NSI: Recent Episodes
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Speaker(s): Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University) Date: 21 November 2022 Speaker Session Summary Forthcoming! Speaker Session Recording Also forthcoming! Briefing Materials Biography: Dr. David R. Dorondo earned the degree of B.A. with honors in history from Armstrong State College in 1980 and the M.A. in German and European diplomatic history from the University of South […]
Speaker(s): Lockyer, A. (Macquarie University) Date: 17 November 2022 Speaker Session Summary Forthcoming! Speaker Session Recording Also forthcoming! Briefing Materials Biography: A/Prof. Adam Lockyer is an Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Macquarie University and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Sea Power Centre–Australia (the Royal Australian Navy’s think-tank). He held the 2015 Fulbright Scholarship in […]
Speaker: Bradley, J. (Plans and Policy Directorate, United States Strategic Command) Date: 1 November 2022 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Jennifer Bradley (Plans and Policy Directorate, United States Strategic Command) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. China is modernizing its nuclear forces which is routine for modern nuclear countries; however, […]
Speaker(s): Futter, A. (Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester, UK) Date: 8 September 2022 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Prof. Andrew J. Futter (Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester, UK) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. The world is undergoing an era of nuclear transition while the mechanisms […]
Speaker(s): Pettyjohn, S. (Senior Fellow & Director of the Defense Program, Center for a New American Security [CNAS]) Date: 26 July 2022 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn (Senior Fellow & Director of the Defense Program, Center for a New American Security [CNAS]) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker […]
Speaker(s): Black, M*. (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska Omaha; Director for Workforce Development and Education, National Counterterrorism, Innovation, Technology and Education (NCITE); Research Fellow, National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska; Co-Editor, Space and Defense Journal) Date: 26 April 202*2 Speaker Session Summary Forthcoming!
Speaker Session Recording
Briefing Materials Michelle Black BiographyDownload
Speaker(s): Lowther, A. (Director, Department of Multi-Domain Operations, Army Management Staff College) Date: 12 January 2022 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a panel discussion with Dr. Adam Lowther (Director, Department of Multi-Domain Operations, Army Management Staff College) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Speaker Series.
Russia’s and China’s status as near-peer nuclear competitors with the US is changing the reality of what a military conflict would look like. Dr. Lowther commented that the threat of being in a military competition with other nuclear capable countries poses new threats to US forces and their allies. It also forces US leadership to examine if their armed forces are ready to use and counter nuclear weapons, especially low-yield nuclear weapons. Dr. Lowther then discussed the effects of low-yield nuclear weapons, how Russia and China would likely use these weapons, and the potential solutions and responses by US and Western forces. He mentioned two theoretical scenarios: a) a Russian invasion of Baltic States and b) a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. These scenarios demonstrated how Russia and China could potentially use nuclear weapons in ways that they believed would not incur an all-out nuclear conflict.
In both scenarios, Russia and China detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon ahead of US or Western forces as a deterrent. Both nuclear strikes would occur in territory that Russia and China consider their own. This was done partially to avoid a nuclear counterstrike. Russia and China would theoretically detonate the weapon 600ft off the ground. An elevation of 600ft would allow US and NATO soldiers to see the blast but avoid serious injuries from about a mile away. This distance also allows Russia and China to contain radiation, thermal fluence, and overpressure from the detonation—all of which fall off sharply as the distance from the detonation site increases. Dr. Lowther commented that for the US to prepare for or dissuade a Russian or Chinese nuclear strike, the US should convince NATO to declare Russia as an adversary, improve Defense Communications Agency mission operational readiness to 24 hours, use weapons that fit the specific operation, and potentially turn a blind eye to Taiwan. Dr. Lowther emphasized that while these are potential options, they are not the best or easiest political or moral decisions, especially turning a blind eye to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Briefing Materials Lowther BiographyDownload
Speaker(s): Malkasian, C. (CNA) Date: 3 November 2021 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Session.
New academic studies focusing on multipolar nuclear deterrence are necessary to understand how posturing and brinksmanship by actors can deter a potential conflict or lead to impending nuclear disaster. Dr. Malkasian commented that methodologies used in war gaming exercises can be used to predict the outcome of real-world conflicts. However, these simulations tend to leave out some nuanced factors, such as the actual resolve and risk acceptance of individual leaders. For example, the risk acceptance and the brinksmanship of actors can result in unintended consequences and an escalation to military conflict. However, it was pointed out that traditional military conflict is unlikely to occur between two nuclear powers.
