you call the two groups A and B, Big and Little, or Male and Female, this foundational cell-sized difference in gamete size has profound effects on evolution, morphology, and behavior. Sexual reproduction that involves the union of gametes of different sizes is termed anisogamy, and it sets the stage for characteristic, and frequently stereotypical, differences between males and females.
My PhD advisor, the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers, was at that doomed colloquium at Rutgers. It was Trivers, who four decades earlier as a graduate student at Harvard, laid down the basic evolutionary argument in one of the most cited papers in biology.2 Throwing down the gauntlet and explaining something that had puzzled biologists since Darwin, he wrote, “What governs the operation of sexual selection is the relative parental investment of the sexes in their offspring.” In a single legendary stroke of insight, which he later described in biblical terms (“the scales fell from my eyes”), he revolutionized the field and provided a broad framework for understanding the emergence of sex differences across all sexually reproducing species.
Because males produce millions of sperm cells quickly and cheaply, the main factor limiting their evolutionary success lies in their ability to attract females. Meanwhile, the primary bottleneck for females, who, in humans, spend an additional nine months carrying the baby, is access to resources. The most successful males, such as Genghis Khan who is likely to have had more than 16 million direct male descendants,3 can invest relatively little and let the chips fall where they may, while the most successful women are restricted by the length of their pregnancy. Trivers’ genius, however, was in extracting the more general argument from these observations.
By replacing “female” with “the sex that invests more in its offspring,” he made one of the most falsifiable predictions in evolution — the sex that invests more in its offspring will be more selective when choosing a mate while the sex that invests less will compete over access to mates.4 That insight not only explains the rule, but it also explains the exceptions to it. Because of the initial disparity in investment (i.e., gamete size) females will usually be more selective in choosing mates. However, that trajectory can be reversed under certain conditions, and sometimes the male of a species will invest more in offspring and so be choosier.
When these so-called sex role reversals5 occur, such as in seahorses where the males “get pregnant” by having the female transfer her fertilized eggs into a structure termed the male’s brood pouch and hence becoming more invested in their offspring, it is the females who are larger and compete over mates, while the males are more selective. Find a species where the sex that invests less in offspring is choosier, and the theory will be disproven.
The assertion that male and female are arbitrary classifications is false on every level. Not only does it confuse primary sexual characteristics6 (i.e., the reproductive organs) which are unambiguously male or female at birth 99.8 percent of the time with secondary sexual characteristics7 (e.g., more hair on the faces of men or larger breasts in women), it ignores the very definition of biological sex — men produce many small sex cells termed sperm while women produce fewer large sex cells termed eggs. Although much is sometimes made of the fact that sex differences in body size, hormonal profiles, behavior, and lots of other traits vary across species, that these differences are minimal or non-existent in some species, or that a small percentage of individuals, due to disorders of development, possess an anomalous mix of female and male traits,8 that does not undermine this basic distinction. There is no third sex. Sex is, by definition, binary.
In the 50 years since Trivers’ epiphany, much has tried to obscure his crucial insight. As biology enters a golden age, with daily advances in genotyping transforming our understanding of evolution and medicine, the social sciences have taken a vastly different direction. Many are now openly hostile to findings outside their narrow field, walling off their respective disciplines from biological knowledge. Why bother learning about new findings in genetics or incorporating discoveries from other fields, if you can assert that all such findings are, by definition, sexist?
Prior to 1955, gender was almost exclusively used to refer to grammatical categories (e.g., masculine and feminine nouns in French). A major shift occurred in the 1960s when the word gender has been applied to distinguish social/cultural differences from biological differences (sex). Harvard Biologist, David Haig documented9 that from 1988 to 1999 the ratio of the use of “sex” versus “gender” in scientific journals shrank from 10 to 1 to less than 2 to 1, and that after 1988 gender outnumbered sex in all social science journals. The last twenty years have seen a rapid acceleration in this trend,10 and today this distinction is rarely observed.11 Indeed, the biological concept of sex in reference to humans has become largely taboo outside of journals that focus on evolution. Many, however, are not content with limiting the gender concept to humans and a new policy instituted by all Nature journals requires that manuscripts include a discussion of how gender was considered in all studies with human participants, on other vertebrates, or on cell lines.12 When would including gender be appropriate in a genetic study of fruit flies?
This change is not merely stylistic. Rather, it is part of a much larger cultural and political movement that denies or attempts to explain away the effects of biology and evolution in humans altogether. The prevailing dominant view in the social sciences is that human sex differences are entirely socially constructed. In that interpretation, all differential outcomes between men and women are the result of unequal social, economic, and political conditions, and so we do all we can to eliminate them, particularly by changing our expectations and encouraging gender-neutral play in children. This received wisdom and policies based upon it, however, are unlikely to produce the results proponents long for. Why is that?
Because sex differences in behavior are among the strongest effect sizes in social, and what might be better termed, behavioral sciences. Humans are notoriously inept at understanding differences between continuous variables, so it is first useful to define precisely what “statistical differences between men and women” does and does not mean. Although gamete size and the reproductive organs in humans are either male or female at birth in over 99 percent of cases, many secondary sexual characteristics such as differences in upper body strength and differences in behavior are not so differentially distributed. Rather, there is considerable overlap between men and women. Life scientists often use something called the effect size as a way to determine if any observed differences are large (and therefore consequential) or so small as to be ignored for almost all practical purposes.
Conceptually, the effect size is a statistical method for comparing any two groups to see how substantially different they are. Graphically, it can be thought of as the distance between the peaks of the two distributions divided by the width of those distributions. For example, men are on average about 6 inches taller than women in the United States13 (mean height for American women is 5 feet 3 inches and the mean height for American men is approximately 5 feet 9 inches). The spread of the height distributions for men and women, also known as the standard deviations, are also somewhat different, and this is slightly higher for men at 2.9 inches vs 2.8 inches for women. For traits such as height that are normally distributed (that is, they fit the familiar bell curve shape), one standard deviation on either side of the mean encompasses about 68 percent of the distribution, while two standard deviations on either side of the mean encompass 95 percent of the total distribution. In other words, 68 percent of women will be between 60.2 inches and 65.8 inches tall, and 95 percent will be between 57.5 to 68.6 inches. So, in a random sample of 1000 adult women in the U.S., approximately 50 of them will be taller than the average man (see figure above).
A large effect size, or the standardized mean difference,14 is anything over 0.8 and is usually seen as an effect that most people would notice without using a calculator. The effect size for sex differences in height is approximately 1.9. This is considered to be a pretty big effect size. But it is certainly not binary, and there are lots of taller-than-average women who are taller than lots of shorter-than-average men (see overlap area in figure). Therefore, when determining whether an effect is small or large, it is important to remember that the cutoffs are always to some degree arbitrary and that what might seem like small differences between the means can become magnified when comparing the number of cases that fall in the extremes of (the tails of their respective distributions) of each group.
In other words, men and women may, on average, be quite similar on a given trait but will be quite different in the number who fall at the extreme (low and high) ends of their respective distributions. This is particularly true of sex differences because natural selection acts more strongly on men, and males have had higher reproductive variance than females over our evolutionary history. That is to say that a greater number of men than women have left no descendants, while a very few men have left far more. Both the maximum number of eggs that a woman produces over the course of her reproductive life versus the number of sperm a man produces and the length of pregnancy, during which another reproduction cannot occur, place an upper limit on the number of offspring women can have. What this means is that males often have wider distributions for a trait (i.e., more at the low end and more at the high end) so that sex differences can be magnified at the tail ends of the distribution. In practical terms, this means that when comparing men and women, it is also important to look at the tails of their respective distributions (e.g., the extremes in mental ability).
The strongest effect sizes where men tend to have the advantage are in physical abilities such as throwing distance or speed, spatial relations tasks, and some social behaviors such as assertiveness.15 Women, meanwhile, tend to have an edge in verbal ability, social cognition, and in being more extroverted, trusting, and nurturing. Some of the largest sex differences, however, are in human mate choice and behaviors that emerge out of the evolutionary logic of Trivers’ parental investment theory. In study after study,16 women are found to give more weight to traits in partners that signal an ability to acquire resources, such as socioeconomic status and ambition, while men tend to give more weight to traits that signal fertility, such as youth and attractiveness.
Indeed these attitudes are also revealed in behavior such as age at marriage (men are on average older than women in every country on earth17), frequency of masturbation, indulging in pornography, and paying for sex. Although these results are often dismissed, largely on ideological grounds, the science is rarely challenged, and the data suggest some biological difference (which may be amplified, indeed enshrined, by social practices).
The evidence that many sex differences in behavior have a biological origin is powerful. There are three primary ways that scientists use to determine whether a trait is rooted in biology or not. The first is if the same pattern is seen across cultures. This is because the likelihood that a particular characteristic, such as husbands being older than their wives, is culturally determined declines every time the same pattern18 is seen in another society — somewhat like the odds of getting heads 200 times in a row. The second indication that a trait has a biological origin is if it is seen in young children who have not yet been fully exposed to a given culture. For example, if boy babies are more aggressive than girl babies, which they generally are,19 it suggests that the behavior may have a biological basis. Finally, if the same pattern, such as males being more aggressive than females, is observed in closely related species, it also suggests an evolutionary basis. While some gender role “theories” can attempt to account for culturally universal sex differences, they cannot explain sex differences that are found in infants who haven’t yet learned to speak, as well as in the young of other related species.
Many human sex differences satisfy all three conditions — they are culturally universal, are observable in newborns, and a similar pattern is seen in apes and other mammals. The largest sex differences20 found with striking cross-cultural similarity are in mate preferences, but other differences arise across societies and among young children before the age of three as boys and girls tend to self-segregate into different groups with distinct and stereotypical styles.21 These patterns, which include more play fighting in males, are observable in other apes and mammal species,22 which, like humans, follow the logic of Trivers’ theory of parental investment and have higher variance in male reproduction, and therefore more intense competition among males as compared to females.
If so, why then has the opposite message — that these differences are either non-existent or solely the result of social construction — been so vehemently argued? The reason, I submit, is essentially political. The idea that any consequential differences between men and women have no foundation in biology has wide appeal because it fosters the illusion of control. If gender role “theories” are correct, then all we need to do to eliminate them is to modify the social environment (e.g., give kids gender-neutral toys, and the problem is solved). If, however, sex differences are hardwired into human nature, they will be more difficult to change.
Acknowledging the role of biology also opens the door to conceding the possibility that the existence of statistically unequal outcomes for men and women are not just something to be expected but may even be…desirable. Consider the so-called gender equality paradox23 whereby sex differences in personality and occupation are higher in countries with greater opportunities for women. Countries with the highest gender equality,24 such as Finland, have the lowest proportion of women who graduate college with degrees in stereotypically masculine STEM fields, while the least gender equal countries such as Saudi Arabia, have the highest. Similarly, the female-to-male sex ratio in stereotypically female occupations such nursing is 40 to 1 in Scandinavia, but only 2 to 1 in countries like Morocco.
The above numbers are consistent with cross-cultural research that indicates that women are, on average, more attracted to professions focused on people such as medicine and biology, while men are, again, on average, more attracted to professions focused on things such as mathematics and engineering.25 These findings are not a matter of dispute, but they are inconvenient for gender role theorists because they suggest that women and men have different preferences upon which they act when given the choice. Indeed, it is only a “paradox” if one assumes that sex is entirely socially constructed. As opportunities for women opened up in Europe and the United States in the sixties and seventies, employment outcomes changed rapidly. However, the proportions of men and women in various fields stabilized sometime around the early 1990s and have barely moved in the last thirty years. These findings imply that there is a limited capacity for outside interventions imposed from the top down to alter these behaviors.
In the cold logic of evolution, neither sex is, or can be, better or worse. Although this may not be the kind of equality some might want, we need to move beyond simplistic ideas of hierarchy.
It is understandable, however, for some to fear that any concession to nature will be used to justify and perpetuate bias and discrimination. Although arguments for why women should be prohibited from certain types of employment or why they should not be allowed to vote were ideological, sex differences have been used to justify a number of historical injustices. Still, is the fear of abuse so great that denying any biological sex differences is the only alternative?
The rhetorical contortions and inscrutable jargon required to assert that gender and sex are nothing more than chosen identities and deny what every parent knows require increasingly complex and incoherent arguments. This not only subverts the public’s rapidly waning confidence in science, but it also leads to extreme exaggerations designed to silence those who don’t agree, such as the claim that discussing biological differences is violence. The lengths to which many previously trusted institutions, such as the American Medical Association, go to deny the impact that hormones have on development are extraordinary. These efforts are also likely to backfire politically when gender-neutral terms are mandated by elites, such as the term “Latinx,” which is opposed by 98 percent of Hispanic Americans.26
Acknowledging the existence of a biological basis for sex differences does not mean that we should accept unequal opportunities for men and women. Indeed, the crux of the problem lies in conflating equality with statistical identity and in our failure to respect and value difference. These differences should not be ranked in terms of inferior or superior, nor do they have any bearing on the worth or dignity of men and women as a group. They cannot be categorized as being either good or bad because it depends on which traits you want to optimize. This is real diversity that we should acknowledge and even celebrate.
Ever since the origin of sexual reproduction approximately two billion years ago,27 sexual selection, governed by an initial disparity in the size of the sex cells, has driven a cascade of differences, a few absolute, many more statistical, between males and females. As a result, men and women have been experiencing distinct evolutionary pressures. At the same time, however, this process has ruthlessly enforced an equality between the sexes, ensured by the fact that it takes one male and one female to reproduce, which guarantees the equal average reproduction of men and women.28 The production of sons and daughters, who inherit a near equal split of their parents’ genetic material, also demands that mothers and fathers contribute equally to their same- and their opposite-sex children. In the cold logic of evolution, neither sex is, or can be, better or worse. Although this may not be the kind of equality some might want, we need to move beyond simplistic ideas of hierarchy, naively confusing difference with claims of inferiority/superiority, or confusing dominance with power.29 In the currency of evolution, better just means more copies, dominance only matters if it leads to more offspring, and there are many paths to power.
The assertion that children are born without sex and are molded into gender roles by their parents is wildly implausible. It undermines what little public trust in science remains and delegitimizes other scientific claims. If we can’t be honest about something every parent knows, what else might we be lying about? Confusion about this issue leads to inane propositions, such as a pro-choice doctor testifying to Congress asserting that men can give birth.30 When people are shamed into silence about the obvious male advantages in almost all sports31 (but note women do as well or better in small bore rifle competition, and no man can match the flexibility of female gymnasts) and when transgender women compete in women’s sports, it endangers the vulnerable. When children are taught that all sex differences are entirely grounded in mere identity (whether self-chosen or culturally-imposed) and are in no way the result of biology, more “masculine” girls and more “feminine” boys may become confused about their sex, or sexual orientation, and harmful stereotypes can take over. The sudden rapid rise in the number of young girls diagnosed with gender dysphoria32 is a warning sign of how dangerously disoriented our culture can become.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 28.1
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Pathologizing gender nonconforming behavior often does the opposite of what proponents intend by creating stereotypes where none existed. Boys are told that if they like dolls, they are really girls trapped with male organs, while girls who display interests in sports or science are told they are boys trapped with female organs and born in the wrong body. Feminine boys, who might end up being homosexual, are encouraged to start down the road towards irreversible medical interventions, hormone blockers, and infertility. Like gay conversion therapy before, such practices can shame individuals for feeling misaligned with their birth sex and encourage them to resort to hormone “therapy” and/or surgery to change their bodies to reflect this new identity. Can that be truly seen as progressive and liberating?
The push for a biologically sexless society is an arrogant utopian vision that cuts us off from our evolutionary history, promotes the delusion that humans are not animals, and undercuts respecting each individual for their unique individuality. Sex is neither simply a matter of socialization, nor a personal choice. Making such assertions without understanding the profound role that an initial biological asymmetry in gamete size plays in sexual selection is neither scientific nor sensible.
About the AuthorRobert Lynch is an evolutionary anthropologist at Penn State who specializes in how biology, the environment, and culture transact to shape life outcomes. His scientific research includes the effect of religious beliefs on social mobility, sex differences in social relationships, the impact of immigration on social capital, how social isolation can promote populism, and the evolutionary function of laughter.
References1. https://bit.ly/3iN1jVf 2. https://bit.ly/3VTZzYm 3. https://bit.ly/3iKr9Js 4. https://bit.ly/3iLr9sE 5. https://bit.ly/3PaC37d 6. https://bit.ly/2UNvcD0 7. https://bit.ly/3uyaCuL 8. https://bit.ly/3uzGxuE 9. https://go.nature.com/3Hfry0J 10. https://bit.ly/3HApBfB 11. https://bit.ly/3iGIFya 12. https://go.nature.com/3FzCAwt 13. https://bit.ly/3h6m6m9 14. An effect size or Cohens D is calculated as the difference between the means (mean1–mean2) / the pooled standard deviations of the two groups (√[(s12 + s22) / 2] 15. https://bit.ly/3h1XkDO 16. https://bit.ly/3FzCHbn 17. https://bit.ly/3FAjbvm 18. https://bit.ly/3VXAQ5n 19. https://bit.ly/3FzPGK7 20. https://bit.ly/2ENp9rK 21. https://bit.ly/2NsvM9N 22. https://bit.ly/3VGzsEu 23. https://bit.ly/31vgqUU 24. https://bit.ly/3Y2GViR 25. https://bit.ly/2UBjKPL 26. https://politi.co/3Y33qnY 27. https://bit.ly/3HjqYz2 28. https://bit.ly/3PaDRgv 29. https://bit.ly/3W2TYzd 30. https://fxn.ws/3utQ9Y5 31. https://bit.ly/3iMLVba 32. https://bit.ly/2oQWz1H
My recent Skeptic article, “Free Will Is Real,” has prompted a response from Gary Whittenberger, who has previously written a standalone article for Skeptic in which he takes a stance against free will.1, 2, 3 Whittenberger’s response to me consists of several distinct points. A few of them are misunderstandings of my position. And a couple others are assertions made without evidence. But one of those assertions, if true, could be a legitimate challenge to my argument. I’ll take the opportunity here to both clarify my original article by rectifying some of Whittenberger’s misunderstandings, and to address a legitimate objection which did not fit within the length of my article. My first article makes three main points:
- We are the true sources of our own actions because the whole human, not the parts, is the correct scale at which to examine free will.
- Because of an asymmetry in time, the right criterion for free will is the ability to be unpredictable in principle.
- We are fundamentally unpredictable because we each have the properties of an undecidable system.
The first point is an argument against determinists like Sam Harris who say that though the subjectively felt intention to act is the proximate cause of acting, there are ultimately other physical causes beyond our control.4 But as it stands, my first point is vulnerable to objection from a philosophical position known as “epiphenomenalism.” This view proposes that a mental event (such as intending to act) is not even a proximate cause of a physical event (such as acting). According to the epiphenomenalists, mental events do not affect physical events any more than the motions of a car’s shadow effects the motions of the car. Whittenberger certainly has not provided any argument for epiphenomenalism, but his assertion of it, if true, would pose a serious problem for the first main point in my previous article. Below, I’ll give a defense against the epiphenomenalist objection. But first I’ll address several other of Whittenberger’s assertions, which are easier to answer.
I’ll start with one of Whittenberger’s basic misunderstandings. In response to my second main point (2), He writes:
This is false because Doyle, as most free will advocates do, has confused determinism with predictability. Our choices are probably determined (except perhaps when chance plays a role), whether or not our choices are predictable either by ourselves or by other people.2
The claim that I have confused determinism with predictability, ironically exhibits confusion on Whittenberger’s part. I do exactly the opposite of conflation between determinism and predictability; I delineate them. Usually, deterministic processes are assumed to be ultimately predictable, but I describe how they can be fundamentally unpredictable. By drawing on the concept of undecidability, I show that determinism and predictability are not inextricably linked. In this way, I clearly characterize determinism and predictability as two distinct and independent properties. In my first article, I spend about 600 words arguing that predictability is the right criterion for free will. Whittenberger disputes this but does not engage with the argument at all. He offers no reason for his disagreement on this main point, other than his confused accusation of confusion.
In a similar manner, Whittenberger misunderstands my third main point (3), and asserts its negation without engaging with its supporting arguments:
What you are expected to do, however, depends on what we know about how brains work and what we know about your brain and your history. We may come to a point in the future of neuroscience and behavior science where what we expect you to do will be exactly what you in fact do, especially if determinism is true, as we currently believe.2
I argue in the “Self-Reference and Undecidability” section of my article that it is in principle not possible to perfectly predict the deliberative decisions of human beings—neither now nor in the future. The case laid out in that section is meant to disprove the common assumption that all human behavior could be predictable, given enough data and analysis. Whittenberger merely reasserts the common assumption, as if I had not yet heard of the basic idea I set out to topple.
The problem here is likely that Whittenberger has not bothered to fully digest the concept of undecidability. One of the necessary features of an undecidable system is the potential to access an infinite computational medium. That is the same thing as having an infinite state-space, as I describe in my article. Whittenberger mistakenly believes that the number of available options has some kind of bearing on the issue:
But more importantly, individual decisions in real time have a finite options-space. For example, if you are going to a Baskin-Robbins store to get ice cream, your options set will probably consist of only a few specific ice creams of a few specific flavors.2
A system with only two options can be undecidable, which means that it is impossible to predict which of the two options will actualize. This is the case in the most simple textbook example of undecidability: the halting problem in Turing machines. One must lack even cursory knowledge of undecidability in order to think that a finite options-space rules out unpredictability. As the one who introduced the concept to Whittenberger, I am partially responsible for this failure.
Now for the next family of missteps, we turn to a concept introduced by Whittenberger: the “decision-making mechanism” (DMM).2 The DMM is a hypothetical part of the brain that supposedly makes decisions. It incorporates information from all other parts of the brain in order to make its decisions, yet those other parts of the brain are arbitrarily excluded from Whittenberger’s definition of the DMM. According to Whittenberger, the other parts of the brain store representations of our genetics, environment, life experiences, and their interactions, while the DMM takes those representations as inputs for a complicated algorithm that spits out a decision. So the difference between our views is that I claim decisions come from the functioning nervous system taken as one whole entity (a person), while Whittenberger insists that the decision making part is partitioned in some important way from the other parts.
I give a reason in my article for why I think the whole person is the right unit of analysis; when analyzing the will, we should be talking about what most people mean when they say that they will to do something. They are talking about desires, intentions, decisions, and commitments that are experienced. Most people would agree that the thermostat on my wall should not count as having a will. The reason is that the thermostat does not experience anything, though it does make “decisions” in an impoverished sense of the word. Will has dimensions of experience. Whittenberger equivocates between willful choosing and “choosing” in the thermostat sense. Willful choosing involves the nuanced textures of experience that can’t exist without a whole person, including a qualitative integration of memories, present senses, and imagined futures.
Whittenberger offers no argument against the whole person as the source of decisions, and he offers no argument for the DMM as the source of decisions. Such an argument would surely be needed since the concept of the DMM seems incoherent under scrutiny, as I will now show. If the DMM takes inputs from other parts of the brain where those inputs are represented, then where does the DMM represent the inputs which it receives? The DMM is supposed to integrate memories into the decision making process. Memories are stored in a distributed way, involving all of the brain areas which were involved in the original experience of the remembered event.5 There is no other way for the brain to represent memories. That means the DMM, which by definition excludes most parts of the brain, has no way to represent the memories which it supposedly uses in its algorithm.
The only apparent way out of this problem would be to say that the representational parts of the brain send compressed gists of memories, not full episodic memories with their visual dimensions, emotional dimensions, auditory dimensions, etc. to the DMM. But this isn’t really a way out. In order to construct a compressed gist of a memory that works for decision making, it needs to be determined which aspects of the memory are relevant to the decision at hand. But in order to assess the relevance of the various aspects of memory, the whole memory must be directly available to be assessed. And relevance is not binary; the more relevant and less relevant aspects of memory should be registered as such in the making of any decision. That relevance ranking is one of the main things that would be needed from a decision making algorithm. Such an algorithm can’t function without direct access to full memory representations, which are distributed throughout the whole brain. There is no way for Whittenberger’s postulated DMM to do this. The whole person is a far more plausible decision maker.
The person at least exists, which can be proven to anyone who tries to coherently doubt his own existence.6 The existence of the DMM can not be verified to this epistemic standard. It is arbitrarily delineated from the rest of the brain, yet unspecified in its physical and computational form. Its supposed informational inputs are implausible, which makes its basic functionality implausible. The mechanistic nature of the DMM is supposed to reduce away the human agent, but the DMM is itself presumably made of mechanistic parts with their own causal rules of “decision,” so it may as well be reduced away to elementary particles. All things considered, I don’t think I can believe in anything so mystical as the DMM.
Now I’ll move on to address epiphenomenalism, the philosophical view which, if true, would pose a serious problem for the first main point (1) in my first Skeptic article. Here is Whittenberger’s presentation:
Our conscious desires and intentions often precede our choices, but this hardly means that they cause them. It could be the case, and probably is the case, that both our conscious desires and intentions and our choices are caused by a third factor which precedes them both. And so, I believe the author is making a classical thinking error known as “post hoc, ergo propter hoc.” As we all learned in graduate school, correlation does not necessarily indicate causation, even when the correlation is sequential.2
Of course, taking such a hard line skeptical attitude toward causation would obliterate the validity of Whittenberger’s own proposed “test of determinism,” which completely depends on correlation.3 The only way Whittenberger’s DMM hypothesis could ever be supported by research on brain and behavior would be by observed correlations between localized brain activity and behavior. When scientists find that certain patterns of activity in a monkey’s dorsal premotor cortex correlate with the monkey’s subsequent choice,7 does Whittenberger declare “post hoc, ergo propter hoc”? Certainly not. Suddenly correlation does indicate causation, when it’s convenient. And it has to. As David Hume pointed out 275 years ago, there is nothing else but correlation to observe when looking for causation.8 My presumption of causal mental states is no more threatened by charges of “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” than is the presumption of causal action potentials.
The epiphenomenalist denies that the mental can affect the physical. But he seems unreasonably comfortable with the fact that the physical can affect the mental. Such one-way causation would be special in the world of causation. A bowling pin is the kind of thing that can be affected by a bowling ball because the bowling ball is the kind of thing that can be affected by a bowling pin. Actions and reactions are the rule in causation. Even a car’s shadow exerts a tiny vacuum force on the car.9 Epiphenomenalists unwittingly postulate the only exception to actions and reactions. Why should such an exception be expected? How does it work? Why aren’t there more exceptions? These questions are probably not any more tractable than the question of how the mental can affect the physical. And without answers to these questions, the epiphenomenalist is committing the fallacy of special pleading.
The draw of epiphenomenalism seems to be our mere lack of knowledge about how the mental might affect the physical. We can’t see any mechanism which connects the two. But this lack of apparent connection works both ways. That’s what’s so hard about the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness; there is no apparent necessary connection between matter and conscious experience.10 But since we know that conscious experience does exist, we should conclude that the lack of apparent necessary connection between mental and physical is only a feature of our ignorance. It can not imply that there is no connection. We should not be fooled by our mere failure to see a connection in either direction. But we do have a good reason to reject epiphenomenalism: it relies on special pleading, failing to justify its needed exception to the rule of action and reaction. This is my preliminary argument against epiphenomenalism. Other writers have already made many other arguments for and against, with the dispute showing no signs of final resolution.11 So I don’t expect this brief treatment to conclude the issue for those in the field.
But my argument should be enough to answer Whittenberger’s unargued claims. Nothing in either of his articles should lead to any doubt about the realities of free will:
- We humans are the true sources of our own actions because the whole human, not his parts, is the correct scale at which to examine free will.
- Because of an asymmetry in time, the right criterion for free will is the ability to be unpredictable in principle.
- We humans are fundamentally unpredictable because we each have the properties of an undecidable system.
About the AuthorStuart Doyle is a Force Recon Marine who has deployed to the Middle East, East Asia, and Central America. He has written philosophy and psychology papers published in The Journal of Mind and Behavior and The Journal of Libertarian Studies. He has also written for Quillette and Merion West. Stuart has degrees in neuroscience and behavior from Columbia University and in criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. Besides contending in the world of ideas, Stuart also contends in the physical world as an MMA fighter. Some of his fights can be found on YouTube.
References1. Doyle, S. T. (2023) Free will is real. Skeptic. https://bit.ly/3U8HuGm 2. Whittenberger, G. (2023) A Skeptical Analysis of Doyle’s Defense of Free Will. Skeptic. https://bit.ly/3Uc6Jro 3. Whittenberger, G. (2023) Testing Determinism. Skeptic. https://bit.ly/40XiUuV 4. Harris, S. (2021). Sam Harris: Consciousness, Free Will, Psychedelics, AI, UFOs, and Meaning. Lex Fridman Podcast #185, 1:19:20. https://bit.ly/3zybDp2 5. Wagner, I. C. (2016). The Integration of Distributed Memory Traces. Journal of Neuroscience 19 October 2016, 36 (42) 10723–10725. https://bit.ly/3U982am 6. Doyle, S. T. (2022). Cartesian Dualism Does Not Commit the Masked Man Fallacy. Preprints. https://bit.ly/3Uc4KTL 7. Peixoto, D., Verhein, J.R., Kiani, R. et al. (2021). Decoding and Perturbing Decision States in Real Time. Nature 591, 604–609. https://bit.ly/3ZItCne 8. Hume, D. (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 2007, edited by Peter Millican. https://bit.ly/3GemOXK 9. Wikipedia (2023). Radiation Pressure. Wikipedia. https://bit.ly/3GhyMjo 10. Van Gulick, R. (2022). Consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.) https://stanford.io/3nOPnVb 11. Robinson, W. (2019). Epiphenomenalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) https://stanford.io/3ZHnPP1
The panel which claimed “pulsed microwave radiation” likely zapped U.S. diplomats botched their investigation. The findings of a newly declassified study that concluded ‘Havana Syndrome’ was likely caused by “pulsed electromagnetic energy” and that a foreign adversary was likely to blame — botched their investigation. Mark Zaid, the man fighting for compensation for victims of ‘Havana Syndrome,’ recently announced that he had obtained the contents of a previously classified report on the condition under the Freedom of Information Act.1 In doing do, Zaid asserted that the report, which is at odds with the recent findings of five separate U.S. intelligence agencies including the C.I.A. and F.B.I., is proof that the government “is covering up evidence” about the supposedly mysterious condition that has afflicted American diplomats and intelligence officers since late 2016.2
The report, which was headed by Stanford Microbiologist David Relman, was finalized in September 2022, and was created by a panel of so-called experts who concluded that the condition is real and represents a serious threat. Zaid points out that the findings differ from “previous statements from the intelligence community” and is adamant that ‘Havana Syndrome’ was “perpetrated either by foreign actors, or it is an experiment gone horribly wrong.”3 Since the report’s release on March 28th, some people have viewed it as a major new development in this longstanding saga.
It is nothing of the sort. It is an example of junk science.
In March 2023, five different intelligence agencies concluded that ‘Havana Syndrome’ was a myth — an imaginary condition consisting of an array of pre-existing health conditions and anxiety reactions — and was not caused by a secret weapon or an inadvertent exposure of an energy source from a foreign adversary.4 The problem with Zaid’s claims is that each of these intelligence agencies would have reviewed this report — and rejected it, and with good reason.
All one has to do is look at the part of the report that dealt with the possible involvement of mass psychology. It is difficult to believe that a panel of scientific experts could get such basic information wrong.
The report concluded that mass psychogenic illness did not play a significant role in the outbreak as there was “No evidence that affected individuals were experiencing extraordinary anxiety relative to their normal work duties.”5 This is inaccurate. Prior to leaving for Cuba, each of the diplomats and intelligence officers were told that they would likely be under 24-hour surveillance. Then, soon after arriving, they were informed that they may be the targets of a sonic weapon — and were asked to take the extraordinary step of not standing or sleeping near windows to reduce the possibility of being attacked.6
The panel also rejected the role of psychogenic illness because the symptoms are mild and temporary, yet “many have had symptoms that have persisted and had serious effects.” This shows a lack of understanding of the literature. This is Mass Psychogenic Illness 101. There are two main types of mass psychogenic illness: anxiety-based and motor based. The panel clearly used the criteria for an anxiety-based outbreak in Cuba when they should have used the motor-based one. Anxiety-based outbreaks typically involve the sudden exposure to what is perceived to be a threatening agent, most commonly an unfamiliar odor, in an atmosphere that is devoid of pre-existing group tension. The victims typically experience short-lived symptoms such as headache, nausea, and dizziness, and usually make a rapid recovery within a few hours. In rare instances where the perceived agent is believed to persist, outbreaks can endure for weeks or months.7
The second most common type of mass psychogenic illness is consistent with what was reported in Cuba — the motor-based outbreak. It is incubated in an atmosphere of prolonged stress and is often accompanied by the brain anomalies that are induced by anxiety. A 2019 study in the Journal of the American Medical Association found brain anomalies in a small cohort of American patients who had served in Havana.8 While this was widely reported in the media as brain damage, they are not the equivalent. In fact, the anomalies were so minor even the authors admitted that they could have resulted from individual variation. The anomalies in the Cuban patients were consistent with the brain scans of people who had been exposed to long-term stress — the exact situation in Cuba.
Another reason for the panel rejecting the influence of psychogenic illness was that it “usually occurs in a segregated group,” and in Cuba those affected “served different organizations in a number of diverse locations and roles.” Outbreaks of mass psychogenic illness commonly begin in small, cohesive groups and spread outward, starting with people of higher status. The first people affected were CIA agents from a small unit in Havana. This is a defining feature of mass psychogenic illness — it follows social networks. Those affected belonged to a common work environment and the same social network that was under a high degree of stress as they were in a foreign country with a history of difficult relations — and to top it off, they had been primed to expect an attack.
With release of the newly declassified report on ‘Havana Syndrome’ and speculation surrounding it, we should never lose sight of one maxim that has stood the test of time: when in doubt — follow the mainstream science. In this instance, the report got the basic science of psychogenic illness wrong. If there are to be any future investigations into ‘Havana Syndrome,’ they should focus not on the existence of this mythical condition, but how a panel of scientific experts could have reached such flawed conclusions.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References1. Declassified United States Government commissioned report. Anomalous Health Incidents: Analysis of Potential Causal Mechanisms IC Experts Panel, September, 2022. 2. Karem, Brian (2023). “Exclusive: Declassified Report suggests “Havana Syndrome” could result from Energy Weapon.” Salon, March 29, accessed at: https://www.salon.com/2023/03/29/exclusive-declassified-report-suggests-havana-syndrome-could-result-from-energy-weapon/ 3. Karem, 2023, op cit. 4. Unclassified: National Intelligence Council Updated Assessment on Anomalous Health Incidents, March 1, 2023 (ICA 2023-02286-B). 5. Declassified United States Government commissioned report. 2022, op cit., p. 35. 6. Baloh, Robert W., and Bartholomew, Robert E. (2020). Havana Syndrome: Mass Psychogenic Illness and the Real Story Behind the Embassy and Hysteria. Cham, Switzerland: Copernicus Books, p. 38. 7. Bartholomew, Robert E. and Wessely, Simon. (2002). “Protean Nature of Mass Sociogenic Illness: From Possessed Nuns to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Fears.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 180:300-306; Bartholomew, Robert E., and Sirois, Francois (2000). “Occupational Mass Psychogenic Illness: A Transcultural Perspective.” Transcultural Psychiatry 37(4):495-524 (December); Bartholomew, Robert E., and Sirois, Francois (1996). “Epidemic Hysteria in Schools: An International and Historical Overview.” Educational Studies 22(3):285-311. 8. Ragini, Verma, Swanson, Randel, Parker, Drew, Ismail, Abdol, Shinohara, Russell, and Alappatt, Jacob, et al. (2019). “Neuroimaging findings in US government personnel with possible exposure to directional phenomena in Havana, Cuba.” Journal of the American Medical Association 322(4):336–47 (July 23). https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2019.9269.
Lenin said, “If you want to make an omelet, you must be willing to break a few eggs.” However, 20 million dead Russians and 45 million dead Chinese are not eggs, and all those five-year plans and great leaps forward failed to produce an omelet.1 The history of attempts at putting utopian ideas into practice is strewn with the wreckage of failed societies, from Robert Owen’s New Harmony in Indiana and John Humphrey Noyes’ Oneida Community in New York — both relatively harmless communal experiments — to Lenin/Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s Communist China, which were catastrophic. Prophets and prognosticators often envision what life will be like when we get “there,” but this is not the right way to think about the future because there is no there there2 — in the utopian sense of the word’s Greek origin as “no place.”3
Utopias are no place, save for in the imagination, because they are grounded in an idealistic theory of human nature — one that assumes, quite wrongly, that perfection in the individual and social realm is a possibility. Instead of aiming for that unattainable place where everyone lives in perfect harmony forever, we should instead aspire to a process of gradual, stepwise advancement of the kind one might imagine occurring on a mountaineering expedition. It’s not a straight climb up, like on a ladder; instead, decisions have to be constantly made about the best route and method to get everyone further up the mountain, one step at a time.
A better descriptor than utopia for what we ought to strive for is protopia — a place where progress is steadfast and measured. The visionary futurist Kevin Kelly described it this way: “I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it’s better than the year before but not by very much — just a micro amount.”4 Instead of the 1950’s imagined jump from the jalopy to the flying car, think of the decades-long cumulative improvements that led to today’s smart cars with their onboard computers and navigation systems, air bags and composite metal frames and bodies, satellite radios and hands-free phones, and electric and hybrid engines. Instead of Great Leap Forward, think Small Step Upward.5
Is Globalism the Future?Throughout history people have been coalescing into ever-larger collectivities: from bands and tribes, to chiefdoms and states, to nations and empires. The historian Quincy Wright has documented that in 15th century Europe there were over 5,000 independent political units. By the early 17th century these coalesced into 500 political units. By 1800 there were around 200. Today there are 50.6 The political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes that in 2000 B.C. there were no fewer than 3,000 polities in China alone, but by 221 B.C. there was only one.7 The trend in unification has led ideologues on each extreme end of the political spectrum — from fascist dictators on the far right to One-World Government dreamers on the far left — to imagine the day when there would be a single overarching Leviathan in charge. But how likely is it really?
Given these trends, it seems plausible that at some point, maybe centuries from now, there will be no more nation- states, their former borders so porous economically and politically that the very concept will fall into disuse. Instead of power-obsessed Kings and Queens, vainglorious dictators and demagogues, megalomaniacal Führers and Dear Leaders, and egocentric Presidents and Prime Ministers, perhaps the most powerful political person will be…the mayor. That’s right, the person who cuts the ribbon at a ground-breaking ceremony for a new building, who works with the police and fire chiefs to keep crime at a minimum and disasters under control, who engages with technocrats and engineers to make sure the public buses run on time, who meets with educators to create the best environment for learning in schools, and who fixes the potholes. Cities, not nation-states or a One World Government, may be the future of humanity.
Are City-states the Future?We are so accustomed to the nation-state as the norm that we forget its existence, as a concept — depending on how it is defined (by its politics or its people) — is barely two centuries old, whereas cities date back ten millennia.8 The Harvard economist Edward Glaeser calls the city “our greatest invention” that allows people to be richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and even happier.9 The long-term historical trend, then, may be a U-shaped curve of lots of political units as civilization takes off, reducing in number over the millennia as smaller states coalesce into larger states, but instead of hitting the bottom of the curve at a One World Government, the curve bounces up off the bottom of the graph and rises again into much more numerous and smaller political units, each governed locally and directly by those most interested in fixing local problems.
The long-term trend toward the decline of centralized power is across the board and well documented by Moisés Naím in his book The End of Power. “Power is spreading, and long-established, big players are increasingly being challenged by newer and smaller ones,” he writes. “And those who have power are more constrained in the way they can use it.” Naím defines power as “the ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups and individuals,” and in that sense power is not only “shifting from brawn to brains, from north to south and west to east, from old corporate behemoths to agile startups, from entrenched dictators to people in town squares and cyberspace,” it is decaying as well, and is “harder to use — and easier to lose.” Naím’s title is a little misleading, inasmuch as it implies that power has ended, but his point is that even though “the president of the United States or China, the CEO of J.P. Morgan or Shell Oil, the executive editor of the New York Times, the head of the International Monetary Fund, and the pope continue to wield immense power,” they wield less power than their predecessors.10
Nations and their leaders care about national issues, whereas most of us care about neighborhood issues.
Geopolitically, for example, having a massive army doesn’t give you as much power as it once did. A 2001 study by Ivan Arreguín-Toft found that in militarily asymmetrical conflicts between 1800 and 1849, the smaller country realized its strategic goals only 12 percent of the time, but between 1950 and 1998 the weaker side triumphed 55 percent of the time. Think about the Vietnam War. Dictators and demagogues are also on the way out. “In 1977, a total of 89 countries were ruled by autocrats,” Naím reports. “By 2011, the number had dwindled to 22.” CEOs are also losing power. Among Fortune 500 corporations, CEOs had a 36 percent chance of keeping their jobs for five years in 1992, a 25 percent chance in 1998, and by 2005 the average CEO for all 500 companies held their position of power for a mere six years. The companies at the top of the heap are also falling by the wayside, seeing an increase from a 10 percent chance to a 25 percent chance of dropping from the top quintile within five years.11
Naím notes that nearly every political institution and principle we have today — representative democracy, political parties, independent judiciaries, judicial review, civil rights — were all invented in the 18th century. The next set of political innovations, Naím predicts, “will not be top-down, orderly, or quick, the product of summits or meetings, but messy, sprawling, and in fits and starts.”12
Who knows? At this point we’re all speculating, but perhaps the sixties’ environmentalists got it right with their bumper-sticker slogan “Think Globally, Act Locally.” Then again, here’s another slogan: “Think Historically, Act Rationally.” The first informs the second.
The political scientist Benjamin Barber, whose 2013 book If Mayors Ruled the World — appropriately subtitled Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities — argues that cities “are unburdened with the issues of borders and sovereignty which hobble the capacity of nation-states to work with one another.” Nations and their leaders care about national issues, whereas most of us care about neighborhood issues. Mayors, not Presidents (or Premiers, Chief Executives, or Federal Chancellors) are best equipped to handle immediate and local problems. Thus, Barber suggests, if we need a parliament of some sort (or a senate or congress or some other gathering of people who don’t know you and couldn’t care less about your immediate problems), it should be a Parliament of Mayors: “A planet ruled by cities represents a new paradigm of global governance — of democratic glocalism rather than top-down imposition, of horizontalism rather than hierarchy, of pragmatic interdependence rather than outworn ideologies of national independence.” The reason is obvious once you think about it. Cities, Barber notes, “collect garbage and collect art rather than collecting votes or collecting allies. They put up buildings and run buses rather than putting up flags and running political parties. They secure the flow of water rather than the flow of arms. They foster education and culture in place of national defense and patriotism. They promote collaboration, not exceptionalism.”13
Former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg explained the problem of dealing with the Federal government this way: “I don’t listen to Washington very much. The difference between my level of government and other levels of government is that action takes place at the city level. While national government at this time is just unable to do anything, the mayors of this country have to deal with the real world.” What about terrorism? Isn’t that a national problem? Not really. Terrorists don’t attack a nation. They attack a specific target, like a building or subway. After 18 months of training his staff at Homeland Security, Bloomberg concluded, “We’re learning nothing in Washington.” (Perhaps Bloomberg should have listened to his own advice and passed on running for President of the United States.) Ditto climate change. After next to no progress by national delegations at a climate change meeting in Mexico City in 2012, for example, representatives from 207 cities signed a Global Cities Climate Pact and pledged to pursue “strategies and actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions” at the local level.14
In the book Smart Cities the New York University urban research professor Anthony Townsend reviews the history of cities in which “buildings and infrastructure shunted the flow of people and goods in rigid, predetermined ways.” However, that flow has been altered by computers and the Internet, that link up people within and between them. “Smart cities are places where information technology is wielded to address problems old and new” because they can “adapt on the fly, by pulling readings from vast arrays of sensors, feeding that data into software that can see the big picture.” Townsend also sees mayors as the lynchpin of the future, and he shows how mayors all over the world are working with companies such as IBM, Cisco, Siemens, Google, Tesla, and Apple to work on problems like crime, pollution, garbage pick up, retail business foot traffic, high rise corporate office space, energy consumption, housing, public venue use, parking, public transportation, and the scourge of all cities — I would know as I live in Los Angeles — traffic.15
As Stewart Brand, the creator of the Whole Earth Catalog and The Long Now Foundation notes, “The cities did what the nations could not.” They solve local problems. Brand lists over 200 organizations dedicated to effecting local change, including the International Union of Local Authorities, the World Association of Major Metropolises, the American League of Cities, Local Governments for Sustainability, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, United Cities and Local Governments at the UN, the New Hanseatic League, and the Megacities Foundation.16 Brand also points out that more than half the world’s population now lives in cities, and the percentage is growing rapidly.17 “Cities are the human organizations with the greatest longevity but also the fastest rate of change. Just now the world is going massively and unstoppably urban…. In a globalized world, city states are re-emerging as a dominant economic player.”18 He points out that in 1800 only three percent of the world’s population lived in cities. In 1900 it had grown to 14 percent. In 2007 it reached 50 percent and by 2030 it will exceed 60 percent. “We’re becoming a city planet,” he says, in which “communications and economic activities bypass national boundaries.”
Self-GovernanceThe social anthropologist Spencer Heath suggests alternative models for the way in which people might come together in nonpolitical voluntary communities consisting of both private and common areas. There already exist many such communities all over the world operating smoothly and efficiently. For instance, shopping centers are proprietary communities, as are condominium complexes, mobile home parks, retirement communities, industrial parks, private colleges and universities, and corporate campuses such as those of Microsoft, Apple, and Google, which are, in essence, miniature cities operating through proprietary instead of political means. The hotel is another fine example. “The hotel has its public and private areas, corridors for streets, and a lobby for its town square. In the lobby is the municipal park with its sculpture, fountains, and plantings. It has its shopping area, where restaurants and retail stores bid for patronage. Its public transit system, as it happens, operates vertically instead of horizontally.”19 When you rent a hotel room, included in the price are utilities such as water, electricity, heat and air conditioning, and sewerage, and for an extra fee you get room service, current movies, and high-speed Internet access. Also provided are police and fire protection by security guards and sprinkler systems. Many hotels include a chapel for religious services, babysitting and play areas for children, pools for recreation and bars for imbibing, concerts and plays and even theater shows (especially in Las Vegas).
Could the proprietary community concept be expanded globally? In his book Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think, the economist Peter Leeson provides numerous examples of social self-organization in which private individuals secure social cooperation without government, and even though there is no world government, as we have seen in the decline of war and the new long peace somehow nations have found pathways toward nonviolent solutions to conflicts and disputes.20 True enough, but critics of anarchy point out that all such proprietary communities are situated within sovereign nations that provide military protection from foreign enemies, police protection from vandals and other criminals, public roads to access their private roads, courts to adjudicate disputes over contract violations, and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force to ensure that the overarching rule of law is enforced fairly and justly.
The FutureWhether these types of communities can be maintained in, say, city-states instead of nation-states, or will ultimately be replaced by other social technologies such as proprietary tools that produce the same results, remains to be seen. Whatever changes are made going forward; history shows us that in order to succeed they should be implemented incrementally, as Thomas Jefferson wrote in his reflection on the American Revolution:
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.21
I am assuming that we are not going to genetically engineer out of our nature greed, avarice, competitiveness, aggression, and violence, because these characteristics are part and parcel of who we are as a species, and all have an evolutionary logic to them. Instead, what I foresee in the far future of civilization here on Earth (and, one day perhaps, on Mars, the moons of Jupiter and Saturn, and maybe even on exo-planets in other solar systems) are civilizations that have learned to design their political, economic, and social systems to bring out the best of our nature while holding back the worst. I envision not a monocultural civilization on Earth, but a multicultural one. And, presuming we will develop the technology to live on other planets, there will not be one civilization, but many. Given the distances and time scales involved, I foresee many species of spacefaring hominins in which each colonized planet will act like a new “founder” population from which a new species evolves reproductively isolated from other populations (the very definition of a species22). These civilizations will vary even more than nations on Earth varied before globalization. There will be dozens, hundreds, possibly even thousands of different civilizations in which sentient beings may flourish.
About the AuthorMichael Shermer is the Publisher of Skeptic magazine, the host of the podcast The Michael Shermer Show, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University where he teaches Skepticism 101. For 18 years he was a monthly columnist for Scientific American. He writes a weekly Substack column. He regularly contributes opinion editorials, book reviews, and essays to the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Science, Nature, and other publications. His new book is: Conspiracy: Why the Rational Believe the Irrational. Follow him on Twitter @michaelshermer.
References1. Rayfield, D. (2005). Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him. Random House; White, M. (2012). The Great Big Book of Horrible Things: The Definitive Chronicle of History’s 100 Worst Atrocities. W.W. Norton, 382–392; Akbar, A. (2010). “Mao’s Great Leap Forward ‘Killed 45 Million in Four Years’.” The Independent (London), September 17; Becker, J. (1998). Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine. Henry Holt; Pipes, R. (2003). Communism: A History. Modern Library. 2. The phrase was introduced by Gertrude Stein in her autobiography, in describing her childhood home of Oakland where she famously declared “there is no there there.” It’s not clear what she meant, although it appears to reference changing identities (one’s home city and one’s self). Stein, G. (1937). Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography. Random House, 289. 3. οὐ (“not”) and τόπος (“place”): “no place” 4. https://bit.ly/3UZH3hI 5. In researching his book What Technology Wants, Kelly went through back issues of Time and Newsweek, plus early issues of Wired (which he co-founded and edited), to see what everyone was predicting for the Web. “Generally, what people thought, including to some extent myself, was it was going to be better TV, like TV 2.0. But, of course, that missed the entire real revolution of the Web, which was that most of the content would be generated by the people using it. The Web was not better TV, it was the Web. Now we think about the future of the Web, we think it’s going to be the better Web; it’s going to be Web 2.0, but it’s not. It’s going to be as different from the Web as Web was from TV.” How does this type of technological improvement translate into moral progress? Kelly explains: “One way to think about this is if you imagine the very first tool made, say, a stone hammer. That stone hammer could be used to kill somebody, or it could be used to make a structure, but before that stone hammer became a tool, that possibility of making that choice did not exist. Technology is continually giving us ways to do harm and to do well; it’s amplifying both… but the fact that we also have a new choice each time is a new good. That, in itself, is an unalloyed good — the fact that we have another choice and that additional choice tips that balance in one direction towards a net good. So you have the power to do evil expanded. You have the power to do good expanded. You think that’s a wash. In fact, we now have a choice that we did not have before, and that tips it very, very slightly in the category of the sum of good.” 6. Wright, Q. (1942). A Study of War, 2nd Ed. University of Chicago Press; Gat, A. (2006). War in Human Civilization. Oxford University Press. 7. Fukuyama, F. (2011). The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 98. 8. Konvitz, J. W. (1985). The Urban Millennium: The City-Building Process from the Early Middle Ages to the Present. Southern Illinois University Press; Kostof, S. (1991). The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History. Little, Brown; Jacobs, J. (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Random House. 9. Glaeser, E. (2011). The Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier. Penguin Press. 10. Naím, M. (2013). The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What it Used to Be. Basic Books, 16, 1–2. 11. Ibid., 7. 12. Ibid., 243–244. 13. Quoted in Barber, 2013. 14. Ibid. 15. Townsend, A. M. (2013). Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia. W. W. Norton, xii–xiii. 16. https://bit.ly/3e0ZIsV 17. https://bit.ly/3EgPfUJ 18. https://bit.ly/3RzrkTI 19. MacCallum, S.H. (1970). The Art of Community. Institute for Humane Studies, 2. See also: Heath, S. (1957). Citadel, Market and Alter: Emerging Society. The Science of Society Foundation. 20. Leeson, P. (2014). Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think. Cambridge University Press. 21. https://bit.ly/3e7Hl5w 22. The evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr defined a species as “a group of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations reproductively isolated from other such populations.” Ernst, M. (1957). “Species Concepts and Definitions,” in The Species Problem. Amer. Assoc. Adv. Sci. Publ. no. 50. Mayr offers this expanded definition: “A species consists of a group of populations which replace each other geographically or ecologically and of which the neighboring ones intergrade or hybridize wherever they are in contact or which are potentially capable of doing so (with one or more of the populations) in those cases where contact is prevented by geographical or ecological barriers.” See also: Mayr, E. (1976). Evolution and the Diversity of Life. Harvard University Press; Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Harvard University Press.
The debate on free will vs. determinism has continued unabated for roughly 2500 years and seems to have become more prolific in the last ten years. Recently, Stuart T. Doyle presented his view in support of free will, the libertarian version. I strongly encourage the reader to study that article first. My intention here, however, is to provide a skeptical analysis of his view and a defense of determinism in human decision-making at the same time. To avoid paraphrasing and the distortions which can sometimes come from it, I will be quoting liberally from Doyle’s article. And so henceforth, when I use quotation marks, I am referring exactly to what Doyle said, unless indicated otherwise.
“Novelist and Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer summed up the dilemma, ‘We must believe in free will, we have no choice.’” Well, of course we have a choice, but the choice is determined! From whatever options are presented to us we will choose only one, and this choice is the result of either prior causes or just chance. Our will is not free! It is constrained, influenced, and/or caused.
“…I argued that many of our actions are caused by our wills; that is, by our conscious desires and intentions. This is not disputed by most (what I’ll term) free will deniers.” But I am one of the “free will deniers” who does dispute this claim. Our conscious desires and intentions often precede our choices, but this hardly means that they cause them. It could be the case, and probably is the case, that both our conscious desires and intentions and our choices are caused by a third factor which precedes them both. And so, I believe the author is making a classical thinking error known as “post hoc, ergo propter hoc.” As we all learned in graduate school, correlation does not necessarily indicate causation, even when the correlation is sequential.
“They [free will deniers] more often dispute that our wills are free, not that we have wills and that our actions often follow from our wills.” Of course, we have wills in the sense that we make choices or decisions. But what do we mean by “we” here? In the singular, what do we mean by the “I” in “I choose”? I suggest that the “I” refers to a decision-making mechanism (DMM) in the brain, a hypothetical thing, but not a homunculus, for which evidence is accumulating. The best model in neuroscience and psychology at the present time seems to be that various causes, such as genetics, environment, life experiences, and their interactions are represented in some parts of our brains which provide input to the DMM which uses some currently unknown algorithm to make choices leading to behaviors.
“Sam Harris, one such determinist with a large general audience, has said that the subjectively felt intention to act is the proximate cause of acting.” Really? Has Harris said this? I don’t recall that idea from Harris’ book Free Will or from his other writings. If he said so, then it is a significant claim, and Doyle should provide the relevant quote and citation. I think it is more likely that although the subjectively felt intention does immediately precede the acting, it is not the cause of the acting. The intention is likely correlated with or representative of some actual brain process that does the real work.
“Likewise, the fact that determinists find no personal authorship or freedom in the actions of molecules shouldn’t lead them to conclude anything about the nature of the will.” Our brains do consist of molecules which follow the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. The DMM is just another part of the brain, consisting of interconnected neuronal circuits which produce our choices.
“We agree that we have wills, that we have subjectively experienced intentions that influence our actions.” We determinists agree that we have wills, but we do not agree that our intentions influence our actions. Our intentions precede our actions but probably have no influence or causal power over our actions.
“The question is whether our will is free or unfree.” Our will is certainly not free, as I have demonstrated in my own relevant essay. If our decisions were free, then they would always be unrestrained, uninfluenced, and uncaused by anything. This is simply not the case. This would make us “uncaused causes” as many gods are assumed to be. Modern science has discarded this kind of thinking.
“To look at molecules for the answer is a scale mistake.” The best scale by which to examine and talk about the decisions of the brain is probably the scale of brain circuits, areas, regions, or neuron groups. But ultimately of course, these are composed of molecules at a lower level.
“The right scale for finding answers to the question of freedom of the will is the agent scale, not the molecule scale.” I think the answers are to be found at neither of these two scales. The agent in this case is the entire human being. However, we know that the entire human being is composed of different organs, tissues, and systems. One of these systems is the nervous system, and the most prominent part of this system is the brain. The brain, and probably one particular mechanism of the brain, which I have called the DMM, is responsible for the will — making decisions.
“Expanding the timescale to include the time before the person was born renders the question [about determinism] incoherent.” We humans exist within a cause-effect nexus which includes time before we were born. There is nothing incoherent about this. However, in explaining, predicting, and controlling decisions it is more useful and practical to look at more proximate causes.
“The will emerges from the complex interactions of many small parts. It’s literally not true to say that it’s caused by any particular small part.” I disagree. I think it is literally true to say that there is a “final common pathway” and every decision is made by the DMM. This hypothesis can be tested and is beginning to be supported and will eventually be fully supported by research on brain and behavior, in my opinion.
“So my thoughts and actions are deterministically caused by me.” But who are you? What are you? What causes you? Doyle fails to give adequate answers to these important questions.
“Yet my mind does exist.” I agree that our minds do exist and some form of dualism must be true, but not Decartes’ version. But what is a mind? How is the mind related to the brain? Does the mind have any causal powers or is it merely an epiphenomenon? Doyle is not clear and direct on these points. However, I believe that the mind is an epiphenomenon and does not have causal powers. Many of the modern determinists seem to agree with my view.
“In order to claim that my choices are really caused by a molecule or a historical epoch, one must refer to the dynamics of a scale where I (that is, my mind) cannot be found. Eliminating the mind from the analysis is not a valid way to answer a question about the mind.” Here Dolye appears to be setting up false dichotomies. There is no good reason to eliminate the mind from the analysis, but there is a need to explicate the relationship of the mind to the brain.
“But what if we wanted to figure out whether or not I’ll have free will tomorrow? From that temporal angle, the question of the ability to do otherwise stops making sense.” No, it still makes sense. Tomorrow, for almost any given situation in which you find yourself, some options will occur to you and you will choose only one of those options. The choice will be determined or perhaps in rare circumstances will result from some random process. After you make the choice tomorrow, you still could have done otherwise yesterday, but only in a special sense — there were other options logically possible or cognitively available to you before you made the choice. I’ll speak more about this later.
“The question must ask whether or not I can do something other than what I’m expected to do, not other than what I will do.” What you are expected to do, however, depends on what we know about how brains work and what we know about your brain and your history. We may come to a point in the future of neuroscience and behavior science where what we expect you to do will be exactly what you in fact do, especially if determinism is true, as we currently believe.
“Large collections of particles obey the second law of thermodynamics, which is not time reversal invariant.” I agree. The decisions of our brains are not “time reversal invariant,” but this fact does not save free will.
“Choices are always about something, and those objects of choice always lie in the future, thus choices are always forward-looking.” I agree. Choices are about options. The options in our minds reflect options for our brains. For any given decision the set of options for our brains is probably larger than, but overlaps with, the set of options occurring to our minds.
“If my actions are in principle perfectly predictable, then I do not have the ability to do otherwise in a forward-looking sense.” Although I have made this point elsewhere, I must reiterate it here: Determinism is just not the same as predictability, although the two are related. A system may be perfectly determined, but unpredictable because we do not understand the laws of the system or we do not have the needed raw data about a particular system.
I am a psychologist and a determinist at least in regard to human decisions, but I think that determinists generally get it wrong in talking about “being able to do otherwise.” Let me explain. Suppose a young woman is a very intelligent, sociable, and high achieving senior at a major university, and in less than a year she will graduate with a degree in electrical engineering. She begins to go to interviews in order to secure a job after graduation and subsequently she gets ten offers. After collecting much information, she narrows her options down to two jobs, which I shall designate simply as X and Y. Before she makes her decision can she choose otherwise than X? Of course she can; she can also choose Y. Can she choose otherwise than Y? Of course she can; she can also choose X. She has two logically possible and cognitively available options from which to choose. Now, suppose she ends up choosing option Y. After the fact, most determinists would probably say that she could not have chosen otherwise than Y because she was caused to pick Y by prior factors. I think this is a mistake, but mostly a semantic one. Instead, I believe we should say that she could have chosen otherwise than Y; she could have chosen X. Even though she chose Y, there were still two options which were logically possible and cognitively available for her prior to the decision. This was the case even though her decision was caused by prior factors. Through some currently unknown algorithm in which many factors relevant to both her options were represented and considered, her DMM selected Y rather than X. Chance would play little or no role in a choice like this.
“If my choices are in principle not predictable, given total knowledge of the present world, then I do have the ability to do otherwise in a forward-looking sense, which is the only sense that makes any sense.” This is false because Doyle, as most free will advocates do, has confused determinism with predictability. Our choices are probably determined (except perhaps when chance plays a role), whether or not our choices are predictable either by ourselves or by other people.
“The fact that I am the relevant cause of my own actions comes with another important implication: I am a causally self-referencing entity.” Determinists like myself view it differently. The cause of your own actions is the DMM of your brain. Using the person level of analysis might be helpful in sociology, but not in neuroscience or psychology when analyzing decisions.
“Self-referential questions like these affect the choices that I make; and those choices change the self-referential questions that I ask.” This is probably false. Instead, the self-referential questions, like those mentioned by Doyle, probably reflect processes occurring in your brain but don’t affect the choices which you make. The model of the mind as epiphenomenal is just as good as and probably better than the model of the mind as causal.
“A system that exhibits undecidable dynamics cannot be predicted, given complete knowledge of its present state.” This claim appears to be tautological, since “undecidable” is equivalent to “not predictable.” I certainly agree that if a system is undetermined, then human beings are unlikely to be able to accurately predict its outputs. In fantasy an all-knowing god would still be able to predict its outputs. Such a god would know the future, as God is supposed to know, according to classical theism, but these notions are not taken seriously by modern science.
“It can be informally proven that humans have an infinite state-space.” I am very skeptical of this. I suspect that each individual human person has a finite state-space. That space is probably determined and constrained by one’s genetics, environment, life experience, and their interactions. But more importantly, individual decisions in real time have a finite options-space. For example, if you are going to a Baskin-Robbins store to get ice cream, your options set will probably consist of only a few specific ice creams of a few specific flavors. The young woman in the earlier example had narrowed her final decision to two job options, again a finite options-space.
“A real brain is made of neurons which are not simply on or off. Some neurons show gradations in voltage and neurotransmitter release, meaning that they have many possible states between ‘on’ and ‘off.’” Here the author is making a scale error similar to what he accuses determinists of making. The scale of neurotransmitter molecules or even individual neurons is probably not the proper scale for analyzing human decisions. But the scale of neuron circuits might be ideal.
“Negation in this context refers to the ability of a logical system to produce an output which is exactly contrary to the processing which led to the output.” But if determinism is true, then this negation would occur because the DMM received new information just before or just after it made the original choice. Determinism is not refuted if the DMM receives new input and alters its output.
Close to the end of his essay Doyle offers the following quote from a 2019 publication by Mikhail Prokopenko and his colleagues:
“As we have shown, the capacity to generate undecidable dynamics is based upon three underlying factors: (1) the program-data duality; (2) the potential to access an infinite computational medium; and (3) the ability to implement negation.”
Doyle tries to apply these factors to the situations of human persons making choices. Unfortunately, he neither defines the factors for the reader nor shows how they are manifested in choice-making situations. This does not help his free will defense.
“Viewing human agents as whole humans instead of as molecules makes it clear that humans are the cause of their own actions,…” Here Doyle presents a false dichotomy for the analysis of decision making. It pits molecules against whole humans, and neither of these levels is helpful. Decisions are made by brains, and the proper level of analysis entails looking at the relevant parts and processes of the brain.
At the end Doyle confidently declares “Neither Zeus, Bertrand Russell, nor the scientists recapitulating the latter’s [Russell’s] argument 77 years later can diminish our free wills.” I strongly disagree. Zeus is irrelevant since he doesn’t exist and never has. But Bertrand Russell, Sam Harris, Jerry Coyne, and Robert Sapolsky have pretty much obliterated the concept of free will. Not only is determinism for human choices probably true, assuming tentatively that it is true is likely to lead to a more fruitful research project than assuming the contrary. Any explanation of human decision making which rules out determinism cannot work.
About the AuthorGary J. Whittenberger PhD is a freelance writer and retired psychologist, now living in North Hollywood, California. He was formerly a leader in many freethought groups in Tallahassee, Florida. He received his doctoral degree from Florida State University after which he worked for 23 years as a psychologist in prisons. He has written many published articles on science, philosophy, psychology, and religion. He is the author of two books—God Wants You to be an Atheist: The Startling Conclusion from a Rational Analysis, and God and Natural Disasters: A Debate Between an Atheist and a Christian.
References1. Prokopenko, M., Harré, M., Lizier, J., Boschetti, F., Peppas, P., & Kauffman, S. (2019). Self-Referential Basis of Undecidable Dynamics: From the Liar Paradox and the Halting Problem to the Edge of Chaos. Physics of Life Reviews, 31, 134—156.
Officials and policy makers have to grapple with historically low levels of citizen trust in the U.S. government. Pew Research Center polling suggests that Americans’ trust in the government has fallen by nearly two-thirds in the last two decades, down to 20 percent in 2020.1 It is not only elected and appointed officials who suffer from the trust gap. Analysts, commentators, and other media figures suffer from decreasing levels of trust, with a drop from 55 percent in 1996 to 40 percent in 2020.2 Given the extensive scholarship on the key role of trust in the public sphere, especially in the political arena, these numbers should alarm officials, policy experts and analysts, and academics concerned with public policy.3
While politicians have made use of disinformation to push their political agendas in the past, this problem has intensified in recent years. The 2016 presidential campaign in the United States and the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom have led the venerable Oxford Dictionary to choose as its 2016 word of the year “post-truth,” defined as “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”4 The 2020 campaign proved to be even worse, including the post-election denial and attacks on a clear election result, culminating in the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol.
On the one hand, post-truth political methods have to do with the quantity of lies. On the other, post-truth politics involves a new model of behavior when caught lying. Unlike previous politicians who backed away when caught lying, post-truth politicians do not back away from their falsehoods. Instead, they attack those who point out their deceptions, undermining public trust in credible experts and reliable news sources.
This is not only a problem with public figures: fake news, more recently termed “viral deception” by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, is sweeping social media, shared by ordinary citizens.5 Sharing such misinformation — at least by private citizens — is not necessarily intended to harm others or even deliberately deceive. Our emotions and intuitions focus more on protecting our worldview and personal identity, and less on finding out the most accurate information.6
Fortunately, behavioral science research findings provide some insights on an intervention that may address this lack of trust — the Pro-Truth Pledge (PTP). Our aspiration is for the PTP to help rebuild trust in and decrease deception in the political sphere, and we encourage all officials, policy experts, and academics to take the PTP. I wrote about this in a recent issue of Skeptic.7
Truth and the Tragedy of the CommonsThe trust gap in the U.S. is difficult to bridge because, although our society as a whole loses when deception is rampant in the public sphere, individuals who practice deceptive behaviors often gain. This type of situation is known as a “tragedy of the commons,” following a famous article in Science by Garret Hardin.8 Hardin demonstrated that in areas where a group of people share a common resource without any rules about the use of this resource, each individual may well have a strong interest in taking more of the common resource than is their fair share, leading to individual gain at cost to the community. A wellknown tragedy of the commons is environmental pollution.9 We all gain from clean air and water, yet individual polluters, from a game-theoretical perspective, may well gain more — at least in the short and medium term — from polluting our environment.10 Pollution of truth is similarly eroding of the atmosphere of trust in our political environment.
Solving tragedies of the commons requires, according to Hardin, “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected,” so as to prevent these harmful outcomes where a few gain at the cost of everyone else.11 The environmental movement presents many examples of successful efforts to addressing the tragedy of the commons in environmental pollution.12 Only substantial disincentives for polluting outweigh the benefits of polluting from a game theoretical perspective.13 Particularly illuminating is an analysis by Mark van Vugt describing the application of behavioral sciences insights to the tragedy of the commons in the environment. His research showed that in addition to mutual coercion by an external party such as the government, the commons can be maintained through a combination of providing credible information, appealing to people’s identities, setting up new or changing existing institutions, and shifting the incentives for participants.14
The research on successful strategies used by the environmental movement fits well with work on choice architecture and libertarian paternalism, the latter of which refers to an approach to private and public institutions that aims to use findings from behavioral science about problematic human thinking patterns — most notably cognitive biases — to shape human behavior for social good while also respecting individual freedom of choice.15 Choice architecture is the method of choice used by libertarian paternalists, through shaping human choices for the welfare of society as a whole, by setting up default options, anticipating errors, giving clear feedback, creating appropriate incentives, and so on.16 The PTP, created by a team of behavioral scientists, is informed by strategies that have proven successful in the environmental movement and combines them with choice architecture.
The Pro-Truth Pledge: Private CitizensBy now, over 10,000 private citizens have taken the pledge. We have performed some follow-up conversations with pledge-takers to determine whether the pledge impacted their behaviors. A U.S. Army veteran and member of the Special Operations community, John Kirbow, took the pledge.17 He then wrote a blog post about how it impacted him. He notes that “I’ve verbally or digitally passed on bad information numerous times, I am fairly sure, as a result of honest mistakes or lack of vigorous fact checking.” He describes how after taking the pledge, he felt “an open commitment to a certain attitude” to “think hard when I want to play an article or statistic which I’m not completely sold on.” Having taken the Pro-Truth Pledge, he found it “really does seem to change one’s habits,” helping push him both to correct his own mistakes with an “attitude of humility and skepticism, and of honesty and moral sincerity,” and also to encourage “friends and peers to do so as well.”
Share truth Verify: fact-check information to confirm it is true before accepting and sharing it * Balance: share the whole truth, even if some aspects do not support my opinion * Cite: share my sources so that others can verify my information * Clarify*: distinguish between my opinion and the facts.
Honor truth Acknowledge: acknowledge when others share true information, even when we disagree otherwise * Reevaluate: reevaluate if my information is challenged, retract it if I cannot verify it * Defend: defend others when they come under attack for sharing true information, even when we disagree otherwise * Align*: align my opinions and my actions with true information.
Encourage truth Fix: ask people to retract information that reliable sources have disproved even if they are my allies * Educate: compassionately inform those around me to stop using unreliable sources even if these sources support my opinion * Defer: recognize the opinions of experts as more likely to be accurate when the facts are disputed * Celebrate*: celebrate those who retract incorrect statements and update their beliefs toward the truth.
For more information, visit: protruthpledge.org.
In another case, Mark Kauffman, a photographer from New York, shared an article from OccupyDemocrats.com, a site shown by credible fact-checkers used by the PTP to be systematically unreliable. Other pledge-takers, following the behavior of asking people to stop using unreliable sources regardless of the credibility of the article, asked him to withdraw it, and he did so.
A former U.S. intelligence officer, who retired from service after four decades, took the PTP (he prefers to remain anonymous due to his career). He later described how soon after taking the pledge, a piece of news “that played right to my particular political biases hit cable TV and then the internet and of course my first inclination was to share it as quickly and widely as possible. But then I remembered the pledge I’d signed and put the brakes on. I decided to wait a bit to see how it played out (and boy-howdy am I glad I did.)… As it turned out the story was a complete dud, ‘fake news’ as they say. That experience has led me to be much more vigilant in assessing, and sharing, stories that appeal to my political sensibilities. I now make a much bigger effort to fact-check before I post or share.”
The Pro-Truth Pledge: Public FiguresWhy should public figures take the PTP? We anticipate that some public figures would be motivated by the same intrinsic motivations that would lead private citizens to take the pledge. However, we wanted to provide particular incentives for public figures to take the pledge, and also disincentives for breaking the pledge, and we decided to do so in the form of reputation. Reputational rewards and penalties have been shown to be vital in addressing tragedies of the commons in the environmental movement, and the PTP borrows from this approach.18
How are public figures rewarded for taking the pledge? Taking the pledge is a way of providing credible information about the honesty of a public figure to an audience interested in such information, thus providing a substantial reputational reward. When signing the pledge, each public figure has an opportunity to provide a brief statement about why they took the pledge, and some links to their online presence. This information will be stored in a database that anyone can access, such as constituents interested in evaluating political candidates for office or deciding whether to trust the commentary of a media figure, policy expert, or academic commenting on public affairs. Moreover, the statement would get sent in a regular newsletter to all pledge signers who chose to subscribe to email updates. Doing so improves that public figure’s reputation and gains them new supporters. The public figure can provide additional content for the PTP newsletter about how the pledge changed their behavior, further reinforcing both their reputation and providing proof for the PTP newsletter subscribers of the effectiveness of the pledge, creating a virtuous cycle characteristic of successful innovations.19
Such provision of information has been crucial in successful interventions within the environmental movement to address tragedies of the commons. As an example, research shows that labels on household appliances that list comparisons of energy use and emissions most effectively change behavior when consumers are already concerned with the environment but lack technical knowledge about the appliances.20 Similarly, many consumers of political information lack knowledge about which officials and media figures and analysts are credible, and the PTP pledge provides that information.
Many may worry about the problem of false signaling or cheating — a public figure may take the pledge to signal a commitment to the truth, without actually abiding by the pledge.21 Private citizens have little incentive to take their time and share their personal data by filling out the pledge, making it likely that only those committed to advancing the cause of truth in our society would take this action. However, the reputational value for public figures of taking the pledge, especially as the PTP gains popularity and credibility and also has a bigger email list, will grow higher and higher. If we do not prevent false signaling and cheating on the pledge, the pledge will not be able to provide credible information and thus fail to shift incentives to favor sharing accurate information instead of deception.
To address cheating, the pledge involves a monitoring mechanism that makes sure the pledge has teeth in the form of reputational penalties which are commensurate with the infraction. Some PTP advocates are assigned to monitor public figures. For example, a candidate running for the state house in Arizona, Johny Martin, took the pledge. He made a misstatement during a public rally, and later posted on Facebook about the misstatement, retracting it and citing the pledge.22
Michael Smith, a candidate for Congress from Idaho, took the PTP. He later posted on his Facebook wall a screenshot of a tweet by Donald Trump criticizing minority and disabled children. After being called out on it, he went and searched Trump’s feed. He could not find the original tweet, and while Trump may have deleted that tweet, the candidate edited his own Facebook post to say that “Due to a Truth Pledge I have taken I have to say I have not been able to verify this post.”23 He indicated that he would be more careful with future postings.
So why should elected or appointed officials take the pledge if it restrains their activities and causes them to make such statements retracting their posts? Officials need to be perceived as trustworthy by citizens. The PTP provides that credibility, due to the presence of the monitoring mechanism. Citizens can easily look them up in the PTP database. If the official has signed the pledge a while ago and is not in contempt, the citizen can assume the official has not made any deceptive statements without retracting them later. The official gets additional benefits because when the official signs up, her information is included in the PTP updates. This provides the official with a positive reputation as being honest and credible and thereby gets them more support.
What about policy experts, commentators, analysts, media figures, and scholars? They all need to be perceived as trustworthy by the audiences to which they communicate. The PTP provides them with that benefit due to the monitoring mechanism, and similarly to the officials described above, the longer they are signed up without being in contempt, the more credibility they get. Those who sign can also get a broader audience engaged with them since their information will be included in the PTP updates. Moreover, if their competitors do not sign the pledge, those who signed up will get a bigger audience, since audiences will start flocking to those deemed more trustworthy sources of news/analysis/thought leadership. Thus, the first mover advantage applies to these groups as well. Media figures are also taking the pledge. In fact, over 1,200 public figures took the pledge, including such public intellectuals as Steven Pinker, Michael Shermer, and Peter Singer.
Fact-Checking OrganizationsThe current best alternatives to advancing truth in our political system focus on supporting the work of fact-checking organizations. Noble and worthwhile, these much needed efforts unfortunately do not address the underlying problem of distrust in fact-checking organizations. For instance, according to a September 2016 Rasmussen Reports survey, only 29 percent of all likely voters in the U.S. trust fact-checking of candidates’ statements. The political disparity is enormous, and in-line with previous reporting on the partisan divide — 88 percent of Trump supporters do not trust fact-checkers, while 59 percent of Clinton supporters express trust for fact-checkers.24
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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This distrust for fact-checkers will not be solved by providing more fact-checking, and can only be addressed by getting citizens to both care more about the truth and by providing credible information about who is truthful. The PTP aims to solve these problems through appealing to people’s identities and getting them more emotionally invested into truth-oriented behavior, while also providing them with information about who are honest public figures. Since the PTP uses credible fact-checking organizations to help determine what is true — holding as credible those organizations that have joined the International Fact-Checking Network at the Poynter Institute for Media Studies — a secondary effect will be to help legitimate trustworthy fact-checking organizations.
ConclusionThe PTP uses all four components shown by behavioral science research on environmental pollution as crucial to addressing tragedies of the commons.25 It provides information about the credibility of those who sign it, as well as information about what it means to orient toward the truth and what constitutes credible information sources. It appeals to the identity of people to desire to be honest and be perceived that way. Finally, it offers positive reputational rewards for honesty and reputational penalties for dishonesty, taking advantage of the behavioral science research on incentives. We propose that the PTP should be taken by all of these public figures committed to truth-oriented behavior, and be used by all audiences and constituents for these public figures to determine the credibility of these individuals.
About the AuthorGleb Tsipursky is a behavioral scientist passionate about promoting truth, rational thinking, and wise decision making. A civic activist and philanthropist, he’s the volunteer President of the Board of the nonprofit Intentional Insights and co-founded the Pro-Truth Pledge. He’s a best-selling author of a number of books, including the national bestseller The Truth Seeker’s Handbook: A Science-Based Guide. His writing was translated into Chinese, Korean, German, Russian, Polish, and other languages. He published over 550 articles and gave over 450 interviews for prominent venues such as Time, USA Today, and Scientific American. His newest book is Pro Truth: A Pragmatic Plan to Put Truth Back Into Politics.
References1. Pew Research Center. “Americans’ Views of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive Performance Ratings.” Pew, September 14, 2020. https://pewrsr.ch/3IxdC0k 2. M. Brenan. “Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media.” Gallup. September 30, 2020. https://bit.ly/3oyraAD; M. J. Hetherington. “The Political Relevance of Political Trust.” American Political Science Review, 92(04), 1998, 791–808. doi:10.2307/2586304 3. E. Vigoda-Gadot. “Citizens’ Perceptions of Politics and Ethics in Public Administration: A Five-Year National Study of Their Relationship to Satisfaction with Services, Trust in Governance, and Voice Orientations.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(2), 2007, 285–305. doi:10.1093/jopart/muj018; M. Levi, and L. Stoker. “Political Trust and Trustworthiness.” Annual Review of Political Science, 3(1), 2000, 475–507. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.475; R. Hardin. 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage foundation; Levi, M., and Braithwaite, V. A. 2003. Trust and Governance; Hetherington, M. J. 2005. Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; K. Newton. “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy.” International Political Science Review, 22(2), 2001, 201–214. doi:10.1177/0192512101222004. 4. “Word of the Year 2016 is…posttruth.” 2017. Oxford University Press. https://bit.ly/3dtHrAy 5. The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania. “Jamieson Offers New Name for Fake News: ‘Viral Deception’ or VD.” March 6, 2017, https://bit.ly/3DCM3ir 6. Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. 2010. When corrections fail: The persistence of political misperceptions. political behavior, 32(2), 303–330. doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2; McDermott, R. 2004. The feeling of rationality: The meaning of neuroscientific advances for political science. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 691–706. doi:10.1017/s1537592704040459; J. Haidt. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion. 2012, New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 7. Gleb Tsipursky. “How Do You Get People to Care About Truth in Politics?” Skeptic, Vol. 25.4, 2020. https://bit.ly/3EEuG1M 8. G. Hardin. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. 9. R. Change. 2000. The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance. 10. N. Hanley and H. Folmer. 1998. Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar Publishing. 11. Hardin, 1968. 12. E. Ostrom. 2015. Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press; D. Feeny, F. Berkes, B. J. McCay and J. M. Acheson. “The tragedy of the commons: twentytwo years later.” Human Ecology, 18(1), 1990, 1–19; Fikret Berkes. “Fishermen and ‘the tragedy of the commons’.” Environmental Conservation 12.03 1985, 199–206. 13. L. U. Fang-yuan, “Evolutionary game analysis on environmental pollution problem.” Systems Engineering — Theory and Practice, 9, 2007, 148–152. 14. Mark Van Vugt. “Averting the tragedy of the commons: Using social psychological science to protect the environment.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 18.3, 2009, 169–173. 15. Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. The University of Chicago Law Review, 1159–1202; R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein, 2003. “Libertarian paternalism.” The American Economic Review, 93(2), 175–179; These are further elaborated in specific prescriptions and approaches to public policy in a popular trade book that might be of particular relevance to policy experts: Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein Cass. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. 2008, Yale University Press. 16. R. H. Thaler, C. R. Sunstein, and J. P. Balz. “Choice architecture” 2014; C. Jolls, C. R. Sunstein and R. Thaler. “A behavioral approach to law and economics.” Stanford Law Review, 1998, 1471–1550; E. J. Johnson, S. B. Shu, B. G. Dellaert, C. Fox, D. G. Goldstein, G. Häubl and B. Wansink. “Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture.” Marketing Letters, 23(2), 2012, 487–504; E. Selinger and K. Whyte. “Is there a right way to nudge? The practice and ethics of choice architecture.” Sociology Compass, 5(10), 2011, 923–935. 17. J. Kirbow. “How the Pro-Truth Pledge has impacted me.” June 6, 2017. Medium, https://bit.ly/3s2HU5l 18. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, and H. J. Krambeck. “Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’.” Nature, 415(6870), 2002, 424–426. 19. R. Casadesus-Masanell, and J. E. Ricart. “How to design a winning business model.” Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2), 2011, 100–107. 20. T. Dietz, E. Ostrom, and P.C. Stern. “The struggle to govern the commons.” Science, 302, 2003, 1907–1912. 21. B. L. Connelly, S. T. Certo, R. D. Ireland, and C. R. Reutzel, “Signaling theory: A review and assessment.” Journal of Management, 37(1), 2011, 39–67. 22. G. Tsipursky. “Impact of the Pro- Truth Pledge.” December 9, 2017. ProTruthPledge.org https://bit.ly/3IHrXr4 23. Imgur (2017, May 24). Imgur photograph of Michael Smith’s public post. http://imgur.com/a/A8IOY 24. “Voters Don’t Trust Media Fact-Checking.” Rasmussen Reports, September 30, 2016, https://bit.ly/332aFV2 25. Mark Van Vugt. “Averting the tragedy of the commons: Using social psychological science to protect the environment.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 18.3, 2009, 169–173.