To avoid a conflict, actors must be careful not to cross tripwires, or actions that cross a metaphorical boundary constructed by their adversary and forces them to engage in a military conflict. State leaders may also be forced to commit an action because their constituents expect it. This is referred to as an audience cost. Also, states can commit actions that take varying degrees of effort or cost that send signals which either escalate or de-escalate a conflict. Guessing a leader’s true intentions is sometimes difficult. However, if they undertake an action which is costly, then they are rarely bluffing. These signals could be economic, political, or military actions. Dr. Malkasian concluded his presentation by suggesting the US should not avoid sending costly signals. This is because actions are the strongest drivers of both escalation and de-escalation of conflicts.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Briefing Materials Biography Malkasian 2021Download Malkasian Slides
Speaker(s): Lin, H. (Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation & Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution, Stanford University) Date: 27 October 2021 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Herb Lin (Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution & Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University), as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
As the frequency and prevalence of cyber-attacks continues to increase, defending against cyber-attacks continues to increase in importance, especially relating to nuclear security. Dr. Lin commented that maintaining strong cyber defense is important because individuals who are online are constantly under attack; however, most people do not realize they are threatened because the security measures for their computers is sufficient to defend their data. Furthermore, many times people do not realize an attack has been successful until the harmful code enacts its attack sequence. Even after this occurs, it is difficult to discern the intent or real impact of the cyber-attack. Therefore, protecting computers responsible for nuclear deterrence is crucial for national security.
Because cyber security does not automatically increase a systems ability to carry out its function, it is rarely given enough attention by software developers. Dr. Lin listed five scenarios where cyber security is crucial to protecting software responsible for monitoring nuclear weaponry and keeping the information environment clear for leaders and personnel. These scenarios are: a) cyberattacks vs espionage or intelligence gathering, b) cyberattacks on ambiguous targets, c) cyberattacks on US military supply chains, d) cyberattacks as a counterforce, and e) social media’s impact on nuclear deterrence. Cyberattacks can mimic enemy missile launches, send fake messages, disable machinery, or cloud the judgement of leaders by overwhelming them with information. Dr. Lin concluded that all personnel, leaders, and decision makers must learn how to interact in an increasingly noisy and chaotic digital realm.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Briefing Materials Herb Lin BiographyDownload
Speaker(s): Eisenstadt, M. (Kahn Fellow & Director of Military and Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Date: 30 September 2021 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Michael Eisenstadt (The Washington Institute), as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
Iran has been increasing its gray zone activities to compete geopolitically with the US and other rivals. Mr. Eisenstadt commented that states which are not content with the geopolitical status quo, like China, Russia, and Iran, will increase their gray zone activities. Ultimately, these states want to weaken US credibility and geopolitical influence by attacking it through cyber warfare, use of proxies, and other gray zone activities. For Iran, competing in the gray zone allows it to advance its anti-US geopolitical agenda while avoiding conventional warfare. However, Iran will engage in conventional warfare if it must. US conception of competition as either in war or peace, provides Iran—which views itself in a constant state of competition—with an advantage to incrementally weaken the US over time.
Iran continues to increase its gray zone capabilities. In the 1980s, Iran’s gray zone activities were mostly wars fought through proxy militias; however, Iran’s current gray zone activities include, but are not limited to: cyber-attacks, information operations, and the threat of long-range missiles. Also, by spacing out its actions in the gray zone, Iran is able to decrease the chances of retribution from the US. For the US to better compete with Iran, the US will need to change how it conceptualizes the gray zone and how it processes its actions within. Mr. Eisenstadt commented that the US must figure out how to better align its deterrence strategy with its actions, force Iran to operate along less effective means, and understand that competing in the gray zone is a long-term strategy and campaign.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Briefing Materials Eisenstadt Biography
Eisenstadt Slides
Speaker(s): Mehta, R. (University of Nebraska, Lincoln) Date: 12 May 2021 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session with Prof. Rupal Mehta (University of Nebraska–Lincoln) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
Prof. Mehta focused on her book project during her brief. The book’s overall thesis is that external pressure can be effective in counter-proliferation, and it examines what factors common among proliferating states can lead to the reversal of their nuclear programs. Prof. Mehta emphasized that there are certainly advantages for a country to pursuing proliferation, including the ability to 1) deter other countries from aggressive action, 2) encourage compliance from other actors, 3) strengthen alliances, and 4) promote political cooperation from other countries. The costs of pursuing a nuclear program, on the other hand, are 1) a loss of security, 2) negative effects on domestic politics, and 3) its heavy financial impact. External factors, Prof. Mehta stated, are the reason why most proliferation programs no longer exist, however.