By the end of World War II, nationalism had been thoroughly discredited. Critics charged that national self-interest had prevented democratic governments from cooperating to end the Great Depression, and that nationalist passions had led not just to war, but also to some of the worst crimes groups of human beings had ever perpetrated on others. The construction of international institutions and norms—in economics, politics, and human rights—as antidotes to nationalist excesses dominated Western diplomacy for decades after 1945, and the global struggle between liberal democracy and communism muted the expression of nationalist sentiments on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The peace and economic growth that characterized this period built public support for this strategy.
As decades passed and new generations emerged, memories of the Great Depression and World War II lost their hold on the Western imagination. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the postwar era began giving way to new forces. The European Union, its boosters convinced that their enlightened post-national project represented the future of politics for mankind, sought to move from economic integration to political integration. But public opposition swelled in many member-states. The “captive nations” of eastern and central Europe reemerged as independent actors, and long-submerged nationalist feelings resurfaced.
But the feelings were not limited to the east: Growing regional inequalities within countries drove a wedge between left-behind populations and the international elites many citizens held responsible for their plight. The Great Recession of 2008 undermined public confidence in expert managers of the economy, and in the internationalist outlook that had long dominated their thinking. In Europe, concerns over immigration grew as people from lower-wage countries in the EU moved freely to wealthy member-states. These concerns exploded in 2015 after German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to admit more than one million refugees from Syria and other countries wracked by conflict and economic stagnation.
All these trends, and others, were at work in the United States. The consequences of China’s entry into the WTO, especially for U.S. manufacturing, stoked concerns about international trade. Five decades of robust immigration transformed America’s demography, a shift celebrated by some but deplored by others. In the wake of the Great Recession and the Iraq war, the costs of America’s global leadership became increasingly controversial, and the belief that other nations were taking advantage of the United States intensified. Postwar internationalism became a new front in the decades-old culture war. In retrospect, it was only a matter of time until someone mounted a frontal challenge to the consensus of elites in both major political parties. When it did, “America First” hit the established order with the force and subtlety of a wrecking ball.
The growth of nationalism as a political phenomenon encouraged the emergence of nationalist theoreticians and ideologues. In the United States, a July 2019 conference on “National Conservatism” brought together thinkers who argued—in direct opposition to the leaders of the postwar era—that nationalism offers a more secure and morally preferable basis for both domestic and international policy. Similar convenings have occurred in Europe. Critics of the new nationalism have been quick to weigh in.
As the battle has been joined, the ratio of heat to light has been high. And yet so are the stakes. Our democratic future depends on whether publics come to see nationalism as the solution, the problem, or something in-between. As a contribution to clarifying the debate, I offer twelve theses on nationalism.
Thesis One: Nationalism and patriotism are not the same. Patriotism is love of country—as George Orwell puts it, “devotion to a particular place and way of life.” Nationalism means giving pride of place, culturally and politically, to a distinctive ensemble of individuals—the nation.
Thesis Two: A nation is a community, united by sentiments of loyalty and mutual concern, that shares a cultural heritage and belief in a common destiny. Some nations additionally invoke common descent, which in nearly all cases is mythical, as it was when John Jay posited it for the nascent United States in Federalist 2. As political theorist Bernard Yack observes in Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community, not all nationalist claims are based on ethnicity. Ethnonations are distinct, he observes, in that they make descent from previous members “a necessary, rather than merely sufficient, condition of membership.”
Thesis Three: An individual need not be born into a cultural heritage to (come to) share it. Entrants into the national community commit themselves not only to learn their nation’s history and customs but also to take on their benefits and burdens as their own, as Ruth did when she pledged to Naomi that “Your people shall be my people, and your God my God.”
Thesis Four: Nationalism and patriotism can yield conflicting imperatives. Many Zionists felt patriotic connections to the states in which they lived, even as they labored to create a nation-state of their own. Although many of today’s Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey harbor patriotic sentiments, their primary loyalty is to the Kurdish nation, and their ultimate aim is national self-determination in their own state.
Nationalism rightly understood means that no nation is an island, that in the long run the wellbeing of one’s nation cannot be decoupled from the fate of others.
Thesis Five: Nationalism poses a challenge to the modern state system. The familiar term “nation-state” implicitly assumes that the geographical locations of distinct nations coincide with state boundaries. Occasionally this is true (Japan comes close), but mostly it isn’t. Nations can be spread across multiple states (as the Kurds are), and states can contain multiple nations (as Spain does). What some regard as the ideal arrangement—a sovereign state for each nation and only this nation—is still exceedingly rare despite the convulsions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and still could not be realized without further massive, bloody disruptions of existing arrangements. Hitler’s determination to unify all ethnocultural Germans into a single nation would have been a disaster, even if he had harbored no further ambitions. Today’s Hungarians have grounds for objecting to the Treaty of Trianon, which left millions of their co-nationals outside the borders of their shrunken state. Nevertheless, any effort to reunite them under a single flag would mean war in the heart of Europe.
Today’s state system includes international organizations, which many nationalists oppose as abrogating their states’ sovereignty. This stance rests on a failure to distinguish between revocable agreements, which are compatible with maintaining sovereignty, and irrevocable agreements, which are not. In leaving the European Union, Britain is exercising its sovereign rights, which it did not surrender when it entered the EU. By contrast, the states that banded together into the United States of America agreed to replace their several sovereignties into a single sovereign power, with no legal right under the Constitution to reverse this decision. When the southern states tried to secede, a civil war ensued, and its outcome ratified the permanent nature of the Union.
Thesis Six: It is possible to be a nationalist without believing that every nation has a right to political independence, but it isn’t easy. The U.S. Declaration of Independence speaks of “the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them.” Similarly, Israel’s Declaration of Independence invokes the “self-evident right of the Jewish people to be a nation, as all other nations, in its own sovereign state.”
There are often practical reasons to deny some nations political self-determination (see Thesis Five). But doing so in principle rests on the belief that some nations are superior to others and deserve to rule over them. The claimed superiority can be cultural, hence mutable and temporary, or ethno-racial, essentialist, and immutable. The former often includes the responsibility of dominant nations to prepare subordinated nations for independence, as John Stuart Mill’s defense of tutelary colonialism did. The latter implies that subordinate nations are at best means to the well-being of dominant nations; at worst, lesser forms of humanity who exist at the sufferance of superior nations.
There is no logical connection between the undeniable premise that each nation is distinctive and the conclusion that mine is better than yours. But the psychology of pride in one’s nation can lead even decent, well-meaning people from the former to the latter. Some contemporary defenders of nationalism claim that it is inherently opposed to imperialism. Nation-states want only to be left alone, they say, to govern themselves in accordance with their own traditions. As Rebecca West once put it, there is not “the smallest reason for confounding nationalism, which is the desire of a people to be itself, with imperialism, which is the desire of a people to prevent other peoples from being themselves.”
She would be right if all nationalism were inwardly focused and guided by the maxim of live and let live. But the history of the 20th century shows that some forms of nationalism are compatible with imperialism and worse. It depends on what a nation thinks that “being itself” entails. The proposition that nationalism and imperialism always stand opposed rests not on historical evidence, but rather on a definition of nationalism at odds with its real-world manifestations.
Thesis Seven: It is possible to be a nationalist without believing that the interests of one’s nation always trump competing considerations. Writing in the shadow of World War II, George Orwell declared that nationalism was “the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests.” Although this is an unmatched description of Nazism, it conflates an extreme instance of nationalism with the totality.
In fact, nationalism is compatible with a wide range of ideologies and political programs. It motivated not only Nazi Germany but also Britain’s heroic resistance to fascism. (Churchill’s wartime speeches rallied his countrymen with stirring invocations of British nationalism against its foe.) And because the nation need not be understood as the supreme good, “liberal nationalism” is not an oxymoron.
Giving priority to the interests of one’s nation does not mean ignoring the interests of others, any more than caring most about one’s own children implies indifference to the fate of others’ children. Nations are sometimes called upon to risk their blood and treasure to respond to or prevent harm in other nations. At some point, the imbalance between modest costs to one’s nation and grievous damage to others should compel action. Even though some Americans would have risked their lives to prevent the Rwandan genocide, America’s failure to intervene was a mistake, a proposition that nationalists can accept without contradicting their beliefs.
Thesis Eight: It is a mistake to finger nationalism as the principal source of oppression and aggression in modern politics. As we have seen repeatedly, creedal and religion- based states and movements can be just as brutal, and they can pose, in their own way, equally fundamental challenges to the state system. The Reformation triggered a full century of astonishingly bloody strife. More recently, for those who took class identity to be more fundamental than civic identity, “socialist internationalism” became the organizing principle of politics, and similarly if membership in the Muslim umma is thought to erase the significance of state boundaries. Those outside the favored class or creed became enemies with whom no permanent peace is possible, and the consequences are as negative for decent politics as any of the evils perpetrated in the name of nationalism.
Thesis Nine: As a key source of social solidarity, nationalism can support higher-order political goods such as democracy and the welfare state. Democracy rests on mutual trust, without which the peaceful transfer of power comes to be regarded as risky. The welfare state rests on sympathy and concern for others who are vulnerable, whether or not the more fortunate members of the community see themselves as equally vulnerable. Shared nationality promotes these sentiments, while in the short-to-medium term (at least), increasing national diversity within states weakens them.
This helps explain why many nationalists who are not driven by racial or ethnic bias nonetheless are ambivalent about high numbers of immigrants and refugees. It also points to the most important domestic challenge contemporary nationalists face—reconciling their attachment to their co-nationals with fair treatment for other groups with whom they share a common civic space.
Thesis Ten: Although we typically think of nations as driving the creation of nation-states, the reverse is also possible. A generation ago, Eugen Weber showed how, over the decades before World War I, the French state deployed a program of linguistic, cultural, and educational unification to turn “peasants into Frenchmen.” During the past half century, post-colonial governments have sought, with varying degrees of success, to weaken tribal and sectarian ties in favor of overarching national attachments.
Many historians have discerned similar processes at work in the United States. Prior to the Civil War, lexicographers such as Noah Webster crystallized a non-regional American English, distinct from British English, while historians such as George Bancroft told the story of America’s creation and growth as a narrative that all could share. After the Civil War, as flows of immigrants from Central and Southern Europe accelerated, programs of civic education proliferated—with the aim, one might say, of turning peasants into Americans. Because it was no longer possible to say, as John Jay did in 1787, that Americans were “descended from the same ancestors,” let alone “professing the same religion,” it became all the more important to create a common cultural heritage into which millions of new immigrants could be initiated. The process may have been rough and ready, even coercive, but in the main it succeeded. And today, after a half century of cultural strife and large flows of immigrants from an unprecedented diversity of countries, it may be necessary to recommit ourselves to this task, albeit in less favorable circumstances.
Thesis Eleven: Although scholars distinguish between creedal nationalism and ethnic or cultural nationalism as ideal types, there are no examples of purely creedal nations. In the United States, abstract principles and concrete identities have been braided together since the Founding. Our greatest President, who famously described the United States as a nation dedicated to a proposition, also invoked (unsuccessfully) the “mystic chords of memory” and our “bonds of affection” as antidotes for civil strife and advocated transmuting our Constitution and laws into objects of reverence—a “political religion.”
Thesis Twelve: Although nationalism is a distinctively modern ideology, national identity has pervaded much of human history and is unlikely to disappear as a prominent feature of politics. As Bernard Yack has persuasively argued, nationalism is unthinkable without the emergence of the principle of popular sovereignty as the source of legitimate political power. Because this theory characterizes the “people” who constitute the sovereign in abstract terms, it does not answer the key practical question: Who or what is the people?
The U.S. Declaration of Independence exemplifies this hiatus. Before we reach its much-quoted second paragraph on the rights of individuals, we encounter the assertion that Americans constitute “one people” asserting its right to “dissolve the political bands that have connected them with another.” Americans are one people, the British another. The governing class of Great Britain had a different view: Americans were subjects of the king, just as residents of the British Isles were, distinguished from them only by location. Even to assert their Lockean right of revolution, of which George III was no great fan, Americans had to make the case that they were a separate and distinct people. It turns out that in the case of the United States and many that followed, national identity offered the most plausible way to meet this challenge, which is why John Jay resorted to it. Nineteenth century nationalists had richer intellectual resources on which to draw, including Herder’s account of distinct cultures, but their strategy was much the same.
In short, national identity is transmuted into nationalism through its encounter with the doctrine of popular sovereignty. When the people are understood as the nation, popular sovereignty becomes national sovereignty.
Because pre-modern politics lacked the theory of popular sovereignty, it could not develop a doctrine of nationalism. Nonetheless, national identity has pervaded human history, for the simple reason that we are finite beings shaped by unchosen contingencies. Although we are social, cultural, and political beings, we are born helpless and unformed. We are formed first by the ministration of parents and kin or their equivalents, then by the experiences of neighborhood and local community, and eventually by the wider circle of those with whom we share a cultural heritage. To be sure, the encounter with those whose formative influences were different will not leave us untouched. No matter how much our horizons are broadened, we never set aside our origin. We may leave home, but home never quite leaves us, a reality reflected in our language. “Mother tongue,” “fatherland”—the age-old metaphor of our place of origin as nurturing, shaping parent will never lose its power.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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National identity is an aspect of human experience that no measure of education should seek to expunge—nor could it if it tried. But as we have seen, the modern political expression of national identity is multi-valent. Nationalism can be a force for great evil or great good. It can motivate collective nobility and collective brutality. It can bring us together and drive us apart.
In the face of these realities, the way forward is clear, at least in principle. Acknowledging the permanence of nationalism and its capacity for good, we must do our best to mitigate its negative effects. Nationalism need not mean that a country’s cultural majority oppresses others with whom it shares a state; putting one’s country first need not mean ignoring the interests and concerns of others. On the contrary: to adapt a Tocquevillian locution, nationalism rightly understood means that no nation is an island, that in the long run the wellbeing of one’s nation cannot be decoupled from the fate of others. The American leaders who rebuilt Europe understood that theirs was not an act of charity but rather a means to the long-time best interest of their country. The leaders of the civil rights movement knew that they promoted not only the cause of justice but also the strength of their country, at home and abroad.
The details may have changed since the days of George Marshall and Martin Luther King, Jr., but the essentials remain the same.
About the AuthorWilliam A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, where he serves as a Senior Fellow. He served as Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy. Galston is the author of nine books and more than 100 articles in the fields of political theory, public policy, and American politics. Galston was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2004. Galston has appeared on all the principal television networks and is frequently interviewed on NPR. He writes a weekly column for the Wall Street Journal.
In the year 390, the Roman Emperor Theodosius strode up the steps of a Cathedral in Milan, Italy. His entry into the church was interrupted by the Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose. Theodosius carried with him the power of a Roman Emperor, but also the guilt of a Christian. In response to a violent uprising in the Grecian city of Thessalonica, the causes of which involved a sexual scandal and chariot racing, Theodosius had commanded his army to put down the rebellion. The emperor later rescinded his order, but it was too late to save the crowd from being slaughtered, and the emperor’s behavior, decided St. Ambrose, had been un-Christian. The bishop required that the emperor ask forgiveness and implement a policy that would prevent any similar actions in the future.
The confrontation between Ambrose and Theodosius set a precedent for the later Roman church and state: a Christian emperor’s behavior should be guided by Christian principles. If the Church authorities determined this not to be the case, then the Church could excommunicate the ruler from the Christian mass. In the early 4th century, Constantine tried to synthesize the Roman military state with Christianity, but, as is evidenced by the showdown between Ambrose and Theodosius just a few decades later, amalgam could not hold. The Church would not justify violence until the year 800, with the creation of the Holy Roman Empire, and would then have to do so only through torturous theological justifications. Eventually, the union between Christianity and state-sponsored violence would decompose and, from that, a nationalism that not only embraced but indeed encouraged the use of state-owned violence was formed. Nationalism originated with Constantine’s error.
When Constantine (r. 306–337) won the Battle of Milvian Bridge in 312, and with it control of Rome, he immediately began to institute Christianity as (more or less) the official religion of the Roman Empire. Constantine seems not to have been a believer in the tenets of Christianity per se, but the religion attracted him with the concept of “one god, one emperor.” He likely hoped that Christianity would unite the now diverse Roman imperium in a way that the traditional pantheon of Roman gods no longer could.1
When he elevated Christianity to Rome’s faith, Constantine seems to have been concerned with the religion’s lack of organization. Although the first three centuries of the faith are nebulous, by the 4th century, Christianity possessed a core message of sorts and Christians held a loose-leaf anthology of texts that included about two dozen gospels.
Did Constantine ever read the gospels? We have no way of knowing, but it is hard to imagine that a man who entered Rome with the head of his rival and brother-inlaw on a pike would have been comforted by phrases such as “Blessed are the peacemakers” or “The meek shall inherit the Earth.” There are many interpretations of the Christian gospels, but it is hard to justify invoking them as a justification for how to gain and exercise political power. Before Constantine, the Chinese had adopted Confucianism, and the Aryan conquerors in India instituted a Hindu caste system; both ideologies consistent with the exercise of hierarchical state power. After Constantine, the Arabs and Aztecs would develop religious systems that embraced the use of violence as a way of expanding and upholding the state. Only in Rome, however, did the state authorities choose to justify power with a state religion based upon a religious literature whose protagonist eschews violence and is martyred by the state, rather than installed as its ruler.
When Ambrose excommunicated Theodosius, he set a precedent for the church that would last for over four centuries. From 390 until about 800, the ecclesiastical authorities generally tried to prevent the petty feudal lords, formed from the collapse of centralized Roman authority, from warring against one another. The Church’s actions for peace seemed compatible with core Christian teachings, but as Europe grew more violent, Rome itself came under threat. Pope Leo III (r.795–816), faced heretical Lombards in the north and, in 799, was nearly defaced by internal rebels who wanted to carve out his tongue and eyes. The pontiff escaped, but the Church needed something more than spiritual power; it needed a secular protector.2
The antithesis to Ambrose confronting Theodosius in 390 is Leo III crowning Charlemagne (748–814) as the Holy Roman Emperor on Christmas Day, 800. In 772, Charlemagne conquered the heretical Saxons at Verdun and gave them a choice: either convert to the true faith or be executed. Most chose death, and when Charlemagne fulfilled his promise, he initiated the idea that faith could be enforced by the sword. When Leo III crowned Charlemagne, the Church stopped enforcing the peace and began to embrace violence as a necessary means of protecting the interests of the Church and of spreading the faith.
Clearly, because it was a core notion of Christendom for seven centuries, the contradictory notion of Christian violence, by itself, could not create nationalism.
Ecclesiastical authorities, now forced to torture Christian doctrine into justifying the use of political violence, devised two core doctrines, both of which would eventually collapse under the weight of their contradictions, and both of which would lead to the creation of nationalism:
A. Indulgences: Although the selling of indulgences, or forgiveness, now features as an example of the Catholic Church’s greed, the concept began in the medieval era as the Church’s attempt to enforce peace. The idea was to create a spiritual penalty on soldiers who killed others in battle; a penance of prayers had to be said. The soldiers, overwhelmed by the scale of what was required, began to pay monks to say the prayers instead and this evolved into the selling of forgiveness in general.
B. Malicide: The most obvious manifestation of Christian violence came in the form of the Crusades. Although Pope Urban II gave a papal guarantee of a place in Heaven for anyone who died during a military quest to Jerusalem, the phantasmagoria of violence that the Crusaders propagated and received sent many of the soldiers in search of further assurance. One spiritually uneasy commander of the Knights Templar issued three letters to the great theologian Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), who responded by expressing the theological conceit of De laude novae militia—while the Bible taught that homicide was a sin, malicide (the killing of evil) was now a duty. The Church, of course, claimed the power to define “evil” and, therefore, claimed the spiritual authority to wage a just war on that evil.3
These two responses to Christian use of violence are the hammer and anvil that helped forge nationalism. The Crusades, properly defined, took place sporadically between 1095, the start of The First Crusade to Jerusalem, and 1492 which marks the completion of the Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula. The desire to continue warring for the faith was a primary reason why Ferdinand and Isabella funded Columbus; those were Crusader crosses adorning the sails of the Nina, the Pinta, and the Santa Maria. The indigenous Arawaks in the Caribbean in 1492 could expect no more mercy than the residents of Jerusalem received in 1099.
Clearly, because it was a core notion of Christendom for seven centuries, the contradictory notion of Christian violence, by itself, could not create nationalism. However, in the 15th and 16th centuries, a confluence of historical forces suddenly converged. In some ways, the faithful seem to have begun losing faith in the 14th century, in part as a result of the Church’s inability to stop the Black Plague, sparking wildcat religious strikes amongst theologians such as Wycliff and Hus in the early 15th century.
By the mid-15th century, the development and widespread use of the printing press created a boon for literacy, and by the early 16th century, the printing press became a staple technology for the average German. The Church, having originally invented indulgences for the purpose of forgiving Christian use of violence, had expanded the practice into a massive revenue producer by promising forgiveness at a price for all sorts of assorted and sordid sins.
When Luther initiated a Reformation in 1517, he began by stoking the anger of the masses regarding overpriced forgiveness. However, he quickly turned the Church’s own theology against it. If the Church claimed that it was Christ’s representative on Earth, then the excommunicated were damned. Luther upended the claim by saying that the Roman Catholic Church was Satan’s representative (making the pope the anti-Christ) and therefore the excommunicated, through faith alone, were saved. Of course, if the Church was evil, then Protestants, as they eventually came to be called, could invoke malicide and wage war against it.
The Reformation spawned different variations of Christianity, but it did not beget nationalism. From 1517 to 1635, when Protestants and Catholics fought against each (and fight they did), a statement of faith provided at least a thin justification for that fighting. In practice, of course, most soldiers fought for riches in this world rather than rewards in the next. The most notorious and ironic proof for this notion came in 1527. The brutal sacking of Rome, and the humiliation of Pope Clement VII, came not from the dreaded Muslim Sultan Süleyman (called “The Magnificent” in the West; “the Law Giver” in his own Islamic domain), nor from the Protestants, but rather from the Pope’s own co-religionist defenders. Upset at not being paid, the troops of the Holy Roman Emperor (Charles V) mutinied and extracted a few pounds of flesh out of Catholicism’s holiest city.
Still, even a mercenary could have answered the question of “who are you fighting for?” by declaring allegiance to some variation of Christianity. That changed a little over halfway into the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), when the territorial ambitions of the French crown mattered more to them than religious allegiance to the Catholic Church.
The Thirty Years War started as a traditional Catholic versus Protestant row. Germany, at the time, was a region consisting of dozens of small principalities. In his day, Luther wasted no time arguing to the nobles of those principalities that if they stopped being Catholic, they could stop seeing their tax money fly over the Alps and into Rome. From the 16th century onward, the ruler of each province could determine the religious affiliation of his subjects, but in 1618 that uneasy peace ended. The ensuing three decades of violence potentially reduced the population of Germany by about half, and overwhelmed any religious designation as some mercenaries killed for the Protestants one week and the Catholics the next.4
In 1635, when Catholic France entered the war against the Catholic Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, the Church could not plausibly choose a side based on theology, nor could either side invoke malicide as a justification for violence; the mass of bodies were all soldiers for the Catholic faith. If religion could no longer be used as a justification for violence, then what exactly were the soldiers warring on behalf the French or the Habsburgs supposed to be fighting for?
The problem was not unique to Catholicism. The English Civil Wars (1642–1651) pitted Protestant against Protestant. The Anglican Charles I warred against members of a Puritanical Parliament, in various alliances. The Parliamentarian Army (the Roundheads), whipped into shape by Oliver Cromwell, fought with frightening efficiency, but one wonders how much religion featured in their motivations.
Charles I, after all, was the son of the man after whom the King James Bible was named (an English language Bible then being heretical to the Catholics), and was lucky not to have been killed as an infant by Catholic terrorists in the 1605 Gunpowder Plot. Charles was married to a French Catholic princess, Henrietta Maria, but that hardly seemed a good reason for a civil war. Increasingly, the Parliamentarians justified their takeover of power and a 1649 regicide, by invoking Magna Carta (1215) and by asserting a secular legal authority. Charles I was tried and convicted on a charge of treason, not of religious heresy.5
Gradually, non-religious justifications for the use of violence evolved in tandem with the needs of the state, and this philosophical movement allowed the ruling classes to justify the use of state violence without theological support. Conflicts that began for religious reasons were post facto justified by social-contract theory. The synthesis of Christianity and the state decomposed and the state, now unencumbered by any inconvenient verses from the Book of Matthew, could freely justify the use of violence using new and secular theories.
Machiavelli’s The Prince, published posthumously in 1532, should be read in the context of this backdrop to Christian violence. Machiavelli’s book is, fundamentally, about advising rulers how to avoid being accused of hypocrisy. If a ruler espouses Christian principles of forgiveness, but then calls out the troops to slaughter innocents, he makes himself a hypocrite. The way to avoid hypocrisy, according to Machiavelli, is for the ruler to make no mention of Christian love. Instead, princes should embrace the use of state violence and make their creeds compatible with their actions.
No longer needing to justify their actions with biblical passages, a nationalist leader could promote military violence without risk of being entangled, by the logic of nationalism, in hypocrisy.
Machiavelli wrote the gospel of power politics; the Christian gospels told the reader how to become a martyr, but if you want to be the Prince, read Machiavelli. His most fundamental quote comes in this form of advice:
A PRINCE, therefore, should have no care or thought but for war, and for the regulations and training it requires, and should apply himself exclusively to this as his peculiar province; for war is the sole art looked for in one who rules, and is of such efficacy that it not merely maintains those who are born Princes, but often enables men to rise to that eminence from a private station (p. 47).6
Machiavelli left unexplored the possibility that the soldiers who make the war might eventually ask the prince some equivalent of “what’s in it for me?” Princes give orders, but what makes the soldiers obey? In the absence of religious devotion and the promise of post-mortem paradise, what would cause a soldier to risk his life for the power structure? Eventually, soldiers who once died for the faith would become content to die for the nation. Machiavelli’s gospel of power circulated in European intellectual circles about the same time that the unintended effects of Protestantism began to spread. The kind of people who did not believe the pope got his power from God, did not believe the king did either (as the example of Charles I shows) and this led to more secularized justifications for mere earthly government. Likewise, the Protestants placed few prohibitions on usury, considered literacy to be a religious duty, and liked to choose their religious leaders from the congregation.
Eventually, in 1688, a Protestant parliament instituted what is termed the “Glorious Revolution” against the Catholic king, James II (a son of Charles I). That revolution may have been driven by anti-Catholic sentiment but was justified by John Locke’s concept of a social contract. The ensuing 1689 English Bill of Rights made England’s people more citizens than subjects, and they began to coalesce around a sense of shared rights and a sense of (albeit limited) democratic participation. Parliamentary leaders no longer needed to justify their actions with biblical passages, and a nationalist leader could promote military violence without risk of being entangled, by the logic of nationalism, in hypocrisy.
The American Revolution occurred, not just because of dissatisfaction with an English monarchy, but because the colonists became frustrated at their inability to join a nationalist system that most of them rather admired. This is what the phrase “no taxation without representation” meant. The colonists wanted to be a part of a representative system but were denied that right. When Jefferson wrote “All men are created equal” he meant it as a passive-aggressive swipe against King George III (the recipient, after all, of the Declaration) who would have read that sentence as indicating that he, the king, was not divinely inspired to rule. A limited king he was, but what powers George III wielded supposedly came from heaven.
With the creation of the United States, there suddenly existed an example of a pure nation where the people interacted with their government based upon a secular legal doctrine, and where constitutional law defined the relationship between a person and his or her relationship to the state. The United States government could freely use military violence because nationalism contains no logical doctrine that would forbid it. Aggressive wars of expansion against Mexico were directly aligned with nationalism’s creed, and nationalist violence could be invoked to either preserve or dissect the Union. In time, military service to the government became a way that immigrants could engage in a secular baptism into the state.
Nationalists, as revolutionaries or as politicians, could promote and glorify violence in a way that Christian government no longer could. In due course, the French Revolution gave way to the Napoleonic era. Napoleon’s troops fought with more elan’ (fighting spirit) as citizens of the Republic than did the subjects of the Austro-Hungarian or Russian Empires.7 Only the British could mount any kind of defense against Napoleon’s force. The Russian land, more than any army, defeated Napoleon in 1812 and when he made his comeback in 1815, the Allies found they could only defeat his motivated troops by amassing enormous armies of conscripts.
Napoleon may have been defeated, but dissatisfaction with the old-world empires created internal unrest that, by 1848, led to revolutions across Europe. Only Great Britain and Russia avoided nationalist revolts. The British government had already made liberal concessions to the people and embraced nationalism. The Russians, despite an 1825 attempted coup by army officers who had seen a better life in Western Europe, remained too isolated to see constitutional nationalism as anything other than a threat to Orthodoxy and Tsarism.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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Rattled by 1848, Prussia, the most militaristic region of Europe, consented to allow men over 24 years old the right to vote in 1849. Prussia had also demonstrated how a state-sponsored system of education could create a sense of citizenship while developing intellectual skills that could be employed by the military. Prussia led the creation of Germany, which was born as a militarist/nationalist state after crushing the French in 1871.8 Just a few years after that, Friedrich Nietzsche would write that Christian values should be rejected in favor of the “will to power” and that an “Anti-Christ” would reject meekness and martyrdom in favor of political dominance. In the religion of power, Machiavelli’s The Prince became the Old Testament, and Nietzsche’s writings–the New. Germany was militancy made manifest in a state which would usher in world war in 1914 and again in 1939.
Only 74 years passed from the time Germany became a state and the first atomic bomb was dropped, and only then did nationalist leaders realize that it might be blessed to make peace. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) took the place of excommunication as a threat, and the free world, like Ambrose, hopes that no one will walk through that door.
About the AuthorChris Edwards, EdD, teaches AP world history and an English course on critical thinking at a public high school in the Midwest and is the author of To Explain it All: Everything You Wanted to Know About the Popularity of World History Today; Connecting the Dots in World History; Femocracy: How Educators Can Teach Democratic Ideals and Feminism; and Beyond Obsolete: How to Upgrade Classroom Practice and School Structure. He is a frequent contributor to Skeptic magazine.
References1. Kirsch, J. (2004). God Against the Gods: The History of the War Between Monotheism and Polytheism. Viking. 2. Wilson, P. H. (2016). Heart of Europe: A History of the Holy Roman Empire. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 3. Edoardo, A. (2020). All About History, Templars: The Rise and Fall of the Secretive Military Order. “Bernard’s Rules: As a new type of knight, the Templars needed someone to reimagine their role, and they found the man to do that in Bernard of Clairvaux” (pp. 36–41). 4. Horton, J. (2020). Holy Roman Empire: Chart the Rise, Rule and Demise of an Empire That Shaped Modern Europe. “1618–1648, The Thirty Years War: The death throes of the Holy Roman Emperor’s authority initiated the ultimate battle for religious freedom, ensnaring Europe and costing millions of lives” (pp. 92–99) 5. Lipscomb, N. (2020). The English Civil Wars: An Atlas and Concise History of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1639–1651. Osprey Publishing. 6. Machiavelli, N (1961). The Prince. Penguin Classics. 7. Wilson, P. H. (2016). 8. Clark. C. (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The question of whether or not we have free will has been pondered by philosophers, psychologists, theologians, neuroscientists, and by many of us in our own conversations and thoughts. Nearly two thousand years ago, the Stoic philosopher Epictetus declared, “You may fetter my leg; but not Zeus himself can get the better of my free will.”1 But Epictetus also believed in a deterministic world where each event is determined by preceding causes. How can this apparent contradiction be resolved?
In the 1940s, Bertrand Russel saw no reason that human volitions would not also be determined in the same way that inanimate processes are determined. Further, he saw the determined nature of volitions as incompatible with a person being the true source of his own actions. Russell supposed that an evil scientist could, by use of psychoactive drugs, manipulate a person to perform certain actions. And this hypothetical manipulation did not seem to Russell so different from normal life, where people are manipulated to do what they do by natural causes outside their own control.2
Fifty years after Russell published his critique of the Stoic notion of free will, several other philosophers made the same argument.3, 4, 5 Today, the continued quandary contributes to a sustained lack of consensus on free will. According to surveys, most people — including most philosophers — believe in some form of free will, most under the rubric of compatibilism.6, 7 Novelist and Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer summed up the dilemma, “We must believe in free will, we have no choice.”
However, the debate still rages in the world of academic philosophy, in a broader audience reached by podcasts and popular books written by scientists, and among readers of Skeptic. Here I will try to convince you that free will is real and not an illusion. I’ll argue that far from being exemplars of rationality and skepticism, the main arguments against free will make unjustifiable logical leaps and are naïve in the light of cutting-edge scientific findings.
Throughout the philosophical literature,8 resolving the question of whether or not we have free will has often revolved around two criteria for free will:
- We must be the true sources of our own actions.
- We must have the ability to do otherwise.
I argue that humans meet both criteria through two concepts: scale and undecidability.
Scale and the True Sources of Our ActionsIn an article in The Journal of Mind and Behavior,9 I argued that many of our actions are caused by our wills; that is, by our conscious desires and intentions. This is not disputed by most (what I’ll term) free will deniers. They more often dispute that our wills are free, not that we have wills and that our actions often follow from our wills. Sam Harris, one such determinist with a large general audience, has said that the subjectively felt intention to act is the proximate cause of acting. Harris makes the same basic claim as renowned scientist Francis Crick,10 philosophers such as Bertrand Russell2 and Derk Pereboom,4 and many others. They claim that in addition to the proximate cause (the will), our actions have ultimate causes lurking behind them that are the relevant causes to consider when judging whether or not our wills are free. The ultimate causes beyond and beneath the surface of our wills, they argue, make them unfree. What are these ultimate causes? Harris identifies genetics and environmental influences as “the only things that contrive to produce” his particular will.11 Molecules beyond DNA have also been offered as ultimate causes of our decisions. Biologist Jerry Coyne argued that, “Our brains are made of molecules; those molecules must obey the laws of physics; our decisions derive from brain activity.”12 Robert Sapolsky, a prominent neuroendocrinologist, is publishing a book this year, detailing many such mechanisms that, it is claimed, obviate the role of willed choices.13
My mind does not exist as a molecule nor as a historical epoch, nor as a socioeconomic class. Yet my mind does exist.
What’s wrong with this line of reasoning? Consider the following question as an analogy: Are apples red? Suppose we all agree that apples have color. The question is whether the color is red or non-red. To answer the question, determinists would look beyond the proximate color of the apple. Realizing that the apple is nothing but atoms, they would examine many of the carbon atoms on the surface of the apple. They find that not a single carbon atom is red. Since none of the atoms are red, and the apple is nothing but atoms, they would conclude that the apple can’t be red. The error is that though they agree the apple has a color, they try to examine the nature of the color at a scale (a carbon atom is smaller than the wavelength of red light) where color is incoherent. The fact that they found no redness at that scale shouldn’t lead them to conclude anything about the color of the apple.
Likewise, the fact that determinists find no personal authorship or freedom in the actions of molecules shouldn’t lead them to conclude anything about the nature of the will. We agree that we have wills, that we have subjectively experienced intentions that influence our actions. The question is whether our will is free or unfree. To look at molecules for the answer is a scale mistake. DNA and neurotransmitters observed at the molecular scale exhibit no will whatsoever. With that knowledge, is it compelling that they exhibit no free will? No. That should tell us that determinists are looking at the wrong scale to find answers about the will, just as looking for answers about redness at a scale where color is not meaningful.
The right scale for finding answers to the question of apple redness is the apple scale, not the atom scale. The right scale for finding answers to the question of freedom of the will is the agent scale, not the molecule scale. Searching the molecule scale is just one example of this error. There are many other wrong scales where a confused determinist might look for answers about the will. He or she may zoom out temporally into an irrelevant timescale, including the time before the will in question existed. In the above analogy, this would be like conceptualizing the apple as merely a step in a process of agricultural industry. Since agricultural industry is not red, should we conclude that the apple is not red? The question about the will can only find its answers from a scale where the will exists as a will. Expanding the timescale to include the time before the person was born renders the question incoherent.
If we keep our analysis in the scale where the individual agent exists, not zooming too far in nor too far out in space, time, or level of organization, then the primary and ultimate cause of my actions is me. The will emerges from the complex interactions of many small parts. It’s literally not true to say that it’s caused by any particular small part. It is caused by many small parts, but only when taken together all at once. And that’s the same thing as the whole person. So my thoughts and actions are deterministically caused by me. The molecules of which my brain is made are simply irrelevant to this fact. So I am the true source of my own actions, and there are no other “ultimate” causes. My mind does not exist as a molecule nor as a historical epoch, nor as a socioeconomic class. Yet my mind does exist. René Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” convinces me of this.14 In order to claim that my choices are really caused by a molecule or a historical epoch, one must refer to the dynamics of a scale where I (that is, my mind) cannot be found. Eliminating the mind from the analysis is not a valid way to answer a question about the mind.
The Ability to Do OtherwiseThere is a temporal asymmetry in the question of whether I could have done otherwise. In the question’s typical form, it is backward-looking. It asks about what could have been in the past, and, at first, it seems like a coherent question. I did one thing yesterday, and we wonder if I could have done something else. But what if we wanted to figure out whether or not I’ll have free will tomorrow? From that temporal angle, the question of the ability to do otherwise stops making sense. In a forward-looking sense, the question becomes manifestly nonsensical. Can I do otherwise in the future? Otherwise? Other than what? Other than the thing I will do? The question stipulates that I will do a certain thing, and simultaneously asks whether or not I can avoid doing that thing. The stipulation contained within the question makes the answer trivial. No, of course I can not do something other than the thing I will do. In order for the question to have any significance in the forward-looking tense, it must be modified. The question can not directly stipulate that I will do a certain thing. The question must ask whether or not I can do something other than what I’m expected to do, not other than what I will do.
Human choice is temporally asymmetric and must be analyzed as such. This point could be missed without properly situating our analysis at the correct scale. An inappropriate focus on the dynamics of little particles could obscure the truth. The laws of physics that describe or govern the interactions of particles do not specify a direction of time. If we could watch a video of two protons colliding, we would have no way to know whether the video was being played forward or in reverse. This is called time reversal symmetry. This symmetry holds true in a wide variety of particle interactions.15 Time appears asymmetric only at scales where emergent phenomena transpire. Large collections of particles obey the second law of thermodynamics, which is not time reversal invariant. As astrophysicist Matt O’Dowd put it, “Zoom in to individual particle interactions and you see the perfect reversibility of the laws of physics. But zoom out, and time’s arrow emerges.”16 A consideration of scale leads to a recognition of temporal asymmetry in human choice.
In analyzing the ability to do otherwise, we should consider only a forward-looking ability because choices, by their nature, are forward-looking. We don’t deliberate or make choices about the past. Choices are always about something, and those objects of choice always lie in the future, thus choices are always forward-looking. At the time when a choice is actually made, there is as of yet no “what” as in “Could have done other than what?” I have not already made the choice, so there is no established action to have done otherwise. There can only be expectation of what I will do. If my actions are in principle perfectly predictable, then I do not have the ability to do otherwise in a forward-looking sense. If my choices are in principle not predictable, given total knowledge of the present world, then I do have the ability to do otherwise in a forward-looking sense, which is the only sense that makes any sense. Given the different dynamics found at different scales, the ability to do otherwise needs to be understood as temporally asymmetric; that is, as always forward-looking; as the ability to do something which is in principle not predictable. We do have that ability, and it derives from our self-referential nature.
Self-Reference and UndecidabilityThe fact that I am the relevant cause of my own actions comes with another important implication: I am a causally self-referencing entity. If a molecule were the relevant cause of my action, this would not be true in the same way. The molecule has no capacity for self-reflection, but I do. I can ask myself, “What will I do? What could I do? What should I do? What do I want to do? What would I do if I wanted to do X and should do Y?” Self-referential questions like these affect the choices that I make; and those choices change the self-referential questions that I ask.
At the relevant scale, self-reference is causally important. I am a system which analyzes its own inputs, character, and potential outputs; generates new outputs based on those analyses; and feeds those new outputs back into itself as inputs which affect the outputs, which affect the system’s character. I am an output of and an input for my own processing. Framing the human self-referential nature in this way brings us to the concept of undecidability.
A system that exhibits undecidable dynamics cannot be predicted, given complete knowledge of its present state. Computer scientists and mathematicians have proven that this fundamental unpredictability shows up in some algorithmic computations, mathematical systems, and dynamical systems (including physical systems).17 Though an unpredictable dynamical system may evoke the concept of chaos, undecidability is not chaos; it is a different sort of unpredictability. IBM research scientist Charles H. Bennett makes the difference clear:
For a dynamical system to be chaotic means that it exponentially amplifies ignorance of its initial condition; for it to be undecidable means that essential aspects of its long-term behaviour — such as whether a trajectory ever enters a certain region — though determined, are unpredictable even from total knowledge of the initial condition.18
If a system exhibits undecidability, then it is unpredictable even given total knowledge of all of its constituent parts. Undecidability makes deterministic systems fundamentally unpredictable in principle, not as a result of merely lacking precise measurements. If humans can exhibit undecidability, then we meet the second main criterion for free will: the forward-looking ability to do otherwise. Scientists recently made such an argument feasible by explicating what features of a system give rise to undecidable dynamics. In 2019, Mikhail Prokopenko and his colleagues conducted a comparative formal analysis of recursive mathematical systems, Turing machines, and cellular automata. They come to a clear conclusion:
As we have shown, the capacity to generate undecidable dynamics is based upon three underlying factors: (1) the program-data duality; (2) the potential to access an infinite computational medium; and (3) the ability to implement negation.19
If humans do have these three properties, then we meet the criteria for undecidable dynamics, which means we can take actions that are fundamentally unpredictable, which means we have the ability to do otherwise in a forward-looking sense, which means we have free will.
First, consider program-data duality, which in this context is the ability for self-reference. The word “duality” simply refers to the typical distinction between program and data with which we are all familiar. A human at time 1 has a certain overall state of mind, coinciding with a certain overall physical state. The state at time 1 is a program, in that it entails implicit rules about what the system would do, given certain types of data. The streams of perceptions taken in at time 2 are data, which get processed according to the implicit rules. In addition to processing basic sense data, this duality allows for a program (or implicit set of rules encoded in the state of a human) to process other programs as data. For example, a human can process ideas, hypothetical scenarios, mathematical operations, and representations of the self as data (thus self-reference).
The next requirement for undecidability is the potential to access an infinite computational medium. The computational medium is the substrate on which the state of the system is represented. In a computer, the computational medium would be the memory and storage. The set of all possible states of the system is called the state-space. For example, the state space of a computer would be the set of all possible configurations of its memory and storage. If we knew that a certain system had an infinite state-space, we could infer that the system has access to an infinite computational medium.
It can be informally proven that humans have an infinite state-space. How many different thoughts is it possible for a human to have? That question includes sub-questions, such as how many things is it possible for a human to see? The state of your visual perception is one small part of your overall state. Think of the number 74. Now think of the number 74 with your eyes closed. Those two occasions of thinking of 74 occupied two very different points in your state-space because of the difference in visual perception.
To roughly estimate how many overall states are possible while thinking of 74, we would need to do something like multiply the number of possible visual perceptions by the number of possible auditory perceptions by the number of possible sensations of heat and cold by the number of possible gradations of feeling sadness or happiness, and so on. Also, you may think of 74 while remembering, for example, the time you thought of 106 or 107. And the next time you think of 74, that will be yet another point in your state-space, since you’ll recall that you’ve thought of 74 before. There may be an infinite number of possible states in which you might think of 74. And there are many conceivable numbers other than 74, and many things to think about other than numbers.
An obvious objection might be that a human and his brain are physically finite. In what sense can an organ that fits inside a skull be infinite? As a starting point, consider the 100 billion neurons that make up the brain. As a simplification, a neuron can be considered to be “firing” or “not firing.” So a simplified brain has 100 billion binary cells. Such an array of cells could instantiate 2100,000,000,000 distinct patterns of on-or-off activation. That’s a big number. For comparison, there are estimated to be roughly 1080 atoms in the observable universe.20 The number of atoms in the universe is an infinitesimally small number compared to the number of activation patterns possible in a simplified brain. And what about a real brain? A real brain is made of neurons which are not simply on or off. Some neurons show gradations in voltage and neurotransmitter release, meaning that they have many possible states between “on” and “off.”21
Besides neurons, there are many other variables in the brain that are not captured by the simplified on/off variable. Each neuron can vary in the amount of neurotransmitter in its vesicles ready for release, and the state of the receptors on its soma and dendrites (that is, to what degree they’re blocked by other molecules). There can also be variation in the amount of neurotransmitter that is floating free at any moment in the space between any two neurons. There are minute variables that will likely never be measured yet do, theoretically, make a causal difference. For example, in what spatial direction is each neurotransmitter molecule oriented? A neurotransmitter molecule must fit into a receptor in order to carry on a signal. For the molecule to fit, it must be facing a certain direction relative to the receptor. So the spatial orientation of the molecule before binding must have some nonzero effect on the binding affinity. How many different patterns of analog spatial orientation might trillions of neurotransmitter molecules be capable of? That alone may be infinite. The variable of “firing” or “not firing” does not capture any of these variables. So the actual number of possible overall brain states is some large exponent greater than 2100,000,000,000 which is a large exponent greater than the number of atoms in the universe.
Whether the human state-space is technically infinite or merely practically infinite (larger than any other number computed for any purpose in all of science), it will not be exhausted in the meager 100 years of a human lifespan. This means that the self-referential loops of processing do not need to stop at any predetermined iteration or level of abstraction. So for the purpose of analyzing the choices of a human, the state-space and computational medium are functionally infinite.
The last element required for undecidability is the ability to implement negation. Negation in this context refers to the ability of a logical system to produce an output which is exactly contrary to the processing which led to the output. It is equivalent to the liar paradox, which is exemplified in a statement such as “everything I say is a lie,” or more formally, “this statement is unprovable.” The liar paradox is a self-referential statement, which can not be judged to be true or false without a contradiction. Self-reference is fundamental to this paradox because the statement refers to its own validity. If humans can implement this paradoxical logic into their thinking, then humans meet this requirement for producing undecidability. The fact that humans came up with the liar paradox thousands of years ago is evidence that humans can perform the logical operation of negation.
ConclusionAll three factors underlying the capacity to generate undecidable dynamics are present in humans. First, we exhibit program-data duality when we process ideas, hypothetical scenarios, mathematical operations, and representations of ourselves as objects of thought. Next, we have the potential to access an infinite computational medium. This is demonstrated by the fact that we can think of any one of an infinite number of objects of thought, which implies an infinite state-space, which implies an infinite computational medium. Finally, we have the ability to implement negation, demonstrated by the inception of the liar paradox in the minds of humans. If these three elements are sufficient to generate undecidable dynamics, then humans are capable of generating undecidable dynamics, which means we cannot be accurately predicted. And that means we have the ability to do otherwise in the forward-looking sense.
Figure 1 (at the top of this article) shows the relationships between the concepts discussed in this article. An understanding of the human agent at the scale where conscious humans actually exist leads to recognition of the self as the source of one’s actions, recognition of the relevance of temporal asymmetry to human choice, and recognition of self-reference as causally relevant to human actions. Self-reference, in combination with access to an infinite computational medium and the ability to implement negation results in undecidable dynamics. This entails the ability to do otherwise in the forward-looking sense, which is the only sense that makes any sense when temporal asymmetry is taken into account. The resulting total picture is that we (humans) meet two criteria for real free will: the forward-looking ability to do otherwise and being the source of one’s own actions.
Viewing human agents as whole humans instead of as molecules makes it clear that humans are the cause of their own actions, and also leads to a focus on the human features such as self-reference, that generate undecidable dynamics. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus was right. Neither Zeus, Bertrand Russell, nor the scientists recapitulating the latter’s argument 77 years later can diminish our free wills.
About the AuthorStuart Doyle is a Force Recon Marine who has deployed to the Middle East, East Asia, and Central America. He has written philosophy and psychology papers published in The Journal of Mind and Behavior and The Journal of Libertarian Studies. He has also written for Quillette and Merion West. Stuart has degrees in neuroscience and behavior from Columbia University and in criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. Besides contending in the world of ideas, Stuart also contends in the physical world as an MMA fighter. Some of his fights can be found on YouTube.
References1. Epictetus. Translated by Higginson, Thomas W. (1865). The Works of Epictetus Consisting of His Discourses, in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and Fragments. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 2. Russell, B. (1979). History of Western Philosophy (3rd ed.). Book Club Associates. 3. Mele, A. R. (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press. 4. Pereboom, D. (1995). Determinism al dente. Noûs, 29(1), 21–45. 5. Rosen, G. (2002). The Case for Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64(3), 699–706. 6. Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology, 18(5), 561–584. 7. Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. J. (2021). Philosophers on Philosophy: The PhilPapers 2020 Survey. 8. Vihvelin, K. (2018). Arguments for Incompatibilism. In Zalta, E. N. (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition). 9. Doyle, S. T. (2021). Sizing Up Free Will: The Scale of Compatibilism. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 42(3 & 4), 271–289. 10. Crick, F. (1995). Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. Scribner. 11. https://bit.ly/3yelD6J 12. https://bit.ly/3yhBuS6 13. https://bit.ly/3SBNC8A 14. Doyle, S. T. (2022). Cartesian Dualism Does Not Commit the Masked Man Fallacy. Preprints, 2022060035 (doi:10.20944/preprints202206.0035.v2). 15. Carbone, D., & Rondoni, L. (2020). Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Time Reversal Symmetry in Presence of Magnetic Fields. Symmetry, 12(8), 1336. 16. https://bit.ly/3rs0HoX 17. Cubitt, T. S., Perez-Garcia, D., & Wolf, M. M. (2015). Undecidability of the Spectral Gap. Nature, 528, 207–211. 18. Bennett, C. H. (1990). Undecidable Dynamics. Nature, 346, 606–607. 19. Prokopenko, M., Harré, M., Lizier, J., Boschetti, F., Peppas, P., Kauffman, S. (2019). Self-Referential Basis of Undecidable Dynamics: From the Liar Paradox and the Halting Problem to the Edge of Chaos. Physics of Life Reviews, 31, 134–156. 20. https://bit.ly/3e92coT 21. Zbili, M., Rama, S., & Debanne, D. (2016). Dynamic Control of Neurotransmitter Release by Presynaptic Potential. Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 10.
What are we to make of the fact that a number of far-right politicians and activists, such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, the U.S. Representative from Georgia, and Andrew Torba, the founder and CEO of Gab, a social media platform flooded with extremist content,1 are now owning the label “Christian Nationalist”? Greene has equated Christian nationalism with patriotism, declaring herself “a proud Christian Nationalist” (while encouraging her followers to “claim your Proud Christian Nationalist shirt now and share your love for our great country”2) and Torba co-wrote and self-published a book, Christian Nationalism: A Biblical Guide for Taking Dominion and Discipling Nations.3 Conversely, conservative Christian leaders such as Albert Mohler, president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, and Russell Moore, chief editor at Christianity Today, are repudiating Christian nationalism by reframing it as a type of extremism relegated to the fringes (Mohler) or, oddly, a “virulent form of secularism” (Moore).4 According to the Family Research Council, a leading Christian Right policy group that organized a presentation on the topic last October, the term is part of a plot to suppress the votes of conservative Christians.5
These conceptions of Christian nationalism are misleading at best. Christian nationalism is neither a labeling trick nor peripheral to American politics. Like authoritarianism, to which it is closely related, religious nationalism is a political dynamic that affects political systems, not just a theory embraced by those who lend their support to it. Yet for too long America’s Christian nationalist movement has been misunderstood and underestimated. Many Americans continue to see it as a cultural movement centered on a set of social issues such as abortion and LGBT rights or preoccupied with a belief in America’s supposed founding as a conservative Christian nation. But Christian nationalism is not just a set of ideas.
The ideology of Christian nationalism is a tool—and a most useful tool at that—for a leadership-driven political machine that turns this story, and set of ideas, into political power.6 Political movements are by their nature complex, and this one is more complex than most. It consists of an extremely well-funded organizational ecosystem that has been built up over decades. There are right-wing policy groups including (but not limited to) the Family Research Council and the American Family Association; think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; and legal advocacy groups like the Alliance Defending Freedom, Liberty Counsel, First Liberty Institute, and Pacific Justice Institute.7 These legal advocacy groups and others align with the aims of The Federalist Society and related organizations, which raise money (some of it dark) to shape the courts.8
Recognizing that a certain degree of unity is the key to victories in the political realm, networking organizations play a critical role. The Council for National Policy gets much of the movement’s leadership cadre on the same page and brings them together with deep-pocketed funders.9 Other networking organizations target elected officials and clergy. Legislative initiatives such as the formerly named Project Blitz and Americans United for Life craft model bills, which allied lawmakers may then introduce into state legislatures. Education initiatives spread the Christian nationalist narrative and take aim at public education. Sophisticated data-mining operations partner with conservative church networks to turn out the vote.10 And a vast media and messaging sphere actively generates or exploits cultural conflict, promotes grievance, and spreads conspiracism in order to improve its grip on its target population.
Some people may question whether everyone who works at such organizations may be called “a Christian nationalist.” Surely not. But what we can say is these organizations and their leaders are lending support to a Christian nationalist agenda.
Sometimes religious nationalism is easier to recognize when it’s happening in other countries, whether Russia or Turkey, Iran or Brazil. When political leaders closely associate themselves with ultraconservative religious figures in their own countries to consolidate authoritarian forms of political power, we rightly recognize that as religious nationalism. These leaders bubble-wrap themselves in sanctimony to guard against any democratic check on their corruption and shield themselves from transparency regarding abuses they may be perpetrating against their own people.
There are of course nuances specific to different regions and countries. But illiberalism takes a common shape in most places. Would-be authoritarians everywhere use the language of exclusionary nationalism to send a message about who gets to properly belong in the nation and who does not.
The general lack of awareness of how the movement works leaves many Americans perplexed by the growing incivility in our politics. They may have a sense, for instance, that many Republican leaders have become more extreme on a number of issues, promoting strict abortion bans, passing measures that support taxpayer funding of or proselytizing in public schools, and declining to hold our former president to account for his actions even in the face of evidence of criminality.11 But they may not know that Christian nationalist organizations pressure them to support those extreme positions, and threaten to mount primary challenges if they don’t.12
Similarly, they may be shocked by the news of unpopular rulings of conservative Justices on the Supreme Court. But they don’t hear much about the Federalist Society, the organization that has played an outsized role in shaping the courts. All six right-wing Justices have current or former ties to the organization, and close to 90 percent of former president Donald Trump’s appellate nominees have ties to the group.
For decades the Federalist Society has been steered by Leonard Leo, a powerful figure who has mobilized hundreds of millions of dollars through a range of affiliated organizations in pursuit of his agenda. Early in his career, Leonard Leo realized that the Christian right had little hope of winning the culture war at the ballot box. A Catholic ultraconservative, Leo was sure that the public would never voluntarily submit to the moral medicine needed to save the nation. The last best chance to rescue civilization, he concluded, was to take over the courts. If activists could funnel just enough true believers onto the bench, especially onto the Supreme Court, they just might be able to reverse the moral tide.13
“He figured out twenty years ago that conservatives had lost the culture war,” said Leo’s former media relations director, Tom Carter. “Abortion, gay rights, contraception— conservatives didn’t have a chance if public opinion prevailed. So they needed to stack the courts.”14
Along with his role at the Federalist Society, Leo also joined the boards or leadership of other religious right initiatives, such as the national anti-abortion organization Students for Life of America and the Napa Institute, which brings together hard-right Catholic clergy with right-wing business leaders and conservative Catholic activists. In 2022, Leo took the helm of a new political advocacy venture; Barre Seid, an elderly billionaire from Chicago, founded the Marble Freedom Trust with a $1.6 billion dollar donation— the largest known donation to a political advocacy group in U.S. history.15 It is unclear exactly how Leo will utilize that vast sum, but the initiative is sure to super-charge American politics on the right.
Then there is the movement’s claim to patriotism, which may be seen as ironic given the fact that Christian nationalism played a critical role in former president Trump’s attempted coup against the U.S. government, which broached the surface of American politics with the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. In their responses to the election outcome, some prominent religious right leaders enabled or remained true to the false Trumpian line of election fraud. Michele Bachmann, the former Minnesota congresswoman and 2012 presidential candidate, said, “Smash the delusion, Father, of Joe Biden as our president. He is not.”16 Mat Staver, chairman and founder of Liberty Counsel, added, “What we are witnessing only happens in communist or repressive regimes. We must not allow this fraud to happen in America.”17
Such coordinated actions show very clearly that this is a leadership-driven movement.
These figures were not outliers; consider where some of the most militant and coordinated support for Mr. Trump’s election fraud claims came from. The Conservative Action Project, a group associated with the Council for National Policy, made its position clear in a statement issued a week before the insurrection. It directed members of the Senate to “contest the electoral votes” from Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan and other states that were the focus of Republicans’ baseless allegations. Cosignatories included over dozen movement leaders, many representing organizations that play a disproportionate role in turning out the conservative Christian vote.18
Such coordinated actions show very clearly that this is a leadership-driven movement. Understanding its appeal to a broad mass of American voters is necessary in explaining its strength but is not sufficient in explaining the movement’s direction. The leaders of the movement have quite consciously reframed the Christian religion itself to suit their political objectives and then promoted this new reactionary religion as widely as possible, thus turning citizens into congregants and congregants into voters.
The movement’s leadership cadre includes a number of personally interconnected activists, funders, strategists, and politicians, many of whom are involved in multiple initiatives. I have covered this movement for nearly 15 years and I lay out as much of this vast organizational infrastructure as I can in my book, The Power Worshippers. Yet the important thing to understand about the collective effort is the source of its unity—a common political vision.
The movement derives much of its power and direction from a subsection of America’s hyper-wealthy class, and many of these megadonors are as committed if not more committed to economic policies that serve their interests, such as low taxation for the rich and minimal rights for the workforce, as they are to right-wing positions in the culture wars. The religious right claims to defend family values, yet it drives support for politicians whose economic policies are making it harder for so many American families, particularly those in the working and middle classes, to succeed.
Many of those funders belong to extended hyper-wealthy families, such as the DeVos-Prince family juggernaut, the Green family, the Bradley Foundation, the Wilks brothers, and many others as I document in my book and reporting elsewhere.19 Without them, along with the donor-advised funds such as the National Christian Foundation, which have channeled billions of dollars in donations anonymously, and the massive flow of money targeting the courts—the Christian nationalist movement would not be what it is today.
A minority of Americans support the suite of regressive policies that the movement promotes. But because sectors of the movement serve effectively as a giant voter-turnout machine, its supporters punch above their political weight by voting in disproportionate numbers. In addition, gerrymandering and voter suppression schemes disproportionately target Black voters and others in democratic-leaning districts.20 Yet political losses remain inevitable—which is why, in recent years, the movement has openly embraced election conspiracies and worked to undermine the integrity of the electoral system.
From the perspective of the movement’s leadership, vast numbers of America’s conservative churches are playing an outsized role. The churches may be fragmented in a variety of denominations and theologies, but Christian nationalist leaders have had considerable success in uniting them around their political vision and mobilizing them to get out the vote for their chosen candidates. Pastors are among the most trusted sources of information in their communities. So the movement draws pastors into organizations such as Watchmen on the Wall, Faith Wins, Church United, and Ministros Hispanos.21 Through hundreds of presentations that reach many tens of thousands, these organizations communicate the message that it is pastors’ biblical duty to become politically engaged. They give pastors tools including voter guides, sermon starters, videos to air at church, and instructions for establishing teams of politically active congregants that will induce fellow parishioners to vote their “biblical values.” At an event attended by dozens of pastors, I witnessed one speaker, a former member of the Trump communications team who was billed as an “elections integrity specialist,” hawk election conspiracies that had been debunked months earlier by Republican-led committees. One of the pastors leading the presentation told us “The church is not a cruise ship. The church is a battleship.”
Just as important as the pursuit of private money to Christian nationalism is the effort to secure public sources of funding. The movement has learned to reallocate public money in the form of subsidies, tax deductions, vouchers, and other schemes. This flow of funds has in turn shaped the ambitions and tactics of the movement.22
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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Perhaps the most salient impediment to our understanding of the movement is the notion that Christian nationalism is a “conservative” ideology. I would describe it as “radical” or “authoritarian.” A genuinely conservative movement would seek to preserve institutions of value. It would hold its leaders accountable to the law. It would prize the integrity of electoral politics, the legitimacy of the judiciary, the importance of public education, and the values of equality, accountability, and mutual respect that represent the best of the American promise.
At every step in the rise of Christian nationalism, some popular commentators have declared that the movement is in terminal decline. Secularization and modernization, we have been told, are the immutable laws of history, and demography will put the nail in the coffin. When journalists and researchers have drawn attention to the theocratic ambitions of the movement, some have been quick to minimize concern and complain of alarmism. It is “a movement that could fit in a phone booth,” as one prominent Republican commentator put it in the Washington Post.23 The “phone booth” was installed in the White House and in the Capitol in 2016; it refused to leave in 2020; and threatens to return in 2024. And it’s not phone booths but stadiums, all across the country. It is long past time to set aside these dismissals.
Parts of this essay are adapted from The Power Worshippers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism (Bloomsbury).
About the AuthorKatherine Stewart is the author of The Power Worshippers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism. Her previous book, The Good News Club: The Christian Right’s Stealth Assault on America’s Children, was an examination of the movement’s efforts to infiltrate and undermine public education. Her work appears in the New York Times opinion, The Atlantic, The New Republic, and elsewhere. The Power Worshippers won first place for Excellence in Nonfiction Books from the Religion News Association, as well as a Morris D. Forkosch award for Best Book in Humanism. You may follow her on Twitter @kathsstewart.
References1. https://nyti.ms/2RlorHd 2. https://bit.ly/3eosEex 3. https://amzn.to/3VhdcS9 4. https://bit.ly/3ev29nL 5. https://bit.ly/3EQ4EeS 6. https://amzn.to/3S4mhe5 7. Ibid. 8. https://wapo.st/2JthvYE 9. https://nyti.ms/3s14IAQ 10. https://bit.ly/3VvL8u4 11. https://nyti.ms/3ev5bIu 12. https://nyti.ms/3CYwt3u 13. https://wapo.st/2JthvYE 14. Ibid. 15. https://bit.ly/3CvNCQJ 16. https://bit.ly/3s4kStm 17. https://bit.ly/3s1S5pl 18. https://nyti.ms/3eA2DZN 19. https://nyti.ms/3rWrXfu 20. https://nyti.ms/3gcf3Hu 21. https://bit.ly/3Tmp1EJ, https://bit.ly/3VFxt43 22. https://bit.ly/3MzmxQY 23. https://wapo.st/3Mu0Xxv
It was a great story that has captivated global attention for the past 6 years with claims of secret ray guns firing mysterious energy beams. There was only one problem – it wasn’t true.
On March 1, 2023, the U.S. Government released the findings of a new report on ‘Havana Syndrome’ – a mysterious condition that has affected American diplomats and intelligence officers in Cuba and later around the world since 2016.1 Five different intelligence agencies have deemed it “highly unlikely” that the condition was the result of a foreign adversary or that a directed energy weapon was involved in causing “anomalous health incidents.” The report would have left many in the intelligence community and Congress red-faced given that since its existence was first announced in August 2017, the government has spent tens of millions of dollars to track down the supposed culprits. Last year, Congress even approved millions of dollars in compensation for victims! On October 8, 2021, President Biden signed into law the HAVANA Act or ‘Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks,’ so named because the first attacks reportedly took place in Cuba. Victims from the CIA and State Department were authorized to receive initial payments of as much as $187,300 for those assessed to have been stricken with the condition.2
In addressing their findings, intelligence officials only released a summary of the report and were careful to point out that that they were not doubting the health claims made by victims. They also conspicuously failed to mention the ‘P’ word – the possibility that some of those affected could have been suffering from psychosomatic ailments. However, a CIA assessment earlier this year found that most of the reported health complaints were the result of existing conditions, environmental factors, and “anxiety,” but fell short of specifically mentioning mass psychogenic illness.
At the height of the Havana Syndrome panic, one theory held that it could have been the unintended consequence of a surveillance device which emitted an energy beam that made people sick, but that possibility was dismissed by an official familiar with the full report.3
This case is a classic example of what can happen when science is intertwined with politics. These complex entities can be separated, but it takes time. While the wheels of progress turn slowly, in this instance the delay in getting to the bottom of Havana Syndrome took far too long. The result was a waste of valuable time and resources, tens of millions of dollars, unnecessary anxiety, damage to the Cuban economy, damage to the credibility of the American intelligence community and the news media, and a stoking of international tensions.
The case of Havana Syndrome is a study in media sensationalism, faulty science, and poor government. By 2018, both the FBI and a panel of top scientists (the Jason group) had both concluded it was highly unlikely ‘Havana Syndrome’ was caused by microwave or sonic weapons, and that anxiety played a major role. The FBI and Jason reports were kept confidential. It was only in 2021 that the conclusions of the FBI report were leaked, while the Jason findings came out in September of the same year as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request.
While perceived victims and lawyers are continuing to cry foul, there can be little doubt that this new report almost certainly sounds the death knell for ‘Havana Syndrome.’ That this imaginary condition survived for so long on the public consciousness is a testament to the ignoring of many red flags that led the public astray down a long rabbit hole. And in the end when they had thoroughly searched that hole, they failed to find Bigfoot or a chupacabra – they found a rabbit.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References1. Unclassified: National Intelligence Council Updated Assessment on Anomalous Health Incidents, March 1, 2023 (ICA 2023-02286-B). 2. “Implementation of HAVANA Act of 2021,” Department of State, 22 CFR, pt. 135, Federal Register 87, no. 125, June 30, 2022, 38981, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/30/2022-13887/implementation-of-havana-act-of-2021. 3. Faguy, Ana (2023). “‘Havana Syndrome’ Likely Wasn’t Caused by Foreign Adversary, Intelligence Report Finds.” Forbes, March 1.
After several months and no concrete evidence of a toxic agent, no deaths, and nearly all victims being young girls who quickly recovered, reports of mass poisonings in Iran should be viewed cautiously, if not skeptically. In recent decades several eerily similar outbreaks were eventually identified as having a psychological origin. (Most recently, the new report about the Cuban-based “Havana Syndrome” that turned up no evidence whatsoever for any acoustic weapon appears to be another example of the psychological origin of such incidents.1) Consider the following.
A young student at an Islamic girls’ school becomes distressed, starts gasping for air, then passes out. Several other girls quickly exhibit similar symptoms, and soon dozens of girls are rushed to a local hospital suffering from what appeared to many to be a poison gas attack. Symptoms include headache, nausea, and dizziness. A description of the recent mass poisonings reported in Iran? No, Afghanistan 2009.
Girls at another Islamic school smell a strong odor and suddenly exhibit headaches, abdominal pain, difficulty breathing, and blurred vision. Several faint. Ambulances rush to the scene and take them to nearby hospitals. The recent events in Iran? No, the disputed West Bank region of the Middle East in 1983.
The parallels between the events in Iran, Afghanistan, and the West Bank are striking. In all three instances, we see young Islamic girls living under extraordinary stress falling victim to a mystery condition.
Since November 2022, reports of schoolgirl poisonings in Iran have involved nearly a dozen separate schools. Media accounts of these “attacks” describe them with such words and “mysterious” “unexplained,” and “baffling.” A popular folk theory holds that these girls are being punished for defying attempts by religious leaders to force them to wear their hijabs in public. But predictably, reports of poisonings have served to inflame anti-government sentiments and there seems little to gain from attacking innocent schoolgirls. According to Iranian officials, no arrests have been made and no chemical agent has been identified despite medical exams that have included blood tests.2
The Afghan “Poisoning” ScareBetween 2009 and 2016, dozens of schools in at least seven provinces across Afghanistan were affected by incidents that were widely reported at the time as mass poisonings.3 I know—in 2016, I was a consultant to a member of the Afghan government on a study of an outbreak in Herat province.4 Our conclusion: the girls were suffering from mass psychogenic illness, a condition triggered by anxiety. The students were under extraordinary stress for attending schools in defiance of the Taliban, stoking fears of reprisals. Taliban spokesmen, while admitting their opposition to girls attending school, always denied involvement.5 Another conspicuous aspect of the outbreaks was that none of the girls died, they almost always made a quick recovery, and no toxin was ever identified in the air, water, or food. Thus far, no toxin has been identified in Iran either, out of nearly a thousand victims.
Not only did we conclude that the girls in Herat were suffering from psychogenic illness, a separate study by the World Health Organization reached the same conclusion based on an investigation of 22 schools.6 While the full report was never released, the WHO later issued a statement that was based on samples of blood, urine and water, concluding that no evidence of poisonings was ever found.7 In 2013, it was revealed that separate investigations had been conducted by both the United Nations and the International Security Assistance Force—a multinational military mission overseeing Afghan security between 2001 and 2014. They too reached the same conclusion,8 as did a 2015 study by the Afghan Government of outbreaks in Herat.9
The Palestinian Schoolgirl “Poisonings”In March-April 1983, nearly one thousand Palestinian schoolgirls in the disputed Israeli-occupied West Bank region were stricken with headaches, dizziness, blurred vision, stomach pain, and weakness. Many of the victims lost consciousness. The episode made global headlines and led to alarming accusations of mass poisonings. The scare occurred amid the long-standing Palestinian mistrust of Jews and rumors that Israeli agents or civilian extremists had had deliberately poisoned the girls. The initial ‘poisoning’ that triggered the outbreak took place at a school in Arrabah and was later traced to an odor from a dirty latrine. Two separate investigations published in The Lancet, concluded that the illness was psychological.10 Another investigation, appearing in the American Journal of Psychiatry, later found that an alarmist report in a prominent Israeli newspaper significantly contributed to the outbreak when a journalist erroneously asserted without foundation that some of the victims had gone blind.11
Another scare involving the reported poisoning of Islamic schoolgirls by Israelis occurred in Egypt in 1993 after 1,500 students between ages 9 and 16 experienced nausea, headaches and fainting spells resulting in the closure of 32 schools. The episode was spread by rumors that the girls were being targeted by Israeli agents intent on rendering them sterile.12 In recent history there have been several other instances where incidents of apparent state terrorism turned out to be psychogenic in origin.13
Why Islamic schoolgirls? Why Iran? Why Now?What do the outbreaks in Iran, Afghanistan, the disputed territories, and Egypt have in common? Nearly all involve young schoolgirls living under repressive conditions and with no means of redress. In each of these episodes, when the first girls begin to fall sick, given the tense political climate, rumors of poisoning quickly spread. Outbreaks such as these are not just confined to Islamic settings. What is fascinating about these cases is that while the names and the places may change, the same patterns re-emerge, yet we continue to be fooled.
Similar episodes have been reported in strict Christian schools in Malawi, although instead of odors, these cases were driven by a belief in demons.14 Young Puritan girls living under prolonged stress and an oppressive political regime was the same recipe for the outbreak of twitching, shaking and trance states in the early 1690s that led to accusations of witchcraft at Salem in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
If history is any guidepost, expect the next phase to be the search for scapegoats as people on the margins of society, in the wrong place at the wrong time, are accused of being perpetrators. It happened in Afghanistan, the disputed territories, Egypt, Malawi, and Salem.
These episodes eventually end, but they often do not end well.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References1. Barnes, Julian and Adam Entous. (2023). “Foreign Adversaries ‘Very Unlikely’ to Blame for Havana Syndrome, Intelligence Review Finds.” The New York Times, March. http://bitly.ws/B8Y2 2. Artemis, Moshtaghian, Pourahmadi, Adam, Kennedy, Niamh, Mezzofiore, Gianluca, and Thompson, Nick (2023). “Alarm Grows in Iran over Reports that Hundreds of Schoolgirls were Poisoned.” CNN, March 2, 2023; Afshang, Maryam (2023). “Iran Investigates Poisoning of Hundreds of Schoolgirls with Toxic Gas, BBC News, March 1, 2023; Esfandiari, Golnaz (2023). “Mysterious Wave of Sickness Hits Iranian Schoolgirls, Amid Speculation Over Poisoning.” Radio Free Liberty, February 24. 3. “Afghan Schoolgirls Targeted in ‘Taliban Gas Attack.” The Stateman (New Delhi, India), May 15, 2009; Nordland, Rod (2010). “Poison Gas Sickened Afghan Schoolgirls.” International Herald Tribune (Paris), September 1, p. 8; “Taliban Suspected of Poisoning 120 Afghan Schoolgirls.” The Hindustan Times (India), May 25, 2012; Wagner, Meg (2015). “More than 100 Afghan Schoolgirls, Teachers Poisoned in Suspected Taliban Attack.” New York Daily News, August 31; “200 Schoolgirls Fall Unconscious after Nimroz Gas Attack, Pajhwok Reporter (Afghan Independent News Agency), May 17, 2016. 4. Bartholomew, Robert E., Lockery, Stephanie, and Najm, Abdul Fattah (2016). “Terror Attacks that Never Were: Myths of Poison Gas Attacks in History and More Recently on Afghan Schoolgirls.” The Skeptic 21(3):44-49. 5. Hamed, Mohammed (2010). “Afghan Girls Fall Ill in Suspected Gas Attack.” Reuters, April 25; “Taliban deny poison attacks on girls’ schools.” BBC News, May 27, 2013. 6. “Mass Psychogenic Illness in Afghanistan.” 2012. Weekly Epidemiological Monitor (World Health Organization, Eastern Office for the Mediterranean) 5(2):27:1 (May). 7. Aikins, Matthieu (2012). “Toxic Panic. Newsweek, July 9, accessed at: https://www.newsweek.com/are-taliban-poisoning-afghan-schoolgirls-evidence-65587 8. Aikins, Matthieu (2013). “The ‘Poisoned’ Schoolgirls of Afghanistan.” The New York Times, April 25. 9. Niayzi A, Sadequ S, Joya S, Faizi S, Rasoli A, Moaid K, et al. Report on Case Control Study Poisoning in Herat School Students. Ministry of Education, Afghanistan, Final Report. November 24, 2015; Najm AF. Assessment Report…of Poisoning of School Students in Herat Province. Community Health Project, International Assistance Mission (Afghanistan); 2015, 4pp. 10. Landrigan, Philip, and Miller, Bess (1983). “The Arjenyattah Epidemic: Home Interview Data and Toxicological Aspects.” The Lancet ii:1474-1476. See p. 1475; Modan, Baruch, Tirosh, Moshe, Weissenberg, Emil, Acker, Cilla, Swartz, T.A., Coston, Corina, Donagi, Alexander, Revach, Moshe, and Vettorazzi, Gaston (1983). “The Arjenyattah Epidemic.” The Lancet ii:1472-1474. 11. Hafez, A. (1985). “The Role of the Press and the Medical Community in an Epidemic of Mysterious Gas Poisoning in the Jordan West Bank.” American Journal of Psychiatry 142:833-837. See p. 834. 12. “Spring Fever.” The Fortean Times (London). 1993;69:16. 13. “State Terrorism Masquerading as Psychogenic Illness,” Pp. 167-177, in Baloh, Robert, and Bartholomew, Robert E. (2020). Havana Syndrome: Mass Psychogenic Illness and the Real Story Behind the Embassy Mystery and Hysteria. Cham, Switzerland: Copernicus Books. 14. MacLachlan, Malcolm, Maluwa Banda, Dixie, and Mc Auliffe, Eilish. (1995). “Epidemic Psychological Disturbance in a Malawian Secondary School: A Case Study in Social Change.” Psychology and Developing Societies 7(1):79-90.
America is being torn apart. Amid growing strife, many people are experiencing angst concerning the future of this country, a country once renowned for its exuberant spirit of discovery, progress, liberty. From across the increasingly tribal political landscape, one can observe attacks on the ideas that fueled America’s spectacular rise: reason, individualism, and political freedom. From the illiberal left the “woke” phenomenon has emerged, rising to dominance in cultural institutions and calling for “canceling” those institutions, symbols, and even thoughts it deems heretical. Standing in opposition to it is another new movement that promises to reunite us and rebuild a society true to the American vision. That latter promise calls for embracing the ideology of nationalism.
The movement to rehabilitate nationalism has a fervent vanguard. Among its leaders is the scholar Yoram Hazony, and his organization, the Edmund Burke Foundation. Under the banner of “national conservatism,” the Foundation has sponsored major international conferences. The most recent event in Miami, FL, featured more than 100 speakers, including keynote talks by Gov. Ron DeSantis, Sen. Josh Hawley, and entrepreneur Peter Thiel. The national conservatives are joined by still other factions, who often describe themselves as the “illiberal right.” And it was a significant moment when then-president Donald Trump thrilled a crowd at one of his rallies by telling them that he’s a nationalist.1
The reemergence of nationalism, however, is grounds for profound concern. Rather than being a cure that restores America to its original vision, nationalism is instead a troubling symptom of the trend that would take us away from America’s founding ideals. Nationalism, we submit, is hostile to America’s distinctive secular ideals. The more influence and power nationalism gains, the bleaker we see our future. The best way to counter this movement is through a deeper understanding of, and a commitment to fully realize, the Enlightenment ideals at the foundation of the American experiment.
America’s Foundation: Reason and Individual RightsThe original American political system was an innovation in political thought. For most of human history, government was an instrument of domination over the individual. Individuals were duty bound to kneel before some authority, whether embodied in a tribe, throne, or church. The individual was literally a pawn at the disposal of the rulers. With the dawn of the Age of Enlightenment, however, the ground began to shift. Thinkers such as John Locke advocated a fundamentally different view of the relation between individual citizens and the state. That political shift stemmed from a philosophical emphasis on reason. The individual, these thinkers believed, is capable of observing the world, understanding it, and discovering truths; and so, people could use their reason to guide their own lives. What emerged was a recognition of the individual as sovereign—in thought and in action.
Because nationalism devalues the individual, it is at odds with the principle of protecting individual liberty. Indeed, nationalism is best understood as a species of collectivism.
Consequently, a new view came into focus regarding the individual’s relation to the state. The state’s purpose was not to dominate and exploit, but rather to protect the individual’s sovereignty. This view informed the Founders, and it reverberates in the words of the Declaration of Independence. The individual—every individual—has the rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” and government exists “to secure these rights.” When government “becomes destructive of these ends,” it is the right of the governed to abolish it and institute a better system that “shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness.” Thus, the state’s raison d’être is to protect individual rights, that is, to protect individuals’ freedom to pursue life and happiness based on their rational judgment.