One key takeaway from Prof. Mehta’s book project is that most countries will likely cease their nuclear proliferation efforts if it comes at the cost of another program that the country cares about more. Furthermore, Prof. Mehta noted that it is common for the US or other developed nations to notice a developing nation’s proliferation program and either initiate negotiations or levy sanctions to prompt that nation to cease its program. Military operations can also potentially dissuade countries from continuing to pursue proliferation programs. Finally, the ideology of the counterproliferation leader can impact the success of its efforts to halt the nuclear program of another nation. Positive incentives, in particular, have been used by these leaders in the past to deter proliferation.
Prof. Mehta concluded by stating that while her research shows that there are several avenues that a nation can take towards effective counterproliferation, all efforts may fail when presented with a unique case like that of North Korea.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Briefing Materials Rupal Mehta BiographyDownload
Speakers: Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University); other panelists TBA Date: 3 March 2021 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University), Dr. Arnold Dupuy (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)), Dr. Ion Iftimie (Central European University, Vienna, Austria), Dr. Daniel Nussbaum (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Naval Postgraduate School), and Mr. Paul Michael Wihbey (Georgetown University and Institute on the Geopolitics of Energy), as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
To kick off the panel, Dr. Dorondo emphasized that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is under construction and will run from Russia to Germany, will have deep impacts on Eastern Europe’s geopolitics. He stated that some regional experts believe that Germany’s political elections, scheduled to occur in 2021, may have an impact on the completion of the pipeline’s completion. However, Dr. Dorondo believes that Germany’s election cycle will not have a strong impact on the completion of the pipeline. He added that it is unlikely that the pipeline will be left unfinished, even if political parties who opposed to the pipeline gain additional seats. This is mostly because the political parties in Germany who oppose the pipeline oppose it for ecological reasons, and since Germany has suffered economically as of late, partially due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these economic reasons would likely outweigh the ecological ones.
Next, Dr. Iftimie expressed his fear that, if Russia becomes less reliant on Ukraine as an avenue for piping gas to Europe, Russia will escalate conflict in Ukraine by increasing support for pro-Russian separatists. NATO as a whole is especially interested in decreasing the potential for conflict in the Ukraine because Ukraine is considered one of NATO’s fronts against Russian aggression. Perceptions of the issues surrounding the pipeline are not universal among NATO member countries, however. The countries closer to the Russian border view the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a geopolitical and economic issue, while countries further from Russia view it as primarily just an economic issue, Dr. Iftimie explained.
Mr. Wihbey argued that Germany will become more receptive to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline because harsh winter conditions exposed weaknesses of solar, wind, and other forms of renewable energy—all of which Germany is trying to transition to over fossil fuels. He added that Germany will likely increase its reliance on Russian natural gas, not only because he thinks it will be reluctant to invest more in renewable energy, but because the gas it is receiving from Russia is inexpensive. Currently, over half of Germany’s natural gas is from Russia. Countries that could lessen Germany’s reliance on Russia—including Qatar—choose to send their gas to Eastern Asian countries because they can make a larger profit doing so. Therefore, all points to an eventual increase in German reliance on Russian natural gas, Mr. Wihbey explained.
Dr. Nussbaum deviated from the group’s discussion to highlight the the Naval Postgraduate School’s role in educating operators for the US Navy at the masters and PhD level. He stated that the Naval Postgraduate School educates, conducts research, and encourages outreach through research programs that focus on optimization and efficiency, critical energy infrastructure protection and resilience, renewables and emerging technologies, and awareness and behavioral changes. Dr. Nussbaum then returned to discussing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline by stating that, as discussed previously, the pipeline is a geopolitical issue that has changed as China became the world’s largest consumer of natural gas. He also argued that Russia is always looking for strategic depth and will look to use Europe’s dependence on Russian fuel to its advantage. Knowing where the strengths and weaknesses are within the pipeline is strategically crucial for both Russia and its European adversaries, he added. Dr. Nussbaum ended his presentation by recommending several books, including The Prize and The Quest by Daniel Yergin and Accidental Super Power and Absent Super Power by Peter Zeihan.