One feature of the original American system deserves special emphasis: the safeguarding of intellectual freedom. The principle of church/state separation fenced religion off from political power. The First Amendment leaves individuals free to form their own conclusions and to express their ideas—emphatically including criticism of religion and the state.
This reflects a view of the individual as capable of rational thought, owing no submission to dogma, and, above all, entitled to pursue the truth by their own best judgment. The unshackling of individuals to gain new knowledge about the world, without fear of retribution from religious leaders, would prove to be both a cause and an accelerant of progress.
It is important to recognize, however, that in the implementation of America’s founding principles there were contradictions and moral failings. The most obvious was the institution of slavery, which persisted until the Emancipation Proclamation (which only freed slaves in those territories still under Confederate control) and the ratification of the 13th Amendment (which abolished slavery throughout the entire nation). Even after those landmark actions, Jim Crow laws, which institutionalized legal racial segregation, remained on the books through the mid-20th century. It took the 19th Amendment, which was ratified just one hundred years ago, to enable, regardless of race, women to vote. These were genuine, if much belated, steps toward a more consistent application of the principle of individual rights.
Despite failing to protect the rights of all individuals, the United States remains a stunning example of the power of (albeit incomplete) liberty to fuel progress. Once a backwater of the British Empire, the United States became the world’s most scientifically, technologically, and economically advanced nation on earth. The Scientific Revolution not only accelerated human knowledge but also instilled a cultural norm of truth seeking, replacing conformity to the specific dogmas of the dominant church. The Industrial Revolution, coupled with a significant economic liberty, supercharged economic progress.
The myriad of advances in science, technology, and industry demonstrated the power of the rational mind to understand nature and reshape it to serve the goal of improving life. Look around at the world we live in: Life expectancy in the 20th century has roughly doubled. Refrigerators, microwave ovens, air-conditioning, televisions, and mobile phones are fixtures even in the homes of Americans who live in poverty. Thanks to the pioneers of Silicon Valley, the number of digital screens—smartphones, tablets, laptops—outnumber the occupants of a typical household, putting at our fingertips access to practically all music, films, books, and the accumulated knowledge of humanity. Medical science has tamed or cured terrible diseases. And during a once-in-a-century pandemic, biotech companies were able to produce not just one, but multiple, vaccines for COVID-19 in a matter of months rather than years.
These material advances, coupled with a culture in which liberty is protected, have made the United States a beacon to the rest of the world, an inspiration to be emulated. That is why the brightest and most ambitious people from all over the world have sought and continue to seek to immigrate to America. What made America such a success story? Its foundational ideals of reason, individualism, and freedom—and the human spirit they unleash.
Nationalism, however, is hostile to all of those.
What is Nationalism?Nationalism is not merely loyalty to one’s own country; it is a political-social doctrine. Nationalism is a rejection of the ideas that support individual human flourishing that have made America the success that it is. Indeed, the essential feature of nationalism is the very un-American notion of elevating the group over the individual.
German romanticists—the original nationalists—held that the “nation-state or folk-state was not a societal organization based upon human law with the purpose of assuring man’s liberty, security and happiness, but an organic personality, God’s creation like the individual himself….”2 The German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel, a major influence on both nationalism and Marxism, did not see the state as an association of individuals, but rather as a kind “person” transcending and subsuming them. “A single person…is something subordinate,” Hegel wrote, “and as such he must dedicate himself to the ethical whole. Hence if the state claims life, the individual must surrender it.”3 The state, in Hegel’s view “is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth.”4
Because nationalism devalues the individual, it is at odds with the principle of protecting individual liberty. Indeed, nationalism is best understood as a species of collectivism. Fundamentally, writes the philosopher Leonard Peikoff, collectivism “holds that in human affairs, the collective—society, the community, the nation, the proletariat, the race, etc.—is the unit of reality and the standard of value. On this view, the individual has reality only as part of the group, and value only insofar as he serves it.” It is predicated, observed Ayn Rand, “on the view of man as a congenital incompetent, a helpless, mindless creature who must be fooled and ruled by a special elite with some unspecified claim to superior wisdom and a lust for power.”5
Nationalism is thus a cousin of tribalism. Both define membership based on accidental or unchosen characteristics (place of birth; “race,” ancestry, language). Both demand unthinking loyalty, obedience, and self-sacrifice, one to the “nation,” the other to the “race,” family, clan, tribe. Nationalism, unlike tribalism, typically relies on some theoretical scaffolding, enabling today’s advocates of nationalism to pass off their ideology as civilized. However, nationalism, like tribalism, has a bloody legacy.
With its stress on “race,” language, and ascriptive group identity, nationalism is primed for in-group supremacism and out-group conflict. In Germany, the National Socialist party built a totalitarian state, in keeping with the idea that the individual citizen is but a cell in the organic nation. It was essential, in Hitler’s words, that the individual should “realize that his own ego is unimportant when compared with the existence of the whole people, and that therefore the position of this single ego is exclusively determined by the interests of the people as a whole, … above all he must realize that the freedom of the mind and will of a nation are to be valued more highly than the individual’s freedom of mind and will.”6
When German citizens are merely fragments of the “nation’s mind and will,” and when non-Aryans are dehumanized as vermin, it is left to the incarnation of the nation’s Will to restore the nation’s glory, ensure its purity, and provide for its needs. Pan-Germanism, which predated the Nazis and influenced Hitler, had “demanded above all a Greater German Lebensraum (living space), overseas colonies, and a big navy.”7 The Nazi regime infamously pursued “Lebensraum,” it exterminated human beings by the millions, and it fought to realize the dream of German domination.
The 20th century was blighted with still other forms of nationalism. Japan combined nationalism with worship of a god-like emperor. Arab Nationalism, infused with socialism and Islam, gained authoritarian power in Egypt and Syria, where it led to stagnation, the exploitation of the subject population, and regional wars. By the early 1970s there were assorted nationalist movements making separatist demands, often using violent means; for instance in Canada (Quebec), Spain’s Basque region, and the perpetually restive Balkans. The term Balkanization entered the lexicon as a byword for the disintegration of Western societies into warring tribal and nationalist factions. Today, nationalism can be seen in Russian belligerence. It is a major part of Vladimir Putin’s justification for invading Ukraine. In a long essay, Putin claims that Russia and Ukraine are essentially one nation. Ukraine, he contends, is an artificial creation, which must be reunited with Russia.8
National conservatism seeks to demolish one of the signal achievements of the american political system—the separation of church and state.
Nationalism is a repudiation of the sovereign individual, the ideal central to a free society. Whatever semblance of credibility nationalism may have had in the last century, it lost that on Europe’s corpse-strewn battlefields and in the gas chambers. And yet today this ideology is not only ravaging Ukraine and menacing the rest of Europe; it is being advocated as a vision for the future of America and Europe. At the forefront of that campaign are the “national conservatives.”
National Conservatism’s Anti-Enlightenment CrusadeDistancing themselves from nationalism’s blood-soaked legacy, those who call themselves “national conservatives” would have us believe that their ideology is pro-liberty, that it is in fact the path to restoring the American vision. However, as with the nationalism of the last century, their vision is hostile to reason, individualism, and liberty.
National conservatism repudiates the Enlightenment’s focus on individual sovereignty. Yoram Hazony, in a keynote at a nationalist conference, announced that “We declare independence from neoliberalism, from libertarianism, from what they call classical liberalism—you can give it any name you want—but that set of ideas that sees the atomic individual, the free and equal individual” as central to political thought.9
National conservatism fundamentally devalues the individual’s rational mind, and consequently, it repudiates the principle of individual rights. In his book, The Virtue of Nationalism, Hazony argues that—contrary to the evidence—human reason is incapable of arriving at universal truths. He writes that, “no human being, and no group of human beings, possesses the necessary powers of reason and the necessary knowledge to dictate the political constitution that is appropriate for all mankind.”10 Therefore, he believes, it is wrong to regard the principle of individual rights as a universal truth. Instead, he downgrades it to a “cultural inheritance of certain tribes and nations.” (And as we’ll see, despite pro-liberty rhetoric, this view empties the principle of individual rights of all meaning.)
National conservatism is tribalism with a theoretical fig leaf. If you unpack Hazony’s idea of “the national state,” inside, like nesting Matryoshka Russian puzzle dolls, you find tribes; unpack tribes, and you find clans and families. Unpack families, and yes, there is a reluctant concession that families consist of individuals, but the basic unit of value is really the family/tribe. Binding the collective together are a common language, and history, and the self-recognition as a community. To be part of this collective is to owe your devotion to its “collective self-determination.” (This implies divining the “collective’s” will, by some means transcending our senses and reasoning minds.) Here as with 20th-century varieties of nationalism, the nation’s needs take precedence over the lives and judgment of individuals.
Will a national conservative state protect your individual rights? To have even a semblance of freedom, in this view, you have to chance to live in a tribe or nation where that is a “cultural inheritance.” (Tough luck if you’re born where “honor killings” and female genital mutilation are accepted cultural inheritances.) Whatever degree of freedom you may be afforded is not a matter of your moral right, but rather as a permission granted by the collective, and hence a permission that it may withdraw. Essentially, your life and freedom actually belong to the nation. To echo Hegel, your life is “something subordinate,” and if the collective “claims life, the individual must surrender it.”
National conservatism seeks not to safeguard individual liberty, but to exert authoritarian control. You can see this in a 10-point manifesto that Hazony co-authored, “National Conservatism: A Statement of Principles,”11 which bears the signatures of a long list of writers, political figures, and activists. The document enunciates several anodyne positions that give it a veneer of compatibility with freedom: an embrace of the rule of law; a repudiation of racism; the idea of constitutional government; a nod to the idea of free enterprise. These, however, are merely window-dressing.
The manifesto’s conception of government’s purpose is overtly collectivist. Government is not instituted for the sake of securing the rights of individuals, but “to establish a more perfect union among the diverse communities, parties, and regions of a given nation.” To serve the collective’s welfare, national conservatives call for imposing a “national economic policy” to command the economy and prop up favored industries (while somehow, miraculously, avoiding “cronyism”). In reality, this erects but the facade of enterprise, trade, and private property, while negating their essence.
The manifesto’s distinctive aim, however, is religious authoritarianism. National conservatism seeks to demolish one of the signal achievements of the American political system—the separation of church and state. This separation reflected a sober recognition of historical experience: the Old World had been racked by wars of religion and by the political dominion of one Church or another. For their part, national conservatives assert that:
No nation can long endure without humility and gratitude before God and fear of his judgment that are found in authentic religious tradition…. Where a Christian majority exists, public life should be rooted in Christianity and its moral vision, which should be honored by the state and other institutions both public and private.
Such a Christian nationalist regime, we’re assured, would protect religious minorities. One should notice, however, the statement’s glib evisceration of the First Amendment’s protection of intellectual freedom. The national conservative manifesto simply states: “Adult individuals should be protected from religious or ideological coercion in their private lives and in their homes.” [Emphasis added.]
To say that freethinkers, dissidents, or atheists, for instance, “should be” protected “in their private lives and in their homes” is not to say that they have a right to freedom of thought and speech. That would necessarily include the right to voice and write and publish your ideas. A protection that extends only to your private life and home conflicts with that; it implies that you cannot hire a lecture hall, run a blog, publish books, release videos, exhibit artwork, or run advertisements to express your views. And why exclude children from such protection? Presumably, national conservatives are only too eager to see children in state schools indoctrinated in the state’s dogmas (presumably Christian dogmas, here in the U.S.).
Moreover, whatever this protection looks like, it is conditional. The nation’s “collective self-determination” takes precedence, overriding any permission granted to individuals. It is hardly an original tactic to promise people a vague freedom that the government can later revoke, once it has seized sufficient political power and no longer feels obliged to put on a friendly mask.
The authoritarianism latent in national conservatism can be seen elsewhere in the “Statement of Principles.” In keeping with the goal of marrying church and state, the government’s purpose is not only to bring criminals to justice. Its mission also encompasses the imposition of a religiously-rooted morality: in areas “in which lawlessness, immorality and dissolution reign, national government must intervene energetically to restore order.”
And how, exactly, does a government’s energetic intervention against “immorality and dissolution” square with protecting individuals from “religious or ideological coercion”? Further evidence of the religious authoritarian agenda is evident in the document’s alarm at “radical forms of sexual license and experimentation” and the notion that government must foster “stable family and congregational life and child-raising as priorities of the highest order.”
These goals—policing sexual behavior, promoting traditional “family values,” encouraging child bearing— are shared by Islamist regimes such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, and, especially, the self-styled Christian regimes of Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. There is a deep kinship between these authoritarian regimes and national conservatism.
Notice also the points of commonality between national conservatism and a political vision that came to power in the last century.
[This outlook] is a religious one in which man is viewed in his permanent relation to a higher law, endowed with an objective will transcending the individual and raising him to conscious membership of a spiritual society…
Being anti-individualistic, … [it] recognizes the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State…; outside of it no human or spiritual values may exist, much less have any value…
To achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and makes use of authority, entering into the mind and ruling with undisputed sway.12
The similarities are marked: Religion as a political foundation. Subjugating the sovereign individual to the nation. Authoritarian control. These are the words of a political figure who elevated the nation above the individual; who allowed the facade of enterprise, trade and private property, while negating their essence; and who built a militant dictatorship. That this statement from Benito Mussolini resonates with the political vision of national conservatism should be disturbing.
National conservatism is an ideology crusading for religious authoritarianism.
In The Virtue of Nationalism Hazony insists that his brand of nationalism is narrow, unambitious, and therefore peaceful. Yet, by design, Hazony’s theory puts the life and freedom of the individual at the mercy of the tribe/nation, and so vulnerable to being exploited in the name of “collective self-determination.” What recourse is possible to an individual if his duty is to subordinate himself? What hope can there be of resolving disagreements peacefully through persuasion, if this society is predicated on sidelining reason and rejecting universal truth? What’s left, except physical force? Nothing.
These points are evident in examining actual societies that devalue reason and subordinate individuals to the collective. They exhibit an ingrained “us-versus-them” mindset, which leads to viewing outsiders with suspicion, if not contempt. How can disagreements and conflicts be settled in such societies? Why try to reason with “outsiders” who are inferior, wrong, or beyond redemption? Think of the Rwandan genocidal tribal war in 1994. Recall the “ethnic cleansing” and concentration camps during the nationalist wars in the Balkans.
Nationalism is notorious for conflict and bloodshed, and that’s fitting: it pushes aside the faculty that enables individuals to avoid and resolve conflicts through persuasion. National conservatism is no exception.
Rediscovering a Pro-Reason, Pro-American AlternativeWhy abandon the Enlightenment ideals at the foundation of America in the name of national conservatism? Because, we’re told, today’s cultural disintegration and the “woke” phenomenon are products of consistently practicing reason, individualism, liberty and their political-economic expression, capitalism. Supposedly, reason ends in alienation, individualism ends in nihilism, capitalism ends in unemployment, poverty, despair, and misery. In their place, national conservatives offer religious collectivism as a cure.
Yet this is a fraud. Reason is our means of understanding the world, ourselves, and others. It is our way of taking control of our lives, earning self-esteem, bonding with friends and lovers, resolving conflicts, and creating lives of meaning. Nihilism and alienation are products not of reason, but rather of rejecting it in the name of faith and other forms of irrationality, a prevailing cultural trend. Moreover, it is not individualism but the focus on group identity and tribalism that dominate our culture. It is not capitalism but the betrayal of political and economic freedom that has been the theme of the past century. The economic upheavals and angst we’re witnessing are products of our refusal to uphold liberty—the full separation of state and economics—consistently.
National conservatism is not a cure for our cultural ills, but part of what’s ailing us.
But there is a rational alternative. What’s urgently needed today is a rediscovery of the ideals of reason, individualism, and freedom—and a commitment to realize them fully, consistently, without compromise.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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In the 20th century, the foremost champion of these philosophic ideals was Ayn Rand. Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism takes reason, not faith, as the only means to knowledge. It teaches us to follow our best, most rational judgment, not treating feelings as tools of cognition. Individualism is the theme running through Rand’s novels and thought. The hallmark of individualism is a fundamental orientation to facts and a commitment to grasping the truth first-handedly, rather than obedience to authority or unthinking social conformity. Politically, this entails a society defined by the principle of individual rights. Rand wrote:
Individualism regards man—every man—as an independent, sovereign entity who possesses an inalienable right to his own life, a right derived from his nature as a rational being. Individualism holds that a civilized society, or any form of association, cooperation or peaceful coexistence among men, can be achieved only on the basis of the recognition of individual rights—and that a group, as such, has no rights other than the individual rights of its members.13
The Enlightenment bequeathed to us the idea of the sovereign individual, but since then this idea was attacked and marginalized. In Rand’s philosophy we find the philosophic validation, grounded in empirical facts and logic, for America’s foundational ideals. It is these secular ideals properly understood and defended that we desperately need today, not any whitewashed form of collectivism.
About the AuthorYaron Brook is the host of the Yaron Brook Show, co-author of Free Market Revolution, Equal Is Unfair, and In Pursuit of Wealth, and Chairman of the Board of the Ayn Rand Institute. He was a columnist for Forbes.com and his articles have appeared in a wide range of publications. Brook is an internationally sought speaker. Twitter: @yaronbrook
Elan Journo, vice president and senior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, writes and speaks for ARI on the application of Objectivism to cultural-political issues and is a senior editor of ARI’s journal New Ideal. Journo’s books include What Justice Demands, Failing to Confront Islamic Totalitarianism, and Winning the Unwinnable War. His articles have appeared in a wide range of publications, from Foreign Policy and Areo to The Hill and the Los Angeles Times. Twitter: @elanjourno
References1. https://youtu.be/sazitj4x6YI 2. Kohn, H. (1965). Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (revised edition). Van Nostrand 3. Peikoff, L. (1982). The Ominous Parallels: The End of Freedom in America. Stein and Day. 4. Quoted in Kohn, H. (1965). 5. https://bit.ly/3yHeEDE 6. Adolf Hitler, speech at Bückeberg, October 7, 1933. Baynes, N.H. (1942). The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1922–1939, vol. 1, 871–872. Oxford University Press. 7. Kohn, H. (1965). 8. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/66181 9. https://youtu.be/4cpyd1OqHJU 10. Hazony, Y. (2018). The Virtue of Nationalism. Basic Books. 11. https://bit.ly/3D1xesH 12. Quoted in Kohn, H. (1965). 13. https://bit.ly/3ey5iTN
While many essays have addressed the social events and psychological traits that drive polarized thinking, the neural underpinnings of uncertainty and polarization are largely unknown. We know the brain processes information and makes decisions, but we know little about how politically polarized information is encoded and even less about how attitudes about uncertainty influence that processing. Why is it important? Uncertainty may be seen as a threat, which moves individuals toward certain positions on the ends of ideological spectrums when considering political candidates1 and policy positions.2
A recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences3 (PNAS) took a fresh look at the neuroscience of polarization. “Neural synchrony,” as defined in this study, is the tendency of two individuals’ brains to share a similar pattern of activity when receiving the same information. Dr. FeldmanHall and her team learned that politically like-minded people have synchronized brain activity when watching politically polarizing video clips and that this activity matches up to an even greater degree between people who find it difficult to tolerate uncertainty. The closest matched activity was observed in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the anterior insula (AI), brain regions that control value judgments and socioemotional activity, respectively.
In the study, self-identified liberal and conservative participants were asked to report their political ideology on a spectrum ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” Then, while they were shown an incendiary video clip from the 2016 vice-presidential debate between Tim Kaine and Mike Pence, their brain activity was measured using an fMRI. Self-reported ideology was confirmed by agreement with statements from the video. These results were compared against responses to a nature video and a neutrally worded news segment on abortion.
Polarized Minds Think AlikeThe first finding of this study demonstrated that pairs of participants with similar ideologies (among both conservatives and liberals) showed neural synchrony when viewing the debate clip, no similarity when viewing the nature video, and activity localized to only one brain region during the news segment on abortion. These data suggest that “like-minded” individuals have synchronized brain activity when receiving polarized information, a persistent finding among both liberals and conservatives.
Uncertainty Makes Polarized Minds More SynchronizedParticipants also took a validated assessment to measure Intolerance of Uncertainty (IUS). Individuals with strong IUS and left or right political ideology exhibited enhanced neural synchrony in areas of the brain associated with values, emotion, and visual processing. They showed even more similarity in their imaging patterns while watching the political debate video clip than when watching a nature video or a neutrally worded news segment. This, too, was seen among both conservatives and liberals. While previous studies have outlined structural and psychological differences between liberals and conservatives, this study revealed shared neurological processing that underlies polarization and demonstrates how it is exacerbated by perceived uncertainty.
As technology continues to grow and change rapidly, the level of uncertainty in the world is not likely to wane. FeldmanHall’s results suggest that increasing uncertainty could further divide society. A new quarterly measuring system, the World Uncertainty Index, has demonstrated an upward trend. This index captures economic and political events over the past 60 years in 143 countries, including Brexit, the occupation and withdrawal from Afghanistan, Korean tensions, etc. The index utilizes text mining for the word “uncertainty” in country-specific policies gathered by the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Overcoming Polarization and UncertaintyGiven that polarization can contribute to democratic instability, distrust of scientific evidence, and support for authoritarianism, the level of uncertainty we might experience is, well… uncertain. Thus, it might be helpful to find ways to increase our tolerance for it. Not only does intolerance of uncertainty affect interactions between political groups, but it has also been associated with various anxiety-based disorders. The good news is that evidence has begun to surface from randomized clinical trials that Intolerance to Uncertainty Therapy might improve anxiety symptoms. If uncertainty fuels divisiveness, perhaps strengthening our ability to live with uncertainty can bring us together.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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SolutionsUnderstanding the psychological and biological underpinnings of political polarization is only the first step in working towards restabilizing our deeply divided society. In Dr. FeldmanHall’s study, the topic of abortion alone did not trigger ideology-synced brain activity, suggesting neutrally worded information does not induce polarization. This distinction indicates a need to consider how we receive information. The current media monetization model is based on generating revenue through attention-encouraging, often divisive outrage, which, according to this study, would activate polarized neural synchronicity. In response to this problem, media organizations that seek to present more inclusive sources of information have been emerging. Outlets such as AllSides, Tangle, and Readocracy fight media bias and minimize polarization. Each site takes a different approach to foster a greater diversity of viewpoints, hoping to help readers gain a more holistic view of a given issue.
Increasing our tolerance for uncertainty, reducing black-and-white thinking, being aware of media bias, and promoting a more neutral presentation of news and varying sides of a news story might help us heal division and neutralize political polarization exacerbated by the ever-changing circumstances of the 21st century.
About the AuthorNatasha Mott is a neuroscientist, podcaster, and writing fellow with the Heterodox Academy. Known online as Theory_Gang, her commentary covers science, culture, and philosophy in various formats from memes, videos, and essays. She has worked in biotechnology, democracy reform, software, game development, and is currently working on her first book, a daily dialectic on science and existentialism.
References1. McGraw, K. M., Hasecke, E., & Conger, K. (2003). Ambivalence, Uncertainty, and Processes of Candidate Evaluation. Political Psychology, 24(3), 421–448. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895x.00335 2. Haas, I. J., Baker, M. N., & Gonzalez, F. J. (2021). Political Uncertainty Moderates Neural Evaluation of Incongruent Policy Positions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 376(1822), 20200138. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0138 3. Baar, J. M. van, Halpern, D. J., & FeldmanHall, O. (2021). Intolerance of Uncertainty Modulates Brain-to-Brain Synchrony During Politically Polarized Perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(20). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022491118
In 2022 it’s hard to decide which is the craziest conspiracy theory people believe. Among chemtrails, QAnon, rigged election, and vaccine conspiracies, flat Earth (F.E.) beliefs surely belong at or near the top. Why? The other conspiracy beliefs have at their core a tiny, tiny bit of physical plausibility. It is possible to spray chemicals into the air from aircraft. It is possible to steal elections, eat children and engage in disgusting sexual activity. It is possible to inject harmful substances. None of these beliefs directly violate physical reality. However, there is no possibility of a flat planet.
Investigative journalist Kelly Weill’s important book details her investigation of the flat Earth movement, the people involved, and their psychology. That movement is more bizarre and interesting than I, at least, had any idea. Before reading this book, I had thought that the F.E. movement was just a bunch of people who thought that Earth was flat and left it at that. I was wrong. An important point of the book is that the F.E. movement contains a great diversity of flat Earth beliefs. As an example, an obvious question is why don’t we find an edge? Well, some say, there is an edge—it’s the Antarctic which forms an ice wall around the flat Earth to keep the oceans from spilling over the edge. But regular people can’t go there to see the edge because it’s highly guarded by secret international troops. Other flat Earth believers say that there is no edge, and that Earth is flat and goes on forever.
What about other planets? Are they flat too? One individual Weill quotes replied to a question from Elon Musk as to whether Mars is flat by saying “no” because “Mars has been observed to be round” (p. 207). By this, one assumes that “round” means spherical because in F.E. belief a planet could be both flat and round. Or flat and square. Or flat and shaped like a great big New Hampshire. Others do not believe in outer space but that the Sun and stars are on a dome high up in the sky, harkening back to medieval beliefs. More disturbingly, Weill documents the recent development of an overlap between the F.E. movement and QAnon and similar conspiracy theory groups.
Despite the diversity of F.E. beliefs, there is a common theme that runs through the movement. Specifically, that “governments and scientists are actually peddling a ‘global lie’ in order to control the world by tarnishing religious teachings or by making people feel insignificant next to the great expanse of outer space” (p. 3). Those in the movement have a willingness or desire to seek out conspiracies and an ability to immerse themselves in their own particular conspiracy-believing milieu to the extent that evidence contrary to their beliefs is rejected out of hand as due to hoaxes (e.g., the moon landings, anything from NASA) or to an explicit governmental coverup.
The idea that Earth is spherical dates back to at least the writings of Pythagoras in the 6th century BCE. Weill gives a good history of the F.E. movement in the English-speaking world, and debunks the myth that when Columbus sailed west his crew was terrified of falling off the edge of a flat Earth. In the first chapter Weill describes the start of the modern flat Earth movement. The main character here is an English socialist named Samuel Birley Rowbotham.
In the late 1830s he was deeply involved in a failed utopian community. He’s famous in flat Earth circles because of experiments he claimed to have performed in a long straight canal in Bedford, England. It had been known for centuries that as a ship sailed away a viewer would see the ship both get smaller and the lower parts of the ship disappear before the upper parts did, due to the curvature of the planet. Rowbotham claimed that when he stood in the middle of the Bedford Canal ships got smaller as they moved away but he did not see the lower parts vanish sooner than the upper parts. This, he argued, showed that Earth was flat. His claim is still offered as proof that Earth isn’t spherical.
In fact, as the co-discoverer of natural selection (with Charles Darwin), Alfred Russel Wallace demonstrated in a bet with a flat Earth advocate named John Hampden at that same canal, in which he set up three objects—a telescope, a disc, and a black band—along a six-mile stretch such that “if the surface of the water is a perfectly straight line for the six miles, then the three objects…being all exactly the same height above the water, the disc would be seen in the telescope projected upon the black band; whereas, if the six-mile surface of the water is convexly curved, then the top disc would appear to be decidedly higher than the black band, the amount due to the known size of the earth.” As the diagram (below) shows, Wallace’s experiment clearly “proved that the curvature was very nearly of the amount calculated from the known dimensions of the earth.” Predictably, Hampden refused to even look through the telescope.
View through the level used by Alfred Russel Wallace in the “Bedford Level” survey experiment: a wager between him and John Hampden to demonstrate the curvature of the earth. Diagram printed in The Field (March 26, 1870), and reproduced in Wallace’s autobiography.
In Chapter 2 we learn about the town of Zion, Illinois, founded in 1901 by John Dowie, a faith-healing preacher from Scotland. In 1906 one of Dowie’s associates, Wilbur Glenn Voliva, pretty much took over the town from Dowie. Volvia believed that there “was no such thing as gravity” (p. 43). Volvia saw to it that F.E. theory was taught in the Zion public schools until the early 1930s when his candidates lost elective office. The story of Zion is fascinating, amusing, and well told.
The next several chapters chronicle the development of the modern F.E. movement from being a “Joke” (Chapter 3) to its current entwinement with conspiracy theories of all sorts. Another chapter is devoted to Mike Hughes, the flat earther (but was he, really?) rocket man who wanted to find out for himself if Earth was spherical. Not trusting NASA, the airlines, and other such sources, his plan was to build a rocket that would take him high enough so he could see for himself the curvature of the planet, if there was any. He did successfully build and ride several rockets, but they didn’t go high enough. On February 22, 2020 Hughes climbed aboard a rocket more powerful than any he had used before. It malfunctioned rather spectacularly (you can see it on YouTube), and he was killed instantly.
Weill has been studying the F.E. movement for years. Like any good investigative reporter, she has gone to F.E. conferences and hung out with and gotten to know many F.E. believers personally. It’s clear from her writing that she finds them fascinating and generally good, if seriously misguided, people. She knew Hughes personally and was very saddened by his death. The last chapter, “Away from the Edge,” describes the role that the internet, and specifically social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, have played in increasing the popularity of not only F.E. belief but also conspiracy theories in general.
Weill outlines in detail how the algorithms used by these companies were responsible for guiding people toward F.E. and other conspiracy theory websites and videos when they did not start out looking for any such information. The fixes now in place to correct these problems are not all that effective. There is much food for thought in this chapter.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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Like most readers of Skeptic, I suspect that five years ago I would have dismissed F.E. belief as nothing but a joke. Weill makes it clear that this is not the case. Yet after finishing the book, I was left with a feeling of non-completeness. Something was missing. Weill’s description, in the final chapter, of how the internet facilitates F.E. belief is all well and good and, as far as it goes, accurate. Still, I was left wondering how normal, intelligent people could accept a belief that is so obviously wrong and for which, as noted above, there is no possible referent for a flat planet in the real universe.
As I finished the book, I thought of Susan Clancy’s 2007 book Abducted, which approached the alien abduction movement in much the same way as Weill deals with the flat Earth movement. By the end of Clancy’s book, along with other research, the reader has a good explanation of alien abduction belief—hypnopompic hallucinations combined with a fantasy-prone personality. It is no fault of Weill that, at this point, there is no similar compelling explanation for F.E. beliefs, although it would be very interesting to see if flat Earth believers, and conspiracy theory believers in general, score higher on fantasy proneness tests than controls.
About the AuthorTerence Hines is a cognitive neuroscientist and professor at the Psychology Department, Pace University, Pleasantville, NY and adjunct professor of neurology at New York Medical College in Valhalla, NY. His research focuses on paranormal belief, the cognitive representation of number and, when he has time, the nature of bilingual memory. He is the author of Pseudoscience and the Paranormal. He received his undergraduate education at Duke University and his PhD from the University of Oregon.
There is probably no other scientific discipline in which fads come and go so quickly, and with so much hype, as psychology. In his Quick Fix, Jesse Singal discusses eight different psychological ideas that have been promoted as quick fixes for different social problems. He refers to these as “half-baked” ideas—ideas that may not be 100 percent bunk but which are severely overhyped” (p. 6).
The first chapter concerns the self-esteem movement, which began in 1990 with a report from the State of California titled Toward a State of Esteem. The report argued that increasing a person’s self-esteem, especially for children and adolescents, would improve nearly everything from social behavior to academic performance. The questionable origins of this report have, to my knowledge, not been previously described. Due to pressure from a “very eccentric California politician” (p. 13) named John Vasconcellos, major findings that called into question the utility of increasing self-esteem were suppressed from the report. This, in turn, led to all sorts of dingbat programs for improving self-esteem. The chapter provides many illuminating examples, such as banning games with winners in elementary schools. Self-esteem improvement programs do seem to make people score higher on subjective measures such as happiness, which is important. But they have little effect on more objective measures of behavior. The cottage industry of self-esteem therapists is doing little to improve objective measures.
The concept of the “superpredator” (Chapter 2), the (usually Black) teenager who ran wild killing, raping, and pillaging, became a popular stereotype in the 1990s. It generated a rush of legislation that meted out much harsher punishment for teenage criminals. The claim was that these teens were destined to become career criminals because of genetic faults, poor upbringing, or both. Since birth rates were increasing, the fear was that there would be a dramatic increase in the coming years of such wilding teens, thus posing a severe threat to society. The idea was advanced by some criminologists and picked up by politicians of both conservative and liberal persuasions. Prominent among the criminologists who advanced the superpredator idea was John Dilulio, “a careful academic in other respects” (p. 72). Singal notes that Dilulio did not put forth this idea in peer-reviewed publications, and thus the idea was not subject to the criticisms that it would have generated due to lack of evidence and sloppy conceptualization. In 2001 Dilulio “acknowledged… that he had simply been wrong” (p. 72) but rejected the idea that he was the cause of so many kids going to jail.
Remember how your mother would tell you to “sit up straight and have a good posture?” Well, in 2010 that advice was reshaped into a sure-fire method of empowerment, especially for women, in the form of “power posing.” The idea was that if you sat up straight, leaned forward, sort of took possession of the space around you…all kinds of good things would happen. The original paper reported that assuming such a pose increased feelings of power and people’s willingness to take a financial risk. It even increased testosterone levels compared to what was defined as more submissive or passive poses. This led to the expected outbreak of self-help books, TED talks, and general hype. The trouble was that none of it was true. In 2016 the lead author of the study, Dana Carney, posted on her UC-Berkeley webpage that “I do not believe that ‘power pose’ effects are real” (p. 82), although she has never formally had the paper retracted. The problem was a statistical manipulation (called p-hacking) that led to finding differences between the power and passive pose conditions where none existed.
One of the goals of the power pose movement was a legitimate one—to help women overcome sex/gender discrimination in hiring and salaries. Singal makes an important point here and throughout the book: it would be better to direct attention to the root causes of these problems rather than fall back on “half-baked” fad psychology quick fixes that don’t fix much of anything.
“Positive psychology,” the focus of Chapter 4, is a kind of successor to humanistic psychology, but without the high psychobabble content of the former and more interest in empirical verification. Positive psychology emphasizes finding ways to make already psychologically healthy people happier and more satisfied with their lives rather than dwell on psychopathology. This is a laudable goal, but positive psychology has had major problems empirically verifying its interventions. One of the founders of positive psychology is Martin Seligman, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania. Seligman is famous for trying to apply the principles of positive psychology on a mass basis through various interventions. However, these interventions have proven to be of questionable effect. “On multiple occasions, Seligman and his center [Positive Psychology Center] have made impressive claims about interventions that outpace the available evidence” (p. 108). One program, the Strath Haven Positive Psychology Curriculum, is aimed at increasing the “strength of character” of elementary school students. On his university website, Seligman claimed that the program “builds character strengths, relationships, and meaning, as well as raises positive emotions and reduces negative emotions” (p. 109). But in a peer-reviewed journal paper, he said precisely the opposite; specifically, that the “positive psychology program did not improve…character strengths” nor several other outcome measures. That report is vague about the overall effects of the program, and Singal notes that, while the study was funded by a grant worth almost $3 million, no complete report of the results has ever been published.
Despite the questionable effectiveness of Seligman’s programs, in 2008 the United States Army reached out to him to devise an intervention to deal with a significant problem—PTSD among soldiers. The result was the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program which incorporated modifications of an earlier intervention called the Penn Resilience Program (PRP). The PRP was “delivered to (mostly) healthy students by laypeople who can be quickly trained for the task” (p. 114). The intervention was done in groups and, not surprisingly, didn’t have much effect on students. Promoting it as an effective treatment for adults who had suffered severe trauma was, to put it mildly, a stretch. Nonetheless, the Army gave Seligman’s group a $31 million contract. As expected, the program had little effect.
The CSF program was approved and mandated by a single person, the then Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey. Casey, a fine general that he might have been, had no experience evaluating psychological intervention programs. Singal cites this as an example of what he terms “unskilled intuition,” which is when a decision maker thinks they have the skills and knowledge to make a decision but do not. This is a case of the Dunning Kruger Effect, a cognitive bias whereby people with limited knowledge or competence in a given intellectual or social domain vastly overestimate their knowledge or competence relative to objective criteria or performance of their peers or people in general. By falling for the sales pitch from Seligman et al., the Army passed up the opportunity to implement more effective programs to treat PTSD.
The concept of “grit,” (Chapter 5) pretty much the same as stick-to-it-iveness, is another spawn of positive psychology. Grit was marketed to American schools by Angela Duckworth in her 2016 book Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance. The text mainly consisted of success stories of people with, you guessed it, real grit. But as Singal correctly notes, this was cherry picking. Reports of students who clearly had grit but didn’t succeed were largely left out. And such people indeed do exist, as documented in Linda Nathan’s 2017 book When Grit Isn’t Enough.
Grit is said to be able to predict success in various situations better than older, well-established measures such as consciousness. For example, a short ten-item grit scale was said to make valuable predictions about whether West Point cadets would make it through a challenging seven-week training course. And so it did… But not really. Ninety-eight percent of cadets scoring high on this scale completed the course. But 95 percent of all cadets complete the course, so the grit scale didn’t really add much. Some schools have jumped on a grit bandwagon with the hope that it is possible to increase grit levels and thus student success. This harkens back to the self-esteem movement in many ways.
Similarly, since grit doesn’t correlate very highly with measures of student success, and there is little evidence that interventions can change grit, such programs are ill-conceived. As was the case with the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program to combat PTSD, there are much better and proven ways of improving student success, such as teaching best study habits and nurturing skills that require class attendance and time management. Grit was just the fancy new kid on the block who got all the attention.
An appealing marketing ploy for grit was to claim that increasing grit would be especially helpful in decreasing the inequality between wealthy and poor children in school achievement. The failure of grit to improve much of anything, or to predict much of anything, belies this hope. Grit was another attempt to avoid making the major changes in the American educational system that would be needed to really address social inequalities. It was just another failed, quick fix.
In Chapter 6, Singal discusses the Implicit Attitude Test (IAT), commonly known as the “bias test,” arguably the most controversial topic in social psychology. There are numerous different varieties of this test, first developed in 1998. “Implicit,” as used here, means “unconscious.” The test is said to measure implicit or unconscious bias against a given racial or ethnic group by using a reaction time measure. Bias is found when “someone is quicker to connect positive concepts with white people and negative concepts with black people” (p. 186). The controversial finding is that people who show no racial or ethnic biases in behavior or explicit attitudes are scored as highly biased by the IAT. The test has become a mainstay of diversity training programs. The basic idea is to identify people who hold implicit biases and then train these biases out of them.
There are serious problems with this approach. The IAT is a test and, like any other test, must meet two fundamental criteria before it can be ethically used to guide any decision making. First, a test claimed to measure some stable characteristic must be reliable. Reliability means that a test must give close to the same results on repeated testing. If the Hines Test of Baseball Skill (HTBS) generates widely different scores when given two weeks apart, it isn’t reliable. A test must also be valid—there must be independent evidence that it measures what it claims to measure. If the HTBS is very reliable, but HTBS scores do not correlate highly with some real-world measure of baseball skill, it is not valid. The IAT is not reliable. The correlations obtained when reliability is measured “have ranged from r = .32 to r = .65” (p. 182). “By the normal standards of psychology,” these figures put “the IAT well below the threshold of usefulness in real-world settings” (p. 181). What Singal does not point out, unfortunately, is that if a test is not reliable, it cannot be valid. That is, if the scores are bouncing around, they can’t be telling us anything about the stable trait the text is advertised as measuring. Indeed, it is clear that the IAT is not valid based on several meta-analyses described by Singal.
A related problem exists: “it has never been clearly stated what it [the IAT] measures” (p. 186) but simply tautologically assumed that having a particular score on the IAT meant that the person had implicit bias “without that score implying a connection to real-world behavior” (p. 187). The meta-analyses referred to above show that “the evidence is simply too lacking for the test to be used to predict individual behavior” (p. 184). Still, people do show a wide range of scores on these tests—these differences must be due to something. One possibility, of course is some sort of bias. But Singal reviews “a significant amount of evidence that the IAT measures a variety of things apart from implicit bias itself” (p. 188). Given this, it’s certainly odd that the IAT is accepted when the “psychological establishment… would surely reject a similarly noisy and arguably misleading test of depression or anxiety” (p. 188).
The general lack of validity of the IAT makes it highly problematic as a tool for changing behavior, although it has become an established tool in antiracism and diversity training. Singal devotes much discussion at the end of Chapter 6 to the idea that it would be better to recognize that the most serious problem facing minority groups is not implicit cognitions that may never express themselves in overt behavior but in the structure of a society that oppresses minorities. This point is similar to the one made regarding self-esteem and grit in previous chapters. It’s a lot easier to focus on “even more microscopic examinations of white people’s behavior and attitudes and etiquette” than to change the structure of the system that so disadvantages minorities. None of this is to say that implicit bias doesn’t exist, an important point made by Singal. It does. The question is whether the IAT: (1) measures it; and (2) whether training programs based on the IAT have any real beneficial effects in mitigating it. The answer to both these questions appears to be “no.”
To the extent that quick fixes don’t work particularly well, the groups at which they were directed will not benefit very much. There is then a danger that these groups will be blamed for their failures.
The crisis of replication in psychology in general and the claims for “social priming” in particular are the topics of Chapter 7. Social priming refers to the idea that subtle environmental cues can have large effects on behavior. Two such claims are illustrative. In one study, one group of college students processed words that suggested elderliness (i.e., frail, old, Florida, etc.) while a control group processed age-neutral words. The supposed finding was that those who processed the “geezer” words took more time to walk down a corridor than the control group. In another study, looking at a picture of Rodan’s The Thinker reduced viewers’ religiosity compared to a control group. Studies like these exploded in the early 21st century. Then along came Daryl Bem and his (in)famous study of psi in which he claimed to have shown real psi effects. Since his paper was published in what was considered the leading journal of social psychology, it attracted a great deal of attention from other psychologists and the popular media.
Singal discusses the fact, noted previously by many other commentators, that Bem’s study was the straw that broke the camel’s back in terms of accepting the standard way that statistical analyses of psychological research had been done. This was because the results of Bem’s experiments were so inherently implausible. That the usual statistical analyses seemed to yield evidence in favor of parapsychological phenomena suggested something badly amiss in how those analyses operated. These included using multiple statistical tests and then reporting only those that seemed to confirm the initial hypothesis. There was also the practice of changing the study’s hypothesis after the fact to conform with the obtained results, among other issues. A broader problem was calculating levels of statistical significance and reporting them as traditional p-values where .05 or less was taken as showing that the effect was real. To be clear—all that the .05 means is that the result is unlikely; that is, it would have occurred by chance five times or less out of 100. It does not mean that it could not have occurred by chance.
The replication crisis refers to the finding that many of the much-ballyhooed study results in social psychology do not replicate when other researchers repeat the experiments. This, too, became clear when Bem’s results did not replicate in the hands of those who tried. To make matters worse, even the journal that published Bem’s paper refused, initially, to publish failures to replicate his findings, not even sending the paper reporting the failures out for peer review. Most journals never published studies reporting attempts to replicate previous findings, whether the replications succeed or not. Thus, results due to chance or statistical manipulation continued to be accepted as real. When this was realized, attempts began to replicate many of the “sexy” findings in social priming. Most failed to replicate, including the priming studies noted above.
Jesse Singal appeared on The Michael Shermer Show in April 2022. Listen to the conversation.
The positive response to this methodological embarrassment is that some journals now require more rigorous standards for publication. Some even require that researchers submit a sort of “letter of intent” detailing the exact hypotheses to be tested, methodology, and statistical analysis to be used before the study is even begun. More researchers are using Bayesian approaches to statistical analysis. This approach can be best summed up by the phrase well known to skeptics—“extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof.” In other words, if your claim is highly unlikely to be true before the study (i.e., looking at The Thinker makes people less religious), you’d better have more than one lone result of p < .05 to support it.
Oddly, Singal hardly mentions that the same replication crisis is found in many medical studies and does not cite Ioannidis’s 2005 PLoS Medicine paper that brought this problem to the fore, well before Bem’s paper appeared. The chapter seemed a bit out of place in the book because, popular as social priming was, the enthusiasm about it never reached the level of claiming that priming was a way to cure various social ills, as was the case for the topics of the other chapters.
The final chapter with a specific program or concept as its subject, Chapter 8, is about “nudging.” Nudging is a way of arranging the environment to make it easier for people to behave in a desired way, as opposed to strong-arm tactics such as regulations or legislation. This technique for changing behavior “has a fair bit of genuine empirical heft behind it” (p. 263). The chapter starts with a great example. Before 2015 or so, New Yorkers who committed minor violations were given a carbon copy of the ticket the office wrote. Buried in the small print on the ticket was the requirement that the defendant appear in court at a particular date, place, and time. An unacceptable number of people didn’t show up for their court dates. To solve this problem, the design of the ticket copy was changed to make the requirements much more obvious. This is a beautiful example of using human factors design to solve a problem. Given this example, I expected the rest of the chapter to be about how the human factors approach to designing such things as forms, signs, roadways, kitchen appliances, and even buildings can be extremely useful in producing desired behavior. But right away, the chapter took a bizarre turn. It veered off into decision-making research and the work of Kahneman and Tversky on how mental shortcuts (“heuristics”) result in poor decision making. This goes on for a few pages, and then we’re back to nudging. There’s an interesting example of how the Obama administration arranged for stimulus money to be distributed to individuals in increments rather than as one lump sum. The goal of the stimulus money was to get people to spend more. Had it been delivered in one lump sum, people would have been more likely to put it away in savings. Multiple smaller individual payments were more likely to be spent. The chapter, which seems more disjointed than the others, ends with the important observation that nudges don’t always work and that by focusing on them, more serious institutional problems can be overlooked.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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In the book’s final chapter, Singal covers the reasons for the wide acceptance of quick fixes and the problems with such acceptance. The reasons are rather obvious—quick fixes are easy to understand and thus gain popularity, especially when their creators promote them through TED talks and public media. As mentioned previously, unskilled intuition also plays a role. Quick fixes get other rewards—academic promotions, consulting gigs, book royalties, etc. Nothing too surprising there.
What is more revealing is how the acceptance of quick fixes may do harm—more harm than just not solving the problems very well. To the extent that quick fixes don’t work particularly well, the groups at which they were directed will not benefit very much. There is then a danger that these groups will be blamed for their failures. If all it takes for disadvantaged children to succeed in school is more grit, then when they get all gritty and still don’t excel, well, it must be their fault. And this can, in turn, breed disappointment and hostility.
Singal’s book is an excellent contribution to the skeptical evaluation of social programs where the claims go far beyond reality. It will be eye-opening to many unfamiliar with the actual success rates of the programs discussed. The text is never heavy with academic jargon and clearly explains the many, sometimes complex, ideas. It is well referenced and not without a pleasing bit of wit.
About the AuthorTerence Hines is a cognitive neuroscientist and professor at the Psychology Department, Pace University, Pleasantville, NY and adjunct professor of neurology at New York Medical College in Valhalla, NY. His research focuses on paranormal belief, the cognitive representation of number and, when he has time, the nature of bilingual memory. He is the author of Pseudoscience and the Paranormal. He received his undergraduate education at Duke University and his PhD from the University of Oregon.
In Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Niels Bohr wrote that initial attempts to unite the scientific story failed because scientists lacked a broad narrative for the history of science. He believed that quantum physics could unite with biology for a more comprehensive theory of scientific understanding. He wrote:
…the reasons for the shortcomings of these pioneer efforts to utilize physics and chemistry for a comprehensive explanation of the properties of living organisms are evident. Not only had one to wait for Lavoisier’s time for the disclosure of the elementary principles of chemistry, which were to give the clue to understanding of respiration and later to provide the basis for the extraordinary development of so-called organic chemistry, but, before Galvani’s discoveries, a whole fundamental aspect of the laws of physics lay still hidden. It is most suggestive to think that the germ which, in the hands of Volta, Oersted, Faraday, and Maxwell, was to develop into a structure rivalling Newtonian mechanics in importance, grew out of researches with a biological aim.1
It is important to revisit Bohr’s idea now because researchers in all the disciplines of science are, in some way, aware of the centrality of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. However, since the Second Law was not really expressed until 1824 (and not really noticed by theorists for nearly a century or so afterward), it came well after physics, biology, and chemistry had already been established as separate fields with separate nomenclature and historical narratives.
The compartmentalized nature of science prevents this understanding from coalescing into a coherent narrative, and this had led to much confusion in the narrative of science. A single concept can unite the history and philosophy of science, but this will require a thorough understanding of how every significant scientific insight can be described as a variant of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. A coherent understanding of science leads to a coalescing of the scientific narrative under the one conceit that is true across the branches of science: there is only entropy.
I: The Traditional NarrativeThe Pre-Socratic philosophers of the Greek tradition developed an “Ionian Enchantment” (E.O. Wilson’s term from his book Consilience2) beginning in the 7th century BCE. The Pre-Socratics were obsessed with a single question: what is the fundamental nature of matter? The answers ranged from water (Thales), to hypothetical unbreakable particles (Democritus), to whole numbers (Pythagoras), to shades of a perfect mathematical world (Plato). The Pre-Socratics asked questions beyond what the technology and mathematical sophistication of the era could answer.
Medieval Indian mathematicians developed the numbers 1–9, created a heliocentric theory, and understood that the Earth rotated on its axis. By 500 CE the number “0” developed in India. A couple of centuries later, mathematicians in the Islamic Empires incorporated those numerals into new kinds of mathematics, creating Al-Jabr, or algebra in the process.
Western society was held back mathematically by Roman numerals. Some people in the West admired Eastern mathematics but few in the West used “Arabic” numbers until the 13th century mathematician Fibonacci explained how beneficial 0–9 could be for making money on interest payments.
Between 1250 and 1500, the compass allowed for Europeans to sail to the Americas. Exploration, according to David Wootton, created the entire concept of “discovery” that is so central to science.3 Aristotle, and his mistaken concepts of motion, became central to the medieval scholarly institutions, and block printing synthesized with metallurgy to create the printing press. Gunpowder, brought from China by the Mongols, synthesized with church-bell making technology to make cannon. Suddenly, spheres flying at high velocities could be observed and they flew in arcs, not straight lines.
Then, the Protestant Reformation of 1517 shattered the authority of the Catholic Church, and not long after, the Polish astronomer Copernicus theorized a heliocentric “solar” system. In the early 17th century, Galileo used his telescope to observe the night sky and provided hard evidence to support Copernicus. The printing press allowed for ideas, including scientific ideas, to “stick” in society in a way that they never had been able to during similar eras in China, India, or the Islamic world.
Although Galileo’s challenges with the church are well-known, the “natural philosophers” of the day recognized his achievement and in 1620, Francis Bacon codified the era’s intellectual shift in his book Novum Organum. Bacon’s book was a work of educational theory; scholars should look to create knowledge through experimentation rather than just study the old knowledge created by the ancients.
Then, of course, there was Newton, who created a theory of universal gravitation, including the Inverse Square Law. Putting Newton’s myth-making about the apple aside, he really superimposed the physics of small spheres (cannonballs) moving in relation to the Earth’s gravity onto big spheres (planets) as they moved in relation to the Sun’s gravity.
Modern physics, and the concept of gravity, therefore developed before modern chemistry which was not really created until Antoine Lavoisier concluded that mass could be neither created nor destroyed, thus developing the famous Law of Conservation (1789).
Darwin’s 1859 On the Origin of Species was written based on biological facts collected from the natural world, and he made no reference to chemistry or physics in his work. Not long after Darwin, the Russian chemist Dmitry Mendeleev created the Periodic Table of Elements.
The development of major theories in physics, chemistry, and biology came through traditional experimentation and observation, but the Machine Age seems to have driven the mind of French natural philosopher Sadi Carnot who noted in Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire (1824) that every interaction that takes place in a machine ultimately results in a loss of heat.
This finding, which would eventually become known as the Second Law of Thermodynamics, came too late to be incorporated as the central ideology in the other sciences. Carnot’s book did not garner the same level of attention as, for example, On the Origin of Species, and the concept of entropy (heat loss) remained relatively obscure.
In the early 20th century, Einstein developed E=MC2, thus answering the pre-Socratic question about the fundamental nature of matter: the answer is “energy.” This was followed by the development of quantum mechanics.
This narrative is not wrong, but because the initial question of the Pre-Socratics has its limitations, because the concepts of gravity, and conservation of mass and energy were developed before entropy was understood, and because writers of the scientific narrative tend to focus on specific discoveries, the whole history becomes a confusion of various disconnected narratives.
II: Understanding EntropyThe 20th and 21st centuries have led us to understand that entropy is central to virtually all scientific phenomena. Consider the fact that vision goggles work in the absence of light because living animals radiate. The center of the Earth is hot because even stable elements radiate, and when packed together, they create heat. Stephen Hawking proved that even black holes radiate, which is another way of saying that Black Holes are subject to entropy.
As Sadi Carnot noted in 1824, energy was always lost in any machine interaction.4
What if this had been discovered in 1600 and then incorporated into the other sciences as they were being developed? What if the Pre-Socratics had asked “why does everything decay?” rather than “what is the fundamental nature of matter?”
Such “what if” questions about the past are useless as intellectual exercises unless they help us to rethink the centralization of the narrative. Consider what happened when quantum physics was developed after the understanding of the Second Law.
In his 2017 book Now: The Physics of Time, Richard Muller correlated the Second Law of Thermodynamics to time.5 The Second Law is not absolute in every interaction, but an increase in entropy is guaranteed through the law of large numbers. This is why time goes forward. Further, if energy is always lost in an interaction, that produces heat, which is what makes a perpetual motion machine impossible. Physicists broadly understand this, but the correlation between entropy, chemistry, and physics has still not been unified, even though Niels Bohr is generally credited with having brought physics and chemistry together in the early 20th century.
This might seem obvious, but everything important in science got discovered out of order. Let’s start over and piece it together again, knowing what we now know.
III: There is Only Entropy: Restructuring the NarrativeSuperimposing entropy back to the beginning of the universe creates a possibility for a more coherent scientific narrative.
“Time” is a relational concept, regarding movement, between two objects. A clock keeps steady movement in a world where movement is often chaotic. Temperature is a more direct measurement of movement precisely because work creates heat. Time began, therefore, with movement. Scientists can identify only one known state where there is no movement, and that is in a pure crystalline substance at 0 degrees Kelvin (see: The Third Law of Thermodynamics).
We might ask ourselves, then, not “why is there something rather than nothing?” but “why is the universe not 0 degrees Kelvin?” The answer to that may simply be that there are more ways to be not 0 degrees Kelvin than there are ways to be 0 degrees Kelvin.
This must be said because, while it makes sense that if the universe is expanding then it must have once been closer together, it doesn’t necessarily make sense to posit a single infinitely dense particle, because that equation indicates heat, and if there’s heat then there is movement, and therefore time.
We might therefore imagine, with some statistical certainty, a dense particle that was cold (0 Kelvin) and not moving. If the universe is expanding, then it is always at peak size. However, if it is always trending towards disorder, then it is also always at peak entropy. Reversing the concept of entropy to a singularity makes more sense than reversing movement to a singularity for reasons to be explained.
The emission of a beta particle from a 0 degrees Kelvin singularity (similar to Hawking radiation) can be seen as the first movement. This would be more in keeping with a modern understanding and prevents us from conjuring up mathematical models based off of predictions (postdictions?) that get less likely to reject the null hypothesis the further back they go.
Because of the concept of a “big bang” is based on reversing motion, it requires that the physicists posit the idea that we can measure the movements of that explosion by putting a hypothetical earth in rotation around a hypothetical sun, and then setting that outside of the real movements of particles so that modern scientists can have the reference point of a “year.” The universe does not allow us this hypothetical reference point. This is why reversing entropy to a singularity makes more sense. No reference point is needed.
In the beginning, there was radiation, which is entropy, which is movement, which is time. From that, what we call “energy” should be defined as one object’s temporary capture of another object’s entropy. The Sun doesn’t shine, it is radiating away and the Earth captures this temporarily to create temporary order. Entropy fuels biological evolution but also ensures only temporary order in an organism, hence the pressures on life to replicate for a future generation with greater capabilities to capture entropy.
The Pre-Socratics asked “what is the fundamental nature of matter” not “why does everything decay?” This, plus Aristotle’s ruminations on motion, framed the scientific enterprise in a particular way so that, in 1666 Newton focused on why the apple fell, not why it rotted. It does no violence to the inverse square law to say that Newton “discovered” that the law of large numbers can determine that atoms move away from each other in a force proportional to their mass. The Inverse Square Law can just as easily be used to describe how entropy’s movement allows for objects to separate. The law of large numbers, not discovered until 1713 when the Swiss mathematician Jakob Bernoulli worked out the equations, joins Newtonian physics with the quantum in a coherent way.
Newton’s calculations just happened to be worked out in a particular place and point of time where the Earth’s mass was large enough to temporarily hold back the entropy of the apple on a macro-scale. On a micro-scale, the apple still radiates away, which is why it rots and decays over time. Had Newton known about entropy, he might have described the elongation of the force of entropy as objects separate, rather than the gravitational force of objects coming together.
If enough entropy is borrowed from another decaying source, then the apple’s entropy can escape. The reason this is hard to see is because the ratio of the Earth to the Apple is not really that skewed. If the Earth was made as heavy as a black hole and the apple as small as a beta particle, then we would now accept the fact of its radiation.
The Second Law of Thermodynamics is not linear and absolute, in the sense that not every interaction causes radiation that can be detected, but in the aggregate, the interactions create heat. This means that, exothermic reactions produce entropy while endothermic reactions temporarily absorb the entropy from another interaction. It does no violence to Einstein’s equation if we make the E stand for entropy rather than energy. It makes more sense to say that nuclear physics releases entropy, because that force does not become energy until it is temporarily captured by another object.
This makes everything clear, because we can think of the elements on the Periodic table as being arranged based on their temporary resistance to entropy. When elements interact, they release heat just as surely as Carnot found that machines do. Humans evolved on the surface of the Earth, absorbing a certain amount of entropy from the Sun and becoming resistant to most of the radiation (entropy) in the objects on the surface of the Earth. If we come into contact with materials that radiate faster that what are cells are used to, this can tear away DNA and caused defects and cancers.
What caused confusion at the dawn of quantum physics was the fact that equations in both physics and chemistry were based on the macro-level where the law of large numbers creates a ratio disparity between particles that makes entropy unimportant for temporary purposes. It doesn’t matter, really, if there is some small level of heat loss that occurs when sodium and chloride are combined, as long as table salt results. Stoichiometry assures a balanced equation that is practical to use, but not exactly accurate. The balanced equation on the right is a little less than the balanced equation on the left. The same is true of how large objects, composed of aggregated particles, act in relation to each other.
But quantum mechanics is the study of the radiated particles, and, individualized, the law of large numbers no longer applies to their behavior. This is why, as Heisenberg discovered, quantum equations are not commutative. If there is an interaction, then there is heat loss, and that cannot be reversed. (In a real way, this is measurable as the paper you write your equation on is slightly hotter after the writing than it was before.) Matrix algebra allows for the quantum physicist to equate the position of a particle to a state of heat loss based on the interaction, but that cannot be reversed.
This is why work creates heat, but heat does not create work. The Second Law is not commutative because time cannot go backwards overall, entropy can be borrowed temporarily to reverse some processes, but overall, everything decays.
Entropy keeps the arrow of time moving; today is less ordered than yesterday, and this is certain. If we extrapolate this concept backwards, through our scientific narrative to the origins of the universe, then we must postdict a universe that was once ordered only through its lack of movement, which means it was frozen. But even then, as Galileo once said of the Earth, eppur si muove, but it does move. And if it moves, it creates heat, and understanding that creates a more coherent scientific narrative.
About the AuthorChris Edwards, EdD, teaches AP world history and an English course on critical thinking at a public high school in the Midwest and is the author of To Explain It All: Everything You Wanted to Know About the Popularity of World History Today; Connecting the Dots in World History; Femocracy: How Educators Can Teach Democratic Ideals and Feminism; and Beyond Obsolete: How to Upgrade Classroom Practice and School Structure. He is a frequent contributor to Skeptic magazine.
References1. Bohr, N. (1961). Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. (p.15) Dover Publications 2. Wilson, E.O. (1999). Consilience: The Unification of Knowledge. 3. Wootton, D. (2016) The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution. Harper 4. Carnot, S. (1824) Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire. (p. 19) Dover Publications. 5. Muller, R. A. (2017) Now: The Physics of Time. W.W. Norton and Company 6. Nash, L.K. (1962). Elements of Chemical Thermodynamics. (p. 56) Dover Publications.
A string of mysterious balloon sightings generates fear and excitement as thousands of anxious residents scan the skies to glimpse floating objects that are believed to emanate from a hostile foreign power. The Chinese spy balloon scare of 2023? No, the balloon panic of 1892 in Russian-occupied Poland. Another series of balloon sightings sparks fears that a foreign adversary is behind their presence. North America, 2023? No, Great Britain, 1940.
When on Saturday morning February 4th 2023, the United States military shot down a Chinese spy balloon off the coast of South Carolina, it marked the beginning of a spate of balloon sightings across North America. Suddenly people were seeing balloons everywhere. Almost certainly the balloons have been there in recent times, but NORAD (The North American Aerospace Defence Command) wasn’t looking for them; instead they were focused on fast-flying objects like planes and ballistic missiles. Now after recalibrating their equipment, they are detecting slowly flying objects like balloons — as are militaries around the world. In addition, according to at least one UFO organization, reports of unidentified flying objects are now on the upswing since the early February shootdown (Vinter 2023).
Some are likely spy, weather, or scientific balloons, but others are likely the result of human imagination as people misidentify astronomical bodies, meteorological phenomena, and objects like birds and advertising planes. Social psychologists have long known just how fallible eyewitness testimony is, especially with the sky as a backdrop. An excellent example of this occurred on March 3, 1968, when a Russian moon probe re-entered the atmosphere at 8:45 p.m. across the central U.S., creating several fiery meteors. Despite knowing when and where it re-entered, several people in the area at the time reported seeing “flying saucers.” One told investigators that it had a “riveted-together look” with “windows.” (Bullard 1982).
There is a long history of balloons — both real and imagined — triggering similar national scares.
The Russian-German Balloon PanicDuring the nineteenth century, balloons captivated the popular imagination in Europe and North America, but their use was extremely limited. Military espionage balloons that were in use were crude and perilous affairs that were tethered to a rope or cable. The balloons were often said to be performing impossible manoeuvres such as traveling against the wind at high altitudes. In late March 1892, a flurry of balloon sightings was reported in Russian-occupied Poland along the German border. In several instances, Russian soldiers fired on the objects, but they always melted into the night. The balloons that were spotted were often illuminated, would sometimes disappear behind clouds, only to reappear and were assumed to have been manned by German spies who were operating a new steering apparatus. Many of the sightings corresponded with known astronomical bodies such as Venus. As aviation historian Bret Holman writes, “All anybody had were the usual static observation balloons, which were certainly not capable of the movement seen over Russian Poland.”
The scare happened at a time of political tension between Russia and Germany as fears of an impending war were projected onto the sky. Russian psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev viewed the sightings as “collective hallucinations” triggered by the rumblings of war. Similar reports of Russian spy balloons were logged by the Germans. An investigation by the Russian war Ministry concluded that the reports were attributed to “errors of observation” and overactive imaginations.
The British Balloon ScareAnother balloon scare occurred in early 1940 when a red weather balloon drifted across several eastern British counties and gave rise to rumours that they were explosive gas balloons released by the Germans with the intention of wreaking havoc. As the Manchester Guardian noted at the time, “Extraordinary rumours in Eastern English and Scottish coastal districts followed the discovery yesterday of a number of small balloons. These were harmless British meteorological balloons but stories which had spread in various parts of the country had suggested that they were of enemy origin and that they contained dangerous gas.”
Space AliensYou knew that it was just a matter of time before space aliens entered into the social hysteria! Let’s not forget that the myth a flying saucer crashed in the desert of Roswell, New Mexico in 1947, was sparked by the crash of a modified weather balloon which was part of Project Mogul. The incident happened in early July and further fueled the “flying saucer” wave that began the previous month. At the time the U.S. military was happy to entertain ideas that the debris was from space aliens, as it deflected from real reason for the balloon’s presence — to detect an acoustic signature of an atmospheric Soviet atomic detonation.
The early media reports on Chinese spy balloons have given way to a recent flurry of articles speculating on the possibility that space aliens may be involved. Fueling this shift is the release of a new U.S. Government report that notes that of several hundred UFO incidents investigated, a small number cannot be explained. Listing reports as “unsolved” and “unidentified”, of course, doesn’t mean that they are ETs; it only means that there is insufficient data to be able to make a more definitive assessment at this time. However, such ambiguity is likely to fuel further speculation and reports.
At a time when our civilization is facing threats from global warming and political conflicts, it is not surprising that people are gravitating toward UFOs — which for many is code for extraterrestrial spacecraft. Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung looked upon the appearance of “flying saucers” as a modern myth in the making involving the appearance of “technological angels” that coincided with an increasingly secular age. It would be comforting to think that saviours from our skies will someday make contact, share their technology, and elevate us to the immortal realm of the gods. Until then, we need to look to human ingenuity and science if we are to survive our current predicament.
About the AuthorRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
References Bartholomew, Robert E. (1991). “The Quest for Transcendence: An Ethnography of UFOs in America.” Anthropology of Consciousness 2(1):1–12. * Bekhterev, Vladimir Mikhailovich. (1910). La Suggestion (Translated from Russian by D P Keraval). Paris: Boulangé, p. 76. * Bullard, Thomas E. (1982). Mysteries in the Eye of the Beholder: UFOs and Their Correlates as a Folkloric Theme Past and Present. Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University Folklore Department, pp. 10–11. * “’ENEMY GAS’: Harmless Balloons Start Rumours.” Manchester Guardian, February 8, 1940, p. 7. * Evans, Hilary, and Bartholomew, Robert E. (2009). “The Russian Poland Balloon Scare.” In Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior. New York: Anomaly Boks, p. 546. * Holman, Bret (2009). “The Phantom Balloon Scare of 1892.” Airminded: Air Power and British Society accessed at: https://airminded.org/2009/07/11/the-phantom-balloon-scare-of-1892/. * Holman, Bret (2010). “The Red Balloon Scare of 1940.” Airminded: Air Power and British Society accessed at: https://airminded.org/2010/02/12/the-red-balloon-scare-of-1940/ * Jung, Carl (1959). Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Sky. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. * Martinez, Luis (2023). New UFO Report Shows Hundreds More Incidents Than Previously Thought. January 13. ABC News (NY). * Vinter, Robyn (2023). “Prepare for Wave of Extraterrestrial Sightings in UK, Say UFO Experts.” The Guardian*, February 14.
After devoting many years to the scientific study of women’s heterosexual experiences—through reading, observing, listening, and participating— I have drawn a few conclusions:
- Many women like sex when it brings erotic pleasure and they like the guy. This is called “good sex.”
- Many women don’t like sex when the guy is a dork, rude, thoughtless, clumsy, coercive, or violent. This is called “bad sex.”
- Many women enjoy hookups, short affairs, conference connections, orgies (planned and spontaneous), and adventures with multiples and variations of all kinds. This is called “having fun.”
- Many #3 women get tired after a few years (“Oh God, Murray, another orgy?”), whereas others make it a way of life. This is called “being in the lifestyle.”
- Many women prefer sex with one doting partner at a time, the “time” lasting from as long as love does, from a week to a lifetime. This is called “a loving relationship.”
In every era, there are people who devote their energies to telling women they’re doing it all wrong. Are you enjoying monogamy with your sweetheart when others all around you are claiming that it is liberating, feminist, and “sex positive” to have many partners? Are you hopelessly straight or gay, or a hopelessly old-fashioned one-partner-at-a-time person, even though you think that for political, personal, or progressive reasons you really ought to be trying the alternatives? Are you enjoying your many affairs when others all around you are claiming that women aren’t designed for infidelity, that you’re merely capitulating to the Playboy standard, that you’re repressing the trauma of all those impersonal adventures, that you’re just a dupe and victim of hardwired male sexual preferences? Like a call-and-response in music or church, whichever view is ascendant will call for its inevitable antithetical response. Sex writers are always pouncing on a new hook, even when today’s new is yesterday’s old.
Today’s hook is this: if it’s good to be sex-positive, how come so many women are having sex-negative experiences? Why so much unwanted sex, harassments, miserable hookups, drunken episodes? Why the eternal difficulties in communication? Why do many women feel obliged to “consent,” when they’d rather go home and play with the dog? A spate of recent books locates the answers in the failure of feminism and the “unfinished” sexual revolution to make women’s sexual lives a thing of beauty and a joy forever. These include Nona Willis Aronowitz’s Bad Sex: Truth, Pleasure, and an Unfinished Revolution; Christine Emba’s Rethinking Sex: A Provocation; and Louise Perry’s The Case Against the Sexual Revolution. To these I’ll add an essay by the self-admitted reformed “slut” Bridget Phetasy, in her substack essay “Beyond Parody,” which, unfortunately, isn’t.
To her credit, Nona Willis Aronowitz does not write an analysis of women’s continuing search for sexual ecstasy, satisfaction, and thoughtful male partners as if no one had done so before. That would have been a challenge, given that her own mother, the brilliant feminist Ellen Willis, tackled these questions a generation earlier, and her daughter interweaves her mother’s writings and experiences, along with those of other feminists of that era, with her own stories. But whereas her mother’s generation (and mine) emphasized that the personal is political, Willis Aronowitz’s mantra is the political is personal. Personal? TMI is an understatement. Indeed, readers may be forgiven for asking,
What bad sex? The book is a litany of the many orgasms she’s had, hours and hours of cunnilingus with this lover and that one, anal oral sideways multiples, the fantastic lovers, the terrible lovers, how she loves dick, experiments with other women, passionate weekends. The “bad sex” of the title is mostly “bad relationships” — hookups with men who were selfish or otherwise unlikeable, or, in the case of the partner she leaves at the outset of her story, relationships that had become sexually boring. Here it all is again, yet another woman trying to find the blissful balance between committed sex and casual sex—open relationships being necessary for anyone who believes that monogamy is death to being a fully sexually liberated person. Calling Dr. Ester Perel and the innumerable marriage counselors who study the shapeshifting patterns of intimacy, passion, and desire over the course of life and love.
As I read this book, I wondered how the same narrative would sound if written by a man:
I left my otherwise loving partner, whom I loved, because I got bored with her and our sex life, and I didn’t like her off-putting smell that ruined our sexual chemistry. I’m happy to report other intimate details about her that annoyed me, but I won’t bother you with her perspective on me. I will tell you about my many lovers so you will understand how desirable I am, including that amazing afternoon in which I received one blow job after another. I confess that certain body shapes and sizes turn me on. Unfortunately, along with the hot women I couldn’t get enough of, at least until I tired of them, I hooked up with some awful women too—demanding, rude, noncommunicative about their desires, egocentric. Wait: one of those impersonal hookups was a very nice person.
When women reveal every nuance of their sexual experiences, why is that considered feminist analysis, and when men do it (not that they could find a publisher nowadays for such unapologetic braggadocio) it’s called narcissistic misogyny?
Bridget Phetasy spends a lot of energy berating herself for her past experiences. “I regret being a slut,” she begins, and what ensues, for this Catholic girl who grew up marinating in religious shame and guilt over sex and her body, is mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. Apart from her first love in high school and her first husband, “of the dozens of men I’ve been with (at least the ones I remember), I can only think of a handful I don’t regret.” The rest were meaningless or mediocre partners in drunken encounters who left her “feeling empty and demoralized.” She tried not to care about being ghosted, about the blackouts, about her anxiety when the man didn’t call; but of course she did. To cope, she put on a carapace of the cold male stereotype and told herself she was liberated. “I wanted to be able to have meaningless sex like a guy,” she writes, “but it didn’t work.” (At least she realizes it doesn’t work for a lot of men either.) “Casual sex is fraught with insecurity and miscommunication,” she writes, as if committed sex were free of both. The reader may wonder why, after the first few dozen demoralizing, drunken encounters Phetasy didn’t think of finding something else to do with her lonely nights, perhaps taking up pingpong. Never mind; her confessional has the requisite happy ending: a blissful second marriage and a baby girl.
Cue Louise Perry’s The Case Against the Sexual Revolution, which could have been published in the 1960s (and was, in one form or another), as her chapter titles reveal:
- Sex must be taken seriously.
- Men and women are different.
- Some desires are bad.
- Loveless sex is not empowering.
- Consent is not enough.
- Violence is not love.
- Marriage is good.
I wonder if these writers have seen the hookup requirements that women on some dating apps specify. They are very specific about the sexual pleasure they want, and it has nothing to do with enduring connections.
Perry’s book is an exemplar of “difference feminism,” the strand of feminism which, for centuries, has regarded women as the weaker sex and men as the violent sex, holding that differences in sexual drive, proclivities, and satisfactions are embedded in human nature. It is unfortunate that Perry is not up to date on the voluminous findings from evolutionary biology showing that the vast majority of females of many species, including ours, are sexually adventurous, having many partners, and that females of many species, including ours, are plenty violent and aggressive [see Lucy Cooke’s Bitch, which I reviewed in Skeptic (27.3), 2022: “What Darwin Got Wrong About the Female of (All) Species”]. As for her claims that “The research is clear” that “Men are (on average) far more interested than women are in casual sex,” we need to ask: what research? What century? What is the sample? College students? Lifestyle conferences? Bumble? Mormons? Rock groupies? Wives of the Taliban?
Perry argues that the sexual revolution liberated women from “the burdens of chastity” (in fact, premarital chastity was on its way out in the Victorian era) but left in its wake “the triumph of the playboy.” Without a moral consensus that “loveless sex” is unethical, bad, immoral, and probably fattening, women had no reason to say no. (Other than, of course, “No, I don’t want to.”) Accordingly, says Perry, today they are saying yes too often and for the wrong reasons, and they are agreeing to sexual acts they dislike, including choking, anal sex, rough sex, and S&M. Christine Emba, who converted to Catholicism and found salvation in Andrea Dworkin’s bitter, puritanical tirades, concurs that women’s sexual woes stem from the “anything goes” attitude that pervades modern sexual norms: as long as you have consent, every behavior is, literally, up for grabs. True sexual pleasure requires authentic, enduring connections, these women argue, which are not to be found on dating apps or through bar hopping.
I’m sure their observations are true for plenty of women, but I wonder if these writers have seen the hookup requirements that women on some dating apps specify. They are very specific about the sexual pleasure they want, and it has nothing to do with enduring connections: “Looking for BBC, or don’t bother;” “seeking Big Dick energy;” “don’t expect to hear from me tomorrow.” And let’s not forget Cardi B’s WAP.
The problem for anyone trying to assess the sexual landscape today, therefore, is that it is divided into territories, some with high walls shielding them from their scandalous (or prudish) neighbors. Sociologists speak of “sexual markets” in which people shop for partners, as they would shop in different markets for preferred foods, according to their sexual orientation, lovemaking desires, ethnicity, race, age, gender, and, apparently, penis preferences. But most sex-book writers tend to focus on one market in particular, which makes any advice they offer seem bizarre if not entirely alien to readers across the wall. Some find the WAP music video vulgar, demeaning, and ugly, others find it playful and funny, the very epitome of an exuberant sex-positivity. (Google the lyrics or watch the video and see for yourself.)
Still, that’s no reason not to write with concern about women who are having sex for problematic reasons. But that’s not news. For decades feminist scholars have been identifying the extrinsic reasons that many women agree to sex: not wanting to lose the relationship; feeling obligated once the partner had spent time and money on them; feeling guilty about not doing what the partner wants or demands; being too shy or embarrassed to say “I want outta here” (looking at you, Aziz Ansari); or wanting to avoid conflict and quarrels. But men also have sex for extrinsic reasons: peer pressure, inexperience, a desire for popularity, or a fear of seeming unmasculine. In studies they report having sex to gain status, enhance their reputation (e.g., because the partner was normally “out of my league”), or get tangible benefits (such as a promotion). They, too, just like women, come to regret having had impersonal hookups with women who turn out to be creepy, a little crazy, selfish…
What is different today, as social scientists and mental health professionals have amply documented, is the extent of alienation, loneliness, sexual confusion, and social despair that afflict many young people and the rise of psychological health problems among teenagers and young adults. The old ways of meeting and mating, with your family and friends vetting your choices and, when your heart was broken, introducing you to their brother-in-law’s sister’s uncle’s cousin, are mostly gone. After college, prospects of finding a serious partner at work have dimmed, what with HR’s Sex Police monitoring your relationships for any sign of a power imbalance or verboten erotic attachment.
Given such complexities, the solutions that these books offer to counteract the supposed fallout from the sexual revolution are sensible but banal: don’t ignore your gut feelings, don’t let any man pressure you into doing anything you don’t want to do, be wary of sexually aggressive men, don’t use dating apps. Perry goes full puritan: don’t have sex with a new boyfriend for at least a few months, and only then if you think he would make a good father to your children (a test not necessarily of his sperm quality but of his trustworthiness). “Just say no” didn’t work in reducing drug use, either.
Such good old-fashioned motherly advice has its place, but it entirely ignores the social and online environments in which most couples today meet and live. It ignores the pull of social comparisons, peer pressure, marketing influences, and Influencer influences. It ignores the role of playful affairs and experimental relationships in teaching participants what they do enjoy as well as what they don’t. Phetasy might be full of regrets now, but I bet she learned a lot about herself and about men from those many experiences, and that one day she will be telling her granddaughter about her lusty, bawdy, naughty years. Or revealing all to the readers of her best-selling memoir, Just Say Yes.
And so: how to finish this “unfinished sexual revolution”? It’s an absurd phrase, because no revolution is ever finished, and many regress—as we all have painfully learned with the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade, with sex books being banned, access to reproductive rights and abortion on the ropes, and evangelical Christianity on the warpath. And yet these writers inadvertently suggest ways of continuing, or retrieving, the goals of their foremothers: by restoring the concept of responsibility and toning down the victim narrative. It’s a shame that “responsibility” has become a politically polarized term, too often used by finger-wagging conservative moralists. Its feminist relevance at the dawn of the modern sexual revolution, when women were organizing to “take back the night” and enjoying plenty of those nights, became buried in the ascendance of the victim, in which every bad thing that happens to a woman is attributed 100 percent to the patriarchy or toxic masculinity. Don’t regret a bad encounter or a relationship that you chose or that you stayed in; sue the bastard.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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In the 1990s, victim feminists were already endorsing a view of female passivity when they warned of men “getting” women drunk and “taking advantage” of them sexually. In The Morning After, Katie Roiphe complained about this view of woman as an inert vessel the man pours liquor into. Where is her agency, her choice? Why, asked Roiphe, aren’t college women being taught to be responsible for their own intake of alcohol? She was excoriated for not knowing the right answer: because that would be victim blaming. No, it isn’t; we still get to throw the book at rapists and we still get to try to reform patriarchal institutions and customs.
So I take it as good signs for feminism that Perry advises women not to get drunk with men they don’t know and that Phetasy freely admits her regrets. Any sexual revolution worth its salt requires women, and men, to take responsibility not only for the decisions that prove wise and satisfying but also those that turn out foolish or hurtful. As my own liberated foremothers would have said, that’s life.
About the AuthorCarol Tavris, PhD, is a social psychologist and writer. She has written hundreds of articles, book reviews, and op-eds on many topics in psychological science. Her books include Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), with Elliot Aronson; Estrogen Matters; and The Mismeasure of Woman. A Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, she has received numerous awards for her efforts to promote science and skepticism, including an award from the Center for Inquiry’s Independent Investigations Group; and an honorary doctorate from Simmons College for her work in promoting critical thinking and gender equity.
Science and religion present two paradoxes in the United States. On the one hand, the U.S. is the undisputed world leader in science. Yet, the U.S. is also the wealthy industrialized country with the most widespread skepticism about science, most notably regarding climate change, vaccines, and evolution.1, 2, 3 How can those two seemingly incompatible facts be reconciled?
The other paradox is that both in the U.S. and in Europe, people’s adherence to religion has an average tendency to decrease with their income and with their educational level.4, 5, 6 Yet the U.S. is the most religious wealthy industrialized nation, despite its high average per-person income and educational level.7 How can those two seemingly incompatible facts be reconciled?
Are those two paradoxes somehow linked? Does one paradox help to explain the other? Now more than ever, these are urgent questions. For example, denial of evolution is widespread in the U.S., at a time when rapid evolution of coronaviruses has already killed a million Americans, most of whom rejected scientists’ advice to protect themselves by using masks and getting vaccinated.
What’s distinctive about science in the U.S. when compared against the most nearly similar countries in Western Europe?
Comparing the United States and EuropeSince around 1960, the U.S. has been winning far more Nobel Prizes in science than any other country, and even more than the rest of the world’s countries combined. Young foreign scientists come to the U.S. for training. However, you may be surprised to learn how recent is that U.S. domination. In the 18th and 19th centuries, science was entirely dominated by Europe. The great founders of modern chemistry, physics, biology, and medical science were all Europeans: Darwin, Newton, Faraday, Helmholtz, Maxwell, Pasteur, and others. Of course, already then, the U.S. was beginning to contribute to applied science, engineering, and invention: think of Eli Whitney’s cotton gin, Robert Fulton‘s steamboats, and Thomas Edison’s many creations. Still, the U.S. barely figured in basic science. European scientists did not then come to the U.S. for training—instead, American scientists went to Europe for training.
Nobel prizes in science offer a simple measure of U.S. science’s trajectory. From the first Nobel awards in 1901 until 1930, Americans accounted for only four of the 95 Nobel science laureates. (All but two of the others were Europeans). The U.S.’ share was still only 28 percent in the 1930s, rising to 46 percent in 1943–1958 and, finally, 57 percent from 1959 onwards. That postwar rise was funded by the establishment of our National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950. (Germany’s equivalent, the Kaiser- Wilhelm Gesellschaft, was founded already in 1911).
Europe’s early lead over the U.S. in science is unsurprising. On the one hand, European science was stimulated by European overseas exploration from 1492 onwards, discovering previously unknown lands, plants, animals, and constellations. On the other hand, the young independent U.S. was instead preoccupied with developing its economy, and with exploring and settling North America. At that time, basic science would have been an expensive distraction for the U.S.
That recency of American scientific literacy helps explain why understanding of science has still not penetrated large sections of the American public. For example, 26 percent of Americans still believe that the Sun revolves around the Earth, despite evidence to the contrary amassed by Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler four centuries ago.8 As well, 40 percent of Americans, including 13 percent of American public high-school biology teachers, still don’t believe in human evolution, and an additional 38 percent believe that humans evolved under God’s guidance.1, 2, 3 Then there are the 60 percent of Americans who believe that dinosaurs died out within the last 10,000 years, and, astonishingly, one-third of those Americans believe that dinosaurs died out as recently as a century ago.9
What’s Distinct About the United StatesNow, let’s turn to three distinctive features of religion in the U.S. compared with the rest of the world, especially Western Europe: high religious commitment, high religious diversity, and strength of fundamentalism.
First, many studies have measured religious commitment in many ways, such as by polling people.10 Comparisons within or between nations show that religious commitment tends to decrease with income and with level of education and has recently been decreasing both in the U.S. and in Western Europe.1, 4, 5 (Obviously, these are average trends, full of exceptions at both the individual level and the national level; e.g., many rich, educated people are religious.)
There are three distinctive features of religion in the U.S., compared with the rest of the world, especially Western Europe: high religious commitment, high religious diversity, and strength of fundamentalism.
The U.S. is a flagrant exception to this trend at the national level. We have the highest average income-per-person, and one of the highest levels of education, among countries with populations exceeding 10 million (i.e., excluding rich micro-nations such as Luxembourg). That would lead one to expect low average religious commitment in the U.S. In fact, measures of religious commitment are nearly twice as high in the U.S. as in Western European countries, among which only Ireland rivals us.7
Second, the U.S. is unusually heterogeneous in its religious affiliations. Even the most numerous U.S. religious denomination, Catholicism, accounts for only 20 percent of the U.S. population, and U.S. Protestants are divided into over a dozen major groups. In contrast, in European countries, either a single religion is overwhelmingly dominant (e.g., Catholics in Italy, Lutherans in Norway), or else there are just a few major religions (e.g., Catholics and Lutherans in Germany). Related to that religious homogeneity of European countries, many of them have or until recently had an established national church recognized by the government (e.g., the Church of England, Italy’s Catholic Church, and Sweden’s Evangelical Lutheran Church). That would be unthinkable in the U.S.
Three reasons for the U.S.’ religious heterogeneity are obvious. One is our nation’s early history as colonies settled by religious minorities such as the Pilgrims and the Quakers, who sought freedom from established national churches.11, 12 Another reason is the subsequent diverse immigrant streams into the U.S., resulting in a population far more diverse than in any other country with an advanced economy. A third reason is the U.S.’ proliferation of newly founded religions that have attracted many converts, such as the Mormons, the Seventh-day Adventists, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses.13, 14, 15
A speculative further reason for our religious heterogeneity is our federal system of government, which leaves responsibility for education fragmented among state and local governments. In contrast, Western European countries concentrate power in a central government in the national capital, which has nation-wide responsibility for education and (surprisingly to Americans) mandates the teaching of religion in schools (though European parents may choose for their children to opt out of religion classes or to choose the particular religion taught).
The U.S.’ religious heterogeneity includes the remaining distinctive feature of its religion, one that is important for U.S. science. That’s the strength, unparalleled in Europe, of fundamentalist Protestant religions whose doctrines include literal interpretation of the Bible, the Bible’s absolute correctness, implicit rejection of science, and belief in the imminence of Christ’s return.16, 17
We suggest that the U.S.’ religious history and diversity provide much of the explanation for the paradox of our high religious commitment, contrary to expectations based on income and education. Americans have now, and have had from colonial times, many different choices of religious affiliation between competing proselytizing religions and less mainstream organized forms of worship. With all of those options available for how to be religious, a large fraction of religious Americans take their own religion seriously. Our proliferation of choices strengthens religious commitment in the U.S.
In Western Europe, on the other hand, Catholics and Protestants fought bloody wars many centuries ago. They ended up in each country with a single national church, or else with just a few dominant churches that have been at equilibrium for a long time, and that no longer try to proselytize from each other. Religious affiliation in each Western European country has become “just” part of the national culture and identity package. One is born into one’s religion along with one’s language and culture, rather than one’s religion being a matter of separate individual choice.
As a matter of course, most Europeans have their children baptized, celebrate major religious holidays, and marry and die in the church—but otherwise don’t often attend church, don’t explore alternative religions, and don’t tell pollsters that religion plays a large and conscious role in their lives. Conflict between religion and science is mild or non-existent.
Why Skepticism Towards Science?Why, then, is skepticism towards science widespread in the U.S.?1, 2, 6 We view part of the reason as a distinctive feature of U.S. religion: the U.S. is unique among developed countries in its widespread rejection of science by religious people. Religious Americans are distinctive in considering morality as resting on divine authority.18 Because religious Americans thus tend to associate religion with morality, and science with immoral atheism, those two beliefs contribute to American rejection of science.19 Neither of those two beliefs prevails in Western Europe. (We reiterate that these are average national characteristics emerging from surveys of thousands of people in each country. Of course, those characteristics don’t apply to every American or to every European).
A special feature of U.S. religion relevant to our discussion is the high percentage of fundamentalists among religious Americans—far higher than in Europe.16, 17 Insistence on the truth of a literal interpretation of the Bible is incompatible with science.2 While mainstream U.S. churches accept evolution, fundamentalists are especially vocal in rejecting it (cf. the Scopes trial and so-called “creation science” along with its descendent “intelligent design” theory).20, 21
However, U.S. religion is only part of the reason for U.S. skepticism towards science. The other major reason that we recognize is rooted in the U.S.’ deep commitment to the ideal of democracy (though not always to the realization of that ideal), and in the U.S.’ rejection of authority. The U.S. was founded as a nation on the ideal that “all men [sic] are created equal.” The second sentence of our Declaration of Independence asserted that ideal to be a self-evident truth. That ideal served as the basis for American democratic government, contrasting with the ideal of authority and inequality as the bases for European governments at the time of our independence. Distrust of authority, and of those who claim special expertise, permeates American society. We are a hyperdemocracy, not just a democracy.
That egalitarian ideal of ours has many manifestations lacking in modern Europe—to the mutual astonishment of Americans and Europeans when they become aware of those differences. A homely manifestation is that American politicians portray themselves as just ordinary people, by adopting nicknames as their official names (Bill Clinton, Joe Biden), and never using the title of Dr. X if they have a PhD. No European politician would adopt a nickname or conceal an earned doctorate degree.
A more consequential manifestation of our egalitarian ideal is American trial by jury, based on our claimed right to be judged guilty or non-guilty by a jury of our peers. We tolerate a professional judge to manage a trial and to pass sentence, but not to judge guilt. While trial by jury may have originated long ago in England, today 90 percent of all jury trials in the world take place in the U.S.; jury trials are now exceptional in England. They are non-existent in other European countries, where cases are instead decided by a judge unassisted by a jury.
Although Americans hold that everyone is created equal, the cruel fact is that people end up very unequal. Some people have much more knowledge and imagination than do other people. In particular, scientists know far more about their specialty than do laypeople. That reality is taken for granted in Europe but causes much discomfort and denial in the U.S.
Within recent decades, the U.S.’ historical rejection of scientists and other knowledgeable authority figures has increased markedly. That rejection is formally justified by the expression “alternative facts.” Blogs, podcasts, and social media companies now serve the democratization of information, by allowing anyone to disseminate their views without any gatekeeper.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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However, science, in essence, is the discovery and explanation of the real world’s facts. There are no alternative facts. Policies based on untruths are doomed to failure—regardless of whether those policies result from religious beliefs, or from a broader rejection of authority.
Are these questions of the origins of American skepticism about science just a matter of academic interest? Absolutely not! American skepticism reduces Congress’ willingness to vote funding of science and increases retaliation against individual scientists who express unpopular views. But science’s value has been accelerating in modern times. Countries that invest heavily in science acquire power and wealth out of proportion to their population. The countries choosing to make those investments include not only countries less populous than the U.S. (such as Finland and Israel), but now also China, the world’s most populous country. Hence the U.S. faces a bleak future if many Americans remain skeptical of science.
About the AuthorJared Diamond is a Pulitzer-Prizewinning author of six best-selling books, translated into 44 languages, about human societies and human evolution: Guns, Germs, and Steel; Collapse; Why Is Sex Fun?; The Third Chimpanzee; The World Until Yesterday; and Upheaval. As a professor of geography at UCLA, he is known for his breadth of interests, which involves conducting research and teaching in three other fields: the biology of New Guinea birds, digestive physiology, and conservation biology. His prizes and honors include the U.S. National Medal of Science and election to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.
Carol Bakhos is a Professor of Religion and of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at UCLA. Since 2012, she has served as Chair of the Study of Religion interdisciplinary program and Director of the Center for the Study of Religion. She is the author of Islam and Its Past, edited with Michael Cook; The Family of Abraham: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Interpretations; and Ishmael on the Border: Rabbinic Portrayals of the First Arab, winner of a Koret Foundation Award. She is currently editing Emerging Judaism, the second of the 10-volume Posen Jewish Anthology of Culture and Civilization (Yale University Press).
Alex Joyce-Johnson is a research associate to Jared Diamond who received his BA from UCLA in 2021 with a major in geography. He has traveled extensively to six continents and spent five years living in the Hague and two years in Rome. In February of 2023, he will join the Barque Picton Castle, a three-masted sailing ship, on the 4-month South Pacific leg of its voyage around the world.
References1. https://bit.ly/3BBLac8 2. Miller, J., Scott, E., & Okamoto, S. (2006). Public Acceptance of Evolution. Science, 313, 765–766. 3. Berkman, M., & Plutzer, E. (2011). Defeating Creationism in the Courtroom, but Not in the Classroom. Science, 331, 404–405. 4. Storm, I. (2017). Does Economic Insecurity Predict Religiosity? Evidence From the European Social Survey 2002–2014. Sociology of Religion: a Quarterly Review, 78 (2), 146–172. 5. https://bit.ly/3qyYQyn 6. Blancke, S., Hjermitslev, H., Braeckman, J., & Kjaergaard, P. (2013). Creationism in Europe: Facts, Gaps, and Prospects. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 81(4), 996–1028. 7. https://bit.ly/3qB4AHL 8. https://bit.ly/3ddOwsu 9. https://bit.ly/3QI2gcL 10. https://bit.ly/3RG5sXF 11. Stark, R., & Finke, R. (1988). American Religion in 1776: A Statistical Portrait. Sociological Analysis, 49(1), 39–51. 12. Pyle, R., & Davidson, J. (2003). The Origins of Religious Stratification in Colonial America. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42(1), 57–75. 13. Jenkins, P. (2000). Mystics and Messiahs: Cults and New Religions in American History. New York: Oxford University Press. 14. Abanes, R. (2002). One Nation Under Gods: A History of the Mormon Church. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows. 15. Urban, H. (2015). New Age, Neopagan, and New Religious Movements: Alternative Spirituality in Contemporary America. Oakland: University of California Press. 16. https://pewrsr.ch/3S3EzN6 17. Martin, J. (2010). Compatibility of Major U.S. Christian Denominations With Evolution. Evolution and Education Outreach, 3, 420–431. 18. Simpson, A., Piazza, J., & Puos, K. (2016). Belief in Divine Moral Authority: Validation of a Shortened Scale With Implications for Social Attitudes and Moral Cognition. Personality and Individual Differences, 94, 256–265. 19. Simpson, A., & Puos, K. (2019). Is Science for Atheists? Perceived Threat to Religious Cultural Authority Explains U.S. Christians’ Distrust in Secularized Science. Public Understanding of Science, 28(7), 740–758. 20. Larson, E. 1997. Summer of the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 21. Allen, F. (1931). Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen Twenties. New York: Harper and Row.
Jens is in his late sixties. He lives in a cozy house on a quiet street in a mid-sized city on the east coast of Jutland, Denmark. He’s many things: a widower, a lover of art and music, a retired radio journalist and social worker, a father, and an atheist.
As for that last part of his identity—the utter lack of any belief in a God—it isn’t all that important to him. Being secular in contemporary Denmark, one of the least pious nations in the world, is simply no big deal. But when I came to his house one sunny, cold morning to interview him for my research, he took the time to actively ponder his lack of religiosity and reflect about how distinct his naturalistic worldview is from that of his forbearers. As he explained, his four grandparents were all “real believers.” What about his parents? Yes, they were religious, too, “but less so.” And as for Jens’s siblings: “my younger brother is a very hard atheist, and my sister and my elder brother are more agnostics.”
In short: Jens’ grandparents were deeply faithful, his folks were religious—but much less so than the grandparents— and today, he and his three siblings are all non-believers. This generational decline of religiosity in Jens’ family is nothing remarkable in Scandinavia today.1 It is, in fact, the norm. Every single indicator of religion in Denmark has plummeted over the course of the last century, from church attendance, baptisms, and confirmations to belief in God, belief in heaven and hell, and belief in the literal truth of the Bible.
This historical process, whereby religion weakens and fades in society, is known as secularization.
SecularizationThe early founders of sociology—Europeans such as Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber—could sense religion’s impending demise, at least within their own corner of the world. They spoke of a growing “disenchantment” within modern society and the dying away of old gods. However, they didn’t have much in the way of data to support their predictions. Today, we have data aplenty, and what they reveal is unambiguous, and in some instances quite precipitous, decline of religion throughout not only Europe, but much of the wider world.
To measure and illustrate religious decline, you need two things: (1) clear indicators of religiosity that can be measured, and (2) longitudinal data that reveal trends over time. In my latest book, Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society, co-authored with Dr. Isabella Kasselstrand and Dr. Ryan Cragun, both are provided. For measures of religious decline, we focus on the “three Bs:” belief, behavior, and belonging. That is: belief in supernatural entities (God, for example); behavior in terms of religious activities such as praying, going to church, baptizing, etc.; and belonging in terms of basic self-identification, that is, seeing oneself as a Catholic, Lutheran, Muslim, and so forth, or just simply being a member of a religious congregation or community. For longitudinal data, we draw on numerous national and international surveys going back many decades, which allow us to chart observable trends over time. Nearly all of them point in the same direction—downwards.
North America
Belief in God in the U.S. is at an all-time low:2 back in the 1940s, 96 percent of Americans believed in God, while today it is down to 81 percent; more interestingly, the percentage of Americans who strongly believe in God without any doubt has fallen from 62 percent in 1990 to 50 percent3 today. Church membership is also at an all-time low:4 in the 1940s 75 percent of Americans were members of a church, but today it is down to 47 percent. Finally, more Americans than ever do not identify5 as having any religion at all: nearly 30 percent.
In Canada, religious identification is also at an alltime low: In the 1960s, 50 percent of Canadians reported attending church on a weekly basis; by 2015, that was down to 10 percent;6 in the 1970s, only four percent of Canadians said that they had no religion, but today, that is up to 29 percent;7 In 1985, 84 percent of Canadians said they believed in God; that number had dropped to 59 percent8 in 2020.
Latin America
Although much more religious than their neighbors to the North, Latin Americans have still exhibited notable signs of secularization9 in recent decades. Consider the example of Chile: In 1998, only five percent of Chileans did not identify with any religion, while today it is up to 22 percent; In 1998, 91 percent said they believed in God and 75 percent in life after death, but in 2018 those percentages had slipped down to 87 percent and 68 percent, respectively; in 1990, 20 percent said that they were “not a religious person,” but that was up to 42 percent in 2018.10 Rates of secularity are even higher in Uruguay,11 the most secularized nation in Latin America. Even very devout nations such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Brazil, have seen an uptick in secularity: back in 1996, less than two percent of the population of each country identified as nonreligious, but today it has increased to 15 percent, 14 percent, and 12 percent, respectively.12
Oceania
In Australia, back in the 1960s, less than one percent of the population claimed to have no religion, but today that is up to an all-time high of almost 40 percent;13 In 2003, 73 percent of people said that they held religious beliefs, but that was down to an all-time low of 53 percent14 as of 2020. In 1950, 44 percent of Australians attended religious services on a regular basis, but by 2016, only 16 percent15 of Australians were regular church attenders. In New Zealand, the percent of the population with no religion (49 percent) is—for the first time ever—higher16 than the percentage who identify as Christian (37 percent).
Europe
Rates of religious decline have been the most dramatic in Europe. As The Guardian17 reported in 2018, European nations today are best described as “post-Christian,” with a majority of young adults in twelve nations having no religious faith; the Czech Republic stands out, where a whopping 66 percent18 don’t believe in God, a historical high.
In Norway, not only are church membership and church attendance rates at all-time lows, but so too is theism: In 1991, 10 percent did not believe in God and 12 percent did not know if there was a God; by 2018, these figures had increased to 26 percent and 19 percent, respectively.19 Even more dramatic rates of rising secularity are found in Sweden and Denmark,20 where God belief, Jesus belief, baptism, belief in heaven and hell, church attendance, church membership, teen confirmation, frequency of prayer, Bible study, and every single other indicator of religiosity are at all-time lows.
In Britain, while 77 percent of adults believed in God back in 1967, that was down to 32 percent as of 2015; simultaneously, while 10 percent of British adults described themselves as “confident atheists” back in 1998, that figure was up to 26 percent in 2018.21 Similar indicators of religiosity, including those of belief, behavior, and belonging, are at all-time historic lows in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland.22
Things are even most interesting when looking at those Catholic European nations that seem to resist secularization. Take Ireland: In 2002, 65 percent attended weekly Mass, but that is down to 34 percent today; In 2002, four percent said they had “no religion,” but that is up to 32 percent today—with a whopping 54 percent of people between the ages of 16 and 29 being nonreligious.23 In Poland, those who maintain a religious faith went from 94 percent in 1992 down to 87 percent today; 70 percent attended church weekly back in 1992, but that is down to 43 percent today, and the percentage of Poles who are “nonpracticing” grew from nine percent in 1992 and is up to 24 percent today; in 2015, 15 percent of 18-to 24-year-olds were non-believers, that has almost doubled up to 28.6 percent today.24
Asia
It is tough to measure religiosity in the most populace nation on Earth, China, for two key reasons. First, like most of Asia, religion has been constructed and conceived much differently there than it has in the West, so typical Western measures of religiosity such as “church attendance,” “frequency of prayer” or “belief in God” don’t work. Secondly, China is a Communist Party dictatorship that is officially atheist, and religion is highly regulated and repressed, which means that Chinese people have a vested interest in keeping their true religious feelings hidden, especially if that would jeopardize their education, career, liberty, or life. Thus, while most surveys show that a majority of Chinese people are non-religious today—with many being explicit atheists—we can’t be sure if this reported high degree of secularity is accurate, or just how it has changed over time.25
However, many other Asian nations, with the notable exception of still strongly religious India, show unambiguous degrees of secularization. For example, in Japan, back in 1947, 71 percent of adults said that they held religious beliefs; that had dropped down to 23 percent by 2005.26 In South Korea, back in 1982, 47 percent said they had “no religion” and 31 percent defined themselves as “atheist” specifically, but those percentages had risen to 64 percent and 55 percent in 2018, respectively; the percentage of South Koreans who believe in the supernatural powers of deceased ancestors has also gone down, from 45 percent in 1940 to 18 percent today.27
Africa and Arabia
People in Africa and the Arab-speaking world are generally quite religious, and secularization is not evident in these parts world, save for a few indications here and there: back in 2013, 10 percent of Libyans and 13 percent of Tunisians said that they had no religion, but by 2019, those percentages had increased to 25 percent and 30 percent, respectively.28 Additionally, younger Arab adults are less religious than older adults. The percentage of 15-to-29 year-olds who claim to be religious is 42 percent in Iraq, 36 percent in Egypt, 33 percent in Yemen, 32 percent in Sudan, 28 percent in Palestine, 24 percent in Morocco, 23 percent in Lebanon, 22 percent in Jordan, and 15 percent in Algeria.29 And in sub-Saharan Africa, in the last twenty years, people in Ghana and Rwanda have ever so slightly decreased their weekly church attendance.30 Given the extensive poverty and existential insecurity that continue to plague Africa and much of the Arab-speaking world, it makes sense that religion remains strong there.
However, in most Western societies—and in many throughout the East—secularization is occurring,31 and mightily so. The wide variety of countries that have seen a decline in belief in God over the previous several decades is notable: Sweden, South Korea, the Netherlands, Estonia, Norway, Great Britain, Denmark, Hong Kong, France, Japan, New Zealand, Finland, Australia, Germany, Iceland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, the United States, India, Uruguay, Singapore, Italy, Chile, Canada, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Poland, Malaysia, Turkey, Colombia, and Indonesia all experienced declines of at least 2.5 percentage points; countries with a decrease of more than 20 percentage points include the Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Belgium, Sweden, Great Britain, Spain, New Zealand, the United States, Iceland, and South Korea. In some of these countries, the drop was truly dramatic: belief in God in Sweden declined from 60 percent in 1982 down to 36 percent in 2017; in Belgium, from 87 percent down to 61 percent in 2009. And more than half of the surveyed countries in the international data have seen regular religious attendance diminish over the past several decades, and many countries in Europe, North America, Latin America, and Asia have seen a drop in people belonging to or identifying with a religion over this same period.
Explaining SecularizationWhy does secularization occur? And why in some countries so dramatically, while not at all in others? There are at least five factors at work.
First: the overall transition from a traditional, rural, non-industrial way of life to a contemporary, urban, industrial (or post-industrial) way of life. This modernization process leads to greater differentiation in society, such as the separation of religion from various aspects of societies, institutions, or individuals, as well as the increased rationalization of society—the ordering of society based on technological efficiency, bureaucratic impersonality, and scientific and empirical evidence—both of which result in varying degrees of secularization.
Second: existential security. When people in a given society live in a state of fear, hunger, and overall precariousness, they tend to be more religious. Conversely, when people live in a society characterized by stability, safety, and overall well-being, they tend to be less religious. As extensive data32 provided by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris show, those nations that have strong economies, excellent social welfare programs, affordable housing, heavily tax-subsidized healthcare and education, democratic government, and low levels of corruption and crime, are among the most secularized—while those nations that lack such indicators of progress are the least secularized.
Third: religious pluralism. As sociologist Peter Berger explained,33 when there is one dominant religion maintaining a hegemonic monopoly over a given society, religion tends to be strong. However, when there are multiple religions existing side by side within society, overall religiosity of the population tends to weaken. This happens for many reasons, but the main one is this: in the religious monopoly situation—imagine, for example, a Portuguese island where everyone is Catholic— religion enjoys a taken-for-granted status, providing people with an uncontested religious worldview. By contrast, in a society where there are many different and distinct religions existing in the same geographical space, each maintaining that they have the ultimate truth while others are wrong, it creates an undermining “crisis of credibility” for all of them. It’s challenging to maintain an exclusive religious worldview, believing that you possess the one true faith and everyone else is wrong, when you live in a metropolitan environment with close friends, relatives, in-laws, and colleagues who hold different religious or even nonreligious worldviews.
Fourth: women working in the paid labor force. In societies where women are mostly sequestered into roles of unpaid domestic labor, religion tends to stay strong. However, as historian Callum Brown34 documents, those societies with high rates of women in the paid labor force tend to secularize. This occurs for various reasons, such as the fact that women, as mothers, tend to take on the role of socializing children into religion and keeping religious life afloat at home, but when women work outside of the home, they often don’t have the energy, time, or drive to keep it up, and fathers rarely take up the slack. Also, when women are paid for their labor, they experience increased autonomy and agency and thus have less of a need to rely on religious explanations or religious community support.
Fifth: education, literacy, and access to and use of the internet. It has long been established that as more people in a given society become better educated,35 and as a larger proportion of the population is able to read, religion tends to diminish. More recently, communications professors Greg Armfield and Lance Holbert have shown the degree to which internet access and use are corrosive36 to religion; by providing information that debunks religious claims, creating social networks and communities for budding skeptics and apostates, and by simply offering all that the internet provides, the world wide web undermines the overall social privilege and potency of religion.
When all five factors coincide, secularization is most acute. On top of such large-scale secularizing forces, however, there are always unique and idiosyncratic nation-specific causes, as well. For example, the public exposure of numerous scandals, crimes, abuses, rapes, and murders within the Catholic church in Ireland37 has led to a sharp increase of distinctly anti-religious secularity there. In the U.S.,38 the ever-intimate marriage between conservative, right-wing Republicans and Evangelical Christians has caused many mainline religious Americans to disaffiliate. In Iran,39 the marked growth of secularism among the younger generations is often a reaction against the despotic policies of the reigning Islamic dictatorship.
ConclusionIs secularization inevitable? No. If certain societies experience marked decreases in existential security— heightened poverty, political instability, climate crises, and so forth—we can expect religion to strengthen. Additionally, birth rates are key: religious people tend to have many more children than secular people, and highly religious societies tend to have much higher overall birthrates40 than highly secular societies. It is possible that the abundance of religious births could override current secularizing trends.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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As of right now, however, secularization is stronger than it has ever been—and it is gaining momentum throughout much of the world. In most modern societies, people are demonstrably less religious than their parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents were in the past. And for the first time in recorded history, we now have numerous societies— such as Scotland, Estonia, the Netherlands, Japan, Scandinavia, the Czech Republic, South Korea, France, Hungary, and Australia—wherein non-religious people outnumber religious people.
Whether we are talking about religious faith and belief, participation and behavior, or identification and belonging, the best available data show that, aside from the noted exceptions of the poorest, least stable nations, religiosity is receding, and more so than ever before.
About the AuthorPhil Zuckerman is Associate Dean at Pitzer College, Professor of Sociology, and the founding chair of the nation’s first Secular Studies Department. He is also the Executive Director of Humanist Global Charity, and the author of many books, including Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society (NYU Press, 2023) and What It Means to Be Moral: Why Religion Is Not Necessary for Living an Ethical Life (Counterpoint, 2019).
References1. https://bit.ly/3T0FGh3 2. https://bit.ly/3e69Pwp 3. https://bit.ly/3SCNCFk 4. https://bit.ly/3SDeeGg 5. https://pewrsr.ch/3M4zTES 6. https://bit.ly/3M8pYhj 7. https://pewrsr.ch/3Eh9TnL 8. https://bit.ly/3ElHKMj 9. https://econ.st/3VdQFWi 10. Kasselstrand, I., Zuckerman, P., & Cragun, R. (2023). Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society. New York University Press. 11. https://bit.ly/3SAWdIt 12. https://econ.st/3fFuIPu 13. https://ab.co/3Cy5UC1 14. https://bit.ly/3M3HROx 15. https://bit.ly/3C5n4Wh 16. https://bit.ly/3ygAa1T 17. https://bit.ly/2IBozyJ 18. https://pewrsr.ch/3RzUTVa 19. Kasselstrand, I., Zuckerman, P., & Cragun, R. (2023). 20. Zuckerman, P. (2020). Society Without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us About Contentment. New York University Press. 21. Kasselstrand, I., Zuckerman, P., & Cragun, R. (2023). 22. Bruce, S. (2013). Secularization. Oxford University Press. 23. https://bit.ly/3fIkxty 24. https://bit.ly/3C8jfj1 25. Zuckerman, P,. Galen, L., & Pasquale, F. (2016). The Nonreligious: Understanding Secular People and Societies. Oxford University Press. 26. Reader, I. (2012). Secularisation, R.I.P.? Nonsense! The ‘Rush Hour Away from the Gods’ and the Decline of Religion in Contemporary Japan. Journal of Religion in Japan 1(1): 7–36; see also Ishii, K. (2007). Dētabukku: Gendai nihon no shūkyō. Shinyōsha. 27. Kasselstrand, I., Zuckerman, P., & Cragun, R. (2023). 28. https://bbc.in/2X26KPk 29. https://bit.ly/3M4Ze1k 30. Kasselstrand, I., Zuckerman, P., & Cragun, R. (2023). 31. https://bit.ly/3yj0OqS 32. Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2011). Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge University Press. 33. Berger, P.L. (1990). The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Anchor. 34. Brown, C.G. (2009). The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization, 1800–2000. Routledge. 35. https://bit.ly/3yi0YhY 36. https://bit.ly/3e8D5mi 37. https://bit.ly/3SYY4Xg 38. Campbell, D.E., Layman, G.C., & Green, J.C. (2020). Secular Surge: A New Fault Line in American Politics. Cambridge Unviersity Press. 39. https://bit.ly/3SWR8tT 40. https://bit.ly/3M812Xs
In its 2022 Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) overturned the previous court decisions on abortion rights in Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). The 5–3 majority opinion stated that the substantive right to abortion was not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history or tradition,” nor considered a right when the Due Process Clause was ratified in 1868, and was unknown in U.S. law until Roe. (Chief Justice Roberts issued a separate Concurring Opinion).
The Dobbs decision has transferred the relevant issues on personhood and abortion rights to legislatures for resolution, whether they be state or federal.1, 2 So, unless one political party manages to dominate the federal government and Congress passes and the president signs a federal abortion law, each state is free to pass its own abortion law. In states where abortion is prohibited or severely restricted, some women who wish to end their pregnancies will have to travel to other states or even to other countries to get proper services, while others may even seek possibly unsafe “underground” abortions in their own states. The best solution to the ensuing inefficient, irrational, and dangerous patchwork of laws would be a reasonable and comprehensive abortion law passed by the federal government applicable to all 50 states. This essay presents not only a model for that law, but also offers a philosophical and scientific foundation upon which to base it.
Warring CampsFor the last 50 years views on abortion rights have been polarized in two warring camps—pro-life and pro-choice. Those taking the extreme in the pro-life position argue that a soul is inserted in the human organism at conception, that the organism becomes a person at this time and so possesses full human rights, and therefore abortion is immoral, equivalent to some degree of murder, and so should be illegal with no or few exceptions. Those taking an extreme pro-choice position argue that the human organism becomes a person only when it is removed from the mother and takes its first breath and that abortion, although regrettable, is morally acceptable and should be legal with no or few exceptions.
Each of these extreme positions, I submit, is irrational. For example, there is no good evidence for the existence of a soul or even for any god’s insertion of a soul at the exact moment of conception. As such, pro-life advocates believe that couples should have no right or opportunity to correct reproductive mistakes or contraceptive failures through the method of abortion. Pro-choice advocates, on the other hand, believe that the mother is either morally infallible in making decisions about abortion or should always be provided with “abortion on demand” even if she makes a moral mistake. These pro-choicers typically believe that nobody has any business in considering, discussing, or participating in abortion decisions except for the mother and her doctor. Many pro-choice radicals even totally exclude men from the abortion discussion, including male legislators and the male partner/father. These extreme positions are unreasonable and counter-productive.
TerminologyUnfortunately, during the past half century, as the pro-life and the pro-choice factions have battled each other, relevant terminology has suffered. Pro-life advocates have been particularly egregious in using inaccurate, unscientific, misleading, and propagandistic terms. For example, in her article in the special issue of Skeptic on abortion matters, Danielle D’Souza Gill continually referred to human organisms inside a woman as “the unborn.”3 Any living human organism inside a woman, however, has three possible outcomes—death in the womb or miscarriage, abortion or premature delivery, and birth or mature delivery. In fact, the first outcome is more likely than the other two.4, 5 So, why not call the indwelling organism “the unmiscarried”? Or to be more accurate, why not call it “the unmiscarried/unaborted/unborn”? Why does Ms. Gill and other extreme pro-life advocates insist upon the term “the unborn”? Because their goal is for every single one of these human organisms to be born, even if that goal were to be opposed by any individual woman who seeks an abortion. These radicals wish to impose their values, goals, and moral rules on all women through relevant laws and SCOTUS decisions. In their minds, every zygote is sacred.
Ms. Gill also referred to these indwelling human organisms as “babies.” Why does she do that? Because even though a human organism in the womb is certainly not a baby, she and her cohorts wish to emphasize the similarities of the zygote, embryo, or fetus to a baby, all in furtherance of their political agenda. (By “embryo” I mean an immature multi-celled human organism, from conception through eight weeks post conception. And by “fetus” I mean an immature multi-celled human organism with all prototypical organs and tissues, from nine weeks post conception until birth.) The worst abuse of language in this regard occurs with use of the terms “unborn baby” and “unborn child.” What’s next? Are adults “undead corpses”? Such language distortion does not constitute a valid philosophical argument for the pro-life position.
Any fair and accurate analysis and any reasonable ethics and legislation on abortion should disregard all the propaganda terms and use clear, accurate, and/or scientific terminology. Much follows from precise language.
To Codify or Not to Codify?Most pro-choice advocates, even the current president of the United States, support the passage of a new federal law that would codify the 1973 SCOTUS decision of Roe v. Wade.6 This would be a huge mistake. That decision was poorly conceived and articulated. Even the distinguished Supreme Court liberal, nominated by a Democrat President, the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg thought so.7 In the Roe decision, later reinforced by Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, the high court established a right to abortion on the crude insubstantial concepts of trimesters, viability, and privacy. It is convenient that 39 weeks, the length of a typical pregnancy, is divisible by three, but that’s a rather arbitrary fact on which to craft a SCOTUS decision on abortion.
Viability is an unreliable measure since it depends so much on specific medical technology and geography. A fetus viable at Cedars Sinai Hospital in Los Angeles would almost surely not be viable in a clinic in a remote village in Africa or even rural West Virginia. Further, people ought not be able to hide a harmful, unethical, and/or illegal act by claiming privacy. For example, secrecy ought not be a shield for murder, and as we know, radical pro-life advocates have long claimed that abortion is murder. Although overall, the Roe decision had beneficial effects on American society, the decision itself was poorly formed, and this might be one reason why it ultimately failed. A new federal law must improve upon the Roe decision, not simply copy or codify it.
A new morality, federal law, and/or SCOTUS decisions on abortion should discard old concepts such as trimesters, viability, privacy, and an absolute right to abortion on demand, and instead should be grounded in rational concepts such as personhood, rights to bodily autonomy, life, well-being, property, parental protection and supervision, and contracts. They should be precisely defined using unbiased terminology and grounded in the science of reproduction. Roe and Casey are obsolete and now invalidated. We need something stronger, more rational, and better articulated to put in their place.
The DefaultWith only five exceptions no law or regulation, federal or state, shall prevent or impede a host female from securing a safe and effective abortion of the zygote, embryo, or early fetus (ZEEF) inside her if she does not want to remain a host and/or care for a resulting baby. Thus, a robust right to abortion would be established as the default. This right to abortion is subsumed under a universal right to bodily autonomy. Here are the five exceptions to this robust right.
Exception 1: A host female seeking an abortion shall be required to obtain the procedure only from a licensed competent medical professional and shall be prohibited from obtaining one from unlicensed or incompetent service providers or those belonging to some “underground black market.” Abortions are relatively safe, even safer than pregnancies maintained to full term, when performed by competent and licensed medical staff.
Exception 2: A host female seeking an abortion shall be prohibited from obtaining the procedure if the ZEF inside her is a fetal person, except for good reasons of which there are only five. Pro-life advocates are correct on the importance of defining what a “human person” is. Federal and state laws and constitutions are mostly formulated to refer to persons, outlining what persons may or may not do and what rights persons have. The problem, however, is that pro-life advocates have always proposed irrational, unfounded, arbitrary, or ridiculous definitions of a “human person.” A cluster of cells shortly after conception is not a human person.
A human person is any living organism belonging to the species Homo sapiens that has acquired and currently possesses the capacity for consciousness, usually beginning at the end of the 24th week post conception. Since the brain is the organ that distinguishes humans from other animal species, it is absolutely essential that “human person” be defined by some emergent feature of the brain. Consciousness is the key feature, since other cognitive abilities and traits either depend on consciousness or are closely related to it. When the fetus becomes conscious for the first time, it then learns something for the first time, namely, what it’s like to be a human organism. Elsewhere, I have provided the full philosophical and scientific justification for this definition,8 so I will not repeat it here. Suffice it to say that a zygote, embryo, and early fetus are not persons by this precise definition, regardless of any similarity in gross appearance to a baby. Rights are assigned to persons, not nonpersons or potential persons.
Pro-life advocates do not take notice of the differences of categories such as human life, human organism, and human person. A single sperm, a single egg, or a living cell from any part of the human body is human life, but these are not human persons; they aren’t even human organisms. A zygote, embryo, and early fetus are clearly human organisms, but they still aren’t human persons because they lack the critical capacity for consciousness. Rights should be reserved for human persons. Jay Watts, a Christian pro-life advocate, asserts: “Any successful defense of abortion must define the unborn as less meaningful life.”9 True. The lives of zygotes, embryos, and early fetuses are indeed less meaningful than fetal persons and the women carrying them. Meaning and value are added or attributed once the human fetus acquires the capacity of consciousness.
When a fetus becomes a human person in the womb, it then acquires human rights just as the host female possesses those rights, and the most important rights for the fetal person are the rights to life, well-being, and parental protection. The host female should not be entitled to endanger these rights of the fetal person through abortion for frivolous or arbitrary reasons. She should have a “good” or a rational reason before being allowed to abort the person inside her. These reasons include:
- To protect the host female from death.
- To protect the host female from permanent injury.
- To protect the host female from unbearable intractable pain or suffering.
- To protect the fetal person from intractable pain or suffering.
- To hasten the death of any fetal person who is so damaged, disordered, deformed, or ill that it is less likely than not to survive for at least two years even with the best medical technology.
All other reasons presented to abort a fetal person shall be considered to be “bad” reasons and thus insufficient grounds to proceed with an abortion. These reasons include:
- “I’ve just changed my mind.”
- “I can’t stand this pregnancy anymore.”
- “I want to return to college.”
- “This baby came from a rape.”
- “My fetus has Down’s Syndrome.”
On the other hand, reasons that are bad, irrational, and insufficient to abort a fetal person may be rational and sufficient to abort a ZEEF (zygote-embryo-early fetus), and they usually are.
If a fetal person and its host female have equal rights to life, well-being, and liberty, then why should the host female be permitted to have an abortion whenever this act would harm the fetal person more than retention of the fetus would harm the host female? However, in conflict situations in which harm to the two is likely to be equal under opposite decisions, then it makes sense to give priority to the host female.
Prior to the fetus becoming a human person, a host female shall be entitled to get an abortion for almost any reason at all, although there are a few exceptions noted below. These reasons include:
- Pregnancy from rape, incest, or sexual trafficking.
- Already have enough or too many children.
- Lack of a partner or other social support.
- Lack of income, savings, or a job.
- Physical, mental, or drug problems.
- Severe defect, disease, or disorder in the ZEEF.
- Pregnancy too uncomfortable or risky.
- Insufficient parenting skills.
- Change in career plans.
- Strong social disapproval of pregnancy.
- Being abandoned by the male partner or one’s parents.
- Recent death in the family.
- Unplanned pregnancy from casual sex.
Exception 3: A surrogate female shall be prohibited from obtaining an abortion except for any reason stated in her written contract or otherwise for any of five good reasons, the same as those stated in exception 2. Persons should always keep the contracts, agreements, or promises they make, as long as those requirements are ethical and legal from the outset. Surrogate agreements almost always meet these standards.
Exception 4: A host female shall be prohibited from obtaining an abortion if she agreed with her male partner prior to sexual intercourse that she would not get an abortion and would retain the ZEF to full term, unless she has any of five good reasons to abort, as stated in exception 2. As stipulated above, persons should always keep the contracts, agreements, or promises they make, as long as those requirements are ethical and legal from the outset. (For these important agreements related to sexual and reproductive behavior, I favor their real-time documentation through a dependable standard cell phone application, given the ubiquity of these tiny pocket computers.)
So many disputes, conflicts, and controversies regarding sex, abortion, reproduction, and children could and would be avoided if couples would just have open and honest discussions and make critical decisions before having sexual intercourse. A male partner and a female partner have a moral duty to always discuss and come to an agreement on key issues before they have sexual intercourse. These include:
- Having sexual intercourse at all.
- Verbal or gestural signals to stop the intercourse in progress.
- The use of any contraceptives and by whom.
- The disposition of any resulting ZEEF, either retention or abortion.
- Caretaking responsibilities for any baby potentially resulting from intercourse.
If they cannot reach agreement on these issues, then they simply should not have intercourse. Of course, such discussions may temporarily attenuate passion, but making these advance agreements is likely to reduce unwanted pregnancies and abortions. And romantic feelings can be rekindled after such conversations. In general, it would be wise to have at least a 12-hour waiting period between the discussions/decisions and the sexual activity.
If such conversations do not happen and a woman becomes aware that she is pregnant, she should disclose this fact to her male partner and then discuss and decide with him the disposition of the ZEEF. The male partner has a right to know about the pregnancy and participate in the decision. Why? Because both parties are equally responsible for the existence of the human organism residing in the female partner. However, there is an exception to this disclosure: if the pregnancy is a result of rape, incest, or sex slavery.
Exception 5: A host female shall be prohibited from obtaining an abortion if she and her male partner made no agreement regarding abortion prior to sexual intercourse, the male partner objects to the abortion, and a court approves a proper plan for the male partner to take full parental responsibilities for a resulting baby, unless the woman has any of five good reasons to abort, as outlined in exception 2.
In this case, since the male and female partners failed to discuss and decide what to do with a ZEEF—either abort it or retain it—before they had intercourse, then they must engage in this discussion as soon as the female informs her male partner that she is pregnant. Most outcomes are easy to determine:
- If both female and male partners vote for retention, then the ZEEF shall be retained and both parties shall equally share the caretaking responsibilities for the resulting baby, unless they both agree to put the baby up for adoption at birth.
- If both female and male partners vote for abortion, then the ZEEF shall be aborted.
- If the female partner votes for retention and the male partner votes for abortion, then the ZEEF shall be retained, and the female partner shall assume all caretaking responsibilities for the resulting baby. The male partner shall have none of those responsibilities nor visitation rights with the baby.
- If the female partner votes for abortion and the male partner votes for retention, then the ZEEF shall be retained or aborted depending on the unique circumstances. If either partner used contraception, then the intentions of the couple were clear—they didn’t want to produce a ZEEF, a fetal person, or a baby. Therefore, in these circumstances, the vote of the male partner for retention should be disregarded and the ZEEF should be aborted. If neither partner used contraception during intercourse, then the intentions of the couple were unclear and ambiguous. In this case the vote of the male partner for retention should be honored, the ZEEF should be retained, and the male partner should assume all caretaking responsibilities for the resulting baby, contingent on a court-approved plan. Even if the male’s plan for retention of the ZEEF is already approved and/or implemented through the court, the host female must be allowed to abort if any of five “medical” conditions occur, as outlined in exception 2. These same principles should be applied to female partners when one of them received sperm from a man to become pregnant. However, the sperm donor should have no role in decision making since he would not be an intended, planned, or agreed upon ‘parent.’
Check out Skeptic magazine 27.2 for more articles on the theme of abortion.
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ConclusionsIn this essay I have described a robust right to abortion, which nevertheless should be limited, restricted, and regulated by the state. A female’s right to bodily autonomy and to an abortion can and sometimes does come into conflict with the rights of others, specifically the rights of a fetal person or the rights of the male partner. It is in these circumstances that the state has a duty to intervene and resolve the conflict in a fair and reasonable manner. I have provided rational, ethical, and practical justifications for the right to abortion itself and for the limitations on it. I have designated my view on these matters as the “pro-person position.” It is my hope that the moral rules I have suggested will become commonplace and the laws I have suggested will be adopted at the federal level, and if not there, then at the state level. Only through robust debate may we find common ground.
About the AuthorGary J. Whittenberger PhD is a free-lance writer and retired psychologist, now living in North Hollywood, California. He was formerly a leader in many freethought groups in Tallahassee, Florida. He received his doctoral degree in clinical psychology from Florida State University after which he worked for 23 years as a psychologist in federal prisons. He has written many published articles on science, philosophy, psychology, and religion.
References1. Glenza, Jessica. “The supreme court just overturned Roe v Wade—what happens next?” The Guardian. 24 June 2022. Web. 2 July 2022. https://bit.ly/3XpCUEt 2. Editors. “Planned Parenthood v. Casey.” History.com. 24 June 2022. https://bit.ly/3ZMEx0A 3. Gill, Danielle D’Souza. “Anti-Abortion: The Case for Life.” Skeptic. Vol. 27, No. 2, 2022, 18-27. 4. Starr, Michelle. “New Research Shows Most Human Pregnancies End in Miscarriage.” Science Alert. 1 August 2018. https://bit.ly/3XncH9F 5. “Miscarriage.” Wikipedia. Web. 7 July 2022. https://bit.ly/3ZMITox 6. Gelhoren, Giovana. “President Biden Calls on Congress to End Filibuster and Codify Roe v. Wade Into Law.” MSN. 30 June 2022. https://bit.ly/3D0KLAp 7. Gupta, Alisha Haridasani. “Why Ruth Bader Ginsburg Wasn’t All That Fond of Roe v. Wade.” New York Times. 21 September 2020. https://nyti.ms/3Wi4ulK 8. Whittenberger, Gary. “Personhood and Abortion Rights: How Science Might Inform this Contentious Issue.” Skeptic. Vol. 23, No. 4, 2018, 34-39. https://bit.ly/2JrHPCq 9. Watts, Jay. The Problem with Improving Abortion. Christian Research Journal. Vol.45, Number 01, June 2022, 44-48.
I keep seeing things that make me wonder, “Can’t these people read?”
I get emails from people who say they liked what I had written about various subjects that I have never written about; for instance, food customs in other countries. Can’t these people read? What are they thinking? And when I write my weekly article for the Science-Based Medicine blog, there are always commenters who don’t read the article but just use it as an excuse to jump on their own soapbox and expound on their own pet beliefs. Fortunately, there are plenty of other commenters who don’t let them get away with it.
Perhaps my most disturbing encounter with poor reading comprehension was when I reviewed Abigail Shrier’s book Irreversible Damage for Science-Based Medicine. What I tried to say was that the science of transgender was far from settled and that Shrier had asked some good questions that deserved to be addressed with further research. I have nothing against transgender people, but it bothers me when opinions are falsely claimed to be backed up by settled science.
In response, I was immediately accused of being a transphobe, of not being a skeptic, of promoting the ideas of TERFs (Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminists), and of spreading scientific misinformation. I am one of three editors on SBM. The other two editors, Steven Novella and David Gorski, said they and “one other editor” had concerns about my book review; but there are no other editors. It turns out they were talking about a contributor who is not an editor, and they never corrected that error. They argued that the science of transgender is settled. They said my book review was insufficiently scientific and unworthy of SBM, and they took the unprecedented step of retracting it, something that had never happened in the entire 13-year history of the blog.
Michael Shermer promptly re-published my review, which can be read in the Skeptic Reading Room. A heated debate ensued over whether the retraction was justified. Many people thought it was not; one called it censorship and “defenestration.” Others pointed out the many errors they found in SBM’s subsequent defense of transgender science. Jesse Singal identified 19 errors, false claims, made-up quotes, endless misinformation, and even an instance of misdemeanor plagiarism. I will probably get some hate mail just for mentioning transgender again, but that will only be more evidence of poor reading comprehension.
Another common example of poor reading comprehension (or perhaps just failure to read?) is when people cite articles in support of a claim. All too often, when I read the cited article, it fails to support the claim or even argues against it. Is this a careless oversight, or are they intentionally trying to deceive? I can’t help suspecting they listed references after just reading article titles, without bothering to read the text.
And then there are the credulous media reports about scientific studies. An article on the webpage for Scientific American enthusiastically praised the new prescription eyedrop Vuity, saying “These drops could replace your reading glasses.” The truth is that some users might be able to dispense with their eyeglasses for a few hours3 if they didn’t notice any decrease in visual acuity.
Reporters are seldom scientists, and they can be lazy. Sometimes they regurgitate a press release without going to the trouble of reading the study and trying to understand the details. They may think that correlation means causation: if eating kumquats is correlated with living longer—that might be because those people have other healthy habits—but the media report may convince readers that they will live longer if they start eating kumquats. Preliminary studies based on animal or test tube research or even on unsupported speculation may be portrayed in the media as proof. If the researchers mention that the evidence was of poor quality and that further research is needed, the media reports often omit or downplay that information.
The Science-Based Medicine website has a prominent tab at the top of its home page explaining “How to submit a guest post.” It mentions that the people who write for SBM are not paid; our contributions are pro bono, for the public good, not for profit. Nevertheless, we editors are constantly bombarded with inappropriate inquiries. They ask if we will publish something they have written or would like to write, sometimes on a subject that is totally at odds with the values of SBM. They ask what publishing their article will cost, or how much they will be paid. As I was writing this, we received yet another inquiry asking, “What is the per post price on your website.” Can’t these people read?
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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My personal website SkepDoc.info is dedicated to making all my writings available in one place, with a searchable database. There is nothing on it by any other writer. I do not accept guest contributions. Anyone who has looked at my website could have noticed this. And yet people are constantly asking if I will publish their content and how much I will charge or pay. Can’t these people read?
I keep having to say the same things over and over: correlation is not causation, and personal anecdotes and testimonials don’t count as evidence. Many readers fail to understand. I received an email telling me I was wrong about dietary supplements. It said I should learn the truth by reading a dog food bag to learn which supplements were added to it. I had to explain, once again, why a dog food bag is not a reliable source of evidence and why a scientific study with a control group can provide more accurate information.
Is this a perverse refusal to acknowledge facts that contradict ideology, or is it a failure in reading comprehension? I can’t help but suspect the latter. Can’t these people read?
About the AuthorHarriet Hall, MD, the SkepDoc, is a retired family physician, former flight surgeon, and retired Air Force Colonel who writes about medicine, pseudoscience, alternative medicine, quackery, and critical thinking. She is a contributing editor and regular columnist for both Skeptic and Skeptical Inquirer magazines and an editor at ScienceBasedMedicine.org, where she has written an article every Tuesday since its inception in 2008. She wrote the book Women Aren’t Supposed to Fly: The Memoirs of a Female Flight Surgeon. The full texts of all her many hundreds of articles can be read on her website www.skepdoc.info.
With the recent brouhaha over the Queen’s funeral crowd size, it might be interesting to explore the ways enormous crowd sizes have been determined in the past, and the science behind crowd estimation.
Way back in 1991, Paul Simon gave a free concert on his Rhythm of the Saints Tour in Central Park. Simon’s promotional poster read, “What If You Threw a Party and 750,000 People Came?” I recall thinking that seemed like an extraordinary number of people. The official tally, I was told later, was somewhere closer to 600,000.
So where did they get that “official” number? How did they count all those people? Short answer—They didn’t! Until recently, extraordinary crowd claims kept growing—and without any supporting data. The 600,000 estimate was used for promotional purposes. In fact, attendance at Simon’s concert was probably much lower than the official estimates, as are official estimates for other concerts.
Those estimates come from the New York City Department of Parks & Recreation. According to their website,1 performances such as Simon’s have drawn crowds “estimated at hundreds of thousands.”
Centralpark.com2 notes “many sources” provided the following estimates:
- New York Philharmonic (July 1986): 800,000 people
- Garth Brooks (August 1997): 750,000 people
- Daryl Hall and John Oates (April 1990): 750,000 people
- Simon & Garfunkel (September 1981): 500,000 people
- Elton John (September 1980): 400,000 people.
In reality, these colossal estimates are provided by publicists for the artists, and they are speculative at best. Meeri Kim of the Philly Voice writes, “…there’s often a hidden agenda behind the number. Event organizers, of course, want to inflate the number of people present, but without the proper equipment and estimation methods, even unbiased parties can be inaccurate.”3
What are the specific equipment and methods on which these estimates are based? The science behind crowd counting began in the late 1960s.4 Herbert Jacobs was a journalism professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Jacobs noticed that the students protesting outside his window were on measured concrete grids. He counted the students on a few grids and derived a rule of thumb for crowd counting: Number = Area × Density. While the science of crowd estimation has developed beyond Jacob’s initial observation (composite images of crowds are now placed into digital 3D models, making heads easier to count), the general formula of Area × Density remains approximately accurate. Crowd counting isn’t an exact science, as crowds move about, but generally: The denser the crowd, the less people move within it.
Mega-concerts take place all over the world in major cities, but one location in particular is famous for them: New York’s Central Park. Unlike Tushino Airfield in Moscow (Metallica, 1991, 1.5 million people estimated) and Copacabana Beach in Rio de Janeiro (Rod Stewart, 1994, 3.5 million people), the space to accommodate spectators is ideal for crowd counting: It is one large, flat oval, with a track surrounding it. The Great Lawn’s surface area is 55 acres, or 222,577 square meters.
Considering those parameters, let us examine three levels of “crowdedness” descending in order, from “very crowded,” to “extremely crowded,” using numbers and space we know to be true.
The square area of Disney World’s Magic Kingdom is 107 acres, which is 433,014 square meters. The park occasionally needs to close due to capacity crowds. It does so in ascending phases according to the number of guests entering the park.5 The final Phase, a “Phase 4 Closure,” excludes all visitors regardless of circumstance. Such a closure is very rare, happening on average only once per decade. On April 7, 2009, the park maxed out at 100,000 people, employees and guests combined. Not counting the space taken by the attractions, food carts, waterways, etc., this means that everybody in the park on April 7, 2009 had less than five square meters to move about (4.33014 m2), slightly less than one third of an American parking space.6
The total floor space of the Rungrado First of May Stadium in Pyongyang North Korea is 207,000 m2 across eight stories. Estimates range between 150,000 and 190,000 spectators and employees, making it easily the largest capacity venue in the world.7 Including the large playing field (limited to athletes and performers), this means each person has between 1.38 square meters (150,000) and 1.08 square meters (190,000), or about one-fourth of the space allotted to guests at Disney World during a Phase 4 Closure. That’s a tight fit, even for undernourished North Koreans (the average North Korean man is 3–8 cm shorter than his South Korean counterpart), but still manageable.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.4
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The starting line of a major city marathon is among the most crowded spaces on the planet. The largest in the world, New York City’s, recorded 51,246 runners in 2017 (minus athletes using wheelchairs, who start earlier) at the starting lines.8 The race was separated into four major waves based on finishing time projections. An aerial photo of the 2017 NY Marathon shows the waves separated by two rows of 14 city buses. The length of an MTA Regional Bus is 12 meters, meaning the length of each wave is about 168 meters.9 The width of each wave is slightly less than two city traffic lanes, each lane encompassing 3.7 meters, a combined width of 7.4 meters.10 This allows an approximate area (168 × 7.4) of 1243.2 m2 per wave. Divided by four, each wave of runners assumes a space of just .9704 m2.
All of the official estimates far exceed that of the (known) New York City Marathon’s starting line. The smallest official concert estimate (400,000) was that of Elton John’s 1980 concert in Central Park. For this estimate to be correct, there would need to be 1.74 concertgoers for every one marathon runner. Consider also that marathoners stand still, shoulder to shoulder, waiting for the race to begin, whereas footage of Elton’s event reveals open spaces and concert attendees dancing.11
In the above table, the Park’s Department estimates are divided into the area of the Great Lawn. I’ve included my comparisons to crowds at capacity at Disney’s Magic Kingdom, First of May Stadium in Pyongyang, and the starting line of the New York City 2017 Marathon: As the technology of crowd counting advances, it seems the days of massive crowd over-estimates have ended. In 2008, Bon Jovi played a free show on The Great Lawn and, in this case, each audience member was counted by workers with clickers at the Lawn’s various entrances. The total? 48,538 people.12 Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe told the New York Times “You look out at the sea of people from the stage, and your mind tells you, ‘That’s what hundreds of thousands of people looks like.’”
About the AuthorJohn D. Van Dyke is an academic and science educator. His personal website is vandykerevue.org.
References1. https://on.nyc.gov/3TzawNT 2. https://bit.ly/3gmrTmV 3. https://bit.ly/3TvxTrE 4. https://bit.ly/3VHLYUX 5. https://bit.ly/3yNDXE3 6. https://bit.ly/3TggyTP 7. https://bit.ly/3D6OAnZ 8. https://bit.ly/3glDxy8 9. https://bit.ly/3ePL47Y 10. American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials. (2011). Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, p. xli, AASHTO. 11. https://bit.ly/3D93p9u 12. https://nyti.ms/3CNFAm7
“We must have a religious head, one who is the founder, as did Christ, Muhammad, Joseph Smith, Mrs. Eddy, Martin Luther, and others who have founded religions. I am the fountain head. I am the founder of chiropractic in its science, in its art, in its philosophy and in its religious phase.” —D.D. Palmer, 1911, claimed discoverer of chiropractic
Chiropractors vigorously deny the charge that its purported founder, Daniel David Palmer (or D.D. Palmer as commonly referenced), copied osteopathy. Yet, the two schools of thought were nearly identical at their beginnings, and just a few hours apart by railway. Further, chiropractic was “discovered” the same year—1895— that the first class of the American School of Osteopathy (ASO) was graduated. Chiropractors dismiss the sudden emergence of chiropractic so near in time and space to the ASO as a one-in-a-million coincidence. Statisticians, on the other hand, infer that one-in-a-million is not a coincidence.
From their side, prominent osteopaths reported Palmer’s distinctive barrel-chested presence at the ASO, escorted by his well-known friend, neighbor, and osteopathic student James A. Strothers.1, 2 No paper trail or other hard evidence of such visits has been found; for example, there are no train tickets, no local newspaper travel reports, and no lodging or guest signatures in Kirksville.
According to osteopathic tradition, Andrew Taylor Still (MD by apprenticeship) discovered osteopathy in 1874. He still practiced for a number of years before founding the ASO with its first class in 1892.
The coincidence is fantasy. Just as the scientific method is shifting from Popperian falsification to Bayesian probabilities of causes, so too must historical research shift from description alone to proffering the best explanation for historical observations.3–5 Given that, Palmer’s chiropractic “discovery” without any influence or context is nonsensical inasmuch as all discoveries and inventions have antecedents. And aside from the ASO, the Upper Mississippi River Valley was then a hotbed of healers of all kinds. It is more likely that Palmer assimilated osteopathy from the ASO. That, in turn, begs the compelling counterfactual question: would there be a chiropractic profession without the ASO, A.T. Still, and James A. Strothers? I believe not.
Yet today, Palmer and son’s writings are read with reverence and cited to settle arguments among chiropractors. Palmer’s idea that nerves carry vital energy (neurovitalism) keeps chiropractic outside the pale of modern health care delivery and encourages chiropractors to make extravagant claims and allege scientific and professional discrimination.3 Most damaging to the profession is that chiropractic research has the unspoken but understood task of justifying Palmer’s ideas, rather than testing other hypotheses that might lead to increased predictability of treatment effectiveness.
Palmer founded his Palmer School and Cure in 1897 to train others in neurovitalism and spinal manipulation. In 1902, he turned the enterprise over to his son B.J. Palmer, who asserted that chiropractic treatment worked from Above Down and Inside Out (ADIO), that is, from the brain, down the spinal cord, and out through spinal nerves into the body. (According to Joseph Keating, ADIO was originally expressed by A.T. Still as an osteopathic principle). Disappointing research led chiropractic seminars to turn ADIO itself upside down and inside out to diagnose and treat the brain with spinal manipulation, a practice called “functional neurology.”6–8 Thus, ADIO quietly transformed into Outside-In and Down-to-Above (OIDA?), while maintaining the idea of nerves as the conductors of health signals. OIDA turns efference into afference, motor to sensory, and challenges the entire corpus of proven neuroscience findings.
1895According to official chiropractic history, D.D. Palmer discovered chiropractic in 1895. This kicked off their legendary view of Palmer as a singular genius, whose inspired ideas are not open to question. Even today, most chiropractors prefer Palmer’s notions of neurovitalism and subluxations to modern, empirically verifiable explanations.9
Medical sociologist Walter Wardwell noted that Palmer and his followers believe Palmer founded chiropractic as if “fully formed out of the head of Zeus.”10–12 There are two main versions of his creation myth. In one, Palmer is said to have restored the hearing of a deaf man by thoracic manipulation. In another, Palmer received instruction in chiropractic from a dead Davenport medical physician named Jim Atkinson. The Atkinson story, in turn, came in two versions.
In the first, Palmer directly communicated with the spirit of Jim Atkinson at a Missouri prayer meeting. In the other, dead Jim Atkinson gave Palmer’s fourth wife the details of chiropractic after she awakened from a 19-hour morphine-induced coma.13 Atkinson chose Palmer to convey to the world a new form of healing that was “too advanced for medicine” during Atkinson’s own lifetime 50 years earlier.14, 15
Even though osteopathy and chiropractic were discovered, respectively, in 1874 and 1895, spinal manipulation had already been around for more than 2500 years on nearly every continent. The idea of neurovitalism (also known as vertebral and neurocentric vitalism) was already 200 to 300 years old.16
As craft guilds died out, the industrial revolution reduced work into repetitive tasks that engendered boredom and endangered musculoskeletal injuries, and much of what we now diagnose and treat as repetitive stress and strain syndrome. Bonesetters and other joint manipulators provided some temporary relief, while American medicine did not.
Miserable American MedicineAmerica lagged behind Europe by almost a century in moving towards science-based medicine. Napoleon Bonaparte was a powerful disruptor to “comforting” physician-based medicine. In planning his conquests, he replaced physicians with surgeons to meet emergency battlefield needs and hospital recovery. Physicians—college-educated elitists who were forbidden to touch blood—were out and surgeons were in. Napoleon shifted French health care delivery to a scientific approach called Paris Medicine.17 Hospitals were converted from palliative care to trauma care. In another paradigm shift, medicine traced diseases to organ dysfunction.18 As each step progressed towards the findings of empirical science, medicine moved away from individual differences and towards increasing predictive power of diagnosis and treatment by disease type.19
The basic tools of 19th century American medicine were guided by the Materia Medica of the day. Treatments included bloodletting (often with leeches) and imbibing mercury compounds.10–12, 20 For self-care, pharmacies sold tonics, soaps, and toothpastes of opium, morphine, heroin, and radium.21, 22 Census records from 1890 list unrecognizable and rare diseases by today’s standards: consumption, “stomach” cancer, apoplexy, and inanition (lack of mental and spiritual vigor).23 Sanitoriums were filled with patients with real, imagined, or misdiagnosed mental illness. At the Still-Hildreth Osteopathic Sanatorium in Macon, Missouri, 88 percent of patients were said to suffer from psychiatric or neuropsychiatric diseases. Substance abuse added another three percent.24
American medicine was so dangerous that physician Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted in 1841 that humanity would be better off if the Materia Medica were sunk “to the bottom of the sea”— though it would kill the fish.17 It is estimated that during the American Civil War, limitations and failures of medicine accounted for two-thirds of 750,000 deaths and many more morbidities.25, 26
Most chiropractors prefer palmer’s notions of neurovitalism and subluxations to modern, empirically verifiable explanations.
Physicians of the day imputed a quaint link between lifestyle and syphilis. They diagnosed by lifestyle27 and treated accordingly: “Billiard markers, some actors, barmaids, actresses, and commercial travelers who drink freely and sit up late” constituted one type. Another was composed of, “the light-haired degenerate lady who sits up all night playing the piano at suburban parties.”28 Depending on “type,” the syphilitic patient was administered a certain color mercury compound. Inducing malaria’s high fever was another medical tool to treat syphilis.29, 30 The medical alternatives were either death from mercury poisoning or death by syphilis.
Palmer Learns OsteopathyThe acrimony of the charge that Palmer visited the ASO in Kirksville has distracted both osteopaths and chiropractors from the more likely event that the ASO regularly visited Palmer in the person of James A. Strothers. Strothers confided in Davenport osteopath O.E. McFadon that he had tutored Palmer.1 Railroad service of 1895 made travel between Davenport and Kirksville easy.
Strothers had signed a confidentiality agreement with Still and the ASO, promising not to teach osteopathy while a student. When Strothers died in 1902 from an unknown abdominal ailment, Palmer was free to weave his discovery myths. Though Palmer admitted he had studied osteopathy in the past, he left it deliberately vague as to just when:
Some years ago I took an expensive course in Electropathy, Cranial Diagnosis, Hydrotherapy, Facial Diagnosis, and later Osteopathy [that] gave me such a measure of confidence as to almost feel it unnecessary to seek other sciences for the mastery of all curable diseases, and having been assured that the underlying philosophy is the same as that of osteopathy…. Chiropractic is osteopathy gone to seed.31
For a brief time in 1911 or 1912, Palmer had a business partner, Alva Gregory, MD, in Oklahoma City. Together, they were going to establish the Palmer-Gregory College of Chiropractic. Dr. Gregory was impressed with spinal manipulation, but not with Palmer. Gregory said that D.D. Palmer and his son B.J. exhibited “gross errors” in understanding human biology,32 and pressed how such an “uneducated” person as Palmer could have discovered chiropractic. Interestingly, Gregory, who produced two books on the subject,32, 33 wrote that Palmer admitted that an osteopath named “Struthers” taught him. The MD wrote, “We find no evidence whether he [Palmer] was the discoverer, but [rather] find facts to the contrary.”32
As Gregory had spelled “Strothers” phonetically as “Struthers,” Palmer’s plagiarizing was hidden for 125 years. Strothers died a decade before Palmer and Gregory met.
The Caster Dynasty: Magnetic Mentors of Still and PalmerPaul Caster was born in Henry County (or Wayne County, depending on source), Indiana in 1827. His mother died when Paul was 14 years old. He quit school in part because of a serious speech impediment and other “disabilities that made learning difficult.”35 He wandered alone around Elkhart County, Indiana, where he said (and she said) he healed a young woman of her breast cancer. She went on to have a family and live a long and happy life.34, 35 Caster eventually made his way to Ottumwa, Iowa, where he was bestowed the title of doctor for his healing work. In 1869, he began construction on a hospital that, adjusted for inflation, cost $23.5 million in 2022 dollars. The Caster Clinic was an impressive four-story hospital-hotel, which drew patients from more than 30 American states.34 A.T. Still visited the Caster Clinic in the early 1870s. Paul Caster declared Still had “the gift” of magnetic healing and encouraged him to practice.
If california failed to license chiropractic, palmer planned to declare chiropractic a new religion with himself as its “religious head.”
D.D. Palmer lived in What Cheer, Iowa52 from 1876 until 1885 where he opened a grocery. Also in What Cheer, lived Paul Caster’s son J.S., who taught Palmer magnetic healing. Both J.S. and Palmer moved to Burlington, Iowa in 1885 to practice magnetic healing. Palmer left Burlington in late 1887 and moved to Davenport, Iowa.36–38
Whether Palmer and Caster practiced together in Burlington is unclear. Perhaps Palmer and Still crossed paths during their separate mentorships with Caster. Years later, Paul Caster’s grandson, Charles Caster, became a chiropractor and taught at the Palmer School.34, 37
Magnetic HealingMagnetic healing was also called mesmerism, after the famous promoter, Anton Mesmer, MD, of Vienna, who practiced “animal magnetism” in Paris in the 1780s. Magnetic healing has nothing to do with magnets and not much to do with healing. The idea is to move vital energy to damaged parts of the body that need it for repair and recovery. So scandalous were the Parisian ladies swooning at group magnetic healings in Paris, that French King Louis XVI appointed a special commission to study the merits of magnetic healing. The American ambassador to France, Ben Franklin, was a distinguished member. Prior to the inquiry, Franklin laid out his expectations in a letter to the king on March 19, 1784:
There are in every great rich City a Number of Persons who are never in health, because they are fond of Medicines and always taking them, whereby they derange the natural Functions, and hurt their Constitutions. If these People can be persuaded to forbear their Drugs in Expectation of being cured by only the Physician’s Finger or an Iron Rod pointing at them, they may possibly find good effects tho’ they mistake the Cause.39
The king’s commission found nothing in Mesmer’s magnetic healing beyond belief and confidence in the provider, a familiar theme in today’s allopathic and alternative medicines.40–42 After that finding, Mesmer was banished from Paris. Thus in 1784, Franklin and the commission had accomplished the world’s first clinical trial.43
Bonesetting, Spinal Manipulation, and NeurovitalismMagnetic healing was based on the belief that matter is animated by spirit, referred to as vitalism. Vitalism had been a handy explanation for health and disease since Aristotle.44 However useful and popular it was to convey concepts of health and disease, the vitalism paradigm increasingly interfered with scientific progress.45, 46 The beginning of the end of vitalism struck in 1827, when German physician and scientist Friedrich Wohler synthesized organic urea from inorganic compounds, instead of from organic ones.45
Vitalism remains popular today as a hopeful, self-empowering paradigm, unchanging in a fast-changing world.19 Whereas scientists and physicians offer educated—even elitist—complex explanations of health and disease, vitalism is conveyed in plain language.47–49 Alternative medicine is the persistent vestige of vitalism.
Hippocrates (460 BCE to 375 BCE), was a proponent of spinal manipulation. His interest in the spine led to his becoming known as the Father of Spine Surgery.50 He practiced spinal manipulation and invented a bench to assist in manipulating.51 In 1580, 1656, and 1674, the first textbooks on spinal manipulation were published.51 In 1871, British physician Wharton Hood published a comprehensive manual on the subject. The topic was of such interest and importance as to be the theme of the 1882 British Medical Association conference.51 English bonesetter John Atkinson, made well publicized and attended visits to Chicago in 1897 and 1898.14 Spinal manipulation was ancient, but acutely interesting in the 300 years leading up to Palmer’s discovery.
By 1906, Palmer was getting in trouble with state medical and osteopathy licensing laws. He claimed that only chiropractic treated nerves, while medicine and osteopathy did not. Some of Palmer’s inspiration may have come from the news of the 1906 Nobel Prize in Medicine to Golgi and Cajal for “work on the structure of the nervous system.”52 Such would be the avant garde and intimidating “rocket science” of its day, a safe place to keep and grow chiropractic until data eventually caught up.
Thus did neurovitalism become central dogma from which chiropractors, their lobbyists, educators, handlers, thought leaders, futurists, justifiers, researchers, and enablers could not escape for the next 125 years. In their research, the nerve paradigm failed to predict and affect even the lowest of low hanging clinical fruit—uncomplicated lower back pain.53, 54
In 1987, chiropractors won an anti-trust lawsuit against the American Medical Association’s long campaign to “contain and eliminate chiropractic.” The ruling judge admonished chiropractic profession to perform the necessary research required of any health care profession.47 When the research failed to vindicate Palmer and neurovitalism, many practicing chiropractors returned to their 19th century neurovitalistic explanations.9, 48
The Religious Head of ChiropracticIn spite of ADIO’s heaven and earth overtones, B.J. Palmer said that chiropractic was the antithesis of Christianity. No deity or soul was required,47, 48, 55 as God was directly accessible through chiropractic care.47, 56 Meanwhile, the senior Palmer was living in California, and state licensing was under consideration. If California failed to license chiropractic, Palmer planned to declare chiropractic a new religion with himself as its “religious head.” In a letter to chiropractor P.W. Johnson of Los Angeles in 1911, D.D. said:
We must have a religious head, … as did Christ, Muhammad, Joseph Smith, Mrs. Eddy, Martin Luther, and others who have founded religions.55
Palmer’s label “chiropractic” was one among several offered by his friend in Davenport, the Reverend Samuel Weed. The word was Greek for “hand practice,” and reflected Palmer’s interest palm reading, or chieromancy.47 As with that esoteric practice, chiropractors could “read” the health of the body by palpating the spine.47
Some Christians mistrusted chiropractors because pain and suffering purified the soul, and chiropractors might remove that pain.47, 48
Chiropractic Wins Neurovitalism but Loses Scientific Agility and RespectIn 1902, the year Strothers died, D.D. Palmer left Davenport and turned his Palmer School and Cure over to his son. D.D. moved on to start schools in Oklahoma, Kansas, Oregon, and Santa Barbara, CA. He practiced in Pasadena, CA where he was put on trial for the deaths of two patients.53 Palmer died in Los Angeles on October 20, 1913 of typhoid fever.53
By 1936, Willard Carver crystallized the official chiropractic dogma in “The History of Chiropractic.” Carver flatly stated that osteopathy was “nothing more than a slight advance over” Mesmer’s magnetic healing.64 By then, the fact that osteopathy and chiropractic both had roots in magnetic healing was conveniently forgotten.
Below is an excerpt from a chiropractor’s website obtained in 2022, making the case for neurovitalistic treatment of the brain. Easily thousands of chiropractic websites worldwide tout neurovitalism as the reason for chiropractic care.
CHIROPRACTIC CARE IMPACTS EVERY CELL, TISSUE AND ORGAN The general public typically doesn’t understand the impact chiropractic care has on every cell, tissue, and organ in our bodies. As they discover this truth, many lives are now being improved and even saved. Take for example the topic of mental health. Many people suffer from things like anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia to name a few, but most people don’t realize there are alternative options to help improve your mental health naturally. Chiropractic care isn’t usually an alternative option to mental health that people think about. The truth is, chiropractic care has been improving mental health of many people since the early 20th century.57
Meanwhile, osteopaths moved on from magnetic healing, and became mainstream health care providers with 38 osteopathic schools across the U.S., many supported within public universities. Osteopaths in America offer primary care, and some consider manipulation as one clinical tool. By contrast, chiropractic never let go of the neurovitalism central dogma while private chiropractic colleges in North America continue to graduate about 2000 chiropractors per year to a saturated market.58
ConclusionThe tragic flaw that plagues the chiropractic profession lies in its members’ devotion to the idea that chiropractic is D.D. Palmer’s unique discovery. Deference to Palmer’s superior intellect and spiritual revelation have encouraged a belief among chiropractors that they are victims of prejudice and discrimination from medicine. Chiropractic “research” has been greatly influenced, if not limited to, justification of Palmer’s ideas.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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If there is any value in chiropractic adjustments it may lie not in the treatment itself, but rather in steering patients away from expensive and risky surgeries and potential dependence on pain killing drugs. Chiropractors offer confident explanations that reduce the fear and anxiety of back pain and motivate patients to engage in self-care and exercise.40–42 Apart from social and psychological support, the value of chiropractic treatment per se remains equivocal. There is no homogeneous diagnostic group and no standard chiropractic treatment. Quasi-experimental designs might be helpful.59
So far, spinal manipulation studies have yielded, at best, weak evidence.40–42 However, as complex as the facets of back pain may be,60, 61 the answer, in most cases, is simple. My meta-analysis showed 97 percent of acute back pain resolves with the passage of time, some attention, and regular exercise.40–42 It was not well received.
About the AuthorMichael Menke was a chiropractor and chiropractic researcher in Northern California for 20 years. He is now a methodologist and measurement expert in health economics and outcomes research in the US, and formerly head of medical psychology in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His research includes evaluating effective smoking cessation programs, gestational diabetes, accuracy of disease screening, traumatic brain injury, colorectal cancer, accuracy of salivary biomarkers, early detection of Parkinson’s disease, and low back pain. His PhD is from University of Arizona Department of Psychology and School of Pharmacy.
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(1899). Biographies and Portraits of the Progressive Men of Iowa: Leaders in Business, Politics and the Professions; Together with an Original and Authentic History of the State, by Ex-Lieutenant- Governor BF Gue. Conaway & Shaw. 36. https://bit.ly/3MOa1M8 37. https://bit.ly/3MOmsrr 38. https://bit.ly/3HtRBzq 39. https://bit.ly/3MUDwfd 40. Menke, J.M. (2014). Manual therapy researchers are misled by natural history and placebo effects. Spine, 39(23). 41. Menke, J.M. (2014). Do manual therapies help low back pain? A comparative effectiveness meta-analysis. Spine, 39(7). 42. Menke, J.M. (2015). Deconstructing the Tower of Back Pain Babel. Physical Therapy Reviews, 20(4), 262–263. 43. Holbrook, M.L. (1896). Franklin on drugging and Mesmerism. Journal of Hygiene. 44. Coulter, I., Snider, P., & Neil, A. (2019). Vitalism–a worldview revisited: a critique of vitalism and its implications for integrative medicine. Integrative Medicine: A Clinician’s Journal, 18(3), 60. 45. Lane, N. (2005). 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The late physicist Steven Weinberg may have had it exactly right when he said that the more comprehensible the world is, the more it may seem without point. What he did not add—but certainly knew—is that when science intrudes on supernatural or religious belief to explain something that seemed a mystery before, many people still prefer the mystery.
Going above or beyond the natural world, belief in a supernatural may offer what ready natural evidence alone does not. Historically, this has been the power of religious belief. It provides explanation and consolation as reassurance against existential dread of death and other troubling, or simply random, aspects of life and living that otherwise seem to be without meaning. Whether or not God or gods exist, humans have longevolved reasons for believing they do, or for inventing them and a supernatural world if they do not.
Most of what we know as traditional religion today emerged from a pre-scientific past in which sacred texts were written or narrated to embrace spiritual yearnings of people who lived in nomadic bands or isolated settlements, where traditional belief had little or no explanatory competitors. The knowledge early religious imparters had of the natural world was probably much less than that possessed by, or at least taught to, the average grade school child today. Yet explanatory beliefs conjured in those distant historical sands are still widely embraced by vast numbers of people.
It was only much later, and then only in some parts of the world, that critical examination of beliefs and their texts was set free from censorship and suppression. Koranic criticism is still muted in much of the Muslim world, and certain modern biblical scholarship may reach conclusions troubling to many Christians and Jews. Today, classic monotheistic stories of God’s intervention in life—privileged communication with Abraham, Moses, Muhammad, Joseph Smith, and other prophets, virgin birth and theistic incarnation and resurrection in Christian belief, the favoring of one group or tribe over another, control of meteorological events, prayers answered and other divine entries into individual lives— receive special scrutiny, at least in certain quarters. Yet all are still widely believed to have occurred or may yet occur.
The jewel in this crown of explanation—revealed absolute truth—contrasts sharply with the provisional truths emerging from natural, falsifiable human inquiry. In a world of many religions, sacred scriptures and narratives have produced little accord on exactly what is revealed, what God loves or hates, wants or doesn’t want, and permits or forbids.
Within religions, it is often unclear whether revealed truth is fixed and inviolable as it is for most orthodox or fundamentalist adherents, or if it can be modified through interpretation by later generations. Ultimate truth raises additional questions about who may authoritatively interpret God’s word and the role such understanding should play in the lives of others. Though most religious individuals do not claim to have personally received revealed truth, many in every age have relied on the word of religious figures, some professing to have received divinely inspired spiritual direction.
In the current scientific age, claims of revealed truth face special rational doubt and are subjected to skeptical testing. If such truth is compelling, why the absence of empirical verification? Why have so few of its prophecies come to pass? For Christians, for example, why is there no hint of a second coming? For Jews, none of a first? If the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is so compelling, why don’t Jews and Muslims believe it? Why has every religious prediction of an imminent end to the world failed? Why have so many moral tenets of revealed truth proved harmful in human affairs and set so many people marching to oppress or kill so many others? These questions are partly rhetorical, but the lack of answers that science, with its powerful metrics of probability and plausibility, might weigh and test is striking.