According to Dr. Dupuy, NATO has been concerned with the flow of critical energy since the Cold War ended. He stated that NATO’s past involvement in the Middle East was partly due to the role the region plays in providing most of NATO’s energy. To deal with its energy needs, NATO has developed two energy organizations: the Hybrid Threats and Energy Security Section and the Energy Security Center of Excellence. Dr. Dupuy also commented that the US perception of any Russian infrastructure in Europe as a direct threat is held by some of the US’s allies in NATO. However, NATO is currently more focused on oil than natural gas because oil has more military applications. Dr. Dupuy concluded the group’s presentation by stating that if NATO does not focus more on controlling natural gas, then it may wind up funding one of its largest threats in Russia.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
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Speaker: **Blankenship, B. (University of Miami)** Date: 9 December 2020 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, entitled “Protection’s Price: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in US Alliances.” The speaker was Dr. Brian Blankenship (University of Miami).
Dr. Blankenship began his presentation by discussing the conditions under which the United States is more or less likely to be successful in persuading its allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense. Concerns about burden-sharing in US alliances are not new; many US presidents have made this issue a priority. On the other hand, these efforts have had varying levels of success. In some cases, US policymakers have been successful in their attempts to encourage allies to spend more on defense, as in the case of Jimmy Carter and South Korean defense spending. By contrast, US pressure has been less successful in other cases. For example, Lyndon Johnson attempted to pressure Great Britain into maintaining its military presence in the Middle East, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. According to Dr. Blankenship, conventional wisdom demonstrated that burden-sharing is quite difficult to achieve in asymmetric alliances between great powers and their smaller allies. US troop presence is conducive to free-riding by allies. In other words, allies lack incentives when the US has such a dominant presence worldwide.
Dr. Blankenship then discussed some of the issues with this conventional wisdom. He stated that empirically, many cases don’t fit the conventional wisdom. For example, the French withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1966, despite being one of NATO’s largest members. Furthermore, smaller NATO allies, such as the Baltic states, have “punched above their weight” in terms of defense spending. More broadly, burden-sharing tends to rise and fall over time—something which existing literature doesn’t account for. Theoretically, weaker allies’ dependence on US protection provides the US with leverage on issues of burden-sharing. Furthermore, the presence of US troops does not necessarily discourage burden-sharing because they are often provided to allies who have the most need for them.
Next, Dr. Blankenship explained how burden-sharing is frequently the outcome of bargaining. Typically, he argues, burden-sharing in alliances tends to stem from fear of abandonment. The more allies that believe that the US has a credible threat of abandonment, and the more they actually need protection from the US, the more likely they will be to be susceptible to US pressure. A factor that enhances the credibility of US threat of abandonment is when the US faces pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments. Another factor that contributes to that credibility is when an ally is less strategically valuable to the US. Lastly, allies are most dependent on the US when their perception of external threat is elevated.
Dr. Blankenship came to three conclusions after conducting his research. First, allies tend to increase their military spending when the US faces domestic retrenchment pressure. Second, allies contiguous to a shared adversary by land spend more on defense, while those close to a maritime chokepoint spend less. Finally, US troop levels have no clear effect on allied military spending. An implication of these conclusions is that the US is not helpless in encouraging allied burden-sharing. Another general implication is that reassurance and burden-sharing are not always at odds. Lastly, the presence of an external threat is no guarantee of success.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
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Speaker: *Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University) Date: 27 October 2020* Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, featuring Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University).
Dr. Dorondo began his presentation by discussing the tumultuous time that nations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are experiencing, while highlighting the political evolutions occurring in the US, the EU, and NATO. In Germany, 2021 holds a number of important state elections and a national election in which a new chancellor will be elected. However, Dr. Dorondo argued that it is important to bear in mind that any doubt about nuclear sharing in Germany as we approach the 2021 electoral year is nothing new. That said, it is also imperative to consider the necessity for nuclear sharing in support of transatlantic cooperation. Germany and other Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) in NATO have a vested interest in what is sometimes called “nuclear decoupling” from the US. Theoretically speaking, the European states within NATO and the EU could achieve strategic autonomy logistically; however, there is not significant enough collective will to establish that strategic autonomy, Dr. Dorondo argued. He then stressed that the US and NATO must continue not only to deter but also assure and reassure in all domains.