Modern physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, social science, and medicine all raise profound questions about the various forms of received wisdom from the past. Natural disasters, disease, injury, good and bad fortune are events or conditions most educated persons no longer ascribe to divine interest or intent. New critical perspectives in philosophy, the arts, and religion itself question traditional authority, and instead emphasize individual agency and human rights. The explanatory territory known as “God of the gaps”—the supernatural default position—has shrunk ever smaller, and what remains requires a more complex and sophisticated theology than most religions offer today.
We are now aware of the bewildering scales of time, space, and matter previously unknown or unimaginable, but consider how hard it would have been for our distant ancestors to imagine, much less sensibly comprehend, a billion years of time. Or to understand movement at 186,000 miles a second—the speed of light—which, by any earthly measure, is instantaneous? Or that the light we now see from the Andromeda galaxy left it 2.5 million years ago? The early imparters of religion did not comprehend that they lived on a minor planet circling a minor star on the edge of a galaxy of several billion stars, perhaps one of billions of galaxies in a universe that might itself be only one of many. They could not know that our small speck of home had itself produced millions of species of life or that 99 percent of those species are now extinct. They would have been unable to imagine how we evolved from earlier and simpler forms of life over thousands of millennia. Nor could they know that more than 98 percent of human history took place before writing was invented or sacred texts produced.
Burdened with a despairing awareness of their own mortality, our religious ancestors imparted far simpler and, as we now know, biologically false versions of creation and human development. Though these narratives may have eased their minds or have been the best explanations available at that time—possibly even saving the early sanity of humankind—they cannot make bad science good or folk ideas credible.
Unlike traditional belief, secular thought requires a troubling appreciation of randomness. That the world may be fundamentally uncertain, unpredictable, possibly even meaningless is alien to our psycho-cognitive inheritance—from the Abrahamic faiths to almost every religious idea ever paid homage. That some things may happen by chance alone seems errant, yet that is exactly the possibility suggested in the incredibly small, invisible quantum world in which the order and causality we have come to expect may, enigmatically, not be there at all.
Nor could our religious forebears have had much appreciation of probability, if for no other reason than what it tells us is often counterintuitive. Coincidence must have special meaning and might even be a “sign” of something supernatural because we “know” that unusual or remarkable things do not happen without there being reasons.
Our religious ancestors resisted the relativism suggested by religious plurality, as many religious people still do today. How could your religion be the one that’s true, if other people worship other gods and follow other religions? Either there is no one true god or the other worshipers are wrong. The latter conclusion very often led (and still does) to religious intolerance or, worse, religious murder and war. A third conclusion that all, or at least many, of the differing religions and differing gods might be true ones, requires a theistic sophistication and tolerance not widely seen in religious history, with notable exceptions being the Greeks, Romans, or Hindus, polytheists that preceded monotheism.
In his posthumously published 2006 book Varieties of Scientific Experience, the late astronomer Carl Sagan described the flood of possibility:
Worlds without gods; gods without worlds; gods that are made by preexisting gods; gods that were always here; gods that never die; gods that do die; gods that die more than once; [have] different degrees of divine intervention in human affairs; zero, one, or many prophets; zero, one, or many saviors; zero, one, or many resurrections; zero, one, or many gods.
And this is just the plurality we are aware of in religious history, which itself goes back only about 60 centuries. We may assume even greater diversity in the human eons and tens of thousands of hunter-gatherer tribes that make up our full story. In fact, religious history has been a grab bag of gods, “revealed” truths, beliefs, saviors and prophets, as well as endless specifics of sacred narrative and ritual. They can’t all be true if for no other reason than some disallow others.
Many religious persons, including some theologians, argue that the improbable events, conditions, and figures of traditional religious narrative are better understood symbolically or metaphorically than literally. Such demythologizing, offered today in some liberal churches and temples, as well as by popular authors such as Jordan Peterson, can be appealing, because it removes religious description of the natural world from conflict with science and its falsifiable propositions while preserving some of the moral or philosophic insight and psychological support religious narrative may offer. Metaphorical understanding appears to be acceptable to increasing numbers of religious persons who are not fundamentalists.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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Today most believers are likely to embrace both literal and symbolic interpretations, picking and choosing among them. Such understanding does not prevent identification with a specific religious tradition, keeping of religious holidays, or observing sacred life-cycle events. Indeed, most social functions of religion—ritual, fellowship, instruction, charity—often remain untouched. Nonetheless, as many fundamentalists recognize, metaphorical interpretation is a very big step away from revealed truth and the traditional religion of our ancestors.
That the vessel of traditional belief has been leaking certainty from its literal and explanatory compartments for some time does not mean other beliefs may not be seaworthy—at least for a time. The supernatural is always lighter than water, and anxious human beings, wired for belief that may seem to offer meaning, particularly a promise of life beyond death, may build spiritual ships of new design to sail old routes. Because the supernatural is not subject to natural proof or disproof but only to measures of greater or lesser credibility, “new” religious ideas and the supernatural beliefs that sustain them may survive challenges of science and critical thinking. Yet the evolved creature fated to anticipate his or her own death is also one fated to explain it.
About the AuthorRichard Randall, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at New York University, has written widely on social and psychological aspects of freedom of thought and speech including Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium, winner of the Broadcast Industry Preceptor Award for Excellence in Publication, and Freedom and Taboo: Pornography and the Politics of a Self Divided. The article above is part of a larger work in progress on issues created by the decline of traditional religious belief and practice in the modern West.
All of us at Skeptic magazine—along with those in the larger skeptical and scientific communities—are sad to announce the passing of Harriet Hall, MD, widely known as the SkepDoc. Since 2006 she has penned the SkepDoc column for Skeptic, and produced numerous medical explainers, such as the Top 10 Things You Should Know About Alternative Medicine. For the James Randi Educational Foundation Dr. Hall produced a 10-part video series on “Science-Based Medicine” along with a 26-page downloadable course guide. Dr. Hall was also a contributing editor for Skeptical Inquirer magazine, an advisor to the Quackwatch network, one of the founders of the Science-Based Medicine blog and online resource, an editorial review board member for the Natural Medicines Comprehensive Database, and built her own following with her regular newsletter skepdoc.info, dealing with all manner of medical quackery.
Her husband, Kirk Hall, provided this brief biographical description of Harriet’s long and productive life:
Harriet Anne Hall was born to Albert L Hoag and Edna (Barnes) Hoag in St. Louis, Missouri on 2 July 1945. She was the eldest of four children (the twins Steven & Stephanie and the youngest Andrea). Harriet attended the University of Washington as an undergraduate, where her father taught and graduated with her medical degree from there in 1970. She was commissioned First Lieutenant in the US Air Force on 13 June 1970 and completed her Rotating Internship at the David Grant USAF Medical Center in 1971. In her early AF career, she was a General Medical Officer and was stationed in Spain for seven years. After her return to the US Harriet attended the Aerospace Medicine Primary Course to become a Flight Surgeon, graduating in 1979. In the same year Harriet became Certified by the American Board of Family Practice. She was assigned to Francis E. Warren AFB where she met and married Kirk Albert Hall, Jr. Harriet retired as a Full Colonel at McChord AFB, WA. She lived in Puyallup, Washington until her death on 11 Jan 2023. Harriet and Kirk had two daughters: Kristin Ann born at F. E. Warren AFB and Kimberly Alexandra born at Plattsburgh, NY.
Dr. Hall penned two books. Her autobiographical Women Aren’t Supposed to Fly: The Memoirs of a Female Flight Surgeon, recounts her experiences as a woman in a mostly-male career path. Her illustrated children’s book, There’s No Such Thing as the Tooth Fairy! teaches young readers how to think like a scientist and skeptic.
I always looked forward to editing Harriet’s SkepDoc column, not only because she was such a lucid writer and critical thinker who required very little editing, but because I learned so much from her about pressing medical issues I was personally interested in, such as cholesterol and statins, diet and nutrition, supplements and vitamins, exercise and health, aging and longevity, and what science can and cannot tell us about how to live a good life. Harriet Hall had a wonderful life that touched so many other lives, and her passing has left an awful hole that cannot be filled. We remember her in words (from her Skeptic columns) and images (from The Amazing Meeting, photographs by David Patton).
Harriet Hall on Psychotherapy
Some psychotherapeutic interventions have been shown to be no better than talking with a friend. Pilot programs in underserved areas are showing that brief training can enable laymen and non-specialist health workers to provide effective psychotherapy. The bottom line: psychotherapy works to help some patients, but we have no idea why. It is not based on science and there is no rational basis for choosing a therapy or a therapist. —in Skeptic 28.1, her last column
On Determining Causality in Medicine
I keep having to say the same things over and over: correlation is not causation, and personal anecdotes and testimonials don’t count as evidence. —in Skeptic 27.4
On Fads
Why do people fall for these fads? The answer is complex. For one thing, people’s brains evolved to be naturally more impressed by testimonials from their friends than by scientific studies, which they may not understand and often distrust. They may want to rebel against authority. They may mistake correlation for causation. They may feel empowered by taking action to improve their own health. They may want to become part of a special club. They may have been bamboozled by misinformation. They are not stupid, but they have not been trained in science and critical thinking skills. —in Skeptic 27.3
On Abortion
Anti-abortion activists are happy to frighten women with the alleged risks of abortion, but they are careful not to divulge this crucial information: whatever the risks of getting an abortion, it’s far riskier not to get an abortion. Pregnancy is known to be hazardous to health, and the risks of continued pregnancy and childbirth are well documented. —in Skeptic 27.2
On Trans Controversies
The science supporting transgender diagnosis and treatment is far from settled, especially for adolescent girls. Unanswered questions remain that can only be answered through good science. If experts could predict which individuals are likely to regret gender transition, irreversible damage might be avoided. —in Skeptic 27.1
On Complementary and Alternative Medicine
Purveyors of so-called complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) don’t have any credible scientific evidence. If they did, their treatments would not be called “alternative” but would have been accepted into mainstream practice and would just be called “medicine” (as in the old joke, “Do you know what you call alternative medicine with evidence? Medicine”). They tend not to appreciate science or even to understand it. They don’t need or want scientific evidence. For them, testimonials are all-powerful and are all the evidence they ask for. —in Skeptic 26.4
On Dietary Supplements
Dietary supplements and deception are constant companions. Taking a supplement is a gamble. Skepticism and vigilance are advised. Caveat emptor. —in Skeptic 26.3
On Gwyneth Paltrow and Her Goop Company
Gwyneth Paltrow was ridiculed for recommending vaginal steaming, which involves squatting over a basin of hot water and herbs for 30 minutes or so. She thinks it can relieve menstrual cramps, cleanse the vagina and uterus, boost fertility, and even relieve headaches. Gynecologists quickly protested, saying that it had no health benefits and was dangerous, potentially causing burns and infections. —in Skeptic 25.4
On Coconut Oil
The evidence that coconut oil is a health hazard is stronger than the evidence that it is a health food. Remember “the dose makes the poison” and “moderation in all things.” If you like the taste, I don’t see any reason a moderate amount of coconut oil couldn’t be part of a healthy diet. —in Skeptic 24.3
On Scientific Studies
Early studies are often superseded by later studies with the opposite findings. We should never trust a single study; we must look at the total weight of all published findings. Most published research findings turn out to be false. That might sound discouraging, but it shouldn’t be. Science is a self-correcting endeavor. —in Skeptic 22.4
On Functional Medicine
Language keeps changing. We used to call questionable remedies “folk medicine,” “fringe medicine,” or “quackery.” In the 1970s, the term “alternative medicine” was coined, an umbrella term for all treatments that were not supported by good enough evidence to have earned them a place in mainstream medicine. Then came “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), and later, “integrative medicine.” Now there’s a new kid on the block, “functional medicine (FM)” which is really just the latest flavor of integrative medicine. These are all marketing terms, Trojan horses designed to sneak non-science-based medicine into conventional medical practice. —in Skeptic 22.1
On Religion and Health
Religion can impact health in good ways, but often it has a bad impact on the health of the believer and also on the health of others. I fully support the right of people to follow any religion or any belief system, but I don’t acknowledge their right to impose their beliefs on others. I draw the line when their beliefs cause harm or the deaths of innocent children or when they endanger public health. —in Skeptic 19.1
SkepDoc’s Rule
The single most important thing you can do is remember the SkepDoc’s Rule: before you accept any claim, try to find out who disagrees with it and why. There is always disagreement, even about whether vaccines cause autism and whether men landed on the moon. Once you have located the opposing arguments you can evaluate which side has the most credible evidence and the fewest logical fallacies. It’s usually easy to spot the winner. —in Skeptic 18.2
In a recent article in Skeptic, (“Misunderstanding Free Will (Which We Don’t Have).” 26.4 (2021): 54-56), David Reeve and Dennis Middlebrooks exchanged opposing views on the issue of free will. Reeve believes free will does not exist, and Middlebrooks believes it does. I favor Reeve’s position.
There has been quite a bit of confusion in the discussion of free will over the centuries, and this is due primarily to semantics, specifically the lack of clear definitions. Hoping to somewhat remedy this problem, I offer the following:
Determinism is the view that all our thoughts, decisions, choices, and behaviors are determined by prior factors and that given the recurrence of the same prior factors we would behave the same way; we could not behave otherwise. Prior factors in this context include things such as genetics, environment, prior experiences, childhood rearing, and their interaction.
Free will, sometimes called libertarian free will, is the view that all our thoughts, decisions, choices, and behaviors are caused by the self, which may be influenced by, but not determined by, prior factors, and that given the recurrence of the same prior factors we might not behave the same; we could behave otherwise.
Legal free will is the view that in certain circumstances persons make decisions that are not affected by immaturity, neuronal or mental defect, or coercion. So, an adult person might say “I signed this contract by my own free will.” Legal free will is compatible with determinism since immaturity, defect, and coercion are just particular kinds of prior factors which may be relevant in some situations but not in others. In the absence of these factors adults may make decisions considered to be legally binding, e.g., contracts.
Compatibilism is the view that some version of free will is compatible with determinism. Libertarian free will is not compatible with determinism, but legal free will is. The validity of compatibilism depends wholly on the definition of the particular version of free will on offer.
In the 2021 book Just Deserts, Daniel Dennett has described a version of free will “worth having,” which I will call morally responsible free will and which he claims is compatible with determinism. I agree. Dennett thinks that usually when we behave immorally or harm others, then we should be punished even if our behavior was determined. Other authors, e.g., Michael Shermer in his 2020 book Giving the Devil His Due, and Dan Barker in his 2018 book Free Will Explained, write of “degrees of freedom” in decision making, but as far as I can tell this idea just refers to the degree of complexity in our decision making. Some of our decisions are more complex than others, and decision making by humans is more complex than that of other animals.
In discussing free will, we may simply consider “will” to be equivalent to choosing. I think it is likely that all decision making can be reduced to choosing between two options, X or Y, and that when there appear to be more options, we only compare two at a time. Taken literally, “free” means unconstrained, untethered, unaffected, or independent. I doubt that anyone believes that the typical choosing between options is free in any absolute sense. Everyone knows on some level that their choices are at least influenced by factors out of their control, and so these choices cannot be free in an absolute way. Libertarian free will is simply not a legitimate view for most philosophers, given how much science has shown us about the various determinants of or influencers on our decisions.
The idea of determinism in human decision making, which I favor, is rather simple—human choices are just another part of the cause-effect world in which we live, and they can be fruitfully investigated through science. Libertarian free will, however, is a different matter. It may seem like we have libertarian free will. For example, we might think “I’m going to go to the store” and then we find ourselves in the store. We think that the thought caused the behavior. But this is probably due to a thinking error known as “post hoc, ergo propter hoc.” We are prone to think that if event Y follows event X, then X must be the cause of Y. Yet, there may be some other factor Z which caused both X and Y, and this is what is probably going on in our common experience. A brain event Z is probably causing both X (the intention to go to the store) and Y (actually going to the store). And thus, we experience what some call the illusion of free will.
I think one common mistake is to confound determinism with predictability when they really aren’t the same thing. Even if the choices of a subject are determined, we may never be able to perfectly predict those choices. We might lack knowledge of context, the inputs into the decision, the algorithm of the choosing process, and/or the past behavior of the subject. In other words, we might not know the prior conditions or the relevant laws of nature.
How could we go about making predictions of choices by a person? What information might we use to make accurate predictions? I see three possibilities:
- We could monitor states of the brain and determine which states are highly correlated with options subsequently selected by a subject. This approach has already been used with some success when brains were electronically monitored and choice between two button presses was predicted.
- We could collect data about many prior conditions and determine which of these are highly correlated with options chosen by a subject.
- We could collect information about a person’s prior choices to help determine his future choices. This reminds me of my graduate school training in psychology in the 1970s when we were taught the maxim “The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.” All of these approaches have potential and could possibly be combined.
I don’t ride motorcycles. I don’t even like them. However, my son-in-law, whom I shall call “KP,” is a motorcycle enthusiast. For the sake of argument, let’s also suppose that he supports libertarian free will over determinism. Let’s try to imagine an experiment with results that would lead him to change his position. I asked KP to imagine this scenario:
You won a lottery. The prize is a really nice motorcycle, valued at $30,000. You can select it yourself—the only catch is that you cannot test ride it. However, if you don’t like it within the first 30 days, you can exchange it (but only once). You will express your preferences for the prize motorcycle through a process of comparing motorcycles, two at a time, for 200 pairs. For each pair, you will be shown a photo and a description that specifies information on six objective factors, and you will express your preference for one of the two in each pair within 30 seconds. So, in your mind, what would be the six most important factors relevant to your choice of the prize motorcycle?
After about 30 minutes of explaining and clarifying with me, KP specified these six factors:
- Engine Configuration with nine different categories (Parallel Twin, Parallel Triple, Parallel 4, Parallel 6, V-Twin, V-4, Boxer Twin, Boxer 4, and Boxer 6).
- Engine Power in units of horsepower.
- Torque in units of foot pounds.
- Riding Style with five categories (Cruiser, Adventure, Standard, Sport, and Touring).
- Luggage Capacity in units of liters.
- Range at Full Capacity in units of miles.
In our hypothetical research, the experimenter would assemble a sample of 150 different motorcycles with pictures and descriptions of each on the six factors. In a series of 200 trials KP would choose which of two motorcycles he would prefer to receive as a prize, each trial lasting only 30 seconds. For each trial, the motorcycles for comparison in pairs would be chosen at random from the sample of 150, with replacement after each trial.
The experimenter would utilize a special computer enabling machine learning through Artificial Intelligence (AI). For the “learning phase” the computer would be given the input of pictures and descriptions of the two compared motorcycles, the same as presented to KP, and also the output of KP’s choice for the first 180 trials. For the “prediction phase,” consisting of the final 20 trials, the computer would still be given the input of pictures and descriptions of compared cycles as given to KP, but the computer would predict what KP’s choices would be! An impressive rate of correct predictions, pointing in favor of determinism, might be 90 percent plus. Before revealing the predictions to KP, he would be asked and would presumably agree that his will was free in making all his choices. Of course, the greater the number of learning trials for the AI, the better it would become at prediction. The computer learns to simulate the decision making process of the subject and thereby make accurate predictions of choices. KP would be likely to give up his belief in free will if the prediction accuracy rate were quite high.
According to my model of determinism, KP has some Neural Choice Mechanism (NCM) in his brain that captures relevant information from all his prior conditions and which leads to values associated with the different categories or states on the six different factors pertinent to each motorcycle. Obviously, all this information will have come from reading about motorcycles, talking with others about them, watching them, tinkering with them, and especially riding them for thousands of miles over many years. The information constitutes KP’s competence and value basis, which enables him to make his 200 binary choices in the hypothetical experiment. By some implicit algorithm in KP’s NCM, the values on the different factors are combined to get an overall value for each motorcycle, and then KP naturally selects the motorcycle in the pair with the highest overall value. What the AI does is simulate his brain, allowing future choices (the last 20) to be predicted from past choices (the first 180). In this experiment the researcher would be using past behavior to predict future behavior (approach #3).
This type of experiment could be repeated with different subjects and different kinds of choices between two candidate items, such as jobs, employees, relationship partners, cars, houses, colleges and universities, clothing, and perhaps even worldviews, etc. High rates of accurate prediction would not only support determinism but might persuade many advocates of libertarian free will to change their minds.
We still have much to learn about human decision making, but we now have methods and tools to help us get answers, moving the controversy a little more from philosophy to science.
About the AuthorGary J. Whittenberger Ph.D. is a freelance writer and retired psychologist, now living in North Hollywood, California. He was formerly a leader in many freethought groups in Tallahassee, Florida. He received his doctoral degree from Florida State University after which he worked for 23 years as a psychologist in prisons. He has written many published articles on science, philosophy, psychology, and religion. He is the author of two books: God Wants You to be an Atheist: The Startling Conclusion from a Rational Analysis, and God and Natural Disasters: A Debate Between an Atheist and a Christian.
“We suffer more in imagination than in reality.” —Seneca
A young woman is walking down a crowded street when she suddenly feels a pain in her wrist accompanied by dizziness and believes she is the victim of a syringe attack from a passer-by.1 Another woman is out at a popular South London nightspot. After dancing with a stranger who offers to buy her a drink, she refuses, and they soon part company. Before long, she feels a prickling sensation on her arm but pays little notice. Later she becomes dizzy and passes out. The press latches onto the incident as a needle attack. One headline proclaims: “Waitress Doped by Stranger at Bar.”2 Over the past year, scores of similar cases have been reported across Europe, mainly in British and French nightclubs. However, the above incidents happened nearly a century ago when waves of similar cases were recorded throughout North America and Europe. During both periods, the attacker melted into the shadows and was never caught in the act.
A fascinating aspect of social panics is that they often recur throughout history. The names and the places may have changed, but the same patterns reappear. The most recent wave began in the spring of 2021 when alarming reports of needle attacks started to appear across Great Britain, where police have logged over 1,300 cases.3 In recent months, French authorities have recorded at least 300 incidents.4 Conspicuously, there is yet to be a single confirmed case or conviction. The typical victim is a young woman out clubbing with friends when she feels lightheaded after drinking a modest amount of alcohol. She would feel faint or pass out and be taken home or to a hospital. The next day, she has trouble recalling the previous night’s events. Then, after hearing suggestions that she may have been stuck with a syringe, she scrutinizes her body for evidence of an attack and finds vague signs confirming her suspicions: a scratch, bruise, bump or blemish that is assumed to be an injection site. The panic began amidst sensational British media reports describing a few high-profile cases and calling for more victims to come forward, prompting a deluge of social media posts. As more and more women shared their experiences, including photos of suspected puncture marks, there was a public outcry for police to do more, generating even more media reports. Police data provided to a 2022 inquiry in the UK House of Commons revealed that most “victims” were female (88 percent), between the ages of 18 and 21 (73 percent), and the majority of incidents occurred at clubs and pubs (93 percent).5
Red Flags and Faulty MemoriesThere are many reasons for skepticism. To stick someone with a needle while clubbing with friends—and without anyone realizing, defies credulity. Dr. Adam Winstock, a British psychiatrist specializing in addiction, observes that to be able to inject someone in a dark club through the victim’s clothing would be highly challenging, as would be keeping the needle in the victim long enough to administer the drug.6 Forensic toxicologist John Slaughter concurs, noting that injecting someone without their knowledge would be incredibly difficult.7 Another red flag involves the array of reported symptoms. Soon after reports of “spiking” began to emerge, one British tabloid published a list of indicators that someone has been spiked. They include confusion, loss of balance, vision problems, nausea, vomiting, feeling “drunker” than expected, and losing consciousness. The problem is that these symptoms are indistinguishable from being intoxicated.8 In January, the head of emergency services for Britain’s National Health Service, Dr. Adrian Boyle, told a UK government inquiry that in most cases when suspected spike victims were examined in emergency rooms, no sedatives were found in their system. In cases where drugs were present, most were prescriptions. In one suspected victim, tests revealed the presence of GHB, a central nervous system depressant used to treat sleep disorders. It causes drowsiness, reduces heart rate, and can be dangerous if misused. Yet, it is so thick and viscous that it would be very difficult to inject.9
Thanks to decades of memory and cognition research, it is well-known that human recall of even recent events is notoriously unreliable. Before their attack, many victims admitted that they had been drinking but were adamant that they were not inebriated. However, a study of suspected drink-spiking in Australia found that people often underestimate the amount of alcohol they consume. In one instance, a 17-year-old girl was rushed to the hospital after drinking a single glass of vodka—or so she said. Upon further questioning, she recalled also drinking beer and whisky. The study analyzed blood and urine samples of 97 patients who presented at hospital emergency departments. Not one had any traces of sedatives.10 Another study examined 75 primarily female patients who presented at a hospital casualty ward in Wales and told doctors their drinks had been spiked while at a local club or bar. Researchers found no evidence that any of the women had consumed spiked beverages. Twenty percent had recreational drugs in their system, while nearly two-thirds had been drinking excessively.11 The lead researcher, emergency room physician Dr. Hywel Hughes, observed that claiming their drink was spiked may be used as an excuse by embarrassed patients after becoming incapacitated from a night of binge drinking. Local physician Dr. Peter Saul concurred: “There had always been a suspicion that people would say that their drinks had been spiked when perhaps they had misjudged how much alcohol they were taking. If you go home and your parents are there, and you are vomiting on the path…you get sympathy if you say, ‘My drink was spiked.’ You don’t get sympathy if you say, ‘We spent too long in the bar.’”12
Social panics involve imaginary or exaggerated threats to society by nefarious individuals or groups. Historical scapegoats include witches, Jews, Communists, foreigners, and homosexuals. Outbreaks are often triggered by a sensational media report that receives saturation coverage. A major figure in the needle-spiking panic is Sarah Buckle. The young Nottingham University student was clubbing with friends on the night of September 28, 2021, when she passed out—only to wake up in the hospital with no recall of the previous night. After an uneventful evening, she said: “I started being sick all over myself, and my friends could sense something was wrong.” A young woman vomiting during a night out on the town with friends is not unusual. In a later interview, she appears to indicate that she had imbibed a significant amount of alcohol, telling a journalist that she “wasn’t intoxicated on a stupid level or overly drunk.”13 She only considered the possibility of having been “spiked” after it was mentioned by attending medical personnel. That’s when she noticed discoloration on her left hand and a mark resembling a tiny pinprick.14
A Crime in Search of CriminalsReports of needle-spiking have been spreading throughout mainland Europe in recent months. On May 4, 2022, eighteen-year-old Tomas Laux attended a rap concert in Lille, Northern France. After drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, he became dizzy and had a headache. He also noticed a mysterious bruise and what appeared to be a puncture mark on his arm. The next day, still feeling unwell, Laux sought medical treatment and was told there was evidence of a needle prick. Tests for HIV and hepatitis were negative. Incidents like this have prompted French authorities to intensify efforts to capture those believed responsible. The French Interior Ministry recently launched a national campaign to raise awareness of the issue by distributing warning leaflets to clubbers. Despite the hundreds of reports, no arrests have been made, no needles have been found, and no motive has been established.15
Similar needle-spiking incidents have been reported in other parts of Western Europe. At a street party near Kaatsheuvel, the Netherlands, on Saturday, April 21, six people presented to a first-aid post reporting that they believed they had been spiked with a needle.16 On the same day in Mechelen, Belgium, a group of soccer supporters began experiencing mysterious symptoms during a match. It started when a young woman collapsed and was taken away by emergency services. Soon after, more women followed suit. In all, fourteen people at the match were taken ill. Media reports blamed needle attacks. One newspaper headline read: “Syringe Spiking: 14 people attacked…” Yet of the eight people brought to the hospital, none had drugs in their system.17 The situation escalated a few days later when 24 teenage girls developed headaches, nausea, and breathing problems at a festival in Hasselt, Belgium. Several victims said they felt a prick before their symptoms developed. An unnamed witness said, “We heard that a woman had fallen from a drug syringe, and then we saw several other people fall.” The festival was halted, and more than 3,000 attendees were evacuated. Ten of the victims were taken to the hospital as a precautionary measure. Four girls had their urine tested for drugs; the results were negative.18
The Historical BackdropNeedle-spiking panics have been occurring for more than a century. There was a major poison needle scare in the United States in 1914. Young women would feel a stinging sensation in their arm while at a theatre or other public place, then suddenly start to feel dizzy. It was believed that they had been injected with a powerful narcotic, and that as the drug began to take effect, the malefactor would step in to help and guide the victim to a waiting cab where they would be whisked away to some sinister fate.19 Similar panics occurred in the UK throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1932, there were so many reports that police suspected there was a drugging gang at work in London, employing both men and women to inject and then kidnap young girls.20 In fact, “drug needle attacks,” as the tabloids called them, were seen as such a growing evil that Scotland Yard considered employing plain clothes female officers to try and catch the culprits. There were hundreds of reported attacks in the first half of 1932 alone.21
Social panics arise in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. It may be no coincidence that the spiking epidemic has coincided with the easing of pandemic restrictions. British nightclubs had only just returned to normal in the summer of 2021, after two years of isolation and disrupted routines. Bombarded with frightening news reports about COVID, as clubs reopened there was still a fear of the virus and guilt associated with the possibility that one might catch it and then pass it on to vulnerable loved ones. The needle, an object of fear for many, may represent anxiety about vaccinations and fear of contamination.
The mythical evil needle-spiker preying on vulnerable women joins a long list of panics involving phantom assailants that have terrorized communities for centuries: Spring Heeled Jack (1837–38); the French hatpin stabber of 1923: the “mad gasser” of Mattoon, Illinois (1944); and the phantom slasher of Taipei (1956); even the recent claims of sonic or microwave attacks on U.S. embassy staff in Cuba and around the world. These are but a few examples.22, 23
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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Social media posts have added a new twist to the panic—reports of women being intentionally spiked with an HIV-contaminated needle. In some of these stories, the woman regains consciousness only to find a note in her pocket telling her she has HIV and later tests positive. This is a new version of a classic 1980s urban legend: “AIDS Mary,” where the victim awakens after a one-night stand to find the words: “Welcome to the world of AIDS” written in lipstick scribbled on the bedroom mirror.
The needle-spiking panic may function as a cautionary tale. Similar panics keep re-emerging throughout history, only the particulars change to reflect current fears. The night club takes the place of the scary forest; the syringe-wielding maniac, the Big Bad Wolf. And we all know what happens to young girls who don’t heed the warnings and stray from the path.
About the AuthorsRobert E. Bartholomew is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. He has written numerous books on the margins of science covering UFOs, haunted houses, Bigfoot, lake monsters—all from a perspective of mainstream science. He has lived with the Malay people in Malaysia, and Aborigines in Central Australia. He is the co-author of two seminal books: Outbreak! The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior with Hilary Evans, and Havana Syndrome with Robert Baloh.
Paul Weatherhead resides in West Yorkshire, England, where he teaches international students research skills and critical thinking. His book, Weird Calderdale, takes a skeptical approach to classic cases of UFO abduction, ghosts, and phantom attacker cases in West Yorkshire. He is also a musician playing electric mandolin with the cult folk-rock group “The Ukrainians.”
References1. …Epidemic of Imaginary Outrages. The Poisoned Needle. (1914, April 14). Manchester Evening News, 6. 2. …Waitress Doped by Stranger at Bar. (January 27, 1932). Daily Herald (London), 9. 3. https://bit.ly/3AhdwYK 4. https://bit.ly/3NIJFfa 5. https://bit.ly/3nw2MhJ 6. https://bbc.in/3a4DHHs 7. https://bit.ly/3R5aw7K 8. https://bit.ly/3AfGVTn 9. https://bit.ly/3AhnGIY 10. https://bit.ly/3Ahs1vE 11. https://bit.ly/3QYWlRM 12. https://bit.ly/3NBBctO 13. https://bit.ly/3I4gZMp 14. https://bit.ly/3nuGfSe 15. https://bit.ly/3QYXTLA 16. https://bit.ly/3uggPf0 17. https://bit.ly/3bIhfEp 18. https://bit.ly/3NEohYa 19. …Epidemic of Imaginary Outrages. The Poisoned Needle. (1914, April 14). Manchester Evening News, 6. 20. Drugging-Gang Attacks Girls. (1932, January 27). Daily Herald, 9. 21. Girls’ Peril from Drug-Needle Attacks in the Street… (1932, March 6). The People. 22. Evans, H., & Bartholomew, R. (2009). Outbreak: The Encyclopedia of Extraordinary Social Behavior. Anomalist Books. 23. Baloh, R.W., & Bartholomew, R. (2020). Havana Syndrome. Copernicus Books.
Anyone who regularly consumes media or just casually monitors the state of race relations over the past two decades will likely have the perception that society is being torn apart over issues of race. In fact, polls support that perception. Gallup, for example, began tracking data in the early 2000s on the “perception of positive race relations among Black and White U.S. adults.” As evident in the graph below, the perception that people are able to see past racial differences and get along is at its lowest level in decades.1 The pattern of race relations is interesting. Throughout the 2000s and into the early 2010s, most people—White or Black—tended to perceive race relations as improving. That changed suddenly in 2014 with a plunge in race relations that continues to the present day.
Figure 1
It is important to understand how this happened. One possibility is that things have gotten worse and that racism has made a stunning comeback in some form. However, the data don’t bear that out. It is widely understood that explicit racism, such as the belief that people from different races are less valuable, not as smart, shouldn’t marry people from other races, etc., has experienced a remarkable decline since the Civil Rights era. Pollsters, for example, used to routinely ask how Americans feel about interracial marriage. It wasn’t until 1967 and the landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that laws banning interracial marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Today, the legality of interracial (and indeed same-sex) marriage is protected by the case law and widely accepted by the public.
Such trends in race relations have led some to argue that polls only measure explicit bias, whereas implicit bias remains unconscious. Hidden bias can be, purportedly, measured through what is known as the Implicit Association Test (IAT). It is claimed to identify unconscious biases (including racism, misogyny, ableism, and others), even among members of the oppressed minority, thus making them “self-hating.” The task for measuring racial bias, for example, asks participants to sort Black and White faces (by pressing computer keys) into one of two categories: European American or African American. The participants are then tasked with sorting a list of words (Joy, Terrible, Love, Agony, Peace, Horrible, Wonderful, Nasty…) into categories of either “Good” or “Bad.” Then, the words and the Black and White faces appear on the screen one at a time, and the participants are asked to sort them into categories of either African American/Good or European American/Bad. The word “joy,” for example, would go into the “Good” category, while a White face would go into the second category. This sorting process goes noticeably slower. Finally, participants are tasked with sorting the words and faces into the categories of European American/Good or African American/Bad. Many respond more quickly when White faces are paired with positive words and when Black faces are paired with negative words. That reaction time difference is claimed to be a measure of their implicitly racist attitudes toward African Americans because it’s harder for the participants’ unconscious minds to link African Americans with positive words.
The scientific validity of the IAT, however, has taken a hit in recent years.2 As the renowned social psychologist Carol Tavris wrote in Skeptic:
It was unclear what those microsecond “associations” meant; it seemed a leap to call it a measure of prejudice; at best it seemed simply to be capturing a familiar cultural association or stereotype, in the same way that people would be quicker to pair bread + butter than bread + avocado. A person of any age might be aware of negative associations between old people and mental decline without being prejudiced against old people in general. One team got an IAT effect by matching target faces with nonsense words and neutral words that had no evaluative connotations at all. They concluded that the IAT does not measure emotional evaluations of the target but rather the salience of the word associated with it—how much it stands out—and negative words attract more attention. When they corrected for these factors, the presumed unconscious prejudice faded away.3
In his Scientific American column on the subject Michael Shermer wrote of the IAT:
I’m skeptical. First, unconscious states of mind are notoriously difficult to discern and require subtle experimental protocols to elicit. Second, associations between words and categories may simply be measuring familiar cultural or linguistic affiliations—associating blue and sky faster than blue and donuts does not mean I unconsciously harbor a pastry prejudice. Third, negative words have more emotional salience than positive words, so the IAT may be tapping into the negativity bias instead of prejudice. Fourth, IAT researchers have been unable to produce any interventions that can reduce the alleged prejudicial associations. A 2016 meta-analysis by Patrick Forscher and his colleagues published on the Open Science Framework examined 426 studies on 72,063 subjects and “found little evidence that changes in implicit bias mediate changes in explicit bias or behavior.” Fifth, the IAT does not predict prejudicial behavior. A 2013 meta-analysis by Frederick Oswald and his colleagues in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology concluded that “the IAT provides little insight into who will discriminate against whom.”4
Even if we take the concept of implicit biases at face value, evidence suggests these too are declining.5 There are certainly economic disparities between ethnic groups, with Indian, Taiwanese, and Filipino Americans having the highest average household income, tens of thousands of dollars ahead of the average White or Black household.6 Even on the central issue of police violence, according to the Washington Post database, police shootings of unarmed Black men are exceedingly rare,7 and scientific evidence suggests that class more than race,8, 9, 10 may predict police shootings, though small race-related predictors may exist for non-lethal use of police force.11 We needn’t believe that the U.S. is a racial utopia to nonetheless conclude that the concepts of “anti-blackness” or “White supremacy” cannot adequately explain the complexities and nuances of data on race outcomes in the U.S.
So why do we have this perception of declining race relations, which seems to have little to do with the reality of what’s occurring in society? Unfortunately, a negative narrative has taken hold and is being promoted, even though data does not support and for the most part, contradicts it. In recent years, many of our elite institutions including academia, journalism, and corporate America have been criticized for exactly this: portraying a negative image of race in the U.S. that is out of sorts with the generally (though not always) positive trends.
Figure 2
To understand what is happening we need to examine the issue empirically. In an initial study, I hypothesized: Is it possible that news media are misinforming us, causing us to believe the issue of race in the U.S. is worse than it actually is? Columbia University linguist John McWhorter points out12 that U.S. news tends to give extreme coverage to situations in which an unarmed Black citizen is killed by police, but ignores similar situations in which the victim is an unarmed White citizen, even when the horrifying footage is available to the public (e.g., the killings of Tony Timpa and Daniel Shaver). Because we tend to overestimate events we can easily remember—a phenomenon termed the availability heuristic—this leads us to think that shootings of unarmed Black individuals are common and shootings of unarmed White individuals are nearly unheard of. As reported in a Skeptic Research Center study published in Skeptic,13 most Americans vastly overestimate the frequency of police shootings of unarmed Black citizens and this may be one explanation for that. Figure 2 (above) shows that asymmetry by political orientation.
Actual data regarding police shootings of unarmed citizens are nuanced and controversial. For example, based on the Washington Post data, unarmed White citizens are shot more often than unarmed Black citizens, but proportionally Black citizens are overrepresented among shooting victims (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Such proportional differences look bad and are mostly what gets reported in the media, but they don’t tell the whole story. The base rate of police encounters and the fact that Black individuals are proportionally overrepresented among perpetrators of violent crime14 (see Figure 4) should be included in interpretation of the data. The political scientist Philip Tetlock has identified what he calls the “forbidden base rate effect,”15 which results from the fact that no two groups of people—Blacks and Whites, men and women, Protestants and Catholics, Jews and Gentiles, Yankee fans and Red Sox fans—are identical on any average measure. Base rate neglect is a common cognitive error most of us make, but base rates become taboo when discussing group differences related to sensitive and controversial issues, such as income, marriage, home ownership, and crime.
Figure 4
At this time, I believe the evidence suggests that it is socioeconomic class, rather than race per se, that is the real issue underlying both police violence and perpetration of crime. Indeed, some forthcoming research I have recently conducted with my colleagues suggests this to be the case. Although young Black men are overrepresented as crime perpetrators, once class factors are controlled for, race is no longer a predictor of violent crime. Similarly, other data we’ve collected suggests that factors such as community mental health predict police misconduct reports more than race does. In other words, a low-income White individual who suffers from mental illness and does not respond to police requests is likely to be treated similarly to a Black individual in the same circumstances. The data do not establish that Black men are inherently more prone to crime, but neither do they indicate that being Black results in an elevated risk of violence at the hands of police; whereas lower income and possibly bad mental health do seem to increase this risk. It is also worth noting that police shootings of unarmed women of any race are exceedingly rare, suggesting police shootings aren’t random and can be best explained as a function of perceived risk (men commit by far more violent crimes than women). According to the Washington Post database, from 2015–2021, only 15 White and 7 Black unarmed women were fatally shot by police compared to 160 White and 130 Black unarmed men. Most news media fail to report on these complexities and nuances of the data.
This brings us back to the matter of the perceived worsening of race relations and the question as to what extent it is due to actual circumstances in real life, news media coverage, or something else? The Kyle Rittenhouse trial and verdict illustrate how news media mishandling of complex details is related to many in the public being misinformed about the case.16 For example, the narrative that Rittenhouse “crossed state lines” with a weapon specifically seeking to kill others was not at all accurate, as became apparent in his trial. Is it possible news media is driving the decline in race relations?
In a recently published study,17 I sought to address this issue by examining how fluctuations in race relations were related to both actual fatal shootings of unarmed Black men, as well as news media coverage of police shootings. I investigated this based on (1) Civiqs polling,18 which continuously surveys opinions on race relations; (2) the aforementioned Washington Post database for fatal police shootings of Black men; and (3) the frequency of articles on “police shootings” published in the New York Times, for news media coverage.
I found that race relations were not correlated with actual fatal police shootings of Black men. So, at least on this issue, it would seem that perceived race relations are not related to actual real events. In contrast, I did find a correlation between news media coverage of police shootings and race relations. The correlation was small, but perceptions that race relations are getting worse were correlated with greater news media coverage of police shootings.
This finding suggests that our perceptions of race relations are more a factor of what is covered in news media than of events occurring in real life. However, as we all know, correlation does not equal causation. So, I sought to expand on this hypothesis by examining whether changes in news media coverage predicted changes in race relations. We might expect this to occur as people absorb news media coverage, perhaps with a certain delay (a day or a few weeks). Working under these assumptions, I did not find any significant association.
This suggests that race relations and news media coverage are correlated, but there was no evidence to suggest news media are causing race relations to decline. Rather, they are best understood as co-occurring phenomena. That is, it might be better to think of news media as pandering to a preexisting narrative rather than causing it to spring into being. Certainly, it might be desirable for news media to present only the verified facts and hew close to reality. However, news media is a business and any business survives (and prospers) when it gives the customers what they want.
My study has some obvious limitations. First, it only captured the years 2016–2021 when race relations had already declined. And it only considered the (relatively, especially as of late) left-leaning outlet, the New York Times. In a forthcoming analysis, I hope to analyze some data stretching back to the early 2000s and examine the impact of both left- and right-leaning media (such as Fox News) on race relations.
Part of the takeaway from this initial data is that our current crisis in race relations cannot be laid exclusively at the news media’s door, even though we can be critical of their role in perpetuating misinformation about race in America. As is often the case with complex social phenomena, the decline in race relations is undoubtedly multifaceted. Although specific events such as the election of a president attributed to xenophobic rhetoric, or the tendency of news media to embrace hoaxes such as that of the actor Jussie Smollett can all be identified as specific anecdotes on this downward trend, anecdotes are not sufficient to explain the decline. Indeed, they likely only reinforce our views. Some say, “What do you expect when people on the Right elect racist politicians?” or “What do you expect when people on the Left justify rioting and looting?” In so doing, we avoid a deeper understanding.
A comprehensive understanding of the decline in race relations since 2014 would undoubtedly need to consider multiple factors. These may include the availability heuristic and the negativity bias (“if it bleeds it leads”), the polarizing fracturing of news media, as well as an embrace of cynical, nihilistic theories of United States history on both the political Right (MAGA) and Left (1619 Project). It’s imaginable that much of our struggles can be understood as a class battle between elites who control media, academia, and corporations, regardless of race or ethnicity. Real issues such as income inequality likely play a role, but so too does the ideological capture of academia by activists embracing scientifically deficient theories.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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The current state of race relations is undoubtedly complex. However, I think we can reverse this trend and examine these very real and complex issues not only critically, but objectively. In future writings, I hope to elaborate on how I see the decline in race relations developing since 2014, perpetuated by the elite reaction to events such as the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, as well as how we can work to reverse these trends.
For now, we can conclude that national news media are only a small part of a much larger challenge. We should demand that our news media report the news more faithfully and end the “moral clarity” era of journalism that has created so much misinformation. However, if we wish to see an improvement in race relations, we must understand the post-2014 trend clearly, acknowledging both those very real problems that do exist as well as how ideologically distorted narratives, from both Right and Left, cause more harm than good by preventing effective actions to resolve them.
About the AuthorChristopher J. Ferguson is a professor of psychology at Stetson University and licensed psychologist. He has done work on violent crime, media effects and societal panics for over two decades. He is author of the books How Madness Shaped History and Moral Combat: Why the War on Violent Video Games is Wrong as well as the historical mystery novel Suicide Kings. He lives in Orlando with his wife and son.
References1. https://bit.ly/3IljV6P 2. https://bit.ly/3dfiDMr 3. https://bit.ly/3Iiuc3W 4. https://bit.ly/3Gg9JLf 5. Charlesworth, T.E.S., & Banaji, M.R. (2019). Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. Long-Term Change and Stability From 2007 to 2016. Psychological Science, 30(2), 174–192. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618813087 6. https://bit.ly/3GbjLgv 7. https://wapo.st/2ZUDD8i 8. Reilly, W. (2020). Taboo: 10 Facts You Can’t Talk About. Regnery Publishing. 9. https://bit.ly/3G3913Q 10. https://bit.ly/3psJhar 11. https://bit.ly/3lx7dbB 12. https://bit.ly/3df9nIc 13. https://bit.ly/3OvyEid 14. Beck, A.J. (2021). Race and Ethnicity of Violent Crime Offenders and Arrestees, 2018. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 15. https://bit.ly/31sArAY 16. https://bit.ly/3rzUatO 17. https://bit.ly/31vyR1d 18. https://bit.ly/3pnUCbM
What complicated, unsettling, contentious times these are for gender and sex, and thinking about the relationship of biology to either one. Traditionally, sex—the biology of female and male, usually defined by a person’s gametes (sperm or ova)—has been distinguished from gender, the cloak woven by culture, psychology, and society that shapes roles and behavior seen as appropriate for women and men. But the distinction is blurring. What is a woman? What is a man? Most transgender people claim an inherent, fixed gender identity, but how does that reconcile with the argument that gender identity is infinitely variable, malleable, and nonbinary?
With the rise of second-wave feminism in the 1960s, women in the social and physical sciences had their work cut out for them, distinguishing gender from sex to expose the male biases that interpreted all gender differences as being biologically determined—a historically convenient justification for sexist practices and discrimination. Some differences, studied in all seriousness, were in such skills as “finger dexterity,” said to explain why women were better at typing and cooking, and women’s “raging hormones,” said to make them unfit for serious work or political office because, who knows, they might start a war. Such “sex differences” were trampled to death in the crush of women entering professional occupations, once discrimination became illegal.
Understandably, most egalitarian-minded social scientists were reluctant to let biology in the door. When the honored feminist sociologist Alice Rossi proposed her “biopsychosocial” theory of mothering in the 1970s, arguing that maternal behavior was not solely learned but partly rooted in inborn sex differences, she brought the wrath of goddess on her head. Many young women were furious—they wanted the “bio” out of there. In those days, the rising fields of evolutionary biology and psychology were regarded with special alarm, and no wonder. Ever since Darwin, evolutionary biologists and their best-selling popularizers had been telling us that male promiscuity and female monogamy are hard-wired reproductive strategies. As E.O. Wilson said, “It pays for males to be aggressive, fickle, and undiscriminating. In theory, it is more profitable for females to be coy, to hold back until they can identify males with the best genes…. Human beings obey this biological principle faithfully.” In all my years of writing about the science of gender differences, that is one of the most enduring I’ve found: Men really, really, like this theory more than women do.
To understand why the coy female is a myth, stop reading this essay and dive into Frans de Waal’s magnum opus, Different: Gender Through the Eyes of a Primatologist, and zoologist Lucy Cooke’s ill-titled but equally brilliant Bitch: A Revolutionary Guide to Sex, Evolution, and the Female Animal. With wit and erudition, and an array of descriptions of animal behavior from insects to fish to birds to our nearest ape relatives to us, these two authors explore how evolutionary biologists have been demolishing Darwin’s views of the “coy female” who waits quietly while the males duke it out to win her favor.
Discoveries of the existence of “sexually adventurous” (to replace the laden word “promiscuous”) behavior in female birds and other species set the stage for what the pioneering biologist Patricia Gowaty called “Darwinian feminism.” The term was needed, says de Waal, because so many feminists regarded evolutionary science and genetics as being “unfriendly to their cause.” (Hostile to their cause, more like.) Yet, as women have done in every scientific field and profession they have entered, they identified male biases in what was studied, how it was studied, and what conclusions were drawn. “There is no conspiracy here,” says Cooke, “just blinkered science.” Cooke and de Waal remove the blinkers, and their readers will never see the world the same way again. The revelations produced by Darwinian feminists—men among them—have transformed what we know about primates, what we know about evolution, and what we know about females. The focus has shifted from the penis to the clitoris, from the passive female to the female who actively chooses her partners. Even the ovum selects the genetically compatible sperm she will admit entry, and it’s not always the first guy who gets there—or even her romantic partner’s.
These books are important reading on two levels: first, for the riveting research they contain. Some of the same stories and studies turn up in both, but they complement each other beautifully. De Waal gives us his insider’s experience as a world-renowned primatologist whose life work has focused on our two closest ape relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos; Cooke, a superb science writer with a Master’s in zoology, covers the spectrum of female sexuality (and many other topics) throughout the animal kingdom, including more about spiders and hyenas than you ever thought you wanted to know. Second, both books offer exemplary lessons about science: how hard it is to overturn dogma and established paradigms; how resistant even leading scientists are to accepting disconfirming evidence. When faced with anomalies, like the blatant promiscuity of females, Darwin’s true believers looked away. They denied what was in front of their eyes; they blocked publication of the disconfirming evidence; they worked hard to squeeze the discrepant evidence into their existing beliefs; some manipulated their data.
Both authors tell the saga of Angus Bateman, the British geneticist and botanist who, in 1948, formulated Bateman’s Principle, which embedded itself in every biology textbook. Bateman, observing fruit flies, determined that females will “be choosy and reticent to make sure that they conceive with the best-quality males.” This was obedient Darwinism: The more partners males have, the greater the number of offspring; females produce the same number of offspring no matter how many partners they have. As Richard Dawkins, who was Cooke’s tutor at Oxford, summed it up: “The word excess has no meaning for a male.” Cooke quotes biologist Zuleyma Tang-Martinez’s gentle riposte: “History has not been kind to this pronouncement.” Try speaking of “excess” to the female lioness and chimpanzee who mate hundreds of times a day during oestrus with multiple males, leaving the poor guys panting on the ground. “A wild female chimpanzee engages in six thousand matings with more than a dozen males during her lifetime,” de Waal writes, yet she produces only five or six offspring. Impossible! What was evolution thinking?
Do female primates enjoy sex and have orgasms? What evolutionary reason for this could there be? Orgasm, as Desmond Morris asserted and many still believe, is unique to human women (supposedly because it bonds us to our promiscuous male partners). But then why does every female mammal, from mouse to elephant, have a clitoris, some larger than penises? “The clitoris likely evolved to turn sex into a pleasant, addictive affair,” de Waal speculates, which would explain why the largest and most prominent clitorises are found in “species marked by multipurpose eroticism”—such as dolphins and bonobos. Bonobos, says de Waal, are “Kama Sutra apes” who “mate in every conceivable posture, including some that we are incapable of, such as hanging upside down by their feet.” Female bonobos get enormous pleasure from their sexual activities, which include masturbation. Some use “handmade ‘French ticklers’ made of twigs,” Cooke reports. Many embarrassed scientists refused to acknowledge that all that genital rubbing and stroking was sexual. Isn’t it “extreme affection?” they’d ask de Waal. “I couldn’t help but point out,” he replied, “that if I were to show this kind of ‘affection’ on a busy street, I’d be in handcuffs within minutes.”
How can it be that females in 93 percent of all species have multiple partners? Doesn’t evolution want them to be monogamous and protect their precious eggs? Didn’t these females read Bateman? The fairy wren didn’t. She chooses a male with the most splendid blue plumage to be her “social partner,” but later she will sneak off to have sex with some neighboring naughty boys. DNA testing shows that more than three-fourths of her chicks will have been sired by different males. (The study of bird sex is a thriving career nowadays. One investigator told Cooke, “We’re basically pornothologists.”) When Patricia Gowaty tested the paternity of the eggs of female bluebirds, her results were welcomed by the male scientific establishment with dead silence. No wonder, says Cooke wryly: She was accusing the bluebird of happiness, a Disney heroine, of being a Jezebel! A male ethology professor told Gowaty that the female bluebirds in her study must have been “raped.” This would be a challenge, seeing as how male songbirds have no penis.
Why would some 450 animal species (and counting) engage in same-sex behavior? Since this activity doesn’t produce offspring, what possible evolutionary reason for it could there be? Therefore, when a male animal mounts another male and ejaculates, traditional Darwinians were forced to conclude that is not “homosexual” or “same-sex” behavior, but pseudo- or sham sexuality, or a sign of dominance. It couldn’t be what it looked like. When primatologist Linda Cooke published a field report of same-sex behavior in monkeys, she was accused of doctoring photos and misinterpreting the animals’ behavior: females were mounting each other “by mistake”!
Sadly for the enthusiastic gay community and their allies who love this research, I must pause to tell readers who fondly remember Silo and Roy, the “gay” penguins who hatched an egg and raised baby Tango to healthy penguinhood, that they didn’t stay together. Silo left Roy and took up with a California gal named Scrappy. De Waal shows that there is no such thing as “gay penguins”—their relationships fluctuate so often that they are better considered bisexual. Likewise, Cooke reports that “lesbian” albatrosses will partner with a female for a couple of seasons and then switch to a male. There are no gay bonobos, either. On Kinsey’s scale of 0–6, exclusively homo- or heterosexual at each extreme, all bonobos are a perfect three. “Sex is no big deal for them,” de Waal explains. “It’s such a natural and spontaneous part of their lives that it is hard to detect a borderline between social and sexual affairs.”
One likely reason for female sexual adventurousness and same-sex behavior, obvious the second we hear it, is that sex is not only for reproduction. It’s also for bonding, affection, conflict resolution, and sheer pleasure. A randy giraffe wants to mount; he’s not thinking of siring calves. Only humans make the connection between intercourse and pregnancy. In the animal world, females who have several partners, even while pregnant, ensure the safety of their young. Because male primates have no concept of paternity, says de Waal, “nature may have implanted a simple rule of thumb…. ‘Tolerate and support the offspring of females with whom you have had sex in the recent past’.” Females who have sex with many males thereby reduce the risk that a new male partner will kill offspring that he didn’t sire, and the males provide food and protection as well.
Both authors have chapters on discoveries about animal behavior—such as the prevalence of terrible mothers and doting fathers, of aggressive females and peaceful males—that also threw traditional Darwinians into confusion. Consider the contortions that two male ornithologists went through in search of the “alpha male” among pinyon jays. “This took some doing,” Cooke writes, because “male pinyon jays are committed pacifists and hardly ever fight.” The researchers ended up counting subtle cues, like sideways glances that would get the “submissive” male to leave the feeder. They patiently recorded 2,500 of these “aggressive” encounters, and even then found that only 14 of 200 flock members “qualified for a place in the dominance network.” Nonetheless, they concluded: “There is little doubt that adult males are in aggressive control.” Some birds actually did display plenty of violence beyond annoyed looks—dueling in flight and pecking opponents fiercely; it was just that all the fighters were female. The researchers suggested lamely that the females were suffering from a hormone surge that produced “the avian equivalent of PMS which we call PBS (pre-breeding syndrome).” They made that up. “There is,” says Cooke, “no such thing as avian PBS.”
So much variety; so many evolutionary riddles. Why do the females of some insect species kill their male inseminators and eat them? Why do only human women and female whales have menopause, living years past their reproductive prime, remaining sexually active? As they offer answers, these books dispel many dated beliefs of male and female behavior. “While baboons inspired the myth that patriarchy is natural and that macho males make up the core of society,” says de Waal, “we now know that this isn’t true even for baboons, let alone for most of the other primates to which this idea was generalized.” Neither are males more hierarchical than females. “In almost every social animal, both sexes arrange themselves on a vertical scale. Anyone who has watched female chimps or bonobos “will be quickly disabused of notions about female egalitarianism.” (Both authors remind us that the term pecking order comes from hens, not cocks.) This is not inherently a bad thing; hierarchies are essential to smooth group living in every social species. We can, however, observe the difference between alphas who are obsessed with loyalty and obedience, who terrorize subordinates into submission, and those who are true leaders, neither abusive nor aggressive, who protect the underdog and keep the peace.
It is almost impossible to read these books without seeing ourselves in the animal behavior being described. De Waal himself describes a power play among his colleagues, in which an alpha male senior professor, the silverback gorilla of his department, was undermined by a coalition of junior faculty members who voted him out. His booming voice silenced, he retired within a year. “I had seen it all before,” notes de Waal, “only in another species.” Not that he suggests we should—or can—model ourselves after any other species, no matter how delighted we might be with the sex-loving bonobos or amused by the female chimps who, unlike males, will suddenly burst into screaming at each other for no apparent reason. Other primates hold up a mirror to ourselves, but they are not the same as us, so they only offer a comparison. “We cannot just go around the animal kingdom and pick and choose which species we like the best,” he says. But we cannot overlook the similarities either. De Waal knows that many people resist the comparison of humans with other animals on the grounds that our magnificent brains (and genitals) are unique. Indeed, a colleague told me that her copyeditor cautioned her not to use females as a noun because it feels demeaning, “as though you’re talking about animals.” This attitude is “idiocy” to de Waal: we are animals. “It’s all vanity,” he writes. “As if evolution came to a screeching halt when it reached the human (and only the human) neck, thus leaving our lofty heads alone!”
These books could not have come at a better time, with the debates about “sex” and “gender” reaching deafening levels. Both authors agree that gender and sex are profoundly intertwined and influenced by culture; that gender includes identities that don’t correspond to biological sex; and that “biological sex” is itself complicated by genetic, hormonal, and chromosomal anomalies. But here the authors diverge sharply: just how gender “fluid” are we humans?
De Waal emphasizes that for a great human majority, biological sex and gender identity are congruent. “We come into the world with a large monkey brain and the psychology that it entails, including how we navigate a world of (mainly) two sexes,” he argues, which is why our “gender radar” is always on, exquisitely attuned to height, muscularity, voice, and facial shape and structure. The discomfort that many people have with transgender individuals, or the greater attention a transman gets with a testosterone- lowered voice than he got as a female, “highlights how deeply primate sexual dimorphism sticks in our subconscious.” To overcome this bias, we must understand where it comes from, and that in turn requires us to separate biological science from political ideology: we don’t get to use biology to say that sexual orientation and transgender identity are innate and immutable, and then reject biological contributions to sexual dimorphism in other behavior.
Cooke, however, aims to persuade us that “sex is wildly variable and that gendered ideas based on assumptions of binary sex are nonsense.” She starts at the genetic and cellular level, with new discoveries that move beyond X and Y: “The entire process of sex organ determination involves an orchestra of around sixty genes working in concert.” They don’t sit neatly on either X or Y chromosome; they are scattered across the genome and have more than one function. She describes an astonishingly complex continuum between male and female, a plasticity that has persisted in reptiles, fish, and amphibians for millions of years across diverse species and thereby must have had evolutionary benefit. For most scientists, gonads determine what sex an animal is. But what to do with animals that transition from male to female and back again? Transitioning anemonefish (also called clownfish) have a female brain but male gonads. The fish thinks it is a female and behaves like one, fiercely battling another rival female put in its territory, even though it has testes. So is sex assigned by its gonads or its brain? Trans activists love the clownfish, as gay activists love Silo and Roy.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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We aren’t bonobos, but we aren’t penguins or anemonefish either. Across culture and history, our gendered sexual behavior has been as fluid as theirs, seeing as how humans can and do have sex in every possible combination, with every possible partner, in every possible way (apart from hanging by our feet, perhaps, and even then…). Will our sexual anatomy prove as fluid? Will the term “pregnant person” one day be a commonly accepted phrase instead of what it means to many today—an infuriating repudiation of female uniqueness, an eradication of biological women? Evolution is a work in progress; stay tuned. These two books, even as they blast a hole in our vanity, inspire awe in the breathtaking diversity of nature and the evolutionary roots of our behavior. Far from calling upon biology to justify the status quo, both authors are optimistic that our biology allows us to create more empathic, more egalitarian societies. Perhaps our human brain, for all its flaws, might help us get there.
This essay originally appeared in the TLS, April 29, 2022.
About the AuthorCarol Tavris, PhD, is a social psychologist and writer. She has written hundreds of articles, book reviews, and opeds on many topics in psychological science. Her books include Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), with Elliot Aronson; Estrogen Matters; and The Mismeasure of Woman. A Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, she has received numerous awards for her efforts to promote science and skepticism, including an award from the Center for Inquiry’s Independent Investigations Group; and an honorary doctorate from Simmons College for her work in promoting critical thinking and gender equity.
In 1998, an important study by psychologist Susan Blackmore was published in the Skeptical Inquirer,1 titled “Abduction by Aliens or Sleep Paralysis? (Skeptical).” Professor Blackmore began by referring to a Roper poll released in 1992 that purported to show that nearly four million Americans had been abducted by space aliens. The Roper organization provides a service by which other questions can be appended to the main polls. This supplemental part of the survey was designed and analyzed by self-identified UFO experts Budd Hopkins and David Jacobs. A representative sample of adults were given a card listing eleven experiences and were asked to say how often each had happened to them. The five main “indicators” were:
- waking up paralyzed with a sense of a strange person or presence or something else in the room
- feeling that you were actually flying through the air although you didn’t know why or how
- experiencing a period of time of an hour or more, in which you were apparently lost, but you could not remember why, or where you had been
- seeing unusual lights or balls of light in a room without knowing what was causing them, or where they came from
- finding puzzling scars on your body and neither you nor anyone else remembering how you received them or where you got them.
Answering “yes” to at least four of the five questions was considered to be strong evidence of an alien abduction. Of the 5947 people interviewed, two percent reported four or five of the indicators. Since the population represented by the sample was 185 million, the prorated estimate was 3.7 million.
To challenge Hopkins’ and Jacobs’ conclusion, Blackmore had 126 school children and 224 university students listen to a typical abduction story, draw pictures of the aliens, and then fill out a questionnaire based on the Roper survey questions including one about false awakenings (that is, dreaming you have woken up) as well as questions about amount of television viewing.
To summarize Blackmore’s results:
Large numbers of both adults and children reported having had most of the experiences. For each person, an “alien score” from 0 to 6 was given for the number of “correct” answers to the questions about the alien…, and another score for the number of Roper Poll indicator experiences reported (0–4).
For the children, the mean alien score was 0.95, and the mean number of experiences 1.51.… The drawings of aliens were roughly categorized by an independent judge into “grays” and “others.”… Twelve (12 percent) of the children drew grays and 87 did not. Not surprisingly, those who drew a gray also achieved higher alien scores, but they did not report more (supposed) alien sexperiences.
Those children who drew grays did not report watching more television. Nor was there a correlation between the amount of television watched and the alien score. Oddly, there was a small positive correlation between the amount of television watched and the number of experiences reported.
For the adults, mean alien score was 1.23 and mean number of experiences 1.64. Again, there was no correlation between the two measures. Seventeen of the adults drew grays, and 103 did not. And again, those who drew a gray achieved higher alien scores…but did not report more experiences.
Among the adults, those who drew grays were those who watched more television, and the amount of television watched correlated positively with the alien score.
If aliens have a breeding program to collect the best genes and skill sets, why haven’t they abducted our top scientists, military leaders, or the heads of Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and Amazon?
Blackmore noted that “the results provide no evidence that people who reported more of the indicator experiences had a better idea of what an alien should look like or what should happen during an abduction. If real gray aliens are abducting people from Earth, and the Roper Poll is correct in associating the indicator experiences with abduction, then we should expect such a relationship.” The results also suggest that “the popular stereotype is obtained more from television programs than from having been abducted by real aliens.”
Thus Blackmore results argue against the validity of Roper survey results.
Fantasy Prone PersonalityResearch has shown that at least some supposed abductions by aliens were due to overactive and uncontrollable imaginations of individuals with Fantasy Prone Personality disorder (FPP). According to Skeptic contributor Robert Bartholomew,2 there is an entire class of persons who “are prone to experiencing exceptionally vivid and involved fantasies. Such people often have difficulty distinguishing between fantasy and reality…. Based on preliminary research by J.R. Hilgard and subsequent work by Wilson and Barber, approximately four percent of the population falls into the FPP category, ranging in degree from mild to intense.” This led to the working hypothesis that FPP individuals are in large part responsible for the reports of interactions with space aliens. Bartholomew and his co-author Howard relied on their own extensive database and performed a content analysis of the biographies of 154 so-called “abductees,” and found that over 85 percent exhibited symptoms of FPP. Based on this analysis, it seems plausible that FPP is a major source of alien close contact and kidnapping stories.
Another study3 found that over half of FPP people spent a large part of their childhoods “playing” with imaginary friends and animals, as well as with actual dolls and stuffed toys that they thought were alive. Some reported interacting with leprechauns, elves, angels, fairies, and the like. The vast majority spent at least half their waking hours fantasizing. These fantasies can be so intense that many could actually feel, hear, and smell the imaginary phenomena. Similar physiological reactions can also occur when not fantasizing. It happens to some while watching movies or television. One subject reported shivering when watching winter scenes from the film Dr. Zhivago. While fantasizing, FPP individuals exhibit actual emotions such as laughing, crying, and sexual arousal. Nearly all have sexual fantasies which are so real to them that 75 percent experience orgasms. The FPP person has trouble distinguishing their fantasies from external reality, and in some cases cannot do so at all.
So-Called Medical EvidenceTrue believers counter that UFO abductees sometimes “present” with skin burns, rashes, nausea, headaches, dry mouths, etc. Sometimes (mostly with women) the injuries are blamed on sexual/medical invasive procedures performed by the alien captors. This was interpreted as overwhelming objective evidence that the stories were true and not fantasies. It was thought that people could lie but not cause themselves to suffer such injuries or illnesses.
In the famous 1967 case of Stefan Michalak from Falcon Lake, Manitoba, Canada, the burn marks from the alien spaceship were more like what occurs if one falls on a barbeque grill. Other “evidence” was equally dubious, and alcoholic intake was sometimes a factor. For details, photos and the original police report see the posting4 of Aaron Sakulich, who holds a PhD in Materials Science and Engineering. The information is entertaining, and at times comical. For example, the alleged “tracking implants” have turned out to be mundane objects the person did not realize had penetrated their bodies.
As for the other cases of “alien experiences,” they show a lack of knowledge of psychology and psychiatry. According to Bartholomew and Howard:5
The most frequently reported symptoms in our sample involved rash-like facial and body marks, itchiness, headaches, dizziness, and burning, or watery eyes. These symptoms typically occur in cases that report medical examinations by aliens where the subject is often stuck with a needlelike device and blood is extracted, or the subject is exposed to bright lights or X-rays. In a similar manner, psychosomatic reactions reported during mass hysteria outbreaks correspond with the prevailing social norm. According to investigators, psychosomatic symptoms occurring in cases of hysterical conversion and mass hysteria in general likewise include: skins rashes, fainting, trance states, dizziness, bad mouth taste, blurred vision, stomach complaints, sleepiness, headache, vomiting and dry mouth. Note that similar symptoms were associated with “witches” and their victims during the Salem witch trials of the late seventeenth century.
False Memory Syndrome and “Screen Memories”Many of the so-called abductees studied by Hough and Kalman in their 1997 book The Truth About Abductions were highly imaginative in a negative, paranoid way.6 The book has a useful chapter on False Memory Syndrome. Earlier research7 pointed out the many similarities between alien abduction memories and those of Satanic abduction. For the client or patient, the influence of a hypnotist combined with our cultural fascination with scifi and UFOs facilitates reaching an easy conclusion of a kidnapping by extraterrestrials. So-called “retrieved” memory details may be fantasies provided by the subject, or memories of other events reinterpreted as alien abductions.
In my own book on the subject,8 I hypothesized that instead of earthly events being “screen memories” to cover memories of alien abductions—as UFOlogists commonly assert—the opposite is sometimes true; namely, a victim of sexual assault invents a “screen memory” of being abducted by space aliens to cover the trauma of having been assaulted. Regarding the classic Betty and Barney Hill “abduction” of 1961, after seeing lights in the sky (most likely Saturn and Jupiter, the latter being especially bright then), the Hills may have been attacked by a group of men; probably men who followed them from the restaurant where, being a mixed race couple, the Hills were subjected to hostile, threatening stares. In his book Alien Abductions, Terry Matheson noted9 that the psychiatrist’s transcripts from the hypnosis sessions show that what Barney Hill reported blocking the road were men (dressed as “Nazis” with dark jackets), not aliens. On returning to their car after the incident, Hill’s wife Betty asked him “Do you believe in flying saucers now?” to which he replied, “Don’t be ridiculous. Of course I don’t.”
The hypothesis that alleged memories of alien abduction are “screen memories” for actual human sexual assault was independently proposed by S.M. Powers.10 She posited that the claim of having been experimented on by aliens may serve to mask a traumatic memory of human sexual abuse. The pseudo-memory of an alien abduction is more bearable, as it does not involve a breach of trust by a relative, neighbor, or other familiar person. The victims of the assaults thus employed two coping mechanisms—amnesia and the creation of a “screenings memory” of a fictional abduction by extraterrestrials (ETs). Bias of the hypnotist colors the nature of this pseudo-memory, whether traumatic or uplifting. A recent study11 supports most of these earlier hypotheses:
Previous research has shown that people reporting contact with aliens, known as “experiencers,” appear to have a different psychological profile compared to control participants. They show higher levels of dissociativity, absorption, paranormal belief and experience, and possibly fantasy proneness. They also appear to show greater susceptibility to false memories…. The present study reports an attempt to replicate these previous findings as well as assessing tendency to hallucinate and self-reported incidence of sleep paralysis in a sample of 19 UK-based experiencers and a control sample matched on age and gender. Experiencers were found to show higher levels of dissociativity, absorption, paranormal belief, paranormal experience, self-reported psychic ability, fantasy proneness, tendency to hallucinate, and self-reported incidence of sleep paralysis. No significant differences were found between the groups in terms of susceptibility to false memories.
Alien kidnappings are not real, are a product of human culture, and may be manifestations of sleep disorders or mental problems.
“Experiencers” tend to have higher levels of absorption and disassociation. In the book The Omega Project, “abductees” were reported to experience greater childhood trauma and stress, including abuse (physical, sexual, emotional, neglect) than a control group.12
Critique of the Big Three: Hopkins, Jacobs, and MackAfter reading his book Alien Abductions, I contacted Professor Terry Matheson. In his email reply, he noted that while Jacobs (author of the Roper poll referenced in the opening section of this essay) is a very bright person, he might be suffering from a form of Stockholm Syndrome as a result of his long immersion in the world of the abductees. Matheson also noted (personal communication, March 2013):
Jacobs apparently believes that ET aliens can somehow manipulate our DNA to create hybrids, for purposes that he can only speculate on, while not entertaining the alternate scenario that, if they are that sophisticated, why bother with us at all, as intermediaries? Why not just take a few of us, get our DNA, and duplicate it on their Mother Ship, or wherever, and do all the hybridizing off-shore, as it were?
Surely beings who could create such hybrids would do it much more efficiently. Indeed, it was this mutually exclusive combination of apparent technological sophistication and sheer stupidity and ham-fistedness that eventually convinced me that the entire narrative was nonsense. Not to mention the inconsistency between the way they are able to enter our homes and permeate solid walls, etc.—which suggests technological sophistication beyond our wildest dreams—while telling the abductees they won’t remember anything (but they always do), or that they won’t feel pain (but they always do), is just beyond belief. They are ahead of us enough to travel light years to get here, but they haven’t discovered painkillers as effective as those we’ve had around for the past several hundred years.
One also wonders if the aliens have a breeding program to collect the best genes and skill sets, why haven’t they abducted our top scientists, military leaders, or the heads of Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Amazon etc., who would appear to have more to offer them than the typical abductee.
In my own book, I am very critical of Budd Hopkins, David Jacobs, and John Mack. The latter was a psychiatrist who should have realized that his patients had peculiar mental problems, rather than simply believing their wild stories about being abducted by space aliens, and then crediting himself with creating a scientific revolution. His first two subjects were a visual artist and a history professor, respectively, before they became writers of best-selling “true” alien abduction stories. Neither had any formal training in hypnosis (the “tool” they relied on to gather “evidence” to support their hypotheses). Their use of leading questions and suggestions was guaranteed to elicit the responses they desired. Hopkins’ main motivation seems to have been to sell books. (Skeptic publisher Michael Shermer tells the story of meeting Budd Hopkins in the Green Room of Bill Maher’s ABC television series Politically Incorrect when both were guests. When Shermer asked Hopkins what he does for a living, he replied “I write science fiction and fantasy.”)
Jacobs’ reputation took a hit due to the Emma Woods (a pseudonym) controversy, wherein Jacobs was “treating” Ms. Woods by hypnotizing her over the phone for her trauma of having been forced to have sexual intercourse with aliens (the crossbreeding program), and he asked for her used underwear to test for alien sperm residue. He also recommended the use of a chastity belt to prevent further intrusions. In 2016, Jacobs posted a lengthy, detailed defense online.13 The following excerpt exemplifies its tone:
Between September 27, 2005 and December 9, 2006 violence against her and threats against me increased. Security for the abduction phenomenon increases enormously when abductees help hybrids who might or might not be living here. By June 2006, her abductors were seriously attempting to stop her from talking with me. Rather than simply telling her not to deal with me, which they did many times, they also engaged in increasingly physical and sexual violent behavior against her when she continued to disobey.
Another highly relevant excerpt states:
Within a few months of discovering that her sleep disorder had dictated her behavior, Emma suddenly changed her theory entirely. She now concluded that she was not and never had been an abductee. Everything she had ever said about her abductions was because my leading questions had forced her into false memories. I had made her believe that she was an abductee. Years later she would marvel that I “actually believed” abductions were real.
The above is ironic because it shows that layperson Woods had over the years become educated about the dangers of using leading questions in hypnosis and that she was aware of sleep disorders as an explanation of “abductions.” She was now much more knowledgeable than Jacobs, who still believed in aliens attacking women for a crossbreeding program, and even writing threatening emails to him.
Hopkins’ reputation also took a hit during roughly the same period when in January 2011, his wife Carol Rainey (a professional filmmaker with university degrees who, inter alia, helped scientists obtain millions in research funding and was thus familiar with the scientific method) wrote an online article14 debunking abductions and criticizing the methodology of Jacobs and her husband. Rainey accused Hopkins and Jacobs of ignoring any evidence or logic that contradicted their views, and of not following up on obvious ways to test claims, while arrogantly asserting that “the evidence” kept mounting in favor of abductions and the presence of alien-human hybrids. She accused Jacobs of practicing medicine without a license when he told Woods that she suffered from multiple personality disorder and should take medication for it. Because Rainey was present for many of Hopkins’ sessions, co-authored a book with him, and knew Jacobs and Mack personally, her evaluation must be given considerable weight. In her article, she proposed a scientific way in which the hybrid and rape claims could be corroborated or falsified—DNA testing.
In contrast to Hopkins and Jacobs, John Mack was an MD and a psychiatrist and for years head of the Psychiatry department at Harvard University. In the preface to the revised edition of his book Abduction,15 he does distinguish between what his patients believed they saw and what he believes happened, but elsewhere he is quoted as believing aliens are abducting humans, and five times in the paperback edition of Abduction he clearly expressed that opinion. For example, he wanted all abductees brought to him for treatment lest they suffer at the hands of therapists, whose “ignorance and denial” of the truth of the abduction renders them incompetent. Using conventional approaches, he stated, will result in “wrong diagnoses and inappropriate treatment.” Unless the therapist is “willing to consider the possibilities of [abductees’] realities,” he argued, child abductees will have their trauma compounded.
In Abduction, Mack reveals the crudeness of his methodology and his own gullibility when he stated that the evidence for the existence of alien abductions depends largely on how the so-called abductee reports his experiences, the emotional appropriateness and intensity involved, and the investigator’s assessment of the reporter’s credibility. In the case of one subject “Dave,” Mack admitted that he was “quite convinced.” In the same book, he discussed the purposes of alien-human interaction, saying that his hybrid (crossbreed) patients are playing a vital role for future history, by changing our consciousness and perhaps breeding a race which will survive future cataclysms. My conclusion: there seems to be no difference between Mack and his patients in terms of their belief systems. But to be completely fair, during one of my radio appearances in 2016, a former research assistant of the late Dr. Mack called in to say that Mack and his team were very careful to rule out normal mental illness before considering the patient to have been in actual contact with space aliens.
In my book, I presented several cases right out of Abduction that document there was a great deal of evidence of paranoid schizophrenia, sexual abuse, sexual problems, sexual fantasies, and of sad and/or traumatic family backgrounds that could have accounted for the symptoms displayed. This analysis was difficult to accomplish because the parties in charge of the late Dr. Mack’s estate would not allow me to quote from the book.
Sleep Disorders to Explain “Abductions”Research into sleep disorders has experienced recent advances. Many abduction experiences may be due to hypnogogic or hypnopompic states (the person has such a vivid dream just before waking up or falling into normal sleep that they believe it was real, or it can be conceptualized as the person is partly awake but hallucinating) or sleep paralysis (which often accompanies the state or hallucination). I have experienced sleep paralysis a few times and found it truly terrifying, wanting to scream and move but being unable, but I thought that there was a burglar rather than an alien in the room.
Generational AbductionsOver the years it has become common in UFOlogy to hear about abductees whose parents and children were also abducted. The fact that some families claim to have experienced generational abduction extending over decades should be an obvious clue to any behavioral scientist or mental health professional that a shared belief system and/or problematic family dynamics and/or a genetic factor related to mental disorder or inheritance of FPP is involved. In simple terms, this is a shared delusion, (a “folie à trois” instead of a “folie à deux”); but the abductee writers and advocates in UFOlogy, ignoring the relevant scientific and medical findings, instead offer it as evidence confirming the abductions.
Ethical Issues: “Abductees” as Victims or CelebritiesSome people like to play the victim role as it provides rewards. A few years ago, on a popular radio program called The Conspiracy Show, a caller phoned in hoping to get help. He was an adult male who believed he was being abducted, probed, and hurt every single night for years. He was a mental and physical wreck and dreaded going to sleep. (He did not mention asking the neighbors if they saw any flying saucers in his back yard every night, from whence he insisted he was beamed up.) It is a shame that such people do not receive competent psychiatric and psychological help, instead having their delusions reinforced, and in several cases having their problems exploited by authors.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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Alternatively, in some cases the “experiencers” enjoy their new status and go on speaking tours at UFO conventions, and otherwise promote the books written about them (e.g., Travis Walton, Betty Hill, Betty Andreasson). Since this has become a sizeable business, a small industry like Roswell tourism, the people who earn money “counseling” abductees and writing books about them have a vested interest in perpetuating the abduction mythology. Also, the phenomenon has strong religious aspects, and no one likes having their faith attacked. Those who believe they have been possessed by the devil or spirits want to be seen by healers who share their belief system– and so seek exorcists, rather than psychiatrists.
Proper TreatmentWhile it is often recommended that a therapist establish sympathetic rapport with a patient, a mental health professional (or academic “expert”) who buys into the abduction scenario reinforces the patient’s beliefs. Instead, I believe that the therapist should explain that alien kidnappings are not real, are a product of human culture, and may be manifestations of sleep disorders or mental problems. Rather than being supported, some patients need to be confronted and deprogrammed in the manner similar to those who have been “brainwashed” into cults. For the normal case of a UFO “abductee” I recommend, along with verbal therapy, standard tests for mental disorder and personality, and testing for sleep disorders. If the person seems rational and healthy according to the tests (as many are), then I propose a new diagnosis of “UFO Neurosis.”
About the AuthorJ. Randal Montgomery is a retired social scientist (degrees in Psychology and Sociology) and a practicing attorney. In regards to his UFO research, he has been interviewed on radio shows in Canada, the UK and the USA, and is the author of the book Aliens and UFOs: Physical, Psychic or Social Reality?
References1. https://bit.ly/3b5KH7k 2. Bartholomew, R.E., & Howard, G.S. (1998). UFOs & Alien Contact: Two Centuries of Mystery. Prometheus Books. 3. Wilson, S.C., & Barber, T.X. (1983). “The Fantasy Prone Personality Implications for Understanding Imagery, Hypnosis and Parapsychological Phenomena.” In A.A. Sheikh (Ed.) Imagery: Current Theory, Research and Application (pp. 340–390). Wiley. 4. https://bit.ly/3HsIU8t 5. Ibid. 6. Hough, P., & Kalman, M. (1997). The Truth About Alien Abductions. Blandford. 7. Gannaway, G.K. (1989). Historical vis Narrative Truth: Clarifying the Role of Exogenous Trauma in the Etiology of Multiple Personality Disorder. Dissociation, 2(4). 8. Montgomery, J.R. (2020). Aliens and UFOs: Physical, Psychic or Social Reality? Booklocker. 9. Matheson, T. (1998). Alien Abductions: Creating a Modern Phenomenon. Prometheus Books. 10. Powers, S.M. (1991). “Fantasy Proneness, Amnesia and the UFO Abduction Phenomenon.” Dissociation, 4(1). 11. French, C.C., Santomauro, J., Hamilton, V., Fox, R., & Thalbourne, M.A. (2008). Psychological Aspects of the Alien Contact Experience. Cortex, 44(10), 1387–1395. 12. Ring, K. (1992). The Omega Project: Near Death Experiences, UFO Encounters, and Mind at Large. Wm. Morrow and Co. 13. https://bit.ly/39uDMnH 14. https://bit.ly/3b9lg4N 15. Mack, J.E. (1994). Abduction: Human Encounters With Aliens. Llewellyn.
“A broadcasting station can’t … [explain] that the mystics are only entertainers … so long as the listener sends in money and problems in good faith.”1
How successful were psychics on early network radio? How sincere were they? These are the main questions asked in the groundbreaking new book Radio Psychics: Mind Reading and Fortune Telling in American Broadcasting, 1920–1940. The author, John Benedict Buescher, former chief of the Tibetan Broadcast Service of the Voice of America, has authored articles on radio broadcasting to Tibet and books on the history of Buddhism and on the history of 19th century American spiritualism. Buescher details the careers of spiritual seekers, entertainers, and hucksters who were popular in the early decades of U.S. radio.
Some “radio psychics” began as seemingly sincere spiritual believers, sometimes performing relatively traditional congregational work; others became so. Especially in the 1920s, some radio psychics were described as magicians or mentalists, as having a “Radio Mind”, and some were billed as Princesses or Rajah; Mystic, Wizard or Fakir; astrologer or spiritualist or Hypnotist. Some used more than one of these billings, successively or even concurrently. Many incorporated astrology or billed themselves as having gained extraordinary knowledge in India, Egypt, or both, and sometimes wore turbans. Some were vaudeville entertainers who read minds on stage and used the radio for publicity. A few psychic claimants earned fortunes from radio programs, especially after transitioning to giving advice.
Whether reading minds, consulting spirits on the radio, or conducting what they called experiments, many radio psychics ran afoul of the same fortune telling laws or charges of obtaining money under false pretenses as faced by live psychics. Several of these colorful characters were sued, fined, arrested, or jailed, sometimes for reasons unrelated to their paranormal claims.
In later years, usually with similar offerings but more traditional attire, many transitioned to calling themselves “doctor” or “psychologist” (both terms being less respected than today). All made some sort of paranormal or extraordinary claim about how they worked. Many were cynical, some were sincere, and more than one may also have transitioned from knowing they were fakes to believing themselves truly psychic. Those who were especially skilled, or more ethically challenged, were flooded with mail, often including dollar bills and, perhaps more importantly to them, the basic building blocks of a mailing list.
Buescher’s introductory chapter is a rich and valuable narrative of the diverse cultural trends that fed the public reception of radio psychics of the 1920s and 1930s. These include 19th century upstart religious movements (especially séance-based spiritualism), astrologers and psychics featured on the fringes of carnivals, fairs, and dime museums; and the popular stage magic feat of “second sight” mind reading, in which a psychic blindfolded on stage would divine the identity of items shown to the performer roaming through the audience.
Lectures/demonstrations of mesmerism and hypnotism are surprisingly relevant because they foreshadowed the radio psychics blurring of the lines between entertainment, self-improvement, science, and fraud. Telegraphy and early radio technology were often thought of as magical phenomena. This both made psychic communication seem more plausible, and gave performers, scientists, and newspapermen a frequently used metaphor. Although the format of most of the balance of Radio Psychics is an overlapping, loosely chronological series of biographies, the introduction foreshadows the rest of the book’s style in being twice as detailed as it needs to be to make its fascinating points. Numerous small photographs significantly enhance the dense text. It is (thankfully) indexed, and the extensive endnotes are a valuable resource given how much new information the book provides.
Who was the first psychic to read a mind on the radio? Most of the various claimants saw occasional radio appearances as a way to publicize their vaudeville stage shows of theatrical mind reading. Often these early publicity stunts were in conjunction with then more widely available newspaper “Question and Answer” articles. While their credibility hinged on the public at least partially believing that the performer was truly psychic, these performers, most active in the 1920s, such as Hope Eden and Julius Zancig, were generally not accused of fraud, and were known among their theatrical peers as merely being entertainers. What fame they had was usually from their stage work.
While individual specialties and personalities varied, many of the radio psychics, even in the later years of their peak popularity, remained rooted as showmen. Many of them staged publicity stunts (sometimes billed as experiments) such as hypnotic “sleeps” in store windows or, more frequently, driving a car while blindfolded. Of the dozens of radio psychics (with minor ones treated in the appendix), Buescher focuses on about 25, giving an average of half a chapter to each. Of these, those relatively famous or prosperous include Leona LaMar, Gene Dennis, Princess Yvonne, Dr. Korda RaMayne, Ralph Richards, Koran, and Rajah Raboid. The latest performer Buescher features is the mid-20th century radio and TV mind reader Joseph Dunninger.
The broadcast landscape evolved rapidly and dramatically between 1920 and 1940. Stations went from amateur and isolated to professional and networked; listenership grew exponentially, and regulation went from non-existent to stringent as radio evolved into a mass medium by the 1930s.
With a wider audience, ethical challenges mounted. Simultaneously, more and more psychics wanted airtime, and for some it became their focus. Sometimes live shows also led to private client consultations, which could be especially profitable, but more likely unethical. A common dodge was to sell a booklet at a live theater appearance that included a coupon that could be mailed in for “free” advice, with reminders of this on the radio. As time passed, many radio psychics began to focus on giving advice on finance, health, and even finding lost children.
Buescher draws an uncommonly vivid verbal portrait of one of the most nefarious radio psychics taking a huge sack of mail to a side road, slitting open the envelopes one by one, removing any money they contained, and tossing the unread letter into a ravine. He was Ralph Richards, who other radio psychics accused of spoiling the racket by his extreme callousness. Perhaps not coincidentally, the incident took place in 1932, the year the Federal Radio Commission cracked down on radio fortune telling. It was more common for radio psychics to respond with a “heartfelt” personal response, which, in reality, was a form letter prepared by secretaries. Charges of fortune telling or mail fraud often resulted.
Some radio psychics were more sincere and had minimal connection to stage performance, though all did at least some work that could be seen as related to mind reading. Alma started a successful astrology magazine; Ethel Duncan was a minister with a reputation for charity. A few of the people profiled by Buescher stand out for other reasons: although many performers cashed in on “Ladies Only” performances, Signa Serene specialized in this intimate advice format. Buescher did genealogy research on Princess Wahletka, whose otherwise unremarkable act became famous from her false claim to be Cherokee, and fakir Hamid Bey, famous in part for his repeated performance of being buried alive, is also shown to be an ethnic fraud. Others went from psychic work to allied fields: Norman Baker harangued crowds and made a fortune as he claimed he could cure cancer, and successful radio psychic Koran and his astrologer wife Rose Dawn later used alleged Mayan teachings to start a membership-based spiritual society which outlasted the couple by decades. Skeptic readers may be especially intrigued by Maurice “Radio Wizard” Francill, who claimed that electronics facilitated his psychic powers. Of course, he rarely allowed his contraptions to be examined. Buescher conducted the necessary research to document that Francill, in fact, held no patents and had no citations in technical journals.
Most of the above, and much more, is either new information from primary sources, or seems so for being put together for the first time from diverse secondary sources. Radio Psychics is over 400 pages long, with small type and detailed footnotes (in even smaller type) that refer the reader to multiple academic journals (including those on medicine, folklore, and psychology) and primary sources, such as Federal Radio Commission files, legal records, and scarce advertising material. The high level of detail given in the text is a double-edged sword. If a performer appeared on the radio even once, not only is their whole career discussed, the rest of their life (and even their family!) is as well. As grateful as I am for the wealth of new information on theatrical mind readers on stage, Buescher’s largely nominal radio psychics focus forces him to ignore the few prominent psychic entertainers or seers who did not appear on the radio, including the most famous and successful vaudeville mind reader, Claude Alexander Conlin, known professionally as Alexander, the Man Who Knows.
It’s not only because of its length that this book could have used a good editor. Although Buescher’s sentence structure is fine, his prose can be difficult to read, with crucial information often appearing in the midst of ancillary material, such as that psychic performer Mel Roy was a household name, or the National Association of Broadcasters statement against fortune tellers on the radio. Even the regulatory changes that drove many radio mentalists off the air, or the resulting trend of psychics (and medical quacks) fleeing to broadcast back to the United States from Mexico, are scattered almost randomly among the entries on one or more of the performers affected by them, and even then, it is not highlighted.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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Radio Psychics is thus a bit of a mixed bag. The subject of psychics on the radio in its heyday, and the immediate effects of this, could have made for a useful and informative narrative that was half the length. Although Radio Psychics is already the most thorough book yet published on stage psychics in the U.S., better editing, and the addition of only a chapter or two would have turned Radio Psychics into a book of the same length which would be a near complete narrative about psychic performers in the U.S. within its time frame. As it is, it is neither. In a few cases, mention of the psychic’s appearance on radio is difficult to find in the chapter!
For all its dramatic personalities, Radio Psychics is tedious and very difficult to read. However, if you forgive the unfortunate phrasing, and once the text is disentangled, the stories can be fascinating, and raise questions about the fuzzy line between performance and religion that remain relevant today.
About the AuthorMichelle Ainsworth holds an MA in History and she is currently researching the cultural history of stage magic in the United States. She is a humanist and lives in New York City.
References1. Buescher, J.B. (2021). Radio Psychics: Mind Reading and Fortune Yelling in American Broadcasting, 1920–1940 (p. 171). McFarland and Company.
As a Black, Caribbean immigrant who identifies as a patriot of our great republic I am often asked why I take such a strong stance against issues such as reparations, antiracism, systemic racism, Critical Race Theory, and Diversity Equity and Inclusion movements as they are promulgated today. If I could give an answer standing on one foot in a single sentence it would be this:
All such movements presuppose that by constitutional design the United States of America is ineradicably racist (in its cultural DNA so to speak) and require a radical political and moral rebranding to remedy the sins of its past.
The reparation movements, for example, overlook the fact that reparations have already been paid to Blacks. The Third Founding of the United States in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its various amendments, such as the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and other attendant pursuant articles and legal enfranchisements for Blacks, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and subsequent affirmative action programs, constitute reparations. I place reparations for Black Americans into the plethora of affirmative action programs that set aside preferential policies in education and employment for Blacks and women. The 1964 Civil Rights Act was as revolutionary as the founding of America and the Bill of Rights. Not only did it single-handedly right the wrongs of slavery and Jim Crow segregation, but in this unique moment in U.S. history, in (arguably) justifiably violating the property rights of U.S. citizens, it was the most audacious act of cultural and moral eugenics ever leveled against the United States of America. By this I mean that it resulted in the broadest moral resocialization and social engineering program of White Americans in the history of this country. The concomitant moral eugenics was a form of moral paternalism and intrusion in the conscience of White Americans. It was an abrogation of freedom of conscience and the application of that conscience in concretized, material form.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, enacted on July 2 of that year, was a landmark civil rights and labor law that outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and later, sexual orientation. It prohibits unequal application of voter registration requirements, racial segregation in all schools and public accommodations, and any employment discrimination. Under the Act, Congress asserted its authority to legislate under various parts of the Constitution, especially to regulate interstate commerce. It guaranteed all citizens equal protection under the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and exercised its duty to protect voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment.
The target of the 1964 Act was as much Whites as it was Blacks—and not just in the sense of mandating that Whites cease egregious practices of discrimination against Blacks, but rather, that Whites become entirely new types of persons by undergoing a moral makeover.
The state had been the biggest manufacturer of systemic racism by creating laws that barred Blacks from full entrance into mainstream society, and had been a great socializer in the formation of the ethos, mores, norms, and values that shaped the sensibilities of Whites. In short, it made it difficult for non-racist Whites to be non-racist in their dealings with Blacks. Homeowners and hoteliers were not free to sell or rent to whomever they chose regardless of race, and miscegenation laws prohibited interracial marriage. Conceptions of the good life were vastly limited for Blacks based on their racial identities created not by private citizens but by the state. The establishment of racial taxonomies, of miscegenation laws, of redlining policies, and of discriminatory housing and school policies were all creations of the state—the biggest and most nefarious enemy of Black Americans who had deputized and socialized ordinary American citizens into a cult of racist practices against their fellow citizens.
In granting Blacks full equality before the law, the state reversed a metaphysical crime it had long been guilty of committing against the former slaves: failure to apply the principle of legal egalitarianism to one group of people for a morally neutral reason—their ascriptive racial identity.
As far as the Diversity Equity and Inclusion movement goes, the real goal here is equity. And the goal of DEI is to conflate equity with equality. They two are different concepts. Equality means treating everyone the same regardless of ethnic or racial affiliation. Equity demands legislating equal results from unequal causes. It is a nefarious idea that must be explained properly so people can reject it outright.
Those who uphold the principle of equity are attempting to advocate the idea that all men are actually born with or acquire talents, skills, and capabilities of equal proportion in intelligence, strength, discipline, perseverance, frugality, temperance, tenacity, exercise of our rational faculty, wisdom, moral sensibility, and a plethora of other dispositions that determine outcomes.
Equity advocates attempt to pass over on society the following idea: if such talents, capabilities, and dispositions were not equally allocated among the races and among individuals, then the state would need to artificially interfere and ensure that equality of outcomes and results preceded equality of opportunity. That is, they mandate equal results from unequal causes, and equal rewards for unequal performance.
Opportunities arise as human beings are left free to pursue their values and exercise efforts on behalf of their lives. Values result from attributes persons possess, which cannot be redistributed.
Equality of results (i.e., equity) advocates a sort of magical thinking. They take any disparity in income between the races as causally reducible to the residual effects of slavery.
The equity appropriators fail to realize that economic inequality is the inevitable result of the fact that human beings were not born equal; but they avoid also the fact that the United States was founded not upon the principle of economic equality, but political equality.
Wealth that is privately created by individual effort is not created on the assumption that the creator of that wealth will end up with an equal share of his wealth. Quite the opposite. As Yaron Brooks points out in his book Equal is Unfair: if I plant ten apple trees on an island, and Jack plants five, one cannot say I have grabbed a bigger part of the island’s apple pie, so to speak. I have created more wealth than Jack, and I have left him no worse off. It would be absurd to say that I have stolen fifty percent of the island’s wealth. If Jack especially made a choice not to plant extra tress, having rather spent his time relaxing under a coconut tree, there is no reason why I should be penalized for the extra initiative I have taken in planting the extra apple trees and cultivating them.
By participating in the massive welfare reparations programs of the 1960s, Black Americans were complicit in their own stigmatization that came to be associated with the wealth extortion wealthier Americans paid for their financial upkeep. Blacks sold out their autonomy, sovereignty, and pride for entitlements they were told they deserved. They voluntarily evicted themselves from that competitive and venturesome realm in which the American Dream is achieved. The American Dream, however, was never achieved through a government handout.
The persistence of racism continues. But to causally link all disparities between Blacks and Whites to either slavery itself or the residual effects of slavery such as Jim Crow seems untenable. As I have argued in my book, What Do White American Owe Black People: Racial Justice in the Age of Post-Oppression, not only did the 1964 Civil rights Act and its attendant amendments outlaw racism, it morally transformed America in overturning a form of systemic racism that had been the norm. Today, there are no policies directly aimed at destroying the lives of Blacks. There are no laws that are punitive simply on the basis of racial ascription.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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Systemically, our public and private institutions are just not suffused with attitudes, policies, and mores that would seek to keep Blacks out of such institutions, and more importantly, outside the domain of the ethical and the pantheon of the human community. What generally has not been discussed, and which I do tackle at length in my book, are some of the pathologies that exist in the Black community that speak for many of these disparities. Until the 1960s, poverty did not entail a social dysfunction in the Black community. The marriage rate in the Black community was higher than it was in the White community despite economic deprivation and virulent racism. In 1925, for example, 85 percent of Black families were a husband and wife raising their children. Today the out-of-wedlock births among Black people is nearly 71 percent.
Blacks are now part of the sovereign mass. The achievement of that status prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act was not theirs to claim and enjoy entirely. Like all persons who, through legislative and judicial processes, are admitted into the judicial and ethical pantheon, they must face harsh truths. There will be inequities, inequalities, and disparities. But life itself is not predicated on equality because, again, we are all not equal. In fact, disparity and inequality are the norm. What must be secured are the foundations of freedom and liberty and equality of rights.
About the AuthorJason D. Hill is professor of philosophy at DePaul University in Chicago specializing in ethics, social and political philosophy, American foreign policy, and moral psychology. He is the author of five books, including We Have Overcome: An Immigrant’s Letter to the American People and What Do White Americans Owe Black People: Racial Justice in the Age of Post-Oppression. Dr. Hill has been published in The Federalist, The American Mind, The American Thinker, Commentary Magazine, Spiked Magazine, and Salon, and interviewed on NBC’s Today Show, Fox News, NPR, and several other mainstream media outlets. He is also a contributor to The Hill. Follow him on Twitter @JasonDhill6.
NOTE FROM EDITORS: As Skeptic Publisher Michael Shermer wrote in his Introduction to Skeptic magazine’s special issue on Race Matters (27.3), the issues outlined in this article documenting the continuation of systemically racist social structures—even as racist attitudes have improved dramatically over the past half century—mean that race still matters very much in the USA. It is thus incumbent on all of us to properly understand the causes of these issues so that we may implement a rational and science-based response to them.
To explain systemic racism, we start with the historical origins of race in the U.S.—that is, the social, political, and economic mechanisms that have maintained it over time. Race is baked into the history of the U.S. going back to colonial times1, 2, 3 and continuing through early independence when slavery was quietly written into the nation’s Constitution.4 Although the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution ended slavery and granted due process, equal protection, and voting rights to the formerly enslaved, efforts to combat systemic racism in the U.S. faltered when Reconstruction collapsed in the disputed election of 1876, which triggered the withdrawal of federal troops from the South.5
The absence of federal troops to enforce Black civil rights enabled states in the former Confederacy to construct a new system of racial subordination known as Jim Crow.6 It rested on a simple principle: in any social encounter, the lowest status White person was superior to the highest status Black person. By law and custom, Black voting rights were suppressed, and Black Americans were socially segregated from Whites, relegated to menial occupations, inferior schools, dilapidated housing, and deficient facilities throughout Southern society. Any challenges to the Jim Crow system, perceived or real, were met with violence, often lethal, both within and outside the legal system.7
Segregation is Key to Explaining Systemic RacismFrom 1876 to 1900, 90 percent of all African Americans lived in the South and were subject to the dictates of the repressive Jim Crow system; 83 percent lived in poor rural areas, occupying ramshackle dwellings clustered in small settlements in or near the plantations where they worked. Although conditions were somewhat better for the 10 percent of African Americans who lived outside the South, anti-Black prejudice was widespread, racial discrimination was common and, as in the South, the prospect of racial violence was never far away.8
Before 1900, few African Americans lived in cities, and levels of urban racial residential segregation were modest. Black workers and servants generally lived within walking distance of their workplaces, and social contact between the races was common.9 At that time, the share of Blacks among city residents was small, and they were not perceived to be a threat to White hegemony, obviating the need for spatial segregation. The Great Black Migration of the 20th century changed this status quo and transformed race relations in the U.S., making race truly a national rather than regional issue.10
Between 1900 and 1970, millions of African Americans left the rural South in search of better lives in industrializing cities throughout the nation. As a result of this migration, by 1970 nearly half of all African Americans had come to live outside the South, 90 percent in urban areas.11 It was during this period of Black urbanization that the ghetto emerged as a structural feature of American urbanism, making Black residential segregation into the linchpin of a new system of racial stratification that prevailed throughout the U.S. irrespective of region.12
The imposition of strict immigration restrictions in 1921 and 1924 guaranteed that Black workers and their families would continue to pour into cities during the economic boom of the 1920s.13 The entry of everlarger cohorts of impoverished Black laborers and sharecroppers into the nation’s cities unnerved White urbanites, prompting them to organize collectively by creating “neighborhood improvement associations.” These organizations pressured landlords not to rent to Black tenants and tried to convince Black home seekers that it was in their best interest to locate elsewhere, using persuasion and payoffs when possible but resorting to violence when these blandishments failed.14
In 1924, the National Association of Real Estate Brokers adopted a code of ethics stating that “a Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.”15 In 1927, the Chicago Real Estate Board devised a model racial covenant to block the entry of Blacks into White neighborhoods and offered it to other cities for adoption throughout the country.16 A racial covenant is a private contract in which property owners within a defined geographic area collectively agree not to rent or sell to African Americans. Once approved by a majority of property owners, the contract became enforceable, and violators could be sued in civil court.
The exclusively private auspices of Black residential segregation ended with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. When Franklin Roosevelt came to power with his New Deal in 1933, the nation was in the midst of a catastrophic banking crisis. Millions of middle-class homeowners had lost jobs and were in danger of defaulting on their mortgages, putting both their homes and their bankers at financial risk. In response, the Roosevelt Administration created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) to help middle-class homeowners refinance their mortgages using long-term, federally insured, low-interest loans.17 Together the federal guarantees and extended amortization periods reduced monthly mortgage payments to affordable levels, saving both the banks and the homeowners from financial losses through foreclosure.
To qualify for the federal guarantees, however, HOLC loans had to meet certain government-mandated criteria. In addition to low interest rates, minimal down payments, and long amortization periods, lenders were obliged to consider the riskiness of the neighborhoods in which properties were located. To this end, HOLC officials worked with local realtors and bankers to create a series of Residential Security Maps for use in cities throughout the nation. These maps color-coded neighborhoods according to their creditworthiness. Green indicated a safe investment, yellow indicated caution, and red indicated excessive risk and hence ineligibility for HOLC lending. Black neighborhoods were invariably coded red, along with adjacent neighborhoods perceived to be at risk of Black settlement.18
In 1934 the Roosevelt Administration created a much larger loan program under the Federal Housing Authority. The FHA offered long-term loans to prospective home buyers, not just owners. Reflecting the prejudices of the realtors, bankers, and builders who helped to design the program, FHA underwriters were also required to make use of the HOLC’s Residential Security Maps, formally institutionalizing the practice of redlining in real estate and banking and systematically cutting off investment in Black neighborhoods for decades to come. The FHA Underwriter’s Manual explicitly stated that “if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.” In addition to requiring the use of Residential Security Maps, the manual went on to advocate the use of racial covenants to protect FHA-insured properties.
The anti-urban biases and discriminatory practices built into federal loan programs had little effect on housing patterns during the 1930s and 1940s owing to the tiny amount of new residential construction that occurred during the Great Depression and Second World War. In the postwar period, however, FHA and VA lending drove forward a massive wave of suburban home construction that made new homes widely accessible to White but not Black households. Given high rents and home prices in central cities owing to the influx of workers during the war years, in the late 1940s and early 1950s it was cheaper to buy a brand-new house in the suburbs than to rent an apartment in the city.19
The end result was a government-subsidized mass exodus of middle-and working-class White families from central cities to suburbs, creating a distinctly American urban configuration of Black cities surrounded by White suburbs. The homes left behind by the departing Whites seeking their piece of the American Dream in the suburbs were quickly occupied by Black in-movers coming to the city to take jobs in the still-vibrant urban manufacturing sector. Neighborhood turnover accelerated, and the nation’s urban Black ghettos rapidly expanded, both demographically and geographically.20
As Black ghettos expanded during the 1950s and 1960s in cities such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis, they ultimately came to encroach on zones in which White elites had placebound investments in universities, hospitals, museums, and business districts. In desperation, local politicians and civic leaders turned to state and federal agencies for help. Drawing on funding from the National Housing Act, they created locally controlled Urban Renewal Authorities with the power of eminent domain, thereby enabling White interests to gain control of the Black neighborhoods threatening their place-bound investments.21, 22 Once in control of the land, they evicted the residents, razed their homes, and demolished neighborhood businesses, replacing them either with large-scale middle-class housing projects or institutional developments that strategically blocked the expansion of the ghetto toward the threatened White properties, prompting James Baldwin to quip that “urban renewal means Negro removal.”23
Because of a “one-for-one rule” embedded within the National Housing Act, for every unit of housing torn down in the name of renewal, planners had to identify another unit into which the displaced tenants could theoretically move. To satisfy this rule, local elites once again turned to the federal government, garnering additional funds authorized by the National Housing Act to construct large public housing projects for families displaced by renewal. Given that the displaced families were Black, it was politically impossible to build the housing project in a White district, so another Black neighborhood was targeted for renewal and torn down to build dense collections of high-rise projects that now had to house two neighborhood’s worth of displaced families.24
This pairing of urban renewal and public housing did not itself increase the level of Black residential segregation.25 Segregation levels were already high in the cities where this pairing occurred; but it did dramatically increase the spatial concentration of poverty within the ghetto by replacing relatively class-diverse Black neighborhoods and business districts with tightly packed blocks of high-rise projects in which being poor was a criterion for entry, yielding neighborhood poverty rates of 90 percent or more.26
By 1970, high levels of Black residential segregation were universal throughout metropolitan America.27 As of 1970, 61 percent of Black Americans living in U.S. metropolitan areas lived under hypersegregation,28 a circumstance unique to Americans. Although in theory, segregation should have withered away after the Civil Rights Era, it has not.
In 2010, the average index of Black–White segregation remained high and a third of all Black metropolitan residents continued to live in hypersegregated areas.29 This reality prevails despite the outlawing of racial discrimination in housing (the 1968 Fair Housing Act) and lending (the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act).
Why Does Modern Segregation Persist Despite Improved Racial Attitudes?Accompanying these legislative changes was a pronounced shift in White racial attitudes. In the early 1960s, more than 60 percent of White Americans agreed that Whites have a right to keep Blacks out of their neighborhoods. By the 1980s the percentage had dropped to 13 percent.30 The fact that discrimination is illegal, and White support for segregation has plummeted, begs the question of why segregation persists.
Although overt discrimination in housing and lending has clearly declined in response to legislation, covert discrimination continues. Rental and sales agents today are less likely to respond to emails from people with stereotypically Black names31, 32 or to reply to phone messages left by speakers who “sound Black.”33, 34 A recent meta-analysis of 16 experimental housing audit studies and 19 lending analyses conducted since 1970 revealed that sharp racial differentials in the number of units recommended by realtors and inspected by clients have persisted and that racial gaps in loan denial rates and borrowing cost have barely changed in 40 years.35
Audit studies, conducted across the social and behavioral sciences, include a subset of resumé studies in which researchers send the same resumé out to apply for jobs, but change just one item: the candidate’s name is Lisa Smith or Lakisha Smith. Then, they wait to see who gets the callback. The bias is clear: employers avoid “Black-sounding” names.36 6 In fact, in both Milwaukee’s and New York City’s low-wage job market, Black applicants with no criminal background were called back with the same frequency or less as White applicants just released from prison.37, 38
That is, in the minds of hiring managers whose mental make-up is expected to be no different than the readers of this article, a White felon is equivalent to a Black non-felon. The same housing application, the same bank loan application, the same health data, the same behavior, lead to different outcomes depending on the race of the applicant, even though the decision-makers believe they are paying attention to the merits of the case and explicitly not to race, which most decision makers in these studies regard to be irrelevant to the decision.
What makes the problem of systemic racism so perverse is that “good people” with no explicit expression of what we would call “racism” are the contributors to such decisions that produce widespread and unnoticed bias, resulting in systemic racism.39 Racial discrimination continues because, although White support for Black segregation may have declined in principle, Whites nonetheless continue to harbor negative racial stereotypes about Black people, which limit their tolerance for integration in practice.
Indeed, the willingness of Whites to enter or remain in a neighborhood declines steadily as the percentage of Black neighbors rises.40, 41 The “correlated characteristics heuristic” relies on a single salient neighborhood trait—in this case racial composition—to represent an area’s acceptability. In White social cognition, the mere presence of Blacks denotes lower property values, higher crime rates, and struggling schools, irrespective of what the objective neighborhood conditions are.42, 43, 44 Although Whites in surveys and interviews say they welcome the presence of Black neighbors, in practice Whites avoid neighborhoods containing more than a few Blacks and confine their searches to overwhelmingly White residential areas exhibiting White percentages well above those they report in describing their “ideal” neighborhood on surveys.45
Owing to the persistence of discrimination, Black Americans are far less able than other Americans to translate their income attainments into residential mobility, greatly compromising their ability to access more integrated and favored neighborhoods.46 As of 2010, the most affluent Black Americans were still more segregated from Whites than the poorest Hispanics.47
No other group in the history of the U.S. has ever experienced such intense residential segregation in so many areas and over such a long period of time.48, 49 Systemic racism in federal housing policies,50 real estate,51 banking,52 and insurance53 has ensured a vicious cycle of racial turnover and neighborhood deterioration for most of the past century. As a result, many Black Americans have been compelled to live in societally isolated, economically disadvantaged, physically deteriorated neighborhoods produced and sustained by powerful external forces beyond their ability to control, the precise embodiment of systemic racism.
Because of racial residential segregation and the blocked mobility and spatial concentration of poverty it produces, neighborhoods have become the key nexus for the transmission of Black socioeconomic disadvantage over the life course and across the generations.54 Half of all Black Americans have lived in the poorest quartile of urban neighborhoods for two consecutive generations, compared with just seven percent of Whites, a gap that cannot be explained by individual or family characteristics.
Whereas in the 1960s Black poverty was transmitted across generations by the inheritance of race and the discrimination and exclusion that came with it,55 in the 21st century Black poverty is transmitted by the inheritance of place and the concentrated poverty it entails.56, 57, 58, 59, 60 Black disadvantage with respect to income and social mobility is explained almost entirely by the poor neighborhood circumstances they experience.61, 62 Racial residential segregation has become linchpin for systemic racism in the U.S. in the 21st century.63, 64
What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?As a scientific question, a skeptic might ask, what’s wrong with differentiating by stereotypes? Given its racial history and ongoing systems, societal patterns and cultural stereotypes prevailing in the U.S. tend to associate Blacks with low status and Whites with high status. To the extent this race–status association has a kernel of statistical accuracy (Blacks are over-represented in low-status jobs), it fails several tests as an argument for using stereotypes as a constructive strategy of intergroup relations.
First, it ignores variability, individuality, and (especially) Black diversity. Second, category-based thinking exaggerates perceived between-group variability and minimizes perceived within-group variability.65, 66 So “nouns that cut slices” (Allport’s felicitous phrase for category labels67) do violence to the human data. What’s more, society has civil rights laws protecting people from being judged by their group membership, so the consensus is that this is not only wrong, but illegal.
A Way ForwardGenerally, White Americans—because of the segregation perpetuated to sustain their advantage—have limited exposure to Black Americans, so their knowledge is indirect, and based on cultural caricatures. Segregation allows White people to be clueless about race, and because racial bias is more automatic, ambiguous, and ambivalent than people think, they fail to detect it in themselves and others. As a result, White people have many unexamined biases, undergirded by earlier stages of information processing (e.g., attention, perception, learning, memory, reasoning) that sustain such a lack of awareness. These cognitive errors and biases stem from lack of exposure, lack of the accurate evidence, and a lack of necessary knowledge.
The assumption here is that if people were simply made aware of the facts that have been described, they would slap their palm to their head and immediately vote for reparations. But as readers may no doubt deduce on their own, confronting accurate data and internalizing it is not a smooth or pretty process. That our minds resist information that challenges certain types of prior beliefs is a fundamental discovery from the mind sciences. Basic cognitive processes such as motivated cognition help to maintain a lack of awareness of racial experiences as they exist on the ground. But no lack of awareness need exist.
The human ability for conscious awareness, deliberate thought, and the motivation to link values to behavior cannot be underestimated as vehicles of change. We have accomplished this regarding how we understand the relationship of Earth to our Sun, so we know it is not as it seems. If we choose, we can similarly put our minds to derive the best evidence to learn about the presence or absence of systemic racism. If we can acquire the appropriate knowledge (often hidden from our conscious perception), we will be more likely to remain open to evidence that shows its presence.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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If we do not undertake this effort, it is at our own peril. If, in the 21st century, we cannot mount a new struggle to see the social world for what it is, we are by choice dooming ourselves to extended ignorance that will be costly to us, our society, and the world we inevitably leave to our descendants. Earlier we provided evidence about unexpected (by scientists) decreases in implicit sexuality bias (massive drop) and race bias (more modest change) since 2007. These data provide optimism that mental content that we cannot change at will is nonetheless capable of movement toward racial neutrality across the U.S.
In other words, who-we-have-been need not be the future-selves-we-are-becoming. Here, we demonstrated that grappling with the correct data is a necessary step on the path to understanding our role in the creation of systemic racism. Among the blind spots that we will need to shake off, once and for all, is the belief that racism is the product of a few bad people in our society, and that removing them from power will suffice to deal with the issue.
This essay is excerpted from “Systemic Racism: Individuals and Interactions, Institutions and Society,” originally published by Springer Nature in the journal Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications. Reproduced under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License © 2021, Mahzarin R. Banaji (Harvard University), Susan T. Fiske (Princeton University) and Douglas S. Massey (Princeton University). In appreciation of the publisher and authors.
About the AuthorsMahzarin R. Banaji is an experimental psychologist who studies implicit social cognition. With colleagues, Banaji is known for the development of a method known as the Implicit Association Test with which she has probed the automatic reliance on social category knowledge in judgments of individuals. Banaji was born and raised in India. She received her PhD from The Ohio State University, served as an NIH postdoctoral fellow at University of Washington and taught at Yale University for 15 years. Since 2002, she has been Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University. She has served as President of the Association for Psychological Science, recognized as William James Fellow of APS for contributions to the basic science of psychology, and received the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award from the American Psychological Association.
Susan T. Fiske is Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs, Princeton University (PhD, Harvard University). She is the author of Social Cognition, on how people make sense of each other. She has written more than 250 articles and chapters, as well as editing many books and journal special issues. Notably, she edits the Annual Review of Psychology and the Handbook of Social Psychology. She also wrote an upper-level integrative text, Social Beings: Core Motives in Social Psychology and edited Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom.
Douglas S. Massey is Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, with a joint appointment in The Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. A member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society, he is the current president of the American Academy of Political and Social Science co-editor of the Annual Review of Sociology. Massey’s research focuses on international migration, race and housing, discrimination, education, urban poverty, stratification, and Latin America, especially Mexico.
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Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920–1974. Temple University Press. 22. Hirsch, A.R. (1983). Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960. Cambridge University Press. 23. https://bit.ly/3Qs9Bxn 24. Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1993). 25. Bickford, A., & Massey, D.S. (1991). Segregation in the Second Ghetto: Racial and Ethnic Segregation in American Public Housing, 1977. Social Forces, 69, 1011–1038. 26. Massey, D.S., & Kanaiaupuni, S.M. (1993). Public Housing and the Concentration of Poverty. Social Science Quarterly, 74(1), 109–123. 27. Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1993). 28. https://bit.ly/3JFCEva 29. Ibid. 30. Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L.D., & Krysan, M. (1998). Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press. 31. https://bit.ly/3zxXBDr 32. https://bit.ly/3P36jPN 33. Massey, D.S., & Fischer, M. . (2004). The Ecology of Racial Discrimination. City and Community, 3(3), 221–243. 34. https://bit.ly/3SrV7PD 35. Quillian, L., Lee, J.J., & Honoré, B. (2020). Racial Discrimination in the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Lending Markets: A Quantitative Review of Trends, 1976–2016. Race and Social Problems, 12(1), 13–28. 36. https://bit.ly/3bAFTaA 37. https://bit.ly/3bCvWt1 38. https://bit.ly/3A1cnnI 39. Banaji, M.R., & Greenwald, A.G. (2013). Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People. Random House. 40. Charles, C.Z. (2003). “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation.” Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 167–207. 41. Emerson, M.O., Chai, K.J., & Yancey, G. (2001). Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans. American Sociological Review, 66(6), 922–935. 42. https://bit.ly/3Qix1oC 43. https://stanford.io/3zHrzoS 44. https://bit.ly/3Q22Xy0 45. Krysan, M., & Crowder, K. (2017). Cycle of Segregation: Social Processes and Residential Stratification. Russell Sage Foundation. 46. Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1985). Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome. American Sociological Review, 50(1), 94–105. 47. https://bit.ly/3PWBXjj 48. Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1993). 49. https://bit.ly/3bwqJTE 50. Katznelson, I. (2006). When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America. W.W. Norton. 51. Helper, R. (1969). Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers. University of Minnesota Press. 52. Ross, S.L., & Yinger, J. (2002). The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination, Research Methodology, and Fair-Lending Enforcement. MIT Press. 53. Orren, K. (1974). Corporate Power and Social Change: The Politics of the Life Insurance Industry. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 54. Sharkey, P. (2013). Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress Toward Racial Equality. University of Chicago Press. 55. Duncan, O.D. (1969). Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race? In D.P. Moynihan (Ed.), On Understanding Poverty: Perspectives From the Social Sciences (pp. 85–110). Basic Books. 56. Massey, D.S. (2013). Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Place? The Emerging Consensus on Neighborhoods and Stratification. Contemporary Sociology, 42, 690–697. 57. Massey, D.S., & Brodmann, S. (2014). Spheres of Influence: The Social Ecology of Racial and Class Inequality. Russell Sage Foundation. 58. Peterson, R.D., & Krivo, L.J. (2010). Divergent Social Worlds: Neighborhood Crime and the Racial-Spatial Divide. Russell Sage Foundation. 59. Sampson, R.J. (2012). Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect. University of Chicago Press. 60. Sharkey, P. (2013). 61. https://bit.ly/3oZdKwO 62. Massey, D.S., & Brodmann, S. (2014). 63. https://bit.ly/3BJKQsd 64. Massey, D.S. (2020). Still the Linchpin: Segregation and Stratification in the USA. Race and Social Problems, 12(1), 1–12. 65. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Inter-Group Relations (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole. 66. https://bit.ly/3Qmg250 67. Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Addison-Wesley.
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Sigmund Freud una vez describió el “psicoanálisis salvaje” como la práctica de la psicoterapia por parte de médicos que no habían sido bien entrenados en la técnica psicoanalítica, señalando que “los médicos forman un gran contingente de charlatanes en el psicoanálisis.”1 El psicoanálisis ha estado en declive durante décadas, y hoy en día existen muchos otros modelos teóricos de psicoterapia, pero todavía existe el peligro de que los psicoterapeutas se vuelvan tan creativos que se involucren en una “psicoterapia salvaje.” Hay mucho que aprender de un estudio de los ejemplos negativos de cómo los terapeutas conocidos han hecho psicoterapia.
Algunos de los métodos descritos en este artículo están claramente fuera de los límites de la práctica estándar de la psicoterapia. Si bien generalmente es seguro y efectivo usar técnicas basadas en la evidencia, los inconformistas de la psicoterapia prefieren confiar en su propia intuición en lugar de la investigación clínica. Algunas técnicas “innovadoras” y “creativas” plantean cuestiones de seguridad, ética y competencia para practicar la psicoterapia. Aquí hay algunos que reviso en mi libro Wild Psychotherapy de 2021.
Anthony RobbinsAnthony “Tony” Robbins es un orador motivacional, life coach (coach de vida), consultor y autor de numerosos libros de superación personal de gran éxito de ventas. En lugar de asistir a la universidad, Robbins trabajó como conserje y organizador de talleres para el orador motivacional Jim Rohn. Robbins aprendió psicología por sí mismo, estudió muchos métodos para provocar el cambio y desarrolló su propia teoría de la motivación humana. Robbins comenzó a impartir seminarios en la década de 1980, que a menudo incluían caminatas sobre fuego, masajes, participación del público y un énfasis en la autoayuda y el pensamiento positivo (para su serie de Fox Family Channel Exploring the Unknown, el editor de Skeptic, Michael Shermer, caminó descalzo sobre brasas de carbón, a más de 1.000 grados, sin quemarse y sin tener pensamientos positivos. Lo puedes ver aquí: https://bit.ly/3oTtMaD). Robbins escribió varios libros y apareció en muchos infomerciales de televisión nocturnos para vender sus productos.2
En 2002, Robbins fundó el Centro de Intervención Robbins-Madanes con la terapeuta familiar Cloe Madanes. El propósito de la organización es capacitar a entrenadores de habilidades para la vida para ayudar a las personas a lidiar con problemas de salud mental y adicciones. Aunque Robbins llama a sus sesiones con clientes “intervenciones estratégicas”, no se pueden distinguir de la psicoterapia. Hay ejemplos de sesiones de terapia de Robbins disponibles en varias películas, como Back from the Edge, Conquering Overwhelming Loss y Love and Passion.3 En las películas, Robbins realiza psicoterapia en reuniones de grupos grandes con clientes voluntarios que tienen una variedad de problemas emocionales graves, incluida la ideación suicida. Su enfoque se basa en técnicas con poco respaldo científico, como la Programación Neurolingüística y la hipnosis Ericksoniana, y utiliza una mezcla ecléctica de homilías de autoayuda, afirmaciones, clichés de la psicología popular e ideas New Age. Parece usar su carisma y autoridad personal, que son sustanciales y energizantes (mide 2 metros de altura y tiene una voz autoritaria), para influir en sus clientes con el objetivo de que acepten su visión de sus problemas. En su terapia, Robbins enfatiza despertar las emociones del cliente para tener una experiencia catártica; él dice: “Tu corazón tiene las respuestas, no tu cabeza.”
El documental de 2016 Tony Robbins: I Am Not Your Guru muestra a Robbins trabajando con varios clientes durante un gran seminario. Hay música fuerte y dramática y presión grupal para participar, mientras Robbins corre y salta por el escenario. Durante el seminario, Robbins selecciona personas con las que trabajar frente a una gran audiencia. Diagnostica los problemas de las personas con poco conocimiento previo y les dice qué hacer sin aparente preocupación por los posibles resultados negativos (porque, le dice a un entrevistador, “Leo a las personas”). Él le dice a la gente que acaba de conocer “Te amo” y que puedes “cambiar en un momento.” Si bien muchas personas han descartado los seminarios de Robbins como un entretenimiento costoso, existe el riesgo de que las personas con las que trabaja en sus seminarios puedan verse perjudicadas.
Las intervenciones altamente manipuladoras de Robbins (como se ve en I Am Not Your Guru) incluyen, por ejemplo, pedirle a una clienta suicida que cuente su historia de violación infantil frente a la audiencia y luego dejar que tres extraños la abracen. Le dicen que llame a estos hombres sus “tíos” y que se mantenga en contacto con ellos durante los próximos diez años. Robbins le dice a otra clienta que llame a su novio para romper con él durante la sesión de terapia, lo cual hace (aunque una nota al final de la película dice que volvieron a estar juntos más tarde). En la película, Robbins se llama a sí mismo “un psicólogo práctico” y se refiere a lo que hace como “terapia” e “intervenciones.” Es muy poco probable que la forma de terapia costosa y superficial de Robbins tenga resultados beneficiosos duraderos para sus clientes después de que se recuperan del “alta” emocional de la experiencia de un grupo grande, que es similar a un concierto de rock de alta energía o un servicio religioso carismático.
Robbins no tiene título universitario, ni título de posgrado, ni certificación o licencia como consejero de salud mental, terapeuta familiar, trabajador social, psicólogo o psiquiatra. El peligro de que personas no capacitadas y no calificadas practiquen la psicoterapia es que dañarán a sus clientes. Aunque Robbins llama a lo que hace en sus sesiones “coaching de vida”, es claramente consejería de salud mental o psicoterapia, ya que trata a personas con trastornos mentales.4 Es probable que sea el terapeuta mejor pagado del mundo, ya que sus clientes pagan un mínimo de 4.000 dólares para asistir a sus seminarios y competir por su atención personalizada durante los seminarios.
Es ilegal practicar psicoterapia sin licencia, pero cualquiera puede ejercer como “coach de vida” porque no se requiere título ni certificación; pero los coachs tienen prohibido por ley tratar a personas con trastornos mentales. Robbins atiende a la mayoría de sus clientes durante una sola sesión breve, no realiza ninguna admisión ni evaluación, y hace poco o ningún seguimiento, lo que dificulta determinar cuánto daño pudo haber causado.
Phillip McGrawPhillip McGraw es una celebridad de la televisión y presentador del programa de televisión Dr. Phil. Obtuvo un doctorado en psicología clínica y trabajó como terapeuta y consultor antes de conocer a Oprah Winfrey, quien produjo su programa de televisión diario. La Asociación Estadounidense de Psicología (APA, por sus siglas en inglés) dijo que “su trabajo ha afectado a más estadounidenses que cualquier otro psicólogo vivo.”5 Desafortunadamente, millones de estadounidenses probablemente piensen que lo que hace McGraw en televisión es representativo de todos los psicoterapeutas. En su programa, McGraw realiza sesiones breves con una amplia variedad de clientes, sin pretensiones de confidencialidad, aunque no tiene licencia para ejercer la terapia desde 2006. Además de su trabajo televisivo, el Dr. Phil vende vitaminas, suplementos nutricionales y productos para adelgazar.
Basándose en un conocimiento muy superficial de sus clientes, McGraw los desafía a realizar cambios de comportamiento a gran escala sin ofrecerles la empatía o el apoyo que suele considerarse fundamental en la práctica de la consejería. McGraw ha dicho que fracasó como terapeuta en la práctica privada porque “no tenía paciencia con mis pacientes.”6 “Lo entiendes o no lo entiendes” (o están de acuerdo con sus opiniones o no). Nunca parece necesitar un momento para pensar antes de decirles a sus clientes lo que deben hacer. Ser caritativo es, quizás, el resultado de acortar las sesiones de consejería en los pocos minutos que hay entre las pausas comerciales de un programa de televisión, pero así, el riesgo de hacer daño se eleva.
La Alianza Nacional para los Enfermos Mentales acusó a McGraw de violaciones éticas y mala praxis después de un programa de televisión en el que diagnosticó a un niño de nueve años como un posible futuro asesino en serie, debido a una crianza permisiva. Aconsejó a los padres del niño que lo encerraran en una habitación que no tuviera nada más que una cama.7 Si bien el estilo abrasivo e intimidatorio de McGraw puede ser entretenido, tiene poco en común con un buen asesoramiento, y a menudo ha sido acusado de explotar a sus clientes vulnerables para obtener índices de audiencia. McGraw interpreta el papel de un padre severo y sensato que sabe lo que es mejor para los demás y no duda en decirle a la gente qué hacer. Algunos psicoterapeutas son directos con los clientes, pero decirles qué hacer es arriesgado y puede tener importantes consecuencias no deseadas.
Dado que no tiene licencia como consejero o psicólogo desde 2006, McGraw no puede practicar legalmente la consejería o la psicoterapia. Las personas que aparecen en su programa de televisión firman una exención diciendo que él no practica terapia ni sustituye ninguna forma de terapia, y que su consejo no es un verdadero consejo psicológico, pero la exención es engañosa.8 McGraw les dice a las personas con problemas de salud mental lo que deben hacer para lidiar con sus problemas, lo cual puede ser una consejería de muy mala calidad, pero es consejería. La exención parecería ser un intento de evitar la responsabilidad legal si el consejo de McGraw causa más problemas que beneficios. Sin duda, muchos de sus clientes en el programa de televisión necesitan ayuda psicológica, y deberían ser derivados a profesionales autorizados y calificados, en lugar de explotarlos para el entretenimiento del público.
Debido a que McGraw no está calificado para practicar consejería o psicoterapia, no está claro por qué se le permite ver clientes en la televisión o en cualquier otro lugar. Es interesante que, aunque las juntas de licencias de psicología prohíben la práctica de la psicología sin una licencia, y no hay excepción para la terapia televisada, la aplicación de tales leyes es extremadamente laxa. Es lamentable que las leyes de licencias a menudo no protejan al público de aquellas personas que pretenden ser consejeros o psicoterapeutas calificados.
Laura SchlessingerLa Dra. Laura Schlessinger (conocida como “Dra. Laura”) es terapeuta, presentadora de programas de radio y autora de varios libros de autoayuda. Tiene un doctorado en fisiología y tomó algunos cursos de consejería matrimonial y familiar; obtuvo la licencia y tuvo una práctica privada en California. Schlessinger ha trabajado en la radio durante 40 años, dando consejos a las personas que llaman sobre sus problemas emocionales personales. Además de realizar sesiones de terapia muy breves con las personas que llaman, a menudo también habla sobre moralidad, problemas sociales y política conservadora. En su apogeo, su programa fue el segundo programa de radio mejor calificado (después de The Rush Limbaugh Show) y se escuchó en 450 estaciones de radio.9 Su programa ahora está en la radio SiriusXM.
El peligro de que personas no capacitadas y no calificadas practiquen la psicoterapia es que dañarán a sus clientes.
El estilo de terapia practicado por Schlessinger en su programa de radio no está basado en ninguna teoría o modelo reconocibles respecto de cómo se practica normalmente la psicoterapia. Basándose en una cantidad muy pequeña de información sobre sus clientes, simplemente les dice lo que deben hacer (basado principalmente en sus propios valores morales y experiencias). No está claro si Schlessinger piensa en sus sesiones de miniconsejería en la radio como psicoterapia, pero cumplen con la definición (ofrecen ayuda a personas con una amplia variedad de trastornos mentales y problemas emocionales).10 Actualmente tiene licencia para matrimonio y familia. terapeuta en su estado natal de California,11 presumiblemente para poder practicar consejería en su programa de radio. Sin embargo, en el programa asesora a clientes en estados donde no tiene licencia para ejercer la consejería. También parece engañoso que llame a su programa de radio “Dr. Laura” cuando su doctorado no tiene nada que ver con consejería o psicología.
Las respuestas de la Dra. Laura a sus clientes a menudo no solo son inútiles, sino también abusivas. Por ejemplo, mientras asesoraba a una mujer que se sentía alienada de su madre, Schlessinger dijo: “¿Quieres dejar a una madre que te crió y estás enojada con ella? ¿Qué demonios te pasa? … En serio, preferiría golpearte en la cabeza que cualquier otra cosa en este momento, pequeña imbécil desagradecida; idiota insensible y desagradecida.”12 Según su sitio web, su programa ofrece “consejos sensatos” y “predica, enseña y regaña.”13 El programa de radio de Schlessinger es popular, probablemente porque puede ser entretenido escuchar su arenga y abuso de sus clientes, pero se desconoce si alguno de ellos realmente ha sido ayudado.
Terapias de ReparentalizaciónEl psicólogo Arthur Janov14 creó la Terapia Primal, un tratamiento para la neurosis que requería que los pacientes tomaran conciencia de las experiencias traumáticas de la infancia y expresaran su ira, frustración y dolor a través de gritos, histeria o violencia espontáneos y desenfrenados. También diseñó un “simulador de nacimiento”, que consiste en un tubo de vinilo aceitoso y largo a través del cual los clientes pueden pasar para volver a experimentar el proceso de nacimiento. Los pacientes de Janov incluyeron al cantautor John Lennon, el actor James Earl Jones, el pianista John Williams y el fundador de Apple, Steve Jobs.
La trabajadora social psiquiátrica Jaqui Lee Schiff15 desarrolló una forma de terapia basada en la teoría del análisis transaccional que denominó “reparentalización de regresión total.” El tratamiento está destinado a corregir los problemas que tienen los pacientes adultos debido a una crianza defectuosa. El paciente regresa a un estado del ego infantil y luego el terapeuta lo vuelve a educar para ayudarlo a desarrollar un ego más saludable. El terapeuta intenta hacer retroceder al paciente dándole biberón, acurrucando al paciente en el regazo del terapeuta, abrazándolo, azotándolo y métodos relacionados. El paciente debe confiar en el terapeuta como padre sustituto y cambiar los patrones de pensamiento negativos. Hay muchos terapeutas que practican diversas formas de terapia de reparentalización, como el renacimiento o la terapia de apego, aunque varios niños han muerto mientras se sometían al controvertido tratamiento.16
La psicóloga Tanya Teton practicó lo que ella llamó Terapia Radical de Reparentalización, que involucró a sus clientes en la regresión a la infancia y en volver a nutrirlos. Pidió a los clientes adultos que se sentaran en su regazo y bebieran de un biberón o enfermera de su pecho desnudo. A veces, hacía que sus clientes usaran pañales y les empolvaba el trasero.17 Los tratamientos de renacimiento y crianza tienen poca evidencia de su seguridad o eficacia y son ilegales en algunos estados.
Terapia de Memoria RecuperadaEl debate sobre la terapia para recuperar recuerdos falsos de abuso sexual infantil ha sido llamado “la controversia interna más enconada, cruel e hiriente en la historia de la psiquiatría moderna.”18 Ed Cara llamó a la creencia de que los recuerdos reprimidos pueden recuperarse en terapia “la idea más peligrosa en la salud mental.”19 El debate sobre la terapia de memoria recuperada planteó varias preguntas. ¿Existen los recuerdos reprimidos y, de ser así, son precisos? ¿Los terapeutas pueden implantar falsos recuerdos en los clientes?
Debido a que todos los recuerdos se “recuperan” en cierto sentido, los recuerdos reprimidos en realidad deberían denominarse una forma de amnesia disociativa. La investigación sugiere que los recuerdos de abuso sexual pueden ser reprimidos por un subconjunto de personas que experimentaron abuso, pero los recuerdos reprimidos no son más ni menos precisos que los recuerdos ordinarios.20 La investigación de Elizabeth Loftus mostró que las personas no recuerdan el pasado, sino que lo reconstruyen.21 Por lo tanto, los terapeutas deben ser cautelosos al creer acríticamente que los recuerdos de los clientes son verdaderos.
No hay consenso sobre cómo se debe practicar la terapia de memoria recuperada. Sin embargo, existe un acuerdo generalizado de que los recuerdos falsos de abuso sexual pueden causar un daño inmenso.22 Aunque algunos terapeutas pueden provocar recuerdos falsos haciendo preguntas capciosas o usando sugestión, hipnosis o imágenes guiadas, la mayoría de los terapeutas presumiblemente buscan obtener recuerdos verdaderos en lugar de falsos. El problema es que, dado que puede ser difícil o imposible establecer la verdad de los recuerdos presentados por los clientes en terapia, simplemente aceptarlos como verdaderos puede generar problemas no intencionales. Sería perjudicial aceptar acríticamente los recuerdos falsos o no creer en los recuerdos genuinos recuperados. La terapia de la memoria recuperada no ha sido aceptada por las comunidades psiquiátricas o psicológicas como una forma legítima de psicoterapia y, afortunadamente, ha caído en desuso en su mayoría después de una serie de demandas contra los terapeutas que la practicaron por parte de sus clientes o las familias de los clientes que sufrieron daños.23
Psicología EnergéticaLa psicoterapia basada en la existencia no verificada de “energías sutiles” y “campos de energía” es extremadamente controvertida. Se han descrito varios tipos diferentes de psicología energética, pero todos se basan en procedimientos inusuales adaptados de culturas no occidentales, tienen mecanismos de acción no verificados y afirman ser inusualmente rápidos y poderosos.24 Aunque las técnicas basadas en la psicología energética se introdujeron hace más de hace tres décadas, todavía falta buena evidencia de su efectividad, y ninguno de ellos está incluido en la lista de tratamientos psicológicos basados en evidencia de la Asociación Estadounidense de Psicología.25
El método básico de la psicología energética implica la estimulación manual de los puntos de acupuntura al tocarlos o golpetearlos, a veces combinados con tarareos o contando en voz alta. Parece que a menudo los desarrolladores de estas técnicas las promocionan en libros y talleres basados en informes anecdóticos de su efectividad y tienen poco o ningún interés en realizar investigaciones controladas, lo que podría determinar si el método realmente funciona mejor que los métodos existentes. Los promotores a menudo afirman tasas de éxito del 90 o 100 por ciento con todos los problemas psicológicos, y esto en sesiones de menos de una hora.26
Este artículo apareció en la revista Skeptic 27.1
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No se ha encontrado evidencia de la existencia de meridianos, campos de energía psicológica invisibles o bloqueos de energía que puedan causar problemas psicológicos. Dado que los elementos de la teoría de la psicología energética no se pueden detectar ni medir, la teoría no se puede refutar y, por lo tanto, no es científica.27 Los estudios han demostrado que los métodos de la psicología energética son más efectivos que los tratamientos estándar basados en la evidencia, como la desensibilización sistemática y la prevención de la exposición y la respuesta. Los únicos estudios de desmantelamiento debidamente controlados que han probado la psicología energética encontraron que no tenía ingredientes efectivos distintos de los que se encuentran en los tratamientos estándar.28
Incluso los defensores más fervientes de la psicología energética admiten fácilmente que los mecanismos de acción hipotéticos no han sido probados, y mucho menos respaldados, y que aquellos que hablan a favor del enfoque tienen “un sesgo innegable resultante de… la identificación con el enfoque.”29 Mientras que los defensores de la psicología energética citan más de cien estudios para apoyarla,30 casi todos los estudios carecen de controles aleatorios de placebo, lo que significa que hay muy poca evidencia buena para el enfoque.31 Por alguna razón, algunos psicoterapeutas están interesados en teorías pseudocientíficas, ideas metafísicas y métodos de autoayuda de la New Age, e incorporarlos en su terapia. Se recomienda a los consumidores que busquen terapeutas que den prioridad a la psicoterapia basada en la evidencia y eviten los tratamientos extraños que desperdician su tiempo, dinero y “energía.”
ConclusionesEl interés en la práctica basada en la evidencia en los últimos años es en parte una reacción a las prácticas extremas de algunos psicoterapeutas. Hay pocas restricciones sobre lo que hacen los psicoterapeutas en el mundo real. Aunque existen estándares profesionales y éticos destinados a definir los límites de la práctica, la voluntad de sancionar a los inconformistas bien conocidos es débil y, por lo general, solo se adjudican los abusos más atroces.32 Los terapeutas rara vez son llevados ante una junta de licencias para defender sus prácticas a menos que un cliente o un colega se queje, y todo el sistema parece estar diseñado para evitar cuestionar la efectividad de las intervenciones. Es interesante que el psicólogo más conocido de Estados Unidos (Dr. Phil McGraw) y el terapeuta mejor pagado de Estados Unidos (Tony Robbins) no estén realmente certificados o autorizados para hacer lo que hacen. Como personalidades de los medios y celebridades ultra ricas, parecen estar exentos de las normas legales que se aplican a otras personas.
En general, las formas más eficaces de psicoterapia que se utilizan para tratar los trastornos mentales son aquellas que han incorporado los resultados de la investigación científica en su práctica, como la terapia cognitiva conductual (TCC). El uso de técnicas que tienen poca evidencia de su efectividad es problemático, ya que los estándares éticos profesionales favorecen el uso de tratamientos que tienen buena evidencia. Los tratamientos basados en la evidencia para los trastornos mentales deben considerarse como los tratamientos de elección, a menos que exista una buena razón para no usarlos. No hay necesidad de que los terapeutas utilicen tratamientos controvertidos y potencialmente dañinos con sus clientes. Los recursos sobre psicoterapias basadas en la evidencia están fácilmente disponibles,33 al igual que los recursos que enumeran los tratamientos que deben evitarse.34
Capítulo extraído de Wild Psychotherapy de Timothy C. Thomason (Flagstaff, AZ: Flagstaff Institute, 2021)
Sobre el AutorTimothy C. Thomason es psicólogo y profesor de la Universidad del Norte de Arizona. Es autor de Case Studies in Psychopathology, Native American Psychology y Wild Psychotherapy.
Artículo traducido por Alejandro Borgo, periodista, escritor y traductor. Director de la revista Pensar (pensar.org).
Article translated by Alejandro Borgo, journalist, writer and translator. Director of Pensar magazine (pensar.org).
Referencias1. Sigmund Freud. “‘Wild’ Psycho-analysis,” en The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 11, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 219–227. 2. Robert Lewis, “Tony Robbins,” en Encyclopedia Britannica, November 16, 2016, https://bit.ly/3bSxA6H. Acceso: Noviembre 24, 2021. 3. Cloe Madanes, “Curriculum Vitae,” Cloe Madanes Films, http://cloemadanes.com/films. Acceso: Deciembre 3, 2020. 4. “Life Coaching: An End Run Around Counseling Practice Acts,” HG.org Legal Resources, https://www.hg.org/legalarticles/life-coaching-an-end-run-around-counselingpracticeacts-6670. Acceso: Noviembre 5, 2020. 5. “About Dr. Phil,” Dr. Phil, CBS Television, https://www.drphil.com/about-dr-phil. Acceso: Octubre 21, 2020 6. Michelle Cottle, “Dr. Evil,” The New Republic 232 no. 1 (2005), 21–26. 7. Clinician’s Digest, “When Therapy Becomes Entertainment,” Psychotherapy Networker (March/April 2005), 18. 8. L. Elber, “Dr. Phil and the Mentally Ill,” Arizona Republic (March 29, 2004), E-1. 9. Chris Ayers, “Just Ditch Those Difficult Parents,” The Times of London (April 6, 2006), 37. 10. “What is psychotherapy?” American Psychiatric Association, July 2017 https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/psychotherapy. Acceso: Noviembre 29, 2021. 11. “Laura Schlessinger,” DCA Search, Board of Behavioral Sciences, https://bit.ly/3ptNxGP. Acceso: Noviembre 29, 2021. 12. Kirk Honda, “First Responders, Narcissistic Breakup, Preoccupied, Dr. Laura.” Psychology in Seattle Podcast, September 25, 2020 https://youtu.be/sp0gZXP6dig. Acceso: Diciembre 9, 2021. 13. “Dr. Laura.” Take On the Day. https://www.drlaura.com/pages/faq. Acceso Diciembre 4, 2020. 14. Arthur Janov, The Primal Scream (Los Angeles: Tarcher Perigee, 1981). 15. Jackie L. Schiff, All My Children (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1971). 16. Jean Mercer, Larry Sarner, and Linda Rosa, Attachment Therapy on Trial (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2003). 17. Gerald Koocher and Patricia Keith-Spiegel, Ethics in Psychology and the Mental Health Professions 4th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 18. Alan W. Scheflin, “Ground Lost: The False Memory/Recovered Memory Therapy Debate,” Psychiatric Times 16 no. 11 (1999), 1–8. 19. Ed Cara, “The Most Dangerous Idea in Mental Health,” The Pacific Standard (Oct. 4, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/dangerous-idea-mental-health-93325. 20. Scheflin, “Ground Lost.” 21. Elizabeth Loftus, The Myth of Repressed Memory (New York: Griffin, 1994). 22. Chris R. Brewin and Bernice Andrews, “False Memories of Childhood Abuse,” The Psychologist (British Psychological Society) 30 (2017), 48–52. 23. Scott O. Lilienfeld, “Psychological Treatments That Cause Harm,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 2 no.1 (2007), 53-70; Richard Ofshe y Ethan Watters, Making Monsters (New York: Scribner’s, 1994). 24. David Feinstein, “Energy Psychology,” Science Direct 15 no. 5 (2015), 340–351. 25. “Research Supported Psychological Treatments,” Society of Clinical Psychology, 2016, https://div12.org/treatments. 26. Gary Bakker, “The Current Status of Energy Psychology,” Clinical Psychologist 17 no. 3 (2013), 91–97. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Feinstein, “Energy Psychology.” 30. “Association for Comprehensive Energy Psychology,” ACEP, https://www.energypsych.org. Acceso: Noviembre 17, 2020. 31. Caleb Lack, “Energy psychology,” Center for Inquiry, November 14, 2018, https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/energy-psychology-an-apa-endorsed-pseudoscience. 32. Barry Beyerstein, “Fringe Psychotherapies: The public at risk,” The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 5 no. 2 (2002), 5–13. 33. “Research Supported…,” Soc. Clinical Psych. 34. Lilienfeld, “Psychological Treatments”; Timothy C. Thomason, Wild Psychotherapy (Flagstaff, AZ: Flagstaff Institute, 2021).
Critical Race Theory (CRT) is, at root, an American phenomenon. So thoroughly is this the case that although its ideas have been used outside the United States for some time, they are often highly flavored by U.S. racial history. CRT holds that race is a social construct that was created to maintain White privilege and White supremacy. This idea originated long before postmodernism with W.E.B. Du Bois, who argued that the idea of race was being used to assert biological explanations of differences that are social and cultural, in order to perpetuate the unjust treatment of racial minorities, especially African Americans.
There are good reasons to accept this claim. Although some average differences in human populations — such as skin color, hair texture, eye shape, and relative susceptibility to certain diseases — are observably real, and an individual’s geographical heritage can be discovered via DNA tests, it is not clear why this has been regarded as so significant as to divide people into groups called “races.” For one thing, biologists don’t. Biologists talk of populations, which can be identified through genetic markers as having had slightly different evolutionary heritages, but reducing this to what we usually call “race” is so often wrong as to be nearly useless in practice.
For example, in medicine, “race” is not very useful because socially constructed racial categories do not reliably map meaningfully onto more biologically relevant genetic lineages. For another thing, the contemporary idea of “race” doesn’t stand up historically. There is compelling reason to believe that it was not considered significant in earlier periods. The Bible, for example, written over two thousand years ago in the Mediterranean, where Black, Brown, and White people were to be found, is filled with moralistic tribalism, but makes almost no mention of skin color. In late medieval England, references to “black” people often simply described the hair color of Europeans now regarded as “white.”
While other factors may have contributed, race and racism as we understand them today probably arose as social constructions, made by Europeans to morally justify European colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade. European historians have tracked the rise of color-based prejudice over the early modern period, from roughly 1500 to 1800, and argued that prejudice on the grounds of religious difference gave way to racism — a belief in the superiority of some races over others — over the course of the seventeenth century.1 In order to justify the abuses of colonialism and the kidnapping, exploitation, and abuse of slaves, their victims had to be regarded as inferior or subhuman (even if they had converted to Christianity). This raises a common point of confusion, because it is also undeniable that other peoples at other times practiced slavery, colonialism, and even genocidal imperialism, and they justified these atrocities similarly — by characterizing those they enslaved or conquered as inferior, often using characteristics like skin, hair, and eye color, which we might identify with race today. This sort of discrimination and even dehumanization was already widespread, but, in Europe and its colonies, a few key differences led to a unique analysis.
Firstly, the concept of race was not consistently connected to heritability in Europe until the sixteenth century. Before then, it was generally assumed that traits like skin color were determined largely environmentally, rather than genetically, although the related concepts in ancient Greek (genos) and Latin (genus) along with records from the Chinese and elsewhere indicate that descent wasn’t wholly neglected.2 Secondly, the constructed ideas of race were specifically used to justify the atrocities of European colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade. Third — and perhaps most importantly — this was done by emerging forms of scholarship in what we would now call the social sciences and natural sciences, although they had neither separated clearly into the disciplines we would now call “anthropology,” “sociology,” and “biology” nor formed what we would now consider rigorous methods.
The concept of race was not connected to heritability until the 16th century.
This is important because naturalism and science were rapidly becoming a knowledge-production, thus idea-legitimizing, methodology the likes of which the world had never seen. It is the legitimatizing authority of science that, ultimately, postmodernism rails against most vigorously. The rise of the sciences — and of an intellectual and political culture that accepted science as legitimate — together with the horrors of colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade, led to new social constructions of race. This, we hear from CRT scholars today, is the “scientific origin” of racism, which can be taken to mean that these discourses that misapplied very preliminary results from science allowed the first socially constructivist racists to come into existence. In other words, with this oversimplified, overreaching, and self-serving scientific categorization came social constructions associated with extremely low-resolution categories: being Black (“blackness”) and being White (“whiteness”), to which value judgments were soon attached. Enter racism as we understand it today.
Taking a Critical Approach: Materialists vs. PostmodernistsCritical Race Theory formally arose in the 1970s through the critical study of law as it pertains to issues of race. The word critical here means that its intention and methods are specifically geared toward identifying and exposing problems in order to facilitate revolutionary political change. This was especially pertinent because, despite a series of profound but imperfect legal changes aimed at preventing racial discrimination, many activists felt a need to continue work on the racism that remained, which was less clearly demonstrable. To accomplish this, they turned to the tools of cultural criticism that were ascendant at the time.
As a result, the critical race approach, like other methods of cultural criticism, has always been somewhat divided into at least two parts — one “materialist” and the other “postmodern” — which both set themselves apart from the liberal approach. Materialist race critics theorize about how material systems — economic, legal, political — affect racial minorities. Postmodernists were more concerned with linguistic and social systems and therefore aimed to deconstruct discourses, detect implicit biases, and counter underlying racial assumptions and attitudes. Because of this fundamental difference in focus, some materialists have criticized postmodernists for conducting intangible and subjective discourse analyses, which usually take place in wealthy and academic milieus, while neglecting salient, widespread material issues, particularly poverty. Postmodernists have countered that, while material reality is of practical importance, it cannot be meaningfully improved while discourses continue to prioritize White people.
CRT in both incarnations, materialist and postmodern, reacted against liberalism and stresses a form of radicalism. As described by critical race theorists Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic:
Unlike traditional civil rights discourse, which stresses incrementalism and step-by-step progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.4 Critical race scholars are discontented with liberalism as a framework for addressing America’s racial problems. Many liberals believe in color blindness and neutral principles of constitutional law. They believe in equality, especially equal treatment for all persons, regardless of their different histories or current situations.5
True. And the illiberal nature of CRT is among the strongest and most enduring criticisms against it.
The late Derrick Bell, the first tenured African American professor at Harvard Law School, is often regarded as the progenitor of what we generally call Critical Race Theory, having derived the name by inserting race into his area of specialty: critical legal theory. Bell was a materialist, who is perhaps best known for having brought critical methods to bear on understanding civil rights and the discourses surrounding them. Bell was an open advocate of historical revisionism and is best known for his “interest convergence” thesis, described in his 1970 book, Race, Racism, and American Law.6 This thesis holds that Whites have allowed rights to Blacks only when it was in their interest to do so — a dismal view that denies the possibility that any moral progress had been made since the Jim Crow era. This is no exaggeration of his intent; Bell states this explicitly in his 1987 book, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary “peaks of progress,” short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain White dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it and move on to adopt policies based on what I call: “Racial Realism.” This mindset or philosophy requires us to acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status. That acknowledgment enables us to avoid despair, and frees us to imagine and implement racial strategies that can bring fulfillment and even triumph.7
This cynical pessimism pervades Bell’s analysis. For instance, he also considered that White people had introduced desegregation, not as a solution to Black people’s problems, but to further their own interests while suppressing Black radicalism during the Cold War (and at other times).8 Because of his beliefs in a pervasive and irreparable system of White dominance in U.S. society,9 he argued that such changes lead to a whole new raft of problems through which White superiority would continually assert itself over the interests of Black people, for instance through White retaliation and White flight.10 This was typical of the critical-race mood at the time. His contemporary, Alan Freeman, was similarly cynical and pessimistic, and wrote a number of legal papers arguing that antiracist legislation actually supported racism.11
Of course, simple legal equality between races is not sufficient to resolve all social inequalities. There is valuable work in addressing measurable imbalances in the political, legal, and economic realms, by comparing funding for schools in majority White and Black areas, differences in sentencing of Black and White offenders, disparities in housing and lending in Black and White communities, differences in representations of Black and White people in high-prestige jobs, with a view to learning why these disparities have come about. Nevertheless, there are plenty of general and liberal criticisms to be made of the materialist Critical Race Theorists, in addition to their pessimism. The materialist critical race theorists frequently advocate Black Nationalism and segregation over universal human rights and cooperation. Also, their supposedly empirical analyses of material reality, which usually find that racism and discrimination are not decreasing at all, can look a great deal like cherry- picking and generalizing from the worst examples.
Though the materialists’ pessimism persisted, their approach did not. Materialists dominated the critical race movement from the 1970s to the 1980s; but, from the 1990s, postmodernists were increasingly in the ascendant. Over time, the postmodernists came to focus on microaggressions, hate speech, safe spaces, cultural appropriation, implicit association tests, media representation, “whiteness,” and all the now familiar trappings of current racial discourse. This change owes much to the influence of a number of female critical race theorists who gained prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s and promoted radical Black feminist thought, including bell hooks (Gloria Jean Watkins), Audre Lorde, and Patricia Hill Collins. These scholars were happy to blur the boundaries of scholarly disciplines, while arguing passionately about both patriarchy and White supremacy in ways that mixed the legal with the sociological, literary, and autobiographical in specifically gendered ways. Significantly, they complained at length about the “whiteness” of feminism. They thereby set the stage for another wave of influential theorists: scholars like Patricia Williams, Angela Harris, and Kimberlé Crenshaw — who helped create the term “Critical Race Theory.” These scholars drew on CRT, which included class analysis, and on feminism, which incorporated ideas about gender and sexuality. This produced a highly layered, “sophisticated” analysis of identity and experience, which included social, legal, and economic factors. By looking at multiple systems of power and privilege and situating experience as a source of knowledge within them, they moved away from materialist analysis and towards the postmodern.
Critical Race Theory and intersectionality are centrally concerned with ending racism through the unlikely means of making everyone more aware of race at all times and places.
This change implied new commitments. Gone was the central focus on the material realities relevant to systemic and structural understandings of racism, especially poverty. This was replaced by analysis of discourse and power. At the same time, CRT invested heavily in identity politics and its supposed intellectual justification, stand-point theory — roughly, the idea that one’s identity and position in society influence how one comes to knowledge. These developments, together with the blurring of boundaries and dissolution of the individual in favor of group identity, reveal the dominance of postmodern thought in CRT by the early 1990s.
This shift is evident throughout writings from the time. For example, Patricia Williams, a professor of commercial law, is best known for her book-length 1991 autobiographical essay, The Alchemy of Race and Rights.12 Its publisher, Harvard University Press, describes it as operating at “the intersection of race, gender, and class” and evokes the blurring of boundaries so common to postmodern approaches, writing, “Williams casts the law as a mythological text in which the powers of commerce and the Constitution, wealth and poverty, sanity and insanity, wage war across complex and overlapping boundaries of discourse. In deliberately transgressing such boundaries, she pursues a path toward racial justice that is, ultimately, transformative.”13 In the CRT that emerged, we also see the focus on language and discourses and the need to disrupt them. There is, of course, validity to the applied postmodernist argument that it is much harder to rectify societal imbalances without first addressing prejudiced attitudes and assumptions, which, the theorists rightly observe, often manifest in ways of speaking about things — discourses.
The best practical use of this recognition would be rigorous (rather than purely theoretical and interpretive) scholarship into social attitudes around race. For the applied postmodernists, however, the focus on discourses is primarily concerned with positionality — the idea that one’s position within society, as determined by group identity, dictates how one understands the world and will be understood in it. This idea is central to CRT, as is evident from the very first lines of The Alchemy: “Subject position is everything in my analysis of the law,” Williams writes. Then she articulates the importance of language and discourses and the need to disrupt them, by blurring the boundaries between meanings, legal and otherwise:
I am interested in the way in which legal language flattens and confines in absolutes the complexity of meaning inherent in any given problem; I am trying to challenge the usual limits of commercial discourse by using an intentionally double-voiced and relational, rather than a traditionally legal black-letter, vocabulary.14
The postmodern concept of a “positional” self — a socially constructed identity that occupies a particular location within the privilege/oppression landscape — is evident. Legal scholar Angela Harris develops this idea further by advocating a multiple-consciousness (standpoint) theory: “It is a premise of this article that we are not born with a ‘self,’ but rather are composed of a welter of partial, sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical ‘selves.’”15 This idea of a multiple consciousness, rooted in identity and positionality, recurs repeatedly in postmodern scholarship on the blending of differing layers of marginalized identity, and has had a huge impact on how knowledge is studied and understood within CRT.
Despite the apparent complexity of constantly having to consider the impact of one’s social position on being both a speaker and a knower and relating it to the social positions of those around you, CRT is usually exceptionally clear in its exposition. Indeed, the frustratingly obscure and ambiguous postmodern language of postcolonial and queer theories is conspicuously absent from CRT, probably because of its genesis in legal studies. CRT maintains a commitment to the role of discourse in constructing social reality and addresses issues of apparently infinite complexity, but it does not usually despair of conveying meaning through clear language. It has a political purpose, which is not limited to deconstructing or disrupting metanarratives. It is therefore much easier to see what the tenets of CRT are — not least because its scholars have a tendency to list them. For example, the highly influential reader, Critical Race Theory, by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, sets out the core tenets thus:
- “Racism is ordinary, not aberrational.” That is, it is the everyday experience of people of color in the United States.
- “A system of white-over-color ascendancy serves important purposes, both psychic and material, for the dominant group.” That is, White supremacy is systemic and benefits White people. Therefore, “color-blind” policies can tackle only the most egregious and demonstrable forms of discrimination.
- “The ‘social construction’ thesis holds that race and races are products of social thought and relations.” Intersectionality and antiessentialism — opposition to the idea of racial difference as innate — are needed to address this.
- A “unique voice of color” exists and “minority status… brings with it a presumed competence to speak about race and racism.” This is not understood as essentialism but as the product of common experiences of oppression. In other words, this is standpoint theory.16
These core tenets unambiguously assert what is going on in CRT — racism is present everywhere and always, and persistently works against people of color, who are aware of this, and for the benefit of White people, who tend not to be, as is their privilege.17
The Spread of CRTCRT has expanded out of legal studies and into many disciplines concerned with Social Justice. The theory of education (pedagogy) has been particularly strongly affected. As Delgado and Stefancic observe,
Although CRT began as a movement in the law, it has rapidly spread beyond that discipline. Today, many scholars in the field of education consider themselves critical race theorists who use CRT’s ideas to understand issues of school discipline and hierarchy, tracking, affirmative action, high-stakes testing, controversies over curriculum and history, bilingual and multicultural education, and alternative and charter schools.18
They list CRT’s strongest footholds, indicating how effectively it can embed itself in other disciplines:
Political scientists ponder voting strategies coined by critical race theorists, while women’s studies professors teach about intersectionality — the predicament of women of color and others who sit at the intersection of two or more categories. Ethnic studies courses often include a unit on critical race theory, and American studies departments teach material on critical White studies developed by CRT writers. Sociologists, theologians, and health care specialists use critical theory and its ideas. Philosophers incorporate critical race ideas in analyzing issues such as viewpoint discrimination and whether Western philosophy is inherently White in its orientation, values, and method of reasoning.19
As a result, we hear the language of CRT from activists in all walks of life, and one could be easily forgiven — if CRT didn’t consider it racist to forgive this — for thinking that Critical Race Theory sounds rather racist itself, in ascribing profound failures of morals and character to White people (as consequences of being White in a White-dominant society). We are told that racism is embedded in culture and that we cannot escape it. We hear that White people are inherently racist. We are told that racism is “prejudice plus power,” therefore, only White people can be racist. We are informed that only people of color can talk about racism, that White people need to just listen, and that they don’t have the “racial stamina” to engage it. We hear that not seeing people in terms of their race (being color-blind) is, in fact, racist and an attempt to ignore the pervasive racism that dominates society and perpetuates White privilege. We can hear these mantras in many spheres of life, but they are particularly prevalent on college campuses. Delgado and Stefancic regard this as positive:
As this book went to press, students on several dozen campuses were demonstrating for “safe spaces” and protection from racially hostile climates with daily insults, epithets, slurs, and displays of Confederate symbols and flags. These “campus climate” issues are prompting serious reconsideration among university administrators, and for good reason. With affirmative action under sharp attack, universities need to assure that their campuses are as welcoming as possible. At the same time, a new generation of millennials seems to be demonstrating a renewed willingness to confront illegitimate authority.20
Critical Race Theory as Applied PostmodernismDespite its increasingly postmodern focus on discourses, attitudes, and bias, some scholars have doubted whether this branch of CRT is truly postmodern. One common objection is that postmodernism typically rejected shared meaning and stable identity (or subject-hood). Therefore, identity politics should make little sense from an orthodox postmodern perspective.