Next, Dr. Dorondo highlighted a minor caveat regarding the definitional uses of the terms “extended deterrence” and “nuclear sharing.” The general definition of extended deterrence can be illustrated by the US’s pledge to provide nuclear security to its own CONUSand forward deployed (and controlled) nuclear forces for an ally’s defense. Nuclear sharing, definitionally, is exemplified by the US’s provision of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear allies for mutually agreed upon employment in extremis. Dr. Dorondo stated that there are overlapping characteristics between the two concepts and can therefore be used interchangeably. In other words, nuclear sharing is a form of extended deterrence. He then added that Germany has been involved as an integral element in NATO nuclear sharing since the 1950s. For instance, the German government has nominally committed to the purchase of F-18 Super Hornets to carry on the dual capable aircraft role of the German Air Force with regards to nuclear delivery systems.
Ambivalence and opposition to nuclear sharing in Germany is nothing new, Dr. Dorondo argued. For example, there was extreme unease over any German rearmament in the late 1940s. Furthermore, there was massive popular opposition to NATO’s “Two Track” deployment of Pershing II in the 1980s. Therefore, the opposition to nuclear sharing in 2021 will not be historically unprecedented. Dr. Dorondo then explained that the current fear of a renewed and uncontrolled arms race has been a political concern since the end of the Cold War. This presumably will be exacerbated by Russian disinformation in 2021, the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties, and uncertainty regarding the fate of New START. There are also two future domestic “wildcards” likely to be targeted by disinformation—conspiracy theories and COVID-19 effects—Dr. Dorondo added.
Despite the extensive historical presence of opposition to nuclear sharing in Germany, there are fundamental differences to the opposition today, both in Germany and in the US, that could affect the outcome of the German discussion on its participation in nuclear sharing. The predominant difference is COVID-19 and its impact on domestic and international politics. Another example is the fact that Chancellor Merkel will not be a candidate for chancellor in 2021. Therefore, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) faces a potentially disruptive leadership fight. With an array of extenuating factors, 2021 will likely prove to be significant in German nuclear sharing conversations, Dr. Dorondo concluded.
Speaker Session Recording Note 1: We experienced some technical difficulties during this speaker session, which caused our speaker’s slides to not appear from 2:02-9:26. To reference these initial slides, please download the deck linked below.
Note 2: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
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Speaker: Péczeli, A. (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) Date: 18 August 2020 Speaker Session Summary SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Péczeli first stated that the main role of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is for the current administration to assess the threat environment, outline nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next five to ten years, and align the country’s nuclear forces accordingly. She elaborated that, depending on the time and which administration was in office, the threats and challenges of the time and the scope of the NPR differ. Furthermore, the NPR is only the “tip of the iceberg” regarding US nuclear guidance because it is the only substantive document that individuals can access in the unclassified domain; the actual employment guidelines and operational capabilities behind US nuclear guidance are classified and much more complex. Dr. Péczeli proceeded to provide a brief history of each NPR to date. President Clinton’s NPR in 1994 focused on deterrence requirements in a post-Cold War period. She stated that the main threats the US faced at the time were conventional threats from the former Soviet Union, as well as Russian nuclear weapons in other countries. Dr. Péczeli claimed that a large accomplishment from this NPR that holds significance today is the extension of the 1992 nuclear testing moratorium and navigation guidelines regarding how to maintain a nuclear arsenal without conducting underground tests. President Bush’s NPR from 2001 was similar to Clinton’s in that it focused on employment decisions and deterrence needs. However, Dr. Péczeli emphasized that Bush’s NPR included all the components of effective deterrence, including nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defense, and infrastructure. Because there was no longer a bipolar system of threats to the US, the growing spectrum of contingency plans and the importance of arms control became pillars of this NPR. President Obama’s NPR from 2010 was extremely transparent and a true interagency review, as it kept allies involved and willing to buy in. Obama navigated the balance between the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and maintaining a secure and effective nuclear arsenal. Dr. Péczeli suggested that this NPR also laid some of the framework for President Trump’s NPR, as the threats emerging relied on strategic stability with Russia and China, two countries in which the US is competing with in 2018. Next, Dr. Péczeli outlined some of the main similarities between the NPRs, including a testing moratorium, deciding against a “no first use” policy, and continuing investments in the modernization of nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure. She also identified some of the primary differences between these policies, including the difference in transparency and interagency involvement, the formal and informal approaches to arms control, and the strategic stability vs. competition declaratory policies. To conclude, Dr. Péczeli stated that as the security environment changes to face different challenges, there have been many different approaches and shifts of focus, but there has also been also a great degree of continuity on three levels: declaratory policy, force structure, and operational policy.
Speaker Session Recording Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer, if you are in this position.
Download Dr. Péczeli’s Briefing Materials Dr. Péczeli’s briefing materials will not be made available on this website. Please refer to the event invitation for her biography and slides.