One could be easily forgiven — if CRT didn’t consider it racist to forgive this — for thinking that critical race theory sounds rather racist itself.
Critics making this argument have a point and are within their rights to insist on only recognizing the first postmodernists as “true” postmodernists, but it is nevertheless true that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Critical Race Theorists took some core postmodern ideas from the radically deconstructive first phase and adapted them to a new, intentionally politically applicable project. The new Critical Race Theorists explicitly rejected the endless, aimless deconstruction of original postmodernism, often seeing it as a product of the naturally privileged status of White male philosophers like Foucault and Derrida, who failed to account for their privileged positions as White men. The Black feminist scholar and activist bell hooks, for example, wrote in the 1980s that the people who wanted to get rid of subjecthood and coherent voices (the original postmodernists) were wealthy, White men, whose voices had been heard and whose identity was dominant in society.21 In her influential 1990 essay, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,” Angela Harris likewise argues that feminism failed Black women by treating their experience as simply a variation on White women’s experience. These ideas developed into a core line of thought in CRT that was instrumental to the development of intersectionality.
IntersectionalityThe critical race scholar who references postmodernism most explicitly in her work and who most clearly advocates for a more politicized and actionable use of it is Kimberlé Crenshaw, a founder of CRT and the progenitor of the concept of intersectionality. Intersectionality began as a heuristic — a tool that lets someone discover something for themselves — but has long been treated as a theory and is now described by Crenshaw as a “practice.” Crenshaw first introduced the idea of intersectionality in a polemical 1989 scholarly law paper called “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.”22
There, she examines three legal discrimination cases and uses the metaphor of a roadway intersection to examine the ways in which different forms of prejudice can “hit” an individual with two or more marginalized identities. She argues that — just as someone standing in the intersection of two streets could get hit by a car coming from any direction or even by more than one at a time — so a marginalized person could be unable to tell which of their identities is being discriminated against in any given instance. Crenshaw argues persuasively that legislation to prevent discrimination on the grounds of race or gender is insufficient to deal with this problem or with the fact that a Black woman, for instance, might experience unique forms of discrimination that neither White women nor Black men face.
This poignant, though seemingly relatively uncontroversial, idea was about to change the world. It was more fully articulated two years later, in Crenshaw’s highly influential 1991 essay, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” in which she defines intersectionality as a “provisional concept linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory.”23 For Crenshaw, a postmodern approach to intersectionality allowed both CRT and feminism to incorporate political activism while retaining their understandings of race and gender as cultural constructs. Furthermore, this theoretical approach allowed for ever more categories of marginalized identity to be incorporated into intersectional analyses, adding layer upon layer of apparent sophistication and complexity to the concept, and the scholarship and activism that utilizes it. This theoretical complexity, which Patricia Hill Collins dubbed the “matrix of domination” in her 1990 book Black Feminist Thought,24 spurred two decades of fresh activity by scholars and activists. “Mapping the Margins” provided the means: openly advocating identity politics over liberal universalism, which had sought to remove the social significance of identity categories and treat people equally regardless of identity. Identity politics restores the social significance of identity categories in order to valorize them as sources of empowerment and community. Crenshaw writes:
We all can recognize the distinction between the claims “I am Black” and the claim “I am a person who happens to be Black.” “I am Black” takes the socially imposed identity and empowers it as an anchor of subjectivity. “I am Black” becomes not simply a statement of resistance but also a positive discourse of self-identification, intimately linked to celebratory statements like the Black nationalist “Black is beautiful.” “I am a person who happens to be Black,” on the other hand, achieves self-identification by straining for a certain universality (in effect, “I am first a person”) and for a concomitant dismissal of the imposed category (“Black”) as contingent, circumstantial, nondeterminant.25
In its return to the social significance of race and gender and the empowerment of Black and female identity politics, “Mapping the Margins” can be considered central and foundational to Social Justice as it is practiced and studied today. It also revitalized the conditions under which socially constructivist racism takes hold — the reification of socially constructed racial categories — after decades of chipping away by liberal approaches. It thereby laid the groundwork for the “strategic racism” that has come to characterize the racial dimension of Social Justice scholarship in recent years.
The Caste System of Social JusticeBecause of its internal complexity and single-minded focus on oppression, intersectionality is riddled with divisions and subcategories, which exist in competition with — or even in unrepentant contradiction to — each other. Some people in the United States therefore argue that gay White men26 and non-Black people of color — generally assessed as marginalized groups — need to recognize their privilege and antiblackness.27 This can lead to the insistence that lighter-skinned Black people recognize their privilege over darker-skinned Black people.28 Straight Black men have been described as the “White people of Black people.”29 It is also not uncommon to hear arguments that trans men, while still oppressed by attitudes towards their trans status, need to recognize that they have ascended to male privilege30 and amplify the voices of trans women, who are seen as doubly oppressed, by being both trans and women. Gay men and lesbians might well find themselves not considered oppressed at all, particularly if they are not attracted to trans men or trans women, respectively, which is considered a form of transphobia and misgendering.31 Asians and Jews may find themselves stripped of marginalized status due to the comparative economic success of their demographics, their participation in “whiteness,” or other factors.32 Queerness needs to be decolonized — meaning made more racially diverse — and its conceptual origins in White figures like Judith Butler need to be interrogated.33
In the real world, attempting to “respect” all marginalized identities at once, as unique voices with the inherent, unquestionable wisdom connected to their cultural groups, can produce conflict and contradiction. We saw examples of this when the lifelong human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell was accused of racism for criticizing Black rap musicians who sang about murdering gay people.34 It appeared again in the confusion and conflict about whom to support when ethnic minority beauticians essentially misgendered a person claiming to be a trans woman by declining to wax around her testicles on the grounds that their religion and customs prohibited contact with male genitalia.35
All this “sophistication” keeps intersectionalists busy, internally argumentative, and divided, but it is all done in the service of uniting the various theoretically oppressed groups into a single meta-group, “oppressed” or “other,” under an overarching metanarrative of Social Justice, which seeks to establish a caste system based on theorized states of oppression. Social Justice in the contemporary sense is therefore markedly different from the activism for universal human rights that characterized the civil rights movements.36 These liberal, egalitarian approaches sought and seek to equalize opportunities by criminalizing discrimination, remedying disenfranchisement, and defeating bigotry by making prejudice on the grounds of immutable characteristics socially unacceptable. They thus provide an achievable goal for the well-meaning liberal individual: treat people equally regardless of their identity. The Social Justice approach regards this as, at best, naivety about the reality of a deeply prejudiced society, and, at worst, a willful refusal to acknowledge that we live in that kind of society. Consequently, the only way to be a virtuous person under Social Justice is to assume that these power imbalances and prejudices exist everywhere at all times, masked by the egalitarian false promises of liberalism, and assiduously seek them out, using the right kind of theoretical analysis.
Critical Race Theory’s hallmark paranoid mindset, which assumes racism is everywhere, always, just waiting to be found, is extremely unlikely to be helpful or healthy for those who adopt it.
Because of intersectionality’s sheer versatility as a tool, it appeals to those involved in many different forms of engagement, ranging from legal activism and academic analysis to affirmative action and educational theory. Mainstream activism has also eagerly embraced intersectionality — especially its concept of privilege, an idea that is vigorously insisted upon, often to the point of bullying and browbeating.
Noble Ends, Terrible MeansCritical Race Theory’s hallmark paranoid mindset, which assumes racism is everywhere, always, just waiting to be found, is extremely unlikely to be helpful or healthy for those who adopt it. Always believing that one will be or is being discriminated against, and trying to find out how, is unlikely to improve the outcome of any situation. It can also be self-defeating. In The Coddling of the American Mind, attorney Greg Lukianoff and social psychologist Jonathan Haidt describe this process as a kind of reverse cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), which makes its participants less mentally and emotionally healthy than before.37 The main purpose of CBT is to train oneself not to catastrophize and interpret every situation in the most negative light, and the goal is to develop a more positive and resilient attitude towards the world, so that one can engage with it as fully as possible. If we train young people to read insult, hostility, and prejudice into every interaction, they may increasingly see the world as hostile to them and fail to thrive in it.
Critical Race Theory and intersectionality are centrally concerned with ending racism, through the unlikely means of making everyone more aware of race at all times and places. They proceed upon an assumption that racism is normal and permanent, and the problem is primarily that people — particularly White people — are failing to see, acknowledge, and address it. As scholar-activists Heather Bruce, Robin DiAngelo, Gyda Swaney (Salish), and Amie Thurber put it at the influential National Race and Pedagogy Conference at Puget Sound University in 2015,38 “The question is not ‘Did racism take place?’” for that is to be assumed, “but rather ‘How did racism manifest in that situation?’”
That is, we are to assume that racism is always taking place and our job is to examine situations for evidence of it. This follows from the beliefs that “all members of society are socialized to participate in the system of racism, albeit in varied social locations,” and that “all White people benefit from racism regardless of intentions.”39 These quintessentially critical-race claims prompt some familiar theoretical imperatives: “Racism must be continually identified, analyzed, and challenged. No one is ever done,” and “The racial status quo is comfortable for most Whites. Therefore, anything that maintains White comfort is suspect.” Moreover, “Resistance is a predictable reaction to antiracist education and must be explicitly and strategically addressed.”33
The core problems with CRT are that it puts social significance back into racial categories and inflames racism, tends to be purely theoretical, uses the postmodern knowledge and political principles, is profoundly aggressive, asserts its relevance to all aspects of Social Justice, and — not least — begins from the assumption that racism is both ordinary and permanent, everywhere and always. Consequently, every interaction between a person with a dominant racial identity and one with a marginalized one must be characterized by a power imbalance (the postmodern political principle). The job of the CRT theorist or activist is to draw attention to this imbalance — often described as racism or White supremacy — in order to begin dismantling it. It also sees racism as omnipresent and eternal, which grants it a mythological status, like sin or depravity.41
Because the member of the marginalized racial group is said to have a unique voice and a counternarrative that, under Theory, must be regarded as authoritative to the degree that it is theoretically “authentic” (the postmodern knowledge principle), there is no real way to dispute her reading of the situation. Therefore, everything the marginalized individual interprets as racism is considered racism by default — an episteme that encourages confirmation bias and leaves wide open the door to the unscrupulous. In scholarship, this leads to theories built only upon theories (and upon Theory), and no real means of testing or falsifying them. Meanwhile, adherents actively search for hidden and overt racial offenses until they find them, and they allow of no alternative or mitigating explanations — racism is not only permanently everywhere and latent in systems; it is also utterly unforgivable. This can lead to mob outrage and public shamings, and it tends to focus all our attention on racial politics, which inevitably become increasingly sensitive and fraught.
In addition, interpreting everything as racist and saying so almost constantly is unlikely to produce the desired results in White people (or for minorities). It could even undermine antiracist activism by creating skepticism and indignation and thus producing a reluctance to cooperate with worthwhile initiatives to overcome racism. Some studies have already shown that diversity courses, in which members of dominant groups are told that racism is everywhere and that they themselves perpetuate it, have resulted in increased hostility towards marginalized groups.42
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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It is bad psychology to tell people who do not believe that they are racist — who may even actively despise racism — that there is nothing they can do to stop themselves from being racist — and then ask them to help you. It is even less helpful to tell them that even their own good intentions are proof of their latent racism. Worst of all is to set up double-binds, like telling them that if they notice race it is because they are racist, but if they don’t notice race it’s because their privilege affords them the luxury of not noticing race, which is racist.
Finally, by focusing so intently on race and by objecting to “color blindness” — the refusal to attach social significance to race — CRT threatens to undo the social taboo against evaluating people by their race. Such an obsessive focus on race, combined with a critique of liberal universalism and individuality (which CRT sees as largely a myth that benefits White people and perpetuates the status quo), is not likely to end well — neither for minority groups nor for social cohesion more broadly. Such attitudes tear at the fabric that holds contemporary societies together.
Excerpted from Cynical Theories: How Activist Scholarship Made Everything About Race, Gender, and Identity — and Why This Harms Everybody (Pitchstone Publishing). Reprinted with permission.
About the AuthorsHelen Pluckrose is a liberal political and cultural writer and speaker. She is the editor of Areo Magazine and the author of many popular essays on postmodernism, critical theory, liberalism, secularism, and feminism.
James Lindsay is a mathematician with a background in physics. He is interested in the psychology of religion, authoritarianism, and extremism and is the author of Everybody is Wrong About God. His other books include Life in Light of Death and How to Have Impossible Conversations (with Peter Boghossian). His essays have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Philosophers’ Magazine, Scientific American, and Time.
References1. https://bit.ly/3zRjTl9 2. Some third-century Han Chinese people described barbarians with blond hair and green eyes, commenting it was obvious that — unlike the Han — they had clearly descended from monkeys. Gossett, T.F. (1997). Race: The History of an Idea in America. Oxford University Press. 3. Delgado R. & Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York University Press. 4. Ibid., Introduction, 26. 5. Bell, D.A. (1984). Race, Racism, and American Law. Little, Brown, and Co. 6. Bell, D.A. (2008). And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice. Basic Books. 7. Ibid., 159. 8. https://bit.ly/3PVMYl0 9. https://bit.ly/3OTLMNx 10. https://bit.ly/3bmjair 11. Stern, M., & Hussain, K. (2015). On the Charter Question: Black Marxism and Black Nationalism. Race Ethnicity and Education, 18(1), 61–88. 12. Williams, P.J. (1991). The Alchemy of Race and Rights. Harvard University Press. 13. See “About This Book” on the page for The Alchemy of Race and Rights by Patricia J. Williams in Harvard University Press’s online catalog, https://bit.ly/3cZcCq9 14. Williams (1991), op cit. 15. https://bit.ly/3bvC2eJ 16. Delgado and Stefancic, Introduction, 8–11. 17. Although CRT arose in the United States in response to a very specific historical racial context, it has not remained in the United States. The British Educational Research Association has formed its own list of tenets of CRT: (1) Centrality of racism ; (2) White supremacy; (3) Voices of people of color; (4) Interest convergence; (5) Intersectionality. https://bit.ly/3Jl7OI5 18. Delgado and Stefancic, Introduction, 7. 19. Ibid., 7–8. 20. Ibid., 7–8. 21. Ibid., 127. 22. https://bit.ly/3cUDs2S 23. https://bit.ly/3OUDTYm 24. Collins, Black Feminist Thought. 25. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins,” 1297. 26. https://tmsnrt.rs/3cZ9xGS 27. https://bit.ly/3SjOjn9 28. https://bit.ly/3PRnJjO 29. https://bit.ly/3Snqvib 30. Abelson, M.J. (2014). “Dangerous Privilege: Trans Men, Masculinities, and Changing Perceptions of Safety.” In Sociological Forum (Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 549–570). 31. https://bit.ly/3cZ9pam 32. https://bit.ly/3ztPcki; https://bit.ly/3BAsLNd 33. https://bit.ly/3SiTXGc 34. https://bit.ly/3bjMqX7 35. https://bit.ly/3PVjkfu 36. https://bit.ly/2OnVfBF 37. Lukianoff, G. & Haidt, J. (2019). The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure. Penguin Books. 38. https://vimeo.com/116986053 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. https://bit.ly/3cW2a2P 42. https://bit.ly/3Q7MtUu
Economic growth, stability, civil liberties, and low crime rates are generally accepted metrics for evaluating the health of societies. On the last-named score, the history of crime in the United States may appear brutal and sordid—as it often is where a major empire arises—but can also appear profoundly encouraging. Consider, for example, the most serious and least under-reported crime: homicide.
As seen in Figure 1, created by sociologist Claude Fischer,1 we are living in one of the most peaceful periods in modern American history. It sounds unbelievable, I know.
Figure 1. Homicides per 100,000 people
Although this graph does not show the slight uptick in homicides since around 2015, as noted in official FBI statistics,2 homicide remains historically low. Some crimes, such as arson and various property crimes, spiked substantially during the 2020 summer riots but have since leveled off and remain at historically low levels. Why has crime declined over time? There are many factors at play.3
One factor is so significant and so obvious that it always bears mentioning: over 40 percent of people in the United States lived in extreme poverty in the 1820s; compared to fewer than five percent today.4 This statistic gets worse the further back in time we go; plausibly 95 percent of people were impoverished in most of the cities and nation-states of history.5 With poverty comes worry, anxiety, frustration, and fears of a foreshortened future. The increase in the standard of living long enjoyed by the West, and increasingly all around the world, is probably the single most significant factor responsible for historically declining rates of crime.
This is all good news, but… “What about the pandemic of police brutality against African Americans, as in the tragic murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and so many others? Isn’t that the real issue?” Indeed, police reform should always be on the agenda in any society concerned with civil liberties. However, a big reason activists can so easily list off various names of unarmed people shot by police is because that list is much shorter than they probably realize.
Breonna Taylor, for example, was the only unarmed Black woman shot by police in 2020.6 In total, 18 unarmed Black Americans were shot by police in 2020, eight in 2021, and four so far in 2022 as of July.7 This means that vastly fewer than one percent of unarmed Black Americans in encounters with police are killed.
There is another unhelpful, though prominent, confusion worth clarifying. Actual violent crime rates are proportionally higher among Black Americans than among White Americans, a likely consequence of their relatively higher rates of poverty, residential instability, and single-parent families, all wellknown predictors of community violence. As a result, police have proportionally more encounters with and receive more calls for service from Black Americans. This accounts for most if not all the differences in Black relative to White arrest rates.8, 9
Unfortunately, these data have not stopped various well-publicized activists from asserting that innocent Black men are routinely “hunted” in the streets by police.10 The strategy of activists is always to catastrophize—the more you’re convinced hundreds, thousands, maybe millions, of lives are on the line and that the future of survival and decency hinges on this moment, the more likely you are to be lured into tacit support of the defund the police movement, along with the broader BLM, CRT, and antiracism movements. Even formerly prestigious magazines such as Science now regard police-violence data as acceptable only if it fits an activist narrative.11 This is precisely the opposite of what empathetic and responsible scientists should want.
It is often the miseducated college graduate of whatever ethnicity who is sure police should be abolished. And when police are defunded, it is a mom in St. Louis, again regardless of race, who would prefer to maintain police funding and seek incremental reform where it is sensible to do so, who will now have to sleep with one eye open and windows shut. The belief that police should be defunded and defenestrated is a “luxury belief”12 espoused by many who live in low-crime areas and take for granted a life so safe and sheltered that defunding public safety seems sensible.
In 2020, Anondah Saide and I conducted a Skeptic Research Center study drawn from a large representative sample of Americans to measure peoples’ estimates of the number of unarmed Black men shot by police in 2019. We found that strongly-identified political liberals overestimated the actual number to an incredible degree—many were wrong by over an order of magnitude (see Figure 2). When looking at it, remember that the actual number of unarmed Black men killed by police is around 10 in any given year.
Figure 2. Data Source: Skeptic Research Center, 2021. CUPES007. How Informed Are Americans About Race and Policing?
The same is true for liberals’ estimates of the proportion of people killed by police who are Black. About 25 percent of all people shot by police are Black in any given year. However, “very liberal” Americans estimate that number to be over 60 percent (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. According to the Washington Post Database for 2019, about 25% of all people shot by police were Black.
We also found that trust in news media was an important correlate of ignorance of the data on police shootings and race (see Figure 4). Perhaps most troubling of all, we discovered that the perception that police brutality is worsening was largely associated with ignorance of the actual data (see Figure 5). The latter finding makes police reform not only difficult but impossible, since reforming any organization requires understanding what that organization actually is and what it actually does.
Figure 4. The actual percentage is about 25%.
Figure 5. The actual percentage is about 25%.
Everyone should be concerned about the observed association between trust in news media, empirical ignorance, and confidence about the pervasiveness and severity of racism and police brutality. One might assume that college-educated people would be well informed considering our results indicated that greater levels of formal education are associated with greater trust in news media. However, political commitment appears to sometimes override the salutary effects of education. Activism and luxury beliefs have compromised various fields of social science,13 and, more importantly, they can threaten peoples’ basic access to public safety.
The real problem is that this isn’t only about policing; it is about the general integrity and healthy functioning of all our institutions. Some activists and intellectuals, on the basis of ignorance or confusion, have gone so far as to demand we “smash,” “dismantle,” or “abolish,” this or that existing core social institution. It is, therefore, a requirement of the skeptical ethic to not automatically take journalists and academics at their word, but rather— and primarily— call for data, analysis, and evidence.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 27.3
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The Washington Post, for example, is one of several websites that now maintains a public and easily accessible database of police shootings. While the gloss of the site can be somewhat slanted and misleading, the data are the data. Before accepting cries to dismantle policing and legal institutions, look at the actual numbers. This issue will eventually affect everyone, regardless of any demographic classification. The more police departments lose funding, the harder it will be for them to recruit high-quality officers who understand the importance and art of good community policing.
Relative to the 335 million population of the United States, police are unjustly and unlawfully killing— thank goodness—a relatively small few. Reality matters, evidence matters. And true institutional reform can only be implemented by individuals who, frankly, know what is true from what is anguished rhetoric.
About the AuthorKevin McCaffree has a PhD in sociology from the University of California, Riverside. He is an assistant professor at the University of North Texas and co-directs the Worldview Foundations Research Team.
References1. https://bit.ly/3oexImU 2. https://pewrsr.ch/3aMsWtZ 3. Pinker, S. (2012). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Penguin Books. 4. https://bit.ly/2FvAe3E 5. Lenski, G. (2015). Ecological-Evolutionary Theory: Principles and Applications. Routledge. 6. https://wapo.st/3aPISvn 7. Ibid. 8. https://bit.ly/3RMOOpG 9. https://bit.ly/3OhtHJ1 10. https://n.pr/3yM0xMq 11. https://bit.ly/3ocBOfh 12. https://bit.ly/2KQFek0 13. https://bit.ly/3B1BZSh
Harriet Hall, M.D. examines the evidence that "testicle tanning" or red light therapy increases testosterone levels. She also discusses a related fad: butthole tanning, also known as butt-chugging, but better described as perineal sunning. Why do people fall for these fads? The answer is complex.
One of the most famous experiments in education — Jane Elliott’s “blue eyes, brown eyes” separation of her third grade students to teach them about prejudice — was very different from what the public was told, as revealed in this excerpt from the in-depth story about what really happened in that classroom.
If race is a social construct with no meaningful biological foundation, then why do medical doctors and researchers collect information about a patient’s race, along with gender and other characteristics? Harriet Hall considers the concept of race from a medical perspective: what we know, what we don’t know, and what difference it makes.
Michael Shermer introduces the theme of Skeptic magazine volume 27, number 3: Race Matters.
For nearly 20 years, Michael Menke was an influential chiropractor. In this column, he describes a meta-analysis he conducted to evaluate the efficacy of chiropractic, which ultimately led him to abandon the practice and pursue a career in quantitative research.
Over the last six years, allegations of stolen elections and massive election fraud have proliferated in the United States. The significance of claims that the results of one election—let alone several—were fraudulent, cannot be overstated. When citizens believe an election has been stolen, chaos, riots, and the potential collapse of political systems ensue. That means the question of whether an election was stolen or rigged should demand the highest level of scrutiny and the highest degree of skepticism. In this Skeptic exclusive, published one week before the 2022 midterm elections, Isaac Saul investigates the most serious claims of election fraud.
Ever since the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume outlined the “Is-Ought” problem—that we cannot derive an ought from an is, or we cannot determine the way something ought to be morally based on the way things are in nature (the classic example being slavery—because ants practice slavery that doesn’t make it natural and therefore acceptable for humans to practice slavery)—people have struggled to figure out on what basis should moral values be grounded. Of course, theists argue that God is that grounding, but what if you don’t believe in God? Is everything relative, including murder? In this article psychologist Gary Whittenberger offers an argument grounded in science and reason for determining objective moral truths.
Abortion is one of the most relevant issues of our time. As with many other subjects capable of arousing strong emotion, people tend to assume that the U.S. public is evenly divided, in this case between the “pro-choice” and “pro-life” positions. And some frequently cited polling would lead you to believe that it is indeed […]
In this review of the new David Copperfield book on the history of magic our Skeptic magic historian and reviewer Michelle Ainsworth offers a concise history of the profession through the lens of the photographer who provided the illustrious photographs for the volume, based on Copperfield’s own museum and collection, including and most noteworthy artifacts from the most famous magician in history, Harry Houdini. Enjoy this gorgeous production through our review.
Holy relics like the Ark of the Covenant, Moses’s Ten Commandment stone tablets, the Holy Grail, the chalice from which Jesus drank at the Last Supper, The Spear of Destiny, and the like, are the stuff of myth, legend, Hollywood movies, and even Nazi villains, but what is the real story behind the myths? In this insightful analysis Skeptic magazine religion editor Tim Callahan reveals what we know and don’t know about these legendary icons.
The Pro-Life vs. Pro-Choice positions on the contentious abortion issue outline the terms of the debate. In this article Michael Shermer defends the position of choice and women’s reproductive rights as the most moral and rational position, even while acknowledging that Pro-Life proponents have good arguments. Ultimately this issues comes down to conflicting rights, namely those of the unborn fetus to live and those of the mother to choose what is best for her life. As in most matters in life, there are no perfect solutions, only compromises.
As computer’s grow ever more powerful and computer programs—especially those involved in voice and image manipulation—the threat of “deepfakes” grows, and with it the problem of both personal and national crisis looms. Personally, someone could created a deepfake sex tape of someone and blackmail them; nationally, a foreign power could create a video of a President or Prime Minister making remarks of a threatening nature, that could then be used as an excuse for military action (a “false flag” operation). In this article tools are provided for how to detect deepfakes.
The issue of abortion has never been more polarizing and much of the controversy surrounds medical claims about the procedure which Harriet Hall, MD (aka the SkepDoc) addresses in this article for our special issue on Abortion Matters. What does medical science say about when life begins? When can a fetus survive outside the body of the mother? When does the fetal heartbeat become detectable? What are the short-term and long-term consequences of undergoing an abortion? What are the risks of not undergoing an abortion and carrying to term a fetus? These and other such crucial questions are answered to the best of science’s knowledge.
Ever since the invention of Viagra for ED, there has been a scramble to find the female equivalent, whatever that would be, often described as “female sexual dysfunction.” In this article, the renowned social psychologist Carol Tavris reviews the many claims by pharmaceutical companies that they had created such a drug, and why the problem is so much more challenging than initially thought.
Although abortion is often framed as a women’s issue, men make up half of the electorate and are more often pro-life. In this study the Skeptic Research Center report on men’s attitudes toward abortion is considered in the larger context of the national abortion debate, which has intensified since the Supreme Court overturned the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision guaranteeing women a Constitutional right to choose abortion.
In recent years the UFO phenomena has reached a new fever pitch over a handful of grainy videos and blurry photographs under the rubric of UAP, or Unidentified Aerial Phenomena. What are those objects in the videos and photographs? Alien spacecraft? Russian or Chinese spy drones? In this masterclass in analytical reasoning based on what little there is to assess, Mick West argues that the most famous of the UAPs, the Gimbal video, is most likely an artifact of the camera used to film it.
A three-part debate between Steven Pinker and Brian D. Josephson, initiated from a private email exchange in which Josephson challenged Pinker’s claims in a BBC radio program that there is no rational reason to believe in ESP. Here, Pinker first makes his case, followed by Josephson’s critique, and then Pinker’s response to that critique. As is our custom, we prefer to steel-man a position someone else holds, especially with a controversial subject like ESP, but better still is to have a proponent of it make the case for believing in it.
One of the surprise bestselling books of 2022 is David Graeber’s and David Wengrow’s book The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity, in which they attempt to upend the standard and widely accepted model of how Hunter-Gatherer bands and tribes developed into chiefdoms and states. How accurate is their alternative history of humanity? In this review essay, Chris Edwards considers the evidence as presented in this compelling book.
With the widespread use of cell phone towers and internet technology, concerns have arisen over health effects of wireless energy, most notably with the recent introduction of Fifth Generation (5G) wireless network technology. Public health expert Raymond Barglow reviews the epidemiological data and science behind these concerns and shows that there is, in fact, nothing to worry about.
Trans rights are human rights, but rights do not mean that any of us can do anything we like any time. There are restrictions on our actions, and when there are conflicting rights something must give. In this article on trans athletes, Michael Shermer explains why Male-to-Female trans athletes competing in women’s sports is unfair and a threat to the hard-earned rights of women to compete in their own athletic divisions, and why biological males that have gone through puberty cannot be considered equal to women with just a year of hormone suppression therapy.
If you give Christians a choice between Jesus and Darwin by telling them that the theory of evolution means you have to be an atheist, they’re going to pick Jesus every time. In this article, Larry Arnhart argues that Christians should accept the theory of evolution not only because it’s true but also that it does not mean they have to give up their religion.
In this important analysis of the medical issues involving trans people, Dr. Harriet Hall reviews what medical science knows about puberty blockers, vaginoplasty, phalloplasty, rapid onset gender dysphoria, detransitioners, and why “watchful waiting” is probably the best strategy at the moment given the considerable uncertainties.
Scientifically trained psychologists and social scientists have long been skeptical of clinical psychotherapy techniques because they are so dependent on anecdotes instead of data. In response, clinicians with scientific training have developed data-based techniques, like Cognitive Behavior Therapy. But these new techniques have not trickled down to pop psychologists like Laura Schlessinger (Dr. Laura) and Phil McGraw (Dr. Phil), along with self-help gurus like Tony Robbins. This article critiques these pop psych nostrums.
In this overview of the debate, research, and policies related to various trans matters, Lisa Selin Davis has written what is arguably the best and most balanced treatment of the culturally radioactive topic that incites passioned opinions on both sides of the political aisle. The trans movement is relatively new and science has just begun intensive study of the various issues, so opinions could change with changing evidence, but for the time being read this article for the most comprehensive analysis to date.
Human perception and memory are notoriously inaccurate. Preconceptions and biases shape both our perceptions of events and how we recall them later. Mick West considers how to think about eyewitness testimony so that it does not become emotional and swiftly evolve into an overly polarized argument.
Everyone knows that the U.S. public education system is broken, but no one quite knows what to do about it. In this analysis the education reform researcher and advocate Chris Edwards explains the problem and considers possible solutions.
In this letter to Bert Hölldobler, following up on his defense of his long-time colleague E. O. Wilson, who has been falsely accused of racism and knowingly promoting race science, Mel Konner, who also knew and worked with Wilson, reinforces the point that Wilson’s defense of Philippe Rushton was done out of concerns about academic freedom; in fact, Konner notes that there are other reasons for critiquing Wilson, primarily for his ultimate rejection of kin selection — one of the key tenets of evolutionary theory.
Mark W. Moffett describes how comparing identical things is extremely boring; breakthroughs in science often come about by exploring points of similarity between things that are normally seen as very different—in his own research, and that of his mentor, Edward O. Wilson, ants and humans.
Is there vigilantism in science? Was the renowned Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson wrongly convicted of racism and promoting race science in the court of public opinion? Yes, says his long-time collaborator and world-class scientist Bert Hölldobler.
Robert Zubrin takes a renewed look at his 2015 Skeptic article about the Mystical High Priest of Russian Fascism, Alexander Dugin, in light of Putin’s recent, full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It will strike readers as all too prescient.
Political scientist and war historian John Mueller argues that Putin’s war in Ukraine could have been avoided and can still be stopped through compromise since NATO was not going to accept Ukraine as a member for decades anyway, and Crimea will be returned to Ukraine about the time Texas is returned to Mexico.
“Havana Syndrome” is the latest in a long list of health scares involving the fear of new technology. The present panic involves claims of a secret weapon that uses sound or microwaves to zap people anywhere in the world. Robert Bartholomew examines some of the sensational claims made in a recent 60 Minutes episode suggesting White House attacks amid ongoing political tensions with Russia.
Read the Skeptic Research Center’s general report, “Pandemic Politics: How 2020 Impacted Americans’ Social and Political Attitudes,” based on their nine reports from the Civil Unrest & Presidential Election Study (CUPES) released in late 2020–early 2021.
Social psychologist Carol Tavris thoughtfully explores and questions “affirmative trans medicine,” the latest dangerous medical practices bubble. Few question the mystifying explosion of cases of gender dysphoria among adolescents and the proliferation of clinics to treat them. Vulnerable teens and baffled parents resort to internet misinformation and succumb to biased media influence, while experts spurn exploratory therapies and promote untested treatments that have long-term effects. Dissenters are vilified and silenced as being transphobic.
In this tribute to Edward O. Wilson, Frank J. Sulloway recounts how the Harvard evolutionary biologist had a profound and enduring influence on his own life and academic career. Wilson, says Sulloway, was the model of a mentor who cared deeply about his students and collaborators. By sharing his infectious love of the wonders of evolutionary biology, Wilson inspired countless others with his impassioned vision about the need to safeguard biological diversity.
To honor the legendary evolutionary theorist and biologist Edward O. Wilson, who passed away on December 26 at the age of 92, his former student Mark Moffett, pays tribute to his mentor in this deeply moving memoir of his time working with the great scientist.
One of the most influential conservative Christian theologians goes all-in for evolutionary science and finds room for a Paleolithic Adam and Eve. This has left some schools of Christian orthodoxy scrambling to find a way forward. With any luck, they may start to reevaluate their opposition to evolution altogether.
In Memoriam: Edward O. Wilson (1929–2021) — entomologist, evolutionary theorist, and unifier of all knowledge. Read an extensive and intimate interview we published in Skeptic in 1998, Vol. 6, No. 1, conducted by our editor Frank Miele, upon the occasion at the time of the publication of Wilson’s game-changing book Consilience.
Have foreign agents been committing nefarious deeds, targeting dozens of American and Canadian diplomats and their families with an energy weapon, or is Havana Syndrome a social panic aided by sensational journalism, dubious science, and social media conspiracy theories? The contents of a U.S. Government investigation into “Havana Syndrome” released under the Freedom of Information Act, concluded that mass psychogenic illness likely played a major role.
Do you believe that men have greater power and privilege because they are stronger, more aggressive, and smarter than women (and don’t have babies)? Think again. Dolores Newton & Jefferson Fish present a plausible sociocultural explanation for the persistence and universality of gender inequality over thousands of years.
What is osteopathy? What is the difference between an MD, a DO, and an osteopath in the US? Why do students choose a DO school? Should the DO degree be abolished? Find out what Harriet Hall, M.D. says in this column from Skeptic magazine 26.1 (2021).
In this column from Skeptic magazine 26.2 (2021), Harriet Hall, M.D. recounts that Mark Twain was an enthusiastic proponent of “alternative medicine” long before the term was coined — and much of it remains the same as in his time.
A review by Dr. Harriet Hall of Abigail Shrier’s 2020 book Irreversible Damage: The Transgender Craze Seducing Our Daughters was originally published on Science-Based Medicine’s website and later removed and put under review by SBM’s Editors “due to concerns expressed over its scientific accuracy and completeness.” Skeptic is publishing here because, if skepticism means anything, there are no sacred cows, no political sensitivities of topics to prohibit open discussion and review, no censorship of ideas that don’t toe a political line.
Has the US government admitted that UFOs are “real” and that the military is investigating them? Mick West presents an analysis of the 60 Minutes episode that aired May 16, 2021.
Admitting our beliefs are false can feel like a failure, a sign of weakness. Instead, we should look at changing our mind as an ‘update.’ The following is a review by Michael Shermer of The Scout Mindset: Why Some People See Things Clearly and Others Don’t by Julia Galef (Portfolio).
Raymond Barglow and Margret Schaefer discuss the anti-vaccination movement in the age of COVID-19.
A tribute to Richard Dawkins by Michael Shermer. The following essay was commissioned by Oxford University Press to be included in a volume entitled Richard Dawkins. How a Scientist Changed the Way We Think: Reflections by Scientists, Writers, and Philosophers, edited by Alan Grafen and Mark Ridley (biologists and former graduate students of Dawkins) and published in 2006 to mark the 30th anniversary of the publication in 1976 of Dawkins’ influential book, The Selfish Gene.
John Henrik Clarke Says Yes From African Warrior Queens “More nonsense has been written about Cleopatra than about any other African queen, mainly because it has been the desire of many writers to paint her white. She was not a white woman until the emergence of the doctrine of white superiority, Cleopatra was generally pictured […]
There is a lot of high-quality, constructive Afrocentric scholarship. As in most fields, however, there are fringe groups and extraordinary claims that grab our attention because of their extremism, and, occasionally, their absurdity. Since it is our job at Skeptic magazine to track these groups and claims, we bring them to our reader’s attention. This is not to imply that all or most African-American scientists and historians believe such claims. The recent surge of these beliefs, however, especially when supported by such recognizable names as Louis Farrakhan, is alarming. Here are just a few quotes emblematic of this extreme.
Since one of the themes of Skeptic is the study of the power of belief systems to shape our interpretation of nature and history, the Afrocentric paradigm should be treated no different from others. That is, a healthy dollop of skepticism and critical thinking is appropriate.
“It is of course possible to sympathize with James, and with his anger at a society that has paid little tribute to real African achievement. Unfortunately Stolen Legacy not only does not help the Afrocentric cause, it hinders it.” Since its publication in 1954 Stolen Legacy, by George G. M. James, has been a best-seller […]
In this cover story article (written in October 2020) for Skeptic magazine 25.4 (December 2020), Daniel Loxton considers the unsavory origins and rising threat of the QAnon conspiracy theory. Written prior to the deadly QAnon-led occupation of the Capitol Building in Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, this analysis exposes the conspiracy theory as baseless, unoriginal, and harmful for believers and society at large.
Perhaps one of the most bizarre beliefs rampant in modern times is that malign, shape-shifting reptilian extraterrestrial invaders, disguised as human beings, secretly control the governments of the world. It is possible that we recently experienced a violent consequence of that belief.
Reports about allergic reactions to COVID-19 vaccines will undoubtedly cause anxiety in people. Robert E. Bartholomew & Kate MacKrill remind us that, if history is a guide — and given the large number of people to be vaccinated — a mass anxiety event is not improbable.
A report by the National Academy of Sciences says microwaves caused an array of mysterious health complaints at the American embassy in Cuba. Robert E. Bartholomew reminds us why we should be skeptical. It was probably psychogenic.
I find it ironic to be weathering out Covid-19 in Brooklyn given that I’m a biologist who thinks of rainforest as my native habitat. Still, I feel fortunate to be a witness to what appears to be a global sea change: The air has grown clearer until the sky can turn a crystalline blue typical of mountain vistas. The squirrels and now superabundant birds — even one fearless raccoon — have stared at us through our 4th floor balcony window as if we were zoo animals. Already the stories are legend. Coyotes prowl San Francisco and mountain lions relax in downtown Boulder as if cities were their native habitat. Those who deny humanity’s footprint on nature point to the fact we can’t prove that people are the culprit behind climate change or species loss, but now it seems we’re actually doing the experiment. Can we turn our perceptions of nature around for good and put an end to the environmental crisis?
One way forward will be to recognize a fact of human psychology: Our abuse of nature is linked to the equally pressing concern of our age, social disintegration as a result of war, terrorism, and inequality. All are manifestations of a basic human drive to distinguish ingroups from outgroups. In this connection lies the key to deactivating the effects of both.
Kimberly Costello and Gordon Hodson, psychologists at Brock University, Ontario, Canada, had research participants read essays enumerating the humanlike traits of animals. Mere exposure to this perspective led even their subjects with the most entrenched prejudices to think more kindly not only of other species, but of immigrants — to regard them more as equals — despite the fact that the essays had mentioned nothing about humans.1
I registered what appeared to be such a link myself when I traveled to Socotra, remote chunks of land, the largest 50 miles across, 250 miles off Yemen’s shore. Whereas the only other archipelagos with comparable biological diversity, the Galapagos and Hawaii, have experienced terrible species loss since human contact, there’s no sign that Socotra’s goat herders have driven species to extinction despite occupying those islands since the time of Christ.2 Socotra has remained ecologically intact because of how tribal elders orchestrated the movements of people and goats to reduce habitat destruction. In Socotra, I was struck, always, by the spiritual connection between herder and goat. Herders, who knew their individual animals well, would cradle the animal to be slaughtered. They would caress it, sing to it. The goat’s sacrifice wasn’t taken lightly. To eat isn’t to be superior. As remarkable as the Socotran respect for animals and nature was their nonviolent behavior toward each other. While war devastates Yemen’s mainland, until very recently no weapons were permitted on the archipelago.
From an evolutionary standpoint, the link in attitudes toward animals and treatment of other people makes sense. In an age when both saber-toothed tiger and foreign clans represented constant threats, people responded by differentiating without hesitation between us and other. While that ingrained tendency to register a gulf from perceived outsiders was a survival tactic in their dangerous and little-understood world, it lies at the heart of dehumanization, and is the source of clashes, racial, ethnic, and nationalistic. The root of the dilemma is how the mind insidiously ranks people, with our own group at the top while others fall in a hierarchy that extends down to the abyssal strata where we position the most despised vermin.
By placing human groups and animals in one hierarchy, in essence we treat foreigners as if they were also different species: just as elephants have trunks and tusks, an ethnic or national group dresses and acts a certain way, and we expect their offspring to do the same (in a word, we see those groups as natural). Thus, our preconceptions about nature and prejudices about people turn out to be part and parcel of the same cognitive system, an equivalence that may have been useful to our ancestors.
Costello and Hodson’s studies indicate that when our innate assumption of superiority is counteracted, the possibility for more humane treatment of both fellow humans and nature increases. Mind you, our hierarchical mode of thinking is an anachronism we won’t be able to expunge; the perspective seems built into us, innate. Tests show that even young children equate members of outside groups with other species, and that they also see people generally as above animals. Still, in the connection between human prejudice and speciesism lies the key to deactivate the effects of both.
Comparisons that Denigrate How can we overcome our denigration of certain peoples, and animals? We can start by imagining ourselves in the other’s place, to open our minds to other points of view and to respect the other’s identity.3 A commonsensical goal might seem to be to dissuade people from dwelling on their differences, which highlight inequities, and focus instead on similarities with disliked others. We assume clashes will fade if a conflict negotiator can prove to both parties that you are like them. But such attempts can backfire for a simple reason: both sides feel their uniqueness, a source of pride and self-worth, is being questioned. Finding their cherished identities under attack, each group typically grows more entrenched. Relations may get worse, not better.4
Even more so when people are asked to recognize similarities between themselves and an animal. This resemblance can’t apply to us, only they — the members of some inferior society or ethnic group — can possibly be like an animal.
Indeed, our tendency to compare outsiders to animals truly shows our contempt for both. Examples exist for any culture, as when Muslim prisoners at Abu Ghraib were posed for photographs as if they were beasts.5 In World War II, Americans crammed their fellow citizens of Japanese ancestry into stockyards, horse stalls, and pigpens.6 As the sociologist Theodor Adorno is said to have declared, “Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks ‘they’re only animals.’”7
Comparisons that Elevate What’s gone so horribly wrong? After all, likening people to animals can be apt. Biology teaches us that people are animals, plain and simple.
In fact, equating people to beasts can be transformed into a positive tool simply by turning the comparison on its head — which is what Costello and Hodson did. Rather than thinking about you and me as animals, try this: animals are like us. Instead of insulting us by knocking us down to an animal’s level, such a vantage point raises animals up to ours.
With this twist in how we perceive the hierarchy of species, other animals now rank next to us rather than as our distinct inferiors. That makes all the difference. Those adopting this outlook see themselves as part of nature and are open to respecting wildlife generally. Still more remarkable, their empathy toward foreign species slashes prejudice toward even the most marginalized foreign people. When animals are seen as deserving our good graces, the comparison to people loses its damaging power.8
Of course, training people to change their point of view won’t be easy. When it comes to identifying with other beings, human or animal, we are fickle. Both love and fear of nature are necessary for survival: some hunter-gatherers labeled the members of foreign societies as animals, in that same pattern of ranking both outsiders and other species as beneath them. Bigotry escalated once people domesticated livestock and began accumulating goods. Conceiving of natural things as items to be owned made it simple to place ourselves above nature, and above other peoples, too. Indeed, rampant enslavement followed on the heels of agriculture. As historian Karl Jacoby noted, slavery is “little more than the extension of domestication to humans.”9
The dragon’s blood tree, Dracaena cinnabari, is one of many plant species unique to Socotra, an archipelago in the Arabian Sea.
(Photograph © Mark W. Moffett)
Yet the perspective that animals (or foreigners) are like us can be cultivated: even Romans, not known for compassion in a fighting arena, took pity on elephants after the beasts cried out rather than defend themselves from gladiators. There arose in the crowd “a feeling that these huge animals have something in common with humankind.”10
Such a burst of empathy, however, wears off — the brutal Roman spectator sports went on. An enduring shift in perspective would require that similarities of animals to people enter the popular consciousness. And evidence of such similarities is multiplying. Biologists have shown that other species experience empathy, have personalities and emotions, feel pain, and are self-aware — traits that bigots imagine to be lacking in allegedly inferior people.
Despite what science brings to bear, another problem is that conceiving of animals or foreigners as like us isn’t a perspective coming readily to everyone. People with the most pow er belong to nations that achieved success much as Columbus did, by subjugating even those who treated him with generosity. The challenge is especially acute for those with socially dominating dispositions, a description fitting Columbus to a tee.11 For him and those like him, conquering animals and outsiders is a birthright.12 Quick to reject similarities between themselves and other species, they have a correspondingly adverse reaction to people they dehumanize.13
There will be other, more general, hurdles. The perception that a creature is similar to us can be sabotaged if we picture it as food. With a steak in front of them, meat eaters have trouble thinking about the emotional life of a cow. They ward off any sense of culpability by imagining cattle as dumb and insensible to pain.14 (That’s also true when we cause other people to suffer: we visualize them in diminished ways that similarly alleviates our guilt.15 ) The result is the meat paradox: people care for animals yet love eating them.16
Fortunately, an accurate understanding of ecology recognizes people and animals as integrated parts of the world. Being a hunter or consuming flesh doesn’t mandate a loss of respect for nature, or the creatures we eat — as I saw in Socotra. The anthropologist Louis Liebenberg has written about Bushman hunters’ humane approach toward their quarry. One !Xõ tracker described how he could feel empathy for the antelopes he killed while simultaneously seeing them as food; his emotion tipped into sadness when a juvenile antelope, too young to watch out for itself, was trapped in his snare.17
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 25.3
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Psychological studies suggest reverence for nature accords animals a moral status that transcends whatever purpose they serve us.18 Here is where conservation arguments backfire when they assume the existence of each species must be justified. Judging a being by how we can exploit it firmly positions it as our inferior. The words of my mentor, E.O. Wilson, ring true: “Humanity is exalted not because we are so far above other living creatures, but because knowing them well elevates the very concept of life.”19 Regarded with a similar basic esteem, all people, too, achieve a value not just on paper but in practice.
Not to say that we’ll ever be comfortable with pumas wandering our streets, as they have done in some U.S. cities under quarantine. We will always set boundaries with the natural world. But just as there’s no true wilderness without allowing for diversity of species, some of which may clash with our interests or sometimes even threaten our safety, sustaining human diversity requires us to make compromises and accept risks. National, ethnic, and racial differences aren’t going away, as we’ve seen recently in viral videos of cops killing civilians and the corresponding protests and the resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement. The payoff for exulting in both the variety of nature and the diversity of human beings will be a more vibrant Earth and a richer future for all lives.
About the Author Dr. Mark Moffett investigated the emergence of societies across species and in humans right up to the present day in his most recent book, The Human Swarm: How Our Societies Arise, Thrive and Fall (Basic Books, 2019). Dr. Moffett is also a Research Associate, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution and a Visiting Scholar, Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University.
References 1. K. Costello, G. Hodson, 2009. Exploring the Roots of Dehumanization: Role of Animal Similarity in Promoting Immigrant Humanization. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13:3–22. 2. K. Van Damme, L. Banfield, 2013. Past and Present Human Iimpacts on the Biodiversity of Socotra Island. Zoology in the Middle East 54:31–88. 3. J. Mayer, P. Salovey, 1993. The Intelligence of Emotional Intelligence. Intelligence 17:433–42. 4. C.M. Fiol, et al., 2009. Managing Intractable Identity Conflicts. Academy of Management Review 34:32–55; YJ Huo, LE Molina 2006 Is pluralism a viable model of diversity? Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9:359–376. 5. N. Haslam, et al., 2011. Beastly: What Makes Animal Metaphors Offensive. Journal of Language & Social Psychology 30:311–325. 6. C. Patterson. 2002. Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. New York: Lantern Books. 7. Translated on page 245 by C. Patterson, 2002. Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. New York: Lantern Books. 8. B. Bastian, et al., 2011. When Closing the Human-Animal Divide Expands Moral Concern. Social Psychological & Personality Science 3:421–429. 9. K. Jacoby, 1994. Slaves by Nature? Domestic Animals and Human Slaves. Slaves & Abolition 15:89–99. 10. Cicero quoted on page 42, M. Cartmill, 1993. A View to a Death in the Morning, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 11. J. Sidanius, F. Pratto, 2001. Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; K. Dhont, et al. 2014. Social Dominance Orientation Connects Prejudicial Human-human and Human-animal Relations. Personality & Individual Differences 61:105–108. 12. For example, Western cultures put themselves above nature, compar ed to American Indians, who envision themselves as part of the greater world even when living in cities, reflecting a heritage as hunter-gatherers or horticulturalists attuned to the cosmos (D. Medin, M. Bang, 2014. The Cultural Side of Science Communication. PNAS 111:13621–13626). 13. G. Hodson, K. Costello, 2007: Interpersonal Dis gust, Ideological Orientations, and Dehumanization. Psychological Science 18:691–698; Costello & Hodson 2010 (ibid.) 14. S. Loughnan, et al. 2014. The Psychology of Eating Animals. Current Directions in Psychological Science 23:104–108. 15. M. Kozak, A. Marsh, D. Wegner, 2006. What Do I Ihink You’re Doing? Action Identification and Mind Attribution. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 90:543–55. E. Castano, R. Giner-Sorolla, 2006. Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 90:804–818. 16. B. Bratanova, et al. 2011 The Effect of Categorization as Food on the Perceived Moral Standing of Animals. Appetite 57:193–196. 17. L. Liebenberg. 1990. The Art of Tracking, the Origin of Science. David Philip, Capetown. 18. S. Opotow, 1993. Animals and the Scope of Justice. Journal of Social Issues. 49:71–85. 19. Page 22, E.O. Wilson, 1984. Biophilia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
This is a classic lecture on skepticism given by James Randi on March 22, 1992 at the inaugural session of the Distinguished Science Lecture Series hosted by Michael Shermer and presented by The Skeptics Society in California (1992–2015). James Randi presents an amazing first-hand analysis of astonishing claims encountered in his European visit. New-found freedoms stimulate rampant pseudoscientific practices in eastern bloc nations. With wit and wonderfully illustrative examples, Randi teaches us several lessons on the scientific investigation of unusual claims. This lecture transcript appeared in Skeptic magazine 1.1 (1992). Read the lecture transcript, listen to audio recording, or watch the video below:
Listen to the lecture (audio-only)
I am in a very peculiar business. I appear on stages around the world as a conjurer. Now the American term for it is magician. It’s not a good expression because if you look in the dictionary the strict definition of a magician is one who uses magic. And magic, at least by the definition I prefer from a leading dictionary, is the attempt to control nature by means of spells and incantations. Now, ladies and gentlemen, in my time, as you might have guessed, I have tried spells and incantations. No good. You can spell and incant all you want; the lady will still be on the couch, waiting patiently to float into the air or will be imprisoned in the box with the saw blade descending upon her unprotected midriff, and in some danger of being severely scratched, if not worse! Spells and incantations don’t work. You have to use skulduggery. And let me make it very clear what the magical trade—the conjuring trade—is with a precise definition: it is the approximation of the effect of a true magician using means of subterfuge and trickery.
The magician, in the American usage, is an actor playing the part of a wizard. We are entertainers. I don’t think that there are many folks—but there are some out there by David Copperfield’s own admission to me—who still believe that they really can do the things they purport to do. After a magical performance we’ve all undergone the same experience, all of us in the trade; you get people coming to you afterwards and saying: “I really enjoyed what you did; thank you so much for coming.” And you say, “Well, it’s great to be here. I’m happy that you were pleased with it.” Then they say, “You know, the business with the bottles that multiplied. Obviously, that’s a trick. And the one where you did the thing with the rings and the ropes. That’s a trick too. But the one where you told the lady what word she’d chosen out of the newspaper—that, of course, can’t be a trick.” I’d say, “Yes, that’s a trick, too, but it’s disguised as a miracle of a semi-religious nature.” And they wink at you and they say, “Sure.” Then they walk away and tell their friends afterwards, “Well, he won’t admit it, but we all know.”
There is a hunger, a very strong hunger, within us all to believe there is something more than what the laws of nature permit. I’m not just saying audiences that watch the magician. I mean within us all. We’d like to have a certain amount of fantasy in our lives, but it’s a very dangerous sort of temptation to immediately assume that it must be supernatural or occult or paranormal if we don’t have an explanation for it. I can tell you that in my life I’ve spent a great deal of time investigating and observing and carefully noting and making use of psychology. I am not a psychologist; I have no academic credentials whatsoever, so I come to you today absolutely unencumbered by any responsibilities of that nature. There is no dean who will call me on the carpet tomorrow morning and say, “You shouldn’t have said that.” You see, I’m in the business of giving opinions from an uninformed point of view, except from the point of view of a skeptical person who knows how people’s minds work and often don’t work.
It was mentioned in the introduction to this talk that at the current rate of scientific growth, in a certain number of years scientists will consist of every human being on earth, as well as all the animals—the donkeys, the burros, the whole thing. Well, my friend David Alexander remarked to me, in a cruel aside, that even today certain parts of certain horses have become scientists. And that is quite true; I have met many of them and though they have Ph.D.s, you’d hardly know it. I’ve just come back from a project that’s ongoing at the moment and I’ve seen that principle at work. I must share with you another thing in passing. I have a theory; this is only a theory, and it is at present unproven. But observations so far tend to support its possible validity, with my advance apologies to Ph.D.s in the room. I have a theory about Ph.D.s and the granting of the degree itself. I am outside the field, not an academic, so as a curious observer I have many times seen films of, and in a couple of cases actually attended ceremonies where Ph.D.s are created. They are created, you know. The Ph.D. itself is earned, of course, but then the person who has passed all the tests and done all the right things in the right way and has been approved doesn’t become a Ph.D. until one significant moment where a roll of paper, usually with a red or a blue ribbon around it, is pressed into his or her hand. At that moment that person becomes a very special class of being known as Ph.D.
There is a hunger, a very strong hunger, within us all to believe there is something more than what the laws of nature permit. I’m not just saying audiences that watch the magician. I mean within us all.
Now, I have noted at those ceremonies, and perhaps you have observed it as well that the man who gives out those rolls of paper wears gloves. Why? Why would he want to wear gloves? Is the paper dirty? I don’t think so. Is there something about that roll of paper, or perhaps the ribbon, that he doesn’t want to contaminate him, and he doesn’t want to touch his skin? I’m going to postulate—just an idea—that perhaps there is a secret chemical that has been genetically engineered which is on the surface of that paper so that when the Ph.D. candidate receives that roll of paper this chemical is absorbed by the skin, goes into the bloodstream and is conducted directly to the brain. This is a very carefully engineered chemical which goes directly—please don’t laugh; this is science—goes directly to the speech center of the brain and paralyzes the brain in such a way that two sentences from then on, in any given language, are no longer possible to be pronounced by that person. Those two sentences are, “I don’t know” and “I was wrong”.
I honestly don’t know about that; however, my observations of the situation are that I have never heard any Ph.D. utter either one of those sentences. I have never heard them say, “I’d like to marry a lobster” either, but that doesn’t mean they can’t say it. But those two sentences never seem to pass their lips.
I am being exceedingly facetious, of course. I have every respect not only for science, but for those who pursue the various disciplines of science. It takes a great deal of courage, application, study, sacrifice (and in many cases, some outrageous attacks on your integrity and your ability) in order to maintain a point of view in science which may or may not be popular. I have been with many prominent scientists who have, from time to time, had to stick their professional necks out, and sometimes their necks get pretty badly beaten up in the process. It’s not an easy thing to speak against what is generally accepted.
What then is generally accepted? I’m afraid, due to the media impact on our civilization, that a great number of things are easily swallowed because they are repeated so often. They are endlessly presented to the public, and eventually make their way to the academic community as well. Any number of times I have spoken to scientists who, when I ask them a critical question about some belief in some sort of parapsychological, supernatural or occult claim, has said, “You know, I hear a good deal about it and Professor so-and-so did make a statement about it. Perhaps, Professor so-and-so, based upon the small amount of data which he has presently gathered, compared to what should be gathered, in order to establish a satisfactory statistical picture, an amount of data on which conclusions could be drawn by one of the various statistical pictures available to him, has come upon conclusions which are prematurely expressed. Therefore, furthermore, and moreover, on further examination….” That’s the academic’s reply. When they ask me, I simply say, “In my layman’s non-academic opinion, I think that Professor so-and-so is not rowing with both oars in the water.” It’s simple, direct, and an honest expression of my opinion.
I am presently faced with a situation, again unnamed, where I am going to have to show a number of dedicated, honest, hard-working people that they have made a colossal error of judgment. I have to do this in a resounding manner, simply because to not do so could result in a great deal of personal damage, grief, and considerable heartbreak and discomfort to a great number of people who are already laboring under certain disadvantages and burdens that they did not bring upon themselves. I hate to be so mysterious about it, but it is an ongoing work of investigation. I am not often involved in that serious a situation. Usually my circumstances are more open—I am looking into an astrologer’s claims or into some sort of pseudoscientific thing. But I always have to remember an experience that occurred to me.
It is easy, when faced with an apparently supernatural phenomena, to say “I guess it’s a ghost” or “It must be paranormal,” or “It could be poltergeists,” and we walk away from it because we can’t or won’t, look a little further into it. Some years ago, when I lived in New Jersey my house was a sort of a wayside stop for itinerant magicians, conjurers, mountebanks—various characters of ill repute who would come by to visit for awhile. One time I came home after a couple of days away, very tired, and came in on my foster son, Alexis, who was in the kitchen helping a couple of magicians drink up the beer. I walked in and said, “Guys, I’m very, very tired; I’m going to bed. I’ll see you in the morning.”
I guess they carried on until late that night. I fell asleep, woke up the next morning, came staggering into the kitchen in time to see them eating up more of my groceries in the form of breakfast at this time. I sat down, got a half cup of coffee into me and straightened up the table. Alexis looked at me and said, “What’s with you?” I said, “I think last night I might have actually had a classic example of the O.B.E.” That’s the out-of-body experience. It means that somehow you find yourself out of your body and looking down on it or from a distance. Alexis looked at me and said, “Sure. You?” I said, “Yes, I have to be honest. It appears to me as if I did undergo such an experience.”
“OK, give us a description,” they replied. The two magicians at the table leaned closer over their bacon and eggs and wanted to hear what I had to say. “Well, I remember waking up in the middle of the night—I couldn’t get to sleep at first because I was so tired, so I turned on the television. The program went on and on and I eventually fell asleep. I remember waking up in the middle of the night, and I felt that I was spread-eagled against the ceiling of my bedroom, looking down at the bed. Alice, my black cat, was curled up in a ball in the exact center of the bed so that I had to be way over to one side. And I was, of course, trying not to disturb the cat! As I was up against the ceiling I noticed that the room was lit in sort of a grayish light. I looked down toward the television set and saw nothing but static on the screen and heard nothing but white noise. What I saw was startling. I saw myself, in bed, scrunched over to one side, a chartreuse bedspread on it, with Alice the cat in the middle. I noted that as she opened her eyes they were green. It almost looked like two holes punched through her head. She looked at me and went, ‘hmmph’ and went right back to sleep.”
Now that was a very strong experience for me. I really believed, from the evidence presented to me, that I had an out-of-body experience that matches the description that we’ve all heard about so many times. But, fortunately for me, I’m not really dead-set against having my belief structure disturbed or having new facts come in that would disturb my previous convictions. And, fortunately, I am able to tell you what actually happened. Alexis looked at me and said, “I’ve got two things to show you.” He went to the foot of the stairs and came up with a big, transparent laundry bag. He had taken it half way down to the laundry room. He brought it all the way up the stairs, and inside noted sheets, pillowcases, and the chartreuse bedspread. He said, “That’s been there since yesterday.” The bedspread hadn’t been on the bed last night! I dashed to the bedroom door, looked in, and the spread I used when the other one was in the laundry lay on the bed. They looked nothing alike. Alexis then called my attention to the patio, noting that he had put Alice outside yesterday afternoon because one of the magician guests was highly allergic to cats. She had remained outside, very unhappily, through the night and into this morning. She could not have been curled up in the middle of the bed last night.
It was a dream—a hallucination, if you will. I had two very good pieces of evidence that it could not have happened. That’s important in that if I did not have one or both of those pieces of evidence, I would now have to say to you that, to the best of my knowledge, I had an out-of-body experience. But, all the other out-of-body experiences we hear of, we have to wonder. Those folks are not quite as skeptical about the subject as I am, in most cases. If they don’t have some convincing evidence to the contrary, what’s to stop them from saying, “I’m absolutely certain I’ve had an out-of-body experience?” There is no other explanation for it except the possible and rather parsimonious conclusion that they were either dreaming or had a hallucination. It might have been a bad pork chop, for all we know. Please consider that carefully, and don’t forget it, because it’s a good example of how even the arch-skeptic could possibly have been taken in.
I have had a number of small experiences like that, including the déjà vu type experiences that so many people have had. (I love the line from the fellow who says, “I keep having the same déjà vu, over and over again.”) But I have resisted the temptation to merely say, “Well, at last I’ve got proof of it.” I’m highly skeptical, but what is that skepticism based on? If you’re skeptical as well, have you asked yourself, “Upon what do I base my skepticism?” Are you just plain ornery? Do you just not want to go along with the status quo? Do you know some people who believe in it who are really pretty dense and you don’t want to join their group?
You must have a reason, I think, for yourself and for others as to why you are skeptical. These things are not likely to be true; therefore, you need proof of them. We’re not required to prove a negative; we can’t do that. I can’t prove telepathy doesn’t exist. I remember getting a question years ago. A lady stood up in the audience and said, “Can you prove to me that ESP doesn’t exist?” I said, “No, I can’t.” She sat down with her arms folded and replied “Ah ha.” That was a victory for her. I went on to explain that I can’t prove a negative. My question is, “Do you believe in it?” She said, “Absolutely.” I asked if she could prove that it is so. She said, “Well, I’m quite convinced of it.”
“That’s not my question,” I responded. “Can you prove that it is so? You’re the one making the claim.” We skeptics, as Michael Shermer clearly pointed out, are not in the business of debunking. If I were in the business of debunking, and I’ve often had that label pinned on me and I’ve always resented it and denied it—it means I would go into an investigation convinced that “this ain’t so and I’m going to show you that it isn’t.” I’m not a lawyer; I don’t have an advocacy position to take. I go into a situation as an investigator. To be perfectly fair, I can’t prove a negative, but I go into this thing prepared to be shown. Am I prejudiced against it? Oh, yes! I have to admit that. But if you’ve been sitting by a chimney for 63 years on the evening of December 24 and a fat man in a red suit has never bounced down that chimney, you can say, “One hundred percent of my evidence shows me that this claim is not necessarily so. I cannot prove that it isn’t, but it’s not very likely to be true, based on what we know.”
The Santa Claus example may seem trivial and a little inappropriate, but it is actually a good metaphor for so many paranormal and pseudoscientific claims. Another is flying reindeer. This one we can actually test. (Please don’t tell the SPCA about this.) I don’t really want to do the experiment, but let’s walk through it as if I were doing it. It’s a thought experiment. Let’s select, by some randomizing process, a thousand reindeer. We’ll number them and get them all together in a reindeer truck (I don’t know what you put reindeer in) and take them to the top of the World Trade Center in New York. We are going to test whether or not reindeer can fly. You have your reindeer all lined up, a video-camera operator standing by, lots of pads of paper and pens at work. The time is now ten past ten in the morning. OK, first experiment. Number one reindeer, please, up to the edge. Camera going? Good. Push. Uhh, write down “no”. Really NO! Number two. Push. I don’t know what the result of the experiment will be; I suspect strongly what it will be, based upon my meagre knowledge of the aerodynamics of the average reindeer, though I’m not an expert on it. But based upon previous accounts of what reindeer can and cannot do, I think we are going to end up with a pile of very unhappy and broken reindeer at the foot of the World Trade Center. And probably a couple of policemen will be standing by a squad car saying, “I don’t know, but here comes another one.”
What have we proven with this experiment? Have we proven that reindeer cannot fly? No, of course not. We have only shown that on this occasion, under these conditions of atmospheric pressure, temperature, radiation, at this position geographically, at this season, that these 1000 reindeer either could not or chose not to fly. (If the second is the case, then we certainly know something of the intelligence of the average reindeer.) However, we have not, and can not, prove the negative that reindeer cannot fly, technically, rationally, and philosophically speaking. People will often look at this example and say, “Well, how many reindeer would you have to test?” I’m not going to get into the statistics of the argument; I will only tell you that you cannot prove a negative. The other folks who claim that something is so are required to prove it. It is what we call the burden of proof. In this case, if it’s so it’s very easy to prove. Just show me one flying reindeer. Then they rationalize, saying, “Oh, no. It’s only the eight tiny reindeer that live at the North Pole who can, and will, on the evening of December 24, fly to do that specific job.” In that case you have to throw up your hands and say, “Well, I don’t think your hypothesis is very testable.” Don’t spin your wheels!
Thought experiments like this one only go so far. As an example of a real experiment testing unusual claims, I just came back from Hungary where I was invited to Budapest by the Academy of Sciences. They are very concerned about the fact that now that many of these countries are freed from the burdensome and onerous yoke of Communism and have the freedom to receive all kinds of scientific information in the form of journals and lectures, nonsense comes in as well. The astrologers, the faith healers, the ESP artists, the people with the pendulums, the water dowsers—they’re lined up and pouring across the border because they see a new market. The scientists of Hungary were concerned about this. A well-known member of parliament who is also a well-respected brain scientist of international repute, said to me, “Mr. Randi, have you seen any of the publicity on the magnetic ladies?” I had.
In case you’re not familiar with the magnetic ladies of Hungary, I will relieve you of that ignorance immediately. You may have seen a picture that made all the wire services in this country last year, of the magnetic man from (then) Leningrad. There was a picture of a middle-aged man standing like this, naked from the belt up, with a flatiron stuck here, a hammer there, nails, razor blades—all kinds of metal clinging to his body. The caption said that he attracted these things. They just jumped, willy nilly, onto his body. He was somehow magnetic. I’ll bet his wristwatch was a mess! Don’t bring him near your computers! I can just imagine him going through a steel door. Bam! Right into it!
Well, I took that with the proverbial grain of salt about the size of a basketball, and just put it in the scrapbook and forgot about it. But the professor asked me about the magnetic ladies of Hungary, and he said, “Their reputation is such that objects, not necessarily metallic ones, cling to their bodies with such tenacity that a strong man cannot tear them loose.” Now, wait a minute! Suppose you have some instant glue, and we take a tennis ball and stick it on the lady’s neck, on the side. If a strong man can’t tear it off, he’s going to tear her skin off—or her head! Something has to give! My scientist friend and sponsor of this trip looked at me and said, “How can they make claims like this?” I said, “Well, show me the magnetic ladies.” He said that the following day, after the press conference, they were scheduled to arrive. I could hardly wait.
One of the parapsychologists had suggested that he could bring me some instrumentation for detection of their magnetism. He promised that we’d take the two ladies down to the laboratory, (hand in hand, clinging to one another, no doubt). I declined to go to the laboratory because the laymen reading the report in the newspaper wouldn’t understand “laboratory”. What are you going to do? Put a cyclotron on her ear? No. I equipped myself with a scientific device and I went along. The device was called a compass. It’s a scientific instrument and an easy way to perform the test. If a woman is magnetic, the compass is going to point right at her. The two ladies showed up. I told my friend in advance that he must understand that the claim is one thing; the event itself will often be something totally different. It won’t be half as entertaining or amusing, or true, as the actual demonstration.
One lady literally did this: she took her wristwatch off her wrist and did this. [Randi put his watch on his forehead and it stays there without falling.] “How do you explain that?,” she said. I looked at both ladies, who were wearing very greasy, high gloss makeup. It was obviously sticky, mixed with a little perspiration. She said, “We have no explanation for it.” I said I didn’t find it terribly difficult to explain.
This lecture transcript appeared in Skeptic magazine 1.1 (1992)
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The second lady had an even better demonstration. She took a small ceramic saucer from her purse, stuck it on her forehead, where it remained. “And how do you explain that?” she parroted the other woman. I pulled it off her forehead, and stuck it on the foreheads of the first four people standing on my right. It stuck very effectively to the foreheads of all of them! Then we tested under controlled conditions. (By the way, the compass test failed miserably; it pointed to North, obstinately refusing to point at them.) I asked for soap and water and, through the interpreter, asked the first lady if I could wash her forehead to remove the makeup and any perspiration that might be there. She informed me that if she washed her forehead it wouldn’t work because water is absorbed into the skin and water and electricity, or magnetism, don’t mix. She denied that that would be a satisfactory test, as did the second lady, and they left. “You’ve learned your first lesson in the scientific investigation of unusual claims,” I told the Professor. “Don’t start to give theories on how it might work until you’ve seen whether it meets the claims of the newspaper account, or is really something much less impressive.
To be fair to these women, I can see how that account might have ended up in a newspaper. I’m sure those ladies didn’t say to the newspaper reporters, “A strong man can’t pull it away from me.” But a reporter is a human being and maybe his story doesn’t look all that great when he writes that things cling to their bodies. Then perhaps he thinks: “Um, how about ‘with such tenacity that a strong man can’t pull them loose’”? Now, he has a story! What I’m saying is that the media are as much to blame for the spread of nonsense and pseudoscience as the claimants themselves. For example, a few years ago the New York Daily News, on page three where they put the “heavy news” and sensational stuff, announced that a student at Duke University had successfully in great detail described not only an aircraft accident 24 hours in advance of the event, he even gave the number of people who would be killed. He was short by only two. He even described the location of the crash in the Canary Islands. That was picked up by news services and was featured on television programs; it was on every newscast for quite some time. It was received by the press as a genuine example of prophecy, and the director of the program in which this was involved at Duke University actually made a statement that he had a sealed envelope 24 hours before in his safe that was not touched by this gentlemen until after the episode had taken place. It was allegedly torn open at that time and it contained the prediction.
To explain this phenomena I will take you into a different world, for just a moment, so you will understand something. Magicians know how this young man could very easily have done this trick. I won’t go into all the details; you can imagine some of them yourself. But the effect is exactly as described—a sealed signed envelope, put into a safe, later carefully opened. Inside you either find a tape cassette or a sealed letter with all kinds of security on it, signed, maybe genuinely notarized, as of the day before. It contains the prediction. A miracle of a semi-religious nature? No, it’s a trick. It can be done by any good magician.
Now, let us return to the article in the Daily News, first edition. It came out in the afternoon. It had the story on page 3, and a box in the middle of it describing the mechanics of how it had been locked up in a safe and it had a final paragraph which quoted the student at Duke University who made the prediction with this disclaimer: “It’s all part of the publicity for my magic show, which is happening tomorrow night. Don’t take it seriously.” The second and third editions of the Daily News had everything except that one sentence.
Another example of how the media distorts claims comes from a young fellow who lived a few doors down from me when I was living in Rumson, New Jersey. He was one of the local characters who did adventurous things like going out on rafts and sailboats. I thought he was a nice kid. One day on the front page of the New York Times there was a little box showing a map of the Bermuda Triangle with a Maltese Cross on it. The headline read: “Rumson boy lost at sea in Bermuda Triangle.” I read the short article, continued on another page, which said he had taken off in his one-man sailboat, sailed into the Triangle carrying a radio transmitter, and hadn’t been heard from since. The Coast Guard was searching for him. No sooner had I finished reading this and had called some friends in New York to tell them about it, I went out to pick up the mail and to my shock there was this kid waving hello to me. He was perfectly all right! I said to him, “You’re in the Times this morning.” He said, “Yeah, they picked me up late last night and they brought me in. They want me to be observed in the hospital, but I feel perfectly all right. We had a bit of a storm; I lost the radio overboard and they finally picked me up very, very early, around 2:30 this morning and they flew me in.”
Though the first story made a big splash, the followup never appeared in the New York Times or any other paper of which I know. It’s still part of the mythology about the Bermuda Triangle. So far as we know, from reading accounts that were published in newspapers, that kid is still someplace out in a sailboat in the Bermuda Triangle or perhaps taken off to Mars. You’ve got to learn that newspaper editors and reporters are subject to the same kinds of pressures that we all are. We all want something successful. Often the choice is between a story and a non-story. We have to realize that we cannot depend on the media to always to represent the facts as they actually are. That’s not a great deal of news to you, but you must bear it in mind at all times. Be careful about accepting what appears in print; don’t let them say to you, “They put it in the paper; it must be so,” or “Someone wrote a book on it. It must be so.”
Furthermore, books are often published which, before they actually reach the stands and are on sale, have been completely refuted because they are based on false information. Do they immediately withdraw them? No. I’ll give you a good example. There’s a book called Learning to Use Extrasensory Perception. Its published by Charles Tart, a respected psychologist at University of California, Davis. I heard Dr. Tart give a talk in Casper, Wyoming. I’m going to tell you exactly what he said and see if your reaction is the same as mine. I recorded it on tape so I know exactly the words he said; this is not a case of interpretation or faulty recollection. He said, in speaking to the audience:
There was a time, years ago, when I was highly skeptical of any paranormal claims of any kind. One of the things that convinced me that there must be something to this is a strange experience that I personally went through. It was wartime. I was at Berkeley, California, and everybody was working overtime. We worked until very late hours of the night and the young lady who was my assistant at the time worked with me until very late this one night. She finally went home; I went home. Then the very next day she came in, all excited. She reported this event. It was wartime; they did work overtime. They often were very, very tired when they went home. It was understandable they would fall into a deep sleep and get as much sleep as they possibly could during the night. She reported that during this night she had suddenly sat bolt upright in her bed, convinced that something terrible had happened. “I had a terrible sense of foreboding,” she said, but she did not know what had happened. “I immediately swung out of bed and went over to the window and looked outside to see if I could see anything that might have happened like an accident. I was just turning away from the window and suddenly the window shook violently. I couldn’t understand that. I went back to bed, woke up the next morning and listened to the radio.” A munitions ship at Port Chicago had exploded. It literally took Port Chicago off the map. It levelled the entire town and over 300 people were killed. Whether it was an accident or sabotage, no one ever found out. She said she had sensed the moment when all these people were snuffed out in this mighty explosion. How would she have suddenly become terrified, jumped out of bed, gone to the window, and then—from 35 miles away, the shock wave had reached Berkeley and shook the window?
Indeed, she remembered looking at the clock to see what time it was—right to the minute. Well, when I heard this, I said to myself, “There’s something wrong here.” I see a couple of smiles around the audience; maybe you’ve spotted the same thing I did. I had a geologist friend sitting three or four seats away; I handed him a note. He winked, smiled, got up and left the room. He came back in, handed it to me, and it just said on it, “8 seconds.” What question did I ask him? [Answer from audience: What is the difference in time of propagation over a distance of 35 miles of a shock wave through the air, compared to a shock wave through the ground? The difference is 8 seconds.] So 8 seconds before that window shook, she had been startled by the room itself shaking, not by the airwave, but by the groundwave. My theory is this: the groundwave which shook the bed startled her, she swung out of bed, went over to the window, looked outside, didn’t see anything, went to turn away from the window and suddenly the pane shook in front of her. The next morning I went to Professor Tart where he was having breakfast by himself. I had known him through correspondence and phone conversations but had never met him personally. I went over, introduced myself, sat down for a moment and gave him this bit of theory. I said there would be 8 seconds difference in the time. He didn’t look up from his scrambled eggs for the longest time. Finally, when he did, he smiled and said, “Mr. Randi, that may be the explanation that you prefer.” I think he had just decided that he wasn’t going to entertain that idea very solidly. But I don’t know that he ever made that statement subsequent to that, so maybe he did come to the conclusion that what I offered as an explanation was more likely to be true. But it is so typical of the field! Again, I’m involved in some stuff that I can’t tell you about, and I apologize for that, where I have a number of prominent scientists who are absolutely ignoring, refusing to look at very good evidence in this case that I’m investigating. They can come up with rationalizations for it that you wouldn’t believe, unless you’ve been through this process before. It is incredible how they can ignore good evidence to show that there is a prosaic, rational, and very probable explanation for what they are observing.
I want to close this presentation with some parallel examples of scientific claims that turned out to be so much nonsense. Let’s go back to 1903 in France. You may have heard of this, if not it really is something you should look up. A prominent scientist—a physicist named Rene Blondlot—startled the world of science with his announcement of the discovery of N-rays. A very well respected man who had won many prizes in science and justifiably so, he was doing experiments by today’s standards that were very simple—such as finding the speed of electricity in a conductor. It sounds easy today, but in those days it was a very sophisticated experiment and not all that easily done. Blondlot was in his 70s at the time when he discovered N-rays, named after the town of Nancy, where he was head of the Department of Physics at the University of Nancy.
What were N-rays? N-rays were allegedly radiation exhibiting impossible properties emitted by all substances with the exception of green wood (wood not dried out) and anesthetized metal. (Metal that had been dipped in ether or chloroform did not give out N-rays!) Within a matter of six to eight months of the announced discovery of N-rays, 30 papers had come in from all over Europe confirming the existence of N-rays. Reports were published in journals despite the fact that there were many laboratories reporting failure after failure in replicating the results. Such acceptance was understandable considering that X-rays, which also exhibited unsuspected properties, were by then firmly established.
What Blondlot had was a basic spectroscope with a prism (not glass, but aluminum) on the inside, and a thread. The narrow stream of N-rays was refracted through the prism and coming out produced a spectrum on a field. The N-rays were reported to be invisible, except when viewed when they hit a treated thread (for example, treated with calcium sulfide). They moved the thread across the gap where the N-rays came through and when it was illuminated that was reported as the detection of the N- rays.
Before long N-rays were established as factual. Nature magazine was skeptical of the N-rays since laboratories in England and Germany were unable to find them. (Germany had just discovered X-rays the decade before and the French were annoyed that they didn’t have a ray.) Nature sent an American physicist named Robert W. Wood from Johns Hopkins University to investigate. Now, I’ve been accused of skulduggery in my time, but what Wood did was brilliant. When no one was looking he removed the prism from the N-ray detection device and put it in his pocket. Without the prism the machine could not possibly work because it was dependent on the refraction of N-rays by the aluminium-treated prism. Yet, when the assistant conducted the next experiment he found N-rays! He swore they were there.
When the experiment was over Wood knew it was really over. He was prepared to make his report, and when he went to replace the prism back in the machine, one of the other assistants saw him do this and thought he was actually removing it, and he decided to show Wood up. Thinking Wood had removed the prism (when he had actually put it back), he set up the experiment, could find no lines, and opened the box to show that the prism was not there and to his dismay, there it was! The whole incident blew up. Papers were withdrawn, those that were in the mail were retracted, and N-rays disappeared from the scene.
How did this happen? How did over 30 papers get published? Not because the scientists who wrote the papers were stupid. Not because they were lying. But because they were deceiving themselves. Irving Klotz made this observation in Scientific American:
According to Blondlot and his disciples, then, it was the sensitivity of the observer rather than the validity of the phenomena that was called into question by criticisms such as Wood’s, a point of view that will not be unfamiliar to those who have followed more recent controversies concerning extrasensory perception. By 1905, when only French scientists remained in the N-ray camp, the argument began to acquire a somewhat chauvinistic aspect. Some proponents of N-rays maintained that only the Latin races possessed the sensitivities (intellectual as well as sensory) necessary to detect manifestations of the rays. It was alleged that Anglo-Saxon powers of perception were dulled by continual exposure to fog and Teutonic ones blunted by constant ingestion of beer.
Yet science does not always learn from these mistakes. Visiting Nancy recently and speaking on the subject of pseudoscience, I discussed this example and though I was in the city that gave the name to N-rays, no one in the audience had ever heard of them, or of Blondlot, not even the professors from the University of Nancy! Now let’s go to modern Germany, after the fall of Communism, and compare N-rays to the newly discovered “E-rays.” They are actually called Erdestrallen, or “Earth-rays,” but I’ve gotten the media all over the world to call them E-rays, a sort of parallel to N-rays. E-rays are even sillier than N-rays. What are they? First of all they cannot be detected by any known means, except by water dousers. They cause cancer. They supposedly come from the center of the Earth. The West German government spent over 400,000 marks, or about $200,000, to pay dowsers to go around to hospitals that were federally funded and federal office buildings to move beds and desks that were in the way of these deadly E-rays. I offered to go over for nothing and conduct a very simple two-part test: 1. Can one dowser find the same spot twice? and 2. Can two dowsers find the same spot once? I told them about this and their response was,”We don’t need to do the experiment because we know dowsing works. It’s been around since the Middle Ages and the historical tradition validates its truthfulness.”
I challenge all the dowsers in a similar way. Since 94 percent of the Earth’s surface has water within drillable distance my challenge is to find a dry spot! They don’t want to do it. Why? Because they only have a six percent chance of success. Dowsing is an idiomotor reaction that is very deceptive. It is an unconscious motion that you cannot detect and it looks for all the world like some mysterious force.
In a similar fashion, a few years ago I was in France investigating the results of experiments done by Jacques Benveniste on water with memory. He managed to get his article published in Nature, who put a disclaimer in the middle of the paper that perhaps “vigilant members of the scientific community with a flair for picking holes in other people’s work may be able to suggest further tests of the validity of the conclusions.” Nature sent a team of investigators over to his laboratory, of which I was a part. [The other two were John Maddox and Walter W. Stewart.] We showed that there were serious problems with the protocol, as well as the fudging of data. When controls were tightened, the experimenter could not replicate the results.
Then there is the theory of homeopathy born approximately 220 years ago, the brainchild of one Samuel Hahnemann. Medicine was in its infancy. Poor people could not afford doctors and recovered more often than the aristocracy who received all sorts of substances, which often killed them. Samuel Hahnemann gave sick, poor people water, which was suppose to contain a curative agent. Since these people did not go to doctors, they tended to survive, and this supported his belief in the curative power of his special water.
The first principle of homeopathy is that an extract of some substance in water will help cure you. The second principle is that an attenuated, or diluted solution will work even better. How diluted were these? If you take a solution and dilute it with 10 parts of water for every one part of itself, you’ve got what is called a “one solution.” If you take one part of that and put it in 10 parts of water, now one part in 100, it’s called a “two solution.” If you have a “five solution,” you have one part in 100,000. When you get to “Avogadro’s limit” there is a chance of there being one molecule in the solution. One more dilution and you have one chance in 10 of there being one molecule in the solution. Well, the homeopathy people start off with a solution of 10 to the power of 50 (a one followed by 50 zeros)! Since there are 10 to the power of 23 stars in the known universe, that’s what I call dilute. But that’s nothing. They go all the way to 10 to the power of 1500!!!
That is so diluted that I could not conceive of what 10 to the 1500 really means, so I called Martin Gardner and asked for an example with which to illustrate it. He called me back and said that an equivalent is to take one grain of rice, crush it up in a teaspoon and dissolve that powder in a sphere of water the size of the solar system, then repeat that process two billion times!! (The technical problems of mixing such a solution are obvious!)
The critical point of homeopathy—the point of all this diluting—is that every molecule of water that comes into contact with the homeopathy water retains the memory of that special water! Thus a little substance can go a long way. I have a simple question from a layman’s perspective. Since water has been around for “billions and billions of years,” in this process it must have come into contact with every organic and inorganic molecule on Earth. That being the case, why not just give the patient ordinary tap water?
James Randi appeared on the cover of Skeptic magazine 5.1 (1997)
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In fact, these homeopathic waters are so diluted that the homeopathy doctors and scientists can’t even tell the difference between the water with iron and the water with gold. Come on folks, let’s get real. There is no evidence that this stuff works, yet people go right on believing anyway. Here’s a typical response, this from a letter written by Boaz Robinzon of the Faculty of Agriculture: “I want you to know that no matter what the Nature investigating committee has written, I am still confident that the phenomenon observed is a real and reproducible one and it is only a matter of time until we shall be proven right.”
That’s a classic example of someone who does not wish to face reality. I’ve been going around the world telling people to get real for years. That’s the peculiar business that I’m in. I shouldn’t have to be in that business but someone has to do it. Will it ever end? Probably not, but perhaps with the efforts of the skeptics and scientists we can “dilute” it a little!
Thank you.
About James Randi James Randi is a retired professional magician, author, and lecturer. He is the founder of the James Randi Educational Foundation and was a founding fellow of CSICOP—the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal—now called The Committee for Skeptical Inquiry. Randi has taught at New York University (NYC) and at Brookdale Community College in New Jersey and has spoken for numerous schools, colleges, universities, and prominent organizations internationally.
The JREF offers a $1 million prize to anyone who can show, under proper observing conditions, evidence of any paranormal, supernatural, or occult power or event. To date, no one has claimed the prize.
In recent discussions about the “replication crisis” in science, in addition to a large percentage of famous psychology experiments failing to replicate, suggestions have also been made that some classic psychology experiments could not be conducted today due to ethical or practical concerns, the most notable being that of Stanley Milgram’s famous shock experiments. In fact, in 2010, Dr. Michael Shermer, working with Chris Hansen and Dateline NBC producers, replicated a number of classic psychology experiments, including Milgram. What follows is a summary of that research, from Chapter 9, Moral Regress, in Dr. Shermer’s book The Moral Arc, along with the two-part episode from the Dateline NBC show, called “What Were You Thinking?”
In 2010, I worked on a Dateline NBC two-hour television special in which we replicated a number of now classic psychology experiments, including that of Yale University professor Stanley Milgram’s famous shock experiments from the early 1960s on the nature of evil. Here we provide links to the two-part segment television episodes of our replication of Milgram.
In public talks in which I screen these videos I am occasionally asked how we got this replication passed by an Institutional Review Board (an IRB), which is required for scientific research, inasmuch as such experiments could never be conducted today. We didn’t. This was for network television, not an academic laboratory, so the equivalent of an IRB was review by NBC’s legal department, which approved it. This seems to surprise — even shock — many academics, until I remind them of what people do to one another on reality television programs in which subjects are stranded on remote islands or thick jungles and left to fend for themselves — sometimes naked and afraid — in various contrivances that resemble a Hobbesian world of a war of all against all.
Watch Replicating Milgram on Dateline NBC’s special “What Were You Thinking?” Part 1 & 2 (playlist)
Shock and Awe in a Yale Lab Shortly after the war crimes trial of Adolf Eichmann began in Jerusalem in July of 1961, psychologist Stanley Milgram devised a set of experiments, the aim of which was to better understand the psychology behind obedience to authority. Eichmann had been one of the chief orchestrators of the Final Solution but, like his fellow Nazis at the Nuremberg trials, his defense was that he was innocent by virtue of the fact that he was only following orders. Befehl ist Befehl — orders are orders — is now known as the Nuremberg defense, and it’s an excuse that seems particularly feeble in a case like Eichmann’s. “My boss told me to kill millions of people so — hey — what could I do?” is not a credible defense. But, Milgram wondered, was Eichmann unique in his willingness to comply with orders, no matter how atrocious? And just how far would ordinary people be willing to go?
A contestant for our faux television reality show “What a Pain!” talks to our actors playing the learner and the authority to be obeyed.
Obviously Milgram could not have his experimental subjects gas or shoot people, so he chose electric shock as a legal nonlethal substitute. Looking for subjects to participate in what was billed as a “study of memory,” Milgram advertised on the Yale campus and also in the surrounding New Haven community. He said he wanted “factory workers, city employees, laborers, barbers, businessmen, clerks, construction workers, sales people, telephone workers,” not just the usual guinea pigs of the psychology lab, i.e., undergraduates participating for extra credit or beer money. Milgram assigned his subjects to the role of “teacher” in what was purported to be research on the effects of punishment on learning. The protocol called for the subject to read a list of paired words to the “learner” (who was, in reality, a shill working for Milgram), then present the first word of each pair again, upon which the learner was to recall the second word. Each time that the learner was incorrect, the teacher was to deliver an electric shock from a box with toggle switches in 15-volt increments that ranged from 15 volts to 450 volts, and featured such labels as Slight Shock, Moderate Shock, Strong Shock, Very Strong Shock, Intense Shock, Extreme Intensity Shock, and DANGER: Severe Shock, XXXX.1 Despite the predictions of 40 psychiatrists that Milgram surveyed before the experiment, who predicted that only one percent of subjects would go all the way to the end, 65 percent of subject completed the experiment, flipping that final toggle switch to deliver a shocking 450 volts, a phenomenon the social psychologist Philip Zimbardo characterizes as “the pornography of power.”1
Who was most likely to go the distance in maximal shock delivery? Surprisingly — and counter-intuitively — gender, age, occupation, and personality characteristics mattered little. Similar levels of punishment were delivered by the young and the old, by males and females, and by blue-collar and white-collar workers alike. What mattered most was physical proximity and group pressure. The closer the learner was to the teacher, the lower on the ladder of shock they climbed. And when Milgram added more confederates to encourage the teacher to administer ever more powerful shocks, most complied; when the confederate themselves rebelled against the authority figure’s instructions, the teacher was equally disinclined to obey. Nevertheless, 100 percent of Milgram’s subjects delivered at least a “strong shock” of 135 volts.3
Shock and Awe in a New York Studio In our 2010 replication in a New York City studio, we tested six subjects who believed they were auditioning for a new reality show called “What a Pain!” We followed Milgram’s protocols and had our subjects read a list of paired words to a “learner” (an actor named Tyler), then present the first word of each pair again. When Tyler gave a prearranged incorrect answer, our subjects were instructed by an authority figure (an actor named Jeremy) to deliver an electric shock from a box modeled after Milgram’s contraption that, like ours, was just a hollow box that delivered no shocks at all.
Milgram characterized his experiments as testing “obedience to authority,” and most interpretations over the decades have focused on subjects’ unquestioning adherence to an authority’s commands. What I saw, however, was great reluctance and disquietude in all of our subjects nearly every step of the way. Our first subject, Emily, quit the moment she was told the protocol. “This isn’t really my thing,” she said with nervous laughter. When our second subject, Julie, got to 75 volts (having flipped five switches) she heard Tyler groan. “I don’t think I want to keep doing this,” she said.
Jeremy pressed the case: “Please continue.”
“No, I’m sorry,” Julie protested. “I don’t think I want to.”
“It’s absolutely imperative that you continue,” Jeremy insisted.
“It’s imperative that I continue?” Julie replied in defiance. “I think that — I’m like, I’m okay with it. I think I’m good.”
“You really have no other choice,” Jeremy said in a firm voice. “I need you to continue until the end of the test.”
Julie stood her ground: “No. I’m sorry. I can just see where this is going, and I just — I don’t — I think I’m good. I think I’m good to go. I think I’m going to leave now.”
At that point the show’s host Chris Hansen entered the room to debrief her and introduce her to Tyler, and then Chris asked Julie what was going through her mind. “I didn’t want to hurt Tyler,” she said. “And then I just wanted to get out. And I’m mad that I let it even go five [toggle switches]. I’m sorry, Tyler.”
Our contestant/subject Julie refuses to continue shocking the learner once he begins to cry out in pain.
Our third subject, Lateefah, started off enthusiastically enough, but as she made her way up the row of toggle switches, her facial expressions and body language made it clear that she was uncomfortable; she squirmed, gritted her teeth, and shook her fists with each toggled shock. At 120 volts she turned to look at Jeremy, seemingly seeking an out. “Please continue,” he authoritatively instructed. At 165 volts, when Tyler screamed “Ah! Ah! Get me out of here! I refuse to go on! Let me out!” Lateefah pleaded with Jeremy. “Oh my gosh. I’m getting all…like…I can’t…”; nevertheless Jeremy pushed her politely, but firmly, to continue. At 180 volts, with Tyler screaming in agony, Lateefah couldn’t take it anymore. She turned to Jeremy: “I know I’m not the one feeling the pain, but I hear him screaming and asking to get out, and it’s almost like my instinct and gut is like, ‘Stop,’ because you’re hurting somebody and you don’t even know why you’re hurting them outside of the fact that it’s for a TV show.” Jeremy icily commanded her to “please continue.” As Lateefah reluctantly turned to the shock box, she silently mouthed, “Oh my God.” At this point, as in Milgram’s experiment, we instructed Tyler to go silent. No more screams. Nothing. As Lateefah moved into the 300-volt range it was obvious that she was greatly distressed, so Chris stepped in to stop the experiment, asking her if she was getting upset. “Yeah, my heart’s beating really fast.” Chris then asked, “What was it about Jeremy that convinced you that you should keep going here?” Lateefah gave us this glance into moral reasoning about the power of authority: “I didn’t know what was going to happen to me if I stopped. He just — he had no emotion. I was afraid of him.”
Our fourth subject, a man named Aranit, unflinchingly cruised through the first set of toggle switches, pausing at 180 volts to apologize to Tyler after his audible protests of pain: “I’m going to hurt you and I’m really sorry.” After a few more rungs up the shock ladder, accompanied by more agonizing pleas by Tyler to stop the proceedings, Aranit encouraged him, saying, “Come on. You can do this. We are almost through.” Later, the punishments were peppered with positive affirmations. “Good.” “Okay.” After completing the experiment Chris asked, “Did it bother you to shock him?” Aranit admitted, “Oh, yeah, it did. Actually, it did. And especially when he wasn’t answering anymore.”
Our subject Aranit (left) continues shocking the learner upon the encouragement of our “authority” figure Jeremy (right).
Two other subjects in our replication, a man and a woman, went all the way to 450 volts, giving us a final tally of five out of six who administered shocks, and three who went all the way to the end of maximal electrical evil. All of the subjects were debriefed and assured that no shocks had actually been delivered, and after lots of laughs and hugs and apologies, everyone departed none the worse for wear.
Active Agents or Mindless Zombies? What are we to make of these results? In the 1960s — the heyday of the Nurture Assumption4 — it was taken to mean that human behavior is almost infinitely malleable, and Milgram’s data seemed to confirm the idea that degenerate acts are primarily the result of degenerate environments (Nazi Germany being, perhaps, the ultimate example). In other words, evil is a matter of bad barrels, not bad apples.
Milgram’s interpretation of his data included what he called the “agentic state,” which is “the condition a person is in when he sees himself as an agent for carrying out another person’s wishes and they therefore no longer see themselves as responsible for their actions. Once this critical shift of viewpoint has occurred in the person, all of the essential features of obedience follow.” Subjects who are told that they are playing a role in an experiment are stuck in a no-man’s land somewhere between authority figure, in the form of a white lab-coated scientist, and stooge, in the form of a defenseless learner in another room. They undergo a mental shift from being moral agents in themselves who make their own decisions (that autonomous state) to the ambiguous and susceptible state of being an intermediary in a hierarchy and therefore prone to unqualified obedience (the agentic state).
Milgram believed that almost anyone put into this agentic state could be pulled into evil one step at a time — in this case 15 volts at a time — until they were so far down the path there was no turning back. “What is surprising is how far ordinary individuals will go in complying with the experimenter’s instructions,” Milgram recalled. “It is psychologically easy to ignore responsibility when one is only an intermediate link in a chain of evil action but is far from the final consequences of the action.” This combination of a step-wise path, plus a self-assured authority figure that keeps the pressure on at every step, is the double whammy that makes evil of this nature so insidious. Milgram broke the process down into two stages: “First, there is a set of ‘binding factors’ that lock the subject into the situation. They include such factors as politeness on his part, his desire to uphold his initial promise of aid to the experimenter, and the awkwardness of withdrawal. Second, a number of adjustments in the subject’s thinking occur that undermine his resolve to break with the authority. The adjustments help the subject maintain his relationship with the experimenter, while at the same time reducing the strain brought about by the experimental conflict.”5
Put yourself into the mind of one of these subjects — either in Milgram’s experiment or in our NBC replication. It’s an experiment conducted at the prestigious Yale University — or at a studio set up by a major television network. It’s being supervised by an established institution — a national university or a national network. It’s for science — or it’s for television. It’s being run by a white-lab-coated scientist — or by a television director. The authorities overseeing the experiment are either university professors or network executives. An agent — someone carrying out someone else’s wishes under such conditions — would feel in no position to object. And why should she? It’s for a good cause, after all — the advancement of science, or the development of a new and interesting television series.
Dr. Shermer explains for the television audience why people commit evil acts.
Out of context, if you ask people — even experts, as Milgram did — how many people would go all the way to 450 volts, they lowball the estimate by a considerable degree, as Milgram’s psychiatrists did. As Milgram later reflected: “I am forever astonished that when lecturing on the obedience experiments in colleges across the country, I faced young men who were aghast at the behavior of experimental subjects and proclaimed they would never behave in such a way, but who, in a matter of months, were brought into the military and performed without compunction actions that made shocking the victim seem pallid.”6
In the sociobiological and evolutionary psychology revolutions of the 1980s and 1990s, the interpretation of Milgram’s results shifted toward the nature/biological end of the spectrum from its previous emphasis on nurture/environment. The interpretation softened somewhat as the multidimensional nature of human behavior was taken into account. As it is with most human action, moral behavior is inextricably complex and includes an array of causal factors, obedience to authority being just one among many. The shock experiments didn’t actually reveal just how primed all of us are to inflict violence for the flimsiest of excuses; that is, it isn’t a simple case of bad apples looking for a bad barrel in order to cut loose. Rather the experiments demonstrate that all of us have conflicting moral tendencies that lie deep within.
Our moral nature includes a propensity to be sympathetic, kind, and good to our fellow kith and kin, as well as an inclination to be xenophobic, cruel, and evil to tribal Others. And the dials for all of these can be adjusted up and down depending on a wide range of conditions and circumstances, perceptions and states of mind, all interacting in a complex suite of variables that are difficult to tease apart. In point of fact, most of the 65 percent of Milgram’s subjects who went all the way to 450 volts did so with great anxiety, as did the subjects in our NBC replication. And it’s good to remember that 35 percent of Milgram’s subjects were exemplars of the disobedience to authority — they quit in defiance of what the authority figure told them to do. In fact, in a 2008 partial replication by the social psychologist Jerry Burger, in which he ran the voltage box only up to 150 volts (the point at which the “learner” in Milgram’s original experiment began to cry out in pain), twice as many subjects refused to obey the authority figure. Assuming these subjects were not already familiar with the experimental protocols, the findings are an additional indicator of moral progress from the 1960s to the 2000s caused, I would argued, by that ever-expanding moral sphere and our collective capacity to take the perspective of another, in this case the to-be-shocked learner.7
Alpinists of Evil Milgram’s model comes dangerously close to suggesting that subjects are really just puppets devoid of free will, which effectively lets Nazi bureaucrats off the hook as mere agentic automatons in an extermination engine run by the great paper-pushing administrator, Adolf Eichmann (whose actions as an unremarkable man in a morally bankrupt and conformist environment were famously described by Hannah Arendt as “the banality of evil.”). The obvious problem with this model is that there can be no moral accountability if an individual is truly nothing more than a mindless zombie whose every action is controlled by some nefarious mastermind. Reading the transcript of Eichmann’s trial is mind numbing (it goes on for thousands of pages), as he both obfuscates his real role while shifting the blame entirely to his overseers, as in this statement:
What I said to myself was this: The Head of State has ordered it, and those exercising judicial authority over me are now transmitting it. I escaped into other areas and looked for a cover for myself which gave me some peace of mind at least, and so in this way I was able to shift — no, that is not the right term — to attach this whole thing one hundred percent to those in judicial authority who happened to be my superiors, to the head of State — since they gave the orders. So, deep down, I did not consider myself responsible and I felt free of guilt. I was greatly relieved that I had nothing to do with the actual physical extermination.8
The last statement might possibly be true — given how many battle-hardened SS soldiers were initially sickened at the site of a killing action — but the rest is pure spin-doctored malarkey and Arendt allowed herself to be taken in by it more than reason would allow, as the historian David Cesarani shows in his revealing biography Becoming Eichmann and as recounted in Margarethe von Trotta’s moving film Hanna Arendt.9 The evidence of Eichmann’s real role in the Holocaust was plain for all to see at the time, as dramatically re-enacted in Robert Young’s 2010 biopic entitled simply Eichmann, based on the transcripts of the interrogation of and confession by Eichmann just before his trial, conducted by the young Israeli police officer Avner Less, whose father was murdered in Auschwitz.10 Time and again, throughout hundreds of recorded hours, Less queries Eichmann about transports of Jews and gypsies sent to their death, all followed by denials and lapses of memory. Less then presses the point by showing Eichmann copies of transport documents with his signature at the bottom, leading Eichmann to say in an exasperated voice, “what’s your point?”
The point is that there is a mountain of evidence proving that Eichmann — like all the rest of the Nazi leadership — were not simply following orders. As Eichmann himself boasted when he wasn’t on trial: “When I reached the conclusion that it was necessary to do to the Jews what we did, I worked with the fanaticism a man can expect from himself. No doubt they considered me the right man in the right place…. I always acted 100 per cent, and in giving of order I certainly was not lukewarm.” As the Holocaust historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen asks rhetorically, “Are these the words of a bureaucrat mindlessly, unreflectively doing his job about which he has no particular view?”11
The historian Yaacov Lozowick characterized the motives in his book Hitler’s Bureaucrats, in which he invokes a mountain-climbing metaphor: “Just as a man does not reach the peak of Mount Everest by accident, so Eichmann and his ilk did not come to murder Jews by accident or in a fit of absent-mindedness, nor by blindly obeying orders or by being small cogs in a big machine. They worked hard, thought hard, took the lead over many years. They were the alpinists of evil.”12
About the Author Dr. Michael Shermer is the Founding Publisher of Skeptic magazine, the host of the Science Salon Podcast, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University where he teaches Skepticism 101. For 18 years he was a monthly columnist for Scientific American. He is the author of New York Times bestsellers Why People Believe Weird Things and The Believing Brain, Why Darwin Matters, The Science of Good and Evil, The Moral Arc, and Heavens on Earth. His new book is Giving the Devil His Due: Reflections of a Scientific Humanist.
References 1. Milgram, Stanley. 1969. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Harper. 2. Interview with Phil Zimbardo conducted by the author on March 26, 2007. 3. Milgram, 1969. 4. Harris, Judith Rich. 1998. The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do. New York: Free Press. 5. Milgram, 1969. 6. Ibid. 7. Burger, Jerry. 2009. “Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?” American Psychologist, 64, 1–11. 8. The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 95, July 13, 1961. https://bit.ly/35AzK8W 9. Cesarani, David. 2006. Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk Murderer”. New York: De Capo Press. Von Trotta, Margarethe (Director). 2012. Hannah Arendt. Zeitgeist Films. See also: Lipstadt, Deborah E. 2011. The Eichmann Trial. New York: Schocken. 10. Young, Robert. 2010. Eichmann. Regent Releasing, Here! Films. October. 11. Quoted in: Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 2009. Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity. New York: PublicAffairs, 158. 12. Lozowick, Yaacov. 2003. Hitler’s Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil. New York: Continuum, 279.
Agenda-driven diversity and antiracism training programs are everywhere, but do they work in creating an inclusive culture? In our current climate of high racial tensions and deadlocked civil discourse, is there a more effective way to break down these conversation barriers in order to answer some of the most difficult, polarizing questions that we face today?
With the rise of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in 2020, government agencies, corporations, and universities and colleges began scrambling to show their support by instituting diversity and racial sensitivity training programs, not dissimilar to what Starbucks did in 2018 when they closed 8,000 stores to put 175,000 employees through an “anti-bias” training program in response to the media frenzy after two African-American men were arrested while waiting for a business meeting to begin there.
Underlying such programs is the belief in the value of diversity and inclusion, and many organizations have taken steps to implement diversity training programs that subtly insist on ideological conformity and often silence open discussions, neither of which are inclusive. The seemingly noble intention of encouraging inclusion is often subverted by agenda-driven trainings that leave little space for different perspectives or nuanced conversations. This contradicts the very essence of the values they are trying to promote.
Most diversity and racial sensitivity training programs are not up to the task of developing truly inclusive environments because they do not foster psychological safety among their participants. I learned this the hard way at Harvard where, as a clinical and social psychologist, I brought together adult children of Holocaust survivors face-to-face with adult children of Nazis, as well as the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of African American slaves and slave holders, the results of which I document in my 2004 book Justice Matters (made into a documentary in 2006) and most recently in my 2020 book The Science of Diversity.
The preponderance of diversity trainings begin with the assumption that we need to eliminate bias and prejudice by purging our “wrong” beliefs, such as those related to historical injustices, power differentials, race and gender differences, and so forth. The contentiousness of this methodology has taken center stage in both the private and political arenas. President Trump recently ordered the heads of federal agencies to cease and desist from offering such trainings, noting that they “engender division and resentment within the Federal workforce.” By contrast, universities and corporations are actively ramping up their diversity and racial sensitivity programs.
A review of the research on diversity and racial sensitivity programs shows that thousands of diversity intervention programs over 50 years have been ineffectual in removing bias and prejudice from people. Telling people that they are biased and need to attend a mandatory anti-bias training, or a racial sensitivity program can activate bias rather than stamp it out. If people feel forced to accept an authority’s agenda, they may do the opposite to assert their autonomy.
In order to comprehend the complexities of our biases, it is necessary to understand the biological, neurological and psychological underpinnings. Commanding people to get rid of biases that are deeply rooted in their personal memories and histories is akin to asking them to shed their very legacies and identities.
Moreover, telling people to get rid of their biases is apt to fail when there are strong feelings on both sides of a historically sensitive issue. Evidence for this phenomenon was apparent in the multiple studies I conducted at Harvard on the aforementioned children of Holocaust survivors and children of Nazis, along with the great-grandchildren of enslaved African Americans with the descendants of slave owners. Both sets reported that they felt they had inherited a legacy that consumed large parts of their lives and identities.
The facilitated conversations between these polarized groups revealed similar threads of feelings and associations to the past that run through their lives. They also revealed an important difference in that most children of Nazis reported their parents told them stories about the war, whereas children of survivors reported their parents told them stories about the Holocaust. The daughter of a survivor put it like this:
I didn’t even know there was a war until I was a teenager. I didn’t even know fifty million people were killed during the war. I thought just six million Jews were killed. The stories I heard were always about taking the Jews to concentration camps. For my whole childhood I think I thought it was only the Jews who were killed. That it was just Nazis killing Jews. It wasn’t until some history class that I realized this was a major war. But you know, still I think the Jews had it the worse, they suffered the most because every Jew was a victim like someone said.1
The daughter of a Nazi officer put it like this:
I didn’t know about the concentration camps until I was in my teens. First I heard about the party. Then I heard stories about the war, about bombs falling or about not having food. I would hear that my father was an officer in the army, and I remember seeing pictures of him in uniform. And I remember his black shiny boots. And I saw a picture of him on a horse. At first I remember feeling proud to find out my father was an officer in the army.2
By providing an environment in which both sides could openly express their experiences, these two historically opposed groups were able to understand that there was a sense of double victimhood. Without such an environment, this phenomenon would have prevented these conversations from the progress that led to common threads of understanding.
In a time of pandemic and racial reckoning, and with our civil discourse at a standstill, conversations on polarizing topics have urgency as never before. Many people are walking on eggshells wondering what to say and how to say it, or worse, some people don’t feel safe to share their viewpoint out of fear of reprisal.
This reflects the discomfort many have with the current widespread cancel culture. “It no longer feels safe to have conversations with people who have a different viewpoint” they say. Diversity and racial sensitivity programs aimed at exposing and curing biases and prejudices are unlikely to succeed at creating a culture of inclusion where everyone feels heard, and where nuanced meaningful conversations take place. Given these constraints, it is natural to ask, “Is there anything we can do? Are there any solutions we can live with?”
The quick answer is yes. The solution requires a fair process of facilitated conversations in which people learn how to scientifically reason together about difficult questions, even when in stark disagreement. Over the years, thousands of students have joined me to reason scientifically about some of the most important polarizing questions we face as a society and in our everyday lives, including questions on racial justice, slavery, police racial bias, white privilege, immigration, BLM, and reparations.
People do not always think of scientific reasoning as a path to understanding in emotionally charged conflicts. However, the nature of scientific reasoning causes one to pause, reflect, look to data for insight and reach scientific consensus.
When teaching the Psychology of Diversity course at Harvard recently, one of my students expressed the view that racism has long been the cause of rampant police brutality. In response, another student suggested that police brutality, regardless of race, may be a more pressing issue and noted a recent news article supporting the same.
We can imagine how an exchange beginning in this manner might unravel into an emotional debate and end in a deadlock. Especially in our current politically polarized environment, we can also see how little progress would be made had another student expressed the view that police brutality was not an issue at all. However, as a facilitator of the conversation, I encouraged them to ask, “What does the data say about the relationship between race and police brutality? What other factors contribute to the nexus between the two?”
The class was then tasked with finding peer-reviewed scientific journal articles on the issue that have conflicting findings. When people are encouraged to seek out information in support of each side, they are encouraged to seek out information without an agenda. This allowed us to problem solve together by asking, “Why do these studies come to opposite conclusions? What data collection and analysis approaches were used? What other factors could play a role in the discrepancy?”
From there, the conversation was able to open up and move forward. We could then ask more difficult questions such as, “What effect does taking race out of the conversation on police brutality have on a person who has experienced racism? What effect does placing race as the central cause of police brutality have on a person who has experienced such brutality without race being a factor?”
Scientific reasoning does not take emotion out of the conversation. Instead, it allows us to pause and reflect on what effect our emotions have on the progression of our dialog. This is what tends to go missing in conversations about polarizing diversity topics, but it is also what I have found to be imperative that we leave in. It is the only way to recognize our blind spots and transform them into facilitators rather than obstacles.
This is the method used in science and problem-solving education. It is dialectic between persons holding different hypotheses about a topic but wishing to understand one another and test their views. One does not judge the other for their view. One does not try to win a debate. One does not expect the other to change or think differently. Rather, the expectation is that one will learn to reason about the topic scientifically.
Many great scientists, including Nobel Prize winners Marie Curie, Albert Einstein, and Richard Feynman, have stressed that scientific reasoning is the key to developing peoples’ moral and intellectual strengths, and that this would lead to a better society. According to Feynman, the scientific worldview is a habit of mind, and once acquired one cannot retreat from it. I would underscore, as Feynman did, that scientific reasoning contains within itself a system of logic and standards of evidence that can be used for building a culture of inclusion. This method has the potential to create an environment where everyone feels safe to express a hypothetical viewpoint and open to understanding that more than one view can be hypothetically true at once.
Scientific reasoning does not rely on armchair theorizing, political conviction, or personal opinion, but instead on methods of empirical research independently available to anyone as a means of opening up the world for scrutiny. All opinions are viewed as hypotheses to be tested, rather than as appeals to emotion. When conversations on polarizing topics get bogged down by passionate opinions, scientific-reasoning lifts us up so we can consider the alternative hypothesis.
It is a universal fact that diversity is a feature of nature. This is true of individuals, families, social classes, religious groups, ethnic groups, and nations. There will always be diverse polarized views with which people passionately identify. Scientific reasoning is a fair two-sided method for evaluating polarized views, fake news, misinformation, and disinformation.
Embracing scientific reasoning and using logic and standards of evidence can bolster American education and our riven society. Whereas agenda-driven diversity training programs are divisive, the scientific reasoning method is connective. Agenda-driven diversity training programs try to resolve differences by methods of shame and pressure that seek to win and control the debate and by cherry-picking evidence in support of an idea, action, or theory, typically with the aim of persuading others to share one’s “right” view.
By contrast, the scientific reasoning method dissolves differences by asking people to consider all the data, ask each other questions about what the data mean, and reach a consensus about what is and is not agreed on. They then have the foundation to collaborate and explore how to test the questions about the points on which they disagree. The process of scientific reasoning is based on finding out what is true, and not, “What can I prove and convince you of?”
Scientifically reasoning together shifts the dynamics of the culture from one of divisiveness to one of connectedness, thereby making it possible to have a truly inclusive culture that includes different perspectives. That is why it is so vital.
About the Author Dr. Mona Sue Weissmark is a professor, researcher and author. She teaches advanced research methods and psychology of diversity, and conducts research on the science of diversity at Harvard University. Her new book is The Science of Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2020). Copyright © 2020 Mona Sue Weissmark. All Rights Reserved.
Acknowledgements To my current Harvard teaching fellows and research assistants Labrita Andrews, Brian Chin, Marcelle Giovannetti, Bushra Hassan, Jeanette Lieb, and Marcelo Soares who help run and continually improve the Harvard Psychology of Diversity course and The Science of Diversity research projects. Their effort is critical to the successes we have teaching the course and running the projects.
Science Salon with Mona Sue Weissmark Listen to Science Salon Podcast # 129 in which Michael Shermer speaks with Mona Sue Weissmark about her book The Science of Diversity which uses a multidisciplinary approach to excavate the theories, principles, and paradigms that illuminate our understanding of the issues surrounding human diversity, social equality, and justice.
References 1. Weissmark, M., 2020. The Science of Diversity. Oxford University Press, p. 219. 2. Ibid., 219–220.
Is Electronic Screen Syndrome (ESS) real? Is it a disease? An addiction? Do violent video games cause aggression? Can playing video games have positive effects? In this column from Skeptic magazine 25.2 (2020), Harriet Hall, M.D. examines ESS and shares the science.
You may have noticed that children seem to spend a lot of time interacting with screens: cell phones, tablets, computers, television, and video games. They do, and a great many people— from parents to pundits—are wondering if this is bad for them or good for them. The answer is “it depends.”
In 2012, Victoria L. Dunckley M.D. was the first to describe what is now called Electronic Screen Syndrome. She wrote an article in Psychology Today arguing that there was an unrecognized disorder that explained many psychiatric symptoms in children. She listed complaints that many parents can relate to:
- “He’s revved up all the time.”
- “He can’t focus at all and is totally defiant. Getting ready for school or bedtime is a daily nightmare.”
- “She’s exhausted and has meltdowns even when she’s slept enough.”
- “He flies into a rage over the slightest thing. The other kids don’t want to play with him anymore.”
- “Her grades have gone downhill this year and we don’t know why.”
These are common complaints that can have many causes and can lead to faulty diagnoses. Dunckley said the two most over-diagnosed conditions she sees in the pediatric population are bipolar disorder and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD or ADD). Overdiagnosis leads to inappropriate treatment with psychotropic drugs that have side effects. She wondered if the true cause of these misdiagnosed symptoms might be environmental. Seek and ye shall find. Sure enough, Dunckley found one: “the unnaturally stimulating nature of an electronic screen, irrespective of the content it brings.” She called it “Electronic Screen Syndrome” or ESS, alleging that too much screen time could cause mental health issues or exacerbate pre-existing ones.
Characteristics of ESS in Children Dunckley says ESS is a disorder of dysregulation, the inability to modulate one’s mood, attention, or level of arousal. She says interacting with screen devices over-stimulates the child and shifts the nervous system into fight-or-flight mode. The response can be immediate, as with action games, or more subtle, as in repeated texting.
A child diagnosed with ESS exhibits symptoms such as irritability, depression, tantrums, low frustration tolerance, poor sportsmanship, poor eye contact, insomnia, poor short-term memory, and learning difficulties. Dunckley claims that ESS can mimic virtually any mental health disorder.
She claims that these symptoms markedly improve or resolve with strict removal of electronic media and may or may not recur when the media are re-introduced. Boys with ADHD and autism are particularly vulnerable. She claims to have treated over 500 patients with “electronic fasting,” with good results. Keep in mind that she is a psychiatrist and her patients are not representative of the general population of children. She has not published any scientific studies; she has only written books for popular consumption.
Who is Dunckley? An “integrative” child and adult psychiatrist in Los Angeles, she is on the advisory board of Physicians for Safe Technology, which endorses fears of wi-fi and cell phone towers. According to their website, Dunckley is “currently involved in research looking at the impact of screentime on the development and severity of autism.” Early electronic screen exposure has been linked not to autism, but to “autistic-like symptoms,” and only in a study that had no control group and is therefore meaningless.
ESS is not accepted by most other psychiatrists. The American Academy of Pediatrics has issued guidelines for limiting media use in children, but only because they are concerned that children may not have adequate time to play, study, talk, or sleep. They don’t even mention the term ESS. Shouldn’t we ask how that screen time is being used and what is happening in the rest of their lives that might influence their development? The World Health Organization recommended limited or no screen time for children under 5. The published guidelines are based on opinion rather than on scientific data. I’d like to see a controlled study that compares children who are allowed unlimited screen time to children who are subjected to the guidelines. No such study exists.
Addiction? The World Health Organization (WHO) does not accept ESS, but it does call “gaming disorder” an addiction. The word addiction is overused and applied to what might be more accurately called habits. To apply it to screen time, sex, food, gambling, and other habits is to trivialize the meaning of true addiction for alcoholics and drug addicts. I like coffee and drink a lot of it, but I’m not “addicted” to coffee. If it were a true addiction like heroin addiction, I would have intense cravings, I would become tolerant and have to increase my dosage to get the same effect, I would suffer withdrawal symptoms when I stopped using it, and it would create serious problems with my health, family, and occupation. It would take over my life. Just as none of that is true for coffee, it is also not true for many other things that have been called “addictive.” I think spending time with screens is a habit, not an addiction. We don’t even know for sure that increased screen time correlates with psychiatric symptoms. There have been no studies of what happens when people are suddenly deprived of their screens. And when correlation of screen time with psychiatric symptoms hasn’t been established, it’s premature to speculate about causation.
Is It a Disease? Is it possible that the symptoms listed by Dunckley occur just as frequently in people who don’t use electronic devices? Comparison studies have never been done. The same symptoms certainly occur in people given other diagnoses.
It’s dangerous to jump to conclusions. For years, parents were told that sugar in the diet makes children hyperactive. Today we know that’s a myth. Children were indeed “bouncing off the walls” at birthday parties, but not because of the sweets they consumed. It was because parties caused excitement and stimulation, and because parents were observing what they expected to observe. Confirmation bias can be very powerful. Double blind studies have demonstrated that sugar in the diet does not affect children’s behavior.
For years, children were denied sweet treats for no good reason. It would be a shame if children were similarly denied enjoyment of screen time on the basis of little or no evidence. It might deprive them of a valuable experience and might just make them rebellious and angry with their parents.
An article in The Telegraph says children face social problems such as loneliness, depression, anxiety, low selfesteem and heightened aggression as a result of overusing computers. It claims that those who sit behind a screen for more than four hours a day are particularly at risk, although very low levels of use can cause issues. Their information comes from Public Health England, but it is based on self-reports rather than controlled scientific studies.
Video Games & Aggression Studies have found that “violent video games increase aggression and aggression-related variables and decrease prosocial outcomes, while prosocial video games have the opposite effects.” But they were wrong. The studies didn’t show that; they only showed correlation, not causation. They didn’t rule out other possible confounders. These findings are debatable and many opposing studies exist. It has been claimed that violent video games lead to mass shootings and school shootings; but studies have shown there is no link.
Positive Effects As sales of violent video games go up, the rate of violent crimes goes down. Could it be that people are attracted to playing violent or prosocial games because they already have those tendencies? Could a violent game serve as a safety valve? It might keep potential aggressors off the streets and provide a safe way to act out fantasies. If we rushed to treatment and made users stop playing video games, would they be less or more aggressive? We simply don’t know.
A large study in 2016 found that time spent playing video games was associated with mental health, cognitive and social skills in young children. They had higher intellectual functioning and better school performance. But that doesn’t mean that video games make you smarter; maybe smarter people are more likely to play video games. A Japanese study, for example, found that kindergarteners who played video games had more friends and were more willing to talk to others.
Video games can improve fine motor skills, eye-hand coordination, visual attention, depth perception, and computer competency. Doctors who have played commercial video games have better surgical skills, are faster, and make fewer surgical errors; and video games have been proposed as a practical teaching tool to help train surgeons, particularly for laparoscopic surgery. Frequent phone texters have improved reaction times. And more agile thumbs!
Other Factors I can’t help but wonder if Dr. Dunckley started with the preconception that screen time must be harmful. If so, it is easy to understand how she could find a diagnosis and treatment to support her belief. She looked for examples and found them. She didn’t look for disconfirming evidence. Confirmation bias did the rest.
This article appeared in Skeptic magazine 25.2
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It is simplistic to look at a single factor like screen time. There are lots of other factors that can influence behavior. Is there an underlying psychiatric disorder? Is the family supportive or dysfunctional? What is the socioeconomic environment? What other activities are available to the child? What is the child’s reason for using the electronic device? In some cases, interaction with electronic screens might cause stress, but for others it might relieve stress.
I don’t think ESS is a useful diagnosis. Interaction with screens may have good or bad consequences. It makes sense to look at the whole picture; it doesn’t make sense to measure one thing and enforce arbitrary rules before the evidence is in.
About the Author Dr. Harriet Hall, MD, the SkepDoc, is a retired family physician and Air Force Colonel living in Puyallup, WA. She writes about alternative medicine, pseudoscience, quackery, and critical thinking. She is a contributing editor to both Skeptic and Skeptical Inquirer, an advisor to the Quackwatch website, and an editor of sciencebasedmedicine.org, where she writes an article every Tuesday. She is author of Women Aren’t Supposed to Fly: The Memoirs of a Female Flight Surgeon. Her website is SkepDoc.info.
Today, August 18, marks the 100th anniversary of the adoption of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing women the right to vote. We honor that momentous event with an excerpt adapted from the chapter on women’s rights in Dr. Michael Shermer’s 2015 book The Moral Arc: How Science and Reason Lead Humanity Toward Truth, Justice, and Freedom (New York: Henry Holt).
Read the essay below, or listen to it being read by the author, Michael Shermer:
Listen to this essay being read by the author, Michael Shermer.
On August 18, 1920, the 19th Amendment of the United States Constitution was ratified, legally securing the franchise to women. It was the culmination of a 72-year battle that began when Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott organized the 1848 Seneca Falls conference, after attending the World Anti-slavery Convention in London in 1840 — a meeting at which they had come to participate as delegates, but at which they were not allowed to speak and were made to sit like obedient children in a curtained-off area. This did not sit well with Stanton and Mott. Conventions were held throughout the 1850s but were interrupted by the American Civil War, which secured the franchise in 1870 — not for women, of course, but for black men (though they were gradually disenfranchised by poll taxes, legal loopholes, literacy tests, threats and intimidation). This didn’t sit well either and only served to energize the likes of Matilda Joslyn Gage, Susan B. Anthony, Ida B. Wells, Carrie Chapman Catt, Doris Stevens, and countless others who campaigned unremittingly against the political slavery of women.
Things began to heat up when the great American suffragist Alice Paul (arrestingly portrayed by Hilary Swank in the 2004 film Iron Jawed Angels) returned from a lengthy sojourn in England. She had learned much during her time there through her active participation in the British suffrage movement and from the more radical and militant British suffragists, including the courageous political activist Emmeline Pankhurst, characterized as “the very edge of that weapon of willpower by which British women freed themselves from being classed with children and idiots in the matter of exercising the franchise.”1
Upon her death Pankhurst was heralded by the New York Times as “the most remarkable political and social agitator of the early part of the twentieth century and the supreme protagonist of the campaign for the electoral enfranchisement of women”;2 years later, Time magazine voted her one of the 100 most important people of the century. Thus, when Alice Paul returned from abroad she was ready for action, though the more conservative members of the women’s movement weren’t quite ready for Alice. Nevertheless, in order to attract attention to the cause she and Lucy Burns organized the largest parade ever held in Washington. On March 3, 1913 (strategically timed for the day before President Wilson’s inauguration), 26 floats, 10 bands, and 8,000 women marched, led by the stunning Inez Milholland wearing a flowing white cape and riding a white horse. (See Figure 1 above.) Upwards of 100,000 spectators watched the parade but the mostly male crowd became increasingly unruly and the women were spat upon, taunted, harassed and attacked while the police stood by. Afraid of an all-out riot, the War Department called in the cavalry to contain the escalating violence and chaos.3
It was a gift. A scandal ensued due to the rough treatment of the women and suddenly, “the issue of suffrage — long thought dead by many politicians — was vividly alive in front page headlines in newspapers across the country.… Paul had accomplished her goal — to make woman suffrage a major political issue.”5
In 1917 women began peacefully picketing outside the White House but, once again, they were met with harassment and violence. These Silent Sentinels (as they were called) stood day and night (except Sundays) with their banners for two and a half years but, after the U.S. joined in the war, patience ran thin as it was seen as improper to picket a wartime president. The picketers were charged with obstructing traffic and were thrown — often quite literally thrown — into prison cells where they were treated like criminals, rather than political protesters, and were kept in appalling conditions. Many of the women went on a hunger strike, including Alice Paul, who was viciously force-fed in order to keep her from becoming a martyr for the cause.
Word of the brutality in the workhouse was leaked to the press and the public became increasingly incensed at the protestors’ horrific treatment. During what became known as the Night of Terror, 40 prison guards went on a rampage and the women were “grabbed, dragged, beaten, kicked, and choked”; Lucy Burns had her wrists cuffed and chained above her head to the cell door; another woman was taken to the men’s section and told “they could do what they pleased with her”; another woman was knocked unconscious, still another had a heart attack.6 These outrages were a grave tactical error. “With public pressure mounting as a result of press coverage, the government felt the need to act.… Arrests didn’t stop these protesters; neither did jail terms, psychopathic wards, force-feeding, or violent attacks. Their next decision was simply to let them out.”7
At long last, in 1920, the 19th amendment (originally drafted by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1878) was passed — by a single vote — thanks to 24-year-old Harry T. Burn, a Tennessee legislator who had originally intended to vote against his state ratifying the amendment (which needed ratification of 36 of the 48 states to pass), but changed his mind because of a note from his mother.
Dear Son:
Hurrah, and vote for suffrage! Don’t keep them in doubt. I notice some of the speeches against. They were bitter. I have been watching to see how you stood, but have not noticed anything yet.
Don’t forget to be a good boy and help Mrs. Catt put the “rat” in ratification.
Your Mother.8
In the end, then, suffrage for women came down to the vote of one man, influenced by his mom. It was rumored that, “the anti-suffragists were so angry at his decision that they chased him from the chamber, forced him to climb out a window of the Capitol and inch along a ledge to safety.”9 Thus suffrage arrived in the U.S., kicking and screaming.
It was a right that women in a number of other countries had already won years before, but one that others would have to wait for. Figure 2 (below) tracks the moral progress of women’s suffrage, while Figure 3 (below) tracks the gaps between when all men versus all women were granted the franchise, from Switzerland’s 123-year gap between 1848 and 1971, to Denmark’s 0-year gap in 1915. By comparison, the 50-year gap in the United States between 1870 and 1920 lies mid-way in this history.
Figure 2: Women’s Right to Vote Over Time The stair-step progress of women’s suffrage is tracked over time from 1900 to 2010, showing two big bursts, the first after World War I and the second after World War II. Tellingly, the expected date for the sovereign nation of Vatican City to grant women the right to vote is “never.”10
Figure 3: The Gap Between the Franchise for Men and Women. The spasmodic nature of moral progress is reflected in the shrinking time in years between the dates that men’s suffrage and women’s suffrage was legalized, from 123 years for Switzerland to 0 years for Denmark. Such change is contingent on many social and political variables that differ from country to country.
Carving Women’s Rights: A Personal Story The trend over the past several centuries has been to grant women the same rights and privileges as those of men. Political, economic, and social advances, enabled by scientific, technological, and medical discoveries and inventions have increasingly provided women not only greater amounts of reproductive autonomy and control, but have also driven an expansion of their rights and opportunities in all areas of life, leading to healthier and happier societies across the globe. As with the other rights revolutions there is much progress that remains to be realized, but the momentum now is such that the expansion of women’s rights should continue unabated into the future.
In these ways — the rational justification for including women as full rights-bearing persons no less deserving than men, the interchangeability of women’s perspectives with that of men, the scientific understanding of the nature of human sexuality and reproduction, and the continuous thinking that enables us to see and comprehend the difference between a woman’s and a fetus’s rights — science and reason have led humanity closer to truth, justice, and freedom.
As an example of how far we’ve come in just the last two generations (and how oppressed women were as recently as the early 20th century), I close with the story of two women — mother and daughter — both named Christine Roselyn Mutchler. The mother was born in Germany and passed through Ellis Island in 1893 with her parents, who then moved to Alhambra, California. Mother Christine married her husband Frederick and gave birth to baby Christine in 1910 (and a second daughter three years later), but their lives were shattered shortly after that when Fred told his wife he was going out for a loaf of bread and never returned. Abandoned by her husband, left with no money or food to care for herself and her two small children, mother Christine was forced to return to her father’s home.
Unknown to her at the time, Fred had wandered off into the county jail with delusions that his father-in-law was after him. After being examined by a physician he was sent to a mental hospital for over a year. During this time, with his delusions in remission, Fred wrote heartbreaking letters to his wife asking about her and the children, but Christine’s father kept the letters from her and she continued to believe that she had been abandoned. In time she found work as a housemaid for a friend of a successful motion picture executive named John C. Epping, whose wife had recently died. Desperate for a daughter and enamored by three-year old Christine, Epping talked Christine’s father into forcing her to allow him to adopt the child. Young, poor, scared, and intimidated by her father, Christine reluctantly agreed to the adoption, although a series of articles in The Los Angeles Times show that a probation officer on the case opposed the adoption, declaring “she believed Epping saw possibilities of a future Mary Pickford in the little girl, and that the child should have a home in some private family where home life and education would be the principal features.”11 Based on the false information provided by Christine’s father that Fred had abandoned them, the judge granted the adoption.
Epping promptly changed the name of his newly adopted daughter to Frances Dorothy Epping, addressed her by her middle name, and (unbelievably) told her she was born in Providence, Rhode Island and that his deceased wife was her true mother. Now age four, Christine/Dorothy apparently did not accept the fictional story and rebelled — or perhaps Epping changed his mind about raising a daughter as a single Dad — because he shuffled her around through a series of surrogate parents, including sisters at the Ramona Convent in Alhambra and caretakers at the Marlborough Preparatory School in Los Angeles, before shipping her back east for a year to live with his sister in the Catskills, and then on to Germany where she lived with Epping’s relations. During that period Dorothy discovered that she had a talent for the arts, in particular sculpture.
She then returned to Los Angeles and finished her secondary education, after which she was reunited with her original family and told the truth about the adoption. She went on to college at the Otis Art Institute in Los Angeles, the Corcoran School of Art in Washington, D.C. and the prestigious Academy of Fine Arts in Munich, Germany in the 1930s under the tutelage of Joseph Wackerle who, at that time, was the Third Reich Culture Senator and received praise from both Goebbels and Hitler. (She later recalled being stunned by the hypnotic pull Hitler had on an audience of one of his speech’s she attended.) In the meantime, Dorothy’s real mother, Christine, was instructed by her father to divorce her husband Fred, after which she met and married a vegetable cart vendor in Los Angeles, left her father’s oppressive rule, and began to rebuild her life and new family. But the tragedy of being forced to give up her first-born child haunted her the rest of her life. As the world changed and Christine saw how women became more empowered in the second half of the 20th century, she continually asked herself why she didn’t speak up and oppose the adoption.
Meanwhile, as Dorothy came of age she soon discovered that family law and the adoption courts were not the only worlds ruled by men. Her chosen profession of sculpture was a heavily male dominated one, so to be taken seriously she began using a truncated version of her first name Frances — Franc — and that gained her entrée into the German academy and subsequent galleries and museums (even now one can find references to “his” work). She later recalled that when the professors at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich found out “Franc” was a women, she had to listen to lectures from the hallways because only men were allowed inside. From the early 1930s through her death in 1983 — by which time it was acceptable for women to shape clay, wood, and stone with their hands — Franc Epping’s work was shown in numerous exhibits throughout the United States, including the prestigious Whitney Museum of American Art in New York City. One of her works, “The Man with a Hat,” even appeared in an episode of the original series of Star Trek. I know because I own that piece, along with many other sculptures of hers, which I inherited from my mother.
Franc Epping’s work, “The Man with a Hat,” appeared in an episode of the original series of Star Trek (The Original Series, Season 1, Dp. 24 A Taste of Armageddon, at 17 minutes, 25 seconds). That sculpture, along with many other Epping sculptures, were inherited by Michael Shermer from his mother. Franc Epping was the author’s Aunt.
You see, Franc Epping was my Aunt, her real mother Christine was my grandmother, and I am proud to be related to such a resilient and determined woman.12 Aunt Franc’s sculptures portray strong women with muscular features in empowering poses — allegories for what women for generations have had to rise to in order to gain the recognition and equality that is rightfully theirs. This book was written in the inspiring presence of those carved stones.
Figure 4: Sculptor Franc Epping, born Christine Roselyn Mutchler and given the adopted name Frances Dorothy Epping, started using the masculinized version of her adopted name — Franc — in order to be taken seriously in the male-dominated world of sculpture.
Figure 5: Among Franc Epping’s many sculptures are strong women with muscular features in empowering poses.13
About the Author Dr. Michael Shermer is the Founding Publisher of Skeptic magazine, the host of the Science Salon Podcast, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University where he teaches Skepticism 101. For 18 years he was a monthly columnist for Scientific American. He is the author of New York Times bestsellers Why People Believe Weird Things and The Believing Brain, Why Darwin Matters, The Science of Good and Evil, The Moral Arc, and Heavens on Earth. His new book is Giving the Devil His Due: Reflections of a Scientific Humanist.
References 1. Purvis, June. 2002. Emmeline Pankhurst: A Biography. London: Routledge. 354. 2. Ibid., 354. 3. Stevens, Doris. Edited by Carol O’Hare. Originally published 1920; 3 revised and edited 1995. Jailed for Freedom: American Women Win the Vote. Troutdale: New Sage Press. 18–19. 4. Source: Library of Congress. George Grantham Bain Collection. Original caption reads: Inez Milholland Boissevain, wearing white cape, seated on white horse at the National American Woman Suffrage Association parade, March 3, 1913, Washington, D.C. LC-DIG-ppmsc-00031 (digital file from original photograph) LC-USZ62-77359 http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/97510669/ 5. Ibid., 19. 6. Adams, Katherine H. and Michael L. Keene. 2007. Alice Paul and the American Suffrage Campaign. Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 206–208. 7. Ibid., 211. 8. http://www.tennessee.gov/tsla/exhibits/suffrage/beginning.htm 9. Ibid. 10. The Wikipedia entry for “Women’s Suffrage” has a complete list of every country and when they legalized the franchise for women: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage 11. “4-Sided Battle in Court for Child.” 1914. Los Angeles Times, October 31. 12. Most of this story has been carefully documented by Ann Marie Batesole, a private detective and my cousin — our grandmother was Christine, Aunt Fanci’s mother. 13. Source: Author’s collection.
On the 75th anniversary of nuclear weapons, Dr. Michael Shermer presents a moral case for their use in ending WWII and the deterrence of Great Power wars since, and a call to eventually eliminate them. This essay was excerpted, in part, from Michael Shermer‘s book, The Moral Arc, in the chapter on war.
Read the essay below, or listen to it being read by the author, Michael Shermer:
Listen to this essay being read by the author, Michael Shermer.
On August 6, 1945 the Little Boy gun-type uranium-235 bomb exploded with an energy equivalent of 16–18 kilotons of TNT, flattening 69 percent of Hiroshima’s buildings and killing an estimated 80,000 people and injuring another 70,000.
Three quarters of a century ago this summer, nuclear weapons altered our civilization forever. On July 16 the Trinity plutonium bomb detonated with the energy equivalent of 22 kilotons (22,000 metric tons) of TNT, sending a mushroom cloud 39,000 feet into the atmosphere. The explosion left a crater 76 meters wide filled with radioactive glass called trinitite (melted quartz grained sand). It could be heard as far away as El Paso, Texas. On August 6 the Little Boy gun-type uranium-235 bomb exploded with an energy equivalent of 16–18 kilotons of TNT, flattening 69 percent of Hiroshima’s buildings and killing an estimated 80,000 people and injuring another 70,000. On August 9 the Fat Man plutonium implosion-type bomb with the energy equivalence of 19-23 kilotons of TNT leveled around 44 percent of Nagasaki, killing an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people and severely wounding another 60,000.1
The aftermath of Little Boy
On August 9, 1945 the Fat Man plutonium implosion-type bomb with the energy equivalence of 19–23 kilotons of TNT leveled around 44 percent of Nagasaki, killing an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people and severely wounding another 60,000.
Before and aftermath of Nagasaki
Click image to view larger PDF. Had the Japanese military hardliners had their way to continue the war into the fall, Groves had three more bombs readied for September and another three for October. Here he instructs his Chief of Staff that the next bomb will be ready to drop on after August 24. Emperor Hirohito capitulated on August 15, thereby saving millions of lives of his citizens.
As documented in the memo below dated August 10, 1945, if the Japanese had not surrendered the head of the Manhattan Project, Major General Leslie R. Groves, had another Fat Man-type plutonium implosion bomb ready to go after August 24 that would have likely killed another 50,000 to 100,000 people.2 And had the Japanese military hardliners had their way to continue the war into the fall, Groves had three more bombs readied for September and another three for October. President Harry Truman was not exaggerating when he threatened Japan with “a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this Earth.” Truman did agonize about dropping more nukes on Japan, troubled as he was by the thought of more innocents and noncombatants being killed. He wrestled that decision away from the military. (Note Groves’ handwritten addendum to his memo that “It is not to be released on Japan without express authority from the President.” U.S. presidents have had sole authority to use nuclear weapons ever since.) However, further bombings proved unnecessary. On August 15 Emperor Hirohito, against the wishes of some of Japan’s military leaders, announced on the radio that Japan would capitulate. On September 2 they signed the surrender documents in Tokyo Bay, ending the Second World War.3
On this 75th anniversary of the summer of the bomb I want to make the case that their use was necessary to end the war, that their continued existence has acted as a deterrence against another Great Power war — but that we must eliminate them entirely for the long-term existence of our civilization and possibly our species.
Since 1945 a cadre of critics have proffered the claim that atomic bombs were unnecessary to bring about the end of World War II (or, at least, the Fat Man Nagasaki bomb was superfluous), and thus this act was immoral, illegal, or even a crime against humanity. Robert Oppenheimer and other physicists like Leo Szilard who worked on the Manhattan Project expressed reservations. “The physicists have known sin,” Oppenheimer opined. He went to Truman and confessed “Mr. President. I feel I have blood on my hands,” to which the President recalled “I told him the blood was on my hands — to let me worry about that.” Truman promptly dismissed Oppenheimer and told Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “I don’t want to see that son-of-a-bitch in this office ever again.”4
In 1946 the Federal Council of Churches issued a statement declaring, “As American Christians, we are deeply penitent for the irresponsible use already made of the atomic bomb. We are agreed that, whatever be one’s judgment of the war in principle, the surprise bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are morally indefensible.”5 In 1967 the linguist and contrarian politico Noam Chomsky called the two bombings “the most unspeakable crimes in history.”6
More recently, in his history of genocide titled Worse Than War, the historian Daniel Goldhagen opens his analysis by calling the U.S. President Harry Truman “a mass murderer” because in ordering the use of atomic weapons he “chose to snuff out the lives of approximately 300,000 men, women and children.” Goldhagen opines that “it is hard to understand how any rightthinking person could fail to call slaughtering unthreatening Japanese mass murder.”7 Goldhagen defines “genocide” broadly enough to equate it with “mass murder” (without ever defining what, exactly, that means). In morally equating Harry Truman with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Pol Pot, Goldhagen allows himself to be constrained by the categorical thinking that prevents one from discerning the different kinds, levels, and motives for large scale military violence. By this reasoning, nearly every act that kills a large number of people could be considered genocidal because there are only two categories — mass murder and non-mass murder.
By contrast, continuous thinking allows us to distinguish the differences between types of mass killings (some scholars define genocide as one-sided killing by armed people of unarmed people), their context (during a state war, civil war, ethnic cleansing), motivations (termination of hostilities or extermination of a people), and quantities (hundreds to millions) along a sliding scale. In 1946 the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin created the term genocide and defined it as “a conspiracy to exterminate national, religious or racial groups.”8 That same year the U.N. General Assembly defined genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups.”9 More recently, in 1994 the highly respected philosopher Steven Katz defined genocide as “the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group.”10
By these definitions, the dropping of Fat Man and Little Boy were not acts of genocide. The difference between Truman and the others is in the context and motivation of the act. In their genocidal actions against targeted people, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot had as their objective the total elimination of a group. The killing would only stop when every last pursued person was exterminated (or if the perpetrators were stopped or defeated). Truman’s goal in dropping the bombs was to end the war with Japan (which it did), not to eliminate the Japanese people (which it didn’t). That the U.S. provided considerable financial, personnel, and material support to help rebuild Japan into a world economic power puts the lie to the eliminationist accusation.11
The author’s father, Richard Shermer, in 1945, serving aboard the USS Wren.
More broadly morally, if we ground morality in the survival and flourishing of sentient beings,12 by that measure, then not only did Fat Man and Little Boy end the war and stop the killing, they saved lives — very probably millions of lives, both Japanese and American. My father Richard Shermer was possibly one such survivor. During the Second World War he served aboard the USS Wren (DD-568), a Fletcher-class destroyer assigned to protect aircraft carriers and other large capital ships from Japanese submarines and from Kamikaze planes on what was called antiaircraft radar picket watch. His ship was so attacked several times but sustained no major damage. The Wren was part of the larger fleet that was working its way toward Japan, escorting the carriers whose planes were bombarding the Japanese homeland in preparation for the planned invasion. My father told me that everyone onboard dreaded that day because they had heard of the horrific carnage resulting from the invasion of just two tiny islands held by the Japanese — Iwo Jima and Okinawa. If that was any indication of what was to come with a full-scale invasion, the contemplation of it was almost too much to bear.13
The USS Wren, a Navy destroyer deployed to protect aircraft carriers from suicidal Kamikaze pilots while their planes bombarded the Japanese homeland in preparation for the invasion that never came, thanks to Fat Man and Little Boy.
Click an image above to enlarge it. Four photos taken by Richard Shermer on board the USS Wren, pictured fore and aft, accompanying the aircraft carrier USS Lexington, and arriving in Tokyo Bay in late August, 1945 in preparation for the surrender ceremony on September 2, marking the end of the Second World War.
During the invasion of Iwo Jima there were approximately 26,000 American casualties that included 6,821 dead in the 36-day battle. How fiercely did the Japanese defend that little volcanic rock 700 miles from Japan? Of the 22,060 Japanese soldiers assigned to fight to the bitter end, only 216 survived.14 The subsequent battle for Okinawa, only 340 miles from the Japanese mainland, was fought even more ferociously, resulting in a staggering body count of 240,931 dead, including 77,166 Japanese soldiers, 14,009 American soldiers, plus an additional 149,193 Japanese civilians living on the island who either died fighting or committed suicide rather than let themselves be captured.15 With an estimated 2.3 million Japanese soldiers and 28 million Japanese civilian militia prepared to defend their island nation to the death,16 it was clear to all what an invasion of the Japanese mainland would entail.
It is from these cold hard facts that Truman’s advisors estimated that between 250,000 and one million American lives would be lost in an invasion of Japan.17 General Douglas MacArthur estimated that there could be a 22:1 ratio of Japanese to American deaths, which translates to a minimum death toll of 5.5 million Japanese.18 By comparison, cold though it may sound, the body count from both atomic bombs — about 200,000–300,000 total (Hiroshima: 90,000–166,000 deaths, Nagasaki: 60,000–80,000 deaths19) — was a bargain.
In any case, if Truman hadn’t ordered the bombs dropped, General Curtis LeMay and his fleet of B-29 bombers would have continued pummeling Tokyo and other Japanese cities into rubble. When asked to predict when the war would end based on his bombing program, LeMay said September 1, because that was when there would be nothing left of Japan to bomb. The death toll from conventional bombing would have been just as high as that produced by the two atomic bombs, if not higher. Previous mass bombing raids had produced Hiroshima-level death rates, and it is likely that more than just two cities would have been destroyed before the Japanese surrendered. Compare, for example, Little Boy’s energy equivalent of 16,000–19,000 tons of TNT to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey estimate that this was the equivalent of 220 B-29s carrying 1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive bombs, and 500 tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, with an equivalent number of casualties.20 In fact, on the night of March 9–10, 1945, 279 B-29s dropped 1,665 tons of bombs on Tokyo, leveling 15.8 square miles of the city, killing 88,000 people, injuring another 41,000, and leaving another million homeless.21
On the night of March 9–10, 1945, 279 B-29s dropped 1,665 tons of bombs on Tokyo, leveling 15.8 square miles of the city, killing 88,000 people, injuring another 41,000, and leaving another million homeless. This is the result.
These facts also help refute the claim that the alternative scenario of dropping an atomic bomb on an uninhabited island or bay to demonstrate its destructive force would have worked to convince the Japanese to surrender. Given that they refused to capitulate even after numerous cities were obliterated by conventional bombs and Hiroshima was erased from the map by an atomic bomb it seems unlikely this more benign strategy would have worked.22
On balance, then, dropping the atomic bombs was the least destructive of the options on the table. Although we wouldn’t want to call it a moral act, it was in the context of the time the least immoral act by the criteria of lives saved. That said, we should also recognize that the several hundred thousand killed is still a colossal loss of life. The fact that the invisible killer of radiation continued its effects long after the bombings should dissuade us from ever using such weapons again. Along that sliding scale of evil, in the context of one of the worst wars in human history that included the singularly destructive Holocaust of six million murdered, it was not, pace Chomsky, the most unspeakable crime in history — not even close — but it was an event in the annals of humanity never to be forgotten and, hopefully, never to be repeated.
When I was an undergraduate at Pepperdine University in 1974, the father of the hydrogen bomb — Edward Teller — spoke at our campus in conjunction with the awarding of an honorary doctorate. His message was that deterrence works. At the time I remember thinking — like so many politicos were saying — “yeah, but a single slip-up is all it takes.” Popular films such as Fail Safe and Dr. Strangelove reinforced the point. But the blunder never came (and the close calls were kept secret for decades). In the game theoretic strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), deterrence works because neither side has anything to gain by initiating a first strike against the other. The retaliatory capability of both is such that a first strike would most likely lead to the utter annihilation of both countries (along with much of the rest of the world). “It’s not mad!” proclaimed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. “Mutual Assured Destruction is the foundation of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have no military utility whatsoever, excepting only to deter one’s opponent from their use. Which means you should never, never, never initiate their use against a nuclear-equipped opponent. If you do, it’s suicide.”23
The logic of deterrence was first articulated in 1946 by the American military strategist Bernard Brodie in his appropriately titled book The Absolute Weapon, in which he noted the break in history that atomic weapons brought with their development: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other purpose.”24 As Dr. Strangelove explained in Stanley Kubrick’s classic Cold War film: “Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack.” Said enemy, of course, must know that you have at the ready such destructive devices, and that is why “The whole point of a doomsday machine is lost if you keep it a secret!”25
Dr. Strangelove was a black comedy that parodied MAD by showing what can happen when things go terribly wrong, in this case when General Jack D. Ripper becomes unhinged at the thought of “Communist infiltration, Communist indoctrination, Communist subversion, and the international Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids” and orders a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Given this unfortunate incident and knowing that the Russkis know about it and will therefore retaliate, General “Buck” Turgidson pleads with the president to go all out and launch a full first strike. “Mr. President, I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed, but I do say no more than ten to twenty million killed, tops, uh, depending on the breaks.”26
This isn’t far off real projected casualties (Kubrick was a student of Cold War strategy), as in 1957 Strategic Air Command (SAC) estimated that between 360 and 525 million casualties would be inflicted in the first week of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet block.27 In 1968 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave these figures for MAD to work: “In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of their population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent.” With a population of the time of about 128 million, this translates to 25–32 million dead.28 A 1979 report from the Office of Technology Assessment for the U.S. Congress, entitled The Effects of Nuclear War, estimated that 155 to 165 million Americans would die in an all-out Soviet first strike (unless people made use of existing shelters near their homes, reducing fatalities to 110–120 million). The population of the U.S. at the time was 225 million, so the estimated percent that would be killed ranged from 49 percent to 73 percent. Staggering.
Deterrence has worked so far — no nuclear weapon has been detonated in a conflict of any kind in 75 years — but it would be foolish to think of deterrence as a permanent solution.29 As long ago as 1795, in an essay titled Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant worked out what such deterrence ultimately leads to: “A war, therefore, which might cause the destruction of both parties at once … would permit the conclusion of a perpetual peace only upon the vast burial-ground of the human species.” (Kant’s book title came from an innkeeper’s30 sign featuring a cemetery — not the type of perpetual peace most of us strive for.) Deterrence acts as only a temporary solution to the Hobbesian temptation to strike first (also called the security dilemma in which a nation arming in defense triggers other nations to also arm in defense), allowing both Leviathans to go about their business in relative peace, settling for small proxy wars, which themselves have been in decline for decades.31
In the long run we need to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The risks of accidents or a deranged Dr. Strangelove-type character triggering a nuclear exchange is too high for a MAD deterrence strategy to be a permanent solution to the security dilemma it was invented to solve. Authors such as Richard Rhodes in his nuclear tetralogy (The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun, Arsenals of Folly, and The Twilight of the Bombs32), and Eric Schlosser in Command and Control,33 leave readers with vertigo knowing how many close calls there have been. To name but a few: the jettisoning of a Mark IV atomic bomb in British Columbia in 1950; the crash of a B-52 carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs in North Carolina; the Cuban Missile Crisis; the Able Archer 83 Exercise in Western Europe that the Soviets misread as the buildup to a nuclear strike against them; the Titan II Missile explosion in Damascus, Arkansas that narrowly avoided eradicating the entire city off the map; and Stanislav Petrov’s decision not to trigger a retaliatory strike against the U.S. based on reports from the Soviet early warning satellite system of incoming ballistic missiles. It is not for nothing that Petrov is known as “the man who saved the world.”34
Thus, in the long run we must get to Nuclear Zero, but in the short run there are so many hurdles that few think we are anywhere near such a lofty goal. In two episodes of my Science Salon podcast Fred Kaplan, the national security journalist and author of several books on nuclear weapons, and William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense under President Clinton and a staunch advocate for eliminating nuclear weapons, both told me that they did not think this could happen any time soon, even while their books outline how it could be done.35 In The Moral Arc I summarized the consensus by experts on the most important steps to take to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons and to work toward a world free of them, including: (1) enact a “no first use” policy, (2) take all weapons off of “launch on warning”; (3) increase the warning and decision times for launching a retaliatory strike; (4) remove from the President the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons; (5) uphold non-proliferation agreements; (6) widen the taboo from using nuclear weapons to owning them; (7) increase economic interdependence; (8) expand democratic governance; (9) reduce spending on nuclear weapons; and (10) continue the disarmament of existing nuclear weapons. To that end, it is encouraging to see the decline in the total number of nuclear warheads to around 16,000 from the peak of around 70,000 in 1986, as visualized in the figure below.36
Click image to enlarge. The decline in the total number of nuclear warheads to around 16,000 from the peak of around 70,000 in 1986.
I should note that some security scholars, along with many political theorists and leaders, think that the path to peace is more deterrence through more and better nuclear weapons. President Trump, for example, insists on renovating our aged nuclear weapons systems to the tune of $1.2 trillion between 2017 and 2046, an upgrade program37 he inherited from President Obama. And despite winning the Nobel Peace Prize for working toward nuclear nonproliferation, Obama nevertheless backed off from initiating a “no first use” policy under pressure from our NATO allies, who were worried that Russian saber rattling and border expansion might be encouraged if an escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons was no longer on the defense table.38
Similarly, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz thought that allowing Iran to go nuclear would bring stability to the Middle East because “in no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel’s nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced.”39 Except for when it doesn’t, as in the post-1991 period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unipolar dominance of the United States. No other medium-size power rose to fill the vacuum, no rising power started wars of conquest to consolidate more power, and the only other candidate, China, has remained war-free for almost four decades. Given Iran’s outlier status in the international system and their avowed promise to “wipe off the map” Israel, anyone who would join a Fair-Play-for-Nuclear-Iran-Committee has lost their moral compass.
This all just shows how difficult it is going to be to get to a world without nukes. Nevertheless, we have to try. One more statistic is sobering in this regard, as noted by the anti-nuclear scientist and activist David Barash: The U.S. has a triad of nuclear weapons: land (missiles), air (bombers) and sea (submarines). A single Trident sub carries 20 nuclear-tipped missiles, each one of which has eight independently targetable warheads of about 465 kilotons, or about 30 times the destructive power of Little Boy. So, one sub packs the equivalent of 4,800 Hiroshimas (20 x 8 x 30), and we have 18 Trident submarines, or the equivalent of 86,400 Hiroshimas!40 In the words of President Obama during a briefing about our nuclear capability: “Let’s stipulate that this is all insane.”41
The use of nuclear weapons for both ending wars and deterring them is a 20th century phenomenon that can be phased out for the new century. As the political scientist Christopher Fettweis notes in his book Dangerous Times?, despite the popularity of such intuitive notions as the “balance of power” — based on a small number of non-generalizable cases from the past that are in any case no longer applicable to the present — so-called “clashes of civilization” like the world wars of the 20th century are extremely unlikely to happen in the highly interdependent world of the 21st century. In fact, Fettweis shows, never in history has such a high percentage of the world’s population lived in peace. Conflicts of all forms have been steadily dropping since the early 1990s, and even terrorism can bring states together in international cooperation to combat a common enemy.42
The abolition of nuclear weapons is a complex and difficult puzzle that has been studied extensively by scholars and scientists for over half a century. The many problems and permutations of getting from here to there are legion, and there is no single sure-fire pathway to zero. Nevertheless, it is a soluble problem, and humans are nothing if not innovative problem solvers.43 I do not believe that the deterrence trap is one from which we can never extricate ourselves, and the remaining threats should direct us to work toward Nuclear Zero sooner rather than later. In the meantime, minimum is the best we can hope for given the complexities of international relations, but given enough time, as Shakespeare poetically observed…
Time’s glory is to calm contending kings,
To unmask falsehood and bring truth to light,
To stamp the seal of time in aged things,
To wake the morn and sentinel the night, …
To slay the tiger that doth live by slaughter, …
To cheer the ploughman with increased crops,
And waste huge stones with little water-drops.”44
About the Author Dr. Michael Shermer is the Founding Publisher of Skeptic magazine, the host of the Science Salon Podcast, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University where he teaches Skepticism 101. For 18 years he was a monthly columnist for Scientific American. He is the author of New York Times bestsellers Why People Believe Weird Things and The Believing Brain, Why Darwin Matters, The Science of Good and Evil, The Moral Arc, and Heavens on Earth. His new book is Giving the Devil His Due: Reflections of a Scientific Humanist.
References 1. Rhodes, Richard. 1986. The Making of the Atomic 1 Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2. The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, A Collection of Primary Sources. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162. George Washington University. https://bit.ly/2WMuDNM See also: “The Third Shot.” https://bit.ly/39eCTuW 3. DeNooyer, Rushmore. 2015. The Bomb. PBS documentary. https://to.pbs.org/3f2yyfw 4. Bird, Kai and Martin J. Sherwin. 2007. American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer. New York: Knopf, 332. 5. Quoted in: Marty, Martin E. 1996. Modern American Religion, Vol 3: Under God, Indivisible, 1941–1960. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 117. 6. Chomsky Noam. 1967. “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.” The New York Review of Books, 8(3). 7. Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 2009. Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity. New York: PublicAffairs, 1, 6. 8. Lemkin, Raphael. 1946. “Genocide.” American Scholar, 15(2), 227–230. 9. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(1): “The Crime of Genocide.” 10. Katz, Steven T. 1994. The Holocaust in Historical Perspective, Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press. 11. Kugler, Tadeusz, Kyung Kook Kang, Jacek Kugler, Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz, and John Thomas. 2013. “Demographic and Economic Consequences of Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly, March, 57(1), 1–12. 12. Shermer, Michael. 2015. The Moral Arc: How Science and Reason Lead Humanity to Truth, Justice, and Freedom. New York: Henry Holt, 11. 13. In 2002 I attended the reunion of the Wren crew in my father’s stead and confirmed his memories. 14. Toland, John. 1970. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936–1945. New York: Random House, 731. 15. “The Cornerstone of Peace — Number of Names Inscribed.” Kyushu-Okinawa Summit 2000: Okinawa G8 Summit Host Preparation Council, 2000. See also: Pike, John. 2010. “Battle of Okinawa.” Globalsecurity.org; Manchester, William. 1987. “The Bloodiest Battle of All.” The New York Times, June 14. 16. Giangreco, Dennis M. 2009. Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945–1947. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 121–124. 17. Giangreco, Dennis M. 1998. “Transcript of ‘Operation Downfall [U.S. Invasion of Japan]: US Plans and Japanese Counter-Measures. Beyond Bushido: Recent Work in Japanese Military History. https://bit.ly/2ZYCLwu See also: Maddox, Robert James. 1995. “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb.” American Heritage, 46(3). 18. Skates, John Ray. 2000. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. University of South Carolina Press, 79. 19. Putnam, Frank W. 1998. “The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Retrospect.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, May 12, 95(10), 5426–5431. 20. K’Olier, Franklin (Ed.) 1946. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Sum 20 mary Report (Pacific War). Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office. https://bit.ly/32TsOSL 21. Rhodes, 1984, op cit., 599. 22. Ibid. 23. Quoted in: Cold War: MAD 1960–1972. 1998. BBC Two Documentary. Transcript: https://bit.ly/2EimnyA. Film: https://bit.ly/2WVLsFX 24. Brodie, Bernard. 1946. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt Brace, 79. 25. Kubrick, Stanley. 1964. Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. Columbia Pictures. http://youtu.be/2yfXgu37iyI 26. Ibid. 27. Brown, Anthony Cave (Ed.). 1978. Dropshot: The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957. New York: Dial Press; Richelson, Jeffrey. 1986. “Population Targeting and US Strategic Doctrine.” In Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Eds.). Strategic Nuclear Targeting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 234–249. 28. McNamara, Robert S. 1969. “Report Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal year 1969-73 Defense Program, and 1969 Defense Budget, January 22, 1969.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11. 29. For a scholarly analysis of and an alternative view to deterrence see: Kugler, Jacek. 1984. “Terror Without Deterrence: Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Weapons.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(3), September, 470–506. 30. Kant, Immanuel. 1795. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Indianapolis: Hackett, I, 6. 31. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Penguin. 32. Rhodes, Richard. 2010. Twilight of the Bombs: Recent Challenges, New Dangers, and the Prospects of a World Without Nuclear Weapons. New York: Knopf. 33. Schlosser, Eric. 2013. Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety. New York: Penguin. 34. See the documentary film of that title. Trailer: https://bit.ly/2CVRuPJ 35. Science Salon podcast episode # 107 with Fred Kaplan and Science Salon podcast episode # 127 with William J. Perry were based on their new books: Kaplan, Fred. 2020. The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War. New York: Simon & Schuster; Perry, William J. and Tom Z. Collina. 2020. The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump. BenBella Books. 36. For a striking visual demonstration of every one of the 2,053 nuclear weapon explosions between 1945 and 1998 by the Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto, starting with the Trinity test in New Mexico, where in the world they happened and whom they were sponsored by, see: https://bit.ly/2D20l2o 37. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs report. Arms Control Association. August. https://bit.ly/3fQv0yk 38. The Nobel Prize committee’s statement on President Obama’s award: https://bit.ly/2WLWr4K Sonne, Paul, Gordon Lubold, and Carol E. Lee. 2016. “‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Proposal Assailed by U.S. Cabinet Officials, Allies.” Wall Street Journal, August 12. https://on.wsj.com/3hsKGYR 39. Waltz, Kenneth N. 2012. “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability.” Foreign Affairs, July/August. 40. Barash, David. 2018. “Deterrence and its Discontents.” Skeptic, Vol. 23, No. 2, https://bit.ly/2EikKkt 41. Quoted in Kaplan, op cit., 244. 42. Fettweis, Christopher. 2010. Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace. Georgetown University Press. 43. Lipton, Judith and David Barash. 2019. Strength Through Peace: How Demilitarization Led to Peace and Happiness in Costa Rica, and What the Rest of the World Can Learn From a Tiny, Tropical Nation. Oxford University Press. 44. Shakespeare, William. 1594. The Rape of Lucrece. Available at: https://bit.ly/2ByB5k4